Author: Castan Centre

  • By Paula Gerber and Ronli Sifris

    Transgender people once again find themselves in the middle of a media storm, stemming from a clash between anti-trans groups (including neo-Nazis) and trans and gender-diverse (TGD) people in front of Parliament House in Melbourne on 18 March.

    The initial spark was when British woman Kellie-Jay Keen-Minshull, also known as Posie Parker, brought her anti-trans “Let Women Speak” rally to the steps of Victoria’s parliament.

    Keen-Minshull has held similar rallies in other cities around the world, but this particular event took a violent turn when a group of about 20 neo-Nazis turned up in support of the anti-trans rally.

    Clad in black and performing the Nazi salute, a fire of hatred, intolerance and bigotry was unleashed on the doorstep of the symbol of Victoria’s democracy.

    This isn’t the first time Posie Parker (and her movement) has been linked with white nationalists, but the Melbourne event exposed this unholy alliance to the general public.

    What happened in Melbourne last Saturday, and the anti-trans voices and actions taken by high-profile politicians and political candidates such as Katherine Deves and Mark Latham, take a significant toll on the trans community, particularly young TGD people.

    There’s a significant body of scholarly research showing that TGD people have poorer mental health outcomes than their peers. Stigma, discrimination, exclusion, negative media commentary and hateful public attacks all contribute to psychological harm and poor mental health among vulnerable trans youth.

    A path of transphobic hate

    The anti-trans rallies Keen-Minshull is leading across Australia have fuelled concerns we may be going down the same path of transphobic hate currently evident in the US and UK.

    Thirty-six of the 50 states that comprise the US have introduced bills that seek to marginalise trans people and fundamentally breach their human rights.

    Most of the proposed laws target trans youth – seeking to prevent trans girls and women from playing on female sports teams, banning TGD persons from using bathrooms and locker rooms that align with their gender identity, and denying access to gender-affirming medical care.

    The most recent example of the enactment of such laws is in Kentucky, where earlier this month, a bill was passed that’s has been described as the worst anti-trans law in the country, not only banning gender-affirming healthcare for trans youth, but also requiring doctors to de-transition young trans people, and preventing schools from discussing gender identity or sexual orientation with students of any age.


    Read more: Mark Latham’s controversial anti-trans kids bill hits constitutional roadblock


    In the UK, the rights of trans people have similarly become a highly divisive political issue. In December 2022, Scotland passed the Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill, which removed barriers for transgender people to legally change their gender. There was overwhelming support for this law reform, with the legislation passing with 86 votes in favour, and 39 against.

    However, in January, the UK government, in an unprecedented move, vetoed the bill. Nancy Kelley, the CEO of the LGBTIQ+ advocacy group Stonewall, said the veto decision “treats trans people as a threat to be contained, not citizens to be respected”

    What can Australia do?

    There are many steps we can – and should – take to ensure that Australia doesn’t go down the anti-trans path the US and UK are pursuing.

    First, we need to strengthen our laws to better-protect the dignity and rights of TGD people. This includes:

    • ensuring nationally consistent laws that allow trans people to change their birth certificate to reflect their gender identity without having to undergo invasive medical or surgical procedures
    • enacting human rights legislation, such as a federal human rights act, to safeguard the fundamental human rights of TGD people (Australia is the only Western nation without a national bill of rights)
    • strengthening legal protections against hate speech and vilification, not only by banning the Nazi salute (as Dan Andrews has proposed), but by enacting broader legislation to cover other forms of vilification.

    In addition to law reform, we need to increase understanding of, and respect for, TGD people.

    This can happen in a number of ways. For example, in schools, in addition to learning about important issues such as consent, and sexual and reproductive health, students should also be learning to respect the rights of all people to be treated with dignity and equality, regardless of their sexual orientation, gender identity, sex characteristics, religion, race or disability.

    We also need a comprehensive public awareness campaign promoting understanding and acceptance of TGD people.

    This could initially be focused on key dates such as International Women’s Day (8 March), Trans Day of Visibility (31 March), and Transgender Day of Remembrance (20 November), which recognises the many trans people who have been killed in transphobic hate crimes.

    Drawing on existing resources

    Australia doesn’t have to reinvent the wheel when it comes to developing such campaigns. Many resources already exist that Australia can draw upon in developing such campaigns, including the United Nations’ Unbox Me campaign.

    We must be proactive in ensuring that Australia doesn’t mirror the transphobic environment on display in the US and UK.

    We should look to our Pacific neighbours for guidance on how to better-respect and embrace gender diversity.

    The respect that the Faʻafafine community enjoys in Samoa, and the Fakaleitis in Tonga, would be a welcome relief for TGD people in Australia, after the recent violence and poison that they’ve been subjected to here.


    Professor Paula Gerber is a Professor in the Monash University Faculty of Law and an Academic Member of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law.

    Dr Ronli Sifris is a Senior Lecturer in Monash University’s Faculty of Law and Deputy Director of Education at the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law.

    This article was originally published in the Monash Lens. Read the original article.

  • By Paula Gerber and Riki Lane

    Since the early 1900s, women have used International Women’s Day (IWD) to demand equality; fight for equal pay, better workplace conditions, and the right to vote. In 2023, IWD continues to be a platform to advocate for women’s rights, and it is more important than ever to remember that this day is for, and about, ALL women, not just cisgender women.  

    To mark IWD, Hershey, the chocolate company, recently released a video featuring a trans woman calling for a future where every woman can live as their honest, authentic self. Such publicity campaigns can be criticised as tokenistic, if they are not backed up by actual changes in corporate policies and procedures. However, the fierce backlash that followed is a painful illustration of how far we still have to go when it comes to respecting the dignity and worth of all women, regardless of their gender identity. The ad provoked an immediate anti-trans campaign on social media, using the hashtag #BoycottHersheys. This is not altogether surprising given the current conservative-led anti-trans sentiment in the US, and the significant increase in anti-trans laws and policies across many parts of that country.

    Efforts to exclude transwomen from International Women’s Day run contrary to its very essence, which is to unite women and fight for equal rights. IWD has never been about only cisgender women, and was never intended to be a divisive campaign. Rather, IWD is an opportunity to focus on ending discrimination for all women, which requires a focus on working class women; marginalised women; women of different races and religions, women with disabilities, First Nations women, and women with diverse sexual orientations, gender identities, and sex characteristics. The women’s movement is stronger and more relevant when it represents all women, not just middle class, white, cis-gender women. The attainment of reproductive rights reform in Argentina is illustrative of this. Trans activists united with the feminist/women’s movement to successfully campaign for the legalisation of abortion in that country.

    Australia likes to think of itself as a leader when it comes to respecting the human rights of LGBTIQ+ people, pointing to its comprehensive laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity (with exceptions for faith-based organisations). But scratch the service and Australia still has a long way to go before it can claim to respect the dignity and equality of transgender persons. While we are not seeing the wave of anti-trans laws that are sweeping across America, Australia has not yet embraced equal rights for trans people. This is seen in the social discrimination and hostility that trans people continue to face, often leading to loss of employment, friends, and family connections.

    Across Australia, laws around changing gender markers  – for example on birth certificates – vary greatly.  In Victoria, a person wanting to change the sex on their birth certificate so that it aligns with their gender identity, need only provide a statutory declaration stating that their sex is the one nominated in the application and a supporting statement from a person who has known them for 12 months. This is in stark contrast with Western Australia, where a Gender Reassignment Boardassesses every individual application, and New South Wales, where a person can only change their birth certificate if they have undergone a “sex affirmation procedure,” in other words, surgery. This is often an insurmountable barrier, given that most gender-affirming surgical procedures are not covered by Medicare, and thus can be prohibitively expensive.

    Accessing gender affirming health care can be hard due to the low number of health care professionals who have received appropriate training. Additionally, public health provision is uncommon, and when it is available usually involves long waitlists – currently over 17 months at the Monash Health Gender Clinic.

    Respect for the inherent dignity of transgender persons could be improved by public awareness raising campaigns and education around gender diversity, including in health care settings. There are many excellent programs that Australia could draw on for inspiration, including the Unbox Me campaign that the United Nations launched last year, resources collated by Human Rights Campaign, and empirical research that shares the opinions of trans people about what they think would help increase general awareness and support for their community.

    It’s time to return International Women’s Day to its roots. Let’s have fewer celebratory morning teas and more strident protests about the real issues that women face every day – sexual assault, harassment, domestic violence, and gendered discrimination in workplaces. Let’s talk honestly and openly about the barriers to equality that marginalised women face, including racism, ableism and laws, policies, and attitudes that exclude transwomen from leading lives of dignity and equality. Let’s use this IWD to amplify the voices of the many women whose stories and experiences rarely get told, and let’s use the other 364 days of the year to work towards taking concrete action to achieve equality for ALL women.


    Professor Paula Gerber is a Professor in the Monash University Faculty of Law and an Academic Member of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law.

    Dr Riki Lane is a researcher in trans health and primary care. They are a Research Fellow at Monash University’s Department of General Practice and is also a Project/Research Worker at the Monash Health Gender Clinic.

    This article is republished from the Australian Outlook, the blog of the Australian Institute of International Affairs under a Creative Commons Licence. Read the original article.

  • By Katie O’Bryan and Paula Gerber

    The Uluru Statement from the Heart is a generous invitation to all Australians from First Nations peoples to walk together towards a better future. Having a referendum on a First Nations Voice to Parliament is the first step on that walk; a chance to change the Constitution to enable First Nations people to be heard in matters that affect them.

    It’s that simple. Yet there are many myths and misconceptions muddying the waters, whether intentional or not. Here, we seek to debunk 10 of them.

    Myth 1

    It will amount to a third chamber of Parliament and therefore impact parliamentary sovereignty, a fundamental element of our constitutional system of government.

    What is proposed is a Voice to Parliament, not a Voice inParliament. It will have no role in passing legislation; that will continue to be left to our elected representatives in the House of Representatives and the Senate, as currently prescribed by the Constitution.

    The proposed Constitutional amendment states that the Voice “may make representations” to Parliament. It will be up to Parliament to decide what it does with those representations. Indeed, the proposed Voice to Parliament is a very conservative change to our Constitution.

    Myth 2

    It will be a lawyers’ picnic, and lead to lots of High Court challenges.

    How Parliament responds (or does not respond) to any representations made by the Voice would be non-justiciable – that is, it could not be subject to any court challenge. This is because the courts have always been reluctant to interfere with the internal workings of Parliament.

    Myth 3

    It will not help to close the gap or have a positive impact on the lives of First Nations peoples.

    The Voice will provide advice to the Parliament on proposed laws affecting First Nations peoples. Accordingly, Parliament will be better-informed about the impact of the proposed laws on First Nations peoples, and can amend where appropriate. A better-informed Parliament is likely to lead to better laws that will have a positive impact on First Nations lives.

    Myth 4

    It will give First Nations peoples special rights.

    The Constitutional Expert Group comprising nine experts (including former High Court judge Kenneth Hayne) and chaired by the Commonwealth Attorney-General has advised that a First Nations Voice will not give First Nations peoples special rights. All Australians have the right to make representations to Parliament, which is guaranteed by the constitutional Implied Freedom of Political Communication. The First Nations Voice is simply a permanent one.

    Myth 5

    Australians should be allowed to see all the proposed legislation establishing the Voice before voting in the referendum.

    Too much detail will lead to confusion, and many people will likely not want to read a lengthy document. There’s already a detailed report that sets out what a legislated Voice could look like: Indigenous Voice Co-design Process Final Report.

    Demanding to see draft legislation ahead of the referendum suggests a lack of trust in Parliament, given that the proposed constitutional amendment gives Parliament the power “to make laws with respect to the composition, powers, functions and procedures” of the Voice.

    It’s sufficient to have a detailed set of principles on which the Voice will be based. The Uluru Statement from the Heart website also contains a set of design principles.

    Myth 6

    There’s no need to enshrine the Voice in the Constitution.

    By enshrining the Voice in the Constitution, it will not be able to be abolished at the whim of Parliament/the government, in contrast to ATSIC (and just about every other Indigenous advisory body set up by the government). It will also not be afraid to give frank and fearless advice. Its composition, powers and procedures will, however, be able to be amended by Parliament to ensure its effectiveness.

    Myth 7

    It will divide the nation

    The Voice to Parliament will unite the nation, because it will be a big step towards reconciliation. A successful referendum on the Voice to Parliament will mean the Australian people have emphatically said that we want Parliament to listen to First Nations people, thereby signalling that we have accepted the invitation in the Uluru Statement from the Heart to walk together for a better future.

    Myth 8

    Indigenous Australians are divided over the Voice, therefore it shouldn’t be supported.

    Although there are some high-profile Indigenous Australians who do not at this point in time support the Voice (such as Jacinta Nampijinpa Price, Warren Mundine and Lidia Thorpe), a significant proportion of First Nations people do support the Voice. An IPSOS poll conducted in late January 2023 found that 80% of First Nations people support the Voice.

    Myth 9

    It offends the notion of equality that underpins the Constitution and our democracy.

    Our Constitution does not protect equality, and actively allows for racially discriminatory laws by virtue of s 51 (xxvi) (the race power). Further, the race power has only ever been used to make laws for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, laws that are not required to be beneficial laws.

    The structure of our Parliament is also not equal – the Constitution requires the Senate to have the same number of senators from each state (12). This means that Tasmania, with a population of approximately 571,500, has the same number of senators as Victoria, which has a population of 6,613,700.

    Amending the Constitution to provide First Nations peoples with a Voice to Parliament does not offend notions of equality; rather, it is acknowledging the finding of the High Court in Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) that “Their dispossession underwrote the development of the nation”.

    Myth 10

    The history of referendums in Australia means that it is likely to fail.

    The most successful referendum in Australia’s history of referendums was in relation to Aboriginal people (1967). More than 90% of Australians voted ‘yes’ to amending two sections of the Constitution to ensure that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples would be counted as part of the population, and that the Commonwealth would be able to make laws for them. This bodes well for a referendum on the Voice.

    Also, social media has changed the landscape; times are different; polling shows relatively consistent support; and approximately 90% of the first 2554 submissions to the Co-design Process were in favour of the Voice being constitutionally enshrined.

    And although bipartisan/multi-party support would be preferable (and has been crucial to the success of previous referendums), it’s arguably no longer a determinative factor due to the changing political and social media landscape. The result of the marriage equality postal survey, where Australians voted “Yes” despite a lack of bipartisan support, is indicative of this. 

    Nothing to be scared of

    We encourage all Australians to read reliable research to make sure we’re well-informed about what the Voice is, and what it is not. Don’t get sucked in by myths like the 10 we’ve debunked above.

    The Voice is nothing to be scared of. On the contrary, it’s something we should be proud of. Amending our constitution to give First Nations peoples a Voice to Parliament would demonstrate we’re a mature nation, one that’s ready to recognise past injustices, and committed to building a better future in which the rights and dignity of all Australians are protected equally.


    Dr Katie O’Bryan is a Lecturer in the Monash University Faculty of Law and an Academic Member of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law.

    Professor Paula Gerber is a Professor in the Monash University Faculty of Law and an Academic Member of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law.

    This article was originally published in the Monash Lens. Read the original article.

    This post was originally published on Castan Centre for Human Rights Law .

  • By Liam Elphick, Alice Taylor and Robin Banks

    In 2018, Australians were shocked to learn that religious schools still had the right to discriminate against LGBTQ students and staff.

    Politicians called it “utter crap”. Polling found 74% of Australians opposed it.

    Federally, both the then-Coalition government and Labor opposition committed to protect LGBTQ students from discrimination. Yet, almost five years later, laws allowing religious schools to expel LGBTQ students and sack LGBTQ staff remain in place.

    Late last year, Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus asked the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) to inquire into how to end discrimination against LGBTQ students and staff while allowing religious schools to build and maintain their communities of faith.

    Last month, the ALRC released its consultation paper. It recommended the exceptions in federal discrimination law allowing religious schools to discriminate be removed.

    In response, some faith leaders and commentators have argued the ALRC proposals threaten the future of religious education, represent a “fundamental attack” on religious freedom, and would be “catastrophic” for religious schools.

    This is entirely untrue.

    The ALRC proposals are sensible, clear and necessary. They cut through the noise that has surrounded these issues for many years. They appropriately protect both the rights of LGBTQ kids and teachers to be treated with dignity and respect, and of religious schools to maintain their connection to faith.

    There are still some improvements that can be made. But this is our best opportunity to ensure federal discrimination laws finally catch up with contemporary values.

    What are the ALRC proposals?

    At the federal level in Australia, exceptions for religious schools have always existed.

    Currently, the Sex Discrimination Act allows religious schools to discriminate on the basis of sex, sexuality, gender identity, marital status, and pregnancy where the discrimination is in “good faith in order to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of adherents of that religion or creed”.

    This sounds like a complicated test, but it is very easy to satisfy. A religious school simply has to prove there are some members of its religion who would want to keep out, or treat differently, particular students or teachers – such as LGBTQ students or unwed teachers.

    The ALRC proposes removing these exceptions. This would, finally, make it unlawful for religious schools to discriminate in this way.

    The ALRC also proposes reforms to ensure religious schools can still build and maintain a community of faith through hiring and termination of staff. These reforms would allow schools to preference staff on the basis of their religion – but not sex, sexuality or gender identity – where religion is a genuine occupational requirement of their role.

    Christian schools could hire Christian teachers, Jewish schools could hire Jewish teachers, and Islamic schools could hire Muslim teachers.

    Several states and territories, including Tasmania and Victoria, already adopt a similar approach. Not only has the sky not fallen, but religious schools in Australia only seem to be growing

    The ALRC has also proposed that religious schools be granted a right to terminate the employment of staff who actively undermine the “ethos” of the school’s religion, where the termination is proportionate in the circumstances.

    How would the proposals affect religious schools?

    The ALRC proposals would stop religious schools from expelling students or subjecting them to different treatment to their peers because they are gay or transgender. These proposals would also stop a religious school from sacking a teacher because, for instance, they are a single mother or in a relationship outside of marriage.

    What the proposals would not do is force religious schools to hire or continue the employment of staff who fail to uphold reasonable and non-discriminatory codes of conduct and behaviour.

    All employers, including religious schools, can adopt non-discriminatory codes of conduct – and the vast majority do. Such codes give employers the right to protect the culture and values of their organisation, including religious values and culture. As long as they are reasonable, nothing in the ALRC proposals affects such codes of conduct.

    These proposals simply mean that religious schools would be in the same position as other schools and employers. They will be able to protect their organisational culture and values through existing discrimination law mechanisms.

    How should the proposals be improved?

    As we set out in the Australian Discrimination Law Experts Group’s submission to this inquiry, there are three ways in which the proposals should be improved.

    First, because of the complex relationship between the Fair Work Act and federal discrimination laws, some of the ALRC’s proposals regarding the Fair Work Act have unintended consequences.

    Certain proposals would actually allow an alternative route – enterprise agreements – through which religious schools could discriminate against LGBTQ staff.

    This should be fixed by amending the Sex Discrimination Act to stop it being overridden by Fair Work Act enterprise agreements, and fixing the legal language in the ALRC’s Fair Work Act proposals.

    Second, the ALRC has proposed that school curriculums should be entirely exempt from the Sex Discrimination Act. This undermines one of the purposes of the inquiry: to stop LGBTQ kids from being discriminated against at religious schools.

    Instead of directly excluding them, schools and teachers could instead use the cloak of the “curriculum” to vilify and discriminate against students on the basis of their sexuality or gender identity.

    It is difficult to see how this proposal is consistent with the duty of care owed by schools to students. It is also unclear how such a proposal would operate in conjunction with the development and implementation of the national curriculum. It should be rejected.

    Third, the terms “ethos” and “religious ethos” are used throughout the ALRC’s proposals. 

    The term “ethos” has never been used in any of Australia’s 13 federal, state or territory discrimination laws. Nor is it found in the international human rights treaties on which those laws rely.

    Importing the concept of an institution having an “ethos” is unnecessary and confounding. References to “ethos” should be removed.

    These three proposals undermine the value of the ALRC’s otherwise sensible proposals. They give rise to confusion and legal complexity. Fixing them will ensure the great promise of the ALRC inquiry is fulfilled.

    School is not just about learning maths and English. It is the place young people learn some of their most important formative lessons about their individual worth and the worth of their peers.

    Religious schools can build and maintain a community of faith without discriminating against LGBTQ students and staff – indeed, many already do. It is well and truly time for the law to reflect that.


    Liam Elphick is a Lecturer in the Faculty of Law and an Academic Member of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law at Monash University.

    Dr Alice Taylor is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Law at Bond University.

    Robin Banks is a PhD Candidate based in the Faculty of Law at the University of Tasmania.

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons Licence. Read the original article.

    This post was originally published on Castan Centre for Human Rights Law .

  • By Scott Walker

    On 10 December 2022 the world marks Human Rights Day commemorating the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights(UDHR) in 1948.  This year’s theme is dignity, freedom, and justice for all, in anticipation of the 75thanniversary of the UDHR in 2023. It gives us cause to reflect on the mobilising force that the UDHR has become in the struggle for human rights across the world. Yet, there is always more work to be done to truly achieve a world in which dignity, freedom, and justice is a lived reality for all. To do so we must utilise human rights both as a guidepost for advocacy and a tool for concrete, on the ground change to address some of the most pressing and ongoing challenges facing our world; including the immediate and catastrophic impacts of climate change

    Here in Australia, the path to domestic enshrinement of human rights has been a meandering one: only two States (Victoria and Queensland) and one Territory (the Australian Capital Territory) have Human Rights Acts. Yet, the capacity of these Human Rights Acts to achieve real and meaningful change in people’s lives is profound. Increasingly, people on the frontline of the climate crisis are also turning towards human rights to achieve justice. The potential impact of human rights-based climate litigation was recently demonstrated in the decision of the Land Court of Queensland in Warratah Coal Pty Ltd v Youth Verdict Ltd. In this case, the Court recommend against the grant of a mining lease and environmental authority to allow Warratah Coal to mine thermal coal in Queensland’s Gallilee Basin.  This case deserves closer examination to illustrate the way in which human rights enshrined in law can be mobilised in claims for climate justice.  

    The case

    Warratah Coal Pty Ltd, a mining company owned by Clive Palmer, applied to the Queensland Government for a mining lease and an environmental authority to allow it to mine thermal coal in the Galilee Basin. The mining project in question consisted of both open cut and underground thermal coal mines on several properties in Central Queensland, all but one of which had been cleared extensively and are used for graining purposes. One of the properties in question was a protected area known as the Bimblebox Nature Refuge. It was agreed that emissions from combusting coal from the project would result in 1.58 gigatonnes of CO2 being emitted between 2029 and 2051. In April 2020, these applications were referred to the Land Court for consideration and so that recommendations could be made to the Queensland Government as to whether the applications should be approved. 

    The decision

    Climate change was a central issue in this case and it was uncontested that the world is struggling to meet the Paris Agreement’s long-term temperature goal of below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels at 2100 with the ambition being to keep long-term temperature to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. It was also uncontested that the higher global temperatures rise, the greater the risk of exacerbating the impacts of climate change and limiting responses to mitigate the impacts of climate change. 

