Bajaur is among Pakistan’s tribal districts that witnessed the greatest battle in the war on terror. In the days of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Al-Qaeda strongholds, it has seen military operations time and again over almost two decades. The campaigns like Operation Sherdil during 2008–2009 showed some fierce counterinsurgency fighting; Operation Sarbakaf in 2025 highlighted how militancy stayed but in a different form ever since it was nearly defeated. The occurrence of various successful and funded coercive instruments, however, did not automatically dissolve the insurgency in Pajaur, reflecting the difficult situation for the extremist institutions. The unfinished war develops the argument that counterterrorism in the region is not only a military challenge but also a struggle counted in politics and society.
Operation Sherdil: Breaking the TTP Stronghold
Operation Sherdil was launched in August 2008, illustrating one of Pakistan’s largest counterinsurgencies in FATA. About 8,000 plus troops of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps, supported by air power, marched into Bajaur Agency as an anticipating preemptive force to dislodge the established TTP. They had fortified the district as a headquarters from which to influence northeastern Afghanistan. By February 2009, the operation was declared a success, with approximately 1,800 estimated militants killed and some hundreds captured. Yet the cost was high in terms of lives of coalition forces, the lacerated civilian displacement, and infrastructure of the military bases. Still, the TTP retaliated with strikes, indicating the limitations of Sherdil to provide Bajaur long-term peace.
The TTP’s Enduring Threat
The TTP group was founded in 2007 under Baitullah Mehsud, quickly becoming among the most deadly militant groups in Pakistan. Unlike the Afghan Taliban, whose interest is in national control, the TTP is more inclined towards sectarian violence and used to stage regular bombings with frequent suicide bombings, particularly carried out against Shia Muslims and state institutions. For them, Al-Qaeda was a source of financial, logistical, and ideological sustenance. Over time, the group found its links to various cross-border sanctuaries between Afghanistan and Pakistan, being based in an underground shelter and sheltered in caves. In 2025, TTP had lost quite a bit but retained fighters, mostly resorting to having bases inside of Afghanistan. Pakistan formally blamed some Afghan intelligence elements and forces shaped by Afghanism [Urdu term افغانیت (Afghanīyat), which reflects the ideological mindset among certain Pashtun groups that only their interpretation of Islam and law should prevail — an outlook carried by both the Afghan Taliban and later the TTP] for the incursion and for not providing real assistance against TTP militancy. All the foregoing compels us to see why militant violence in Bajaur has resisted almost everything.
U.S. Military Assistance and Its Controversies
Fighting against terrorism in Bajaur has been broadened to get financial support for Throne of Dollars from the USA. The American government started granting millions of dollars for Pak Army equipment endowing the F-16, MI-17, night vision devices, and secure communication infrastructures. All of these things were like shooting adrenaline to Pak war machinery and let campaigns like Sherdil dominate the battlefield. This aid was highly controversial in its own way as critics raised questions on the effective use of this assistance and warned of weapons leakage to militant groups. After a consequence of the Taliban from Afghanistan in 2021, a public shift is seen from NATO-grade arms to TTP arsenals; this incident added fuel to suspicions concerning diversion and battlefield capture. This $7-billion figure, almost as commonplace in the media debates as is the perception that a good chunk of the money spent continued to indirectly aid insurgents, goes a long way to underline that support can equip the state but also foster political mistrust.
Civilian Toll of Bajaur
The tribal communities of Bajaur are among those that have suffered unimaginably over the years due to repeated military operations. Operation Sherdil left thousands of families homeless and destroyed the infrastructure: schools, bazaars, and clinics were destroyed. Operation Sarbakaf was supposed to somewhat rectify this situation by evacuating people into relief camps and providing medical services, but civilian casualties were still left to bear the brunt of displacement and trauma. The unending cycle of violence has eroded the trust of the masses in the state, which militants capitalise on. Local elders lament that development and governance promises are often abandoned once operations are declared over. This social aspect shows that military success alone cannot bring peace to Bajaur. Without education, jobs, and credible governance, the space for militant groups to recruit and regroup will remain. Thus, the war in Bajaur is as much about rebuilding lives as it is about annihilating the insurgents.
Evolution of Militancy 2009–2025
Militancy in Bajaur has changed so much with the passing of years. In 2009 TTP, foreign Uzbeks and Arab jihadists were controlling areas like Damdola and Khazai Ghar under commanders like Maulvi Faqir Mohammad), sitting pretty and openly boasting of their power. The victories of the Pakistani Army pulled them out of territories, but the fighters withdrew into the mountains where they regrouped under new banners. TTP, while internally fighting, allied with other factions like Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi; some factions tilted toward ISIS-K. By 2025, the insurgency had become less about holding territories and more about sporadic ambushes, assassinations, and recruitment drives. This evolution is a clear demonstration of the flexibility and adaptability of the militants, as they changed their mode of action from open warfare to clandestine insurgency. This explains why even after so many “victories”, Bajaur remains an unresolved security concern two decades onwards.
Conclusions
The trajectory of Bajaur has transformed from Operation Sherdil to Operation Sarbakaf, revealing transformations of Pakistan’s counterinsurgency strategies and an evolving resilience of militant networks. Sherdil’s heavy fighting in 2008-2009 reclaimed territory at a terrible cost to civilians, while Sarbakaf in 2025 sought to combine targeted strikes with humanitarian safeguards. Sustained by regional safe havens, ideological networks, and alleged external sponsorship, however, TTP’s persistence shows that this war is far from over. While U.S. massive military aid has given Pakistan leverage, it has opened the Pandora’s box of fears of leakage to insurgents and another complication to counterterrorism discourse. The Bajaur conflict ultimately points out that victory over militancy requires more than force; it requires prolonged governance, social rehab, and regional cooperation. Until these dimensions are aligned, Bajaur’s war remains unfinished, a reminder of how insurgencies live where politics and development cease.
The post Bajaur’s Unfinished War: From Operation Sherdil to Operation Sarbakaf first appeared on Dissident Voice.This post was originally published on Dissident Voice.