Category: China

  • Admiral Alvin Hosley demonstrated selective outrage over the fear of multipolarity in the Western Hemisphere. The Southcom commander confirmed the official US military doctrine for the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region on February 13, before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

    In a poorly disguised assertion of US hegemony, Hosley envisioned, “an enduring commitment to democratic principles…to engender security, capability, democratic norms, and resilience that fuel regional peace, prosperity, and sovereignty.”

    Threats to the vision of a Pax Americana

    Foremost of the “threats to this vision” is the “methodical incursion into the region” by China, secondarily by Russia, and a distant third by Iran.

    Hosley charged China with a “long-term global campaign to become the world’s dominant strategic power in the Western Hemisphere” and Russia with continuing support for “anti-American authoritarian regimes” and spreading “misinformation throughout the region.” Meanwhile, the “theocratic regime” in Iran, “seeks to build political, military, and economic clout in Latin America… where it believes cooperation is achievable.”

    These “malign actions,” Holsey argued, run against US national interests, threaten our sovereignty, and pose a “global risk.” Not questioned, of course, is the US presence in the region as part of Washington’s official “full spectrum [world] dominance” posture.

    Rather, he lauded US regional military programs: acquisitions of F-16s by Argentina and Black Hawk helicopters by Brazil, the International Military Education and Training program spanning 27 regional countries, and the Joint Exercise Program with over 10,000 participants from 38 countries.

    Unlike the US with 76 regional military bases, neither China nor Russia has formal alliances, joint command structures, or large-scale military agreements in the region. In contrast, Colombia is a NATO “global partner,” Argentina and Brazil are “major non-NATO Allies,” and Chile is a key cooperator with NATO. The US is making Guyana a military hotspot, while the US occupation of Cuba with the Guantánamo naval base is rendered invisible.

    Hosley also cited humanitarian assistance as “an essential soft power tool,” later adding “with empathy and compassion at the forefront.”

    “Erosion of democratic capitalism”

    The admiral’s double-speak continued with the claim that the Western Hemisphere suffers from an “erosion of democratic capitalism, which in too many countries is being replaced by…authoritarianism.” Not mentioned is the recent US support of Bukele in El Salvador, Bolsonaro in Brazil, Moreno, Lasso and Noboa in Ecuador, Boluarte in Peru, Añez in Bolivia, Uribe and Duque in Colombia, or Milei in Argentina.

    China is accused of interfering in “our south,” a new euphemism of “our backyard,” but with the same chauvinistic implications. Hosley testified that Chinese presence “at strategic chokepoints such as the Panama Canal imperil the US’s ability to rapidly respond in the Indo-Pacific should a crisis unfold.” Might such a contingency include US military deployment to the Asia-Pacific, which has been the practice since at least 2003?

    The admiral charged China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with doing what the US has consistently failed to do; namely going “beyond raw materials and commodities to include” infrastructure improvements. China accomplished becoming the region’s second major trading partner and the first specifically in South America in less than two decades, where the US had previously enjoyed nearly uncontested dominance for well over a century.

    Hosley lauded the region’s abundant natural resources (20% of the world’s oil reserves, 25% of its strategic metals, etc.). That these are resources which US multinationals have been pillaging, leaving little in return, remained unstated.

    Meanwhile, China is accused of chicanery by providing benevolent short-term benefits to leave regional countries “vulnerable to unsustainable debt, environmental degradation, and informational security risks.” In fact, “no country…owes Chinese creditors more than it owes other major creditor categories, including bondholders, Paris Club creditors, multilateral development banks (MDBs) or other creditors.”

    And what are the security risks? Satellites for Venezuela and Bolivia? DeepSeek? Technology transfer? Millions of anti-COVID vaccines?

    Outlandishly, the admiral asserted that “the malign activities, harmful influence, and autocratic philosophy of China are a direct threat to the democratic will.” In contrast, he claims the US “offers economic prosperity, sustainable development, and true partnership.” This would be laughable if it weren’t so tragically false. Consider Haiti, under US domination, where the country is in ruins and any pretence of democratic elections has long been dropped.

    Predictably, Hosley also charged Russia with “malign” aims because it “seeks to undermine the US regional interests” by supporting “like-minded authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela.”

    His concern with Russia’s “state-controlled media to disseminate disinformation and propaganda,” is far eclipsed by the 6,200 journalists and the 707 non-state media outlets in more than 30 countries financed by USAID. This is without mentioning the Western giant media conglomerates that overwhelmingly dominate the world’s news reporting.

    Transnational criminal organizations and Russian acolytes

    Hosley reported that transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) engaged in drug trafficking are connected to the “death of thousands of US citizens.” Not only that but, “TCO-driven corruption and instability open space for China, Russia, and other malign actors to achieve strategic ends and further their agendas.”

    Yet, as Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum noted, organized crime and drug distribution are prevalent within the US itself, which is the largest market for illicit drugs and the source of most weapons used by the cartels to the south. She rhetorically asked: “Who is in charge of distributing the drug? Who sells it in the cities of the US?…Let them start with their country.”

    Venezuela is presented as exemplifying the “devastating effects and consequences of authoritarian rule.” Citing the “widespread inability to access life-sustaining necessities” driving economic refugees from Venezuela, Hosley warned: “The large numbers of migrants transiting the region strains our Partner Nations.”

    Nicaragua is accused of harbouring a global positioning system, a vaccination plant, and a police academy, all of which are collaborations with Russia, which – horrors – “enjoys the diplomatic status of an embassy.” The “repressive Ortega-Murillo regime” joined the BRI and a free trade agreement with China, including building “a massive solar power plant.”

    “Instead of addressing the ongoing humanitarian crises,” the Cuban “authoritarian regime” is accused of “strengthening ties with our Strategic Competitors and adversaries.” Hypocritically, he mourns: “The long-suffering populace does not have sufficient access to medicine, food, and essential services.”

    Outrageously omitted are the effects of draconian Yankee unilateral coercive measures (aka sanctions) on what Hosley calls the “ideological acolytes” of Russia. His narrative blames the victims for the severe consequences of Washington’s sanctions imposed to deliberately produce what the admiral laments.

    “The challenge”

    “Time is not on our side” were the possibly prescient words by the commander of Southcom to the senators about the LAC region, which is “on the front lines of a decisive and urgent contest to define the future of our world.”

    This may be because the US is not prepared to accept that sovereign and independent nations enter into beneficial trade agreements about their raw materials and infrastructure and join multipolar bodies such as BRI and BRICS. The ultimate logic of US policy is to prevent the region from being part of a multipolar world. As the admiral admitted, “we have redoubled our efforts to nest military engagement with diplomatic, informational and economic initiatives.”