    It was, however, in dispute whether the Court could consider emissions generated from combustion of the coal mined in Queensland, notwithstanding that combustion of the goal would occur outside of Queensland within Southeast Asia. The Court dismissed Waratah’s argument that the court could not take generation emission into account, holding instead that ‘granting permission to mine the coal cannot be logically separated from the coal being used to generate electricity’. As the Court further acknowledged, ‘[w]herever the coal is burnt the emissions will contribute to environmental harm, including in Queensland’. 

    Waratah also attempted to argue that approving the mine would make no different to total emissions because it will displace combustion of lower-quality coal which would generate higher greenhouse gas emissions. This submission was also rejected by the Court. Instead, the Court found that the mine’s contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions would be a meaningful contribution to the remaining carbon budget available to meet the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement. 

    As part of the Court’s function in considering the mining licence application and the environmental approval, the Court—as a public authority—was required under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (HRA) to both act compatibly with human rights and give proper consideration to relevant human rights in making its decision. The Court identified a number of human rights as being engaged by the application, but I here consider only two: the right to life of people in Queensland and the rights of First Nations people. 

    The right to life

    Section 16 of the HRA provides that ‘Every person has the right to life and has the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life’. The Court held that climate change (and its consequences) can constitute a pressing and serious threat to enjoyment of the right to life. As to whether the climate change impacts flowing from the mining project could be considered an arbitrary deprivation of the right to life, the Court note that mining thermal coal for thermal combustion was not the only way in which Queensland could generate economic benefit and secure the energy needs of electricity customers (wherever they are). While approval of the project would be necessary for Waratah to secure the financial benefit flowing from the project, this must be weighed against the threat to life posed by climate change to the people of Queensland. Ultimately, the project’s ‘material contribution to the life-threatening conditions of climate change (and associated economic and social costs) is not proportionate to the economic benefit and the supply of thermal coal to Southeast Asia … the limit is unreasonable in the sense of being disproportionate because it extends beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the purposes’ of the mining project. As the project would contribute to the risk of above 3°C pre-industrial warming being materialised, preserving the right to life outweighed the economic and energy security benefits of the mine.

    The rights of First Nations people

    Section 28 of the HRA deals with the cultural rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. It recognises that First Nations people ‘hold distinct cultural rights’ and, among other things, that have the right ‘to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual, material and economic relationship with the land, territories, waters, coastal seas and other resources with which they have a connection’. 

    The Court noted that ‘against the background of systemic dispossession and destruction of culture, [the rights recognised in s 28] are of fundamental importance to First Nations peoples’. The Court also acknowledged that ‘First Nations peoples will be disproportionately affected by climate change impacts’, including through heatwaves and extreme temperatures and sea level rise resulting in frequent severe and damaging coastal flooding and storm surges. Indeed, due to ‘sea level rise alone … the potential changes in the climate system in the next few centuries could well pose an existential threat to Torres Strait Islander peoples’. Evidence obtained from First Nations people on the frontline of climate change also the Court to conclude that ‘climate change impacts will have a profound impact on cultural rights and, for some peoples who will be displaced from their country, it risks the survival of their culture, the very thing s 28 is intended to protect’. In the Court’s view, the scale of the potential destruction posed by the effects of climate change meant that the limitation of s 28 rights for First Nations people counted against approval of the project, especially ‘set against the history of dispossession of First Nations peoples in this country’. 

    The impact of this decision

    This is the first time that the Land Court of Queensland has utilised the HRA to recommend against approval of a coal mine. In that sense alone the case is ground breaking. But the impact of this decision is much wider than this alone: it demonstrates the potential of human rights to achieve climate justice. Elsewhere, I have written about the potential of a human rights-based approach to climate change to drive a rethinking of policy making which places people on the frontline of the climate crisis at the centre of our climate response and treat those people on the frontline as rights-holders rather than victims of a hostile climate. Although it remains to be seen what the Queensland Government will ultimately decide on the project’s fate, this decision demonstrates the potential of human rights enshrined in domestic law to protect against the catastrophic impacts of climate change and deliver climate justice in a meaningful and substantive way.

    Recognising that climate change poses a tremendous risk to the enjoyment of fundamental human rights is not new. In the Urgenda case, it was recognised that the obligations of the Netherlands to protect the right to life and the right to family life under the European Convention of Human Rights required the Netherlands to more greatly reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. In Teitiota, the UN Human Rights Committee also observed the risk pose the rights of asylum seekers and refugees by climate change. In a recent case brought by eight Torres Strait Islanders and six of their children, the same committee found that Australia had failed to adequately adapt to climate change and therefore violated the human rights of Torres Strait Islanders. In particular, the Committee found that Australia violated the Torres Strait Islanders’ right to private life, home and family, and their enjoyment of culture. 

    Yet Australia lags behind in our acknowledgement of the human rights impacts of climate change, mostly because our human rights protection at a Federal level and in the remaining five State and Territory jurisdictions without stand-alone human rights legislation is extremely limited. This is despite the power of human rights law to achieve real and meaningful change in people’s lives being well-documented. The Human Rights Law Centre has compiled 101 cases highlighting the benefits of the human rights legislation that exist in Australia. Meanwhile, the ACT is about to recognise a right to a health environment in its Human Rights Act. Imagine how differently the Sharma case might have turned out if the young people that brought that case were able to ground their case in human rights protected in a Federal Human Rights Act. At a time in which the effects of climate change are already being sharply experienced the world over, let us imagine how a Federal Human Rights Act could deliver climate justice in a meaningful and substantive way to deliver dignity, freedom, and justice for those confronting the immediate impacts of climate change.  


    Scott Walker is a Researcher at the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, a Fellow at Eleos Justice and a Research Assistant within the Faculty of Law, Monash University.

    This post was originally published on Castan Centre for Human Rights Law .

  • By Karin M Frodé, Andrea Olivares Jones and Joanna Kyriakakis

    In a historic decision, the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee found on Friday 23 September that Australia’s failure to adequately adapt to climate change violates the human rights of Torres Strait Islanders.   

    The Committee, which oversees the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) received a complaint by eight Torres Strait Islanders and six of their children in 2019. The group called for the Committee to recognise that the Australian Government had violated their human rights by failing to reduce carbon emissions, and introduce measures to adapt to climate change.

    The Committee’s decision makes clear that inadequate responses to climate change can result in the violation of human rights. It is a landmark victory worth celebrating as part of a broader trend in climate change litigation which has seen human rights arguments put forward to hold both states (ie, the NetherlandsPakistan and Belgium) and corporations (ie, Shell and other Carbon Majors) accountable. It is also an example of a rise in cases where Indigenous actors are central. 

    The decision adds to the pressure mounting against Australia to take climate change seriously. 

    The complaint

    The Torres Strait Islanders’ claimed that Australia has not fulfilled its legal obligations to protect their rights to life (Article 6), private life, family and home (Article 17) and culture (Article 27) under the ICCPR. Additionally, they claimed that Australia has failed to adequately protect the rights of future generations (Article 24(1)). 

    Communities on the Torres Strait Islands are already facing rising sea levels, extreme weather, the erosion of the coastdamaged reefs, and limited availability of freshwater. A tangible example of damage is graves that have been washed away on Sabai Island. Homes and many more cultural sites are at risk of damage. The risks of climate change to Torres Strait Islanders are not new. They were, for example, clearly set out in the 2008 Native Title Report of the Australian Human Rights Commission. 

    Reaction of the Australian Government 

    The former Morrison Government rejected the claims made by the Torres Strait Islanders, arguing that it cannot be held responsible for the effects of climate change due to the global nature of the crisis. It also argued that there was a lack of proof of ‘causation’, meaning the link between the claimed human rights harms and Australia’s actions or inaction ([4.2]). Further, Australia challenged whether there was sufficient evidence of a ‘current or imminent threat’ of any rights violations ([4.2]). 

    The former Federal Minister for the Environment evoked similar lines of argument recently in a domestic tort case when she argued against owing duty of care to children when approving mining.  

    The Committee’s decision

    The Committee found that Australia has violated the Torres Strait Islanders’ rights to private life, home and family and their enjoyment of culture. In doing so, the Committee noted Australia’s efforts to construct a seawall, but found it to be an inadequate response to the alarming threats that had been raised by Torres Strait Islanders since the 1990s, due to its delay initiating the project ([8.12], [8.14]). 

    The Committee did not find a violation of the right to life.  The right to life includes the need to protect against ‘reasonably foreseeable threats…that can result in loss of life’, and this ‘may include adverse climate change impacts’ which amount to ‘some of the most pressing and serious threats to the ability of present and future generations to enjoy the right to life’ ([8.3]). However, in the present case, the Committee did not consider the necessary foreseeability was demonstrated ([8.6]), though not all Committee members agreed on this point. 

    The Committee did not to address child rights because violations of other rights were established. 

    Why is this decision important? 

    While decisions by UN bodies are not automatically binding in Australian law, they are persuasive opinions by independent experts that outline Australia’s international obligations and analyse whether they are complied with. The relationship between climate change impacts and human rights is an emerging area, so the clarity that decisions such as in the present case bring is critical.

    This decision is therefore important not only to the complainants but for other climate justice advocates. 

    The present decision follows other climate related decisions by human rights bodies. In Teitiota, a case brought against New Zealand, the same Committee made important observations about state obligations and climate change in the context of asylum seekers and refugees, though it stopped short of finding a violation. Another complaint brought by young climate activists against five states for climate inaction before the Committee on the Rights of the Child, focused on child-centric impacts of climate change. Although dismissed for technical reasons, that decision made important findings that children fall within the jurisdiction of states where transboundary harm originates, following the approach of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

    In what might be lamented as a missed opportunity, the Torres Strait Islander decision focuses on Australia’s failure to adapt to climate change in a timely manner. As noted by Committee member Gentian Zyberi, the decision does not make clear connections between the human rights violations and Australia’s failure to mitigate climate impacts by, for example, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 

    Further, as the Committee members themselves did, it is possible to disagree regarding the application of the law and facts to the right to life. If the right to life includes ‘a life with dignity’, climate impacts upon the enjoyment by First Nations peoples of a way of life which puts central significance upon land would demonstrate a violation. 

    The decision is nonetheless critical on the responsibility of individual states to act to address climate change induced human rights impacts. It is accompanied by other significant developments, such as the 2022 UN General Assembly Resolution which recognised the ‘right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment’ as a human right. This Resolution was supported by 161 states, including Australia. 

    The expectation now is for Australia to take the ‘measures necessary to secure the communities’ continued safe existence on their respective islands’ and to review those measures for effectiveness over time [11]. It is also expected to compensate the claimants for the violations suffered. Time will tell if Australia does so, but Attorney-General, Mark Dreyfus has indicated openness to engaging with Torres Strait Islanders about climate change and to the findings in this case. 

    More broadly, it is time for Australia to take seriously its climate obligations and act now to avoid further human rights impacts. In that regard, the passage earlier this month of Australia’s first climate change legislation in over a decade is at least a step in the right direction.   


    Karin M Frodé is a PhD candidate at Monash University and a PhD Affiliate of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law.

    Andrea Olivares Jones is an advanced LLM Candidate in European and International Human Rights Law at Leiden University, The Netherlands and a former Policy Manager at the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law.

    Dr Joanna Kyriakakis is a Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at Monash University and an Academic Member of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law.

    This post was originally published on Castan Centre for Human Rights Law .

  • By Maria O’Sullivan

    During the present period of mourning for Queen Elizabeth II, public sensitivities in the United Kingdom and Australia are high. There’s strong sentiment in both countries in favour of showing respect for the queen’s death. Some people may wish to do this privately. Others will want to demonstrate their respect publicly by attending commemorations and processions.

    There are also cohorts within both countries that may wish to express discontent and disagreement with the monarchy at this time. For instance, groups such as Indigenous peoples and others who were subject to dispossession and oppression by the British monarchy may wish to express important political views about these significant and continuing injustices.

    This has caused tension across the globe. For instance, a professor from the United States who tweeted a critical comment of the queen has been subject to significant public backlash. Also, an Aboriginal rugby league player is facing a ban and a fine by the NRL for similar negative comments she posted online following the queen’s death.

    This tension has been particularly so in the UK, where police have questioned protestors expressing anti-monarchy sentiments, and in some cases, arrested them.

    But should such concerns about the actions of the queen and monarchy be silenced or limited because a public declaration of mourning has been made by the government?

    This raises some difficult questions as to how the freedom of speech of both those who wish to grieve publicly and those who wish to protest should be balanced.

    What laws in the UK are being used to do this?

    There are various laws that regulate protest in the UK. At a basic level, police can arrest a person for a “breach of the peace”.

    Also, two statutes provide specific offences that allow police to arrest protestors. 

    Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 UK provides that a person is guilty of a public order offence if:

    • they use threatening or abusive words or behaviour or disorderly behaviour 
    • or display any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening or abusive. 

    The offence provision then provides this must be “within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress” by those acts.

    There’s some protection for speech in the legislation because people arrested under this provision can argue a defence of “reasonable excuse”. However, there’s still a great deal of discretion placed in the hands of the police.

    The other statute that was recently amended is the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act of 2022, which allows police to arrest protestors for “public nuisance”.

    In the context of the period of mourning for Queen Elizabeth II, the wide terms used in this legislation (such as “nuisance” and “distress”) gives a lot of discretion to police to arrest protestors who they perceive to be upsetting others. For instance, a protestor who holds a placard saying “Not my king, abolish the monarchy” may be seen as likely to cause distress to others given the high sensitivities in the community during the period of mourning. 

    Is there a right to protest under UK and Australian law?

    Protest rights are recognised in both the UK and in Australia, but in different ways. 

    In the UK, the right to freedom of expression is recognised in Article 10 of the Human Rights Act.

    In Australia, there’s no equivalent of the right to freedom of expression at the federal level as Australia doesn’t have a national human rights charter. Rather, there’s a constitutional principle called the “implied freedom of political communication”. This isn’t a “right” as such but does provide some acknowledgement of the importance of protest.

    Also, freedom of expression is recognised in the three jurisdictions in Australia that have human rights instruments (Victoria, Queensland and the ACT).

    Can the right to protest be limited in a period of mourning?

    In this period of public mourning, people wishing to assemble in a public place to pay respect to the queen are exercising two primary human rights: the right to assembly and the right to freedom of expression. But these aren’t absolute rights. They cannot override the rights of others to also express their own views. 

    Further, there’s no recognised right to assemble without annoyance or disturbance from others. That is, others in the community are also permitted to gather in a public place during the period of mourning and voice their views (which may be critical of the queen or monarchy).

    It’s important to also note that neither the UK nor Australia protects the monarchy against criticism. This is significant because in some countries (such as Thailand), it’s a criminal offence to insult the monarch. These are called “lèse-majesté” laws – a French term meaning “to do wrong to majesty”.

    The police in the UK and Australia cannot therefore use public order offences (such breach of the peace) to unlawfully limit public criticism of the monarchy.

    It may be uncomfortable or even distressing for those wishing to publicly grieve the queen’s passing to see anti-monarchy placards displayed. But that doesn’t make it a criminal offence that allows protestors to be arrested.

    The ability to voice dissent is vital for a functioning democracy. It’s therefore arguable that people should be able to voice their concerns with the monarchy even in this period of heightened sensitivity. The only way in which anti-monarchy sentiment can lawfully be suppressed is in a state of emergency. A public period of mourning does not meet that standard.


    Dr Maria O’Sullivan is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law and the Deputy Director (Research) of the Castan Centre for Human Rights at Monash University.

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

    This post was originally published on Castan Centre for Human Rights Law .

  • By Professor Paula Gerber

    There are many factors which point to now being the right time to focus on improving human rights in Australia, including,

    1. change of government at the federal level, from one that was largely hostile to human rights to one that has made many commitments to enhancing respect for human rights;
    2. the COVID pandemic which saw far-reaching restrictions on human rights and stimulated greater awareness of, and debate about, human rights generally; 
    3. the US Supreme Court decision in Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organization overturning Roe v Wade which has made women in Australia feel vulnerable to similar regressive steps regarding reproductive rights; 
    4. the frequency of floods and fires, and the devasting impact they are having on many communities, has led to an increased interest in climate change as a human rights issue; and
    5. the public’s strong rejection of politicians and political candidates attacking transgender women.

    Given that the Australian landscape appears ripe for increased protection of human rights, the question becomes: What are the human rights priorities in Australia? Professor Paula Gerber and Professor Michael Mintrom discussed this with ABC host Paul Barclay, in a recent episode of Radio National Big Ideas they identified the following reforms of being of critical importance.

    A Federal Charter of Human Rights

    Australia is an outlier when it comes to national protection of human rights, at least within the West. We are the only western democracy that does not have human rights legislation that applies to the whole country. Some Australian states and territories have decided that they are no longer going to wait for the federal government to take the lead, and have enacted their own human rights legislation. The result is that people living in the ACT, Victoria and Queensland enjoy rights protection pursuant to legislation that gives effect to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), while people in New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania have no such protection. This patchwork quilt approach to human rights is unacceptable and the enactment of a federal statutory charter of human rights is long overdue. 

    Human Rights Education

    The absence of a national Human Rights Act, is one of the barriers to comprehensive school based human rights education. Research demonstrates that having a national human rights instrument, increases education and awareness raising about human rights. Currently our national curriculum mandates that students learn about the Constitution, but in the absence of a federal Charter of Rights, they do not learn about human rights. This is in stark contrast with countries like the United States, where all students learn about the American Bill of Rights.

    A key aspect of having a society that respects and protects human rights, is having a population that knows and understands human rights. This requires ensuring that children learn about human rights from an early age, so that they grow up knowing about their rights and the rights of others and understand them as an inherent part of coexisting in a harmonious and peaceful community, both locally and globally. 

    Respecting the rights of LGBTIQA+ People

    There is no denying that the rights of LGBTIQA+ people took a significant battering under previous coalition governments. The postal survey that preceded the attainment of marriage equality in 2017, was unnecessary, divisive and sanctioned homophobic and transphobic hate speech under the guise of “civilised debate”. This was closely followed by further attacks and regression, including the defunding of the Safe Schools program and Scott Morrison’s relentless (unsuccessful) efforts to pass his Religious Discrimination Bills, that were described as a sword rather than a shield, and legislation that would have given people of faith license to be bigots.

    Repairing the harm done to LGBTIQA+ people by this sustained persecution requires the Albanese to implement a variety of reforms including, 

    • amending the Sex Discrimination Act to ensure that religious schools cannot expel LGBTIQA+ students nor dismiss teachers because of their sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status; 
    • counting LGBTIQApeople in the next census, including same-sex families; and 
    • greater consultation and funding for LGBTIQA+ health services, to address the unique health issues and barriers to accessing health services that LGBTIQA+ Australians face.

    In addition, the Albanese Government would do well to follow the lead of Victoria and the UK, by appointing a Minister for Equality. Having such a Ministry would help the government to focus on promoting equality of opportunity for everyone.

    Conclusion

    The specific human rights reforms outlined above are by no means an exhaustive list and there are many other human rights priorities that also need to be addressed, including, 

    1. giving effect to the Uluru Statement from the Heart and advancing and expanding the Treaty and Truth-Telling process that is taking place in Victoria, to other parts of the country;
    2. raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility to 14-years-old and reducing the youth incarceration rates, particularly the disproportionately high rate of incarceration of First Nations your people;
    3. ending indefinite and arbitrary immigration detention of refugees and asylum seekers; 
    4. achieving gender equality and combatting family violence; and
    5. implementing just transition policies and practices to facilitate the move from fossil fuel to clean energy in a manner that protects the rights of all people impacted by these changes; and 

    Australia’s reputation as a country that respects the rights of all people has taken a significant battering in recent years. The Albanese Government has the opportunity to start repairing that damage by implementing the long overdue reforms highlighted here. Such reforms would benefit individuals, minority groups and society as a whole, as well as businesses and governments who derive economic benefits from respecting human rights.


    You can listen to the episode of Radio National Big Ideas featuring Professors Paula Gerber and Michael Mintrom here, on the ABC Listen app or wherever you get your podcasts.


    Professor Paula Gerber is a Professor in the Monash University Faculty of Law and an Academic Member of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law. Professor Gerber has expertise in international human rights law generally and has a particular interest in children’s rights and the rights of LGBTQIA+ people.

  • Disturbing footage emerged this week of a chess-playing robot breaking the finger of a seven-year-old child during a tournament in Russia. 

    Public commentary on this event highlights some concern in the community about the increasing use of robots in our society. Some people joked on social media that the robot was a “sore loser” and had a “bad temper”. 

    Of course, robots cannot actually express real human characteristics such as anger (at least, not yet). But these comments do demonstrate increasing concern in the community about the “humanisation” of robots. Others noted that this was the beginning of a robot revolution – evoking images that many have of robots from popular films such as RoboCop and The Terminator

    While these comments may have been made in jest and some images of robots in popular culture are exaggerated, they do highlight uncertainty about what our future with robots will look like. We should ask: are we ready to deal with the moral and legal complexities raised by human-robot interaction?

    Human and robot interaction

    Many of us have basic forms of artificial intelligence in our home. For instance, robotic vacuums are very popular items in houses across Australia, helping us with chores we would rather not do ourselves. 

    But as we increase our interaction with robots, we must consider the dangers and unknown elements in the development of this technology.

    Examining the Russian chess incident, we might ask why the robot acted the way it did? The answer to this is that robots are designed to operate in situations of certainty. They do not deal well with unexpected events. 

    So in the case of the child with the broken finger, Russian chess officials stated the incident occurred because the child “violated” safety rules by taking his turn too quickly. One explanation of the incident was that when the child moved quickly, the robot mistakenly interpreted the child’s finger as a chess piece. 

    Whatever the technical reason for the robot’s action, it demonstrates there are particular dangers in allowing robots to interact directly with humans. Human communication is complex and requires attention to voice and body language. Robots are not yet sophisticated enough to process those cues and act appropriately.

    What does the law say about robots?

    Despite the dangers of human-robot interaction demonstrated by the chess incident, these complexities have not yet been adequately considered in Australian law and policies. 

    One fundamental legal question is who is liable for the acts of a robot. Australian consumer law sets out robust requirements for product safety for goods sold in Australia. These include provisions for safety standards, safety warning notices and manufacturer liability for product defects. Using these laws, the manufacturer of the robot in the chess incident would ordinarily be liable for the damage caused to the child. 

    However, there are no specific provisions in our product laws related to robots. This is problematic because Australian Consumer law provides a defence to liability. This could be used by manufacturers of robots to evade their legal responsibility, as it applies if

    the state of scientific or technical knowledge at the time when the goods were supplied by their manufacturer was not such as to enable that safety defect to be discovered.

    To put it simply, the robot manufacturer could argue that it was not aware of the safety defect and could not have been aware. It could also be argued that the consumer used the product in a way that was not intended. Therefore, I would argue more specific laws directly dealing with robots and other technology are needed in Australia.

    Law reform bodies have done some work to guide our lawmakers in this area. For instance, the Australian Human Rights Commission handed down a landmark Human Rights and Technology Report in 2021. The report recommended the Australian government establish an AI safety commissioner focused on promoting safety and protecting human rights in the development and use of AI in Australia. The government has not yet implemented this recommendation, but it would provide a way for robot manufacturers and suppliers to be held accountable.

    Implications for the future

    The chess robot’s acts this week have demonstrated the need for greater legal regulation of artificial intelligence and robotics in Australia. This is particularly so because robots are increasingly being used in high-risk environments such as aged care and to assist people with a disability. Sex robots are also available in Australia and are very human-like in appearance, raising ethical and legal concerns about the unforeseen consequences of their use.

