The escape of noxious fumes from the premises of the pesticide factory operated by Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) and controlled by Union Carbide Corporation (UCC, a US-based multinational company, presently wholly owned by the Dow Chemical Company) on the night of December 2–3, 1984 exposed the people of the city of Bhopal to highly poisonous gases.

Bhopal, the capital of Madhya Pradesh in central India, was then inhabited by nearly 900,000 people. The leakage occurred due to exothermic reactions that set off within a partially buried stainless steel tank containing about 42 tonnes of an extremely volatile and highly toxic chemical called methyl isocyanate (MIC), which was stored in liquid form.

The equivalent of nearly 30 tonnes of MIC and its pyrolysis products reportedly escaped from the storage tank of the pesticide factory, which was located on the northwestern edge of Bhopal. Aided by a gentle breeze in the southeasterly direction, the burgeoning cloud of heavy lethal gases soon enveloped nearly 40 sq. km of the city, causing havoc in its wake before slowly dissipating in about two hours.

Impact on life systems

As exposure to MIC is extremely dangerous, the impact of the disaster was staggering on all life systems, including flora and fauna. Official sources estimated the immediate human death toll to be about 2,500, while according to other sources (Delhi Science Forum’s Report) the figure may have been at least twice as much.

A report of the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), India’s premier institution for medical research, titled Technical Report on Population-Based Long Term Epidemiological Studies (1985–94) (2004) had further noted as follows:

“Based on the mortality figures of the first four days, i.e., during December 3–6, 1984, the 36 wards [of Bhopal] were subdivided into severely, moderately and mildly affected areas.” (Para 5, p. 44)

In other words, 36 of the 56 municipal wards of Bhopal were officially declared as gas-affected— implying that nearly 600,000 of the then approximately 900,000 residents of the city were exposed to the toxic gases to some degree or the other.

As a result, the morbidity rate was also found to be very high. In December 1984, the morbidity rate in the severely affected wards of Bhopal was 98.99 percent; in the moderately affected wards it was 99.5 percent; and in the mildly affected wards, it was 99.54 percent. At the same time, in the control area (non-exposed area), the morbidity rate was merely 0.17 percent. (Table no. 31, p.76)

Mystery over antidote

Top managers of the UCC and the UCIL were very well aware that MIC is a highly poisonous chemical and that on thermal decomposition it could release equally deadly compounds such as carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide.

Therefore, Union Carbide officials and their agents systematically conducted a campaign of misinformation and disinformation regarding the probable chemical composition of the toxic emission from its Bhopal plant and the toxic effects of MIC and its poisonous derivatives on life systems and the environment.

Thus, as several activists on the ground have repeatedly pointed out, the trauma and travails faced by the gas victims were compounded by the chaos, indifference and directionlessness prevailing in matters relating to medical relief, rehabilitation, documentation and research. Since the UCC/UCIL had remained totally silent regarding the best possible antidote to MIC-related poisoning and had staunchly opposed the administration of sodium thiosulphate as an antidote, Dr Sriramachari, a leading ICMR scientist had later succinctly observed as follows:

“The moment the Bhopal gas disaster took place, the Union Carbide Company adopted a policy of suppressio vari and suggestio falsi [suppression of truth and suggesting falsehood]. Concerted efforts were made to spread the message of disinformation.” (p. 916)

Treatment subverted

Since the very first day of the disaster, autopsies performed by Dr Heersh Chandra and his team from the Medico-Legal Institute attached to the Mahatma Gandhi Medical College at Bhopal revealed characteristic ‘cherry red’ colour of the blood and internal viscera such as the lung and the brain, so there was a strong suspicion about the possibilities of death being caused by hydrogen cyanide (HCN) poisoning. [Figure 3.9, p.15 (2010)]

These observations were confirmed by the tests conducted Dr Max Daunderer, a German clinical toxicologist, who had arrived in Bhopal on December 4, 1984, to assist with the relief work.

Dr Daunderer was an expert in handling cyanide poisoning and he had suspected that many of the Bhopal victims may have been victims of acute cyanide poisoning and, therefore, had brought along with him to Bhopal several thousands of vials of sodium thiosulphate as an antidote to treat gas victims.

Dr Daunderer and Dr Chandra soon confirmed that intravenous injection of sodium thiosulphate solution to seriously injured gas victims led to the excretion in urine of high levels of thiocyanate resulting in detoxification of the body.

ICMR’s own observations in this regard are pertinent: “Soon the use of sodium thiosulphate (NaTS) injections as an antidote was not only postulated by the visiting German toxicologist, Dr Max Daunderer, but strongly advocated by Prof Heeresh Chandra.

“In fact, even the Union Carbide in its earlier message suggested that in case cyanide poisoning was suspected, NaTS injections could be given in the standard manner, i.e., along with sodium nitrite.