    The post Every Accusation Is a Confession first appeared on Dissident Voice.

    This post was originally published on Dissident Voice.

  • After nearly a decade covering China as an NPR correspondent, Emily Feng returned to Washington, D.C. Her reporting spanned a period of profound social and economic change : Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power; the Xinjiang detention camps; Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement and the crackdown against it; China’s strict zero-COVID policy; and the country’s transformation into a surveillance state.

    Ultimately, Feng was caught in the crossfire of the U.S.-China rivalry — her visa was unexpectedly rejected, forcing her to relocate to Taiwan for the final years of her reporting.

    Her new book, “Let Only Red Flowers Bloom,” is a reflection on the search for identity and belonging under Xi Jinping’s rule. It will be published March 18. The following interview has been edited for length and clarity.

    RFA: You moved to China in 2015 at the age of 22. What was the biggest question you had, and did you find the answer?

    Emily Feng: I wanted to see China for myself. I had visited family in the south a few times, but I was curious about how the country was changing, especially under Xi Jinping, who was then in his third year as leader. I wondered if China would continue opening up — economically, politically and culturally. I had just started consuming more Chinese-language culture, and I was interested in how cultural production would evolve.

    The day I arrived was about a week after the July 9 crackdown on human rights lawyers. I didn’t realize it at the time, but that was a watershed moment in Chinese politics. It shaped the China I would experience over the next several years.

    RFA: The July 9 crackdown shocked many. What were its lasting effects?

    Emily Feng: It had systemic impacts. Many influential lawyers lost their licenses — people who had been shaping ideas about China’s legal and political future. It wasn’t just about individuals; it rippled across corporations, organizations and society as a whole.

    “Let Only Red Flowers Bloom” by Emily Feng.
    “Let Only Red Flowers Bloom” by Emily Feng.
    (Penguin Random House)

    RFA: Your book’s title, ‘Let Only Red Flowers Bloom,’ is a twist on Mao’s famous slogan, ‘Let a hundred flowers bloom.’ You write that a source told you, ‘That’s the state now.’ What did they mean, and why did it stay with you?

    Emily Feng: The title reflects a duality. On one hand, it’s about celebrating the diversity that exists in China — different voices, perspectives and identities, along with varying views on the role of private business, ethnicity and languages beyond Mandarin Chinese. On the other hand, it reflects how the state is increasingly trying to constrain that diversity.

    One of the people I interviewed told me, ‘At this point, the state only lets one color of flower bloom—red flowers.’ That quote captured the theme of my book: the tension between the natural diversity within Chinese society and the state’s efforts to control it.

    RFA: You spent nearly a decade covering China. What’s the biggest shift you’ve seen?

    Emily Feng: The Communist Party is much more present in everyday life. When I first moved there, political control felt more distant for many people. But over the years, the government became more involved — even in the small details of daily life. COVID-19 made that even more visible, with strict movement controls and surveillance.

    I felt it in my reporting as well. When I first got there, there was concern that talking to people could get them in trouble. People needed to be anonymous for their safety. But as my years in China continued, the level of surveillance, particularly online, really intensified.

    That said, I want people to know that there are still many voices in China. Despite the tightening restrictions, there are still compelling stories to tell, and I hope more journalists can continue working there.

    A security guard watches from a tower at a detention facility in Yarkent county in China's Xinjiang region on March 21, 2021.
    A security guard watches from a tower at a detention facility in Yarkent county in China’s Xinjiang region on March 21, 2021.
    (Ng Han Guan/AP)

    RFA: Were there any key moments during this period when you felt that social control was tightening?

    Emily Feng: I started thinking about this issue because of what was happening in Xinjiang. In 2017, I began reporting on Xinjiang, and at first, I had only heard about the existence of some camps.

    But as I continued following the story, I realized that the Xinjiang issue and the situation of the Uyghurs had much broader significance for the entire country. It wasn’t just a problem in the western region — it was connected to policies on ethnicity, identity, language and culture at the time. It also tied into a larger question of what kind of nation China and the Communist Party were trying to create. So, starting from Xinjiang as an entry point, I began to ask: Why does identity play such a central role in contemporary Chinese politics?

    RFA: How did you build trust with the people you interviewed, and how did you weigh the risks, both for yourself and for them?

    Emily Feng: It’s a daily conversation — with editors, with yourself, and, most importantly, with your sources. Many of my stories weren’t about government leaks; they were about personal experiences. Earning trust meant showing that I was willing to listen and making the effort to be there.

    Sometimes, it took years for people to open up. One Uyghur family I interviewed, for example, only felt comfortable sharing their full story after they had processed what had happened to them. In China, I might have to spend a lot of time exploring 10 different stories, but there’s only a 20% or even just a 10% chance of success.

    RFA: Did you ever face danger yourself?

    Emily Feng: Yes. I was investigated for my work, and my news organization was audited as part of the U.S.-China media tensions. Many reporting trips were cut short, and interviewees were sometimes detained while I was speaking with them. People I talked to risked losing jobs or public benefits. It’s not a black-and-white situation, but it’s something I had to be aware of when reporting in China.

    A worker wearing protective gear and standing behind a fence in a residential area under COVID-19 lockdown talks with a man on a scooter in the Xuhui district of Shanghai on June 16, 2022.
    A worker wearing protective gear and standing behind a fence in a residential area under COVID-19 lockdown talks with a man on a scooter in the Xuhui district of Shanghai on June 16, 2022.
    (Hector Retamal/AFP)

    RFA: Your reporting often focuses on human stories. Under Xi’s rule, how is the younger generation navigating identity?

    Emily Feng: For me, identity was the central theme in all the stories I found most interesting in China. It’s also why I decided to collect many of them and write a book about it. I argue that identity is key not only to understanding this vast country, which is so important economically and geopolitically, but also to understanding how China sees itself and, consequently, what its future holds.

    Every decade or so, there’s this question: What kind of country can China become? The expectations of what Chinese people thought their country would become 10 years ago — before COVID, before the economic downturn — are vastly different from what a 20-year-old in Beijing or Shanghai envisions today.

    The theme of identity also allowed me to give a personal twist to these big, weighty questions that often dominate newsroom discussions. What gets lost in much of that coverage is the fact that these issues affect real people. Despite being a country so far away from the U.S., I wanted to humanize these stories, to make readers ask, ‘What if this were happening to my friend?’ I wanted to help people feel what it’s like to live in their world, because that’s what I’ve lost since leaving China — and, I think, what we’ve all lost now that there are fewer reporters on the ground in mainland China.