    Using robots clearly has some benefits for society – they can increase efficiency, fill staff shortages and undertake dangerous work on our behalf.

    But this issue is complex and requires a complex response. While a robot breaking a child’s finger may be seen as a once-off, it should not be ignored. This event should cause our legal regulators to implement more sophisticated laws that directly deal with robots and AI.


    Dr Maria O’Sullivan is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law and the Deputy Director (Research) of the Castan Centre for Human Rights at Monash University.

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

    This post was originally published on Castan Centre for Human Rights Law .

  • By Luke Beck

    New federal Education Minister Jason Clare has announced a change to the National School Chaplaincy Program to allow schools to “choose” between having a religious chaplain and having a professionally qualified well-being worker.

    The opposition has criticised the announcement as effectively meaning “the end of many school chaplains”. So what’s the fuss about?

    The Howard Coalition government started the chaplaincy program in 2006. It has continued, with some variations, ever since.

    A “project agreement” signed by federal, state and territory education ministers governs the chaplaincy program. The states and territories receive federal funding to pay for chaplains in public schools.

    What do school chaplains do?

    Chaplains are not counsellors in the psychologist sense. They are more like youth workers in the social worker sense.

    The project agreement says chaplains are responsible for providing “pastoral care services” and strategies that support the “well-being of the school community”. It gives examples of activities like “co-ordinating volunteering activities and support, breakfast clubs, lunchtime activities, excursions, school incursions, and parent/carer workshops”.

    These activities look non-religious. Any qualified youth worker, regardless of their religion, could deliver them. However, the National School Chaplaincy Association says:

    “While chaplains must have underlying qualifications in youth work, community work or equivalent, school chaplaincy is religious in nature.”

    How are school chaplains hired?

    The project agreement sets two key criteria for the appointment of chaplains:

    1. all chaplains must have minimum qualifications such as a Certificate IV in Youth Work
    2. all chaplains must be “recognised through formal ordination, commissioning, recognised religious qualifications or endorsement by a recognised or accepted religious institution”.

    Rather than being school employees like teachers or front-office staff, chaplains are employed by third-party providers that have contracts with schools. One provider is a Christian organisation called Generate, which says its mission is:

    “To bring God’s love, hope, and good news to children, young people, and families.”

    Job advertisements for school chaplains usually require applicants to be Christians. For example, to apply for school chaplaincy positions advertised through Generate, this organisation says “you need to have a committed Christian faith”.

    Schools working with Generate have effectively decided they will not have Jewish, Muslim, Hindu or atheist youth workers working with students. Generate is currently advertising positions at more than 20 public schools, including schools in highly multicultural areas such as western Sydney.

    There is no public information about the processes public schools use to choose the school’s favoured religion for the purpose of hiring a chaplain.

    Isn’t religious discrimination unlawful?

    You might think refusing to hire someone for a job in a public school simply because that person doesn’t belong to a particular religion sounds like religious discrimination. Religious discrimination in employment is unlawful under anti-discrimination laws in every state and territory, except New South Wales and South Australia.

    A number of state anti-discrimination commissioners have expressed concern about the National Schools Chaplaincy Program.

    In 2020, Victoria’s Human Rights Commission told a Victorian MP: “we agree that the program may be in breach of [Victoria’s] Equal Opportunity Act 2010”.

    In 2021, in response to advocacy by the Rationalist Society of Australia, Western Australia’s Equal Opportunity Commission said it was concerned that restricting youth worker/chaplain positions to religious people was “prima facie religious conviction discrimination” under Western Australia’s Equal Opportunity Act 1984. In 2020, Queensland’s Human Rights Commissioner said the practice involved “potential contraventions of the [Qld Anti-Discrimination] Act”.

    A 2019 religious discrimination case in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal settled before the tribunal could rule on whether limiting youth worker/chaplain jobs in public schools to Christians breached state anti-discrimination laws.

    What exactly did the minister announce?

    Last Friday, Clare announced:

    “The government will open up the program to give schools the option to choose either a chaplain or a professionally qualified student welfare officer.”

    The fact it was the new minister’s first big decision suggests the issue is important to him. There’s no good reason to force a public school to hire youth workers on the basis of religion. It’s why the ACT pulled out of the school chaplains program in 2019.

    However, there are three key problems with the minister’s announcement.

    First, all chaplains are already required to have professional qualifications. There’s nothing new about that.

    Second, the minister has not explained how a public school – which schools legislation says are secular in character – could ever justify “choosing” that Jewish, Muslim, Hindu and atheist youth workers should not be eligible for a pastoral care job at the school.

    The third and most practical problem is that this announced change won’t actually enable schools to hire youth workers without reference to the person’s religious affiliation.

    Existing third-party providers like Generate are in the business of hiring only Christians. Unless new providers come onto the scene, public schools will have little choice but to continue to engage existing providers who will continue to hire only Christians.

    What’s the solution?

    The minister said he will work with his state and territory counterparts to revise the project agreement so a new system is in place for the 2023 school year.

    If the nation’s education ministers want to make sure school youth workers/chaplains are hired based on merit and not on religion, they could make one simple change: get rid of outsourcing.

    Requiring schools to hire directly rather than through third-party providers will ensure job ads don’t include selection criteria about a person’s religion. Some public schools might well be happy to allow their third-party provider to refuse to hire Jewish, Muslim and atheist youth workers. However, a public school is rather unlikely to itself ever put out an ad like that.

    Getting rid of outsourcing would also mean the public money now used to fund the administration costs of third-party providers can be redirected to putting more youth workers in more schools.


    Luke Beck is an Associate Professor of Constitutional Law and Associate Dean (Education) in the Faculty of Law at Monash University. He is also an academic member at the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law. He is the author of Religious Freedom and the Australian Constitution: Origins and Future (Routledge, 2018)


    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

    This post was originally published on Castan Centre for Human Rights Law .

  • By Melissa Castan, Kate Galloway and Scott Walker

    Last week the Victorian government demonstrated its commitment to build an equal relationship with First Peoples. A new bill has been tabled in the Victorian parliament to advance the Victorian treaty processes.

    In 2018, legislation was enacted that required the First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria and the Victorian government to work together to establish a Treaty Authority. 

    The new bill further affirms the Assembly and the Victorian government’s agreement and commitment to establish a Treaty Authority and support its operations. 

    The new Treaty Authority will be the first of its kind in Australia, placing First Peoples’ culture at the heart of its practices.

    What is the Treaty Authority and how will it work?

    The significant power difference between the government and First Nations people means there needs to be a way to establish equal footing for treaty negotiations. 

    The Treaty Authority serves that role as an institution independent of parliament and government. 

    Negotiations may well be long and complex. The authority will oversee treaty negotiations and if the parties cannot agree on particular matters or the appropriate process, it will act as an independent umpire to help resolve the issue. 

    The new authority will respect First Peoples’ culture with a focus on dialogue. Talking through problems to achieve agreement, rather using than a combative approach, is at the core of the treaty process. 

    Assembly co-chair and Nira illim bulluk man Marcus Stewartsaid the Treaty Authority

    will be guided by Aboriginal lore, law and cultural authority that has been practised on these lands for countless generations.

    This is a significant development in Australian legal institutions and processes. It addresses well known problems with the adversarial nature of native title determinations, where traditional owners must sue the government to prove their title. 

    This new public law process appropriately recognises the standing of Indigenous cultural approaches.

    In another important development, the Treaty Authority will have guaranteed government funding, which it controls and manages. This will ensure the authority can perform its functions long-term. 

    In the past when governments set up bodies to assist First Nations, there were problems with sustainability, because the body did not have the resources to function. It is encouraging to see the commitment at this early stage, to continuous funding and First Nations’ control.

    The Treaty Authority will be comprised of independent members who are all First Peoples, who will be selected after a public call for nominations.

    The Treaty Authority recognises the right to self-determination

    Indigenous rights expert Professor Megan Davis explained

    before Indigenous Australia can participate in the Australian democratic project on just and equal terms, the unresolved issues of the colonial project and the psychological terra nullius of Australia’s public institutions must be finally dealt with.

    The Treaty Authority will be a public institution that grapples with this problem of “psychological terra nullius” – the exclusion of First Nations peoples in politics and law.

    It forms part of the broader work to provide just and equal participation by First Peoples in our democratic institutions. It complements the First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria, and the Yoorrook Justice Commission, which address voice and truth respectively.

    All of these institutions are part of the overarching treaty process in Victoria.

    Treaty is one important way of realising Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. 

    Self-determination means the right of a people to make decisions about their own governance and way of life. 

    Self-determination for Indigenous peoples is also a requirement of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and other international human rights law

    By drawing on First Nations’ “law, lore, and cultural authority” in order to support the treaty process, the Victorian Treaty Authority is demonstrating an innovative approach to realising First Peoples’ right to self-determination.

    Navigating a way to treaty

    Victoria is only one Australian jurisdiction currently navigating treaty processes. Queensland, the Northern TerritorySouth Australia, and Tasmania are all embarking on pathways to treaty. 

    And the new Albanese government is working to deliver on its commitment to the Uluru Statement from the Heart’s call for Voice, Treaty, and Truth at the federal level. 

    Each of these processes should properly be informed by respective First Peoples in each area. 

    For all jurisdictions, the Victorian approach demonstrates the potential for transformative institutional reform, in and beyond government. 

    Self-determination must be led by sovereign First Nations people and grounded in Indigenous culture and law. International human rights law requires it. And justice alone demands the state, in all its guises, enters into proper relations with the First Nations of this land.


    Dr Melissa Castan is an Associate Professor and Director of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, at Monash University Faculty of Law. She teaches, researches and writes on Australian public law, Indigenous legal issues, human rights law, and legal education.

    Dr Kate Galloway is an Associate Professor at Griffith Law School. Kate researches in property law and legal education, with particular interest in legal issues affecting women, Indigenous Australians, and environmental justice.

    Scott Walker is a Researcher at the Castan Centre for Human Rights law, a Researcher and Fellow at Eleos Justice and a Research Assistant within the Faculty of Law, Monash University. Scott’s research interests span international human rights law, health law, and disability rights.


    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

    This post was originally published on Castan Centre for Human Rights Law .

  • Voluntary assisted dying (VAD) has been legal in countries such as Switzerland and the Netherlands for more than a decade.

    In Australia, aside from a brief introduction by the Northern Territory in 1995 that was quickly overruled by conflicting federal legislation, VAD remained illegal in every Australian jurisdiction until 2017.

    In 2017, Victoria took the lead, enacting the Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017 (Vic). In 2019, Western Australia followed suit, and in 2021 VAD became legal in TasmaniaSouth Australia and Queensland.

    On 19 May, 2022, the NSW Parliament passed the Voluntary Assisted Dying Bill. In doing so, NSW became the final Australian state to legalise VAD.

    In his second reading speech, Alex Greenwich (the MP who introduced the bill) noted that:

    ‘The bill will create a safe framework for people who are in the final stages of a terminal illness, and who are experiencing cruel suffering that cannot be relieved by treatment or palliative care, to be provided with the choice to die peacefully, with dignity and surrounded by loved ones’.

    As this statement suggests, VAD legislation is also sometimes referred to as dying with dignity legislation, because it enables an unwell person to choose the time and place of their death.

    VAD has been described as involving “a physician prescribing medication to a patient with the explicit intention of causing premature death”.

    Accordingly, across the country, self-administration is the predominant mechanism by which VAD is carried out. Physician-administered VAD is rare, and only occurs where a patient is unable to self-administer.

    Attitudes to VAD among health professionals

    VAD is a polarising issue in the healthcare sector; it’s literally about life and death, and elicits passionate and emotional responses in both the medical community and the general community.

    Some people regard VAD as a human right, inherent in fundamental rights such as the right to dignity, autonomy and self-determination.

    Others express concern that a doctor’s key ethical commitment is to do no harm, and on this basis doctors should not play a role in hastening a person’s death. They also worry about whether the safeguards in place are adequate to prevent undue influence or coercion.

    A high proportion of the Australian population supports VAD. For example, a “recent survey carried out by the NSW Council on the Ageing found that 72% of people over 50 in NSW were in favour of legalising voluntary assisted dying”. That said, many health professionals remain uncomfortable participating in VAD.

    All Australian states allow a health professional with a conscientious objection to refrain from participating in VAD. As in all other states, the NSW law will allow a health practitioner to refuse to participate in VAD.

    This is similar to abortion legislation, which across Australia also includes provision for conscientious objection.

    States’ laws not all the same

    It’s worth noting that while all Australian states allow for conscientious objection, the laws between the states are framed slightly differently.

    For example, both Victoria and Tasmania allow an unmitigated form of conscientious objection, with no requirement to provide information to a patient who raises the question of VAD; Western Australia requires the provision of an information booklet; and Queensland requires doctors to direct the patient to someone without a conscientious objection.

    Attitudes towards VAD among health professionals aren’t binary, but rather tend to sit on a spectrum. Unfortunately, there’s a lack of accurate, comprehensive data capturing the rates of conscientious objection to VAD among health professionals in Australia.

    However, the research that has been conducted suggests rates of conscientious objection to VAD are reasonably high among the cohort of medical practitioners whose patients are most likely to seek access.

    For example, in a survey conducted by the Medical Oncology Group of Australia, out of the 362 respondents, 47% disagreed with voluntary assisted dying. Similarly, in a survey of the Australian and New Zealand Society for Geriatric Medicine, out of the 226 respondents, 53% opposed VAD.

    There’s a range of reasons why practitioners object to participating in VAD. Interestingly, unlike in the abortion context, it seems the majority of health professionals who object to VAD do so for “reasons that could be regarded as secular, humanist or professional” rather than for religious reasons.

    The way forward for VAD legislation

    There’s a global trend towards the legalisation of VAD. For example, the past decade has seen the legalisation of VAD in Canada and New Zealand, two countries culturally similar to Australia.

    It seems, therefore, that VAD is here to stay, but that– as has occurred in the context of the decriminalisation of abortion – there’s likely to be some tinkering with the legislation in the different jurisdictions.

    In time, we may see greater harmonisation between states. Further, it seems that it’s only a matter of time until the federal government repeals its own legislation that prevents the territories from legalising VAD.

    A society is measured by how it treats its most vulnerable, such as those who are sick and approaching the end of their lives – “I’m not interested in whether you’ve stood with the great; I’m interested in whether you’ve sat with the broken”.

    Whether a person does or doesn’t support VAD, I think we can all agree that treating people with respect and dignity at the end of their lives is of paramount importance.

    As a society, we need to strike an appropriate balance between respecting the right to freedom of conscience, and securing the rights of individual patients to dignity, privacy and autonomy.

    This isn’t an easy conversation, but it’s one we must have.


    Dr Ronli Sifris is a Senior Lecturer in Monash University’s Faculty of Law and Deputy Director of Education at the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law. Her research is predominantly focused on issues at the intersection of women’s reproductive health and the law (at both the domestic and international level) including abortion, surrogacy, assisted reproduction and involuntary sterilisation. Her research also spans other spheres of health law, human rights and gender.


    This article is republished from Monash Lens under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

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  • By Paula Gerber and Melissa Castan

    It’s easy to tell we’re in a federal election campaign – politicians are everywhere, parading around in high-vis vests and kissing babies who just want to be back in their parents’ arms.

    You can also tell politicians are on the campaign trail by what they’re not talking about.

    They’re not talking about human rights – neither major party has a policy to strengthen the protection of human rights in Australia.

    This is shameful, given we’re the only Western country to not have a Bill of Rights. New Zealand, the US, Canada and the UK, for example, have all recognised that human rights are important enough to warrant protection in national legislation.

    Not Australia. Mention a national Bill of Rights, and politicians run for the hills.

    So why does Australia need a federal Human Rights Act? Aren’t human rights here already well-protected?

    A recently published two-volume collection comprises 46 chapters by Australia’s leading human rights experts and documents the many pressing human rights issues facing Australia. It doesn’t make for pretty reading.

    This article considers just two areas where human rights violations are being perpetrated across Australia with impunity – against Indigenous peoples and LGBTIQ+ people.

    These issues need urgent attention, and should be part of the conversations we’re having in the lead-up to a federal election.

    Little progress on Indigenous rights

    We’re not making any progress in overcoming Indigenous inequality. A recent report found that:

    “In the 30 years since the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, the NDICP [National Deaths in Custody Program] has recorded 489 Indigenous deaths in custody, including 320 in prison, 165 in police custody or custody-related operations, and four in youth detention.”

    That equates to more than one death in custody every month for three decades. How can we as a country tolerate this?

    The systemic racism and structural inequalities that enable this to happen must be addressed. These include raising the age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 14. This would significantly reduce Indigenous youth incarceration rates.

    Indigenous youth comprise 6% of the 10-17 youth population, but more than half of all the young people in detention. This is because Indigenous youths are jailed at 20 times the rate of non-Indigenous children.

    Australian governments, including state and territory governments, have committed to raising the age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 12, but this isn’t enough. The age at which a child can be held criminally responsible shouldn’t be lower than the age at which they can have a Snapchat or Instagram account (13).

    The entrenched disadvantage Indigenous Australians experience is only possible because of the structural discrimination embedded in our legal system.

    The Uluru Statement from the Heart is an invitation to work together to address this systemic discrimination by establishing a First Nations Voice to Parliament and a commission to explore treaty making and truth-telling.

    The Uluru Statement was developed in 2017. Five years later, there’s no sign our government is ready to accept the invitation and work with Indigenous Australians to build a better, more equal, future.

    Protest marchers, one with a sign with the Aboriginal flag, reading ‘We are still here‘

    No significant improvement LGBTIQ+ rights

    Marriage equality was attained in Australia in December 2017. Although many same-sex couples have tied the knot since then, there’s been no significant improvement regarding the human rights of LGBTIQ+ people. Some of the pressing human rights violations that need to be addressed are:

    Prohibiting gender-normalising surgery on intersex infants

    Approximately 1.7% of infants are born with sex characteristics that don’t reflect the binary medical and social norms of “female” or “male” bodies. Often, “normalising” surgery is performed on these intersex infants to try to make their genitalia conform to cultural and gender norms.

    Such surgeries, which are not medically necessary nor supported by scientific evidence, constitute a breach of human rights, and must be prohibited.

    Removing religious exemptions from anti-discrimination legislation

    While all Australian states and territories prohibit discrimination of the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, some exempt faith-based organisations from complying with these prohibitions, even if they’re providing services traditionally provided by government, such as healthcare, education and social services.

    The result is that religious schools can fire teachers for being gay, and expel students on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity.

    Banning ‘conversion therapy’

    Conversion practices is the name given to pseudoscientific endeavours that involve psychological and physical interventions, often faith-based, to try to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity. Such practices are often psychologically damaging and lead to higher risks of psychological stress, poor mental health, self-harm, post-traumatic stress disorder and suicide.

    Conversion practices are inherently humiliating, demeaning and discriminatory. Despite constituting a fundamental breach of human rights, they’ve only been prohibited in three Australian jurisdictions – Victoria, the ACT and Queensland.

    A nationally coordinated response is required to ensure such practices are comprehensively and uniformly banned, and to support survivors of such trauma.

    Protecting the rights of transgender and gender-diverse people

    The tsunami of anti-trans laws being introduced across the United States is truly staggering. A moral panic is fuelling numerous pieces of legislation requiring transgender athletes to compete in sports according to the sex assigned to them at birth, which is completely contradictory to the IOC Framework on Fairness, Inclusion and Non-Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity and Sex Variations, which provides that:

    “No athlete should be precluded from competing or excluded from competition on the exclusive ground of an unverified, alleged or perceived unfair competitive advantage due to their sex variation, physical appearance or transgender status.”

    Laws have also been passed in multiple states, prohibiting any discussion of gender identity in classrooms.

    Perhaps most troubling of all are moves to define gender-affirming health treatment as child abuse, turning supportive parents of trans children and medical practitioners into criminals.

    In Australia, the anti-trans views being expressed by politicians such as Mark Latham and candidates such as Katherine Deves suggest we may be heading down a similar path.

    We’ve already seen attempts to wind back the human rights protections LGBTQ+ people fought so hard to achieve. Some of these have failed; for example, neither the Religious Discrimination Bill 2021 (Cth) nor the Education Legislation Amendment (Parental Rights) Bill 2020 (NSW) were passed by parliament.

    However, other attacks on LGBTQ+ people have been more effective, including the defunding of the Safe Schools program.

    Having a national Bill of Rights would not immediately fix all of these problems. But it would be a good start. It would elevate the level of debate about human rights in this country, but would need to be accompanied by improved independence and increased funding for the Australian Human Rights Commission.

    It’s time to ask our politicians the hard questions about what they intend to do to strengthen human rights protections if, on 21 May, the Australian people elect them to form government.


    Paula Gerber is a Professor in the Faculty of Law at Monash University, and a member of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law. She specialises in international human rights law, with a particular focus in LGBTI rights and children’s rights.

    Melissa Castan is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law at Monash University, and the Director of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law. She teaches, researches and writes on Australian public law, Indigenous legal issues, human rights law, and legal education.

    This article is republished from Monash Lens under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.


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  • By Dr Ronli Sifris

    Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a nightmare for prospective parents engaged in surrogacy arrangements in the country.

    Ukraine has become a popular destination for surrogacy. While exact numbers are difficult to obtain, it’s estimated between 2,000 and 2,500 babies are born each year via surrogacy in Ukraine.

    BioTexCom, one of the largest fertility clinics in Ukraine, is expecting 200 babies to be born via surrogacy by the end of May.

    More than ten Australian families are expecting babies to be born via surrogacy in Ukraine by the first week of May.

    But it’s currently extremely challenging for such parents to cross the border into Ukraine to meet their babies. This is a disaster for the babies, the surrogates and the intended parents.

    The babies are left in limbo, born into a war zone without their parents to look after them. The surrogates have to give birth in a war zone and then aren’t able to hand the babies over to the intended parents.

    As for the intended parents, one can hardly imagine how distressing it must be to know your baby has been born, or is about to be born, but not know how or when you can reach them.

    The situation highlights why Australia must change its surrogacy laws.

    Why are Australians travelling to Ukraine for surrogacy?

    Ukraine is a popular surrogacy destination for several reasons.

    One is financial. Surrogacy in Ukraine is more affordable than in the United States, for example. Surrogacy in Ukraine is estimated to cost approximately USD $40,000 (A$54,000), whereas surrogacy in the United States can cost as much as USD $150,000 (A$202,000).

    Another is legal. Under Ukrainian law, unlike in Australia for example, the intended parents are recognised as the legal parents of a child born through surrogacy at birth.

    Although it’s worth noting only heterosexual married couples are able to access surrogacy in the country.

    For the vast majority of people, surrogacy isn’t their preferred way to have a child, but an option of last resort.

    For example, for one Australian couple, the topic of a recent Sydney Morning Herald article, surrogacy was their only option. They’d lost three pregnancies, and their use of surrogacy in Ukraine was the culmination of an excruciating six-year journey.

    Australian laws encouraging cross-border surrogacy

    The stress involved in cross-border surrogacy highlights this further. The vast majority of Australians who travel overseas to access surrogacy arrangements would prefer to do so back home, but Australian law presents a significant obstacle.

