Category: and

  • Read a version of this story in Burmese.

    Closures along Myanmar’s shared border with China have cut off residents of Kachin and Shan states from humanitarian aid and sent the prices of goods skyrocketing, sources from the regions said Monday.

    Myanmar’s civil war in the aftermath of the military’s Feb. 1, 2021 coup d’etat prompted China to close all its border gates in Kachin state beginning on Oct. 19, and all border crossings in northern Shan state except for Muse township since July.

    Meanwhile, Myanmar’s junta has imposed restrictions on the transportation of goods to Kachin state from the country’s heartland, as the rebel Kachin Independence Army, or KIA, now controls all 11 of the state’s border gates with China, including the major trade checkpoints of Kan Paik Ti and Lwegel townships.

    In Shan state, the junta has also restricted the transportation of goods from Muse to areas of the state under the control of ethnic armed groups.

    The restrictions have left residents of the two border areas, and especially civilians displaced by fighting, feeling the squeeze, sources told RFA Burmese.

    A civilian sheltering in the Jay Yang camp for the displaced near Kachin’s Laiza township, where the KIA’s headquarters is located, said that between the border closures and junta restrictions on goods transported from the Kachin town of Bhamo and the state capital Myitkyina, “the situation has become dire.”

    “Residents are enduring severe hardships,” he said. “We are facing an uncertain and bleak future.”

    The displaced civilian said that the price of food items in Kachin state has risen dramatically, making it difficult for camp residents to afford basic necessities.

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    Nearly all prices have doubled since the border closures, he said, with eggs at 1,000 kyats from 400; a viss (3.5 pounds) of pork at 50,000 kyats from 20,000; a viss of fish at 30,000 kyats from 15,000; a viss of chicken at 40,000 kyats from 20,000; a viss of beef at 60,000 kyats from 30,000; a viss of potatoes at 10,000 kyats from 6,000; and a cup of chili peppers at 3,000 kyats from 1,500.

    Meanwhile, a liter (.26 gallon) of cooking oil now costs 25,000 kyats, up from 10,000, and a liter of gasoline costs 15,000 kyats, up from 7,000.

    At the time of publishing, the official exchange rate was 2,100 kyats to the U.S. dollar, while the black market exchange rate was 4,300 kyats per dollar.

    Prior to the border closures, relief groups had been providing camps for the displaced with rice, oil, salt and chickpeas, but now can only distribute around 30,000 kyats per person, camp residents told RFA.

    Displaced suffer shortages

    Residents said that since the KIA seized the Kan Paik Ti border gate on Nov. 20 and Chinese authorities shut down the crossing, food prices had increased in Myitkyina, and the Kachin capital is now enduring a fuel shortage.

    A resident of the Sha Eit Yang camp for the displaced, located in a KIA-controlled area along the border, told RFA that the gate closures had made life extremely difficult.

    “There is no work to earn money in the area near our camp, so we can only find jobs far away from the camp,” he said. “With all the border gates closed, we can’t earn any income.”

    People at the Muse border gate in Myanmar's Shan state wait to cross into China on Jan. 11, 2019.
    People at the Muse border gate in Myanmar’s Shan state wait to cross into China on Jan. 11, 2019.

    In Kachin state, more than 100,000 civilians have sought shelter in 160 camps following the fighting that began in 2021. Since the coup, the total number of displaced persons has risen to more than 200,000, according to aid workers. Around 40,000 displaced persons are taking refuge in around 20 camps in Kachin state along the Chinese border.

    Sin Yaung, the deputy head of the Wai Kyaing camp for the displaced near Laiza, told RFA that the longer the border gates remain closed, the more hardships residents will face.

    “If the closures persist, it will be very difficult to access food,” he said. “The closure of the border gates and restrictions on the transportation of goods have caused severe difficulties for residents.”

    Attempts by RFA to contact the junta’s spokesperson and social affairs minister for Kachin state, Moe Min Thein, and KIA information officer Colonel Naw Bu for more information went unanswered Monday.

