Author: Bhatt,M

  • March 7-8 (2023) protests in Tbilisi marked one of the milestones in Georgia’s recent history. Chanting “No to Russian Law,” tens of thousands of Georgians took to the streets in Tbilisi to stand and act against the first-reading adoption of the draft law on “Transparency of Foreign Influence,” which mirrored its Russian counterpart, intending to shrink space for civil society and jeopardise democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

    Backed by the ruling Georgian Dream party, the draft law required civil society organisations and media, that received more than 20% of their funds (financial or in-kind support) from abroad, to register as “Foreign Agents” with the Ministry of Justice. Full of vague concepts and insufficiently defined terms, the draft law imposed fines up to 25,000 Georgian Lari (around 9, 800 USD) in the event of non-compliance with its terms (Human Rights Watch, 2023; Parulava, 2023). The initiators of the draft law, which was adopted in first reading, also registered another version of the bill on “Registration of Foreign Agents,” extending its scope to individuals and increasing its penalties up to 5 years of imprisonment. Even though the initiators and  government attempted to deceive the public into believing that the sole goal of both bills was to ensure transparency of funds, it soon became evident that the proposed draft laws tacitly aimed to impose control and undue restrictions on independent groups that are at the forefront of securing human rights, democracy and the rule of law in the country.

    Protesters in Tbilisi holding up the flags of Georgia and the EU | Photo by Ilia Samurganidi

    Protesters in Tbilisi holding up the flags of Georgia and the EU | Photo by Ilia Samurganidi

    The event sparked a large-scale wave of protests throughout Georgia, especially in the country’s capital. United against the oppressive law, demonstrators showed the highest degree of resistance, unity, coordination and self-organisation, which eventually paid off. Even though the government attempted to disperse protesters with riot police, tear gas and water cannons, the crowd proved to be extremely resilient. Following 2 days of non-stop mass protests, the parliament was pressured to schedule an extraordinary session, where the government voted down the draft law on “Transparency of Foreign Influence” (Kincha, 2023). In addition, the second bill on “Registration of Foreign Agents” was withdrawn.

    The first-reading adoption of the draft law on “Transparency of Foreign Influence” has prompted not only internal but also strong external condemnation. The United Nations in Georgia (2023) expressed “profound concern,” stating that civil society organisations in the country have been taking a leading role in protecting human rights and supporting the most vulnerable communities. A high representative of the EU stressed the incompatibility of the draft law with  EU values and added that its final enactment would have “serious repercussions” on EU-Georgia relations (EEAS Press Team, 2023). In her open letter, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe , Dunja Mijatović,  pointed to the detrimental consequences of the proposed draft law on freedom of expression and association and urged the parliament to withdraw the law.

    Incompatibility of  “Foreign Agents” Law with Fundamental Human Rights

    The case law within the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) affirm that the “Foreign Agents” law conflicts with fundamental human rights. In the case of Ecodefence and Others v. Russia (2022), the ECHR found Russian law on “Foreign Agents,” which closely resembled the Georgian bills (1,2), in violation of Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, protecting freedom of assembly and association. The Court noted that the law is neither justified nor necessary in a democratic society, placing a “chilling effect” on the activities of civil society organisations (Eco Defence and Others v. Russia, 2022, para. 186). In the same vein, in the case of European Commission v. Hungary (2020), the CJEU held that the Hungarian law on the “Transparency of Organisations Receiving Foreign Funds” was contrary to the right to private life, protection of personal data and freedom of assembly and association. As a result, the Hungarian government was compelled to repeal the law (Hungary Today, 2021).

    Lessons Learned from Russian “Foreign Agents” Legislation

    Russia adopted its first “Foreign Agents” law in 2012, which took a toll on civil society organisations. By 2016, the government had designated 148 organisations as “Foreign Agents,” 27 of which, mostly those whose scope of work was centered on human rights, eventually ceased to exist (Amnesty International, 2016). Subsequent amendments widened the application of the law from registered civil society organisations to media, individuals and associations. In 2022, a new law entered into force that radically expanded Russia’s oppressive “Foreign Agents” legislation to virtually any entity or individual who, under “foreign influence,” pursues civil activism or is critical of Russian policies (Human Rights Watch, 2022). In the face of such an immensely hostile environment, many civil society organisations were shut down. In 2021 alone, 1,500 human rights defenders, activists and journalists fled the country (North Realities, 2021).

    Since the proposed Foreign Agents draft laws in Georgia echoed the spirit of the Russian laws, one could reasonably assume that Georgian civil society and the human rights situation in the country would have been subjected to the same oppressive, dictatorial and authoritarian rule as they are in Russia, should the Georgian government have not faced unbreakable public backlash.

    Concluding Discussion: The Power of Protests  and Active Civil Society

    March 7-8 (2023) protests in Georgia demonstrate that governments with authoritative tendencies often underestimate the power which lies with people when human rights and democratic values are endangered. The event has proved that the utilisation of the right to protest, which closely intersects with freedom of assembly, freedom of association and freedom of speech, is an indispensable tool to expose injustice, attract public support, generate and sustain political pressure and ultimately influence power structures’ decision-making processes. The resistance, high level of self-organisation and  scale of the protests compelled the government of Georgia to realise that civil society forms the very foundation of a public domain and participatory governance.

    In spite of the failure of the Georgian government to silence civil society, the hostile environment in the country towards civil society organisations, human rights defenders, media and activists is a systemic issue that cannot be eradicated with a single case of success. The proposal and/or enactment of Russian-styled oppressive laws is an extremely dangerous trend that requires high levels of scrutiny, vigilance and coordination from civil society and the larger public. This is particularly vital now, as Georgia is at the critical stage of its euro integration process – with 81% of Georgia’s population willing to join the EU (National Democracy Initiative, 2023), Georgia is expected to fulfill the recommendations given by the European Commission (2022) in order to obtain an EU candidate status. As human rights, democracy and the rule of law form an integral part of the Commission’s recommendations, the Georgian government shall acknowledge that any law, policy, or initiative that undermines these values will be met with high criticism and opposition from the public.

    Bibliography

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    Ecodefence and Others v. Russia, nos. 9988/13 and 60 others, European Court of Human Rights 2022. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-217751%22]}

    European External Action Service (EEAS) Press Team. (2023). Georgia: Statement by the High Representative on the adoption of the “foreign influence” law. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-statement-high-representative-adoption-%E2%80%9Cforeign-influence%E2%80%9D-law_en

    European Commission v. Hungary, C‑78/18, Court of Justice of the European Union 2020. https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=227569&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4209735

    European Commission. (2022). Opinion on the EU membership application by Georgia. Brussels. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/qanda_22_3800/QANDA_22_3800_EN.pdf

    Human Rights Watch. (2022). Russia: New Restrictions for ‘Foreign Agents’. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/01/russia-new-restrictions-foreign-agents

    Human Rights Watch. (2023). Georgia: ‘Foreign Agents’ Bill Tramples on Rights. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/07/georgia-foreign-agents-bill-tramples-rights

    Hungary Today. (2021). Government Revokes Controversial NGO Law. https://hungarytoday.hu/government-fidesz-orban-ngo-civil-org-law-foreign-funded-soros/

    Kincha, Sh. (2023). Georgian Dream formally kill foreign agent draft law. OC Media. https://oc-media.org/georgian-dream-kill-foreign-agent-draft-law/

    Mijatović, D. (2023). [Open letter to mr. Shalva Papuashvili, the Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia]. https://rm.coe.int/commhr-2023-5-letter-to-the-chairman-of-the-georgian-parliament-by-dun/1680aa5eba

    National Democracy Initiative. (2023). Taking Georgians’ pulse: Findings from December 2022 face to face survey. https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Georgia_December%202022%20poll_public%20version_ENG_vf.pdf

    United Nations in Georgia. (2023). Statement of the United Nations in Georgia on the draft Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence. https://www.undp.org/georgia/news/un-statement-on-draft-law-on-transparency-of-foreign-influence

    Parulava, D. (2023). ‘Over my dead body’: How Georgian protesters beat a Russian-style legal threat to their freedoms. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/georgia-protest-russia-bill-freedoms-tbilisi-nato-eu/

    This post was originally published on LSE Human Rights.

  • The burning of the Quran by the far-right politician, Rasmus Paludan, in Sweden on 21 January 2023 brought the debate about the limits of freedom of expression and the harm principle to the forefront. In this incident, Paludan’s choice of location was also noteworthy, as he chose to ignite the action before the Turkish Embassy, in a period when Sweden and Türkiye were negotiating the NATO membership of the Scandinavian nation. While Paludan has already recorded a notorious history of this kind of incident, the selection of location during the NATO negotiations refers to the fact that Paludan might have political motivations beyond his Islamophobic standpoint. Whereas it is still not clear how the incident would affect the negotiations, Sweden has already deepened its partnership via cooperation agreements with NATO in areas such as crisis management, counterterrorism and cybersecurity issues.

    The incident also is not the first Quran burning incident. Recently, the “International Day of Burning the Quran,” which the priest, Terry Jones, wanted to bring to life on 11 September 2010, was cancelled for the moment due to intense protests. Two years later, the authorities arrested his attempt to burn 3,000 Qurans in a public park, which was the crime scene, for carrying weapons without permission. Many European politicians and activists have emerged with systematic and continuous insults against the Quran. Dutch Geert Wilders, who made a political career out of Islamophobia, put forward the goal of banning the holy book of Muslims in 2016. Swedish Rasmus Paludan tried to carry out acts of burning the Quran in different public countries in 2020. Moreover, he had led off the Quran burning incident in 2022, leading to the arrest of 17 individuals.

    While burning any religious text is deeply offensive, it is essential to remember that freedom of expression is a fundamental human right enshrined in international law and is vital to any functioning democracy. This right includes the freedom to express unpopular, offensive, or even hateful ideas as long as this expression does not incite violence or hatred against specific individuals or groups. However, can the Quran burning incident be accepted as freedom of expression? It is vital to remember the harm principle for freedom of expression. In the case of hate speech or incitement to violence, for example, it is legitimate for states to restrict freedom of expression to protect individuals or groups from harm. This balancing act between freedom of expression and protecting vulnerable groups is one of the most complex and challenging issues in a modern democracy. In the case of the Quran burning, it is clear that the act is deeply offensive and hurtful to many Muslims worldwide. Because, for Muslims, the Quran is not just a book, but a sacred text that holds great spiritual and religious significance. It is a symbol of Muslims faith, and burning it is seen as an insult to Allah (God) and a desecration of Islam. Also for Muslims, burning the Quran is seen as an attack on the very essence of their faith. Furthermore, the act of burning the Quran can be accompanied by hateful and discriminatory language and actions towards Muslims, which compounds the hurt and offense felt by the Muslim community. It is a reminder of the discrimination and violence that many Muslims have faced throughout history and continue to face today. However, it is essential to consider the context in which this act occurred. The far-right group responsible for the burning is known for its extreme anti-Muslim views and has been involved in numerous incidents of hate speech and incitement to violence. For example, Danish far-right politician has been barred from the UK after threatening to burn a copy of the Quran in Wakefield. Also, far-right activists burned a Quran in the southern Swedish city of Malmo in 2020, sparking riots and unrest after more than 300 people gathered to protest. In this context, it is reasonable to argue that the burning of the Quran was not an innocent act of expression, but rather an intentional act of incitement to hatred and violence against Muslims.

    The incident in Sweden in January 2023 raises essential questions about the limits of freedom of expression and the harm principle. While freedom of expression is an important right, it should not be used to justify actions that cause harm to others, especially in the context of rising hate speech and incitement to violence against minority groups. It is only through a careful balancing of these principles that we can create a truly inclusive and democratic society. While free speech is an essential aspect of a democratic society, it should not be wielded as a shield to justify actions that harm others.

    The incident can also be seen as an example of the consequences of failing to balance these principles. If a person uses their freedom of expression to spread hate speech against a particular group, it can lead to discrimination and even violence against members of that group. This can create an atmosphere of fear and exclusion, undermining the principles of inclusivity and democracy. Therefore, it is important to ensure that freedom of expression is not used to justify harmful actions.

    Bibliography

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    Kulik, R. M. (2023, February 22). Islamophobia. Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved March 29, 2023, from https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islam.

    Baynes , C. & PA Media(2023, March 20). Danish far-right leader banned from UK over threat to burn quran in Wakefield. BBC News. Retrieved March 29, 2023, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-leeds-65020528.

    Bell, M. (2021). John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle and Free Speech: Expanding the Notion of Harm. Utilitas, 33(2), 162-179. doi:10.1017/S0953820820000229

    Van Mill, D. (2017, May 1). Freedom of speech. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved February 29, 2023, from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freedom-speech/#:~:text=2.1%20John%20Stuart%20Mill’s%20Harm%20Principle,-Given%20that%20Mill&text=Mill%20claims%20that%20the%20fullest,for%20the%20dignity%20of%20persons.

    Rankin, J. (2023, January 27). Burning of Qur’an in Stockholm funded by journalist with Kremlin ties. The Guardian. Retrieved February 29, 2023, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/27/burning-of-quran-in-stockholm-funded-by-journalist-with-kremlin-ties-sweden-nato-russia.

    Ejiofor, P. F. (2023). Decolonising Islamophobia. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1-30.

    Armstrong, K. (2023, January 21). Turkey condemns ‘vile’ sweden quran-burning protest. BBC News. Retrieved February 29, 2023, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64360528.

    Ozturk, B. (2023, January 25). The burning of the Quran: Why Sweden is headed for disaster. The burning of the quran: Why Sweden is headed for disaster. Retrieved February 29, 2023, from https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/the-burning-of-the-quran-why-sweden-is-headed-for-disaster-64810.

    TRT World and agencies. (2020, August 29). Riots in Sweden after Quran burning by far-right activists. Retrieved February 29, 2023, from https://www.trtworld.com/europe/riots-in-sweden-after-quran-burning-by-far-right-activists-39309.

    Khan, H. W., Fatima, M. F., Sheikh, M. K., & Ahmed, M. K. (2023). Hate Speech And Ridiculing Islam: An Overview In The Context Of Freedom Of Expression. Journal of Positive School Psychology, 1233-1250.

    Russell, L. (2010, July 31). Church plans quran-burning event. CNN. Retrieved February 29, 2023, from http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US/07/29/florida.burn.quran.day/index.html.

    Wikimedia Foundation. (2023, February 22). Dove World Outreach Center quran-burning controversy. Wikipedia. Retrieved March 29, 2023, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dove_World_Outreach_Center_Quran-burning_controversy#:~:text=In%202010%20Jones%20announced%20plans,International%20Burn%20a%20Quran%20Day%22.

    Al Jazeera. (2010, September 10). The cost of burning the Quran. Features | Al Jazeera. Retrieved February 29, 2023, from https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2010/9/10/the-cost-of-burning-the-quran.

    Cristaudo, W. (2023). Free Speech in a World of Diversity, Inclusion and Equity. The European Legacy, 1-8.

    This post was originally published on LSE Human Rights.

  • As climate change reshapes the way that societies interact with the natural world, the effects of rising concern and salience regarding this issue have allowed courts to increasingly become central actors in the relationship between climate law and human rights. Particularly influential in progressing human rights protections relating to climate issues are regional actors, including regional human rights courts and regional agreements on human rights. Take, for example, three significant cases from three different continents; 1) Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, 2) Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights (MFHR) v. Greece, and 3) Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd et al. These particular cases present variation in terms geography and jurisdiction, yet the decisions in these cases reflect how regional courts can play a central role in upholding human rights relating to environmental issues and represent three major rulings in regard to climate litigation with human rights claims.