“However, for unknown reasons, very soon this message was withdrawn through the official channels (Mr Dasgupta and Dr Nagu), even though NaTS was not a harmful treatment… Dr Ishwar Das, then health secretary, government of Madhya Pradesh, was a witness to this miraculous therapy. Even then, at the government level, he did not support the treatment.” (Para 3, p. 69)

Vile ploy

There were definite motives behind raising objections to the use of sodium thiosulphate as an antidote for treating gas victims. Union Carbide was intent on denying the presence of hydrogen cyanide as one of the pyrolysis products of MIC because the calamitous impact of cyanide poisoning was well known to the public at large since World War II.

The UCC succeeded in its vile ploy with the aid of the pro-UCC lobby in the government (among whom reportedly were the then director of health services, Dr M.N. Nagu, and the then health secretary Dr Iswar Das, some senior doctors and, of course, their political bosses).

According to Dr N.R. Bandari (the then medical superintendent of the State-run Hamidia Hospital attached to Gandhi Medical College, Bhopal), as reported in the executive summary (p.5) of Krishna Murti Commission Report, July 1987: “UCC’s medical director initially supported mass administration of thiosulphate but, in another telex message three days later, forbade it.

The literal ban on the use of sodium thiosulphate was imposed despite “a highly level meeting convened by the director of health services in New Delhi on December 11, 1984, and attended by many experts from abroad and home recommending that blood of severely affected cases should be examined for the presence of cyanide and those found positive should be given injection of sodium thiosulphate.”

Even before the issuance of the said controversial circular by Dr M.N. Nagu on December 13, 1984 (which was in gross violation of the recommendations of the said high-level meeting convened by the directorate of health services on December 11, 1984), Dr Max Daunderer had been hastily deported from India at the behest of the UCC.

As a result, the gas victims were deprived of a timely and critical treatment that was readily available, which would have not only saved thousands of lives but also arrested aggravation of injuries. Such was the influence of the UCC and the pro-multinational corporation lobby over those at the helm of affairs in India from that time till now!

Nevertheless, Dr Sriramachai and a dedicated team of doctors from the ICMR did undertake a study to understand the efficacy of sodium thiosulphate therapy. In this regard, in his letter to the Supreme Court of India dated October 5, 1988 in his capacity as chairperson of the Supreme Court Committee that was appointed to look into medical relief and other matters relating to gas victims, Dr Sriramachari has disclosed as follows: “The ICMR undertook the first double blind study towards the end of January 1985.

“There was clear-cut statistically significant evidence that concomitant with clinical improvement there was marked elevation of urinary thiocyanate following the administration of sodium thiosulphate injections. These findings were statistically significant. This evidence constitutes the bedrock for the use of sodium thiosulphate and also a guideline for its subsequent use later as per the press release dated February 12, 1985.” (Para 26, p.87)

Despite irrefutable evidence that sodium thiosulphate therapy could provide substantial relief to gas victims, and despite the ICMR issuing specific guidelines through its notification dated February 12, 1985, the ICMR found itself helpless in countering the influence of the powerful pro-UCC and anti-sodium thiosulphate therapy lobby within the government.

Therefore, Dr Sriramachari could only meekly submit as follows: “There were persisting controversies in the medical circles to give or not to give the drug. Certainly, the ICMR can only lay down the guidelines but not impose itself to give or take injections.” (Para 28, p. 87)

Dr Sriramachari may have later regretted taking such a ridiculous stand! If the ICMR found the therapy to be effective, why did it not take a firm stand regarding its use?

Not only did the government of Madhya Pradesh fiercely desist from following the guidelines issued by the ICMR regarding sodium thiosulphate therapy but also the state government took punitive action against voluntary organisations (such as forcibly closing down the Jana Swasthya Kendra in Bhopal and arresting its volunteers including doctors on June 24, 1985) for daring to render sodium thiosulphate treatment and other medical aid to gas victims.

The extent to which the Union and state governments willingly succumbed to UCC’s pressure is just unbelievable!

Callous attitude

Production of MIC commenced at Bhopal in February 1980. On December 25, 1981, plant operator Mohammed Ashraf Khan died after being exposed four days earlier to a leak of phosgene gas (a highly toxic chemical used for producing MIC). On February 7, 1982, another phosgene gas leak caused 16 workers to struggle between life and death for several days.

Due to rising incidents of accidents, a ‘safety week’ was organised from April 14 to April 21, 1982 at the Bhopal plant during which at least 10 accidents were reported. Following the spate of accidents that had taken place previously, the UCC (US) was forced to send a team of safety experts to India to carry out an operational safety survey.

In their confidential report, the UCC team, which carried out the survey in May 1982, had warned that a leak could occur due to “equipment failure, operation problems or maintenance problems.