    Transportation restrictions in Shan

    The junta has also blocked the transportation of food from Muse, which is under the control of the military, to rebel-occupied towns on the Myanmar-China border in northern Shan state, according to residents.

    A resident of Nam Hkam, which is under the control of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, told RFA that no goods have gotten through from Muse since Nov. 27.

    “Residents are not allowed to carry food items by motorcycle and even vendors from Muse no longer come here,” he said. “Commodity prices have sharply increased. Tomatoes are now being sold for 20,000 kyats per viss here, whereas in Muse, one viss of tomatoes costs only 8,000 kyats.”

    A Chinese flag flies over the border wall between China and Myanmar in Ruili, west Yunnan province on Jan. 14, 2023.
    A Chinese flag flies over the border wall between China and Myanmar in Ruili, west Yunnan province on Jan. 14, 2023.

    Residents said that the TNLA has also blocked the transportation of fuel and food from Nam Hkam to Muse since Sunday, although TNLA spokeswoman Lway Yay Oo insisted that her group had imposed no restrictions on the flow of goods.

    RFA also tried to contact the junta’s spokesperson and economic minister for Shan state, Khun Thein, for comments on the commodity blockades, but he did not respond.

    Residents reported that restrictions have caused the prices of goods to “more than double” in Muse and Nam Hkam. Additionally, traders and drivers are out of work due to the closure of trade routes, traders in Muse told RFA.

    The restrictions imposed by China and Myanmar’s junta have impacted most of the nearly two million people who live in northern Shan state’s 20 townships, residents said.

    Translated by Aung Naing. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Matt Reed.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Burmese.

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  • Asia Pacific Report

    Palestinian diaspora poets, singers and musicians gathered today with solidarity partners from Aotearoa New Zealand, African nations — including South Africa — in a vibrant celebration.

    The celebration marked the UN International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People and similar events have been happening around New Zealand today, across the world and over the weekend.

    Images by David Robie of Asia Pacific Report.


    This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by APR editor.

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  • GlobalFoundries, a New York-based company, is the world’s third largest maker of semiconductor chips. It landed in hot water this month when U.S. authorities fined it $500,000 for selling its products to SJ Semiconductor, a Chinese company that can be found on a growing list of firms deemed a national security threat.

    Known unofficially as “America’s blacklist,” this catalog of over a thousand companies is maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security, a division of the Commerce Department. Officially called the Entity List, it dates back decades and includes firms that are part of China’s military industrial complex. Companies from other countries like Iran and Russia are also on the list, but Chinese companies have the highest representation.

    U.S. businesses have to obtain a special license in order to trade with these companies.

    New firms are added regularly.

    Why are Chinese companies a focus on the blacklist?

    China has one of the most robust economies in the world and is attempting to modernize their military, the People’s Liberation Army, on air, land and sea. U.S. officials believe that China has been expanding their military in recent years in order to achieve dominance over the United States and gain an edge over its armed forces.

    Buying U.S. products helps Chinese manufacturers make weapons and develop technology, Western experts say. “China’s basically using these civilian companies to bolster its military,” says University of Tennessee’s Vasabjit Banerjee, coauthor of an October 2022 Foreign Affairs article, “The Coming Chinese Weapons Boom.”

    Chinese officials counter that they are promoting international cooperation through trade, not trying to dominate others with it.

    “The Chinese side has all along firmly opposed the U.S.’ arbitrary use of [the] ‘Entity List,’ as well as other export control instruments, to suppress Chinese companies,” Liu Pengyu, a spokesperson at the Chinese embassy in Washington, told RFA. “We urge the US side to stop using national security as a catch-all phrase to politicize and weaponize trade issues.”

    What happens when a company gets “blacklisted”?

    Companies can get added to the Entity List when employees at federal agencies such as State, Energy or Homeland Security draw up a request to consider whether a foreign company should be added. They explain why they believe the firm poses a threat to national security and then submit their request to a group known as the End-User Review Committee. Members of the committee evaluate the request and then vote. If a majority agrees that a company poses a threat, then it’s added. There are currently more than 1,100 companies on the list. China has the most entries.