    In Australia, only “altruistic surrogacy” is permitted, where the surrogate mother doesn’t benefit financially from the arrangement.

    But “compensated” or “commercial” surrogacy, where the surrogate does receive a financial benefit, is prohibited.

    The prohibition of compensation is problematic for a number of reasons. From the perspective of the surrogate, it’s inherently exploitative to refuse to allow a woman to be paid for her reproductive labour. And the obsession with “altruism” amplifies problematic stereotypes and expectations of the “self-sacrificing woman”.

    From the perspective of intended parents, the prohibition of compensation has led to a predictable dearth of Australian women willing to become surrogates.

    This has fuelled the popularity of cross-border compensated surrogacy, which is illegal for residents of New South Wales, Queensland and the ACT but widely undertaken.

    What’s the solution?

    All Australian states and territories should amend their laws to allow for compensated surrogacy.

    Regulating behaviour that is already occurring, and to which law enforcement is turning a blind eye, has three key benefits:

    1. regulation ensures the rights of all parties are protected properly. Regulation in Australia can prevent exploitation abroad
    2. in a country like Australia, which has a social safety net in place to protect those who are most vulnerable, the question of compensation can be separated from exploitation
    3. compensation is a matter of justice. It’s unjust to allow many of the people involved in providing surrogacy – clinics, lawyers, counsellors and others – to be compensated for their time and services, but not the person doing the most labour and assuming the greatest risk.

    The anxiety around legalising and regulating compensated surrogacy in Australia does not make sense.

    Australia’s legal system has the capability to do this, and in doing so, would minimise the risk of exploitation.

    This would also likely reduce the number of Australians going overseas for compensated surrogacy, with the risks and stressors that comes with that.

    The most sensible solution, and the solution that best protects the rights of all involved, is for Australia to properly regulate (rather than prohibit) compensated surrogacy arrangements so desperate intended parents aren’t forced overseas.


    Dr Ronli Sifris is a Senior Lecturer in Monash University’s Faculty of Law and Deputy Director of Education at the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law. Her research is predominantly focused on issues at the intersection of women’s reproductive health and the law (at both the domestic and international level) including abortion, surrogacy, assisted reproduction and involuntary sterilisation. Her research also spans other spheres of health law, human rights and gender. 


    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

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  • By Dr Monique Cormier

    Last week, it was announced that the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor was opening an investigation into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, examining whether any war crimes had been committed.

    Then this week, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held a preliminary hearing into the Ukrainian demand that it issue an emergency order that Russia stop its incursion.

    Despite these two international courts having similar acronyms, they’re quite different. So, what are these courts, how do they differ, and what are their roles in the Ukraine-Russia conflict?

    The International Criminal Court

    As the name suggests, the ICC is a court that deals with criminal matters. Specifically, with war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and aggression. It was established in 1998 by a treaty, and has 123 member states (countries). The ICC has jurisdiction (authority) to investigate and prosecute international crimes if they’re committed on the territory of a member state, or by a national of a member state.

    The ICC can go beyond this and investigate crimes alleged to have been committed on the territory of a non-member state if the United Nations (UN) Security Council has authorised it.

    The ICC has 18 international judges who are elected by the member states. It also has an independent prosecutor whose office is responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes. Karim Khan, from the UK, is the ICC’s newest prosecutor. The ICC is headquartered in The Hague and, as a criminal court, it prosecutes individuals, not countries. Punishment for anyone convicted is jail time.

    The ICC and Ukraine

    Neither Ukraine nor Russia are member states of the ICC, but Ukraine has previously accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction over any international crimes committed in its territory since 2014. An unprecedented 40 ICC member states (including Australia) referred the current situation in the Ukraine to the prosecutor, who decided to open an official investigation that may lead to prosecutions.

    What crimes might be investigated?

    The ICC will be investigating possible war crimes that Russians are committing in Ukraine. If Ukrainians commit any war crimes, then they may also be investigated by the ICC.

    What the ICC will not have authority over is the crime of aggression. Despite the fact that Russia has clearly committed an act of aggression against Ukraine by invading, the rules on the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression are different – if the aggressor state (Russia) is not a member of the ICC, then the ICC cannot exercise its jurisdiction, even if the victim state (Ukraine) has agreed to the court’s jurisdiction. The reasons for this are complex and political.

    Who might be prosecuted?

    The ICC is a “court of last resort”, which means it usually focuses on a small number of people who are considered most responsible for the crimes. Even if high-ranking commanders never actually set foot on the battlefield, they can still be held responsible for the crimes of their subordinates. The ICC can issue arrest warrants, but relies on member states to arrest and transfer any suspects to the court. Anyone wanted by the court might then avoid traveling to countries that are members of the ICC.

    Could the ICC prosecute Putin?

    Under international law, senior state officials such as presidents and prime ministers are immune from any kind of legal action in foreign courts. As an international court, the ICC does not allow immunity for any individuals over whom it has jurisdiction.

    However, because Putin is the head of state of a non-member country, it’s legally more complicated as to whether the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over him. If the UN Security Council had referred the situation to the ICC (as it did with Sudan and Libya), then the court would be able to assert its authority over Putin.

    But without UN Security Council authorisation, it’s uncertain as a matter of legal principle that the ICC will be able to assert jurisdiction over Putin while he remains president.

    The International Court of Justice

    The ICJ is older than the ICC. It was established after World War II as the principal judicial organ of the UN. It has 15 international judges who are elected by the UN General Assembly and Security Council, and it’s also based in The Hague. The ICJ hears legal disputes on a range of issues between countries, but it only has authority to adjudicate if the countries involved have agreed to its jurisdiction.

    Ukraine v Russia

    On 26 February, Ukraine filed an application with the ICJ to institute proceedings against Russia. Because Russia will not simply agree to the ICJ’s jurisdiction in this case, Ukraine has come up with a creative legal argument that may mean that the ICJ can adjudicate the matter.

    Does the ICJ have jurisdiction?

    One of the ways that the ICJ can exercise jurisdiction over a dispute is if the countries involved are parties to a treaty containing a dispute resolution clause that gives the ICJ jurisdiction. In this case, Ukraine is invoking the fact that both Ukraine and Russia are parties to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, which has such a clause to enable the jurisdiction of the ICJ.

    One of the pretexts Russia has used for the invasion is that Ukraine has committed genocide in its Donbas region, which, if true, would be a violation of the convention. Ukraine is arguing that it has not violated the convention, and is asking the ICJ to exercise its jurisdiction over a dispute arising in relation to it.

    What does Ukraine want from the ICJ?

    If the ICJ decides it does have jurisdiction to hear the matter, Ukraine is seeking a declaration from the court that Russia’s claim of Ukrainian genocide is false. Ukraine is also asking the ICJ to affirm that it’s unlawful for Russia to invade on this pretext, and wants an order of “full reparation for all damage caused by the Russian Federation as a consequence of any actions taken on the basis of Russia’s false claim of genocide”.

    What happens next?

    Proceedings at the ICJ (and ICC) take a long time. So Ukraine has also asked the ICJ for provisional measures in the interim. In the expedited hearing that took place on Monday this week, Ukraine asked the ICJ to order Russia to suspend its military campaign against Ukraine until the broader dispute is resolved before the court.

    In the short term, it’s almost guaranteed that Russia will ignore anything the ICJ has to say. But a ruling from a respected international court will nevertheless have important symbolic significance, and will dispel any doubt that Russia’s invasion is not justifiable under international law.

    Update: On 16 of March, the ICJ ruled in Ukraine’s favour on the provisional measures.


    Dr Monique Cormier is a Senior Lecturer in the Monash University Faculty of Law. Her primary research interests include jurisdiction and immunities in international law and legal issues relating to nuclear non-proliferation. 

    This article is republished from Monash Lens under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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  • By Karin M. Frodé

    Today marks what the United Nations calls International Human Solidarity Day’. The idea of solidarity across borders is appealing, particularly in light of the many global crises that challenge the enjoyment of human rights. But can we conceptualise solidarity in a manner which enables it to go beyond mere rhetoric? Does it (or can it) have work to do, in the realisation of human rights?

    How we conceive of solidarity has become a pressing issue in the 21st century, not least since the COVID-19 outbreak. The pandemic has made it abundantly clear that we simply cannot defeat global challenges along national lines. In response, the international community has made frequent calls for solidarity, often incorporated into mantras such as ‘we are all in this together’. In practice, such calls often go unanswered, particularly by states. Continued vaccine hoarding by wealthier countries and insufficient progress in combating climate change are just two examples which paint a bleak picture.

    STRUCTURAL INEQUALITIES

    The lack of solidarity is particularly detrimental for already marginalised individuals, peoples and states. Structural inequalities within and between countries have, for example, been uncovered and exacerbated during the pandemic. To use the metaphor of the UN Secretary-General, “[w]hile we are all floating on the same sea, it’s clear that some are on superyachts while others are clinging to the drifting debris”. The sea metaphor is not just a figure of speech.  Migrants regularly drown at sea. Last month, over two dozen migrants lost their lives when attempting to cross the English Channel. The current UN Independent Expert on Human Rights and International Solidarity, Professor Obiora Chinedu Okafor, has described refugee protection as “a crisis of international solidarity par excellence”.

    The actions by the US and its allies in Afghanistan, culminating in the disastrous response to the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021 is another example of the detrimental impacts of the lack of solidarity. The withdrawal of foreign forces from the country was not just a withdrawal of troops but the withdrawal of solidarity. Countless numbers of Afghans are still at risk of summary execution by the Taliban due to their support of foreign forces, organisations and liberal values.

    BEYOND STATE (IN)ACTION

    Non-state actors often step in to fill the solidarity gaps generated by state inaction. Indeed, the UN’s focus on international ‘human’ solidarity suggests that we all, as humans, have a role to play. Yet, in doing so, individuals and other non-state actors may face significant barriers, including exposure to criminal liability for so-called ‘crimes of solidarity’. This was the case for Cédric Herrou, a French farmer, who was charged and convicted for assisting the free movement of ‘illegal immigrants’. Interestingly, the French Constitutional Council found that the relevant provisions infringed the principle of ‘fraternité (fraternity) which the Council confirmed to be a principle of constitutional value. Herrou has since been acquitted.

    A HUMAN RIGHT TO INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY?

    The Independent Expert on Human Rights and International Solidarity has referred to the Herrou case to counter criticism that solidarity is too vague to be useful. In addition to a fundamental principle, the UN mandate on international solidarity has also conceived of international solidarity as a human right:

    “…by which individuals and peoples are entitled, on the basis of equality and non-discrimination, to participate meaningfully in, contribute to and enjoy a social and international order in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.”

    This proposed right is reminiscent of other so-called ‘solidarity rights’, such as the rights to self-determination, peace, development and a healthy environment. These rights are often distinguished from ‘traditional’ human rights in that they belong not just to individuals but also to peoples and require collective action for their realisation.

    The Independent Expert on Human Rights and International Solidarity has found that there is no automatic bar on conceiving solidarity as a human right if we accept that human rights are contingent upon historical and social factors rather than a fixed list derived from a higher order.  

    It may be useful to take a step back and consider why it is that scholars debate over whether solidarity is or could be a human right. Solidarity rights depart from the ‘traditional’ understanding of human rights based upon individual rights against the state in which the person resides, and which concern narrow, concrete and justiciable claims. The criticism of claims being too vague and broad to be human rights has been powerfully opposed in theory and practice with regards to economic, social and cultural rights. Solidarity raises additional tensions, however. For example, by pointing towards a social, rather than individualistic ontology of rights.  Further, while states may still play a key role in the fulfilment of solidarity rights, correlative duties of solidarity also appear to fall upon non-state actors, including other individuals.

    In addition to tensions within the human rights framework as traditionally understood, solidarity raises various philosophical conundrums. For example, who are we in solidarity with and for what purpose/aim? The UN celebrates ‘human’ solidarity day. Can we really be in solidarity with the whole world? Is solidarity concerned with the recognition of similarities, acceptance of difference or perhaps something else entirely?

    WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?

    If the international community continues to proclaim solidarity as the key to solving the world’s most pressing challenges, it is imperative that more efforts are made to engage with the tensions and challenges which solidarity poses to traditional understandings of the international human rights law framework, as well as the international system of which it forms part. Given the elusive nature of a concept like solidarity, this exercise may raise more questions than answers. But perhaps it is precisely the questions which solidarity evokes that may be the key to its potential usefulness in the realisation of human rights.  

    Karin M. Frodé is PhD Candidate and Raydon Scholar at the Faculty of Law, Monash University. She is also a PhD Affiliate at the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law and engages in teaching and research in human rights within the Faculty. Her doctoral research considers the role of solidarity in international law, specifically international human rights law. Outside of her studies, she co-founded the Ham Diley Campaign, an initiative to support Afghans at risk together with other human rights lawyers and the Capital Punishment Justice Project (formerly Reprieve Australia).


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  • By AAP FactCheck, expert commentary by Maria O’Sullivan and others

    WHAT WAS CLAIMED

    COVID-19 vaccination mandates are at odds with the 1986 Human Rights Commission Act

    OUR VERDICT

    False. Experts say the legislation in question does not have any relevance to vaccine mandates in Australia.

    Queensland Liberal National Party (LNP) senator Gerard Rennick says there are human rights laws protecting Australians from being coerced into receiving COVID-19 vaccinations under state mandates.

    However, experts have told AAP FactCheck the human rights laws to which Senator Rennick refers have no implications for vaccine-related mandates in Australia.

    Speaking on the Chris Smith Tonight program on Sky News on November 21, Senator Rennick said: “I think there’s a number of federal laws that protect against coercion of vaccinations. In particular there’s the Immunisation Handbook itself, (which) says you can’t give vaccinations without consent. There’s also Section 51 23A of the Constitution that says that doctors and nurses can’t be forced against their will to give a medical procedure. There’s also Schedule 7 of the 1986 Human Rights Act that says people can’t be forced into a medical procedure.” (podcast mark 9min 34sec)

    When contacted by AAP FactCheck, Senator Rennick clarified the legislation to which he referred was the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986Schedule 2, Article 7 of that Act states: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”

    The wording of Article 7 comes from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a multilateral United Nations treaty that is formally recognised in Schedule 2 of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act.

    Senator Rennick told AAP FactCheck his focus was on the first sentence of Article 7, regarding cruel and inhuman treatment.

    He says it is “intolerably cruel” to tell someone who has had a bad reaction to a first dose of a COVID vaccine that they have to have a second shot.

    Professor Sarah Joseph, a human rights law expert at Griffith University, told AAP FactCheck the schedules listed at the end of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act give the Australian Human Rights Commissionpowers to perform functions in regard to various treaties and charters, including the ICCPR.

    However, the ICCPR is not an enforceable part of Australian law and Article 7 has no direct relevance to COVID-19 vaccines, Prof Joseph said.

    “Article 7 is designed to combat the most extreme of bad treatment, with the worst form of banned treatment being ‘torture’,” she said in an email.

    “In any case, no one is being ‘forced’ to have a vaccine. People are being excluded from certain jobs or scenarios (e.g. restaurants) if they refuse to get vaccinated. That is a level of coercion, arguably, but it is not nearly enough to constitute a breach of Article 7 in terms of a breach of the right to be free from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment.”

    Prof Joseph said overall the senator’s claim was “completely inaccurate”.

    “I don’t believe that Article 7, which is not a part of Australian law anyway, is relevant to vaccine mandates and lockouts in Australia.”

    Associate Professor Maria O’Sullivan, a deputy director at the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law at Monash University, agreed the “very high” thresholds of the ICCPR mean Article 7 would be unlikely to apply to Australian vaccine mandates.

    “The sorts of actions which have been recognised as meeting this threshold are things like forced sterilisation,” Dr O’Sullivan told AAP FactCheck in an email.

    “I would contrast that to a workplace or public place vaccine requirement which does not reach that high coercive threshold.”

    Dr O’Sullivan added that, in the context of vaccines and mental distress, it is important to differentiate between people who have a genuine medical reason for not getting a COVID vaccine and those who feel anxious or have a mild reaction.

    “Those with a genuine, recognised medical reason will be exempt,” she said.

    “Those with a mild reaction or some anxiety about it, or (who) feel coerced into getting the vaccine, may feel mental distress but I do not believe that this would be sufficiently severe in order to meet the threshold of mental harm that has been established by case law on this issue.”

    Senator Rennick’s reference to the Immunisation Handbook as being “federal law” is also misplaced, according to Associate Professor Fiona McDonald, the co-director of the Australian Centre for Health Law Research at QUT.

    “The Immunisation Handbook is, as it states in the introduction, focused on providing clinical guidelines for the provision of immunisations in Australia,” Dr McDonald told AAP FactCheck in an email.

    “Clinical guidelines may be used as evidence of best practice in a legal proceeding but to date the courts in Australia have not considered them determinative of best practice in and of themselves.”

    The handbook says that for a person to legally consent to receive a vaccine, consent “must be given voluntarily in the absence of undue pressure, coercion or manipulation”.

    Dr McDonald says it is possible vaccine mandates could mean a person feels coerced into receiving a jab but that would be “unlikely” to meet the legal threshold for coercion given they retain the ability to refuse to be vaccinated.

    AAP FactCheck has previously investigated the claim the Australian Constitution prevents healthcare workers from being “forced” to give a medical procedure. The claim relies on Section 51 (xxiiiA) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, which says the government has the power to make laws about medical and dental services but “not so as to authorise any form of civil conscription”.

    Luke Beck, an associate professor of constitutional law at Monash University, told AAP FactCheck in July that section 51 (xxiiiA) was added to the constitution in 1946 to allow the Commonwealth to fund various social services schemes such as Medicare and the pharmaceutical benefits scheme but has no relevance to vaccine mandates.

    “There’s nothing in the constitution that would prevent a law making COVID vaccination mandatory. We have had mandatory vaccination rules for some professions for a long time in respect of other vaccines,” Dr Beck said.

    Claims that Australians are protected from vaccine mandates by the Nuremberg Code have also been debunked by AAP FactCheck.

    THE VERDICT

    The claim that Schedule 2, Article 7 of the Human Rights Commission Act 1986 offers protection to people who feel covered into received COVID-19 vaccinations is false. Multiple experts told AAP Fact Check that Article 7 was not an enforceable part of Australian law and had no direct relevance to vaccine mandates.

    False – The claim is inaccurate.


    Dr Maria O’Sullivan is an Associate Professor and the Deputy Director (Research) of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law at Monash University.


    This article is republished with permission from AAP FACTCHECK. Read the original article.

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  • By Scott Walker

    The Supreme Court of Queensland recently delivered a landmark judgment (the Owen-D’Arcy judgment) on the operation of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (HRA).[1] The HRA is Australia’s most recently enacted human rights statute joining those already in force in Victoria[2] and the Australian Capital Territory.[3] These human rights statutes mark a change from the traditional reliance on representative arms of government for the ‘protection and promotion of human rights’ in Australia.[4] Although the HRA has been previously considered by Queensland courts and tribunals,[5] the Owen-D’Arcy judgment is the first opportunity that the Queensland Supreme Court has had to substantively consider the HRA’s operation.

    The Owen-D’Arcy judgment brings to mind observations made by the Castan Centre’s Executive Director, Professor the Hon Kevin H Bell AM QC earlier this year at the Castan Centre Human Rights Conference. In his presentation on the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities (Victorian Charter), Bell argued that the Victorian Charter has developed to operate ‘with certainty and coherence’, ‘but not always optimally’.[6]  It is the certainty and coherence of the Victorian Charter that I seek to here address.

    The Facts

    Michael Owen-D’Arcy (applicant) committed murder in July 2007 and was subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.[7] On approximately 29 January 2013, a Maximum Security Order (MSO) was issued with respect to the applicant and was thereafter renewed every six months.[8] The MSO was issued ‘on the basis that [the applicant] posed a high risk of killing or seriously injuring other prisoners or other persons with whom he may come into contact’.[9] The MSO required that the applicant be accommodated within a single cell,[10] be permitted two telephone calls of 10 minutes duration each week,[11] be permitted the opportunity of at least two hours exercise in fresh air in daylight,[12] and be entitled one non-contact visit per week for one hour.[13] The decision to issue the MSO (MSO Decision) was made on 17 June 2020 and was effective from 18 June 2020 to 16 December 2020.[14]  A ‘no association direction’ (No Association Decision) was made together with the MSO Decision.[15] The No Association Decision provided that the applicant was ‘not permitted contact associations with other prisoners … without approval’.[16]

    The applicant sought judicial review of the MSO Decision and the No Association Decision alleging that, in making the decision, the decision-maker failed (inter alia) to afford to the applicant natural justice and breached a number of the applicant’s human rights under the HRA.[17] In the alternative, the applicant also sought relief under s 59 of the HRA which provides that a person may seek remedy or relief in relation to an act or decision of a public entity if the decision was unlawful for a reason other than under the HRA.[18]

    The Court’s Decision on Judicial Review and the Obligation to Give Proper Consideration

    The applicant succeeded, in part, on his application for judicial review in so far as Martin J held that the decision-maker failed to take into account the effect of the No Association Decision on the applicant’s human rights, which was a relevant consideration.[19] Martin J identified that s 58(1) of the HRA,[20] which concerns the obligations of public entities to act compatibly with human rights (substantive limb) and to give proper consideration to relevant human rights in the making of a decision (procedural limb),[21] required the decision-maker to consider whether the decision was compatible with the applicant’s human rights.

