Has Egypt, a member of BRICS+, increased its trade with Israel despite the genocide?

Certainly, for example, Egypt is supplying increasing quantities of cement that enable Israel to develop its illegal settlements in occupied territories while systematically and massively destroying homes and infrastructure in Gaza and the West Bank. According to the website enterprise.news: “Egyptian cement exports to Israel skyrocketed by more than 16 times in 2024, reaching USD 66.2 million from just USD 3.8 million in 2023, according to the Export Council for Building Materials.”

Israel rose from 35^th place among importers Egyptian cement in 2022 to 4^th place in 2024, coinciding with Turkey’s decision in April-May 2024 to suspend its cement exports to Israel, [1] making Egypt its main alternative supplier. Egypt is complicit in genocide by helping Israel cope with sanctions imposed by Turkey.

Furthermore, Egypt imports gas sold by Israel. In June 2025, its government cracked down on protesters who had come from all over the world to try to reach the border with Israel to demand an end to the genocide and allow humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip.

It should also be noted that Egypt, as indicated in part 1 of this series, which receives $1.3 billion in military aid from Washington each year, cooperates militarily with Israel, particularly in the destruction of communication tunnels between its territory and Gaza.

Let us now turn to the role of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a full member of BRICS+, and Saudi Arabia, which has been asked to join.

Apart from the Emirati military intervention in the Socotra archipelago off the coast of Aden discussed in the first part, what other direct or indirect military interventions has the UAE carried out in the Arabian Peninsula?

In the Arabian Peninsula, for most of the 2010s, the United Arab Emirates (which is a full member of BRICS+) and Saudi Arabia (which has been invited by BRICS to join) remained close counter-revolutionary allies in their opposition to the popular movements of the “Arab Spring”. Together with Saudi Arabia, the UAE intervened militarily in the Kingdom of Bahrain to put an end to the strong popular protests in 2011 [2].

In Yemen, the UAE collaborated with Saudi Arabia from 2015 onwards to reinstate the regime that had been overthrown the previous year by a popular uprising. Gradually, the UAE pursued its own agenda separately from Saudi Arabia by attempting to establish control over part of Yemen’s coastline.

Are there any direct or indirect interventions by the UAE in armed conflicts in Africa?

In Libya, in 2019 and 2020, the UAE actively supported General Khalifa Haftar, a Libyan warlord, financially and with arms shipments after he launched an attack on Tripoli to overthrow the UN-backed government.

In Sudan, referring to Husam Mahjoub’s analysis cited above (see part 1 of this series), it can be argued that the UAE’s involvement over the past decade reflects its growing sub-imperialist tendencies, particularly in terms of regional dominance, economic exploitation and military intervention. Together with Saudi Arabia, they have recruited Sudanese soldiers from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to fight in the war in Yemen. The UAE provided financial support to Omar al-Bashir’s dictatorial regime in Khartoum until his ouster in April 2019 following mass protests that began in December 2018 (December Revolution).

After Omar al-Bashir’s fall, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt, encouraged a process that led to the formation of a transitional government, which failed to meet the aspirations of the Sudanese people. The three countries then undermined the civilian wing of the government, supporting military leaders with financial aid, military supplies and lobbying efforts to consolidate their power. The United Arab Emirates also pushed Sudan to normalise relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords [3], thereby aligning Sudan with the regional strategies pursued by the United Arab Emirates.

In October 2021, the three countries supported a military coup that further strengthened military rule in Sudan. As tensions escalated, the United Arab Emirates’ support shifted decisively towards the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), contributing to the outbreak of war on 15 April 2023, which has since developed into one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. The UAE has been a hub for RSF’s financing, logistics, media, public relations and political activities.

In Somalia, the UAE has funded, trained and equipped rebel forces for several years. Relations deteriorated in 2018 when Mogadishu seized Emirati funds, but the UAE subsequently restored its support, particularly to Puntland. See, for example: Washington Institute, “More Emirati Military Involvement in Somalia Could Help Curb al-Shabab,” published 27 June 2023. Read also: Husam Mahjoub, “The emerging sub-imperial role of the United Arab Emirates in Africa”, TNI, 4 February 2025.