    A drone made by sanctioned Chinese company DJI is seen in 2023.
    A drone made by sanctioned Chinese company DJI is seen in 2023.

    Those in the U.S who try to secretly export goods may be punished. The penalties may range from hefty fines to imprisonment.

    A smaller, more recently formed list known as the UFLPA Entity List is maintained by the Department of Homeland Security and blacklists Chinese companies that use Uyghur forced labor, but this is separate to the better-known Commerce blacklist.

    Does it work?

    Once a company is placed on the Entity List, most U.S. business owners steer clear of them. This makes it harder for the foreign company to get new parts to build weapons and develop advanced military technology. And so, experts say, the list is working.

    Being put on the list is “a huge red flag,” says Craig Phildius, a former official with the bureau who now works for a Washington-based group, Export Controls and Sanctions Advisors. “A lot of companies will simply not do business with them.”

    But there are clear limitations. Chinese manufacturers can circumvent the U.S.-imposed restrictions by buying products from other countries, or just make the parts themselves.

    “China is simply too big for the West to actually hope to stop it from developing technologically,” says Sam Perlo-Freeman, a research coordinator at a London-based nonprofit, Campaign Against Arms Trade.

    One recent study shows that blacklisted Chinese firms invest more in their own research. Firms placed on the list increase their investment in research and development by 16 percent on average, the study authors said.

    What has China done in response to the blacklist?

    Chinese officials have established their own mechanism for controlling exports of valuable resources. Last year, they imposed restrictions on sales of a chemical element, gallium, used to make computer chips. Chinese officials say they have taken these steps in order to ensure their own national security.

    China's President Xi Jinping speaks during a meeting with President Joe Biden on the sidelines of the APEC Summit in Lima, Peru, Nov. 16, 2024.
    China’s President Xi Jinping speaks during a meeting with President Joe Biden on the sidelines of the APEC Summit in Lima, Peru, Nov. 16, 2024.

    In early November, China’s Ministry of State Security officials said they had blocked an attempt to smuggle a bottle of gallium out of the country.

    People in Washington and Beijing are waiting to see whether the list gets longer or shorter in the coming year. The newly elected president, Donald Trump, will take office in January, and he’s promised big changes.

    Still, Trump has spoken out forcefully against China. Says Phildius: “I think he will—for lack of a better word—keep the screws tightened.”


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Tara McKelvey.

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  • Comprehensive coverage of the day’s news with a focus on war and peace; social, environmental and economic justice.

    The post The Pacifica Evening News, Weekdays – November 27, 2024 President-elect Trump names decorated general Keith Kellogg as special envoy to Russia and Ukraine. appeared first on KPFA.


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  • WASHINGTON – Donald Trump has made no secret of his plans to hit China with massive tariffs. The only question is how much exactly.

    Calling tariffs “the most beautiful word in the dictionary,” the president-elect threatened during the 2024 election campaign to hit Chinese imports with tariffs of “more than” 60%, effectively slamming the brakes on trade between the world’s two biggest economies.

    On Monday, he said that whatever rate was ultimately levied, there would be an extra 10% tariff on top of that to punish Beijing for continued outflows of precursors for the synthetic opioid fentanyl, which U.S. authorities say is killing around 75,000 Americans a year.

    All that suggests that the U.S.-China relationship looks set under the second Trump presidency to become increasingly dominated by a grand rebalancing of trade ties, experts told Radio Free Asia.

    Women pass by a display board showing Chinese stock market movements on the U.S. presidential election day, in Beijing. 
 (AP Photo/Ng Han Guan)
    Women pass by a display board showing Chinese stock market movements on the U.S. presidential election day, in Beijing.
    (AP Photo/Ng Han Guan)

    In many ways, they said, things will pick right up from where Trump left them in January 2021, having hit China with some $50 billion worth of tariffs, which the Biden administration has since declined to roll back.