    In reaching this conclusion, Martin J held that it was not sufficient for the decision-maker to refer broadly and imprecisely to ‘prisoner Owen-D’Arcy’s human rights’.[22] In particular, the decision-maker did not turn their mind to the applicant’s right not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way or his right to be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person when deprived of liberty.[23] As the attention given to the applicant’s human rights was ‘was superficial at best’,[24] the decision-maker failed to take into account a relevant consideration in the making of the No Association Decision. [25]

    The Court’s Decision on the Human Rights Act Claim

    The Applicant’s Claim

    The applicant argued that the MSO Decision and the No Association Decision breached his human rights, namely he argued that:

    • the decisions resulted in cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment contrary to HRA s 17(b);
    • the decisions resulted in the applicant not having liberty or security contrary to s 29;
    • the decisions resulted in the applicant, who was deprived of his liberty, not being treated with humanity and respect for his inherent dignity contrary to s 30.[26]

    Interpreting the HRA

    As this was the first substantive opportunity for the Court to consider the HRA’s operation, Martin J was required to determine the issues that arise when a breach of human rights recognised in the HRA are alleged. Acknowledging that ‘[s]ome situations will call for more intensive examination of some issues’, Martin J identified the following steps in determining such a claim:

    • identification of the decision and the reasons for making it;
    • identification of the human rights engaged by the decision;
    • determining whether the applicant has shown whether the decision limits the human rights engaged, and, if so, whether the respondent has justified the limits as reasonable;[27]
    • whether the respondent has made a decision not compatible with human rights;[28]and
    • whether the respondent, in making their decision, has failed to give proper consideration of relevant human rights.[29]

    The human rights recognised in the HRA ‘are not absolute’ and, as with the Victorian Charter,[30] the HRA has a general limitations provision.[31]This limitations provision ‘emobod[ies] a proportionality test’. [32] Relying on Victorian Charter jurisprudence, Martin J held that in determining whether a limitation had been justified

    • the onus of demonstrably justifying a limitation rests on the party seeking to rely on the limitation;
    • the standard of proof is ‘high’, such that it requires ‘a degree of probability commensurate with the occasion’ on ‘cogent and persuasive’ evidence; and
    • the  court’s role is here to ‘balance the competing interests of society, including the public interest, and to determine what is required for a person to obtain or retain the benefit of the rights recognised or bestowed by the statute.[33]

    In interpreting the HRA, international law and the judgment of international courts and tribunals may be drawn upon.[34] Such interpretive assistance may also be drawn upon in Victoria[35] and has been done so extensively.[36] The HRA should be given a broad construction as the HRA is beneficial legislation.[37]

    The Court’s Consideration of the Applicant’s Solitary Confinement

    The evidence presented by the applicant was that, aside from contact with prison officers, he was without physical contact with any other individual since January 2013.[38] His cell is small and bare, he is permitted a three minute shower, is only permitted to flush the toilet in his cell six times in a day and his cell is searched daily.[39]He is allowed two hours of time outside his cell per day.[40]

    The applicant’s evidence engaged s 30 of the HRA (the right to humane treatment when deprived of liberty).[41] The respondent did not justify the limitation placed upon the applicant’s s 30 right arising from the conditions of his detention. In particular, the decision-maker in their reasons does not disclose any basis for the view expressed that there was no alternative available to adequately manage the risk posed by the applicant than making a further consecutive MSO. As Martin J notes, this burden ‘is a heavy one and cannot be discharged simply by the decision-maker reciting that he or she held a particular belief without providing any basis for that belief’.[42]This respondent did not attempt to call any evidence in support of justification.[43] Further, the decision-maker failed to adequately (or at all) appreciate that the MSO was ‘for a further six months – on to of more than seven years of MSOs’.[44]As such, the cumulative effect of the applicant’s solitary confinement as a burden on his right ought to be considered.[45] The No Association Decision also went to the solitary confinement of the applicant as much as the MSO, as it worked ‘to prevent the applicant from engaging in any meaningful conversations or exchanges’, thus placing ‘him in a cocoon of isolation from all but the slightest interaction with other human beings’.[46]

    In upholding the applicant’s claim for breach of his HRA rights (in part), Martin J held that the MSO Decision was unlawful because it was not compatible with human rights,[47] and the decision-maker also failed to adequately consider the decision’s burden on the applicant’s rights.[48]In relation to the No Association Decision, while the decision-maker considered the applicant’s right to peaceful assembly and freedom of assembly as relevant, the decision-maker did not turn their mind to the right to be treated humanely when deprived of liberty.[49] Having not sufficiently identified the human rights thereby engaged, the decision-maker could not have given proper consideration to the human rights relevant to that decision.[50]Accordingly, the No Association Decision was also unlawful.[51]

    The Impact of Victorian Charter Jurisprudence

    The Owen-D’Arcy judgment draws heavily upon Victorian Charter jurisprudence in interpreting the HRA and ascertaining how it ought to be administered. In this way, it illustrates the certainty and coherence of Victorian Charter jurisprudence as the leading body of human rights jurisprudence in Australia, which itself has been developed alongside the jurisprudence of other leading human rights instruments.[52] Nevertheless, there is a key point of distinction between the HRA and the Victorian Charter: the obligation on public authorities under both the substantive and procedural limbs.

    The Procedural Limb

    The obligation on public authorities to give proper consideration to relevant human rights in making decisions[53] has been the subject of much consideration by Victorian courts. In Castles v Secretary, Department of Justice, Emerton J recognised that there was no ‘strict formula’, but that the decision-maker must perform a number of steps in order to be found to have given proper consideration, including ‘understanding in general terms which of the rights of the person affected by the decision may be relevant and whether, and if so, how, those rights will be interfered with by the decision that is made.[54] However, the decision-maker need not identify the specific or correct rights which are engaged.[55]

    Under the HRA, a decision maker is required to specify the rights engaged by a decision, ‘in a common sense and practical manner’, [56] because of s 58(5) which defines ‘proper consideration’ non-exhaustively as including:

    • identifying the human rights potentially affected by the decision; and
    • considering whether the decision would be compatible with human rights.

    This is a preferable situation because it explicitly prevents a cursory or general assessment of a person’s human rights by requiring a decision-maker to give a higher degree of attention to the specific rights engaged.

    The Substantive Limb

    The HRA has also remedied one of the less effective parts of the Victorian Charter which has seen divided opinion in the High Court in Momcilovic,[57] and an imperfect workaround adopted thereafter. This is in the interpretation of human rights and the relationship with the proportionality analysis (ie, the relationship between ss 23(1) and 7(2) of the Victorian Charter).[58] For its part, the HRA does away with any such confusion by adopting a single definition of ‘compatible with human rights’[59] which applies wherever that expression is used within the HRA.[60] This definition is consistent with early judgments under the Victorian Charter which adopted a proportionality analysis at the interpretation stage.[61] Recommendations for a similar provision have been made in Victoria to remedy this inconsistency, but such an amendment has not been made to date.[62]

    This position renders the Charter as less than ‘optimum’, such that it impedes ‘the fulfilment of its purpose of promoting and protecting human rights of individual Victorians’.[63] Indeed, of the most important factors of human rights compliance is the promotion and embedding of a culture which respects human rights.[64] In the context of the mental health system, for example, this requires that human rights are embedded in service delivery and embedded within law, policy, and practice of the mental health workforce.[65] It requires everyone within systems to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights, not merely through recourse to lawyers and the courts with their understanding of the law’s intricacies. This requires an understanding of human rights, which is generally considered to be lacking in Australia, [66] as a necessary step for ensuring human rights compliance. The Victorian Charter, and its operation, should therefore be readily comprehensible. This comprehensibility is risked and human rights compliance worse off because of this interpretive anomaly which ought to be rectified now that the HRA has demonstrated a clear path forward.


    References

    [1] Owen-D’Arcy v Chief Executive, Queensland Corrective Services [2021] QSC 273 (‘Owen-D’Arcy’).

    [2] Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (‘Victorian Charter’).

    [3] Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).

    [4] Julie Debeljak and Laure Grenfell, ‘Diverse Australian Landscapes of Law-Making and Human Rights: Contextualising Law-Making and Human Rights’ in Julie Debeljak and Laura Grenfell, Law Making and Human Rights (Lawbook Co, 2020) 1, 2.

    [5] Prior to Owen-D’Arcy, the most extensive consideration was by Ryan J sitting in the Court of Disputed Returns in Innes v Electoral Commission of Queensland (No 2) (2020) 5 QR 632 (‘Innes’). While the underlying cause of action was dismissed such that it was ultimately not necessary to consider the applicant’s arguments under the HRA, Ryan J ultimately considered it appropriate to make a number of observations about the operation of the HRA and to consider, in obiter, the arguments put by the applicant. Of particular relevance is her Honour’s endorsement of the Attorney-General of Queensland’s submission that the HRA should be approached consistently with the Victorian Charter, which Ryan J considered to be a ‘reasonable’ approach: 668 [202] (Ryan J).

    [6] Kevin Bell, ‘Certainty and Coherence in the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic)’ (Conference Paper, Castan Centre Human Rights Law Conference, 23 July 2021) 3. This paper is available at SSRN: < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3899704&gt;.

    [7] Owen-D’Arcy (n 1) [1].

    [8] Ibid [4], [18].

    [9] Ibid [18]. The MSO Decision was made pursuant to s 60 of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) (‘CSA’).

    [10] Ibid [21(a)].

    [11] Ibid [21(c)].

    [12] Ibid [21(d)].

    [13] Ibid [21(e)].

    [14] Ibid [19].

    [15] Ibid [20].The No Association Decision was made pursuant to s 62(1)(a) of the CSA.

    [16] Ibid.

    [17] Ibid [3].

    [18] Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s 59(1) (‘HRA’). This is analogous to s 39 of the Victorian Charter.

    [19] Owen-D’Arcy (n 1) [81].

    [20] Section 58 of the HRA is drafted in substantially similar terms to s 38 of the Victorian Charter and deals with the conduct of public authorities.

    [21] It was accepted by the parties as uncontroversial that the decision-maker, exercising decision-making authority vested in them by the respondent was a public entity for the purposes of s 58 of the HRA.

    [22] Owen-D’Arcy (n 1) [79] (Martin J).

    [23] HRA (n 22) ss 17(b), 30.

    [24] Owen-D’Arcy (n 1) [80] (Martin J).

    [25] HRA (n 22) s 58(1)(b).

    [26] Owen-D’Arcy (n 1) [124].

    [27] HRA (n 22) s 13.

    [28] Ibid s 58(1)(a).

    [29] Owen-D’Arcy (n 1) [95] (Martin J).

    [30] Victorian Charter (n 2) s 7(2).

    [31] HRA (n 22) s 13.

    [32] Owen-D’Arcy (n 1) [104], citing Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, 39-40 [22], 44-5 [34[ ( French CJ), 172 [432] (Heydon J), 213-4 [555]0[557] (Crennan and Kiefel JJ).

    [33] Ibid [108]-[109] (Martin J), quoting Re Application under the Major Crimes (Investigative Powers Act 2004 (2009) 24 VR 415, 448-9 [147] (Warren CJ).

    [34] Ibid [112]-[117] (Martin J); HRA (n 22) s 48(3).

    [35] Victorian Charter (n 2) s 32(2).  

    [36] See, eg, PBU & NJE v Mental Health Tribunal (2018) 56 VR 141 (Bell J); Loielo v Giles (2020) 63 VR 1 (Ginnane J).

    [37] Owen-D’Arcy (n 1) [118] (Martin J).

    [38] Ibid [151].

    [39] Ibid.

    [40] Ibid [152].

    [41] Ibid [240].

    [42] Ibid [250].

    [43] Owen-D’Arcy (n 1) [175].

    [44] Ibid [253].

    [45] Ibid.

    [46] Ibid [264].

    [47] Ibid [261] (Martin J).

    [48] Ibid [262] (Martin J).

    [49] Ibid [265] (Martin J).

    [50] Ibid [266] (Martin J).

    [51] Ibid.

    [52] These include the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), the Canadian Constitution 1982 pt 1 (‘Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.

    [53] Victorian Charter (n 2) s 38(1)(b).

    [54] Ibid 184 [185] (Emerton J).

    [55] Castles (n 51) 184 [185]-[186].

    [56] Owen-D’Arcy (n 1) [136], endorsing Castles (n 51) 185 [185]-[186]. For a recent discussion of these principles in a similar context see Minogue v Thompson [2021] VSC 56 (Richards J).

    [57] A majority of the High Court in Momcilovic v The Queen held that s 7(2) (proportionality analysis) did not have a role in interpreting a provision in accordance with s 32(2):(2011) 254 CLR 1, 44 [35] (French CJ), 219 [572]-[574] (Crennan and Kiefel JJ), 92 [168] (Gummow J), 132 [168] (Hayne J), 247-9 [678]-[682] (Bell J). For a summary of the effect of the High Court in Momcilovic see DPP v Kaba (2014) 44 VR 526, 587 [211] (Bell J).

    [58] Bell (n 6) 10.

    [59] HRA (n 22) s 8.

    [60] Bell (n 6) 11.

    [61] See Re Kracke and Mental Health Review Board (2009) 29 VAR 1, 31 [88], 33 [96]-[97] (Bell J).

    [62] Michael Brett-Young, From Commitment to Culture: 2015 Review of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Report, 2015) 146 (recommendation 28).

    [63] Bell (n 6) 12.

    [64] Melissa Castan and Paula Gerber, ‘Taking the Temperature of Human Rights in Australia’ in Paula Gerber and Melissa Castan (eds), Critical Perspectives on Human Rights Law in Australia (Lawbook Co, 2021) vol 1, 1, 9.

    [65] See, eg, Simon Katterl and Chris Maylea, ‘Keeping Human Rights in Mind: Embedding the Victorian Charter of Human Rights into the Public Health System’ (2021) Australian Journal of Human Rights 10.1080:1-21.

    [66] See Kevin M Dunn and Rachel Sharples, ‘Do Australians Care about Human Rights? Awareness, Hierarchies of Sympathy and Universality’ in Paula Gerber and Melissa Castan (eds), Critical Perspectives on Human Rights Law in Australia (Lawbook Co, 2021) vol 1, 589.


    Scott Walker is a final year LLB (Hons) student at Monash University. He is a Researcher at the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law and Eleos Justice and a Research Assistant to Professor the Hon Kevin H Bell AM QC. Scott’s Honours thesis was on the implementation of art 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

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  • By Sarah Hellyer

    Women’s Rights as Rhetoric

    Concerns for the rights of Afghan women and girls were used to leverage support for the war in Afghanistan from start to finish. In her famous radio address at the beginning of the war, Laura Bush urged Western governments and the international community to amplify and protect the voice of Afghan women. Throughout the duration of the war, this sentiment was captured in the development of foreign policies which were notionally designed to facilitate women’s empowerment and prevent further curtailment of their rights.

    Yet much of the political support and resourcing behind these nominal policies began to dwindle as the war continued, resulting in a failure to secure meaningful change for Afghan women following the withdrawal of US and allied forces. Now, Afghan women and girls wait to see whether the international community is serious about promoting and securing their rights, or if concerns for their wellbeing were simply optics all along. 

    The frustration that Afghan women feel towards the ineffective, optics-driven policy response of the international community is summarised in the following quote from an Afghan human rights defender who spoke recently at a seminar on women and peace negotiations organised by the Castan Centre and Monash Centre for Gender Peace and Security:

    “…the other side of the story is the unfair position of the international community. While in statements and press releases and their tweets they talk about women’s rights, they think that women’s rights is a priority for them, that women are half of the society in Afghanistan; in reality they have not done much in terms of protection of especially women human rights defenders in Afghanistan.”  

    [Speaker’s identity withheld for security reasons]

    Feminist Foreign Policy – A New Framework for Securing Women’s Rights?

    In contrast to foreign policies which address the rights of women and gender equality as an isolated policy concern, such as those relied on by the US and other western countries throughout the war in Afghanistan, Feminist Foreign Policy takes a structural approach to securing the rights of women. Feminist foreign policy draws on critical feminist and race scholarship to create a policy framework that addresses and interrogates the global systems of patriarchal power which facilitate the military-industrial complex and perpetuate harms against women. It is also a framework which steps away from traditional forms of foreign policy which focus on military force and coercion, opting instead for policies which holistically address the human needs of the most vulnerable. Under a feminist foreign policy, the needs of women are central to all policy considerations and their engagement is required in all aspects of political and policy decision making.

    Feminist Foreign Policy is achieving groundswell amongst certain governments, as indicated by the establishment of a Global Partner Network for Feminist Foreign Policy which was formalised at the Generation Equality Forum in Paris in June this year.  While gender equality and the rights of women are playing an increasingly significant role within international foreign policy, only 8 countries, including Sweden and Canada have formally adopted a feminist foreign policy. Notably, Australia, the UK and the US are yet to implement a formal Feminist Foreign Policy. 

    Importantly, research has shown that when women are placed at the centre of foreign policy concerns, meaningful outcomes can be achieved which go beyond optics or gestures. In particular, the Council on Foreign Relations reports that peace agreements which engage civil society and women’s organisations are 64% less likely to fail.[1] Further, studies indicate that when women participate in peace processes, the agreement reached is likely to be better implemented and more durable.[2] Moreover, it has also been found that societies with higher levels of gender equality are less prone to conflict both between and within states.[3] Addressing the need for women engagement in peace talks in the Afghan context, a joint brief from UN Women and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission notes that: 

    “….in a context where conflict recidivism remains high around the world, the inclusion of women in peace processes, and ceasefires negotiations in particular, may result in the long-term sustainability of the agreement—and of peace itself.”

    Yet despite the evidence that women’s engagement in peace talks leads to better foreign policy outcomes, there were only four women in the Afghan government’s 21-person negotiation team at the Doha negotiations, and no women delegates representing the Taliban.

    The following quote from an Afghan human rights defender at the Women and Peace seminar highlights the need for women to be meaningfully engaged in foreign policy as opposed to symbolic inclusion:

    “I think what the major problem is, is giving a symbolic role to Afghan women. Even if it’s a ministerial position, whether it’s an ambassador position, whether you are holding a senior position, whether you are in the negotiation team … women are mostly given symbolic roles. It’s more about numbers, not about meaningful participation of women, it’s not about women making decisions, it’s not about women influencing the decisions.”

    [Speaker’s identity withheld for security reasons]

    Similarly, this Afghan commentator at the same seminar addresses a key concern of feminist foreign policy, namely that peace-negotiation frameworks should holistically incorporate women instead of being limited to the realm of military and combat, which is primarily the ambit of men:

    “The belief in Afghanistan is that men fought, so they have to also bring peace. Because men have been leading the war in Afghanistan, they believe that they … have the responsibility to discuss peace in Afghanistan. I have witnessed different forums where, you know, men have said ‘why should we bring in women? What woman has to do [here]? We know the war, so we will know the peace also.”  

    [Speaker’s identity withheld for security reasons]

    Feminist Foreign Policy in the Wake of the Withdrawal

    Canada and Sweden are two countries that fought in Afghanistan whilst having a feminist foreign policy framework in place. Sweden was the first country to introduce a feminist foreign policy back in 2014. Ann Bernes, Director and Special Advisor on Women, Peace and Security at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has said that Sweden’s feminist foreign policy is about moving gender equality from being an issue that competes amongst other priorities to being “the absolute core and DNA of… everything we do.”  The rights and resources of women in Afghanistan has been a key focus of Swedish feminist foreign policy, with Afghanistan being the largest recipient country of Swedish development assistance since 2013.

    Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy, which was introduced in 2017, takes a holistic approach to the aims of feminist foreign policy, addressing not just issues of equality and rights recognition but also women’s engagement with and disruption of existing power structures. An example of a project instituted under Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy in Afghanistan was the Amplify Change: Supporting Women’s Rights project aimed at promoting women’s and girls’ rights by increasing awareness of existing rights under the law and by enhancing women’s and girls’ access to services and support.”                                              

    Yet while both Canada and Sweden have established feminist foreign policy programming efforts during the occupation of Afghanistan, there has been little indication from either country about how these efforts will continue following the withdrawal of allied forces that has occurred this year. In a statement following their withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Swedish government has said:

    “Under the development assistance strategy, Sweden was due to contribute almost SEK 3.3 billion between 2021 and 2024. Following the Taliban takeover, Sweden will have to redirect parts of this assistance.”

    This raises the question of how countries such as Sweden and Canada will continue to proceed with their feminist foreign policy approach following withdrawal. It also raises questions as to whether the current iterations of these country’s feminist policies can effectively address the needs of Afghan women. Importantly, a growing number of feminist foreign policy advocates argue that any form of military intervention is incommensurate with the goal of furthering women’s rights, given the violent patriarchal structures which are imbedded within the military.

    Where to from here?

    For many advocates, the withdrawal of troops provides an opportunity for the US and allied countries to instigate a total paradigm shift within their foreign policies that facilitates a non-military solution to the situation in Afghanistan through a commitment to peace building. For Lara Kiswani, the executive director of the Arab Resource & Organizing Centre (a member of Grassroots Global Justice Alliance), this involves adopting the principles of ‘feminist democracy’ whereby intersectionality and self-determination are pioneered, and economic and political power is redistributed.

    In any case, the international community waits to see whether the withdrawal of the US and its NATO allies truly signifies the end of (albeit perfunctory) efforts to empower women in Afghanistan, or whether this juncture presents an opportunity to revise current foreign policies and adopt a substantive feminist framework.


    References

    [1] Desirée Nilsson (2012) Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable  Peace, International Interactions, 38:2, 243-266, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.659139.

    [2] Jana Krause, Werner Krause & Piia Bränfors (2018) Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace, International Interactions, 44:6, 985-1016, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1492386.

    [3] Hudson, Valerie M., Mary Caprioli, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Rose McDermott, and Chad F. Emmett. “The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States.” Quarterly Journal: International Security, vol. 33. no. 3. (Winter 2008/09): 7-45.


    Sarah Hellyer is completing a double degree in a Bachelor of Laws (Honours) and a Bachelor of Arts at Monash University.  She is currently undertaking the Monash Afghanistan Support Clinic set up by the Monash Faculty of Law’s Clinical Education Program to support the Ham diley Campaign. The Campaign is an initiative started byPhD students Azadah Raz Mohammad (Melbourne University) and Karin Frodé (Monash University, Castan Centre Affiliate) and CEO of the Capital Punishment Justice Project, Simone Abel, that seeks to support Afghans at risk by providing research and advocacy support, as well as by leveraging trusted contacts to make referrals for evacuation.


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  • By Yohannes Ayalew

    No right has preoccupied as many conversations in the digital age than the right to privacy. This is mainly owing to the fact that an individual’s privacy is being subjected to constant intrusion by States and non-state actors, thereby leaving the individual’s lives in a ‘goldfish bowl’ situation. At global and regional levels, countries are grappling to withstand these threats in the digital era by employing a number of legal and institutional mechanisms.

    This blog post seeks to examine possible treaty-based mechanisms towards realising the right to privacy on the internet in Africa. These are: applying international law through the Charter’s flexibility clause and through developments under African human rights law as a result of subsequent agreements and practice.

    Tellingly, the content of the right to privacy under international human rights law is broad-ranging, and includes: private life (or solitude), autonomy (or self-determination), identity (e.g., biometric data), integrity, sexuality, intimacy (e.g., data protection, freedom from surveillance, confidentiality etc) and communications on the internet. (see here, here and here) Nonetheless, defining the right to privacy intuitively is an elusive undertaking as the concept itself is sweeping. Some authors even go beyond to explain the difficulty of defining the concept of the right to privacy through the metaphor of ‘Chameleon’—which underscores that the notion of privacy is under frequent changes.

    The right to privacy in the digital age is recognised under the 2015 UN Human Rights Council landmark resolution, which affirms that ‘the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online, including the right to privacy.’ (See UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reports in 2014, 2018 and 2021). Recently, while interpreting the right to privacy under article 16 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in its General Comment No.25 (2021) has clarified that the gamut of the right to privacy includes additional layers in the digital ecosystem.

    When it comes to the African human rights system, in order to realise the right to privacy in digital era robustly, States are required to align their use or development of AI, robotics or other digital technologies with African human rights law. While the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) doesn’t expressly provide for the right to privacy, the early draft of the African Charter, which was drafted by Kéba Mbaye in 1979, contained an express provision on the right to privacy. In particular, article 24(2) of Mbaye draft guarantees individuals’ privacy from arbitrary or abusive interferences in their private life, family, home or correspondence.

    Recent debates have asked whether, and to what extent, African human rights law, and in particular African Charter protects the right to privacy on the digital ecosystem.

    On the one hand, there is a view that the African Charter doesn’t expressly protect the right to privacy, which gives rise to the debate of lex imperfecta (an imperfect treaty).  To put this another way, the omission of the right to privacy under the African Charter makes Africa’s foremost human rights instrument inadequate to safeguard this right (see here and here). As such, proponents of this view offer claim that accordingly the African Charter could be overhauled through amendment,  although it should be noted that amending the Charter by itself requires considerable effort as provided under article 68 of the African Charter.