    RFA: In this era of tighter control, how do people carve out personal or ideological space?

    Emily Feng: It’s increasingly difficult. Many of the people I interviewed for the book have since left China. Some persisted for years, even decades, within the system. I tell the story of a former state prosecutor who later became a human rights lawyer. She worked inside the system for years before stepping out to fight it.

    There’s a lot of resilience among people, and a good sense of survival about when to be outspoken and when to be quieter. But I think even that small degree of flexibility is disappearing. Most of the characters in the book have since left China since I wrote the first draft.

    RFA: Foreign correspondents have played a crucial role in shaping global understanding of China. With fewer journalists on the ground, what do you hope your coverage conveys to readers who have never been to China?

    Emily Feng: I want people to see that, at the end of the day, people are people everywhere. No matter the country or language, human nature is universal.

    For me, this book is also personal. My parents were born in China, and I still have family there. I never held a Chinese passport, but I have a deep connection to the place. When I lived there, I realized I had seen only a tiny bit of it. I had seen it through my family’s eyes, through their immigration story. But there are many different versions of China, depending on who you are in China.

    Edited by Boer Deng.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Jane Tang for RFA and Jeff Wang for RFA Mandarin.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • After nearly a decade covering China as an NPR correspondent, Emily Feng returned to Washington, D.C. Her reporting spanned a period of profound social and economic change : Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power; the Xinjiang detention camps; Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement and the crackdown against it; China’s strict zero-COVID policy; and the country’s transformation into a surveillance state.

    Ultimately, Feng was caught in the crossfire of the U.S.-China rivalry — her visa was unexpectedly rejected, forcing her to relocate to Taiwan for the final years of her reporting.

    Her new book, “Let Only Red Flowers Bloom,” is a reflection on the search for identity and belonging under Xi Jinping’s rule. It will be published March 18. The following interview has been edited for length and clarity.

    RFA: You moved to China in 2015 at the age of 22. What was the biggest question you had, and did you find the answer?

    Emily Feng: I wanted to see China for myself. I had visited family in the south a few times, but I was curious about how the country was changing, especially under Xi Jinping, who was then in his third year as leader. I wondered if China would continue opening up — economically, politically and culturally. I had just started consuming more Chinese-language culture, and I was interested in how cultural production would evolve.

    The day I arrived was about a week after the July 9 crackdown on human rights lawyers. I didn’t realize it at the time, but that was a watershed moment in Chinese politics. It shaped the China I would experience over the next several years.

    RFA: The July 9 crackdown shocked many. What were its lasting effects?

    Emily Feng: It had systemic impacts. Many influential lawyers lost their licenses — people who had been shaping ideas about China’s legal and political future. It wasn’t just about individuals; it rippled across corporations, organizations and society as a whole.

    “Let Only Red Flowers Bloom” by Emily Feng.
    “Let Only Red Flowers Bloom” by Emily Feng.
    (Penguin Random House)

    RFA: Your book’s title, ‘Let Only Red Flowers Bloom,’ is a twist on Mao’s famous slogan, ‘Let a hundred flowers bloom.’ You write that a source told you, ‘That’s the state now.’ What did they mean, and why did it stay with you?

    Emily Feng: The title reflects a duality. On one hand, it’s about celebrating the diversity that exists in China — different voices, perspectives and identities, along with varying views on the role of private business, ethnicity and languages beyond Mandarin Chinese. On the other hand, it reflects how the state is increasingly trying to constrain that diversity.

    One of the people I interviewed told me, ‘At this point, the state only lets one color of flower bloom—red flowers.’ That quote captured the theme of my book: the tension between the natural diversity within Chinese society and the state’s efforts to control it.

    RFA: You spent nearly a decade covering China. What’s the biggest shift you’ve seen?

    Emily Feng: The Communist Party is much more present in everyday life. When I first moved there, political control felt more distant for many people. But over the years, the government became more involved — even in the small details of daily life. COVID-19 made that even more visible, with strict movement controls and surveillance.

    I felt it in my reporting as well. When I first got there, there was concern that talking to people could get them in trouble. People needed to be anonymous for their safety. But as my years in China continued, the level of surveillance, particularly online, really intensified.

    That said, I want people to know that there are still many voices in China. Despite the tightening restrictions, there are still compelling stories to tell, and I hope more journalists can continue working there.

    A security guard watches from a tower at a detention facility in Yarkent county in China's Xinjiang region on March 21, 2021.
    A security guard watches from a tower at a detention facility in Yarkent county in China’s Xinjiang region on March 21, 2021.
    (Ng Han Guan/AP)

    RFA: Were there any key moments during this period when you felt that social control was tightening?

    Emily Feng: I started thinking about this issue because of what was happening in Xinjiang. In 2017, I began reporting on Xinjiang, and at first, I had only heard about the existence of some camps.

    But as I continued following the story, I realized that the Xinjiang issue and the situation of the Uyghurs had much broader significance for the entire country. It wasn’t just a problem in the western region — it was connected to policies on ethnicity, identity, language and culture at the time. It also tied into a larger question of what kind of nation China and the Communist Party were trying to create. So, starting from Xinjiang as an entry point, I began to ask: Why does identity play such a central role in contemporary Chinese politics?

    RFA: How did you build trust with the people you interviewed, and how did you weigh the risks, both for yourself and for them?

    Emily Feng: It’s a daily conversation — with editors, with yourself, and, most importantly, with your sources. Many of my stories weren’t about government leaks; they were about personal experiences. Earning trust meant showing that I was willing to listen and making the effort to be there.

    Sometimes, it took years for people to open up. One Uyghur family I interviewed, for example, only felt comfortable sharing their full story after they had processed what had happened to them. In China, I might have to spend a lot of time exploring 10 different stories, but there’s only a 20% or even just a 10% chance of success.

    RFA: Did you ever face danger yourself?

    Emily Feng: Yes. I was investigated for my work, and my news organization was audited as part of the U.S.-China media tensions. Many reporting trips were cut short, and interviewees were sometimes detained while I was speaking with them. People I talked to risked losing jobs or public benefits. It’s not a black-and-white situation, but it’s something I had to be aware of when reporting in China.

    A worker wearing protective gear and standing behind a fence in a residential area under COVID-19 lockdown talks with a man on a scooter in the Xuhui district of Shanghai on June 16, 2022.
    A worker wearing protective gear and standing behind a fence in a residential area under COVID-19 lockdown talks with a man on a scooter in the Xuhui district of Shanghai on June 16, 2022.
    (Hector Retamal/AFP)

    RFA: Your reporting often focuses on human stories. Under Xi’s rule, how is the younger generation navigating identity?