    Yet things may be a lot different this time.

    Trump tariffs 2.0

    Beijing now has nearly a decade of experience in dealing with trade pressure from the United States, said Shanghai-based Han Lin, the China country director for the Asia Group business consultancy.

    While the world’s second-biggest economy was looking to increased exports as its ticket out of slumping growth, he said, Chinese economic officials also now have experience with retaliatory measures and knowledge of how best to hit back at aggressive U.S. policies.

    “China is better prepared now than during Trump 1.0,” Han told RFA. “It has a wider range of carrot-and-stick trade responses, but the ever-present need for foreign investment may calibrate their behavior to send a message of strength without unnecessary escalation.”

    President Donald Trump waves during joint statements with China's President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Nov. 9, 2017.
    President Donald Trump waves during joint statements with China’s President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Nov. 9, 2017.

    A likely response from Beijing, he explained, would be to let the Chinese yuan “drift weaker,” so the exchange rate with the U.S. dollar makes Chinese goods more competitive for American buyers without directly needing to confront Trump or spark a tit-for-tat trade war.

    “This will help offset the impact of U.S. tariffs on China exporters,” he said, noting they would “inevitably” get requests to lower their prices from American importers looking to avoid their own revenue losses.

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    But it’s not even clear yet how much damage control will be needed.

    Zhiwu Chen, a professor of finance at the University of Hong Kong, said China’s leadership likely saw Trump’s campaign threats of 60% tariffs as more of a “negotiating tactic” than a solid policy promise.

    From Beijing’s view, he said, the final tariff rate was likely to be lower – especially if China agrees to buy more American exports like agricultural goods or oil, thereby mitigating the U.S. current account deficit.

    “What the leadership in Beijing learned from Trump 1.0 is that he is for real and transactional, kind of like an open book, so they may prefer his style, though they don’t like his bare-knuckle style,” Chen said, adding he believed trade ties could even “warm up somewhat in 2025.”

    Soybeans are harvested from a field on Hodgen Farm in Roachdale, Indiana, Nov. 8, 2019.
    Soybeans are harvested from a field on Hodgen Farm in Roachdale, Indiana, Nov. 8, 2019.

    Trump ally Elon Musk would be a key dissenting voice in the White House, he explained, and would advocate against a total decoupling with the Chinese market, given his extensive business ties there.

    “Elon Musk can be counted on to temper that push as Tesla depends so much on the China market,” Chen told Radio Free Asia.

    The art of the deal

    Others are less convinced that the author of the “The Art of the Deal” is necessarily so focussed this time on striking a deal with Beijing.

    Tao Wang, the Hong Kong-based chief China economist at the UBS Investment Bank, noted that China’s government would not blush at the idea of negotiating with Trump to find a new status quo.

    “I think the Chinese government would be very open to having a deal,” Wang at a Nov. 20 event at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “It’s just not really clear to me what Trump would want.”

    “Last time, he said he’s the great salesperson – he wants to sell more soybeans, and LNG, and all these American products,” she said. “Now he seems to want something different: He wants fiscal revenue from tariffs, and he wants to bring manufacturing back to the U.S.”

    On the campaign trail and in his debate with Vice President Kamala Harris on Sept. 10, Trump touted the fiscal revenue a 60% tariff on Chinese imports would generate, arguing that the funds paid by Chinese importers could even offset tax cuts for Americans.

    A Ford Explorer SUV is displayed at the China International Import Expo in Shanghai, China. (Reuters/Nicoco Chan)
    A Ford Explorer SUV is displayed at the China International Import Expo in Shanghai, China. (Reuters/Nicoco Chan)

    Still, even if Trump is serious about the 60% Chinese tariff rate, the practicalities of governing could temper his plans once in office.

    At the same Nov. 20 event, Mary E. Lovely, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, said that the campaign pledges of tariffs on China would be the easy part for Trump.

    When so many basic goods used by American consumers and businesses come from inexpensive Chinese sources, she argued, implementing the tariffs without fanning inflation would be the hard part.