    On the other hand, there is an argument that it is possible to read the right to privacy into the African Charter, notwithstanding this lack of an express provision. Proponents of this view have offered distinct opinions as to how the right to privacy exists under African human rights law (see for example here, and here). The right to privacy may therefore be implicit in some provisions in the African Charter, including the rights to integrity, dignity, liberty and security and the right to health, and accordingly impliedly read into the African Charter.

    Flexibility clause

    The flexibility clause or complementarity principle within the African Charter provides a mechanism to read the right to privacy into the African Charter through drawing inspiration from international law or the corpus of international human rights relating to the right to privacy in the digital age.  Article 60 of the African Charter states that:

    The [African] Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’ rights, particularly from the provisions of various African instruments on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in the field of Human and Peoples’ Rights, as well as from the provisions of various instruments adopted within the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations of which the Parties to the present Charter are members.

    The presence of the flexibility clause can be seen as a bulwark for the protection of the right to privacy because it reinforces international human rights law in Africa and brings the regional and international system into harmony. Nevertheless, an overbroad formulation of the flexibility clause may cast doubt on the determinacy of treaty obligations.

    Subsequent agreements and practice

    Subsequent agreements and practice that have developed African human rights law since the Charter came into force are the second way to read the right to privacy into the African Charter.

    The 2018 Draft Conclusions of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the interpretation of treaties helps us understand the meaning and effect of subsequent agreements and practice. Pursuant to Draft Conclusion 6(2), subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) may take a variety of forms. They include not only externally oriented conduct, such as official acts, statements and voting at the international level, but also internal legislative, executive and judicial acts, and may even include conduct by non-State actors on behalf of one or more States parties and that falls within the scope of what the treaty conceives as forms of its application. The ILC Draft Conclusion further clarifies that a pronouncement of expert treaty bodies (such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACmHPR)) may give rise a subsequent agreement or subsequent practice by states under articles 31(3) of the VCLT, although such pronouncement on its own cannot constitute a subsequent agreement or practice.

    When we extrapolate the ILC Draft Conclusions in line with subsequent agreements or practice in the African human rights system, it can be said that African states had not envisaged all human rights, including the right to privacy at the time when the African Charter was adopted. However, African states have since adopted various treaties and protocols that serve to interpret (and arguably widen) the scope of the African Charter. For example, despite being applied on specific themes, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) – which inter alia spells out the right to privacy – was adopted by States in 1990. The ACRWC may be considered as a subsequent treaty which came nine years after the adoption of the African Charter in 1981.

    Importantly, the African Commission adopted copious subsequent Declarations (see 2002, 2016, and 2019), Resolutions (see here), Press releases (see here and here), and Guidelines (see here) that seek to fully guarantee the right to privacy in Africa. For example, following the adoption of Principle 40 of the 2019 African Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, the right to privacy in Africa has now clearly been thought to include the protection of personal information, anonymity and confidentiality of communications in digital environment. The African Declaration provides:

    Principle 40. Privacy and the protection of personal information

    1. Everyone has the right to privacy, including the confidentiality of their communications and the protection of their personal information.

    2. Everyone has the right to communicate anonymously or use pseudonyms on the internet and to secure the confidentiality of their communications and personal information from access by third parties through the aid of digital technologies.

    The African Declaration explicitly guarantees protection of personal information, anonymity and confidentiality of communications. This further assures individuals of the right to enjoy freedom from any form of surveillance or interception. This further elaborates the right to privacy in the digital ecosystem.

    States assent, however, continue to be the Achilles heel of subsequent agreements and practice. Simply put, unless states agree and take notice of the existence of the right to privacy under the African Charter through jus dispositivum (a law adopted by consent), it will be unlikely for this approach to become effective (see here, and here)

    Additional barriers to the right to privacy

    Thus far, there is no well-developed jurisprudence developed by the African human rights mechanisms, such as African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACmHPR) and African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC), on the right to privacy in the digital era in Africa.

    In the absence of well-established jurisprudence, the African regional human rights system could draw inspiration from other avenues such as domestic systems. In 2019, for instance, the South African case of Amabhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism NPC and Another v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others, saw the High Court hold that the practice of bulk surveillance activities and foreign signals interception by the South African Government amounted to interference with individuals’ privacy and was accordingly declared to be unlawful. The South African Constitutional Court upheld this judgement in 2021.  The practice of some domestic courts in Africa will have a ripple effect on the development of jurisprudence at regional level. While the impact of domestic jurisprudence on regional level couldn’t be ignored, yet it will be a slow process for this to influence other judicial attitudes towards privacy.

    Going forward

    The above illustrates that amendment of the Charter is unlikely, and other mechanisms (i.e., jurisprudence) are ineffective.  Ultimately, the African Commission and African Court should seriously consider utilising the flexibility and subsequent agreements and practice mechanism to more effectively protect the right to privacy in the digital age.


    Yohannes Eneyew Ayalew is PhD Candidate at the Faculty of Law, Monash University and was formerly a Lecturer in Media Law and Human Rights at Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia. He is also a PhD Affiliate at Castan Centre for Human Rights. His project is looking at balancing the rights to freedom of expression and to privacy on the Internet under the African human rights system.


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  • By Neerav Srivastava. I am grateful to Prof. Kevin Bell and Ms Andrea Olivares Jones at the Castan Centre for their advice and feedback. 

    A right to assisted dying is a scary proposition. It means that a State is obliged to help someone die. Such a right challenges traditions, values, and beliefs. Societies are living organisms, built on continuity, and the sanctity of human life.

    There are circumstances, however, where an assisted dying preserves the dignity and autonomy of an individual. This piece argues, first, that there is a limited right to die (the right) as an aspect of the right to privacy at section 13(a) of the Charter of Human Rights And Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (‘Charter’). Second, that the Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017 (Vic) (‘VADA’) is inconsistent with the right because it fails to provide for an exceptional residual judicial discretion to permit an assisted dying.

    The need for a right to die

    While it is hoped no one is ever in the position of wanting an assisted death, the reality is that this is not always the case.  

    In a harrowing example, during the 1999 Japanese Tokaimura nuclear accident, Mr Ouchi was exposed to considerable radiation. On arrival at the hospital, he was described as ‘a husk of a man’. He was ‘practically skin-less’, had almost zero white blood cells, organ failures and a destroyed immune system. After a week, Mr Ouchi said that ‘he can’t take it anymore’ and that he was not a guinea pig. He was kept alive for 83 days; allegedly against his will and because his survival was a matter of national pride. To be clear, these are allegations. 

    Closer to home, the Victorian Inquiry that led to the enactment of VADA reported on a number of cases involving spouses who had helped their partner die. One case involved a woman who had large tumours, and was unable to wash, dress or feed herself. She asked her husband to help her end her life. He complied, even though it was unlawful, and was convicted of aiding and abetting a suicide. The sentencing judge observed that the husband’s love for his wife was absolute. Tragic circumstances led to tragic consequences.

    While a right to die is deeply troubling, the absence of such a right is also troubling. There are exceptional circumstances where the desire for assisted dying is explicable. Further, it would be impossible to exhaustively identify every scenario when there is a genuine and understandable desire for an assisted death. 

    The spouse cases suggest that if the State does not permit assisted dying, it will still occur. Illegality amplifies the tragedy. A right to die is also a form of protection against the State keeping us alive for its own purposes as was alleged occurred with Mr Ouchi. 

    Understanding ‘rights’

    The starting point of the argument is understanding the technical meaning of a ‘right’. ‘Rights’ relates to the conduct of another. For human ‘rights’, there is a correlative duty owed by the State. The right to life means that the State owes a duty to protect that right through the laws it passes and its actions. ‘Rights’ can be distinguished from ‘liberties’. A mere ‘liberty’ is not relational and does not impose obligations on anybody else. 

    If there is a ‘right’ to die, the State owes duties in respect of that right. If it was an absolute right to die, then anybody could insist that the State help them die. This piece takes the position that assisted dying should be exceptional. 

    However, if there is a mere liberty to die then the State does not owe individuals any obligations. Legally, the State could ignore do not resuscitate (DNR) instructions, keep us alive for its own purposes, and act contrary to our own wishes, autonomy, and dignity. 

    As for a right to assisted dying in certain circumstances, cases in the US, EU, UK, Canada, and India support a conclusion that it exists as an aspect of privacy, autonomy, and dignity. Similarly, in Victoria, the Minister for Health acknowledged that the right to privacy was engaged by the bill that became VADA.

    Right to die as aspect of right to privacy

    Hence, a mere liberty to die is hard to reconcile with the right to privacy at s 13(a) of the Charter, a right of considerable amplitude. Privacy has been held to include the rights to autonomy, dignity, be free from unwarranted government interference, be secluded, and sexual orientation. Privacy protects the exercise of self-determination. With respect to dying, cases have held that privacy includes the right to:

    So authorities are to the effect that there is a right to die as an aspect of the right to privacy. Having said that, the authorities do not speak with one voice when it comes to defining what is the right. It is submitted that it is the right: the right to die with dignity and autonomy. 

    The right is a principled approach that reconciles existing legal positions: 

    • it is only in exceptional circumstances, when a person’s dignity and autonomy are genuinely compromised, that the right is agitated, and the State owes a duty to assist a person die. 
    • the State is not under a general duty to assist anyone die.
    • the right is consistent with the established rights to choose our own (and refuse) medical treatment, to issue DNR instructions, to die a natural death, and to die in private. An individual’s response to a grievous and irremediable medical condition, or having a say in how they die, is a matter critical to our dignity and autonomy.
    • being principle-based, the right does not draw inconsistent distinctions between passive and active euthanasia.
    • the right is consistent with there being a general liberty right, to die. While, in general, the State does not have to assist dying to stand in the way by recriminalising suicide would agitate the right. Recriminalising suicide would be inconsistent with our autonomy and the individual would suffer the indignity of being branded a criminal. 

    Assisted dying under VADA

    Assuming that the right exists under the Charter, the remaining question is whether the assisted dying regime in VADA is consistent with it. 

    Under s 9 of VADA, the State will only assist a person die if:

    • they are above 18; 
    • they have decision-making capacity; 
    • they have an incurable condition, that is so advanced that they are not expected to live for more than 6 months;
    • the suffering is intolerable; and 
    • cannot be relieved. 

    To assist someone die when they do not meet the VADA criteria is to commit an offence, such as aiding and abetting a suicide. VADA deals with a deeply sensitive matter and insisting on strict criteria is understandable. 

    However, it leads to anomalous consequences:

    Broad ineligibility

    VADA is a 10% solution. If the Victorian Inquiry’s figures as to the demographics of whom commits suicide is indicative of future suicides, then 90% of the people contemplating ending their life will be ineligible under VADA.

    A person who is ineligible confronts a cruel choice. The person can take their own life prematurely, often by violent means, or suffer until they die from natural causes. ‘People do not want to die slowly, piece by piece or be wracked with pain.’  

    As Lord Neuberger observed, ineligibility may lead to an early suicide, rather than prevent it, and so be counterproductive. 

    Suffering

    The 6-month time limit is understandable but produces a curious result. If a person will suffer intolerably for weeks, they are eligible but not if it is for a year.

    Modern medicine can identify when intolerable suffering is inevitable. As a matter of dignity and autonomy some would not choose to wait. This is consistent with the Netherlands’s approach.

    It is not clear if debilitating old age meet the criteria.

    Age limitations

    Likewise, the criteria that the person be at least 18 is understandable. An adolescent may not have sufficient decision-making capacity. However, it is disproportionate. A 17-year-old, suffering intolerably, and for whom death is imminent is ineligible. As has already been done for DNR, procedures can be put in place to assess an adolescent’s capacity.

    Residual discretion

    Hence, VADA in combination with criminal laws limit the right and lead to anomalous and arbitrary consequences. It is right that Victoria has a general ban on assisted dying and that State-sanctioned assisted dying is exceptional. The problem with VADA is that it is so tightly strung that it becomes hard to rationalise. 

    Put simply, the VADA criteria are not the only exceptional circumstances where the right is agitated. In the UK, Baroness Hale asked herself why the UK blanket ban on assisted suicide was unconstitutional. She answered: ‘Not because it contains a general prohibition … [but] because it fails to admit of any exceptions.’If there was an exceptional residual judicial discretion to permit an assisted dying, it may help VADA be consistent with the Charter. It may also help in tragic circumstances and not leave people out in the cold.

    Neerav Srivastava is a PhD student specialising in law and technology. His PhD is on digital matching and the legal responsibilities of a platform, such as Uber, Tinder, and AirBnB, to users. Neerav has published articles in respected journals and books and has been cited in court with approval.

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  • Conference Conversations is a 3-part blog series based on papers from key speakers at the Castan Centre Human Rights Law Conference 2021, which took place on Friday 23 July this year. The final blog in this series is based on a paper presented by the author, Emeritus Professor Rosalind Croucher AM, in session three of the conference on ‘Charters of Human Rights: the Victorian Experience and the National Potential’.

    Mapping an agenda on promoting, protecting and fulfilling human rights in Australia

    By Emeritus Professor Rosalind Croucher AM, President, Australian Human Rights Commission

    Everyone’s talking about rights …

    Have you noticed over this past year and a half that there’s been a lot of talk about human rights? There has been anger and resistance to the restrictions to our rights and freedoms as Australia deals with the COVID-19 pandemic, and there has been passionate defence of the need for such restrictions to fully protect the human rights of the entire community. 

    I think this has been a really good thing, speaking to a heightened ‘rights consciousness’ in the face of COVID-19 restrictions.  

    In some way or another, each and every one of us has encountered restrictions—on our freedom of movement, the right to peaceful protest, on our ability to spend time with our family and friends, to celebrate marriages, memorialise our dearly departed, in recording our every movement in the community and providing personal information for the purpose of contact tracing. 

    Australians for the most part have been willing to ‘do the right thing’, guided by public health advice informing the restrictions imposed by Federal, State and Territory governments. Trusting their governments. But some have not. Some have acted through a sense of invulnerability, ignorance or simple stupidity. Others have spoken about their rights. Some have even invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as did the protester at Bunnings last year, or other international human rights instruments in their refusal to follow public health directives. 

    At the Castan Centre two years ago I spoke about the need to reimagine our system of protections of human rights and freedoms in Australia, asking what kind of Australia do we want to live in? Our experience with COVID 19 responses has provided the national test case and setting for looking at answers.

    Government measures in the interests of protecting the health of the entire community have provided a range of conversations about our rights. 

    In part this is a conversation about public understanding of rights, and it is part of a much wider discussion—about the legal architecture, or grammar, for protecting rights and freedoms in Australia.  Our experience over this year and a half, of responding to a pandemic, has brought the contours of this conversation into stark relief.

    Australia’s response to the pandemic has involved Parliaments nationwide transferring extraordinarily wide powers to executive governments and agencies, with significant impacts on individual rights and freedoms.1 Emergency times required emergency measures.

    Different layers of scrutiny have applied, depending on whether measures are legislated; whether they are in the form of ‘disallowable’ instruments; or whether, as has been the case for a number of measures, they are introduced through instruments that are not disallowable or reviewable, and which have not included human rights compatibility analysis. 

    Some of these measures have been hugely controversial: like curfews and criminal sanctions for Australian citizens seeking to return to their homeland from overseas.

    In December 2020, the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation2 released an interim report in its inquiry into the exemption of delegated legislation from parliamentary oversight, using delegated legislation made in response to COVID-19 as a case study to ‘shine a light on the deeper, systemic issues which inhibit Parliament from effectively overseeing delegated legislation at all times, not just during emergencies’.3 The Committee noted that, in 2019, 20% of the 1,675 laws made by the executive were exempt from disallowance and that

    The significant volume of delegated legislation made by the executive, and the frequent exemption of this delegated legislation from parliamentary oversight, pose serious challenges to Parliament’s constitutionally recognised law-making role.4

    The checks and balances that ordinarily exist are integral to our democracy.

    The complexity of our federal system also makes it difficult to ensure appropriate scrutiny of these measures. The National Cabinet is not accountable in the same way as the federal, state and territory cabinets are, which ‘complicates the way responsible government functions in practice’.5

    We need to embed a human rights scrutiny process better into all emergency responses, to ensure that any intrusion on our rights is always fully justified, and the debate is had at the time the restrictions are considered—not afterwards.

    For the most part, governments have openly justified their decisions. The Premiers and first ministers have maintained a regimen of press conferences, often on a daily basis, that have assisted in the acceptance of the limits to rights and freedoms that have been part of the emergency response.

    But we need to ensure that ordinary accountability measures resume ‘as quickly as possible’.6 To maintain public trust and ensuring compliance with restrictions. To provide a safeguard that, when we plan for recovery from this crisis, no-one gets left behind. Embedding human rights thinking more broadly in decision-making, and the accountability measures that express it, will assist in ensuring the maintenance of trust in our governments and our parliaments, and those who are delegated to act on our behalf, especially in times of emergency, a trust that has been the foundation of our democratic structure since 1688.

    There are new expectations from the community generally about the dialogue around human rights and justification for limitations, more public discussion and explanation of the consideration of what is the least restrictive approach that can protect the community; and a broad consensus about the need to advance and protect the rights of the community as a major focus of what government does. 

    This creates the momentum for a ‘new normal’ in the post-COVID world. 

    A federal Human Rights Act or Charter is a key piece of architecture that can ensure a ‘dialogue model’ between the government of the day, as well as the Parliament, the courts and the community.

    In conducting the national conversation project, the Commission has been looking to ways to fully integrate human rights into our national systems of law, policy and programs. Not as an afterthought but as a deliberative tool to aid better government decisions.

    Our national conversation project has been framed in three parts: reforming discrimination laws; positive framing of human rights, including a federal Human Rights Act; and accountability measures.

    Engaging with this issue again as part of the human rights architecture is part of our conversation. It is also a missing piece in the architectural framework of the Commission.

    The framing of rights in Australia

    Our Constitution expressly speaks about some rights, but the ‘rights’ questions in the Australian constitutional context are framed through the lens of limitations on legislative power—and largely through arguing about the implications of such limitations. They are not about personal rights.7

    Contrast the ‘Bills of Rights’ approach as in the US, with its constitutionally entrenched rights and freedoms.8 Not driven by wars of independence from other nations, our Constitution was designed around the concerns of its time: foreign affairs, immigration, defence, trade and commerce, and industrial relations—as well as about ‘colonising activities of France and Germany in the region’. We saw ourselves as ‘essentially British’, as the Hon Robert French AC remarked, and the rights ‘most intensely debated’ were those ‘of the individual colonies as proposed states, vis a vis, the proposed federal parliament’.9 It was, in essence, a deal among the States.

    While the US approach has given strong protections to rights and freedoms, it is an approach that has led to a politicisation of appointments to the US Supreme Court—one, if I might say, that should not be emulated in our own constitutional context. I observe in contrast that the model of statutory rights protection in Commonwealth countries is a different one, which retains and emphasises parliamentary supremacy—and the clear separation of powers between the courts and the parliament.  

    The language of ‘human rights’ and international law

    It has been remarkable I think that people have been invoking human rights in the context of COVID responses. The Bunnings protester strongly invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). This landmark document, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948, was one of the first decisions of the United Nations. Australia’s own ‘Doc’ Evatt was in the Chair as President of the General Assembly on that significant occasion.

    It was a moment that was also embraced and marked across Australia. Michael Kirby remembers clearly the UDHR being given to every schoolchild in Australia, on that flimsy aerogramme paper that some of you may remember. 

    Australia was a founding signatory to each of the other major first human rights instruments—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as to the Charter of the United Nations itself. Overall, we have signed up to seven major treaties and a number of associated protocols.10 I note in this respect that if you look at the treaties Australia has committed to and their ratification, it is an equal split of Coalition and Labor support. It is neither a ‘Labor’ nor a ‘Coalition’ project.

    The UDHR was an aspirational document, without conferring rights as such, but the other treaties do, and governments commit to them in signing and ratifying them. However, little has been done to enact the rights and freedoms protected by these instruments into Australian law—despite the aspirations perhaps encouraged in the schoolchildren of Michael Kirby’s young years. This means that the rights and freedoms enshrined in these international human rights instruments are not directly enforceable in Australia—no matter how loudly protesters may invoke them. 

    The legislative framework of rights we got

    While Australia has not ‘domesticated’ these international commitments, we did get anti-discrimination laws. On this I should note that one of the big pieces in our national conversation project has been to look at these laws.  We will shortly release our final position paper on this subject, framed around four outcome pillars: building a preventative culture; modernising the regulatory framework; enhancing access to justice; and improving the practical operation of laws.

    But looking at rights and freedoms more generally, the central piece—direct implementation in a Human Rights Act—never happened, despite repeated and current pressure to do so..

    When the Commission was put on a permanent foundation in 1986, as HREOC, after its predecessor had completed its five years under the leadership of Dame Roma Mitchell, it was designed in tandem with an accompanying Australian Bill of Rights Act. The Bill was passed in the House of Representatives, but did not survive the Senate. More recently, the idea was the principal recommendation of the National Human Rights Conversation led by Fr Frank Brennan SJ, over a decade ago. The past President of the Law Council of Australia, Pauline Wright, in her Press Club address, called for an Australian Bill of Rights, joining many voices to do so, amplifying the conversation, to do at the federal level what the ACT, Victoria and Queensland have done in relation to State and Territory decision making and accountability. 

    Following Brennan’s report we got the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, but we did not get a Human Rights Act.

    While the entire Commonwealth of Nations has moved forward by introducing comprehensive human rights protections in legislation, Australia stands alone in the Commonwealth for not having introduced such protection, at least at the Commonwealth level. 

    From the perspective of the Commission’s jurisdiction, it is still unfinished legal architecture. To continue along the allegorical lines, we are like a doughnut— with a hole in the middle.

    The functions under the ICCPR (and other treaties) for Australia are there, but essentially invisible to people like the Bunnings protester. Even without a formal enactment of the covenant as a Human Rights Act or Charter, people can bring a complaint on the basis of the ICCPR rights to us at the Commission. Our functions, since 1981, when the Commission was first established under Dame Roma Mitchell at the helm, have included a complaints mechanism. And ever since 1981 the Commission has been handling human rights complaints based on the instruments that are scheduled to our Act.12

    So, for example, we have a particular and growing set of complaints invoking the right to return to the country and for children to enter or leave Australia for the purpose of family reunification.13 These are complaints that do not sit under the category of ‘unlawful discrimination’ in the four anti-discrimination laws, but in what we describe as our ‘human rights’ jurisdiction that links to the treaties. 

    Complaints under our Act have increased 500% with COVID-19—masks, travel caps, travel bans, family reunion, people with disability and COVID restrictions, and vaccinations. Our overall complaint caseload has also increased nearly 100% over the past year.

    This human rights jurisdiction is important, but it is limited, and essentially invisible. The process itself, however, may have impact for individuals through quiet diplomacy. But if the process does not lead to a successful result, there is no access to judicial consideration, nor to any enforceable remedies.

    Moreover, its central weakness is that it is a jurisdiction based on international treaties that are scheduled to our Act. It is not about direct obligations under Australian law. A similar weakness affects the operation of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights. In both cases the weakness is stifling the effectiveness of the processes. 

    The beauty of a Human Rights Act, and other measures that frontload rightsmindedness, is that they are expressed in the positive: affirming rights and freedoms—not just implying them—and giving a clear anchor for decision making. It frontloads human rights thinking. It is also Australian legislation. It is parsed in the vernacular.

    This is the focus of the other major part of our national conversation project: advancing the case for a Human Rights Act and other complementary reforms.