    In Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, the Republic of Colombia requested in March, 2016 that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) provide an advisory opinion on the scope of states’ obligation of responsibility to protect against environmental harm. The IACHR recognized that there was an undeniable relationship between the protection of the environment and the realization of human rights, and that the right to a healthy environment is recognized under Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). The court also determined that “jurisdiction” as outlined in Article 1(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights can refer to state activities which cause harm outside of its borders, meaning that there is an obligation to protect against cross-border environmental harm. Significantly, this opinion by the IACHR established a scope of responsibility that regional observers had to both provide individuals the right to a healthy environment and that actions taken within state boundaries could not harm those outside of state boundaries either.

    In the case of Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights (MFHR) v. Greece, the Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights (MFHR) argued that Greece had violated rights to a clean environment by owning and overseeing coal mines and coal-fired power plants. The case was under the jurisdiction of the European Committee on Social Rights (ECSR) and the claim brought by MFHR pertained to Article 2 Section 4, Article 3 Section 1 and 2, and Article 11 of the European Social Charter (ESC) of 1961.

    The most important implication of this case was in relation to Article 11, which provides a right to protection of health. The MFHR had argued that Greece had failed to comply with its obligation to protect public health against air pollution, in accordance with Article 11§1 of the ESC. Specifically, the organisation cited that total suspended particle pollution levels had consistently risen above European Union and World Health Organization established limits and pollution and its effects on the health of individuals were a direct result of actions and omissions on the part of the Greek state. The ECSR ultimately ruled in favor of MFHR that the Greek state had violated Article 11, along with Articles 2 and 3, of the ESC. This ruling explicitly acknowledged the right to a healthy environment under the ESC, while leading Greece to subsequently introduce legislation phasing out lignite-fired plants and coal mines.

    Finally, in Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd et al., Gbemre, representing the Niger Delta Iwherekan community, brought suit against the Nigerian government in the Federal Court of Nigeria, arguing that gas flaring caused by oil extraction operated through the company Shell had violated Sections 33 and 34 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, as well as Articles 4, 16, and 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR). Sections 33 and 34 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution guarantee every person a right to life and respect for the dignity of their person, respectively. Article 4, 16, 24 of the ACHPR guarantees a right to life, a right to health, and a right to a satisfactory environment. The Federal High Court ruled in favor of Gbemre in November, 2005, supporting that the allowance of gas flaring activities was inconsistent with rights under the ACHPR, as well as the Nigerian Constitution.

    These three cases illuminate the particular influence that regional actors have had in shaping the trajectory of human rights protections through climate litigation. While these cases only represent a small portion of all cases brought before courts regarding human rights claims in climate litigation, they provide significant insight into the role of regional courts in upholding human rights. We can observe across different geographic contexts, namely South America, Europe, and Africa, that regional courts and human rights charters can serve as pathways for the protection of human rights regarding a healthy environment and protection against climate change. Within these cases, specificity of the claim focused on actions which are currently causing harm have also been shown to be particularly important. State support for environmental activities, such as mining and oil extraction, which extensively harm the environmental well-being of individuals has been curtailed by regional litigation.

    Accounting for the influence of regional litigation in shaping climate litigation with human rights claims, future observation of developments in climate litigation should pay particular attention to regional courts and regional human rights agreements in judicial decisions. This is important, as there are climate cases with human rights claims currently pending decision in regional courts. For example, two significant cases have been filed in the European Court of Human Rights. The first is De Conto vs. Italy and 32 Other States and the second is Uricchio vs. Italy and 32 Other States. Both suits have been filed by young applicants in Italy, and rely on Articles 2, 8, 13 and 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights, contending that observer states to the convention have not taken sufficient action to protect the environment and address climate change, and that this inaction violates their rights. The decisions made in these cases will present significant information regarding interpretations of state obligations to climate-related issues under regional agreements, heard before a regional court. As instances of climate litigation with human rights claims increase, these regional actors will likely be increasingly integral in shaping the trajectory of rights protections relating to climate law.

    Bibliography

    African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Available at https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=49

    Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Available at https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ng/ng014en.pdf

    Corte InterAmericana de Derechos Humanos, Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17 (Advisory Opinion OC-23/17) de 15 de Noviembre de 2017, Solicitada por la República de Colombia, Medio Ambiente y Derechos Humanos, Obligaciones Estatales en Relación con el Medio Ambiente en el Marco de la Protección y Garantía de los Derechos a la vida y a la  Integridad Personal – Interpretación y Alcance de los Artículos 4.1 y 5.1, en Relación con los Artículos 1.1 y 2 de la Convención Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos

    Frédéric Simon and Theodore Karaoulanis, “Greece confirms last coal plant will be shut in 2025”, euractive.com, (2021), Available at https://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-environment/news/greece-confirms-last-coal-plant-will-be-shut-in-2025/

    Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd et al. (2005) AHRLR 151 (NgHC 2005)

    Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights (MFHR) v. Greece, Complaint No. 30/2005

  • The Education-Migration Nexus

    Humans have always been on the move. The UN International Organization for Migration (IOM) conceptualises a migrant as a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. Some people migrate in search of work, economic opportunities, to join family, or to study. Others migrate to escape conflict, persecution, terrorism and/or human rights violations. Migration can also occur in response to the harmful effects of climate change, natural disasters and/or other environmental factors. Children migrate accompanied or unaccompanied, according to UNESCO’s 2013 Report on Social Inclusion of Internal Migrants, which estimated that there were 15 million seasonal migrant children in India who encounter many obstacles, including a limited access to education, amongst many others. Although education is undeniably one of the foundations of children’s well-being, child migrants often suffer from the lack of it.

    India, being a diverse nation, has witnessed successive waves of migration, resulting in an increasing number of children and adolescents. Internal migration in this country has significantly surged due to population pressure and scarcity of resources. As per the latest Census conducted in 2011, the count of domestic migrants in India stood at 450 million. Across India, 20% of internal migrants were children in 2011, i.e., 92.95 million, according to UNICEF. Hence, the exodus of child migrants was notably higher than the growth of the children population during the same period, i.e., 18.5% between 1991-2001 and 6.3% between 2001-2011. Since then, there is a lack of current information regarding migrant children. In 2021, the Supreme Court urged India’s governments to furnish details about migrant children. Nevertheless, there has been negligible advancement since then, and the issue remains unresolved. Based on the Economic and Political Weekly (2022), migration discussions often overlook children from migrant families in India with low income. The lives of children were under greater vulnerability of missing out on the most developmental aspect, i.e., education. Studies indicate that migrant children in India between the age group of 6-18-years-old are more exposed to child labour, child trafficking and ceased educational opportunities. Around 22.1% of migrant children in this age were not enrolled in any educational institution in 2011.

    Addressing Unequal Access to Education for Migrant Children in India

    In 2015, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. Sustainable Development Goal 4 (SDG 4) is aimed at addressing the global education crisis, which affects millions of children and young people around the world who do not have access to quality education. SDG 4 has several targets, including the following: (1) ensuring that all girls and boys have access to quality early childhood development, care and pre-primary education; (2) ensuring that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education (3) increasing the number of adults who have relevant skills for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship and (4) securing equal access to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education. SDG 4 also aims to eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access for all, including people with disabilities, indigenous peoples and refugees. Achieving SDG 4 is critical for migrant children’s access to education, as it is a fundamental human right and a key driver of economic growth, social development and environmental sustainability.

    In the past five years, India has provided an array of solutions for migrant children. The enactment of the Right to Education Act of 2009 (RTE), passed by the Indian Parliament in 2009 and came into force on April 1, 2010, provides for free and compulsory education for all children between the ages of 6 and 14-years-old. The RTE Act mandates that every child in this age group has the right to education in a neighbourhood school and prohibits discrimination on the grounds of gender, caste, religion and disability. The RTE Act has been instrumental in expanding access to education in India and improving the quality of education in government schools. However, there are still several challenges in its implementation, including inadequate infrastructure, shortage of teachers and a lack of monitoring and accountability. Moreover, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) and Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) are two major government initiatives in India that promote education and child development, particularly for marginalised and vulnerable populations, including migrant children. Under Poshan 2.0, the government is currently prioritizing the provision of Anganwadi services to all, including migrant families, meaning the arrangement of a network of centers for the holistic development of children. For instance, SSA has developed special modules on migration and education, providing training to teachers and education administrators on addressing the needs of migrant children in the country. Overall, SSA and ICDS are crucial in ensuring that migrant children have access to education and development opportunities, significantly contributing to improving the education outcomes of migrant children in India.

    Challenges in Delivering Education to Migrant Children in India

    Despite the attention conveyed to the issue, the education of migrant children in India remains a very difficult issue of paramount importance to India’s development. It is compromised due to several reasons, such as the frequent mobilities, socio-economic backgrounds and several exclusionary school experiences of these children. Indeed, children are subjected to hazardous travel between villages and work sites. India Today writes that the villages of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh to Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat and Delhi, which are mostly migration hubs, migrant children are not accepted in schools or the larger community, and are constantly viewed as outsiders. Consequently, according to the Global Monitoring Report, 80% of children of seasonal workers in India do not have access to education. Furthermore, because of the nature of their parents’ labour patterns, these children are difficult to trace and are, therefore, easily left out of the standard systemic interventions of the education system. Children often end up dropping out of school or struggle with learning gaps due to prolonged absence, which ultimately affects children’s psychosocial and cognitive abilities, depriving them from having a correct exposure to socialisation. Migrant children lose the protection of their social networks back home and their well-being is often sidelined as they migrate. As a matter of fact, rooted away from their homes and villages, the first thing that migrants lose is their identity as citizens and all of their basic entitlements, including access to schooling facilities, free services in public health centres. They are also prevented from participating in panchayat (village council) activities, and are sometimes unable to cast their vote or participate in the census, as these usually take place during the first half of the year and coincide with the migration period.

    Cultural differences and language barriers become a disadvantage for migrant children, hindering their educational attainment. Ernst Georg Ravenstein’s laws on migration (1885) deals with the impact of rural-urban labour migration on the education of children. As migration has wide-ranging impacts on children whether they are left behind by one or both migrating parents, move with their parents, are born abroad, or migrate alone, the educational performance of children is highly compromised when migrating. Due to this process, many children suffer from depression, abandonment, low self-esteem and several behavioural disorders due to the unavailability of education (Virupaksha et al., 2014). There is a dire need to focus on and develop a mixed-methods research agenda, referring to the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods for child migration to understand their plight in a better way and provide solutions. Hence, there is a need to make a regular assessment of the number of child migrants in India in order for them to be protected from any form of vulnerability, such as kidnapping, trafficking, etc. Eventually, we would think that research, policy and advocacy efforts undertaken on behalf of migrant children in India would help in raising awareness on the issue concerning their access to education.

    Nevertheless, these have commonly focused on those living in situations that are dangerous, abusive and/or exploitative, either inherently or because of their young age. They are often represented as passive victims of these crimes, perpetuating this idea of the innocent and at-risk child who can be easily instrumentalized. In consequence, they start to reflect dominant notions of trauma and victimhood. It would be a matter of investigating the issue with children rather than on them.

    Conclusion 

    Migrant children are deprived of education, which is a major threat to their social well-being. The conditions under which mobility takes place are often unsafe and risky,  putting migrant children, especially unaccompanied and separated children, at an exponential risk of economic or sexual exploitation, abuse, neglect and/or violence as well as being prevented from education. Policy responses to protect and support migrant children are often limited. While children on the move have become a recognised part of today’s global and mixed migration flows, they are still largely discreet in debates on migration, child protection and empowerment. It is necessary to identify mechanisms on how to enhance migrant childrens’ capabilities by providing a better quality of education and preventing them from every form of exploitation, inequalities, discrimination and/or marginalisation.

    The effects of migration on children are diverse, and there are numerous concerns that require attention. It’s crucial to support the families of migrant workers who live and work in precarious conditions. To ensure the well-being of their children, policy perspectives must be re-evaluated and a greater emphasis must be placed on policy implementation. Despite the availability of educational opportunities, many migrant children do not pursue formal education, making it necessary to consider the overall social well-being of these families, including their living conditions, in order to empower their children. Policies aimed at improving educational conditions of migrant children migrants must be tailored to their special needs. Unfortunately, migrant children are somehow ignored in the educational attainment process, for sometimes migration is inevitable and an important process to develop India.

    References

    Crépeau, F. (2013). Children on the Move. Switzerland: International Organization for Migration (IOM)

    Desk, I. T. W. (2018, December 11). How seasonal migration of Indians is destroying educational opportunities for children. India Today. Retrieved June 24, 2022, from https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/featurephilia/story/how-seasonal-migration-of-i ndians-is-destroying-educational-opportunities-for-children-1406369-2018-12-11

    Ensor, Marisa & Gozdziak, Elzbieta. (2010). Migrant Children: At the Crossroads of Vulnerability and Resiliency. Palgrave MacMillan

    Pandey, P. (2022). Always on the move: The troubling landscape of the right to education for migrant children in India. [Online] Times of India Blog. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/voices/always-on-the-move-the-troubling-lands cape-of-the-right-to-education-for-migrant-children-in-india/

    Peddie, F. and Liu, J. (2021) Education and Migration in an Asian Context. Germany: Springer Singapore

    Tumbe, C. (2018). India Moving: A History of Migration. India: Penguin Random House India Private Limited

    United Nations. (n.d.). Migration. United Nations. Retrieved June 24, 2022, from https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/migration

    Virupaksha, H. G., Kumar, A., & Nirmala, B. P. (2014, July). Migration and Mental Health: An Interface. Journal of natural science, biology, and medicine. Retrieved March 16, 2023, from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4121889/

    Understanding child migration in India – unicef.org. (2020). Retrieved March 20, 2023, from https://www.unicef.org/india/media/3416/file

    What is right to education act (RTE act)? Times of India Blog. (2021, May 15). Retrieved March 18, 2023, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/readersblog/igoravsharma/what-is-right-to-education-a ct-rte-act-32034/

    Internal migration in India grows, but inter-state movements remain low. World Bank Blogs. (2019). Retrieved March 18, 2023, from https://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/internal-migration-india-grows-inter-state-movements-remain-low#%3A~%3Atext%3DThe%20number%20of%20internal%20migrants%2C2001%20to%2037%25%20in%25 

    The laws of migration – Ravenstein – 1885 – Journal of the statistical (1885). Retrieved March 17, 2023, from https://rss.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/2979181

    Vikaspedia domains. Vikaspedia. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2023, from https://vikaspedia.in/social-welfare/women-and-child-development/child-development-1/in tegrated-child-development-scheme

    Unesdoc.unesco.org. (2021). Retrieved March 20, 2023, from https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000379875.locale=en

    United Nations. (n.d.). Goal 4 | Department of Economic and Social Affairs. United Nations. Retrieved March 20, 2023, from https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal4

    Home : Women and child development department, govt. of Maharashtra, India. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2023, from https://womenchild.maharashtra.gov.in/content/

    Roy, E. (2022, June 19). Centre focuses on access to Anganwadi services for migrants. The Indian Express.   Retrieved March  20,  2023, fromhttps://indianexpress.com/article/india/centre-focuses-on-access-to-anganwadi-services-for-migrants-7977880/

    Always on the move: The troubling landscape of the right to education for migrant children in India. Times of India Blog. (2021, April 19). Retrieved March 20, 2023, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/voices/always-on-the-move-the-troubling-landsc ape-of-the-right-to-education-for-migrant-children-in-india/

    A case for functional social protection portability to address vulnerabilities of migration-affected children. Economic and Political Weekly. (2022, November 10). Retrieved March 20, 2023, from https://www.epw.in/engage/article/case-functional-social-protection-portability

    Bashir, S. (2023, February 11). How education remains out of reach for India’s Invisible Migrant Children. Scroll.in. Retrieved March 20, 2023, from https://scroll.in/article/1041923/how-education-remains-out-of-reach-for-indias-invisible-mi grant-children

    Home. International Organization for Migration. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2023, from https://www.iom.int/

    This post was originally published on LSE Human Rights.