In Eritrea, the UAE leased the port and airbase at Assab, transforming it into an important logistics hub for its military operations in Yemen (2015-2019). This initiative strengthened its presence in the Red Sea.

In Ethiopia, the UAE provided drones and support to Abiy Ahmed during the Tigray war (2020-2022), thereby contributing, according to some sources, to changing the dynamics of the battlefield against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

The UAE has evolved from being a commercial and financial hub in the Gulf to an active participant in African conflicts. From Libya and Sudan to Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Sahel, it uses a combination of weapons, drones, financial resources and mercenaries to influence outcomes. Their actions often exacerbate conflicts, strengthen authoritarian regimes, and undermine peace processes while presenting themselves on the international stage as a “guarantor of stability”.

How can we summarise the UAE’s intervention in the Arab region?

The United Arab Emirates has played a central role in suppressing democratic movements in the Arab world. It has opposed popular movements calling for greater social justice and supported authoritarian regimes. At the same time, they have pursued military and economic expansion, intervening in Yemen and Libya, establishing strategic bases and using their wealth to consolidate their regional influence. They have also supported forces opposed to the revolutions and collaborated with other counter-revolutionary powers (Israel, Saudi Arabia) to block any democratic transition and limit the rights of peoples to decide their own future.

The Emirates are a pillar of the counter-revolution in the region. While adopting a policy that corresponds to their interests as a rising regional power, they have prioritised despotic stability in the region and respect for the interests of US imperialism and Israel at the expense of democratic change and popular aspirations.

What is the United Arab Emirates doing among the BRICS+?

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) officially joined the BRICS in January 2024, alongside four other countries (Indonesia, Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia), as part of a historic expansion of the group.

The United Arab Emirates joined BRICS to increase its global influence. It remains an ally of the United States and Israel, and by joining BRICS, it gains importance on the international stage. For the UAE, joining BRICS expands investment and trade opportunities, particularly with China.

What is Donald Trump’s reaction to the UAE’s accession to BRICS?

We wait to see what pressure Donald Trump will apply to the UAE regarding its participation in BRICS. To date, there has been no direct public statement or testimony from Donald Trump specifically denouncing the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) membership of BRICS. While he has repeatedly made virulent comments against BRICS, no article, post or official speech mentions Trump specifically targeting the UAE’s membership (see the box on Trump’s statements about BRICS).

Why did the founding members of BRICS invite the UAE to join them?

To broaden their influence, the leaders of the BRICS founding countries considered it useful to include an oil and financial power that is also a traditional ally of the United States. For the same reason, they wanted Saudi Arabia to join.

What about Saudi Arabia, which was invited to join as a full member, and Turkey, which was invited as a partner?

It is justified to take into account the role of Saudi Arabia and Turkey, as both countries are sub-imperial powers in the region that have not yet decided whether to join the BRICS while maintaining close relations with them by participating in their summits. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attended the Kazan summit in October 2024, and Saudi Arabia was represented by its foreign minister at both the Kazan 2024 and Rio 2025 summits.

Saudi Arabia, ultimately did not confirm its membership after being invited to join the BRICS as a full member. It is likely that Saudi Arabia is increasing its leverage with Washington, which aims to prevent this significant oil reserve and financial power from also joining the heterogeneous coalition that Washington has designated as an enemy. Saudi Arabia has every interest in maintaining an ambiguous position and not joining BRICS+.

Turkey, which has also been invited by the BRICS to join without becoming a member, is also demonstrating its ability to play both sides. It occupies a geostrategic position in NATO and pursues a policy that is relatively autonomous from that of Washington, Moscow and the capitals of Western Europe. It defends its own interests in the region, but it knows that if it officially joined the BRICS+, this would greatly increase tensions with Washington. To demonstrate its autonomy and regain legitimacy among the Muslim population, Turkey is one of the few countries that has actually reduced its trade relations with Israel, while the BRICS+ countries, with the exception of Iran, are strengthening their trade with Israel.

