Since the 2024 cease-fire, Lebanon has repeatedly affirmed its desire for stability and peace. Yet, the south of Lebanon in general, and border areas in particular, continue to suffer under Israeli strikes and land incursions — even after ‘the truce.’ If those incidents underscore anything, it’s that the reality on the ground remains tense, and citizens in Lebanon view normalisation proposals as hypocritical in light of ongoing violence.
During a visit to Kfarkila and Aita al Shaab, two border towns close to Palestine (Israel), I saw nothing but rubble. Destroyed houses, lost dreams, and graffiti in Hebrew promising an Israeli return to take over the border towns. This statement on the wall was accompanied by other racist, colonial slurs against Lebanon, drawn on what remained of houses and shops, by the Israeli occupation forces during the 2024 war. The towns are now ‘protected’ by a small number of the Lebanese armed forces, with nothing but unarmored vehicles, an M-16, and a communication device they use to stay in contact with the command. These helpless soldiers are facing the Israeli military. One that’s equipped with the most technologically advanced weaponry, a thirst for occupation, and psychopathic urges that we’ve witnessed in Lebanon and Gaza in the past couple of years.
Lebanon has ‘no choice but to negotiate’
This week, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun has publicly declared that Lebanon “has no choice but to negotiate,” framing diplomacy as the preferable path over the repeated cycles of war and destruction. Similarly, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam recently stated that a lasting peace with Israel could — in theory — pave the way for economic ties and normalisation. But he also stressed that “we are far from being there” as long as security conditions and mutual trust remain unmet.
Earlier in 2025, U.S. envoy Morgan Ortagus announced that Washington would mediate efforts between Lebanon and Israel to “resolve outstanding issues.” Among the discussed items: disputed border villages along the Blue Line such as the Shebaa Farms and Kfarshouba hills, release of Lebanese detainees, and the fate of Israeli positions still held in southern Lebanon. This U.S.-led format — civilian delegations, ceasefire committees, economic cooperation — signals a push not just to halt conflict, but to institutionalise contact and possibly pave the way for normalisation under the guise of a ‘technical’ or ‘post-war reconstruction’ diplomacy.
Since the ceasefire, Israel and the United States have adopted a strategy of ‘coercive diplomacy.’ This means the use of force, or the threat of it, to pressure Lebanon to back down or accept certain conditions without the need to wage a full-scale war. In practice, the United States and Israel employ a functional division of roles to achieve this principle:
1. The Israeli part (kinetic pressure): Continuing military operations, exerting pressure on the ground, and threatening all-out war to create a reality that forces concessions.
2. The American part (strategic strangulation): Using economic, political, and diplomatic tools to pressure Lebanon, aiming to force it to accept Israeli conditions as a “less costly” option than continuing the war.
Lebanese official position is not treason because…
Despite these diplomatic moves, there is no public sign that Israel is ready to reciprocate Lebanese advances with meaningful steps toward peace. Israel continues to maintain military positions in southern Lebanon, carries out regular strikes, and has not provided any guarantees for withdrawal or long-term ceasefire compliance. As this article is being written, Israeli spy drones are flying over several Lebanese southern towns, as well as Beirut, while the warplanes have conducted two strikes, on a house and a resort, in the towns of Jbeih and Mahrouna. Nevertheless, the shift to civilian-led talks, rather than full peace negotiations, underscores that Israel appears more interested in managing tensions than resolving the underlying conflict.
By acting as the mediator and guarantor of the ceasefire, on the one hand the United States essentially facilitates the framework through which Lebanon engages Israel. On the other hand, Israel continues its violations with a clear green light from America — coupled with military, financial, and political support. The new ceasefire-monitoring committee, co-chaired by U.S. and UN envoys, includes Lebanese and Israeli civilian representatives. This dynamic raises the concern that Lebanon is entrusting its security and sovereignty to a process overseen (and heavily influenced) by a ‘third party’ that has historically backed Israeli military operations, and most recently in the Israeli genocide in Gaza and the war on Lebanon in the past two years.
No one in Lebanon should have weapons — except for Israel
The Lebanese government, backed by U.S. diplomatic pressure, is pushing for a state monopoly on weapons — in other words, disarmament of Hezbollah. In August 2025, a proposal was floated to convince Hezbollah to disarm in exchange for vague economic aid and security assurances. Yet, critics warn that Lebanon is moving toward disarming even though the Israeli threat remains. There is still no guarantee that Israel will respect the border, stop military strikes, or relinquish occupied areas. In effect, Lebanon may be disarming without receiving any credible proof of Israel’s good intentions, leaving the country defenceless should Israel resume attacks. This reminds us of what happened back in May 1983, when Israel was already occupying Lebanon and direct negotiations where on-going back then between both sides, which was followed a year later by an uprising that ended the security deal with Israel.
If things go the same as they did 42 years ago, it won’t be a surprise that Israel would directly demand the Lebanese military to search the south of Lebanon house by house — the Israeli narrative, after all, claims that southerners are hiding ballistic missiles in their houses. The Israeli military, or Mossad, could ask the Lebanese military intelligence to apprehend civilians under the accusation of being members of Hezbollah, similar to what used to happen during the time Israel occupied the south of Lebanon (1982-2000).
If 1983 is repeated, it is possible that there would be a repetition of 1984. Especially now that the Lebanese, particularly the southerners, have just gotten out of a horrific war and have a long bloody history with the Israeli occupational forces. As the Lebanese proverb goes: “the blood does not become water”.
Featured image provided by the author
This post was originally published on Canary.