    Economists warn that the tariffs on China will accelerate inflation just as the U.S. economy is recovering from an extended bout of surging prices.

    “I don’t think anyone really knows how realistic his team has been about alternative sources,” Lovely said, explaining that the current White House had been struggling to diversify U.S. supply chains.

    “We saw that in the Biden administration, where there was effort to create alternatives. They really didn’t make a whole lot of progress,” she said. “This is a really difficult problem. I’m afraid we don’t know if the new team has really faced up to how difficult it is going to be.”

    Dear leader

    One thing seems clear though, and that’s that the U.S.-China relationship will increasingly be defined by the personal relationship between Xi and Trump, who in his first term variously expressed both admiration and disdain for China’s authoritarian leader.

    “President Trump will probably want to engage directly with President Xi, and the leader-to-leader level interaction will color and inform the agenda and the tone of the relationship going forward,” said Ryan Hass, the director of the Brookings Institution’s John L. Thornton China Center, at an event hosted by the think tank on Friday.

    The Biden administration struggled to ignite talks between lower-level U.S. and Chinese officials. Bilateral tensions saw many Chinese officials – even the defense minister – ignore overtures from their U.S. counterparts, fearing the consequences of appearing too friendly.

    After Biden and Xi’s high-profile summit in San Francisco last November, though, cooperation at the lower levels was resumed.

    An employee works on solar photovoltaic modules for export at a factory in Sihong, in eastern China's Jiangsu province.
    An employee works on solar photovoltaic modules for export at a factory in Sihong, in eastern China’s Jiangsu province.

    Still, Hass cautioned that Trump would not have absolute power in his dealmaking with Xi. Pressure would remain on him to maintain close alliances with allies like Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, he said.

    “President Trump is not Kim Jong Un: He does not decide by fiat what the United States is, or where the United States is going,” Hass said, noting Trump was now “elderly” and “in his final term” as president.

    He pointed to Rep. Matt Gaetz’s decision last week – apparently forced by Trump – to step aside as the nominee for attorney-general amid private opposition even from Trump-allied Senate Republicans.

    “I mention that because President Trump’s views on alliances are also out-of-sync with the views of many members of Congress related to alliances,” Hass said, listing Senators Bill Haggerty, Jim Risch, Dan Sullivan and Marco Rubio, Trump’s pick for secretary of state.

    “These are all Republicans who feel very strongly about the importance of alliances,” he said, “so I encourage us to keep that front of mind.”

    Edited by Malcolm Foster.

    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Alex Willemyns.


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  • He has not been heard from for over 10 years, but the news of his engagement this month has made a splash from Taipei to (probably) Tiananmen.

    Bo Guagua, a once high-profile son of the Chinese political elite whose notorious family drama both shocked and shaped the country’s politics today, touched down in Taiwan last week to make a pilgrimage familiar to many young people: to visit his future in-laws.

    Yet the public attention on what should have been a normal rite of passage reveals just how much interest there is in this Communist Party scion once tipped for power.

    Taiwanese media quoted a nurse who laid eyes on him (“he is handsome!”), while the office of the former Taiwanese president declared that he had not been invited to the wedding, which is due to take place on Nov. 23.

    So who is Bo Guagua – and why is there interest in his marriage?

    A princeling ‘hongsandai’

    Bo Kuangyi, better known as “Guagua,” is the son of Bo Xilai, once one of the most powerful politicians in China, and his businesswoman wife, Gu Kailai.

    His grandfather, Bo Yibo, was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party. Guagua was one of a generation of high-profile princelings whose family wealth – gained owing to a connection to the ruling party amid China’s rapid economic growth in the 1990s and 2000s – made them known as the “hongsandai” or “third generation reds.”