  • The 2022 FIFA World Cup kicked off last November to begin a month-long celebration of the beautiful game known as football. This World Cup was Qatar’s moment of  spotlight on the global stage, but to reach this moment, Qatar undertook a decade-long sportwashing campaign, the likes of which the world had yet to see before.

    “Sportswashing refers to attempts on the parts of authoritarian regimes to improve their tarnished global reputations through sports” (Lenskyj, 2020, p.51). This phenomenon began with Hitler and the 1936 Nazi Olympics, and over the past two decades, sportswashing has become a serious diplomatic tactic for oppressive governments seeking to correct their human rights records. Premier League clubs have been taken over by Russian oligarchs and Middle-Eastern sovereign wealth funds, the Olympic Games have been awarded to China and Russia, and just last year Saudi Arabia launched the breakaway LIV Golf Tour. The human rights records of all these nations leaves much to be desired, and by appealing to “the glamor of the game”, these oppressive regimes can try and band-aid over their damaged reputations (Guardian, 2018).

    Qatar was different. Qatar did not use sports to distract from the abuse of human rights. Qatar chose to abuse human rights to build the infrastructure that would allow sports to thrive, and hoped that nobody noticed along the way. When Qatar was awarded the World Cup in 2010, only one of the eight stadiums required to host the tournament existed (Whiteside, 2022), as Qatar knew they could construct the other seven stadiums through forced, migrant labor.

    It was not just stadiums that needed construction. Human Rights Watch claims that during the 2010’s decade, there were, “more than 2 million migrants working in Qatar at any one time building stadiums, roads, and hotels” (Worden, 2022). The sweltering heat and strict labor practices of Kafala subjected migrant workers to inhumane working conditions across the country. The Kafala system is a practice used in many Gulf States to control the influx of migrant labor, yet this system requires workers to be sponsored by an employer to enter the country, binding workers movement, immigration status, and wages to their employer (Nguyen, 2021).

    While global outrage forced Qatar into reforming some of the rules of Kafala, this does not correct the abuses upon human dignity which occurred to stage the World Cup. It has been reported that since the World Cup was awarded to Qatar, at least 6,500 migrant workers died in the construction of basic infrastructure necessary to host a tournament the magnitude of the World Cup (Pattison and McIntyre, 2021). In Qatar, this treatment is not just limited to migrant workers. Individuals who identify as LGBTQ have their rights repressed, as same-sex relationships are punishable by up to seven years in prison (Younes, 2022).

    FIFA was aware of these laws when they awarded the World cup to Qatar, yet expressed no hesitations concerning their human rights record. FIFA even went so far to further their empty commitment to human rights by signing on to the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in 2016, requiring FIFA to “avoid infringing on the human rights of others” and take measures to prevent the abuse of human rights (Panja and Draper, 2020). Speaking just days before the upcoming World Cup, FIFA President Ganni Infantino claimed, “everything is ready and everyone is welcome”, and asserted that this World Cup would be the best one yet, on and off the field (FIFA 2022).

    Qatar and FIFA insisted that everybody and everything would be welcome in Qatar. Fans would be able to drink alcohol in designated areas, LGBTQ+ persons visiting would be allowed to freely express themselves, and even some team captains like England’s Harry Kane planned to wear a rainbow captains armband as an act of protest (SkySports 2022). Yet, FIFA and Qatar walked back on their promises just days before the World Cup was set to kickoff; Beer was no longer sold in stadiums, LGBTQ+ fans were told be “be respectful” of Qatari culture, and England’s Harry Kane was threatened with a yellow card for every game he wore the rainbow armband.

    FIFA is not a political organization, and should not make their decisions based on politics. However, what we saw transpire in Qatar is not about politics; it is about fundamental human rights, dignity, and basic respect for one another. While these issues may become political on a national level, for FIFA, this is the minimum standard which they should strive to uphold. As an organization, FIFA has explicitly said that, “FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights” (FIFA). Yet to this date, the only substantive measure taken by FIFA towards “respecting all internationally recognised human rights” is their removal of the Russian National Team and all Russian clubs from FIFA sponsored events after the invasion of Ukraine (RFE, 2022).

    The actions of Russia do require international condemnation, yet their removal by FIFA hurts only the players and coaches who have trained their whole lives to compete, and not Mr. Putin, the man who ordered the invasion. Russian footballers are not war-mongering individuals, but the officials overseeing the 2022 World Cup are human rights abusers. If FIFA truly cared about their commitment to “internationally recognized human rights”, then it would have stripped Qatar of their right to host the World Cup years ago, or better yet, chosen a different host country to begin with, and certainly not enlisted Russia to host four years prior.

    Criticisms of the 2022 World Cup have been seen as a mere continuation of Eurocentric ideology and Islamophobia. FIFA President Infantino said that for the West, “this moral lesson-giving is just hypocrisy”, and it is certainly true that media coverage of the World Cup has been orientalists and out-right racists at times (Aladam, 2022). Western countries undeniably have imperfect human rights records themselves, and we should continue to call out injustices wherever we see them in the world of sport. Regardless of whether the World Cup is in Qatar or The States, FIFA should have an independent Human Rights Commission to ensure that human rights practices of a host country are in accordance with international norms and deserving of a global platform (HRW, 2022).

    Sports are meant to be the platform where people, states, and nations can all come together around a common interest. Sports should also bring out the best in people and celebrate humanity. The beautiful game of football is this platform, and FIFA failed the world of football by allowing Qatar to host the 2022 World Cup. If FIFA and other international sporting bodies are truly interested in upholding their commitment to human rights, then oppressive regimes like Qatar cannot be allowed to host global spectacles like the World Cup. I am not calling on FIFA to act as any sort of political body, but to simply stay true to their promise of protecting and promoting human rights, and ensuring that humanity has a place in the world of football.

    Works Cited

    Aladam, M. (2022). “World Cup 2022: ‘Orientalist’ Depictions of Qatar Condemned Online”. Middle East Eye. 23 November.

    FIFA. (2022). “FIFA and Qatar Ready for the Best FIFA World Cup in Just Over a Month’s Time”. FIFA. 17 October.

    Human Rights Watch (2022). “FIFA: Pay for harm to Qatar’s Migrant Workers”. HRW. 18 May.

    Lenskyj, H. J. (2020). “The Olympic Games: A Critical Approach”. Bingley: Emerald Publishing Limited.

    Murray, S. (2012). “The Two Halves of Sports-Diplomacy”. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 23(3). P.576-592.

    Nyugen, N. (2021). “Kafala Labor System Reform and the 2022 World Cup”. Georgetown University Qatar: Center for International and Regional Studies. 20 December.

    Panja, T; Draper, K. (2020). “U.S. Says FIFA Officials Were Bribed to Award World Cups to Russia and Qatar”. The New York Times. 6 April.

    Pattison, P; McIntyre, N. (2021). “Revealed: 6,500 Migrant Workers Have Died in Qatar Since World Cup Awarded”. The Guardian. 23 February.

    RFE/RL. (2022). “Court of Arbitration for Sport Dismisses Russian Appeals of FIFA, UEFA Bans”. RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. 15 July.

    Sky Sports. (2022). “England Captain Harry Kane Will Wear OneLove Armband at Qatar World Cup Even if FIFA Prohibits It”. Sky Sports. 11 October.

    Whiteside, P. “Cost of the Cup”. SkyNews. https://news.sky.com/story/qatar-2022-what-has-been-built-for-the-2022-world-cup-what-it-has-cost-in-lives-and-how-much-was-spent-on-construction-12576850

    Worden, M. (2022). “The World Cup is Exciting, Lucrative, and Deadly”. Human Rights Watch. 23 August.

    Youes, R. (2022). “A World Cup of Shame: FIFA Fails LGBT Rights Test in Qatar”. Human Rights Watch. 7 July.

    This post was originally published on LSE Human Rights.

  • On 6 December 2022, the Parliament of Indonesia passed the country’s new criminal code (NCC), outlawing sex and cohabitation outside of marriage. Under the new law, extramarital sex carries a jail sentence of one year, while cohabitation of unmarried couples carries a jail term of six months. In a statement given to Reuters, a spokesperson for the Indonesian justice ministry justified the law on the grounds that it aimed to “protect the institution of marriage and Indonesian values.”

    The law was passed despite widespread outrage, with thousands taking to the streets in protest, as well as a coalition of Indonesian civil society organizations petitioning the country’s president to delay the law’s passage. Regardless of the government’s claims that the law is designed to protect “Indonesian values,” the new criminal code flagrantly violates Indonesia’s obligations under international human rights law (IHRL).

    In order to get a sense of Indonesia’s IHRL obligations, it is essential to examine  the relevant treaty to which Indonesia is a party—namely, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 17 of the ICCPR places a responsibility upon State Parties to uphold the right to privacy using the language, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,” which includes the right to freedom of association and the right against arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy.

    The right to sexual freedom is woven within the tapestry of the right to privacy.  For instance, in Toonen v. Australia at the United National Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the major issue was the prohibition of homosexual intercourse in Tasmania (one of Australia’s six constitutive states). The UNHRC concluded that a prohibition on adult consensual homosexual intercourse constituted “arbitrary interference” with Mr. Toonen’s right to privacy (para. 11), thus violating Article 17 of the ICCPR. Indonesia’s NCC, by criminalizing sex outside marriage, constitutes severe and arbitrary interference on individuals’ rights to privacy and association in the same manner as Tasmania’s ban on homosexual intercourse. Thus, the NCC violates Indonesia’s commitments under IHRL.

    To qualify as a legitimate restriction on the rights in the ICCPR, a measure must meet two tests as set out in the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the ICCPR and General Comment No. 18 (para. 13) (For UNHRC jurisprudence see here). First, the differentiation must be reasonable and objective. Second, it must be to achieve a legitimate purpose under the ICCPR. While examining the applicability of the legitimate restriction exception in such cases, Fellmeth writes that it is essential to look at the degree of state interference into sexuality (p. 890). Such an exception was created to protect laws that aim to combat child abuse or actions demeaning women. However, countries like Indonesia are trying to misuse it to legitimise the oppressive NCC.

    For example, in Fedotova v Russia Federation at the UNHRC, Russia argued that a restriction on dissemination of “homosexual propaganda” amongst minors was based on the reasonable and objective purpose of avoiding harming their development by forming perverted views about family values. The UNHRC refused Russia’s arguments and concluded that the State could not restrict Fedotova’s right to freedom of expression about her homosexuality to protect “traditional family values.” Additionally, in Toonen v. Australia, Tasmanian authorities had argued that the ban on homosexual intercourse was based on the reasonable and objective purpose of public health to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS in Tasmania (para. 6.5). However, the UNHRC and even Australia itself denied the assertion that criminalization of homosexual activity would prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS (para. 8.4). Thus, Tasmania’s defence of their law working within the ambit of legitimate exceptions was denied by the UNHRC (para. 8.4) In an extremely similar manner as in Fedotova v Russian Federation, Indonesia has based their restriction on the right to privacy on “protecting the institution of marriage and Indonesian values.” This does not meet the reasonable and objective criteria as depicted by UNHRC jurisprudence in Fedotova. Further, Indonesia has provided no argument towards the legitimate purpose test. Thus, the NCC would not qualify for the legitimate restriction exception.

    The NCC poses a legitimate threat to the members of the LGBTQ community living in Indonesia and constitutes an arbitrary interference to their right to privacy. Such a law combined with a political climate which systematically targets members of the LGBTQ community has stifled hope for the community in Indonesia. The former Defense Minister of Indonesia, Ryamizard Ryacudu, had stated that the existence  of LGBTQ activists is “more dangerous than nuclear warfare” and that they have “declared a proxy war on the State.” As per a report by the Human Rights Watch, the LGBTQ community in Indonesia is under constant threat and there also have been instances of militants attacking LGBTQ activists. The circumstances in Indonesia illustrate how sexual and moral panics may construct certain subjects as dangers to the existing social order and try to propagate the regressive idea that the “moral,” righteous people must be safeguarded from the “deviant.” Further, the NCC effectively criminalises the existence of the LGBTQ community within Indonesia and has a disproportionate impact on them.

    The New Criminal Code recently introduced by Indonesia’s Parliament poses a clear and present danger to the basic right of sexual freedom in the country, violating Indonesia’s obligations under international human rights law. The international community must come together to swiftly condemn this act, and support the advocacy of Indonesian citizens and civil society groups who are protesting this attack on basic freedoms.

    This post was originally published on LSE Human Rights.

  • Since the elevation of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power on the national level, India has been witnessing a state-driven clampdown on the rights of its citizens in furtherance of the ruling disposition’s ideological agenda. The BJP- a right-wing, Hindu Nationalist party that believes in replacing India’s pluralistic, secular democracy with an ethnocratic Hindu state, secured an absolute electoral majority on its own for the first time in the 2014 General Elections under the leadership of strongman Narendra Modi and replicated its performance in the 2019 elections. Under its watch, arrests of dissidents, activists, journalists and intellectuals, who refuse to toe the regime’s line, have become increasingly more common, with scant regard paid to evidence and guidelines  enshrined  in  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  (CrPC).  Religious  minorities  have become especially vulnerable as they routinely face systematic state persecution and violence from vigilantes. Draconian laws, such as the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) and Prevention  of  Money  Laundering  Act  (PMLA),  in  effect,  sanction  preventive  detention  by making  bail  well-nigh impossible to procure. These laws initially aimed to combat criminal activities, such as terrorism and money-laundering. However, the present government has since amended the statutes to bypass some of the most fundamental principles of fairness, such as the presumption of innocence and the right to be heard. The process has thus become the punishment, making these laws a handy tool for the state to crack down on dissent. The continued  incarceration  of  activists  from  diverse  backgrounds  pertaining  to  a   civil  society gathering at Bhima Koregaon and journalists like Siddique Kappan whose bail plea was rejected in October last year, are some of the most egregious instances of the misuse of these laws. In the former case, following the breaking out of violence at a gathering called by activists belonging to the Dalit community, a group of intellectuals and human rights activists affiliated with different institutions from all across India were linked to the incident on sketchy evidence and arrested. One of them, Fr. Stan Swamy, died in incarceration, whereas others had to spend more than three years in prison before securing bail. Repression of civil society organisations, independent media houses, and think tanks using investigative agencies has become commonplace under the Modi regime.

    This state of affairs is prevalent despite judicial decisions over the years that have characterized detention for long periods without trial as a violation of the right to life and personal liberty as provided under Article 21 of the Indian constitution. The Supreme Court has also provided a set of guidelines in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, for police officers to follow, concerning arrests. In Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., the court stressed the need for sufficient justification for arresting the accused. Acknowledging that most of the arrests in the country were either unnecessary or unjustified, the court established a set of safeguards such as immediately informing the relatives and friends of the accused about his arrest.