What is the reaction of the BRICS+ to the unilateral acts of war by the United States and Israel against Iran?

In the final declaration of the Rio summit on 6 July 2025, the BRICS criticise the attacks against Iran in point 21 but do not name the United States and Israel as responsible for them. [4] While Iran, a member of BRICS+, is under military attack, the BRICS+ coalition is not taking any concrete measures to defend it, which indicates that they are on the defensive against the military offensive by Washington and Israel and are unable to adopt a strong common stance on the issue.

To clarify this situation, it is important to consider the pressure exerted by the UAE, which, while part of BRICS+, opposes Iran and supports its weakening, as well as regime change in Tehran. The UAE has every interest in ensuring that the BRICS countries do not take any initiative to defend Iran. Moreover, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have at various times helped Israel and the United States to prevent Iranian missiles from reaching their targets in Israel. For more information, see The Times of Israel, “Report: Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, provided intelligence on Iran attack”, published on 15 April 2024.

What is the BRICS+ reaction to the destruction of infrastructure and loss of life inflicted on the Houthis by the United States and Israel?

In the final declaration, the BRICS+ countries do not mention the attacks by the United States and Israel against the Houthis because, with the exception of Iran, they oppose Houthis’ actions that are taken in solidarity with the Palestinian people’s struggle. Indeed, these actions, which mainly target Israel and US interests, hamper BRICS trade with Israel and force them to divert a significant number of ships to avoid the region. The Houthis have attacked several ships carrying goods to or from Russia, India, and even China since early 2024. Read a fairly comprehensive study on the subject: Michael Knights, “A Draw Is a Win: The Houthis After One Year of War,” CTC Sentinel, October 2024, Volume 17, Issue 9.
Read about a Houthi action concerning Chinese interests, the attack on 19 July 2024 against the Pumba, a ship returning from Turkey and heading back to China.

The final declaration of the Rio Summit contains no criticism or mention of the military attacks carried out by the United States and Israel on Yemeni territory controlled by the Houthis. Yet these attacks have caused the deaths of many civilians.

It should be noted that, in the Kazan Declaration of October 2024, the BRICS leaders condemned, without naming them, the actions of the Houthis who attack ships tradingwith Israel. The BRICS stated:

“it is important to guarantee the rights and freedoms of navigation of all states’ ships in the Red Sea and the Bab Al-Mandab Strait”.

What is the BRICS+ position on Syria?

Regarding Syria, the final declaration of the BRICS+ summit, in point 29, welcomes the lifting of sanctions against the country. While the regime in Damascus, which was allied with Moscow and Tehran, was overthrown in December 2024 and Bashar al-Assad subsequently found refuge in Russia, the BRICS+ welcome the lifting of sanctions. The BRICS+ call on Israel to leave the Syrian territory it occupies, namely the Golan Heights. The statement makes no mention of the hundreds of air strikes carried out by Israel since December 2024. This statement also shows that BRICS+ does not wish to take a hard line against the neo-fascist regime in Israel. Without sanctions against Israel, how can Netanyahu’s government be forced to comply?What is the position of BRICS+ regarding Lebanon?

While Israel has systematically carried out deadly attacks in Lebanon and occupies part of the country’s territory, the BRICS+, in point 28, call on the Zionist state to respect the agreements made with the Lebanese government and ask it to withdraw its occupying troops. However, it’s important to note that the BRICS+ countries have not announced any concrete measures to try to force Israel to heed their call. It should be noted that the Lebanese government denounces the Israeli occupation.

What is the BRICS position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

Only points 22 and 35 address the war in Ukraine, and there is no condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Furthermore, there is no mention or condemnation of NATO. The Ukrainian army’s attacks on civilians in Russian territory (point 35) are condemned, but Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians are not. Yet this war has caused hundreds of thousands of deaths among Ukrainians and Russians.

Nor is there any announcement of a BRICS+ initiative to end the conflict, which allows Trump to present himself as the sole arbiter, the one who can bring about a ceasefire or lasting peace.