    Emily Feng: For me, identity was the central theme in all the stories I found most interesting in China. It’s also why I decided to collect many of them and write a book about it. I argue that identity is key not only to understanding this vast country, which is so important economically and geopolitically, but also to understanding how China sees itself and, consequently, what its future holds.

    Every decade or so, there’s this question: What kind of country can China become? The expectations of what Chinese people thought their country would become 10 years ago — before COVID, before the economic downturn — are vastly different from what a 20-year-old in Beijing or Shanghai envisions today.

    The theme of identity also allowed me to give a personal twist to these big, weighty questions that often dominate newsroom discussions. What gets lost in much of that coverage is the fact that these issues affect real people. Despite being a country so far away from the U.S., I wanted to humanize these stories, to make readers ask, ‘What if this were happening to my friend?’ I wanted to help people feel what it’s like to live in their world, because that’s what I’ve lost since leaving China — and, I think, what we’ve all lost now that there are fewer reporters on the ground in mainland China.

    RFA: In this era of tighter control, how do people carve out personal or ideological space?

    Emily Feng: It’s increasingly difficult. Many of the people I interviewed for the book have since left China. Some persisted for years, even decades, within the system. I tell the story of a former state prosecutor who later became a human rights lawyer. She worked inside the system for years before stepping out to fight it.

    There’s a lot of resilience among people, and a good sense of survival about when to be outspoken and when to be quieter. But I think even that small degree of flexibility is disappearing. Most of the characters in the book have since left China since I wrote the first draft.

    RFA: Foreign correspondents have played a crucial role in shaping global understanding of China. With fewer journalists on the ground, what do you hope your coverage conveys to readers who have never been to China?

    Emily Feng: I want people to see that, at the end of the day, people are people everywhere. No matter the country or language, human nature is universal.

    For me, this book is also personal. My parents were born in China, and I still have family there. I never held a Chinese passport, but I have a deep connection to the place. When I lived there, I realized I had seen only a tiny bit of it. I had seen it through my family’s eyes, through their immigration story. But there are many different versions of China, depending on who you are in China.

    Edited by Boer Deng.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Jane Tang for RFA and Jeff Wang for RFA Mandarin.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The Chinese company DeepSeek has made a major breakthrough in the development of artificial intelligence (AI), with the release of its deep learning model R1. As the Financial Times put it, “With DeepSeek, China innovates and the US imitates”.

    Until now, the West had deemed China incapable of innovation, and Western monopoly capitalism was considered the summit of technological development. China has quietly and gradually overcome not only crucial internal contradictions but, above all, impediments imposed by the West that sought to curb its development.

    The post China’s AI Breakthroughs Show It Is Outcompeting Monopoly Capitalism appeared first on PopularResistance.Org.

    This post was originally published on PopularResistance.Org.

  • Once Hong Kong’s biggest opposition party, the Democratic Party has announced plans to disband amid a political crackdown in the city under two security laws.

    “It is a decision that we made based on our understanding of the overall political environment,” Chairman Lo Kin-hei told journalists following a meeting of the party’s central committee on Thursday.

    “Developing democracy in Hong Kong is always difficult, and it’s been especially difficult in the past few years,” Lo told reporters in the party’s headquarters, adding: “This is not what we wanted to see.”

    Lo said he hoped that Hong Kong would return to the values ​​of “diversity, tolerance and democracy” that were the cornerstones of the city’s past success.

    The move is widely seen as the symbolic end of any formal political opposition in Hong Kong, where critics of the authorities can face prosecution under security legislation brought in to quell dissent in the wake of the 2019 protests.

    It follows repeated calls for the party’s dissolution in Chinese Communist Party-backed media like the Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Po.

    The news came just weeks after a court in Hong Kong sentenced 45 democratic politicians and activists to jail terms of up to 10 years for “subversion” after they took part in a democratic primary in the summer of 2020.

    The ongoing political crackdown has already seen the dissolution of the Civic Party, which disbanded in May 2023 after its lawmakers were barred from running for re-election in the wake of the 2020 National Security Law.

    The pro-democracy youth activist party Demosisto disbanded in June 2020.

    ‘That light has faded’

    Lo said the disbandment couldn’t go ahead without a vote from a general meeting attended by 75% of the party’s members.

    He said he will chair a three-person working group to handle the process following what he called a “collective decision” by the Central Committee.

    Lo declined to comment on reports that party members had been harassed or threatened by people acting as messengers for the Chinese government. He said the party wasn’t in financial difficulty.

    Founding party member Fred Li said the Democratic Party had “done its duty and shone its light on Hong Kong.”

    “But we can see today that that light has faded,” Li said in comments reported by the Hong Kong Free Press.

    Office workers join pro-democracy protesters during a demonstration in Central in Hong Kong, Nov. 12, 2019 following a day of pro-democracy protests.
    Office workers join pro-democracy protesters during a demonstration in Central in Hong Kong, Nov. 12, 2019 following a day of pro-democracy protests.
    (Anthony Wallace/AFP)

    Taiwan-based bookseller Lam Wing-kei, who was detained in mainland China for selling banned political books from Hong Kong, said there was “no point in pretending” that there is still any room for political opposition under Chinese rule.

    “This is the total end of party politics in Hong Kong,” Lam told RFA Mandarin in an interview on Friday. “There’s no way the Communist Party is going to allow an opposition party to carry on existing. Under their rule, nobody else is allowed a voice.”

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    He said he worries that Beijing’s attention may now focus on moves to destroy democracy in Taiwan, which has never been ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, nor formed part of the People’s Republic of China.

    “The pace could accelerate in the next few years,” he said of Chinese infiltration in Taiwan.

    Taiwan-based Hong Kong artist Kacey Wong said the party had played a hugely important role in the development of Hong Kong’s democracy before the current crackdown.

    “Its founder Martin Lee and the kind of values he ​​represented embodied the attitudes of many Hong Kong people towards freedom and democracy — they were pretty moderate,” Wong said.

    Martin Lee, known as the
    Martin Lee, known as the “father of democracy” in Hong Kong, April 26, 2021.
    (Anthony Wallace/AFP)

    He said its death would mark the end of democratic party politics in Hong Kong.

    “The Democratic Party was once the most important party when it came to gauging public opinion, so its death actually represents the ultimate death of public opinion [as a political force] in Hong Kong,” Wong said.