    Bo Guagua receives his masters degree in public policy at Harvard University on May 24, 2012. (Brian Snyder/Reuters)
    Bo Guagua receives his masters degree in public policy at Harvard University on May 24, 2012. (Brian Snyder/Reuters)

    From that privileged position, he led a visibly gilded lifestyle that included prime seats at the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics, a private education at Harrow, the English boarding school, and an enviable network of contacts collected from stints at Oxford and Harvard Universities.

    Unlike peers of similar backgrounds – top leader Xi Jinping’s daughter, for example, also attended Harvard but under a pseudonym – Guagua was not shy. He became known as a playboy, hosting parties with guests like Jackie Chan and allegedly driving a Ferrari to pick up the daughter of a diplomat (a story he later denied).

    All this came to a sudden, stunning end when the Bo family became the subjects of one of the most consequential scandals in modern Chinese politics— one that has shaped the contours of power in the country today.

    Who is Bo Xilai and why was he important?

    Before his dramatic downfall, Bo Xilai, Guagua’s father, held some of the most important positions in the CCP, putting him on a collision course with President Xi Jinping, who rose to the position in 2012, the year of Bo Xilai’s ousting.

    At the time, the elder Bo had been the CCP party secretary of Chongqing, the capital of Sichuan province. In that capacity, Bo amassed enormous influence as well as personal wealth.

    Ousted Chinese politician Bo Xilai stands at his second trial in Shandong province on Oct. 25, 2013. (Xie Haunchi/AP)
    Ousted Chinese politician Bo Xilai stands at his second trial in Shandong province on Oct. 25, 2013. (Xie Haunchi/AP)

    As secretary, he developed a political system that came to be known as the “Chongqing model,” which featured sweeping crackdowns and an emphasis on promoting Maoist, “red” culture.

    In early 2012, Bo and his wife Gu Kailai were implicated in a corruption scandal and, shockingly, the death of a British businessman and family friend, Neil Heywood, who Gu was later convicted of murdering. Bo and Gu are now both serving life sentences in prison in China.

    What happened to Bo Guagua after his parents went to jail?

    When his parents were facing criminal allegations in China, Bo Guagua was in graduate school at Harvard. He was reported to have been smuggled into hiding by U.S. officials in April 2012 as it was unknown whether he would also be swept up by authorities.

    Months later, in September, he posted a social media post defending his father shortly after the elder Bo was accused of major offenses, including bribery and shared responsibility for the Haywood murder.

    The elder Bo was found guilty of corruption in 2013 and stripped of his party membership the following year.

    Bo Guagua is seen Nov. 11, 2015. (Fang Bing/VOA)
    Bo Guagua is seen Nov. 11, 2015. (Fang Bing/VOA)

    His son then kept a low profile in the U.S., his whereabouts largely unknown except that he attended Columbia Law School after he finished at Harvard.

    Only last week did he re-emerge in public, when he arrived in Taiwan.

    Who is Bo Guagua’s fiancée?

    The bride-to-be has been named as Hsu Hui Yu, a Taiwanese woman who Guagua is said to have known for years after meeting as students.

    One of the details of what has caught the attention of China watchers is the political ties of the bride’s family. Hsu’s grandfather was a prominent political donor and member of the Kuomintang (KMT), while her uncle most recently ran as a party candidate for the legislature in 1992, before turning to run the family real estate and healthcare business.

    The family were close to the ex-KMT president Ma Yinjeou, whose government was once accused of helping them improperly secure business contracts.

    What does interest in the nuptials tell us?

    What might seem like a baroque scandal about a Chinese political insider is still capable of igniting the public imagination..

    Slews of news stories have been written about the marriage already, with everything from commentary on whether the marriage of a CCP heir into Taiwan is a good thing to how the Mainland Affairs Council, the Taiwan agency that deals with China, is handling the situation.

    It also speaks to the mystery that surrounds the children of senior Chinese leaders, many of whom went abroad, have access to unknown deposits of wealth and influence, and will shape important relationships in the future.

    As for the couple, they have not publicly commented. They are expected to make their residence in Canada, where, according to a LinkedIn profile, Bo Guagua is now based. The wedding this weekend itself is supposed to be “low key.”