    However, judicial diktats have failed to dissuade the state from committing unlawful arrests, primarily due to the absence of a legal framework to affix accountability. In the face of repeated instances of non-compliance with its directions and recognizing the need to provide the victims with a remedy, the apex court, in Rudal Sah v. State of Bihar, observed that true relief didn’t simply constitute a release from imprisonment; instead, compensation had to be provided to the victims to mitigate, in some measure, the harm suffered by them as a result of spending long periods in incarceration. The court has since then, unequivocally asserted multiple times that compensation is the ‘only appropriate remedy’ in cases of violation of Article 21.

    Despite past decisions, recent actions of the judiciary reflect a change in its stance, as exhibited in the Akshardham case, in which the Supreme Court decided not to grant compensation to people who had wrongfully faced prosecution and detainment, even while acknowledging that the accused had been the scapegoats of a conspiracy. This particular decision of the judiciary shows that giving compensation is still a matter of judicial discretion in India, and depends on the deliberations of individual benches. However, the Akshardham case decision is in stark contrast  to  the  protections  that  are  supposed  to be provided by Articles 9 (5) and 14 (6) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 5 (5) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Specifically, these sections lawfully outline that there should be an enforceable right to access these payments in cases of unlawful prosecution and detention. While ratifying the former covenant, the Indian government confessed that no such right existed in India. Conversely in Spain, a statutory right to compensation exists in cases where there is proven judicial or procedural error concerning arrests. Spanish courts have applied this  principle  to  even  those  cases  where  the  accused  is  made  to  undergo  detention  by the authorities after following every safeguard and gets acquitted after the trial. Such a position avers that rights can’t be curtailed by the state simply on the suspicion of guilt, or by maliciously imputing guilt on the basis of flimsy evidence- principles that desperately need to be  incorporated into Indian criminal jurisprudence.

    As of now, the absence of a clear statutory or constitutional right to compensation in cases of unlawful prosecution and detainment encourages the state to continue to abuse its power and disobey expressly laid out judicial directions. The arbitrary arrests of dissenters and journalists are the most glaring evidence of the abusive repression. Such actions not only intimidate the regime’s critics, but also whip up public support for the BJP’s ideological project, as the government misrepresents these actions as strong measures intended to maintain national security. Seen together with the attempts to erode the autonomy of democratic institutions, discriminatory laws, and policies targeting religious minorities, undermining of federalism, and widespread proliferation of hate speech and fake news, such acts of repression threaten the foundations of Indian constitutionalism. One possible solution, therefore, would be to elevate the right to compensation for violation of Article 21 to the stature of a fundamental right; the legislature can viably incorporate this right into Article 32 of the Constitution, which provides for the right to secure remedies for the enforcement of fundamental rights by approaching the Supreme Court. Adopting such a measure would bind the state to legally having to compensate individuals who have had to endure long years of wrongful imprisonment, thereby serving both as a remedy for the victims and an effective deterrent against such actions in the future.

    Bibliography

    Statutes

    1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
    2. European Convention on Human Rights
    3. Constitution of India
    4. Code of Criminal Procedure

    Cases

    1. Sebastian M. Hongray vs Union Of India 1984 AIR 571
    2. Shri D.K. Basu State of West Bengal 1997 1 SCC 416
    3. Rudul Sah State of Bihar 1983 AIR 1086
    4. Bhim Singh, MLA State of Jammu and Kashmir AIR 1986 SC 494

    Other Sources

    1. Ara, I. (2022) A List of Activists, Scholars and Scribes Whose Personal Liberty Remains at Judiciary’s Mercy. The Wire. Available at:  https://thewire.in/rights/jail-bail-hearings-court-delhi-riots-elgar-parishad [Accessed 25 Nov. 2022]
    2. Loganathan, S. (2022). Watch | Data Point: UAPA, 153A, PMLA: What do these laws have in common? The Hindu. 8 Sep. Available at:  https://www.thehindu.com/data/watch-data-point-uapa-153a-pmla-what-do-these-laws-have-in-common/article65865206.ece [Accessed 27 Nov. 2022].
    3. Shantha, S. (2022) Bhima Koregaon Violence: Four Different Theories, but No Justice in Sight.  The Wire.  Available at:  https://thewire.in/rights/bhima-koregaon-violence-four-different-theories-but-no-justice-in-sight [Accessed 27 Nov. 2022].
    4. The Indian Express. (2016). Akshardham terror attack case: SC refuses compensation plea of acquitted persons. Available at: https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/akshardham-terror-attack-case-sc  -refuses-compensation-plea-of-acquitted-persons-2895251/ [Accessed 27 Nov. 2022].
    5. poderjudicial.es. (n.d.).  C.G.P.J – Leyes.  Available at:  https://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Temas/Compendio-de-Derecho-Judicial/Leyes/Ley-Organica-6-1985–de-1-de-julio–del-Poder-Judicial [Accessed 27 Nov. 2022].
    6. Nair, R (2022) Violations of Rights and Compensation: India’s Failure to Adhere to International Standards. The Leaflet. Available at: https://theleaflet.in/violations-of-rights-and-compensation-indias-failure-to-adhere-to-international-standards/ [Accessed 27 Nov. 2022].

    This post was originally published on LSE Human Rights.

  • Background

    Recently, Singapore’s parliament decriminalised sex between men, thereby, repealing the British colonial-era law i.e., Section 377A of the Penal Code, which was discriminatory and inconsistent with the rights to equality, privacy, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention.

    The Court of Appeal had explicitly ruled last year that Section 377A of the Penal Code stays on the books but cannot be used to prosecute men for having gay sex, asserting that this regulation is unenforceable in its entirety. As a result, the aforementioned legislative change was expected to have come sooner or later.

    Judicial Decisions over the years

    Repeatedly, Section 377A has been challenged and marked by the courts of Singapore as unconstitutional. In 2010, Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney-General was the first judicial challenge made, wherein, the Court of Appeal held that the authority to strike it down lay only with the legislature. Furthermore, in another landmark ruling of Lim Meng Suang v. Attorney-General in 2014, the Court of Appeal held that Section 377A was valid and consistent with Article 9 (right to personal liberty) and Article 12 (right to equality) of the Constitution of Singapore.

    In addition to the above, multiple petitions were filed for the repeal of this draconian section following the high-profile repeal of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code in 2018, which is effectively identical to Section 377A of the Singapore Penal Code, but all such legal challenges went in vain and were eventually dismissed by the courts in Singapore.

    Finally, on the 21st of August, 2022, current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong announced that the government would table a motion in the Parliament to quash Section 377A. After a two-day debate, Section 377A was officially repealed on the 29th of November, 2022.

    Legal Implications

    Although decriminalisation is a welcome step, it comes hand-in-hand with another amendment that proposes the introduction of a new “Institution of Marriage” clause as a reform to the existing constitution that would clarify that the Parliament, and not the courts, have the sole right to make laws to “define, regulate, protect, safeguard, support, foster, and promote” the institution of marriage. Such a move by the government showcases the unequal treatment meted out against the LGBTQ population of the country.

    As is quite evident from the above discussion, the bill has been introduced to, firstly, appease the conservative segment of the Singaporean society and, secondly, prevent court challenges that in other countries have led to the legalisation of same-sex marriage and hence, appears to be a massive setback for the LGBTQ community. The government’s opinion that the fundamental rights of the LGBTQ people are a political issue rather than a legal one also highlights their blatant disregard for the community’s interests.

    Social Implications

    Gay rights campaigners are relieved by the government’s decision but believe that “the true impact of repeal will be determined by how the people of Singapore respond to it, and treat each other, in the days and months to come.”

    There are still abundant stories of discrimination being meted out against the community. To  begin with, certain television programs in the nation continue to depict homosexual men as deviants, failing to acknowledge their authentic identities, ultimately resulting in the perpetuation of an enduring stigma in the minds of people, in a way, fostering a perception that being gay is morally objectionable.

    In the end, while courts have struck down this colonial law, the Singaporian society still does not accept homosexuality in its complete sense, thereby refusing to give up its current viewpoint on heterosexual marriage. In light of this, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Singapore also emphasized on the fact that, “the fruitfulness of marriage necessitates that marriage must be open to procreation.” Hence, we find ourselves in a position where there is a need to overcome such prejudicial social attitudes. The government’s stance to try and balance both the pro- and anti-standpoints cannot work in the long run. With an increasing public participation and shift towards a more liberal stance, Singapore will be exposed to increasingly globalised values. As a result, with enough public discourse, there could hopefully be a possibility for a legalisation of same-sex marriage in the future.

    Conclusion

    In Singapore, although attitudes towards LGBTQ issues have shifted towards a more liberal stance in recent years, especially among the young, but conservative attitudes remain strong among religious groups, which is apparent from the National Council of Churches of Singapore’s statement that, “the move has weakened the legislation’s role as a moral signifier.” Hence, the LGBTQ community still has a long way to go in changing the prevailing misconceptions and fostering an understanding societal atmosphere for their community.

    The new constitutional amendment now hangs like a sword over the heads of gay rights activists who will once again need to convince the masses that complete equality needs to be the norm in Singapore. Such changes, however, leave room for a future parliament to expand the definition of marriage to include same-sex relationships following the lead of countries such as Brazil, the United States of America, and Taiwan

    As a global community, we need to make sure that LGBTQ couples and their families also get their due right to be recognised and protected with immediate effect.

    This post was originally published on LSE Human Rights.

  • This piece analyses two recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), A.M. and Others v. Russia[1] and X and Y v. Romania,[2] to highlight the courts’ failure to incorporate rights arising from the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)[3] into jurisprudence relating to trans women. CEDAW is a convention adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979 and is implemented by a body of independent experts  titled the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The gap in the CEDAW with respect to trans rights, has an adverse impact on trans women’s custody and guardianship rights.  In addition, the piece critiques the doctrine of margin of appreciation. Due to the absence of pervasive domestic legislation and lack of consensus among European nations regarding trans rights, the ECtHR is more likely to concede to the often transphobic discretion of nation-states. To counter the trans-exclusionary impacts of the margin of appreciation, this article proposes a dual approach: the incorporation of specialised treaties into ECtHR  jurisprudence as well as the incentivisation of member states  to reach an inclusive consensus by the court.

    Margin of Appreciation and Self-Recognition in ECtHR

    The margin of appreciation is a “judicial doctrine whereby international courts allow states to have a measure of diversity in their interpretation of human rights treaty obligations”.[4] Pre-1998, ECtHR jurisprudence was not trans-sensitive,[5] as it afforded a wide margin of appreciation to states which narrowly interpreted violations against trans individuals under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to respect for family and private life.  Cases like Rees v. UK;[6] X, Y, and Z v. UK;[7] and Cossey v. UK,[8] did not find Article 8 violations against trans litigants. However, the 1992 B v. France[9] was the first of  the pre-1998 cases to recognise an Article 8 violation, when a trans woman complained of the refusal of the French authorities to amend the civil-status register in accordance with her gender identity. Finally, in 1998, Sheffield and Horsham v. the United Kingdom[10] marked a turning point in trans rights jurisprudence. While the ECtHR did not find an Article 8 violation,[11] it reaffirmed the need for trans rights to be kept under  permanent review by the Contracting States, given the problems faced by post-operative trans individuals.[12]    Unfortunately, the decision did not grant the right to self-identification and did not have implications beyond those undergoing surgery. The decisions post-1998 beginning with the Christine Goodman v. UK[13] in 2002 to Y.V v. Turkey[14]  in 2015, recognised Article 8 violations by States and curbed margin of appreciation on the grounds that the resulting interference with the applicant’s right to respect for their private life could not be considered “necessary” in a democratic society.

    The ECtHR delivered its most recent pronouncement on trans rights, X and Y v. Romania, on 19th January 2021. Here, two Romanian nationals approached the ECtHR because the national authorities failed to recognise the gender identity of transgender persons in the absence of gender reassignment surgery.[15] The applicants approached administrative and judicial authorities to correct the details on their identity papers concerning their gender, forenames and social security number. The applicants wanted to obtain legal recognition of their gender identity without undergoing expensive and psychologically-taxing surgery.[16] However, these requests were refused on the grounds of absence of ‘proof’[17] of their gender identity through gender reassignment surgery. The ECtHR admitted the application on the grounds that the state violated Article 8 of ECHR.

    Article 8 was found to be applicable as the Court found gender identification to be a crucial aspect of personal identity. Further, the Court noted that this applies “to all individuals, including transgender persons like the applicants, whether or not they wish to undergo gender reassignment treatment approved by the authorities.”[18] The case is relevant to the current discussion despite acknowledging the absence of the right to self-identification of the Romanian legal framework, as the court decided against granting a margin of appreciation. The ECtHR’s logic was that the national authorities’ lack of recognition of the applicants’ male identity in the absence of gender reassignment surgery “had upset the fair balance to be struck by the State between the general interest and the interests of the applicants.”[19] This non-recognition constituted unjustified interference with the Article 8 rights of the applicants.  The Court’s justification was that only a few Council of Europe member States mandated gender reassignment as a pre-condition for legal recognition of gender identity and highlighted that “by 2020, twenty-six States no longer made it a requirement.”[20] This decision therefore illustrates the wide support for the self-recognition of gender and serves as an important precedent for limiting European States’ margin of appreciation in this context. The case gives rise to the question of whether international courts can deny states’ margin of appreciation and allow international human rights law to fill in gaps in domestic legislation.

    Using Self-Recognition of Gender Jurisprudence in ECtHR to Critique Trans Custody Jurisprudence

    A.M. and Others v. Russia[21] followed closely at the heels of X and Y v. Romania. A.M. and Others v. Russia involved a transgender woman who was denied custody of her children based on her gender identity. The woman had transitioned after the dissolution of her marriage, after which the Court denied her custody. The applicant contested this decision in the ECtHR under the Article 14 right against discrimination and the Article 8 right to family life. The ECtHR read Articles 8 and 14 together to hold that the applicant’s gender identity had influenced the Court’s decision to restrict contact with her children. This meant that the applicant was treated differently than parents whose gender identity matched their sex assigned at birth. The ECtHR held that although the domestic courts had pursued a legitimate aim of the protection of the rights of children in these proceedings, it could not establish convincing and sufficient reasons for the difference in treatment, such that a reasonable relationship of proportionality had not existed between the means employed and the aim pursued.

    In this case, the margin of appreciation was not applicable as there was no conflict between domestic law and international law. However, the X and Y v. Romania case can be used to formulate a minor critique of A.M. and Others v. Russia. This is because interestingly, the recent and significant X and Y v. Romania case was not cited in the Russian transgender woman’s custody case. Had the prior case been cited it would have a two-fold impact for trans-sensitive international human rights jurisprudence. Firstly, although the gender identity of the applicant was not in question in the current case, X and Y v. Romania could be used to reassert the legitimacy of the transgender woman’s gender identity. This leads to the second point. The classification of the applicant as a woman using a recent ECtHR ruling, could entitle her to guardianship rights and protections under Article 16 (e) and (f) of the CEDAW.[22] These provisions could further strengthen her case within the international human rights law regime by enforcing the nation-state’s compliance with its CEDAW treaty obligations. This oversight by the ECtHR demonstrates not just its own reluctance to recognise trans women’s rights as being on par with ciswomen, but also the limitations of CEDAW and its essentialist and rigid definition of the woman subject. The ECtHR thus missed the opportunity to expand the scope of or at least present recommendations for CEDAW to widen its scope, in its failure to read X and Y v. Romania. into A.M. and Others v. Russia.