    ‘We must be vigilant’

    He said fears that Hong Kong would become a base for opposition to Chinese Communist Party rule had led Beijing to break its promise that the city could keep its freedoms for 50 years after the 1997 handover.

    He warned that Beijing was trying to undermine Taiwan’s democracy by placing its supporters in positions of power, much as it did in Hong Kong.

    “Taiwanese people must be vigilant and must not believe the Chinese Communist Party’s promises to Taiwan that it can keep its freedoms if it submits to Beijing’s rule,” Wong said. “We must be vigilant, and we must resist.”

    Political commentator Sang Pu said the Democratic Party would never be allowed to field candidates under the current system in Hong Kong.

    “A political party that doesn’t run for election has no way to raise funds,” Sang said. “They get rejected [by venues] even when they try to hold party events … for spurious reasons like chefs getting into a fight or broken water meters.”

    “They are being badly suppressed, so at this point it’s probably better to give up,” he said.

    Recent electoral reforms now ensure that almost nobody in the city’s once-vibrant opposition camp will stand for election again, amid the jailing of dozens of pro-democracy figures and rule changes requiring political vetting.

    The last directly elected District Council, which saw a landslide victory for pro-democracy candidates amid record turnout that was widely seen as a ringing public endorsement of the 2019 protest movement.

    The first Legislative Council election after the rule change saw plummeting turnout, while Chief Executive John Lee was given the top job after an “election” in which he was the only candidate.

    Since Beijing imposed the two national security laws banning public opposition and dissent in the city and blamed “hostile foreign forces” for the resulting protests, hundreds of thousands have voted with their feet amid plummeting human rights rankings, shrinking press freedom and widespread government propaganda in schools.

    The government has blamed several waves of pro-democracy protests in recent years on “foreign forces” trying to instigate a democratic revolution in Hong Kong.

    Translated by Luisetta Mudie. Edited by Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Kwong Wing for RFA Cantonese, Wang Yun and Hsia Hsiao-hwa for RFA Mandarin.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Read RFA coverage of this story in Tibetan.

    Chinese authorities have extended the prison sentence of a Tibetan environmental activist from Sichuan province by an additional eight months after he rejected charges of “disrupting social order,” two sources from inside Tibet told Radio Free Asia.

    In a video clip posted in October on the Chinese social media platform WeChat, Tsongon Tsering, 29, spoke out against the illegal extraction of sand and gravel mining activity along the Tsaruma River in his village in Ngaba (in Chinese, Aba) prefecture.

    “The large-scale and indiscriminate extraction of sand from the river has led to serious soil erosion in the surrounding area and is posing a threat to the foundations of residents’ homes,” he said in the video, in which he holds up his government ID card.

    After posting that, Tsering was arrested. He was initially sentenced to eight months by the Kyungchu County People’s Court on Oct. 27 on charges of “disturbing social order” and “provoking trouble and picking quarrels” after he made the rare public appeal online to authorities.

    In January, the Kyungchu County People’s Court extended Tsering’s prison sentence by eight more months, increasing his total prison sentence to 16 months.

    Strict surveillance

    Tsering’s case illustrates the risks Tibetans face for speaking out, and the swift action authorities take to silence those who raise concerns about environmental degradation in their communities, especially when linked to Chinese companies.

    Tsering’s parents have been kept under virtual house arrest with strict surveillance, sources said, adding that his mother’s health has been impacted due to anxiety and concerns over her son.

    Chinese authorities have also placed tight restrictions on movement in the historic Amdo region of Tibet, specifically in the Atsoknb Tsenyi Gon Monastery in Ngaba county, Sichuan province, sources said.

    Tsering has since been transferred from Kyungchu county to a prison in Barkham, the prefectural capital of Ngaba Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, said Tenzin Dawa, director of the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, which first reported the news on Thursday.

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    “The Chinese authorities told Tsongon Tsering that he would be relieved of his prison sentence if he made a statement admitting to the charges that he posted the video online to incite social disorder, but Tsongon and his family rejected this,” the first source said.

    “They stood by their concerns, stating that the Chinese government is causing major environmental damage in the region,” he said. “The authorities are now trying to make Tsongon Tsering’s situation more difficult for him.”

    In December 2024, sources told RFA that Tsering had been held in Kyungchu County Prison since October and that he faced “continued investigation and threats of extended sentencing.”

    At the time, sources said authorities had indicated to Tsering’s family that the eight-month prison sentence was “not final” and said they would “continue to investigate the matter completely before making a conclusive ruling.”

    ‘Respect Tibetans’ rights’

    On Thursday, the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, reported that authorities have forbidden Tsering’s family from participating in any religious activities during the Tibetan New Year, or Losar, which begins on Feb. 28.

    Authorities also have warned Tsering’s relatives against speaking out about his case, the center said.

    The rights group also called on Chinese authorities to “immediately overturn” the conviction and sentence of Tsering and “uphold and respect the fundamental rights of all Tibetans, including human rights defenders and activists, allowing them to freely express their opinions without fear of persecution.”

    Other Tibetan environmental defenders, such as Anya Sengdra, have faced persecution for their activism.

    In 2019, Chinese authorities sentenced Sengdra to a seven-year prison term on charges of disturbing social order after he complained online about corrupt officials, illegal mining and the hunting of protected wildlife.

    Additional reporting by Dorjee Damdul, Tenzin Norzom, Thaklha Gyal and Tsewang Norbu for RFA Tibetan. Translated by Tenzin Palmo and Tenzin Dickyi, Edited by Tenzin Pema, Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Tibetan.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.


  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • WASHINGTON – U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng discussed President Donald Trump’s plans for sweeping tariffs on Chinese imports during an introductory video call on Friday morning, according to readouts from both sides.

    Trump has vowed tariffs of “more than” 60% on Chinese imports, and earlier this month began with a 10% levy on all goods from China. That led Beijing to introduce a 15% retaliatory tariff on certain U.S. energy exports to China, leading to concerns about a renewed trade war.

    A brief readout from the U.S. Treasury Department said that the “introductory call” between Bessent and Lifeng had largely focused on trade, with the American side raising concerns about the U.S. trade deficit with China, which has long been a bugbear of Trump.

    Bessent “expressed serious concerns about the PRC’s counternarcotics efforts, economic imbalances, and unfair policies,” the readout said, using an acronym for the People’s Republic of China.

    Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng speaks at the 11th China-UK Economic and Financial Dialogue in Beijing,  Jan. 11, 2025.
    Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng speaks at the 11th China-UK Economic and Financial Dialogue in Beijing, Jan. 11, 2025.
    (Aaron Favila/AP)

    The Treasury secretary “stressed the [Trump] Administration’s commitment to pursue trade and economic policies that protect the American economy, the American worker, and our national security,” but committed to communication with the Chinese side, it said.

    According to the Chinese readout released by state news agency Xinhua, Lifeng meanwhile “expressed serious concerns over recent U.S. additional tariffs and other restrictive measures against China.”

    However, both Bessent and Lifeng “recognized the significance of bilateral economic and trade relations,” the Chinese readout said.

    US State Department website changes

    The video call came days after the U.S. State Department updated its bilateral relations “fact sheet” on China to add a series of grievances about Beijing, leading to a backlash from the Chinese government.

    The Feb. 13 changes, which themselves came days after the State Department removed previously standard language about not supporting Taiwanese independence, signaled the Trump administration’s concerns about U.S.-China trade relations.

    China is “one of the most restrictive investment climates in the world” the page on U.S.-China relations now reads, before pledging to carry out Trump’s “America First” approach to trade and diplomatic ties.

    “In its bilateral economic relations with China, the United States will place U.S. interests and the American people first and work to end China’s abusive, unfair, and illegal economic practices,” it says.

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    EXPLAINED: Trump’s and Harris’ differing proposals on Chinese tariffs

    It also accuses Beijing of profiting off “unfair trade practices,” with the United States, including by “using forced labor and massive state subsidies, putting American businesses at a disadvantage, and making them complicit in China’s human rights abuses.”

    The updated page notably also discarded the usual American diplomatic practice of referring to China’s government as “The People’s Republic of China,” or by the acronym “PRC,” rather than “China.”

    “The United States is firmly committed to countering China’s licit and illicit efforts to obtain U.S. technologies to advance its military modernization,” the page says in one example passage.

    ‘China’ not ‘PRC’

    The State Department did not respond directly to a request from Radio Free Asia to comment about the change in the name used for China’s government, but said the changes to the page in general were made to bring it in line with the priorities of the new Trump administration.

    “The China fact sheet on state.gov was updated to reflect the current Administration’s policies and priorities as they relate to China and the U.S.-China relationship,” a State Department spokesperson said.

    Speaking at a regular press briefing in Beijing on Thursday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said his government “strongly deplores and firmly opposes” the tone of the new page.

    “The changes made by the U.S. State Department on its ‘U.S.-China Relations’ page and ‘U.S. Relations With China’ fact sheet misrepresent the facts, attack China’s foreign policy and peddle the so-called China-U.S. strategic competition,” Guo said.

    Edited by Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Alex Willemyns.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • WASHINGTON – U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng discussed President Donald Trump’s plans for sweeping tariffs on Chinese imports during an introductory video call on Friday morning, according to readouts from both sides.

    Trump has vowed tariffs of “more than” 60% on Chinese imports, and earlier this month began with a 10% levy on all goods from China. That led Beijing to introduce a 15% retaliatory tariff on certain U.S. energy exports to China, leading to concerns about a renewed trade war.

    A brief readout from the U.S. Treasury Department said that the “introductory call” between Bessent and Lifeng had largely focused on trade, with the American side raising concerns about the U.S. trade deficit with China, which has long been a bugbear of Trump.

    Bessent “expressed serious concerns about the PRC’s counternarcotics efforts, economic imbalances, and unfair policies,” the readout said, using an acronym for the People’s Republic of China.

    Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng speaks at the 11th China-UK Economic and Financial Dialogue in Beijing,  Jan. 11, 2025.
    Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng speaks at the 11th China-UK Economic and Financial Dialogue in Beijing, Jan. 11, 2025.
    (Aaron Favila/AP)

    The Treasury secretary “stressed the [Trump] Administration’s commitment to pursue trade and economic policies that protect the American economy, the American worker, and our national security,” but committed to communication with the Chinese side, it said.

    According to the Chinese readout released by state news agency Xinhua, Lifeng meanwhile “expressed serious concerns over recent U.S. additional tariffs and other restrictive measures against China.”

    However, both Bessent and Lifeng “recognized the significance of bilateral economic and trade relations,” the Chinese readout said.

    US State Department website changes

    The video call came days after the U.S. State Department updated its bilateral relations “fact sheet” on China to add a series of grievances about Beijing, leading to a backlash from the Chinese government.

    The Feb. 13 changes, which themselves came days after the State Department removed previously standard language about not supporting Taiwanese independence, signaled the Trump administration’s concerns about U.S.-China trade relations.

    China is “one of the most restrictive investment climates in the world” the page on U.S.-China relations now reads, before pledging to carry out Trump’s “America First” approach to trade and diplomatic ties.

    “In its bilateral economic relations with China, the United States will place U.S. interests and the American people first and work to end China’s abusive, unfair, and illegal economic practices,” it says.

    RELATED STORIES

    Tariff war escalates: China counters US with 15% duties, Google investigation

    China condemns US for tweak to Taiwan reference; Washington calls it ‘routine’ update

    China condemns US tariffs, saying fentanyl is ‘America’s problem’

    Beijing changes Rubio’s Chinese name, perhaps to get around travel ban

    EXPLAINED: Trump’s and Harris’ differing proposals on Chinese tariffs

    It also accuses Beijing of profiting off “unfair trade practices,” with the United States, including by “using forced labor and massive state subsidies, putting American businesses at a disadvantage, and making them complicit in China’s human rights abuses.”

    The updated page notably also discarded the usual American diplomatic practice of referring to China’s government as “The People’s Republic of China,” or by the acronym “PRC,” rather than “China.”

    “The United States is firmly committed to countering China’s licit and illicit efforts to obtain U.S. technologies to advance its military modernization,” the page says in one example passage.

    ‘China’ not ‘PRC’

    The State Department did not respond directly to a request from Radio Free Asia to comment about the change in the name used for China’s government, but said the changes to the page in general were made to bring it in line with the priorities of the new Trump administration.

    “The China fact sheet on state.gov was updated to reflect the current Administration’s policies and priorities as they relate to China and the U.S.-China relationship,” a State Department spokesperson said.

    Speaking at a regular press briefing in Beijing on Thursday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said his government “strongly deplores and firmly opposes” the tone of the new page.

    “The changes made by the U.S. State Department on its ‘U.S.-China Relations’ page and ‘U.S. Relations With China’ fact sheet misrepresent the facts, attack China’s foreign policy and peddle the so-called China-U.S. strategic competition,” Guo said.