    For my own part, I have had somewhat of a ‘Road to Damascus’ conversion to the idea of, and need for, an Australian Human Rights Act and embedding human rights thinking more directly in our laws and decision making.

    My journey along the road to Damascus

    It was not one specific Damascene moment, but a growing realisation, in three parts. 

    Part one—while the common law strongly embeds the idea of rights, the common law has its limits. 

    Protection of serious invasions of privacy, for example, has got stuck. The common law needs a great leap forward, as it achieved in Donoghue v Stevenson in relation to negligence, but we have not got there yet. Perhaps the ‘age of drones’, is the contemporary equivalent of the ‘age of railroads’ to provide the necessary catalyst for the common law. 

    Part two—was a realisation that the statutory expression of rights is played out in the negative, reliant on individual disputes; and what coverage there is, is patchy. They are framed in terms of what you can’t and, like the common law, they rely on a dispute before offering a solution.

    This is not to say that our discrimination laws are not important. They directly reflect international commitments, being domestic implementations of them, and they can achieve many positive systemic outcomes through the conciliation process that is the heart and soul of the complaints-handling processes, and the principal vehicle of operation of discrimination laws.14 

    Part three—was the realisation of the effectiveness of the complaint-handling jurisdiction of the Commission, when it is dealing with claims of unlawfulness under Australian law. This is a jurisdiction the Commission has had since the very first days under the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975. 

    Complaints usually start with just a phone call or email—some form of contact— by, on average, 15,000 people a year, individuals who consider that they have been badly done by in one way or another, and businesses just trying to understand their obligations. They are assisted or referred. About 2,000 people pursue the Commission’s formal complaints process—one that is based on conciliation. Only a tiny number of these ever end up in court—on average 2–4%; and most participants, both those who complain and those who are complained against, are very satisfied with the professionalism of the process and its outcomes.15

    Compare the situation now in relation to the implied freedom of political communication in the Constitution—this is entirely played out in High Court litigation for the most part. In contrast, only a tiny percentage of complaints matters handled by the Commission get anywhere near a Court.

    The kinds of objections that lawyers may have to the imprecision of rights language, when framed as laws, need to be set in a context in which most arguments about rights happen not in a judicial environment at all. It is also about seeing the experience of those common law jurisdictions that have made the leap into the legislative model, and that the world has not fallen in as a result.

    The essential idea that a Human Rights Act captures is a positive framing of rights. The beauty of a Human Rights Act, and other measures that frontload rights-mindedness, is that they are expressed in the positive—and they are ahead of any dispute. It provides the foundation for shaping human rights-based decision-making and for shifting towards a culture of human rights thinking.

    We don’t have a sufficient level of proficiency, or fluency, to converse in human rights terms when discussing issues of major concern to the community. 

    This year and a half has brought this into sharp relief. People are talking about rights. People are demanding their rights. Governments are defending their incursions on people’s freedoms in terms of rights. 

    Human rights approaches provide the parsing for the solution. A human rightsbased approach gives us the grammar we need─for approaching complex balancing issues where rights are engaged. A greater embedding of our promises to the world in Australian law would provide the pathway to do so. It provides the way for an Australian conversation about rights.

    A federal framing

    When I was involved in a panel that was looking at the protection of religious freedom in Australia over the summer of 2017–18, I was struck by the fact that both of the broad sides of the argument saw an answer in having a Human Rights Act as part of the commonwealth protections of rights and freedoms. This was even from those who had been ardent opponents in previous times. But it also struck me that having one was not an end, in and of itself, but the beginning or the unravelling of many more questions. Whether we introduce one; what it would look like; and what role the Australian Human Rights Commission will play, are all key questions, for example. 

    The purpose needs to be about changing the culture of decision-making and embedding transparent, human rights-based decisions as part of public culture.

    For me the outcome needs to be that decisions are made through a human rights lens.  It is the upstream aspect that is so crucial to change.

    The focus has often been on the downstream—in courts—because it is there that the tests are demonstrated in the public gaze. This has prompted jibes like ‘lawyers’ picnic’. Academic scrutiny—vindication or condemnation—follows.

    How do we shift the decisions themselves?

    Of course, education from the basis of a Human Rights Act is a solid foundation, as has been demonstrated well in Victoria.

    We are in the middle of consultations on what federal initiatives can be taken.

    We are looking at the rights and freedoms to be in the list. We want to give greater prominence to rights to participation and to procedural fairness. We are looking to address the limitations in the existing state and territory Human Rights Acts, by ensuring a direct cause of action—not requiring people to tie themselves in knots to bring claims through so-called ‘piggy-backing’ off other claims. 

    We are navigating all the constitutional issues—most notably the High Court’s Momcilovic decision and understanding how far judicial power stretches—and we are having wonderful, probing, engaged conversations. Not so long ago we actually had these conversations ‘in 3D’, in Melbourne. 

    We know that the political realities are as they are, but when we complete our work we will have three position papers, compiled as a report, providing our views as the national human rights institution as a roadmap to reform in protecting human rights in Australia – both aspirational and practical – with different horizons, short, medium and long-term.

    We are framing our work in terms of our view, as the National Human Rights Institution, of what the reform agenda needs to be to respect, protect and fulfil human rights in Australia in the future.

    Madeleine Albright was asked whether she was an optimist or a pessimist. Her answer, ‘I’m an optimist who worries a lot’. So in that vein, I will finish with optimism. 

    When I launched this project I referenced the last stanza of a poem by Indigenous poet, Oodgeroo Noonuccal, ‘A Song of Hope’. 

    To our fathers’ fathers

    The pain, the sorrow;

    To our children’s children The glad tomorrow.

    Let’s end on that note.


    References

    1. Sarah Moulds, ‘Scrutinising COVID-19 laws: An early glimpse into the scrutiny work of federal parliamentary committees’ (2020) 45(3) Alternative Law Journal 180, 180–181.
    2. The Committee was established in 1932.
    3. Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation released an interim report in its inquiry into the exemption of delegated legislation from parliamentary oversight, 7 December 2020, xiii.
    4. Ibid.
    5. Janina Boughey, ‘Executive power in emergencies: Where is the accountability?’ (2020) 45(3) Alternative Law Journal 168, 169.
    6. Ibid, 174.
    7. McCloy v New South Wales [2015] HCA 34 [30]. See also Unions NSW v New South Wales (2013) 252 CLR 530 at 554 [36]. 
    8. See, eg, J L Hiebert, ‘Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model?’ (2006) 69 Modern Law Review 7; S Gardbaum, ‘The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism’ (2001) 49(4) American Journal of Comparative Law 707, 710.
    9. R French, ‘Protecting Human Rights Without a Bill of Rights’, John Marshall Law School, Chicago, 26 January 2010, 7.
    10. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).
    11. Most notably, however, these instruments do not include the ICESCR.
    12. For individuals alone—Art 12 ICCPR; for family groups—Art 12,17 and 23 of ICCPR; and family groups with children—all of the above plus Arts 3, 8, and 10 of the CRC.
    13. See my article on this topic, ‘”Seeking equal dignity without discrimination”: The Australian Human Rights Commission and the handling of complaints’, (2019) 93 Australian Law Journal 571.
    14. For example, if we look at the number of complaints the Commission has received and conciliated over the 20 years to 2018, the numbers represent successful alternative dispute resolution through conciliation for more than 30,000 people and organisations: looking at Annual Reports from July 1998 to July 2018.

    Emeritus Professor Rosalind Croucher AM is President of the Australian Human Rights Commission. She was appointed in July 2017, after seven and a half years as President of the Australian Law Reform Commission.

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  • Conference Conversations is a 3-part blog series based on papers from key speakers at the Castan Centre Human Rights Law Conference 2021, which took place on Friday 23 July this year. The first blog in this series is based on a paper presented by the author, Dr Tania Penovic, in session one of the conference on ‘Confronting Persistent Gender Inequality and Harnessing Women’s Voices’.

    By Tania Penovic 

    Australia’s current level of engagement with the UN human rights system is perhaps unprecedented. We have two representatives on human rights treaty bodies and two experts serving on mandates of the Human Rights Council. All four of these individuals are women and on the world stage, we have presented ourselves as a leader in advancing gender equality. My paper will interrogate this self-image by looking at our international engagement and considering the way it is reflected at home. 

    Our recent history of engagement

    Our engagement has not always been constructive. It took a combative turn two decades ago, largely in response to findings of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on discrimination against Indigenous Australians. The Committee was said to have ‘failed to grapple with [our] unique and complex history of race relations’1 and castigated for its reliance on information from civil society rather than the more airbrushed image presented by Australia. Then Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer declared that ‘[i]f a United Nations committee wants to play domestic politics here in Australia, it will end up with a bloody nose.’ 

    We disengaged to a degree with treaty bodies, resisted international visits2 and refused to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on the basis that Australia already has a ‘world class regime of legal and institutional mechanisms to protect women against discrimination’.3

    Dianne Otto observed that this exceptionalist stance rests on the claim that our exemplary human rights record exempts us from having to respond seriously to the concerns of an international system which should be focused on undemocratic states (them) rather than us. 

    Resistance to human rights scrutiny has been reflected in hostility directed towards NGOs and former Australian Human Rights Commission president Gillian Triggs in the context of our seemingly intractable asylum seeker policy. Reports from UN special rapporteurs have been disparaged as lectures that ‘Australians are sick of’ or ‘the kind of nonsense we are used to from these armchair critics.’ But more recently, we have welcomed visits from these special procedures of the Human Rights Council and hosted visits by five special rapporteurs with a further three postponed due to COVID-19. We have sought election and served a three-year term on the Human Rights Council, fuelling speculation about a shift in our engagement with the UN system and a greater commitment to domestic implementation

     A retreat from exceptionalism?

    In examining whether Australia’s engagement has shifted from the exceptionalism of the past, I will apply the lens of rituals and ritualism drawn from sociology, anthropology and regulatory theory by Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking and applied to participation in the UN system. Charlesworth and Larking have described rituals are ‘ceremonies or formalities that, through repetition, entrench the understandings and the power relationships they embody’, a ‘means of enacting a social consensus.’4 Ritualism involves embracing human rights language and garnering the legitimacy associated with human rights commitments while, or even as a means of, deflecting scrutiny and avoiding accountability.5  

    So rituals encompass the processes of engagement with the human rights system, including the processes of reporting periodically to treaty bodies and the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review, responding to the recommendations emanating from these processes and engaging in international political negotiations.  

    I will consider whether Australia’s engagement is marked by human rights ritualism by examining our recent participation in the rituals of the UN human rights system and then considering whether this has translated into a commitment to the advancement of gender equality at home.    

    The rituals of engagement 

    A foundational ritual of UN engagement is treaty ratification. And despite previous its earlier refusal, Australia has ratified CEDAW’s Optional Protocol. In recent years, it has also ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, its Optional Protocol, two Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and, after significant delay, the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture

    A focal point of our international engagement has been our recent term on the UN’s key intergovernmental body responsible for human rights, the Human Rights Council. In our bid for membership, we promised a principled but practical approach built on five pillars which represent areas in which we claimed to be positioned to advance human rights and to be leaders in promoting improvements. The first pillar is gender equality. 

    Our leadership in this regard derives from a foreign aid strategy introduced by our first female Foreign Affairs Minister and continued under our second. At least 80% of development investments are dedicated to gender issues, including violence against women and women’s empowerment. This significant commitment to gender equality abroad has yet to be matched with a broad-based gender policy at home. Susan Harris Rimmer and Marian Sawer have observed a longstanding tendency to champion our achievements in foreign policy while deflecting attention from the gendered impact of the ‘neoliberal reshaping of the welfare state’ in the form of shrinking public sector funding6 which may be seen, for example, in the chronic underfunding of the Office for Women. 

    During our final year on the Human Rights Council, we commenced a four-year term on the Commission on the Status of Women, the UN’s principal intergovernmental body dedicated to gender equality and women’s empowerment. At its 65th session in March 2021, Australia engaged actively in the rituals of membership, serving as Vice-Chair of its Bureau. Our national statement to the session was delivered by Senator Marise Payne at around about the same time that thousands of people marched across Australia for gender justice. 

    The statement noted the gendered impact of COVID-19 and the effectiveness of targeted measures for increasing women’s full, equal and meaningful participation and leadership in public life. It affirmed Australia’s commitment to the Security Council’s Women Peace and Security Agenda. It observed that women’s wellbeing and ability to participate in public life is inextricably linked to achieving women’s economic empowerment, and end to gender-based violence and sexual and reproductive health and rights. And it declared Australia’s commitment to ‘advancing women’s leadership at all levels and in all areas of our lives, free from discrimination and violence.’ In the performative rituals of membership and participation in key intergovernmental bodies concerned with human rights, Australia presents as champion of gender equality. For observers unapprised of events at home, Australia may indeed appear to have eliminated gender-based discrimination.     

    Nominating experts

    A further ritual of engagement has been Australia’s nomination of a number of human rights experts to thematic mechanisms and treaty bodies. 

    First, Megan Davis currently serves on the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which advises the Human Rights Council. Her contribution to the UN human rights system is broad and significant. She has served as a member and chair of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and participated in drafting the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. At home, Professor Davis has played an important role in the Uluru Statement from the Heart.   

    Second, Australia’s former Sex Discrimination Commissioner Elizabeth Broderick was appointed in 2017 to the Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls, a body created by the Human Rights Council to address the failure of states to realise the commitment made at the Fourth World Conference on Women to revoke discriminatory laws. During Broderick’s tenure, the working group has undertaken important work to highlight the gendered impacts of laws and practices and advocated for the reform of discriminatory laws. 

    Third, Rosemary Kayess was elected to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2019 and now serves as chair. Kayess was involved in the drafting of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and lobbying for its ratification by Australia. She is the first Australian woman and second Australian to serve on the committee, with Ron McCallum having served two terms between 2009 and 2014. Australia’s nomination for her re-election was recently announced. 

    Finally, for the first time in almost three decades, the CEDAW Committee has an Australian member. Natasha Stott Despoja commenced her term in January after an election campaign conducted largely online. Stott Despoja will build on an important legacy. Her predecessor, Elizabeth Evatt served on the committee from 1984 until 1992 and chaired it from 1989-1991. Evatt helped achieve important procedural reforms to the Committee’s processes and played a critical role in the normative expansion of the prohibition of gender-based violence, promoting the understanding that violence in the private sphere is a violation of human rights.7 

    In a media release congratulating Stott Despoja on her election, Senator Marise Payne links the government’s support for the election of an Australian to the committee as a corollary of ‘Australia’s proud record of advocacy on gender equality’, building on our global leadership on gender equality and commitment to eliminating discrimination against women and girls in Australia and globally. I will now consider that commitment in Australia.   

    From the international to the domestic 

    So has our high-level engagement in UN rituals, including the nomination of leading experts, marked a retreat from the exceptionalist premise that the system is designed for others and not for us?  Or is it a manifestation of human rights ritualism? The answer lies in our stance towards domestic implementation, the degree to which we have embraced the standards that underpin our international engagement. 

    In recent years, recommendations by bodies such as the CEDAW Committee and Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women have been received politely, without public contestation. But many are not implemented and we have failed to manifest a commitment to the kind of transformative change needed to advance gender equality in Australia. 

    When UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet visited Australia in 2019, she revealed a significant understanding of Australia’s progress in achieving gender equality: 

    ‘Australia has a significantly better track record than many other countries, but still women continue to face many barriers, including unequal pay, workplace discrimination and pervasive sexual harassment. And I have heard for a long time about the exceptionally misogynistic approach to women politicians by many men in Australian political life, and elsewhere in society.’

    The ‘misogynistic approach’ referred to by the High Commissioner has been well ventilated in recent months and much has been said about Australia’s cultural ‘moment.’ But we are yet to see a sincere commitment to the transformative change needed to address sexual harassment, discrimination and gender-based violence. 

    The implementation of CEDAW requires states to combat gender stereotypes in the family and society and the CEDAW Committee has called on Australia to develop a comprehensive strategy to overcome discriminatory stereotypes. But we do not need to look much further than the treatment of women in political office to understand that stereotypes pervade our society and require so much more than an hour-long optional training session to dismantle. Female politicians are routinely depicted as housewives, housekeepers, child carers, school girls, head girls, headmistresses or weather girls, shamed for being deliberately barren, man-hating shrews, or outsourcing their parenting responsibilities

    Research undertaken by Blair Williams has found gender stereotyping in the media has intensified over time. Gender is often the primary descriptor of female politicians8, and significant attention paid to clothes, body shape, partners, families and childcare arrangements.9 ‘Celebritised’ depictions of female politicians have come with expectations about grooming and appearance, positioning ‘sartorial style as central’, making women ‘seem ‘other’ to their political role’10 and ‘detract[ing] from their reputation as serious political actors.’11

    This type of attention came into sharp focus during the leadership of our first and only female Prime Minister Julia Gillard. Even Germaine Greer weighed in on Gillard’s clothing choices with reference to her body shape, providing a license to others to weaponise the very tropes Greer has worked to dismantle. 

    Gillard received a lot more than gendered wardrobe advice. She was the subjected to intense hostility and gender-based mockery,12 described by Anne Summers as a manifestation of institutionalised resistance to women’s equality, rooted in entrenched assumptions about women’s full participation in Australian society.13 

    With her inquiry into Parliament House culture underway, Sex Discrimination Commissioner Kate Jenkins has a gargantuan task ahead. And there are many dark spots in Australia’s gender equality picture beyond the government’s failure to manifest the commitment necessary to change Australia’s culture of sexual violence and discrimination. These include the federal government’s failure to accept the Respect@Work report’s most transformative recommendation, requiring positive measures from employers to eliminate sexual harassment, discrimination and victimisation. 

    They include the imminent absorption of the Family Court of Australia into the Federal Circuit Court in the face of warnings by a preponderance of experts that the loss of a specialist court is likely to expose women to gendered harm.  

    They include the re-emergence of ‘religious freedoms’ on the government’s legislative agenda. UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Ahmed Shaheed, whose mandate is focused on dismantling obstacles to religious freedoms, has cautioned against the enactment of such laws on the basis that they undermine gender equality and legitimise violations of fundamental rights. In a report to the Human Rights Council, he observed that similar laws have served as a rationale for the dismissal of pregnant employees for being unmarried; the denial of access to (and insurance coverage for) legal reproductive health services and refusals to discharge prescriptions for contraception.  

    Reports that religious freedoms will be an election issue raise the disturbing prospect of a radical departure from the standards we champion to the world. The enactment of such laws would not facilitate constructive engagement with the UN, or help Australia advance gender equality at home, in our region and beyond. 

    Facing our ritualism 

    Hilary Charlesworth and Gillian Triggs have observed Australia to be Janus-faced; with one face looking to the UN and championing human rights elsewhere while the other looks inwards and fails to implement human rights principles at home. When we consider Australia’s domestic implementation of the international standards it champions on the world stage, the ritualistic face is revealed. 

    The power of participating in rituals in which we position ourselves as a leader has yet to translate to a deeper commitment to advancing gender equality and accountability for violations of women’s human rights. Significant work remains to be done to bring our implementation of international norms into line with our vainglorious view of ourselves.  


    References

    1. Daryl Williams, Attorney-General, ‘CERD Report Unbalanced’ (Press Release, 26 March 2000).
    2.  Alexander Downer, Daryl Williams and Philip Ruddock, ‘Improving the effectiveness of United Nations Committees’ (Joint Media release, 29 August 2000). 
    3. Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, ‘Minister’s Reply’ [to letter from Professor Maddocks] (2000) 147 UNity News 2.
    4.  Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking, ‘Introduction: the regulatory power of the Universal Periodic Review’in Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking, Human rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 8. 
    5.  Ibid, 18. 
    6. Susan Harris Rimmer and Marian Sawer, ‘Neoliberalism and Gender Equality Policy in Australia’,(2016) 51(4) Australian Journal of Political Science 742, 753-754.
    7.  Evatt was a driving force behind the Committee’s first comprehensive statement on violence against women, General Recommendation 19. The statement recognised gender-based violence as a form of discrimination within the ambit of CEDAW and has been built upon by a General Assembly declaration and the work of thematic mandates of the Human Rights Council, regional human rights bodies and the CEDAW Committee’s views and inquiries under CEDAW’s Optional Protocol. In 2017, General Recommendation 19 was updated by the more comprehensive General Recommendation 35 which affirms the position that the prohibition on gender-based violence had evolved into a principle of customary international law. 
    8.  Blair Williams, ‘A Tale of Two Women: A Comparative Gendered Media Analysis of UK Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and Theresa May, Parliamentary Affairs (2021) 74, 398–420; Blair Williams, ’A gendered media analysis of the prime ministerial ascension of Gillard and Turnbull: he’s ‘taken back the reins’ and she’s ‘a backstabbing’ murderer’, (2017) Australian Journal of Political Science, 52:4, 550-564, DOI: 10.1080/10361146.2017.1374347, 558. 
    9.  Ibid, Blair Williams, ‘It’s a man’s world at the top: gendered media representations of Julia Gillard and Helen Clark, (2020) Feminist Media Studies, DOI: 10.1080/14680777.2020.1842482
    10.  Blair Williams, A tale of Two Women’ note 8 above, 413. 
    11.  Ibid 411. 
    12.  See generally Samantha Trenoweth (ed), Bewitched and Bedevilled: Women Write the Gillard Years (Hardie Grant, Melbourne, 2013).  
    13. Anne Summers, The Misogyny Factor (NewSouth, Sydney, 2013) 19-21; see also Helen Pringle, ‘The Pornification of Julia Gillard’, in Samantha Trenoweth (ed), Bewitched and Bedevilled: Women Writethe Gillard Years (Hardie Grant, Melbourne, 2013)

    Dr Tania Penovic is a Senior Lecturer, and Deputy Associate Dean (International) in the Faculty of Law at Monash University. She is also the Research Program Group Leader in Gender and Sexuality for the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law.

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  • By Madeleine Hale

    On Independence Day this year, Donald Trump’s Team launched GETTR, an alternative social media platform, and Team Trump’s answer to mainstream platforms Facebook and Twitter, which both censored and de-platformed the former US President in 2020.

    The platform, founded by former advisor to Donald Trump, Jason Miller, advertises itself as a “marketplace of ideas” that allows “anyone to express their opinion freely”. It has been promoted as an island of free speech in a sea of liberal social media censorship.

    Within only a few weeks of operation however, the platform already appears to be failing. Without content moderation, the platform has descended into a cesspool of spam, hackers, MAGA merchandise, fake accounts, pornography and lewd sonic hedgehog memes. Although Trump himself has so far refrained from officially endorsing the platform, many accounts have been set up impersonating the former President. Even the Australian political landscape is not immune, with apparently fake accounts appearing on GETTR for politicians Peter Dutton and Pauline Hanson.    

    GETTR administrators are now furiously moderating content to regain control of the platform. The social media site without censorship – ironically – is now censoring its own users. The free speech utopia is not such a utopia after all.

    The recent experience of GETTR gives rise to important considerations about free speech principles, the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and the limitations of free speech in a democratic society.      

    Free Speech and the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression

    In political theory, free speech is generally conceived of as a ‘negative right’ – that is to say, the government cannot abridge the free expression of its citizens. Nevertheless, some limitations of free speech may be justifiable in certain circumstances.