    Conclusion: Way Forward

    (i) Incorporation of CEDAW into ECtHR Jurisprudence

    The ECHR  has been termed a “living instrument” and for more than seven decades, has been a significant instrument in international law.[23] Further, scholars have noted that the relevance, dynamism and effectiveness of the ECHR has been maintained by the ECtHR interpreting it in light of other international human rights documents and jurisprudence.[24] The ECtHR’s receptiveness to other relevant sources and jurisprudence allows the ECHR to remain compatible with common values and emerging consensus in international law.[25] Turkish scholar Ebru Demir underlined the effectiveness of this approach in the context of the ECtHR broadening the scope of domestic violence in international law.[26] He did so by illustrating how the ECtHR innovatively interpreted article 14 of the ECHR by engaging extensively with the relevant international human rights instruments on the issue, in particular, CEDAW to define “discrimination against women”[27] and underline the obligations of the state parties under the CEDAW. A similar approach by the ECtHR in cases involving the rights of trans women could facilitate more trans-friendly decisions and persuade the ECHR and CEDAW to broaden their ambit. Consequently, the initiation of trans women into the ambit of a treaty of the nature of the CEDAW which represents universal consensus, would limit a state’s margin of appreciation in human rights violations against these vulnerable communities and would thus enable state accountability in the international human rights arena.

    The exclusion of LBTQ+ individuals from the CEDAW  has been highlighted by civil society organisations. For instance, in 2014, the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) requested that CEDAW’s forthcoming General Recommendation on girls’ and women’s right to education include specific provisions on barriers to education faced by girls and youth because of their sexual orientation and gender.[28] Despite this, out of the 39 General Recommendations made by CEDAW as of 2022, not a single one deals with the protection of the rights of LBTQ+ women.[29] Further, the exclusionary strains of CEDAW are visible in its wording. CEDAW only defines discrimination in Article 1.[30] Further, while CEDAW  leaves the term ‘woman’ undefined and thus fluid and open to interpretation, the provisions of the treaty end up overlooking the equality concerns of trans women. In other words, there are no explicit protections relating to discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation. As argued by Margaret Murphy, human rights law scholar from Queen’s University Belfast, “by recognizing gendered harms broadly, CEDAW could additionally strengthen women’s rights…the dichotomy of man and woman lacks a holistic view of sex/gender as it is recognized by many today.”[31] Thus to ensure inclusive jurisprudence, the ECtHR consider attempting to interpret CEDAW expansively and recommend that it be made trans friendly. 

    (ii) ECtHR’s Incentivizing a Trans-sensitive Consensus

    X and Y v. Romania and A.M. and Others v. Russia represent a crucial advancement for transgender rights as these cases illustrate that the ECtHR is willing to expand the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 ECHR) to gender non-conforming people. However, it raises some concerns regarding both the margin of appreciation and the scope of CEDAW. This is because while X and Y v. Romania highlights the consensus with respect to self-identification of gender, it still shows that transgender personhood is based on treaty-based consensus rather than a natural-rights based approach[32] to their personhood. It also means that if this majoritarian consensus changes to make the recognition of gender reaffirmation surgery-based, it could jeopardise the rights of minorities. As British professor of sociology Paul Johnson, states in his piece about margin of appreciation and LGBTQIA+ rights in Europe, if the Court continues to deprive individuals of their rights due to its reliance on the margin of appreciation’, “it calls into question both the legitimacy of its methodology and the universality of the Convention that it interprets.”[33] He further states that despite the Court’s progressive narrowing of the margin of appreciation in the context of queer rights since the 1980s, the approach is largely piecemeal and inconsistent.[34] This calls for a treaty-based recognition of gender non-conforming individuals, for decisive and uniform protections under international human rights law. In addition to courts referring to specialised treaties to broaden the rights regime, international courts can play a key role in facilitating a bottom-up trans-sensitive development of international human rights law. Norwegian philosophers Andreas Follesdal and Nino Tsereteli suggest “a bottom-up development of European human rights law that can be facilitated and subsequently validated by the ECtHR”.[35] They argue that by showing an explicit link between the breadth of the margin of appreciation and firmness of consensus, the ECtHR could incentivise national authorities to continuously engage with the convention in light of present-day conditions.[36] The ECtHR could also more frequently call for keeping issues under review where there is no clear consensus on the substantive minimal protection standard yet, but where such a consensus is likely to consolidate in the near future. Overall, the ECtHR must consider encouraging EU consensus, keeping issues for non-operative trans individuals under review and relying on special treaties such as CEDAW to fully recognise trans rights.

    [1] A.M. and Others v. Russia App no. 47220/19  (ECHR July 2021)

    [2] X and Y v. Romania App no. 20607/16 (ECHR 19 January 2021)

    [3] Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13, available at: https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm

    [4] Legg, Andrew, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law: Deference and Proportionality, Oxford Monographs in International Law(Oxford, 2012; online edn, Oxford Academic, 20 Sept. 2012), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199650453.001.0001, accessed 14 Oct. 2022.

    [5] Fact Sheet-Gender Identity Issues, European Court of Human Rights, October 2022, < https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Gender_identity_eng.pdf > accessed 1 November 2022

    [6] Rees v. UK, App no. 9532/81 (ECHR 17 October 1986)

    [7] X, Y, and Z v. UK App no. 21830/93 (ECHR 22 April 1997)

    [8] Cossey v. UK App no. 10843/84 (ECHR 27 September 1990)

    [9] B v France, App No 13343/87 (ECHR 25th March 1992)

    [10] Sheffield and Horsham v. the United Kingdom App no. 22985/93 (ECHR 30 July 1998)

    [11] Id.

    [12] Id.

    [13] Christine Goodman v. UK App no. 28957/95 (ECHR 11 July 2002)

    [14] Y.V v. Turkey App no. 14793/08 (ECHR 10 May 2015)

    [15] X, Y, and Z v. UK App no. 21830/93 (ECHR 22 April 1997)

    [16] Id.

    [17] Id.

    [18] X, Y, and Z v. UK App no. 21830/93 (ECHR 22 April 1997)

    [19] X, Y, and Z v. UK App no. 21830/93 (ECHR 22 April 1997)

    [20] X, Y, and Z v. UK App no. 21830/93 (ECHR 22 April 1997)

    [21] A.M. and Others v. Russia App no. 47220/19  (ECHR July 2021)

    [22] Article 16, UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13, available at: https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm

    [23] Dzehtsiarou K. (2011) European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights. German Law Journal 12(10): 1730–1745.

    [24] Letsas G. (2013) The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and Legitimacy. In: Følledal A, Peters B, and Ulfstein G (eds) Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context. Cambridge University Press, pp. 106–141.

    [25] Letsas G. (2013) The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and Legitimacy. In: Følledal A, Peters B, and Ulfstein G (eds) Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context. Cambridge University Press, pp. 106–141.

    [26] Ebru Demir, The European Court of Human Rights’ Engagement with International Human Rights Instruments: Looking at the Cases of Domestic Violence, The Age of Human Rights Journal, 17 (December2021) pp. 79-96 ISSN: 2340-9592 DOI: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6347

    [27] Ebru Demir, The European Court of Human Rights’ Engagement with International Human Rights Instruments: Looking at the Cases of Domestic Violence, The Age of Human Rights Journal, 17 (December2021) pp. 79-96 ISSN: 2340-9592 DOI: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6347

    [28] The International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) Memo on General Recommendation on Article 10 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, June 20, 2014<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/WomensRightEducation/IGLHRCContribution.pdf > accessed November 1, 2022

    [29] General Recommendations, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women <https://www.ohchr.org/en/treaty-bodies/cedaw/general-recommendations > accessed 1 November, 2022

    [30] Article 1, UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13, available at: https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm

    [31] Margaret Murphy, ‘ Queering Women’s Rights: Re-Examining CEDAW’ Human Rights Pulse, March 1 2021 < https://www.humanrightspulse.com/mastercontentblog/queering-womens-rights-re-examining-cedaw > accessed November 1, 2022

    [32] A natural rights based approach is one that conceives of rights as independent of legal and political systems. Broadly, natural rights are seen as those rights that originate from individuals by virtue of their existence, independent of the state. Political theorists like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau were proponents of this approach.

    [33] Paul Johnson, ‘Homosexuality, Freedom of Assembly and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights: Alekseyev v Russia’, Human Rights Law Review, (2011), pp 578-593 < https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r27001.pdf > accessed 14 October 2022

    [34] Paul Johnson, ‘Homosexuality, Freedom of Assembly and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights: Alekseyev v Russia’, Human Rights Law Review, (2011), pp 578-593 < https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r27001.pdf > accessed 14 October 2022

    [35] Andreas Follesdal & Nino Tsereteli (2016) The margin of appreciation in Europe and beyond, The International Journal of Human Rights, 20:8, 1055-1057

    [36] Andreas Follesdal & Nino Tsereteli (2016) The margin of appreciation in Europe and beyond, The International Journal of Human Rights, 20:8, 1055-1057

  • Women with disabilities in India suffer two-fold discrimination based on gender and disability. Often stigmatized and isolated by society, over 93% of women with disabilities are denied their reproductive rights and are forced into procedures like sterilization to regulate their fertility. In a joint statement released by the United Nations (UN) agencies forced sterilization was emphasized as a “form of torture and a violation of the right to be free” yet the practice continues to prevail in the country.

    The Practice of Forced Sterilization

    Across the globe, the practice of Forced sterilization can be linked to the eugenics theory where people with disabilities are excluded from society and are often considered genetically inferior from the rest of the human population. A similar mindset can be observed in India, where the guardians or family members frequently associate disability with a burden, especially when it comes to the reproductive autonomy of a disabled woman. Social prejudice envelops the society where a disabled woman is often considered incapable of understanding her sexuality and the family feels the need of making decisions on behalf of her often leading to violation of the rights such as Article 21 enshrined in the Indian Constitution that guarantees protection of Personal Liberty. Another facet of this problem can be traced back to the state-sponsored population control camps that have been organized by the government since 1975 when the then prime minister Indira Gandhi ordered mass sterilization of over a million people in the country. With a growing population of more than 1 billion people, even today successive Indian governments have been accused of performing involuntary sterilization camps in unsanitary and unsafe conditions that often target the poor and vulnerable sections of society as a method of population control. Governments at the state and district level are allocated funds for family planning, which often assigns certain numbers or targets for sterilizing the population as a mode of permanent contraception. In 2020, the state of Madhya Pradesh issued a circular to multi-purpose health workers (MPHWs) to persuade at least 5 willing male beneficiaries for sterilization, and any failure to complete the given task would result in consequences ranging from their salaries being withheld to a compulsory retirement. While the government repealed the order after strong backlash from citizens and opposition political parties, this target oriented approach towards population control still poses a threat to the vulnerable population, particularly the disabled community. In order to achieve these targets, health workers on the ground are forced to impose coercive conditions without providing adequate information to the concerned population, as was seen during the pandemic when an ASHA ( Accredited Social Health Activist) worker in the state of Uttar Pradesh left a deaf and mute man sterilized without his knowledge on the pretext of getting the COVID vaccination in order to complete the target assigned by the district health department.

    International Law on Forced sterilization of Persons with Disabilities

    The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006 and ratified by 185 countries, addressed the problem of forced sterilization among the disabled abled community. Under Article 23 (1)(c) persons with disabilities including children have equal reproductive rights to retain their fertility. Additionally, Article 25 emphasizes providing health care to persons with disabilities after taking their free and informed consent. While India has ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities the question of ensuring equal rights still remains a challenge.

    The Legal Conundrum in India

    In India, the Right to Persons with Disabilities Act (RPWD), 2016 was introduced to legally address the problems faced by the disabled community and ensure equitable access to justice for all members of society. While the RPWD Act took a step towards recognizing the issue of forced abortions under Section 92(f)[1] which states that any medical procedure performed on a disabled woman without her express consent that leads to the termination of pregnancy is punishable with an imprisonment term, there is still no specific mention of forced sterilization as a problem. Another contentious factor is the need for “express consent”. While consent forms a crucial factor in developing reproductive autonomy there is no mention regarding the procedure to take this consent free from any undue influence from the disabled woman.

    Like in the case of Suchita v Chandigarh (2009) where a mentally ill orphaned woman expressed clear consent to have a child but was opposed by the guardian welfare institution where she was admitted. In this case, the Supreme Court emphasized that the requirement for consent cannot be diluted solely by what society deems to be in the woman’s best interests. The case further argued for a limited guardianship approach, whereby the state could not extend its power to the point of breaching a woman’s reproductive autonomy. While this principle of limited guardianship is present even in the Rights to Persons with Disabilities Act under Section 14,  the law on paper and the law practiced shows a stark difference. In 2012, when almost 53 women from the state of Bihar were forced to undergo sterilization in a state-run camp inside school premises in unsanitary conditions, the case of Devika Biswas v Union of India was moved to the Supreme Court of the country. The apex court emphasized the need for informed consent in the case of sterilization, it also considered that such informal incentive schemes of fixing “sterilization targets” by the state impacts the socially and economically vulnerable the most. While these judgments have tried to take a progressive stance, access to justice remains a struggle for many. According to a Human Rights Watch report, 15 out of 17 women with disabilities in India were either left neglected by the authorities or suffered additional sexual violence while trying to file a complaint.

    Suggestions

    Internationally, groups like The Women Enabled International have collaborated with the United Nations Population Fund and have issued guidelines to increase accessibility to sexual and reproductive health services for women and young people with disabilities who have experienced gender-based violence like forced sterilisation. Further in India, local advocacy initiatives like Project Samarth organize menstrual awareness sessions for young girls with disabilities who are often sterilized by their guardians because of difficulties in menstrual management and the risk of sexual abuse.

    Finally, it becomes the need of the hour to implement a systematized change against the problem of forced sterilization amongst disabled women. It is time for the judiciary to be more accessible to the needs of such vulnerable groups, which can be achieved by facilitating remedial action and creating an independent grievance redressal mechanism for reporting such cases, and for the government to be more responsive to the needs of the disabled community by ensuring their due inclusion in the social health benefit schemes and family planning programs.

    Lastly, bringing a shift in the mindset of the society cannot be achieved without public discourse because it is equally important for people to acknowledge this problem rather than dismissing it as a subject too taboo for Indian society.

    Bibliography

    1. Of Stigma and Sterilization: The Layered Stigmatization of Women With Disabilities. (2019).The Bastion. https://thebastion.co.in/ideas/of-stigma-and-sterilization-the-layered-stigmatization-of-women-with-disabilities-in-india/
    2. Eliminating forced, coercive and otherwise involuntary sterilization- An interagency statement. (2014). https://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/201405_sterilization_en.pdf
    3. Eugenics and Scientific Racism. National Human Genome Research Institute. https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Eugenics-and-Scientific-Racism
    4. The Constitution of India,1950, Article 21. https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/COI_English.pdf
    5. India: “The Emergency” and the Politics of Mass Sterilization.(2020). Association for Asian Studies. https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/india-the-emergency-and-the-politics-of-mass-sterilization/
    6. Govt transfers NHM director, scraps sterilization circular. (2020). The Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bhopal/govt-transfers-nhm-director-scraps-sterilisation-circular/articleshow/74249580.cms
    7. Lavania, D. (2021). Deaf- mute man taken for Covid shot is sterilized at Uttar Pradesh hospital. The Times Of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/agra/unmarried-deaf-mute-man-goes-to-etah-dist-hosp-for-covid-19-jab-along-with-an-asha-worker-returns-home-sterilized/articleshow/84355308.cms
    8. Ministry of Health & Family Welfare-Government of India. National Health Mission. https://nhm.gov.in/index1.php?lang=1 
    9. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. (2006). https://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/convention/convention_accessible_pdf.pdf 
    10.  Rights of Persons With Disabilities (RPWD) bill provides for penalties for offenses committed against Persons With Disabilities. (2016). Press Information Bureau. https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=154862
    11.  Right to Persons with Disabilities Act (RPWD). 2016. https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A2016-49_1.pdf
    12.  Suchita v Chandigarh. (2009). https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1500783/
    13.  Devika Biswas v Union of India. (2016). https://indiankanoon.org/doc/28938556/
    14.  Invisible Victims of Sexual Violence. (2018). Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/04/03/invisible-victims-sexual-violence/access-justice-women-and-girls-disabilities
    15.  Women Enabled International. (2022). https://womenenabled.org/
    16.  Changoiwala, P. (2017). The Fight to End Forced Sterilization of Girls with Disabilities. The New Humanitarian. https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/womenandgirls/articles/2017/12/19/the-fight-to-end-forced-sterilization-of-girls-with-disabilities
    17.  India: Target-Driven Sterilization Harming Women. (2020). Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/12/india-target-driven-sterilization-harming-women

     

    This post was originally published on LSE Human Rights.