    Edited by Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Alex Willemyns.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Several commercial flights between Australia and New Zealand had to divert on Friday because of a live-fire exercise conducted by Chinese warships, according to media reports.

    The Associated Press quoted Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong as saying that Canberra had warned international airlines flying between the two countries to beware of the Chinese live-fire exercise in the Tasman Sea. Commercial pilots had been informed of potential hazards in the airspace.

    Several international flights had been diverted as a result, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation reported without giving details.

    It was not clear if the exercise had finished. The Chinese military has not commented on it.

    The Tasman Sea between southeast Australia and New Zealand.
    The Tasman Sea between southeast Australia and New Zealand.
    (Google Maps)

    A Chinese navy task group, including the frigate Hengyang, cruiser Zunyi and replenishment vessel Weishanhu, is believed to have conducted the live-fire exercise.

    The Australian airline Qantas and its budget affiliate Jetstar had adjusted some flights across the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand, media reported.

    Australia’s Civil Aviation Authority and the air traffic control agency Airservices Australia “are aware of reports of live firing in international waters,” the latter said in a statement quoted by Reuters news agency.

    Although the live-fire exercise was observed in international waters, airlines with flights over the area were still advised to take precaution, it said.

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    Short notice

    China had only notified Australian authorities about the exercise off the coast of New South Wales state earlier on Friday, according to the Sydney Morning Herald.

    “We will be discussing this with the Chinese, and we already have at officials’ level, in relation to the notice given and the transparency, that has been provided in relation to these exercises, particularly the live fire exercises,” Wong was quoted as saying.

    The Chinese task group has been operating near Australia since last week.

    On Thursday, the Australian defense department said the Chinese ships were spotted 150 nautical miles (276 kilometers) from Sydney, well inside Australia’s exclusive economic zone.

    Some naval vessels were deployed to monitor the Chinese warships’ movements, given they were just exercising freedom of navigation under international law, the department said.

    Some Australian analysts warned of the Chinese navy normalizing its presence and power projection overseas but Chinese media dismissed those concerts as “hype”, saying it was a normal part of the navy’s far seas drills.

    Edited by Mike Firn


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Staff.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • A photograph emerged in Chinese-language social media posts with a claim that it shows two Chinese ships, the Changsha 173 and the Yuncheng 571, shadowing Canada’s HMCS Ottawa in the South China Sea.

    But the claim is false. The size and appearance of the three ships in the photo do not align with credible descriptions or verified images of the named vessels. AI detection tools show that the photo had likely been generated by AI.

    The photo was shared on X on Feb. 14, 2025.

    “The Canadian ship HMCS Ottawa entered the South China Sea, and the Chinese Navy’s Changsha 173 and the Yuncheng 571 vessels quickly shadowed it for a welcoming,” the claim reads.

    The claim was shared alongside a photo that shows two large vessels shadowing a smaller vessel.

    Some X users claim that the photo shows Chinese warships shadowing a Canadian vessel in the South China Sea.
    Some X users claim that the photo shows Chinese warships shadowing a Canadian vessel in the South China Sea.
    (X)

    The South China Sea is a strategically vital and resource-rich body of water in the western Pacific Ocean, bordered by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.

    Covering approximately 3.5 million square kilometers, it serves as a key maritime trade route, carrying about one-third of global shipping traffic. The sea is also rich in fisheries, oil, and natural gas reserves, making it a focal point of economic and geopolitical interest.

    It is highly contested due to overlapping territorial claims. China claims most of it, as illustrated by a “nine-dash line” on its maps, which includes parts of the exclusive economic zones of neighboring countries.

    The region is a flash point for confrontations between various militaries and coast guard forces, triggering diplomatic tensions, involving not only regional countries but also external powers such as the United States, which conducts freedom of navigation operations to challenge China’s claims.

    The same photo with similar claims was shared on X here, here and here.

    But the claim is false.

    Discrepancies

    The Ottawa is 134 meters (440 feet) long and 16 meters (52 feet) wide.

    While measurements for the Chinese vessels are unavailable, the U.S. Naval Institute estimates that the Yuncheng is about the same size as the Ottawa.

    Meanwhile, Taiwanese navy estimates put the Changsha at 156 meters (511 feet) long and 17.5 meters (57 feet) wide, making it roughly 15% longer than the other two ships.

    However, the ships in the photo appear disproportionate, with the two supposed Chinese vessels looking several times larger than the alleged Canadian ship.

    The ships in the photo do not match the official measurements of the named vessels.
    The ships in the photo do not match the official measurements of the named vessels.
    (X, CCTV Military, Baidu and the Ottawa’s Facebook page. Annotations by AFCL)
    The ships in the photo do not match the official measurements of the named vessels.
    The ships in the photo do not match the official measurements of the named vessels.
    ((X, CCTV Military, Baidu and the Ottawa’s Facebook page. Annotations by AFCL)
    The ships in the photo do not match the official measurements of the named vessels.
    The ships in the photo do not match the official measurements of the named vessels.
    (X, CCTV Military, Baidu and the Ottawa’s Facebook page. Annotations by AFCL)

    The AI image detection software Hive found a 72.5% chance that the image was AI-generated, while a test with the different tool Sightengine placed this estimate at 98%.

    AI detection tools Hive (left) and Sightengine (right) both judged that the image was likely AI-generated.
    AI detection tools Hive (left) and Sightengine (right) both judged that the image was likely AI-generated.
    (Hive and Sightengine)

    January incident

    Canadian broadcaster CTV reported on Jan. 9 and Jan. 10 that both the Changsha and the Yuncheng were seen in silhouette shadowing the Ottawa during its passage through the South China Sea.

    A CTV journalist was reporting from the Ottawa during the incident.

    While the two Chinese ships kept in sight for more than two days, the reports do not mention them trying to approach the Ottawa at close range.

    Translated by Shen Ke. Edited by Taejun Kang.

    Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) was established to counter disinformation in today’s complex media environment. We publish fact-checks, media-watches and in-depth reports that aim to sharpen and deepen our readers’ understanding of current affairs and public issues. If you like our content, you can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram and X.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Dong Zhe for Asia Fact Check Lab.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Tensions between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea have been making more headlines in 2025 after escalating alarmingly last year.

    Some other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, meanwhile, are trying to maintain good relations with their big neighbor to the north, whose economic and political influence is only growing in importance, while protecting their interests in the disputed waterway.

    Reporters from RFA and BenarNews, an RFA-affiliated news organization, look at how three countries on the South China Sea are approaching relations with China.