    For example, seminal political theorist John Stuart Mill developed the ‘harm principle’. This principle allows for the restriction of free speech where the speech itself is likely to cause imminent harm to another person. Other limitations also apply to free speech, however, these vary across different jurisdictions.

    Free speech protections under international human rights law also provide that limitations are necessary in certain circumstances. For example, free speech is recognised and protected as the right to freedom of opinion and expression in various human rights law instruments including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its legally binding counterpart, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).      

    Again, the right, as it exists within these instruments, is not absolute, and may be subject to certain limitations. For example, Article 19(3) of the ICCPR states that freedom of expression may be subject to restrictions, only as provided by law and necessary for the ‘respect of the rights or reputations of others’ or the protection of national security, or public order, health or morals. Article 20 further adds that freedom of expression does not protect vilifying speech of individuals on the grounds of their race, religion or nationality.

    At a domestic level, the approaches taken by various jurisdictions vary. In the US, the existence of the First Amendment and the jurisprudence that has developed around it has allowed for the development of broad protections for speech, which allow for the spread of hate speech and other forms of harmful content.

    Free speech on social media must have limits    

    This unfortunate episode in GETTR’s origin story shows us that the utopian ideal of a social media platform completely free from censorship is in fact a dystopian reality. Entirely unbridled free speech cannot work in this context. Indeed when free speech principles were strictly applied in the microcosm of GETTR, we saw a clear rise in spam, disinformation, fake accounts, bullying, hate speech and anti-democratic speech online.

    The very architecture of social media platforms is in part to blame for this. Driven by the ‘attention economy’, platform algorithms reward the most attention-grabbing, emotionally engaging material. It is the most shocking content that captures and sustains our attention, appears highest in our newsfeeds and ultimately goes viral.

    Applying free speech principles, in an absolute sense, further exacerbates this. To prevent platforms from moderating content altogether makes it impossible for social media companies to remove harmful content. This kind of content is accordingly free to spread, with potentially devastating consequences.

    Further, rather than creating a space where multitudes of diverse opinions can flourish, a platform that allows content such as hate speech to be widely disseminated may actually have a chilling effect on free speech. Victims may be effectively silenced by the intimidatory, discrediting and humiliating effect of hate speech. This undermines the free speech of hate speech target groups and reduces the diversity of voices in the ‘marketplace of ideas’ first envisaged by Holmes J’s seminal judgment in Abrams v United States.

    Additionally, if disinformation and false news is protected by free speech laws on social media, this may lead to a rise in anti-democratic speech and foreign election interference, of the kind seen in the 2016 U.S. election. This undermines effective self-government through democracy, which is a defining justification for free speech propounded by theorist Alexander Meiklejohn. Through its truth distorting effect, the protection of disinformation and false news also undermines another prevailing purpose of free speech advanced by John Stuart Mill – the discovery of truth through rational, intelligent debate. 

    The above illustrates that, albeit counter-intuitively, applying free speech principles to social media absolutely may actually threaten free speech, rather than protect it. Some limits on speech are therefore necessary to facilitate intelligent debate. Free speech must be – and has always been – counter-balanced with competing interests like personal autonomy.

    Careful limiting of free speech can help free speech flourishbut these limits need to be decided carefully

    Notwithstanding the irony of GETTR’s dilemma, the platform’s abject failure to thrive is also cause for concern.

    We should be concerned about the dominance of only a few social media superpowers like Facebook and Twitter and the inability of a niche platform like GETTR to survive in this environment.      

    We should also be concerned about the hugely silencing effect of Twitter and Facebook decision to de-platform a politician like Trump. Indeed, international leaders such as Angela Merkel and Alexei Navalny have both rightly expressed concern over Trump’s ban from mainstream social media.      

    Since his removal from the platforms, discussion of Trump on social media has gone down by 91 percent. The ability of Trump to challenge the bans is limited, particularly given that Facebook and Twitter, as private companies, are not bound by free speech norms (which traditionally only apply to the State under US law). He is nevertheless attempting to argue in court that the platforms are extensions of the State. Team Trump’s failed attempt to launch an independent blog is further evidence of his loss of political traction since the de-platforming.

    While Trump clearly violated free speech norms against incitement to violence, the silencing impact of de-platforming Trump should serve as a warning. It shows us the enormous power of social media companies in governing speech – who speaks, how much and when. Should only a few autocratic, profit-centric social media companies be able to govern so much speech without restraint or guidance? 

    A way forward

    GETTR shows that free speech is under threat on social media from two directions.

    From one perspective, the proliferation of rampant disinformation, false news, foreign interference and hate speech, threatens the very founding principles of free speech and democracy itself. This is significantly worsened where free speech principles are strictly applied on social media platforms.

    On the other hand, the immense power of private social media companies to engage in content moderation that in effect may silence political discourse, including that of a President in office presents an arguably larger threat to free speech than governments themselves.

    Rather than the absolutist approach to free speech of the United States, a more nuanced tool is required. Given the global superpowers that these large social media companies have become, perhaps international human rights law holds the key. We should require social media companies to make their standards and policies compatible with international human rights law. This would enable a more nuanced approach that would balance the protection of freedom of expression with other competing human rights, whilst simultaneously protecting users from hate speech and discrimination.

    Madeleine Hale is a PhD Candidate and Sessional Academic at Monash University and was previously a corporate lawyer at Herbert Smith Freehills. She is also a PhD Affiliate member of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law. Madeleine’s PhD is examining the application of freedom of speech rights to social media companies.

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  • By Michaela Guthridge

    Allegations of trolling, upskirting, and a mocking apology by federal MP Andrew Laming are just the latest in a litany of reports which have revealed systemic issues of gender inequality in our nation’s capital. In response to these allegations, Prime Minister Scott Morrison directed Laming to undertake empathy training.

    These incidents are set within a wider context of generalised disrespect of women in the halls of parliament. Prime Minister Scott Morrison, whose government has reportedly paid $190,000 on empathy training in the past, has looked to his wife Jenny for guidance on invoking an empathic response. In relation to Laming, the Prime Minister is reported to have said “I would hope that we would see a very significant change in his behaviour”.  

    After attending the online course, Laming has now claimed that he has too much empathy.

    So, was empathy the answer?

    We may quickly answer a resounding ‘no!’ But it needs some unpacking to garner a deeper understanding of whether empathy can truly be a way forward or not.

    If we look to the neuroscience of empathy, we discover there is more than one dimension of empathy. The dimension we are most familiar with is cognitive empathy. This colloquially is stepping into another’s shoes to imagine another’s perspective. Through this perspective-taking we can appreciate our ‘sameness’ despite our many differences. Perspective-taking and prosocial behaviours develop when we are between 18-25 months old and by adulthood our trait empathy is relatively stable. This suggests that behaviour change based on cognitive empathy would require intensive and long-term dedication beyond the capabilities of any online short course.

    There also may be great danger in using cognitive empathy to achieve gender equality as one person’s understanding is not equivalent to another’s. To take the metaphor of stepping into another’s shoes, we only know how we feel in another’s shoes. Their shoes may be a perfect fit for us, but abrasive and uncomfortable for another. If we apply this notion to gender equality, we could say that a man has no point of reference in which to imagine what it is to be a woman. It appears that the training undertaken by Laming was based on the cognitive dimension of empathy given that he now considers himself with a surfeit of empathy.

    Another Dimension of Empathy

    There is, however, another dimension of empathy known as affective empathy. Affective empathy allows you to feel what another is feeling via the brain’s mirror neuron system. If cognitive empathy can be conceptualized as ‘I understand how you feel’, affective empathy is described as ‘I feel what you feel’. This second dimension of empathy may be ‘trainable’. In this respect, affective empathy is malleable, and much more than a social or emotional reflex. Affective empathy can be a choice and a skill that can be improved with attention, dedication and practice, and targeted brain training could be a powerful way to alter the function, connections and activity within and between our key neural networks. Because of this, racism, ageism, ableism, sexism and heterosexism are not inevitable. They can be learnt (and unlearnt) based on the acquisition of non-biased attitudes.

    Traditional strategies for overcoming gender inequality have generally focused on increasing knowledge or awareness rather than on modulating experience or behaviour. Compulsory diversity training is often ineffective, can result in backlash, and has shown only modest to weak impacts on gender-based discrimination. Indeed, fact-driven presentations that cite statistics can have the contrary effect of normalising discriminatory behaviour as ‘everyone is doing it’. Traditional education or training programs may not effectively influence our implicit biases in order to challenge or change harmful and discriminatory constructs, particularly when the principles that we are taught contradict what we see, hear and feel in our environments. While important steps forward have been taken, the limited effectiveness of strategies to combat gender inequality calls for consideration of alternative approaches that support the existing legal architecture.

    My Model

    I propose a new theoretical model that may lead to effective change through cultivation of empathic responses towards women and girls. The theoretical model is based on the neuroscience of affective empathy and has three elements: (1) Intersubjectivity, (2) Multisensory Engagement, and (3) Empathic Embodiment.

    In intersubjectivity, it is not the subject of two people that is important. It is the relationship that exists between them; in the shared third space. It mandates a perpetual response, transcending the temporal limitations of the human rights system. Intersubjectivity is important in the current context because gender equality is an ongoing goal that requires constant reinforcement and is not a static endgame achieved by an online course such as the one attended by Laming.

    The second element of the model of affective empathy is multisensory engagement. Operating in a multisensory environment can hone our empathic skills. In particular, the brain’s mirror mechanisms appear to convert sensory information from sights, sounds and sensations into a motor format, which enables us to feel what another is feeling. Whilst there is no equivalent to multisensory processing in the human rights-based approach, it could create an ‘enabling environment’ for the advancement of women’s human rights.  

    The final element in my model of affective empathy is empathic embodiment, which is a subjective element specific to the occurrence of embodying the experience of others. The rate of mirroring is low in interactions with outgroup members (such as women) because people generally do not mirror their outgroups. When mirroring basic emotions, the person mirroring does not necessarily have to feel the full emotion expressed or interpret its implications because it is the commonality, not the compassion, that generates equality.

    This model requires rigorous empirical testing and validation. As part of this testing, I am now seeking to explore the practical application of the model based on current NGO work. I hypothesize that this model is particularly suited young girls and boys as the next generation of feminists. This is important as there is a gap in NGO interventions that target pre-adolescents, a critical time when biases, stereotypes and empathy are formed.

    We can be assured that we will never live in a world devoid of all empathy. As integral to our sense of humanity, empathy inspires our greatest human sentiments; both love and hate. When we empathise with someone, we humanise them. It is this potential that gives empathy such power. But in order to disrupt the hegemony and initiate transformative equality, a seismic shift in thinking is required. In theory, this three-pronged model could be capable of supporting such a change.

    Applying the Model

    In dealing with the allegations levelled at Laming, Scott Morrison said “I don’t want to see gender become a defining thing in this nation”. Perhaps it should, but that takes leadership. Barnaby Joyce said you can’t “redesign people’s brains” with empathy training. You can, but it has to target the right dimension of empathy. It has to target affective empathy. Empathy is learnt, but as we see from the outcome of Laming’s training, teaching cognitive empathy can be dangerous and can make one believe they are too empathic, which unfortunately can be a hallmark of psychopathy.

    The task of tackling the toxic culture of misogyny in the ‘Canberra Bubble’ and broader society is not advanced by empathy training, a PM for Women, confusing messages about sexual consent, and a cabinet reshuffle. While measures known to create change, such as gender quotas and legal sanctions are continually brushed aside by the current government, this only perpetuates a lack of accountability and commitment to gender equality. New models based on the neuroscience of affective empathy may be the way forward to achieving gender equality. Given the high stakes (as exemplified here) exploring a model based on affective empathy is paramount. 

    Michaela Guthridge is PhD Candidate at Monash University exploring how the neuroscience of affective empathy can advance gender equality. Contact: michaela.guthridge@monash.edu

    This is an abridged version of a talk given at the 65th United Nation Commission on the Status of Women parallel event: “Next Frontiers: Neurofeminism, #UsToo and Korean Unification” 16 March 2021.

    This post was originally published on Castan Centre for Human Rights Law.

  • By Dr Heli Askola

    The recent travel ban on arrivals from India to Australia has been all over the news this week. There has been debate over whether the pausing of flights until 15 May 2021, and the potential use of the Biosecurity Act 2015 to fine those who return to Australia from India, is lawful or unconstitutional. Some have been concerned that these measures undermine the legitimacy of the liberal state. There has also been discussion about whether Australia is unique among democratic nations to adopt such severe targeted measures, leaving its own citizens out in the cold (it’s not, as New Zealand implemented a similar pause in April).

    Australia’s obligations under international human rights law

    This post examines these measures against international human rights law. Australia has ratified a number of human rights treaties which impose obligations to respect and protect the rights guaranteed in them. The two most relevant treaties are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).

    The ICCPR states in Article 12(4) that ‘no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country’. Articles 2 and 26 further prohibit any discrimination on the basis of, for instance, race and national origin. Similarly, ICERD requires States to ‘guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction… to leave any country, including one’s own, and to return to one’s country’ in Article 5, and prohibits discrimination based on ‘race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’ (Article 1).

    The body overseeing the ICCPR, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, has further clarified that ‘the right of a person to enter his or her own country recognizes the special relationship of a person to that country’. The Committee has further emphasised, in relation to the prohibition of arbitrary interference with Article 12(4), that ‘even interference provided for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular circumstances’. Most importantly, the Committee has emphasised that ‘there are few, if any, circumstances in which deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country could be reasonable’ (emphasis added). The Committee overseeing the CERD has further underlined States have an obligation to ensure that Article 5 is ‘neither in purpose nor effect’ limited in ways that are incompatible with Article 1 of the Convention.

    The India travel ban

    Is it therefore reasonable to prevent citizens from returning to the country to keep Australia effectively Covid-free at this stage of the global pandemic? Some would say so, given the global number of deaths the SARS-CoV-2 virus has caused since early 2020. A less alarmist and more evidence-based view would however recognise that Australia has largely managed to suppress the virus over the last year, and that the population has in fact been tremendously compliant with quite extraordinary restrictions that have been imposed on individual liberty to maintain this situation.

    Despite minor outbreaks from hotel quarantine, Australia has in fact been generally successful in tracking cases and suppressing outbreaks, and certainly has the capacity and resources (not to mention the obligation) to put in place effective mechanisms to respond to the pandemic, based on, for example, lessons learnt from the Victorian outbreak. We are therefore, comparatively speaking, very well-placed to manage any risk posed by returning citizens, and ought to recognise that responsibility. Further, it is certainly the case that Australia’s current capacity to protect its citizens in India from the risks of Covid-19 is better than India’s at present.

    As regards Australia’s compliance with international human rights law, it is important to highlight that very little evidence has been provided to indicate that the federal government has even considered whether it is acting reasonably in imposing these drastic limitations, or that it has observed its obligation to consider the effects, not just the stated purpose of the restrictions. Unsurprisingly, some have suspected that the measures, in particular the pause on accepting arrivals, are racially motivated, given the lack of clarity as to why India has been singled out. It is incumbent on the federal government to explain its reasoning, including the role of human rights considerations in shaping its assessment of possible policy alternatives.

    However, apart from saying the measures were adopted to ‘protect Australia from a third wave’, the government has failed properly to justify the policy. For instance, the medical case for invoking the Biosecurity Act simply highlights the number of cases of Covid-19 recorded globally and in India, and claims that ‘quarantine leakage’ constitutes ‘a significant risk to the Australian community’. Though the advice then goes on to remark that the potential consequences for Australians left in India include ‘the risk of serious illness without access to health care, the potential for Australians to be stranded in a transit country, and in a worst-case scenario, deaths’, the advice simply suggests these extremely serious risks can be ‘mitigated through having the restriction only temporarily in place’.

    Statements like this brush away the potentially life-threatening consequences to Australians in India, and fall far short of providing a sufficiently detailed analysis of why the measures would be reasonable and not discriminatory. They certainly do little to justify any deaths that may result from the pause. Instead, the explanations suggest that the federal government is willing to sacrifice overseas Australians to their fate, because it refuses to tolerate any risk from Covid-19 inside Australia. Of course, the federal government is here taking its lead from the states and territories, whose premiers have manifested a similar tendency to opt for sudden and harsh measures to appear decisive in the face of the virus, such as snap border closures, lockdowns over one case and cutting places in the quarantine program as soon as a minimal outbreak is detected.

    Preventing Australians from leaving and returning home

    The criticisms that can be made about the India travel ban can also be made about the ban on leaving Australia and existing hotel quarantine caps, which have for over a year limited the actual ability of Australians to leave and return home. The possibility of penalising incoming passengers is also not new. The hotel quarantine caps are ostensibly based on the quarantine capacity of the states and territories, but are again set with very little evidence of the actual resources dedicated to managing quarantine, and the policy has resulted in thousands of Australians being stranded outside the country for more than a year. Among these are some extremely vulnerable and sick people, whose ability to return is prevented by inflated ticket prices and lack of quarantine places.

    In effect therefore, Australia has already taken the extraordinary step of banning people from entering the country, just on the basis of wealth, as opposed to race and national origin, as with the India travel ban. The justification for either measure, under human rights law, is questionable, given no attempt has been made to explain why, at this stage of the pandemic, such sweeping measures are necessary and reasonable. Not only have we now developed vaccines against the virus, but we also know much more than we did a year ago about who is most at risk of the virus, what works to prevent infection, and how to deal with local outbreaks. For months, hotel quarantine has been criticised as potentially ‘costly overkill’. The National Review of Hotel Quarantine, commissioned by the federal government, has also recommended consideration of less restrictive and expensive measures, such as home quarantine.

    Accountability for border restrictions

    The UN Human Rights Committee has already called on Australia to facilitate the return of two Australians as an interim measure under the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR in response to their claims that Australia is violating Article 12(4) of the Covenant by not allowing them to return home. Given the absence of a national-level charter of rights under Australian law, the Committee is the closest we presently have to a human rights oversight body that can assess whether these border restrictions are compatible with our existing international legal obligations (note that a domestic legal challenge would have to be brought on constitutional or administrative grounds, rather than on the basis of international human rights law).

    Notwithstanding the fact that international human rights obligations lack ‘teeth’ under domestic law, they draw much needed attention to the rights of individuals whose very lives are at stake a result of Australia’s border restrictions. International human rights law was created in the aftermath of the Second World War with the aim of recognising that all human beings are ‘equal in dignity and rights’, and should never be treated purely as a means to an end. The Covid-19 pandemic has shown the willingness of governments to reduce human beings to vectors of disease, who are ordered to stop doing ‘unnecessary’ things like attending funerals of loved ones.

    Human rights law makes the bold claim that all humans are equally valuable and hold basic rights, including the right to enter one’s country. Any limitations must be absolutely necessary and justified on the basis of evidence, and not discriminate. In this instance, the evidence is missing, the justification is questionable and the human costs are disproportionately borne by those with Indian background, and more generally by the nearly half (49%) of Australians who were born overseas or have at least one overseas-born parent.

    Dr Heli Askola is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, Monash University, and an academic member of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law.

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  • By Karen O’Connell and Liam Elphick

    Following the allegations of rape against attorney general Christian Porter, which he firmly denies, Scott Morrison has insisted that alleged sexual assault can only be dealt

    with in criminal law. “I am not the police force,” he said when asked for his response as prime minister. “That is a matter for the police. I am not the commissioner of police.”

    Treating an allegation of sexual violence as if it is, and can only ever be, a matter for police and the criminal law is legally incorrect and a dangerous message for the many women and men who have experienced sexual assault. It also kills off a measured, informed public conversation about how else we might respond.

    The criminal law remains, despite valiant attempts to reform it over the years, a terrible tool for dealing with gender-based sexual violence. Governmental data suggests that almost 2 million Australian adults have experienced sexual assault since the age of 15, yet only about 14% of sexual assaults in Australia are reported to police. An overwhelming majority of these reports do not end with a conviction.

    Without a living person to provide evidence, the very low prospect of a conviction evaporates. The police discontinued their investigation into the allegations against Porter largely because of this. Is that then the end of all possible legal or institutional responses as Morrison is suggesting?

    The answer is no: alleged sexual violence can be investigated without police or criminal proceedings. There are a range of legal responses available to victims and their families, including a civil action in battery, a sexual harassment claim, or pursuing compensation under other statutes. In each of these instances, victims do not have to rely on police to bring their claim, and the standard of proof required is lower.

    In battery, more commonly known as “assault”, a victim can sue their alleged offender for compensation. A recent US example is the cases brought by various women against movie producer Harvey Weinstein. These civil suits are separate to his criminal prosecution.

    In New South Wales, where the allegations against Porter are claimed to have occurred, it is also possible, if rare and difficult, for an alleged victim’s estate to bring a battery claim on behalf of the deceased. In a child sexual assault case it does not matter how many years have passed.

    Allegations of sexual violence can also be investigated under sexual harassment laws, without requiring determination of criminal guilt.

    Jemma Ewin, whose criminal case was unable to proceed because of problems with evidence, successfully argued under Australian sex discrimination laws that sexual intercourse which took place after a work function was “unwelcome sexual conduct”. Here the test was not the criminal “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard but that it was “probable” that she had not consented to the sex. Ewin was awarded a record amount of compensation.

    These actions can also be difficult to bring, and they are not an adequate response to the harm of sexual violence, but they are an important aspect of the legal picture that Morrison is disregarding.

    There has been intense concern expressed by the government and some media commentators that the principle of “innocent until proven guilty” is being undermined. It is true that a person should not be treated as if they have committed a crime if criminal standards of evidence and conviction have not been met. It is important that if there are findings against a person in civil cases or inquiries, this does not lead to a presumption that the person is guilty of a crime.

    But these examples show that an absence of criminal prosecution is not the end of the conversation about legal responsibility and harm.

    An absence of criminal prosecution also does not limit institutional responses that are directed not to a person’s guilt or liability but to their suitability for a particular role.

    Independent inquiries are often commissioned by institutions in response to allegations. These include workplace inquiries, royal commissions, coronial inquests, anti-corruption bodies, and other everyday disciplinary proceedings. None of these processes require a previous criminal charge or prosecution. Indeed, they mostly occur in their absence.

    The high court recently conducted an independent investigation into sexual harassment, triggered by allegations against former Justice Dyson Heydonwhich focused on allegations at work but also helped to maintain public trust in the integrity of the court. The attorney general is Australia’s highest law officer and trust in that role is institutionally important.

    Lawyers in particular are held to high standards of conduct and are required to prove that they are a fit and proper person to be admitted to practice law in Australia. Legal practice boards can consider complaints made against lawyers. Two legal academics have referred the attorney general to the Legal Practice Board of Western Australia, although the executive director of the board has indicated they are unlikely to investigate.

    There are a range of ways in which our legal system and our institutions investigate credible allegations and provide the opportunities for all parties to have their perspectives heard. It is misleading to suggest the criminal law is the be-all and end-all in such matters.

    If we let the end of police proceedings be the end of any discussion about alleged sexual violence, we continue the long legacy of ineffectual legal and governmental responses. We should not treat someone as guilty of a crime if allegations cannot be tested, but that does not mean that our only choice is no response at all.

    Karen O’Connell is associate professor at the faculty of law, University of Technology Sydney; and Liam Elphick is associate lecturer at the faculty of law, Monash University, and a member of the Working Group on Gender and Sexuality at the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law.

    This article is republished from The Guardian under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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