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Staff.

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  • The Committee to Protect Journalists has submitted a report on the state of press freedom and journalist safety in Kyrgyzstan to the United Nations Human Rights Council ahead of its 2025 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) session.

    CPJ’s submission, together with Austria-based human rights group Freedom for Eurasia and the Free Russia Foundation, highlights the sharp deterioration in media freedom in Kyrgyzstan, once vaunted as a relative Central Asian safe haven for free press, since the country’s 2020 UPR review.

    Following current President Sadyr Japarov’s rise to power, Kyrgyz authorities have launched an unprecedented assault on independent reporting, imprisoning journalists on retaliatory charges, blocking and shuttering key media, and introducing a Russian-style “foreign agents” law.

    Read the full report here.


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  • In the first half of the show, Eleanor sits down with an empty seat – a seat that could easily be filled by dozens if not hundreds of Kashmiri journalists and activists who cannot speak out due to the complex and constant threat of violence by the Indian government. Eleanor contextualizes the current situation in Kashmir while paralleling it to another settler colonialist struggle in Palestine, why we must connect these struggles, and how critical media literacy is vital in the case of silenced stories such as Kashmir. In the second half of the show, Ben Norton joins the program to discuss the recent BRICS summit, how our corporate media fell over itself to frame it as no big deal, the what, how and when of de-dollorization, and what the recent election means for our economy, or rather our economies – one for the rich and the one for the rest of us.

    The post Silenced Voices: Kashmir, Palestine, and BRICS Uncovered appeared first on Project Censored.


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  • Uyghur and Tibetan activists have welcomed U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s nomination of Marco Rubio to be the next secretary of state, saying they hope the senator’s track record of defending human rights in China will continue in his role as America’s top diplomat.

    The son of Cuban migrants and a longtime foreign policy “hawk” when it comes to the Chinese Communist Party, Rubio was named by Trump on Wednesday as his choice to replace Antony Blinken, who has served through President Joe Biden’s nearly four years in office.

    Rubio would be the first sitting U.S. secretary of state to have been sanctioned by the Chinese government, having been blacklisted by Beijing in retaliation for U.S. sanctions on Chinese officials involved in the genocide of the Uyghurs and the crackdown in Hong Kong.

    Such sanctions would bar Rubio from visiting China.

    Both Uyghurs and Tibetans — large ethnic groups that live in the western regions of China — have been oppressed by the Chinese government, with the United States accusing Beijing of committing human rights abuses against both peoples.

    The U.S. government and other Western parliaments have labeled China’s treatment of the 12-million strong Uyghurs a “genocide.”

    Rushan Abbas, the executive chair of the Munich-based World Uyghur Congress, told Radio Free Asia the sanctions, which could complicate diplomatic ties, should be worn as a badge of honor for Rubio.

    Sen. Marco Rubio speaks during a campaign rally for former President Donald Trump on Nov. 4, 2024, in Raleigh, North Carolina.
    Sen. Marco Rubio speaks during a campaign rally for former President Donald Trump on Nov. 4, 2024, in Raleigh, North Carolina.

    “Marco Rubio has been a steadfast advocate for human rights, particularly for the Uyghur people enduring ongoing genocide,” she said, noting his “leadership role” in Congress passing the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act and Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.

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    Abbas’ sister, Gulshan Abbas, has been imprisoned in China for the past six years, and she said the Florida senator had taken a personal interest in her battle to free her sister, even inviting her to Congress as one of his guests for Biden’s State of the Union address in 2020.

    “His advocacy has helped in holding Chinese officials committing Uyghur genocide accountable, highlighted Uyghur prisoners of conscience, protected American markets from Uyghur forced labor and defended religious freedom,” Abbas said of Rubio’s senate tenure.

    She added that she hoped Rubio “will strengthen efforts to secure justice for the Uyghur people and end the ongoing genocide.”

    Experienced campaigner

    Other human rights activists said Rubio could get off to a running start when it comes to U.S. relations with China, given that he already has a deep understanding of the country and its alleged rights abuses.