  • Introduction

    “It is impossible to think about the welfare of the world unless the condition of women is improved. It is impossible for a bird to fly on only one wing.” ~ Swami Vivekanand.

    Nearly three-quarters of a century later, the silence around unsafe abortions, maternal deaths, use of contraceptives and reproductive rights still deafens independent India.

    Broadly, reproductive rights refer to an individual’s ability to choose whether or not to procreate and to maintain reproductive health. This includes the right to start a family, terminate a pregnancy, use contraception, and obtain reproductive health care. The trajectory of women’s emancipation in India has veritably been dynamic. Tracing it right from their participation in nationalist movements, to being forced into the domiciliary domain and to their recent revival as super-women, women in our country have seen it all.

    The judiciary has been the flag bearer for securing and furthering reproductive rights here and now. Nevertheless, women’s sexual and reproductive rights in the country still hang in the realm of obliviousness. Despite women successfully marching towards closing gender gaps, the griming realities of maternal health and abortion-related fatalities have weighed heavily against all the progress made.

    The griming reality

    Despite India being the forerunner in the world to come up with infrastructural and policy measures ensuring safe abortion and contraception, women continue to encounter obstacles in exercising their reproductive rights, including poor health services and dismissal of decision-making authority. It is a problem that encompasses reproductive rights, sexual health, family planning, and maternal health.

    Women are often made to face the weight of administrative delays. In one such example, a woman was prevented from having an abortion after 20 weeks, despite having requested one at 17 weeks.

    Furthermore, inconsistent judgements add to the general lack of clarity surrounding the conditions in which a woman may legitimately terminate her pregnancy. While a Supreme Court decision in 2019 enabled a woman from Mumbai to terminate her pregnancy at 24 weeks due to a foetal anomaly that would jeopardise her life, previous rulings have penalised women who seek abortions after the 20-week mark, even where medically proven problems existed. Like in early 2017, the apex court decided against a lady whose foetus had a down syndrome-diagnosed abortion at 26 weeks. She was forced to deliver the baby with severe brain disorders, all credit to India’s archaic abortion law.

    Additionally, discriminatory precepts like spousal consent being an informal but imperative condition to obtain reproductive health services implicitly or explicitly sabotage women’s reproductive autonomy. Legal protection of reproductive rights as human rights is essential for gender parity and gender equity.

    Judiciary to the rescue

    Despite these inconsistencies, the Supreme Court has made paramount strides in India regarding the reproductive rights of women. Each country, however, has its restriction and exceptions when it comes to abortion rights.

    While abortion has been a contention in America for decades, many states, particularly those led by conservatives, have recently expressed interest in or initiated legislation to limit abortion drastically. Recent newsworthy events include the US Supreme Court’s draught decision in the Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization case. The historic rulings in  Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) and Roe v. Wade (1973) which protected women’s right to abortion, are reversed in the draught opinion. The apex court of the United States in a significant ruling in 1973, two years after India legalised abortion, recognised for the first time that the constitutional right to privacy is not so shallow that it does not even grant women the autonomy to decide the termination of her pregnancy.

    On the other hand, the Indian judiciary gave true sense to the societal needs in the landmark K.S. Puttaswamy judgment which bestowed upon an individual the sense and privilege of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. It also reaffirmed the decision in Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, which held that reproductive rights include a woman’s right to carry a pregnancy to term, give birth, and raise children; and that these rights are part of a woman’s right to privacy, dignity, and bodily integrity. In Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, the apex court has also extended the meaning of personal liberty by decriminalising adultery and homosexuality.

    The reproductive rights are directly affected by these decisions. The right to safe abortion is an essential component of women’s right to bodily integrity, life, and self-determination, and it must be guarded.

    Conclusion and way forward

    We must not paint the Indian legislative and judiciary as perfect, despite their consistently supporting abortion rights from a liberal standpoint. The old legislation on abortion rights was exemplary but the new one was overdue as it broadened its scope to encompass single women and adjusted the abortion threshold considering recent medical breakthroughs. In addition, the USA recognised the right to privacy in 1891 whereas India recognised it in 2017 bringing the right to abortion under its wide ambit. While it may be said that these developments are late, it is undeniable that India is on the correct path despite the setbacks. On the other hand, the established good norms in the USA have been shaken with the recent trends on the judicial front which is concerning for the developed society of the nation.

    The governments in both the nations should focus on providing access to licit and safe abortion, which are integral to sexual and reproductive parity and public health issues. The legal systems must consider these rights as a fundamental part of the laws it enacts, the policies it inserts place and the programs it engenders. The responsibility additionally lies with civil society and development actors to raise these issues for public debate and demands.

    As mentioned earlier, the legal protections outlined in the judgements serve as a powerful call to defend and uphold women’s reproductive rights, defined as both reproductive health and autonomy, including for marginalised communities in future litigation.

    This post was originally published on LSE Human Rights.

  • After the Supreme Court Collegium revealed the Indian Government’s arguments against the recommendation of the Supreme Court Collegium regarding the appointment of an advocate, Saurabh Kirpal, because he is homosexual and purportedly a security threat, a discussion in India over the nomination of a man who would be the country’s first openly gay judge broke into rarely seen public exposure.

    From the year 2014 when homosexuals were officially given voting rights as the ‘third gender’ to the year 2019 when they were given equal recognition and status in the country, the journey for the LGBTQ community has been a bit turbulent. However, they still face prejudice and marginalization in India, despite these advancements. Transgender people, in particular, struggle to find educational, and employment prospects. According to National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) study in 2018, 96% of the LGBTQIA+ community is denied employment in every sphere of work. For the handful of them who gets work, they are either employed in low-paying jobs or undignified work like sex work and begging. Hence, while the parliament of India has proclaimed big promises for the employment of youth in the country, little heed has been paid to the struggles of the transgender community in the sphere of equal job opportunities.

    While homosexuality is no longer a crime in India, whether discrimination against transgender people has ended is a question that needs to be addressed by the executive and the judiciary in this country. On paper, it could be argued that the  Transgender Person (Protection of Rights) Act 2019 gave transgender people equal rights in the country, but much work needs to be done before these rights can be effectively enforced and respected by all. The Centre’s objections to Advocate Saurabh Kripal’s appointment as a judge demonstrate that the main issue is not a lack of legislation but rather the acceptance of the transgender community by those in positions of authority. The Collegium recommended Kirpal’s name four times earlier, but the Centre had always been against the appointment. The Centre, in defense, argues two points; that Kirpal’s sexual orientation as gay would lead to bias in decision-making; his unequivocal acceptance of an intimate relationship with a Swiss national might result in biases that would jeopardize the security of the nation.

    Moreover, Kirpal was a part of the legal team which represented LGBTQIA+ petitioners in the historic case named Navtej Singh Johar case[1], wherein the apex court decriminalized consensual sexual intercourse between adults of the same sex giving homosexuals the much-awaited right in the country, in turn, has contributed to the notion that the Centre holds against Kirpal about him being a bias against the transgender community. To negate the same, the authors would like to refer to the landmark Sabarimala Temple case[2] decision, where the main issue was whether women should be allowed to enter the Sabarimala temple to worship the deity. By the 4:1 vote, the Apex Court granted women the right to enter the temple over the prevailing religious customs and traditions. The point that should be focused on is that the dissenting opinion above came from none other than a woman judge itself named Hon’ble Justice Indu Malhotra, who recognized the tradition of the temple over that of women’s rights. If being a woman judge on a constitutional issue of women’s fundamental rights does not result in bias but rather in inclusivity and different perspectives, how can it be argued that being a gay judge will result in a bias towards the transgender community? On this, the Supreme Court Collegium correctly rejected the Centre’s objection, stating that Saurabh Kripal’s appointment as a High Court Judge will bring inclusivity and diversity to the bench.

    Additionally, it should be noted that Switzerland is a friendly nation, and the relationship would not have affected the nation’s security at any cost. Many persons holding high positions in public offices have foreign partners, but that has never questioned their credibility or jeopardized the interest of a nation. Such grounds for rejections are frivolous and a clear blow to the constitutional values of a country that recognizes the equality of every individual to choose his/her sexual orientation. Moreover, it is mentioned under Article 15(1) of the Constitution of India that the state shall not discriminate against any citizen based on sex. Under the Naz Foundation case[3], sexual orientation as an analogous ground was also introduced under Article 15(1), and the Centre’s act violates the very essence of this provision.

    The Centre’s statement comes at a time when countries worldwide recognize and elevate transgender people’s rights not only in the executive and administrative domains but also in the judicial domain. The appointment of Justice Edwin Cameron, the South African Constitutional Court, who came out as gay and has since served the nation admirably, is a fitting illustration of how India’s rich constitutional jurisprudence should be acknowledged. Moreover, in Bostock vs Clayton County, the US Supreme Court reiterated that it is impossible to treat discrimination based on sexual orientation or transgender status differently from that of sex and thereby deny legal protection against discrimination based on sex due to the words “sex,” “sexual orientation,” and “transgender status” being inextricably linked.

    While India’s stance to decriminalize same-sex relationships is commendable, the country still lacks the awareness and recognition to be able to execute the transgender act to the full extent. By reminding the Government of the proper legal position on the status of repeated recommendations, that is, that they are binding on the Government, the Collegium has taken a step ahead of acceptance and inclusivity of this community. Moreover, by enlisting the reiteration of recommendations and the centre response in the public domain, the Supreme Court has showcased that transparency in the legislative and judicial intersection is crucial for India to function democratically. The appointment of Advocate Saurabh Kripal as a High Court judge will open the doors of equal representation of the LGBTQ community.

    [1] Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1

    [2] Indian Young Lawyers Assn. v. State of Kerala, (2017) 10 SCC 689

    [3] Naz Foundation v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), (2016) 15 SCC 619

  • In Indonesian management prisons, women bringing their children to prison is  a vital issue. According to World Prison Brief’s assessment, Indonesia had the 21st highest jail occupancy rate out of 207 nations as of May 3, 2022, with a 208% occupancy rate for prisons or correctional institutions, putting Indonesia in fourth place in Asia.[1][2] With these conditions, there are many female prisoners and detainees that must be considered. Unfortunately, the lack of facilities and experienced human resources in correctional facilities is one of the factors that trigger the absence of health services for prisoners’ rights, including female prisoners, particularly those who are pregnant, nursing, or have specific healthcare and dietary requirements. Although internationally, several regulations attribute special attention to female prisoners. For instance, Rule 42 (2) of Bangkok Rules specifies that the prison regime should be flexible enough to respond to the needs of pregnant women, nursing mothers and women with children. Rule 42 (3) further notes that ‘particular efforts shall be made to provide appropriate programmes for pregnant women, nursing mothers and women with children in prison’.[3] However, despite this rule becoming a standard for Indonesian women’s prisons, not all of them follow it due to structural challenges, such as lack of facilities, infrastructure and human resources. Therefore, this rule’s implementation is only partially effective and not legally binding, meaning that many female prisoners and detainees do not receive the care they need.

    Moreover, there are no specific national-level regulations that manage women and girls’ rights, both in detention centers and prisons in Indonesia.[4] This is not only related to the reproductive health of incarcerated women, but also to the health and well-being of their infants; whereas, women’s right to health is protected in Article 4 of Law Number 36 of 2009 concerning Health.[5] Of the twelve places of detention surveyed, it was found that there were only Class IIA Women’s Prisons in Malang, Palembang, and Pondok Bambu that provided special toilet facilities for pregnant women. Another fact is that 5 of the 12 detention centers surveyed are not equipped with doctors, let alone obstetricians. Yet, an obstetrician could undoubtedly provide support to pregnant women so that they can give birth to children who are psychologically and physically healthy. Of the 12 detentions, only the Class IIA Malang Women’s Prison has met the overall needs of pregnant women.[6] These statistics  indicate that few of the rights of pregnant and nursing female prisoners are met; specifically, their health and well-being are at-risk.

    Moreover, in the event of an emergency, pregnant prisoners, who are required to be referred to the nearest hospital, are not easily transferred, even with the Social Health Insurance Agency. This discrepancy is due to the absence of a special budget for pregnant women. Usually, the polyclinic only provides blood-boosting vitamins for pregnant female prisoners.[7] The facilities that prisons offer also demonstrate a setting that is not suitable for rearing kids. There is only one nursing booth, located outside the residential block.[8] Although they are separated from other bedrooms, the bedrooms for pregnant women and kids take up one residential block. Children must grow up in an unfavorable environment, exposing them to violence, as they were raised by around 350 adults from different backgrounds using abusive words.[9] Even to meet their daily needs, ranging from food and milk to diapers, many female prisoners work as conveyors or some assistants to serve other, more wealthy inmates.[10]

    Women can keep their babies with them in prisons until they are three years of age, according to Law No.22 of 2022 concerning Corrections.[11]  However, other female prisoners are wholly separated from their children, and the impact is often visible on their mental health, stunting their children’s cognitive development.[12] For this reason, the access to proper facilities is crucial to ensure that pregnant prisoners and their children grow up in a healthier, more conducive environment.

    Additionally, punishment is another area that, if the prison is still unable to provide suitable facilities and medical personnel, can be altered. Instead of strict criminal penalties, law enforcement might impose alternative punishment on expectant and nursing mothers. For example, punishment against expectant women may be delayed until the baby is born or until they have finished weaning their children by the time they turn two. As for the children of female prisoners, there must be advocacy and awareness-raising regarding their rights, as well as a good support system when the child lives without his/her mother.

    [1] Monavia Ayu Rizalty (2022) ‘Penghuni Penjara Membludak, Ini umlah Narapidana di Indonesia’ [Online] Available at: https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2022/05/12/penghuni-penjara-membludak-ini-jumlah-narapidana-di-indonesia (Accessed: 11 November 2022)

    [2] Monavia Ayu Rizalty (2022) ‘Jumlah Narapidana Indonesia Terbanyak Keempat di Asia.’ [Online] Available at: https://dataindonesia.id/ragam/detail/jumlah-narapidana-indonesia-terbanyak-keempat-di-asia. (Accessed: 09 November 2022)

    [3] Aturan-aturan Bangkok. [online]. Available at: https://www.tijbangkokrules.org/pdf/Bangkok_Rules_Bahasa%20Indonesian.pdf (Accessed: 10 November 2022)

    [4] Yustina Mariana Neta & Heri Fernandez Butar-Butar. (2020) ‘Urgensi Pengaturan tentang Pemenuhan Hak dan Kebutuhan Dasar Perempuan di Lembaga Pemasyarakatan’ Indonesian Journal of Social Science Education (IJSSE), 4 (1) [online]. Available at: http://ejournal.iainbengkulu.ac.id/index.php/ijsse (Accessed 18 October 2022).