He is applying the same approach to the outcome of the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which were announced by Trump during a White House meeting in early August 2025 in the presence of leaders from both belligerent countries.

What is the BRICS+ position on NATO?

As mentioned above, the 2025 Rio final declaration makes no mention of or criticism of NATO. The same was true of the final declaration of the Kazan summit in October 2024.

What is the BRICS+ position on the armed conflict in Sudan?

The BRICS+ countries are calling for a ceasefire, but, as mentioned above, the United Arab Emirates supports the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which are playing a major role in the ongoing war and are responsible for large-scale crimes against humanity, as are the government forces they are fighting against5 .

Does the final declaration of July 2025 adopted by BRICS+ address other conflict regions?

The situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Great Lakes region is not addressed, as it is only briefly mentioned among other conflicts in point 31 of the declaration, alongside the conflicts in the Horn of Africa and Sudan (in which the UAE is involved).

The final declaration makes no mention whatsoever of the conflict between Pakistan and India (a prominent member of BRICS) over Kashmir, which reached a critical point in May 2025. This also allows Trump to claim to be the arbiter who put an end to the escalation of the conflict (a version contradicted by N. Modi). This is particularly noteworthy given that the Pakistani authorities are proposing him for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Neither is there any mention of the ongoing conflict in Myanmar between the military dictatorship (which has good relations with Beijing and Moscow) and the resistance, nor of the tensions in the South China Sea and over Taiwan.

A specific point in the declaration is devoted to the situation in Haiti, stating that “The current crisis requires a solution led by Haitians, which encompasses national dialogue and the search for consensus among local political forces, institutions and society.” This is not a bad thing.

What is the position of the BRICS+, on the Sahel Alliance (AES), which includes Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger?

There is no reference to the AES in the final declaration. There were no official representatives of the AES (which has existed since 2024) or its member countries among the official guests.

Conclusions

BRICS+ is a heterogeneous and contradictory coalition: while claiming to embody an alternative to the camp led by US imperialism and its domination over the peoples of the South, it maintains close relations with Israel and reactionary regimes. Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, allies of Washington and Tel Aviv, play a central role in this compromise. Faced with the genocide in Gaza and the wars (Yemen, Iran, Ukraine, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, Eastern Congo, etc.), the final declaration of the 2025 summit is limited to general appeals, without sanctions against Israel or any strong initiatives.

The agreement reveals the BRICS+ coalition’s unwillingness to take clear and decisive measures to weaken Netanyahu’s neo-fascist government, to end the genocide in Gaza and to put an end to the ongoing wars, even though several of them are actively involved in these wars, such as Russia and the UAE, which are carrying out attacks against their neighbours.

In practice, the BRICS+ coalition is largely allowing Trump to take the lead, as he presents himself as a peacemaker in conflicts such as India/Pakistan, DRC/Rwanda, Ukraine/Russia, and Armenia/Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, he aggressively pursues various offensive actions—including military operations and customs measures—and does not hesitate to use force while supporting Israel in its crimes.

Faced with this situation, priority must be given to independent action by the peoples and to the strongest and most massive mobilisations possible against the ongoing genocide of the Palestinian people and in solidarity with all victims of conflicts wherever they occur on the planet. It is also a question of mobilising internationally and locally against the rise of extreme right-wing and neo-fascist forces. The construction of an anti-imperialist, feminist, internationalist, ecologist and socialist alternative remains more necessary than ever.

In the following parts of the series, the author will discuss the position of the BRICS+ countries in relation to the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, ‘free’ trade, ‘free’ competition, etc. He will analyse the tools that the BRICS countries have equipped themselves with, such as the New Development Bank. He will discuss the position of the BRICS+ countries on the pound sterling and their position on environmental challenges.

The author would like to thank Omar Aziki, Patrick Bond, Sushovan Dhar, Jawad Moustakbal and Maxime Perriot for their proofreading and advice. The author is solely responsible for the opinions expressed in this text and any errors it may contain.

Footnotes