But UCC’s ‘safety survey’ team did not comment on the basic design defects of the safety systems that the UCC had installed at the Bhopal plant or question operational irregularities such as keeping the refrigeration unit shut off most of the time and operating it only intermittently during production of MIC and transfer of the same from the storage tank into the Sevin pot.

In fact, irrefutable evidence was provided by defence witness no. 8, T.R. Raghuraman, who deposed before the court of the chief judicial magistrate, Bhopal, on February 22, 2010 that it was on January 07, 1982 that Warren Woomer (from UCC, US), the then works manager at the UCIL, Bhopal, took the decision to shut off the refrigeration system and to operate it only intermittently.

According to the said witness, this was evident from the technical instruction note (document no. 37 dated January 12, 1982, exhibit no. 46), which the prosecution has submitted as evidence before the court of the chief judicial magistrate.

The said witness has also revealed that the UCC’s inspection team that prepared the operational safety survey report in May 1982 had not opposed this decision. Neither accused no. 5, J. Mukund, who succeeded Warren Woomer as works manager at the UCIL, Bhopal, nor any of the other accused officials of the UCIL did anything to reverse the shocking decision, which left huge quantities of MIC (85 tonne) in the storage tanks not at 0^o Celsius, as stipulated by UCC’s brochure, titled, Mythyl Isocyanate Manual (F-41443A) (July 1976), and UCIL’s operation safety manuals, but at ambient temperature, which always ranged between 15^o Celsius and 40^o Celsius.

Early warnings ignored

Two years before the disaster, Rajkumar Keswani, a Bhopal-based editor and publisher of a Hindi weekly titled Rapat, had sounded the earliest clear warning of an impending catastrophe in Bhopal.

In the lead article titled “Please Save This City”, which was published on September 17, 1982, Keswani tried to warn the residents of Bhopal of the imminent danger from the UCIL plant and about the possibility of a genocide being unleashed at Bhopal.

Two weeks later, on October 01, 1982, Keswani published yet another warning in the same weekly with the headline: “Bhopal You Are Sitting on the Mouth of a Volcano!”

But, because the UCIL had such pervasive influence in Bhopal at that time, very few people were willing to heed Keswani’s unequivocal warnings. Yet the alarm that Keswani had raised was timely.

On October 05, 1982, MIC did escape from a broken valve and seriously injured four workers. People living in nearby colonies also experienced a burning sensation in the eyes and had breathing trouble, because for the first time toxic gases had leaked into their homes. The residents ran away to save their lives and returned only after several hours, as reported in Nav Bharat, Bhopal, on October 7, 1982. Luckily, the leak was controlled in time before it caused further damage.

Soon after this incident, UCIL’s workers’ union printed hundreds of posters with the following warning: “Beware of fatal accidents. The lives of thousands of workers and citizens are in danger because of poisonous gas. A spurt of accidents in the factory; safety measures deficient.”

The posters were pasted in the residential areas near the UCIL plant. Keshwani too, in his weekly on October 08, 1982, again sounded an alert: “If you don’t understand, you all shall be wiped out.” These warnings were callously ignored by the authorities.

The rising sense of insecurity forced Shahnawaz Khan, a Bhopal-based lawyer, to serve a notice to the UCIL management on March 4, 1983, complaining about the danger that the UCIL plant posed to the lives of the workers at the plant, to the population living in the nearby areas and to the environment.

In his written reply dated March 29, 1983 to the notice sent by Shahnawaz Khan, UCIL’s works manager, J. Mukund, had made tall claims:

1.) That “all precautions are taken for the safety of persons working in the factory as also those living in the vicinity”; and

Despite making such self-righteous assertions, Mukund, who is accused no. 5, along with production manager, S.P. Chaudhary, accused no. 7, had the temerity to keep shut all three critical safety systems of the MIC unit at Bhopal.

They not only kept the refrigeration system shut at the peak of summer, but they also shut off the vent gas scrubber in October 1984 soon after the MIC unit had stopped production after 85 tonnes of highly toxic MIC were stored in the MIC storage tanks. Mukund and Chaudhary then ordered the dismantling of the flare tower for repairs.

These highly callous and criminally irresponsible steps were taken in deliberate violation of all prescribed safety norms for handling MIC. Although the under-designed safety systems— even if they were in working order— could not have prevented a disaster if the stored MIC had got highly contaminated, the refrigeration system— if it was in operation— would have considerably slowed down the reaction process, thereby providing ample time to the residents near the plant to escape to safety.

According to a report in the New York Times, January 28, 1985: “If the refrigeration unit had been operating, a senior official of the Indian company said, it would have taken as long as two days, rather than two hours, for the methyl isocyanate reaction to produce the conditions that caused the leak. This would have given plant personnel sufficient time to deal with the mishap and prevent most, if not all, loss of life, he said.”

Shutting off the refrigeration system was an unpardonable criminal act.