    [5] UU No. 36 Tahun 2009 Tentang kesehatan [Online] Available at: https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/38778/uu-no-36-tahun-2009 (Accessed: 07 November 2022)

    [6] Ryan Muthiara Wasti. (2022) Women in Detention: Memahami Hak dan Tanggung Jawab Negara [Online]. Available at: https://law.ui.ac.id/women-in-detention-memahami-hak-dan-tanggung-jawab-negara-oleh-ryan-muthiara-wasti/ (Accessed: 25 October 2022)

    [7] M. Aris Kurniawan. (2021) ‘Pemenuhan Hak Pelayanan Kesehatan Terhadap Narapidana Wanita Hamil Di Lapas/RutanJUSTITIA : Jurnal Ilmu Hukum dan Humaniora 8 (2) [Online] Available at: http://://jurnal.um-tapsel.ac.id/index.php/Justitia Accessed 25 October 2022

    [8] Jasmine Floretta. (2022) ‘Kasus Nikita Mirzani, Tebang Pilih Hukum, dan Hak Ibu Narapidana’ [Online] Available at: https://magdalene.co/story/kasus-nikita-mirzani-tebang-pilih-hukum-dan-hak-ibu-narapidana (Accessed: 23 October 2022)

    [9] Jasmine Floretta. (2022) ‘Kasus Nikita Mirzani, Tebang Pilih Hukum, dan Hak Ibu Narapidana’ [Online] Available at: https://magdalene.co/story/kasus-nikita-mirzani-tebang-pilih-hukum-dan-hak-ibu-narapidana (Accessed: 23 October 2022)

    [10] Amel (2019) ‘Sutradara Dokumenter Soroti Napi Perempuan yang Hamil dan Melahirkan di Penjara’ [Online] Available at: https://magdalene.co/story/sutradara-dokumenter-soroti-napi-perempuan-yang-hamil-dan-melahirkan-di-penjara (Accessed: 03 November 2022)

    [11] David Kurniawan (2022) ‘Setahun Ada 3 Napi Bawa Anak saat Jalani Hukuman di Lapas Perempuan’ [Online]. Available at: https://jogjapolitan.harianjogja.com/read/2022/09/06/513/1111003/setahun-ada-3-napi-bawa-anak-saat-jalani-hukuman-di-lapas-perempuan (Accessed: 10 November 2022)

    [12] Jasmine Floretta. (2022) ‘Kasus Nikita Mirzani, Tebang Pilih Hukum, dan Hak Ibu Narapidana’ [Online] Available at: https://magdalene.co/story/kasus-nikita-mirzani-tebang-pilih-hukum-dan-hak-ibu-narapidana (Accessed: 23 October 2022)

  • This month marks a year of conflict in Ukraine. Since Russian Forces launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine on the 24th February 2022, the world has seen a rise in digital evidence, such as videos, drones, satellite imagery and cutting-edge tools. Whilst this evidence may prove to be extremely efficient to denounce human rights violations and war crimes, there is also a growing risk of misleading information and falsehoods about the war. Amid this stream of information, it is crucial to use a clear methodology based on credible, authentic and ethical evidence-gathering and analysis[1], and to analyse and verify each piece of potential evidence.

    Maryna Slobodyanyuk is the Head of the investigation department at Truth Hounds, an NGO founded in 2014 by Ukrainian human rights defenders willing to document war crimes when hostilities started with Russian Forces invading the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine. Truth Hounds started conducting field missions in dangerous areas controlled by Russia, in order to uncover atrocities and violations of international humanitarian law, and to reveal the truth. With the development of new technologies in recent years, they started using open-source intelligence (OSINT) to conduct investigations. They implemented a database to register and transfer all cases of collected war crimes, with separate sections for alleged perpetrators and victims/survivors. The aim is to make each case as structured and complete as possible, and to connect different cases with similar characteristics, such as the same perpetrators, time, place, scale, and operational mode. After cross-cutting this information, it becomes possible to start identifying certain patterns related to war crimes.

    A woman walking next to a shelled building, Kharkiv, Ukraine, November 2022. This photo is copyright of the author (Lila Carrée).

     

    Truth Hounds, in cooperation with international organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, works on several investigation cases using digital technology. For instance, they are currently working on a 3D model and simulation of the destruction of the port city of Mariupol in the Donetsk Oblast region. Russian Forces started bombing Mariupol at the beginning of March 2022, as part of the Russian Eastern and Southern Ukraine strategic offensive, killing thousands of civilians by shelling residential buildings, stores, and public institutions, such as the theatre. Satellite images have shown the extent of the destruction caused by Russian bombs. Further, a model of the detonation was created to determine the model of explosive and weight of the blast, based on an analysis of aerial bombs used by Russia arsenal, and localisation of nearby Russian airfields. Experts found that the bombing was conducted by a fighters’ aircraft, a weapon extensively used in the South of Ukraine. After cross-cutting architectural plans, mathematical modelling, and satellite imagery, it was possible to reconstruct the attack, and to show that Russia intentionally targeted civilians, which would constitute a war crime under international law.

    Truth Hounds forms part of the 5am coalition, a network of human rights organisations devoted to documenting and gathering evidence of war crimes in Ukraine, through the use of new technologies. They are also submitting their findings to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which represents the first step to potentially bring a case to court. Further, Maryna has also started cooperating with local prosecutors in Ukraine, which might lead to faster and more efficient justice results compared to pursuing crimes at the international level. In 2018, a war department was created in the prosecutor’s office, with sub-departments dedicated to war crimes, investigation, and security in various regions of Ukraine, and OSINT training is now a new reality for prosecutors.

    Additionally, organisations use social media platforms such as Twitter, TikTok and Telegram to gather critical content, such as videos, photos and GPS locations. Russian soldiers and military staff tend to publish their photos and locations without realising that experts can use them to uncover key elements. Thanks to innovative apps such as SunCalc, researchers can ascertain the sun’s movement using interactive maps, sunrise and sunset times and shadow length, enabling them to track the position of Russian soldiers at a specific time and location, and to discard manipulated narratives often used by Russia. Using cross-platform searches, they can trace and follow up digital footprints of perpetrators and see if they intend to cross borders, which is incredibly useful when using universal justice mechanisms, such as international criminal tribunals and courts.

    Dalila Mujagic, legal advisor at Witness, a U.S.-based NGO, works on the intersection of technology and international criminal law. She believes visual evidence is a powerful resource to document and denounce war crimes. Indeed, it is worth recalling that back in 1945, video footage was used as evidence at the Nuremberg Trials. 50 years later, a video of a mass execution of Bosnians during the Srebrenica massacre was revealed during the trial of former Serbian president, Slobodan Milošević and from 2011 in Syria, human-rights focused technology was used for the first time by individual activists. New technologies revolutionise human rights abuses investigations. Nevertheless, with the flow of photos, videos and posts coming out of Ukraine, it is difficult to recognise what is authentic and what is not.

    To address this, Dalila works with the Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group to train people on the ground to capture footage of potential crimes. Recently, the ‘5 tips for filing human rights abuses in Ukraine’[2], an infographic on what to consider before sharing on social media, was released, and downloaded more than 3000 times in just 2 weeks. Witness works with partners on the ground, to help them capture and preserve trusted and authentic video footage of human rights crimes. As Benjamin Powers, technology reporter for Grid disclosed in an interview with the author, “it is essential to have a 360-degree approach when capturing footage, with metadata and key details like shadows, landmarks, military items. Footages need to be contextualised to be useful for investigators or future legal proceedings”. Even though a single video cannot be an admissible piece of evidence, it can be a key piece of the puzzle, alongside other proofs: “We need to think of all the puzzle pieces we collect, one by one, to create the bigger picture” (Maryna Slobodyanyuk).

    These technological tools can prove to be very powerful and accurate, enabling experts to collect crucial clues, find key evidence, uncover violations of the laws of war, as well as eliminating misinformation and propaganda, as Benjamin recalls. The aim of organisations investigating human rights crimes and abuses is to collect legal evidence that can be admissible in court before they disappear from the web. As Maryna states: “I want our investigations to be strong and admissible enough to become an official prejudicial argument”. To support that goal, the University of California at Berkeley’s Human Rights Center developed a protocol for using OSINT that can be admissible in courts, and Bellingcat, a Netherlands-based investigative journalism group specialised in fact-checking and open-source intelligence, keeps compiling incidents that have resulted in potential attacks on civilians in Ukraine. Furthermore, Starling Lab, an academic research lab supported by Stanford University, uses Web3 technology[3] – the same blockchain technology that underlies cryptocurrency and Non-fungible tokens (NFTs) – to document alleged war crimes through cryptography tools[4] such as encrypted and secured communication and face recognition softwares.

    Technology has drastically changed the ways of warfare, including how criminal investigations are conducted. As Benjamin affirms: “It is absolutely crucial to gather evidence, making sure it never gets lost”. This new way of collecting evidence marks a radical shift and is drastically evolving with the web native Gen Z, who use new methods to simultaneously capture, absorb and share information on human rights abuses online. This real-time speed and exposure of information exacerbates misinformation, but it also means that there are more and more eyes on the conflict, with real-time monitoring of attacks.

    Even though digital records of war crimes have been used in other conflicts, the use of open-source investigation evidence in the Ukraine war takes this to a higher scale. We are witnessing a systematic effort from various stakeholders that is new in the modern history of war. Ultimately, as Maryna affirms, “the goal is to fight against impunity, and to see that alleged criminals are sentenced and fully recognized in the face of the world, facing the consequences of their acts”. Open-source evidence is crucial in complex cases, and in the development of international law, enabling the achievement of justice. And even though international war-crimes cases are very difficult to prosecute, collecting evidence via digital tools on atrocities is also a powerful defence tool against propaganda and disinformation and creates historical testimonies. The conflict in Ukraine may be technology’s greatest legal test in future war crimes cases.

    Author: Lila Carrée.

    Editors: Hayley D’Souza and Kamil Hazbun-Muñoz

    Sources:

    Interviews

    • Interview with Maryna Slobodyanyuk in-person in Kyiv, November 2022
    • Interview with Dalila Mujagic via phone call, November 2022
    • Interview with Benjamin Powers via phone call, November 2022

    Articles

     

    [1] Murad Code: https://www.muradcode.com/

    [2] https://library.witness.org/product/5-tips-ukraine/

    [3] https://ethereum.org/en/web3/

    [4] https://www.jstor.org/stable/1135885

  • The route to social justice in India is steeped in dichotomy; one that is wadded with U-turns and dead ends that set its progress several decades back every so often. Even as the nation is all set to appoint its first “openly gay” judge in independent history, conservative backlash against NCERT’s pathbreaking teacher training manual titled “Inclusion of Transgender Children in School Education: Concerns and Roadmap” and its consequent withdrawal has once again given public morality the upper hand over its constitutional counterpart and failed to protect fundamental rights of an entire social community.

    When an incredibly diverse population is straitjacketed as binary and heteronormative, any attempts at spreading awareness are dubbed as “exposure”, while attempts at making educational curricula more inclusive are parroted as against the “cultural fabric of the nation.” Section 29(a) of the Right to Education Act1 asks academic authorities to conform with the values enshrined in our Constitution. And for the first time, a national level body sought to address a gender-biased, discriminatory school culture and replace it with a sensitised and gender diversity-informed teaching base, thereby aligning it with constitutional values of equality, liberty and justice. While it may very well appease a number of people, the move to withdraw the Module falls in direct contradiction to not only Fundamental Rights as guaranteed by the Constitution but also the United Nations Convention on Rights of the Child2, to which India stands signatory to since 1992. The Convention’s primary goal is to view every child as a complete human, worthy of independent thought and self-expression, bolstered by principles of non-discrimination, right to live with dignity and holistic development. By suppressing information that is vital for transgender and non-binary children to feel accepted, heard and safe, their birth rights are very cunningly controversialised and served up for debate.

    Apart from international conventions, the validity of the withdrawal can further be juxtaposed with domestic judicial pronouncements. While originally envisaged in the context of rights of illegitimate children, the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s 1997 Gaurav Jain judgement3 can be effectively used to protect transgender and gender non-conforming children’s fundamental rights to life, dignity, equal opportunity and holistic integration into mainstream society- “(The) children have the right to equality of opportunity, dignity and care, protection and rehabilitation by the society with both hands open to bring them into the mainstream of social life without pre-stigma affixed on them for no fault of theirs… Abandoning the children, excluding good foundation of life for them, is a crime against humanity.” The Court, in the same judgement reinforced the 10 principals of The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child4 and asked the relevant state authorities to closely adhere to it. Similarly, in National Commission for Child Rights v Rajesh Kumar5, the Court directed the Central and various State-level Child Rights Commissions (NCCR) to effectively implement provisions of the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act6 that gives notable recognition to “children in need of special care and protection including children in distress, marginalised and disadvantaged children.”

    In a binary-coded heteronormative society, intrinsic parts of what makes one human such as personhood, self-expression and dignity are often entrapped within binary-gendered bodies. This is the root cause of constant alienation of trans folks from their supposedly “inalienable” rights. When certain bodies are dehumanised and subjected to unending scrutiny and stigmatisation, their suppression of (self) expression too becomes rather digestible. Trans children are victims of consistent institutional gaslighting and cultural invisibalisation which severely hinders their right to participate and engage in socio-educational contexts that are fulfilling, inclusive and pro-dialogue. It thus also becomes the NCCR’s duty to demand bringing back the NCERT Manual and ensure trans and gender non-conforming children are not robbed off their fundamental right to a dignified and secure life.

    As Kofi Annan once very eloquently put it- “There is no trust more sacred than the one the world holds with children. There is no duty more important than ensuring that their rights are respected, that their welfare is protected, that their lives are free from fear and want and that they can grow up in peace.”

    This post was originally published on LSE Human Rights.

  • The COVID-19 vaccine’s rapid development and approval offered relief to nations around the world. However, of the 1.5 billion doses that have been distributed to date, 75% of the vaccine supply was acquired by 10 countries alone.[1] Rich countries managed to buy stocks to vaccinate their population several times over, while poor countries are still struggling to vaccinate their healthcare workers. In the African continent, with a population of over 1.36 billion, less than 25 million doses were supplied.  The World Health Organization (WHO) calls the issue of vaccine inequity and injustice “not a mere moral failure, but an economic and human rights catastrophe and self-defeating”.[2] The COVID-19 crisis has led to the growing realization that shortage of many vital medications, vaccines, and raw materials is not inevitable, but rather a result of business and government policies and actions.[3]

    International law recognizes ‘health’ as a fundamental human right, and Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) grants, “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” Article 12 mandates that states who are a party to the convention take necessary steps to consider the right to health important with respect to prevention, treatment, and control of epidemic and other diseases. the convention should also necessarily protect the right to health of other states and see that third parties in those states do not violate this right on any grounds. Under the control of disease, for example, individuals and states must promote disease control techniques like immunization programmes. Such an initiative will only be successful once states cooperate in this international dimension. This can be done by setting up bodies by the States party to the ICESR and UDHR in various countries to support those directly affected. Tracking the responses received by these bodies will help parties to the convention to appropriately communicate with those affected by human rights violations thereby acting as a channel to help mitigate[4] potential human rights impacts. In the COVID era, this becomes essential, since such an international perspective means states party to the ICESCR are precluded from hindering other States’ access to COVID-19 vaccines, and such actions are to be treated as an emergency. But recent studies on vaccine inequity prove that states are currently violating this principle.