    Elfidar Iltebir, president of the Washington-based Uyghur American Association, said he was “pleased” to learn of Rubio’s nomination and that it gave him hope “that we might finally be able to hold China accountable for its inhumane treatment of Uyghurs.”

    “He is a young, fearless, and intelligent leader who already has a deep understanding of the Chinese government’s genocidal policies and state-imposed forced labor practices,” Iltebir explained.

    “Having Rubio … at the State Department sends a powerful message to China: America will not tolerate oppression, and the new administration is ready to enforce a tough China policy.”

    Namgyal Choedup, a representative of the Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration in North America, said that he believed it was too soon to say a State Department led by Rubio could lead to tangible change for Tibetans, but that he did not doubt Rubio’s sincerity.

    “Senator Rubio’s deep understanding of Tibetan issues, his strong stance on Tibet and his significant role in sponsoring and advocating for two key Tibet-related acts passed by the U.S. government are commendable,” Choedup said. “His firm positions on China, Iran, and Venezuela have shown him to be a dedicated leader.”

    In 2018, Rubio was the co-sponsor of the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act, which seeks to deny entry into the United States to any Chinese officials who prohibit American citizens from entering Tibet.

    He also pushed for the Tibet Policy and Support Act, which says any decision about Dalai Lama’s reincarnation rests solely with the Dalai Lama himself and the broader Tibetan community – and not with Beijing, which is seeking to install its own successor.

    “While it is still too early to determine the exact impact he will have on Tibet, his unwavering support for the Tibetan cause is clear,” the Tibetan envoy added.

    “With the new administration in place, we remain cautious, but we are optimistic, as the U.S. government, Congress, and the American people have long been strong allies of Tibet.”

    Edited by Alex Willemyns and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Uyghur, RFA Tibetan.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.


  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

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  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and was authored by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

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  • Asia Pacific Report

    The Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa (PSNA) has written to the Minister for Space Judith Collins and Rocket Lab CEO Peter Beck to warn that satellites being launched from the Māhia Peninsula are “highly likely” to conduct surveillance for Israel.

    And also to assist in the commission of war crimes in Gaza and in Lebanon, said PSNA national chair John Minto.

    “Three companies are of particular concern to us: BlackSky Technology, Capella Space, and HawkEye 360,” Minto said in a statement.

    “In particular, BlackSky has a US$150 million contract to supply high temporal frequency images and analysis to Israel,” Minto said.

    “We believe it is highly likely that BlackSky provides data to Israel which it uses to target civilian infrastructure across Gaza and Lebanon.”

    Minto said that PSNA understood that Rocket Lab had launched satellites for BlackSky since 2019.

    The advocacy group also aware that by the end of 2024, Rocket Lab was expected to begin deploying BlackSky’s constellation of next generation earth observation satellites, with improved capability.

    Asking for suspension
    “We are asking the minister and Rocket Lab to suspend all further satellite launches for BlackSky, full stop,” Minto said.

    “For Capella Space and HawkEye 360, we are asking that the minister suspend satellite launches from the Māhia Peninsula until an investigation has taken place to assure New Zealanders that further launches will not put us in breach of our commitments under international law.

    “New Zealanders don’t want our country used to support war crimes committed by Israel or any other country”, he said.

    “If we are serious about our responsibilities under international law, including the Genocide Convention, then we must act now.”

    Stopping the satellite launches was the “least we can do”.

    A PSNA support lawyer, Sam Vincent, said: “New Zealand has solemn responsibilities under international law which must trump any short-term profit for Rocket Lab or the convenience of our government.”

    He said that all three companies were sponsors of a geospatial intelligence conference in Israel taking place in January 2025 [Ramon GeoInt360], of which the Israel Ministry of Defence and BlackSky were “leading partners” and HawkEye 360 and Capella Space were sponsors.

    Minto added: “All the alarm bells are ringing. These companies are up their eyeballs in support for Israel.”


    This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by APR editor.

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