    There are several challenges associated with realizing the right to health in the context of vaccine inequity. Many countries have not ratified legal instruments that emphasize right to health like the ICESCR, making it, along with the paucity of international jurisprudence on vaccination, difficult to enforce.[5] With the lack of a strong law, citizens may not be able raise their claims concerning vaccination and right to health before bodies concerned.

    The WHO created the COVAX programme, with the aim of providing access to COVID- 19 vaccines. When looking at the disparities in vaccination rates, it is evident that the programme failed to achieve its goals. The failure was primarily due to the exclusion of low- income countries from decision making, bilateral deals, vaccine nationalism and corporate decisions.[6]

    COVAX has been accused of excluding organizations representing the interests of poorer countries from its top-tier deliberations, therefore depriving those who are most desperate of a voice. Rather than procuring vaccines through the COVAX program, which many developing countries were willing to do, several high-income countries, such as the United Kingdom, US, Canada, and even some upper-middle-income countries, such as Russia,[7] entered into bilateral deals with pharmaceutical companies, who have the authority to decide who gets access to medical developments.[8] Such deals aided in developing leading COVID vaccines in a short period of time, but also increased vaccine inequity giving rise to the issue of “vaccine hoarding” or “vaccine nationalism” as these arrangements determined where those vaccines would go. Due to these bilateral deals, there was no motivation for these countries to join COVAX, but without them COVAX’s entire concept would fail. To prevent that outcome, affluent countries were allowed to join COVAX while maintaining their bilateral deals. The US and UK promised to donate their surplus doses, but there is no clarity on how many doses pledged have been delivered till date. This illustrates that the aim of a global collaborative vaccination allocation process failed, and decisions taken by the wealthier countries determined where the vaccines would go.[9] In the US, The Defense Production Act was also invoked 18 times during the Trump administration and once under Biden. This resulted in exports of crucial raw materials ceasing, meaning they were not available for other nations.[10]

    In the last two decades, pharmaceutical corporations decided not to register or sell their medicine in developing countries like Africa, South-East Asia, and many more because it was not financially viable, despite apparent medical needs and demand for the product.[11] With COVID-19 vaccines and other essential medical technology, supply controls over where to make items available has become a daily reality. The COVID-19 era could be said to be a repetition of a battle between developing countries and rich countries who protected pharmaceuticals in their countries during the HIV epidemic.[12]

    The existing health innovation and access ecosystem seem to be driven by selfishness and political agendas, leading to the creation of surplus vaccines in a few countries while the others struggle to acquire doses. This shows that there is a breakdown in values, as human rights are being jeopardized in the name of wealth and competition. People in those countries may eventually lose faith in institutions that work to eliminate human rights violations and their governments. One of the effective moves taken to address vaccine inequity is World Trade Organization (WTO) members agreement on a TRIPS waiver, a deal to remove intellectual property (IP) barriers around patents for COVID-19 vaccines, boosting their manufacture and easing access.[13]

    To eradicate vaccine inequity, rich countries must stop hoarding vaccines and pharmaceutical companies need to make intellectual property like patent and health technologies available to other nations as well. The WHO can set up committees to monitor vaccine distribution in every nation, helping to keep track of the various doses administered, and reduce vaccine wastage. Along with setting up committees, investing in Research & Development, and local production not having IP barriers in such situations is vital. The TRIPS waiver proposal raised at the WTO is a good start,[14] but it should not just be for COVID-19. When nations experience similar challenges in the future, such a measure should still be implemented.

    BIBLIOGRAPHY

    Articles

    1. Muizz Akhtar, Is Covax finally going to vaccinate the world? VOX (June 11, 2021, 6:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/22872438/covax-omicron-covid-19-vaccine-global-inequity.
    2. Kai Kupferschmidt, Vaccine nationalism threatens global plan to distribute COVID-19 shots fairly, 2 SCIENCE 1 (2020), https://www.scienceopen.com/document?vid=66ec3dd6-c881-4994-a309-e369df0ccecb.
    3. Els Torreele & Joseph J. Amon, Equitable COVID-19 Vaccine Access, 23 HHR 273, 274-276 (2021).
    4. Gaelle Krikorian & Els Torreele, We Cannot Win the Access to Medicines Struggle Using the Same Thinking That Causes the Chronic Access Crisis, 23 HHR 273, 119, 121 (2021).
    5. Sirleaf, Matiangai, Disposable lives: COVID 19, Vaccines, and the Uprising, 121 CLR 71, 75 (2021).
    6. Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, The COVID-19 Vaccine Dilemma, 6 ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 49, 52 (2020).
    7. Andrew Green, WTO finally agrees on a TRIPS deal. But not everyone is happy. DEVEX (August 8, 2022, 7:30 PM), https://www.devex.com/news/wto-finally-agrees-on-a-trips-deal-but-not-everyone-is-happy-103476.

     

    Online Resources

    1. Roser & E. Ortiz-Ospina, COVID19 vaccine doses administered, OURWORLDINDATA.ORG (Nov 6, 2021, 9:00 PM), https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cumulative-covid-vaccination.
    2. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, COVID-19 and the right to development: A call for international solidarity, OHCR (Nov 6, 2021, 10:00 PM), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/COVID19-Right-to-development.aspx.
    3. Ainslie Pierrynowski, Vaccine Inequity and International Human Rights Law, ULTRAVIRES (Nov 4, 2021, 6:30 PM), https://ultravires.ca/2021/09/vaccine-inequity-and-international-human-rights-law/
    4. https://ultravires.ca/2021/09/vaccine-inequity-and-international-human-rights-law/
    5. Kupferschmidt, Vaccine nationalism threatens global plan to distribute COVID-19 shots fairly, Science Magazine (2020), www. sciencemag.org/news/2020/07/vaccine-nationalism-threatens-global-plan-distribute-covid-19-shots-fairly.
    6. Members pursue convergence for an IP COVID-19 response, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, (Nov 8, 2021).

     

    [1] M. Roser & E. Ortiz-Ospina, COVID19 vaccine doses administered, OURWORLDINDATA.ORG (Nov 6, 2021, 9:00 PM), https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cumulative-covid-vaccination.

    [3] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, COVID-19 and the right to development: A call for international solidarity, OHCR (Nov 6, 2021, 10:00 PM), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/COVID19-Right-to-development.aspx.

    [4]Ainslie Pierrynowski, Vaccine Inequity and International Human Rights Law, ULTRAVIRES (Nov 4, 2021, 6:30 PM),  https://ultravires.ca/2021/09/vaccine-inequity-and-international-human-rights-law/.

    [5] https://ultravires.ca/2021/09/vaccine-inequity-and-international-human-rights-law/.

    [6] Muizz Akhtar, Is Covax finally going to vaccinate the world? VOX (June 11, 2021, 6:30 PM),  https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/22872438/covax-omicron-covid-19-vaccine-global-inequity.

    [7] Els Torreele & Joseph J. Amon, Equitable COVID-19 Vaccine Access, 23 HHR 273, 274-276 (2021).

    [8] K. Kupferschmidt, Vaccine nationalism threatens global plan to distribute COVID-19 shots fairly, Science Magazine (2020), www. sciencemag.org/news/2020/07/vaccine-nationalism-threatens-global-plan-distribute-covid-19-shots-fairly.

    [9] Gaelle Krikorian & Els Torreele, We Cannot Win the Access to Medicines Struggle Using the Same Thinking That Causes the Chronic Access Crisis, 23 HHR 273, 119, 121 (2021).

    [11] Sirleaf, Matiangai, Disposable lives: COVID 19, Vaccines, and the Uprising, 121 CLR 71, 75 (2021).

    [12] Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, The COVID-19 Vaccine Dilemma, 6 ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 49, 52 (2020).

    [13] Andrew Green, WTO finally agrees on a TRIPS deal. But not everyone is happy. DEVEX (August 8, 2022, 7:30 PM), https://www.devex.com/news/wto-finally-agrees-on-a-trips-deal-but-not-everyone-is-happy-103476.

    [14] Members pursue convergence for an IP COVID-19 response, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, (Nov 8, 2021).

  • INTRODUCTION

    On 24 June 2022, the United States Supreme Court declared in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization that there is not any constitutional right to abortion, reversing Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey—two landmark decisions which had affirmed American’s right to access abortions.

    Since the Dobbs decision, there has been much discussion over the widespread use of period tracking apps, which according to a report by Consumer Reports are used by around 50 million women worldwide. It has been cautioned by some advocates that law enforcement in states where abortion is criminalised can and would subpoena the data obtained by these apps to be used as evidence of a terminated pregnancy in an effort to combat self-managed abortions, despite the fact that such abortions are medically identical to miscarriages. Period trackers could, theoretically, share user information with law enforcement if faced with requests.

    ABORTION AND PRIVACY RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL WORLD

    It is worth mentioning that the right to privacy and the right to have an abortion are two rights that are intertwined in the legal system of the United States, despite the fact that they may seem to be unrelated at first look. This is because the decision in Roe v. Wade, which was handed down in 1973, states that the right to abortion originates from the constitutional right to privacy that is provided by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    It is well-established that the criminalisation of abortion forces women to turn to illegal and frequently dangerous procedures. But in the digital era, restricted access to reproductive care has also bred worries about privacy. Privacy advocates worry that state and local governments may use sensitive information, such as data about menstrual cycles and reproductive health from period-tracking apps, search histories and even text messages to identify and punish women who seek abortions in the wake of the Dobbs ruling. Many of these period tracking applications also work in the AdTech sector and employ business strategies that generate income by selling users’ sensitive information.

    The increased criminalisation of reproductive health care has serious ramifications for the lack of robust digital privacy protections for health apps, such as period trackers. In 2019, Privacy International published a study highlighting  how certain popular period tracking applications were sharing the data they acquired with Facebook for advertisement purposes. In a different study, Privacy International requested data from five period tracking applications in order to examine these apps’ adherence to GDPR standards, including the right of access to one’s data and to observe how users’ data was being used and shared. When the researchers tried to access their own data, only two apps responded, and even then, their data was occasionally shared with outside parties. In 2021, a complaint was filed against the widely-used app Flo, alleging that “app events,” or app data shared to third parties for various reasons, had been used to disclose sensitive health information, such as the confirmation of a user’s pregnancy, to third parties. After Dobbs, privacy advocates and women’s rights organisations worry that state officials will now have access to and be free to exploit this data.

    These concerns are not unfounded. In one widely reported instance, a Mississippi mother who gave birth to a stillborn child at home was accused of murder because she had looked up abortion medications online. In another instance, prosecutors used a woman’s text messages as evidence that her miscarriage was in fact a self-induced abortion, and she was given a 20-year prison term for feticide. Her conviction was ultimately overturned, but only after she had served three years in prison.

    According to a recent investigation by Reveal and The Markup, anti-abortion groups used Facebook’s advertising tools, which collect data from large portions of the internet—including some hospitals—to monitor people seeking abortion services, in spite of Meta’s rules prohibiting the collection of such information. According to the investigation, data gathered by the organisations was also shared with various anti-abortion marketing businesses, allowing them to target advertisements to “abortion-minded women.” While there have been no confirmed cases thus far of period trackers being used in prosecutions of abortions, the data collected by digital health applications, such as period trackers, is potentially subject to subpoena and therefore could be used by law enforcement as evidence of abortion in jurisdictions where the practise is now illegal.

    SCOPE OF EXISTING DATA PRIVACY LAWS

    Before the Dobbs decision was finalised, lawmakers urged Google and the Federal Trade Commission to guarantee that in the event of such a decision, data for online patients seeking care would be protected. The letters were sent after Politico reported on a draft of the Dobbs ruling that had been leaked, indicating that the Supreme Court was preparing to overturn Roe. In many areas of the United States, a routine, safe medical procedure was swiftly made illegal by the repeal of federal abortion rights, and routine medical information was transformed into evidence that could be used against people who might have had an abortion.

    Medical privacy laws in the United states, the most significant of which is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), do not prevent subpoenas or warrants for medical records data, and as a result, doctors are permitted to reveal medical information if they have reason to believe that a crime has been committed. The majority of patients do not possess their own medical records, and patients have clear ownership rights over their medical records in only one state, New Hampshire. In  other states, the laws expressly state that hospitals or medical providers are the owners of the records, though people must be able to view their own complete medical records in accordance with HIPAA. One could believe that the HIPAA safeguards the medical information of abortion-seeking women. However, the law is deficient in this area, and patients’ privacy is not completely protected.

    Experts in health law, Kayte Spector-Bagdady and Michelle Mello, suggested three scenarios where HIPAA would fall short of protecting patients’ privacy. These include using medical records of a patient to prove that they are seeking an abortion, using medical facility records to prove that the medical facility is at fault and using online activity data to prove that a patient is seeking an abortion. US senators recently urged the Department of Human and Health Services (HHS) to address this problem and safeguard patients’ reproductive healthcare information. After that, the HHS Office of Civil Rights published guidance outlining ways that people could protect their health information while using cell phones and tablets. The guidance also advised healthcare professionals that the privacy rule under HIPAA would prevent them from disclosing information about abortion-related incidents unless required to do so by State law. Additionally, it was stated in the guidance that healthcare providers were not required to divulge a patient’s personal health information absent a court order or subpoena from law enforcement. The HHS has been urged by the US senators to take additional action, including using their administrative authority to update the HIPAA privacy rule, identify the covered entities, restrict the circumstances under which these entities may share information about reproductive health or abortion, and make it clear that healthcare information cannot be shared with law enforcement agencies that may be targeting women seeking abortions.

    Surprisingly, because they do not qualify as covered companies, period-tracking apps are not subjected to HIPAA regulations, which enables them to freely monetise the data they gather. As a result, many menstrual apps in the US have been found to exchange data with outside parties, and advertisers use information like a user’s desire for a child or desire to avoid having one to display advertisements for fertility or abortion clinics. Thus, the lack of adequate regulations concerning the use of health data by period tracking apps raises serious concerns about users’ digital privacy in the wake of the Dobbs decision.

    CONCLUSION

    The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization highlights the need for  tech corporations to recognise their own power and the elevated significance of user privacy. We currently live in a world where we leave unparalleled digital fingerprints. The data-sharing tactics of period-tracking apps can exacerbate issues for women and those who procreate, but they can also aid in the diagnosis of diseases, like polycystic ovarian syndrome. Some apps assist in the creation of reports that can be shared with medical practitioners, which makes opting out more difficult and unpleasant, especially for users without access to health insurance or other forms of medical assistance. Today, Protected Health Information (PHI) is gathered, stored, communicated and guarded in quite different ways than it was  when HIPAA was passed more than 25 years ago. As new technological advancements and data storage techniques take hold, providers and patients alike are discovering that HIPAA’s patient privacy protections are less comprehensive than previously believed.

    Following are  suggestions in order to address some of the problems with period tracking software collecting personal data:

    • Strengthen the security system: Companies are required to inform the period tracking application users of the security precautions and procedures that will be used to protect their data, which might include conducting compliance reports of the data laws prevailing in the countries where their services are available.
    • Users must also be made aware of any breaches or hacks and provided with information about how much their data has been impacted, which might also include sending data breach notifications to its users.
    • User rights should not be restricted, and data fiduciaries should not have the authority to refuse users’ requests outright.

     

    REFERENCE LIST

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    2. ‌Rosato, D. (2020). What Your Period Tracker App Knows About You. [online] Consumer Reports. Available at: https://www.consumerreports.org/health-privacy/what-your-period-tracker-app-knows-about-you-a8701683935/ [Accessed 28 Nov. 2022].
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    This post was originally published on LSE Human Rights.