    INDONESIA: Growing openness toward China

    In November 2024, Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto, stunned South China Sea watchers with a sentence in a joint statement issued in China on his first overseas trip since becoming president.

    Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, right, with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Nov. 9, 2024.
    Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, right, with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Nov. 9, 2024.
    (China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

    The seemingly innocuous line explained that Jakarta and Beijing had reached an “important common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims” in the South China Sea.

    But analysts were quick to point out that by acknowledging overlapping maritime boundaries, Prabowo and his officials had effectively acknowledged the legitimacy of China’s claims, something Indonesia had never done before.

    Indonesia had always insisted that China’s so-called nine-dash line, which it uses on its maps to claim historic rights over most of the South China Sea, has no legal basis, as seen in a note verbale to the United Nations in May 2020.

    Indonesia realized the mistake and issued a correction two days later, saying mutual recognition of differences and disputes does not equal accepting the other side’s legitimacy and China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea still lacked legal basis.

    Muhammad Waffaa Kharisma, a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, in Jakarta said that nevertheless, there has been “a shift toward a closer relationship that could reduce Jakarta’s assertiveness in the South China Sea under President Prabowo Subianto.”

    China is Indonesia’s largest trading partner and one of its biggest sources of foreign direct investment, and expanding economic ties have been a major factor in Jakarta’s decision-making.

    This year, Indonesia became the first Southeast Asia member of the BRICS bloc led by China.

    Raden Mokhamad Luthfi, a defense analyst at Al Azhar University Indonesia said that there was growing openness toward China, not just in trade and investment but also in security cooperation.

    Prabowo’s dominant role in foreign policy appears to have sidelined Indonesia’s ministry of foreign affairs, he said.

    “I am concerned that under Prabowo’s leadership, Indonesian diplomats may have less space to provide input and guidance on how the country’s foreign policy should be shaped,” Luthfi said.

    Waffaa noted a sense that “Indonesia is increasingly practicing self-censorship when dealing with China.”

    “One possible explanation is China’s proactive diplomatic approach, which includes strong responses, or even retaliatory measures, against criticism,” he said. “This makes Indonesia more cautious, possibly fearing economic repercussions and as a result, it has become difficult to openly address concerns over sovereignty and international law.”

    Indonesia is one of the founding members of ASEAN and long served as its de-facto leader, playing a crucial role in mediating regional crises. Analysts warned that its leadership in the group on the South China Sea issue would wane if it stopped championing international legal norms.

    Indonesian navy personnel welcome  British Royal Navy's HMS Spey, in Jakarta on Jan. 15, 2025.
    Indonesian navy personnel welcome British Royal Navy’s HMS Spey, in Jakarta on Jan. 15, 2025.
    (BAY ISMOYO/AFP)

    Indonesia has repeatedly said that it is not a party to territorial disputes in the South China Sea. But its law enforcement agencies have had to deal with encroachment and illegal fishing, including by Chinese vessels in the waters off the Natuna islands.

    A major question now is whether warming relations will keep encroachments at bay.

    MALAYSIA: Aligning with China’s preferences?

    Malaysia’s leaders have always seen China as an important neighbor and partner with which they have to navigate a complex relationship.

    The two countries established a comprehensive partnership in 2013 and China is Malaysia’s top economic partner, with trade worth more than US$200 billion in 2022. In comparison, Malaysia-U.S. trade was US$73 billion in the same year.

    Since coming to power in 2022, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has made it clear that fostering good ties with China is one of his priorities.

    Malaysia's Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim speaks at a World Economic Forum meeting in Switzerland, Jan. 22, 2025.
    Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim speaks at a World Economic Forum meeting in Switzerland, Jan. 22, 2025.
    (Yves Herman/Reuters)

    Regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Malaysia’s long-standing policy has been to protect its sovereignty via international law. Malaysia has never recognized China’s nine-dash line and even ordered the removal of a scene from an animated movie that showed it.

    Yet some of the prime minister’s comments have stirred controversy.

    In March 2024, in a speech at the Australian National University in Canberra, Anwar said that countries needed to put themselves in China’s shoes and trying to block its economic and technological advancement would only bring grievances.

    In November, after meeting President Xi Jinping in Beijing, Anwar said that Malaysia was “ready to negotiate” on the South China Sea, suggesting bilateral negotiations over conflicting claims in the waters off the coast of Sabah and Sarawak in East Malaysia.

    At the World Economic Forum in Switzerland in January, once again the Malaysian leader stated that China should not be singled out for the tensions in the South China Sea, striking a clear pro-Beijing tone.

    “Malaysia’s desire to exclude other countries, such as Australia, Japan and the United States, from South China Sea disputes aligns with China’s preferences,” wrote Euan Graham, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

    “It also helps China’s behind-the-scenes efforts to influence negotiations with ASEAN on a code of conduct for the South China Sea,” Graham added.

    China and ASEAN have been discussing the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea for years but have yet to reach a final agreement.

    In February, during a trip to Brunei, Anwar called for the code to be completed “as soon as possible” to address escalating tensions in the waterway. Malaysia is the ASEAN chair this year.

    “I believe Malaysia prefers to settle the issue among the stakeholders through dialogue and engagement without any intervention from outside,” said Lee Pei May, assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the International Islamic University Malaysia.

    “If there is intervention from outside powers, I believe the situation would be chaotic,” Lee said. “The U.S., U.K. and other powers, they are not directly related to the dispute so they are considered outside powers.”

    The U.S. and its regional allies, for their part, argue that they are also Pacific nations, and have interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific.

    Malaysia's offshore patrol vessel KD Terengganu takes part in the AMAN-25 exercise off the coast of Karachi, Pakistan, on Feb. 10, 2025.
    Malaysia’s offshore patrol vessel KD Terengganu takes part in the AMAN-25 exercise off the coast of Karachi, Pakistan, on Feb. 10, 2025.
    (Asif Hassan/AFP)

    Some analysts said that the Anwar administration, despite being criticized for its seemingly pro-Beijing stance, had not compromised Malaysia’s claims in the South China Sea.

    “To be sure, Malaysia has adopted a very different approach to the South China Sea dispute than either Vietnam or the Philippines,” said Ian Storey, a senior fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.

    Anwar’s policy still “allows Malaysia to maintain close ties with China while asserting its territorial claims and protecting its sovereign rights,” he said.

    VIETNAM: A balancing act

    On Feb. 19, Beijing for the first time officially and publicly denounced Vietnam’s island building in the South China Sea.

    Foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said that China opposed construction on “illegally occupied islands and reefs,” referring to the features that Vietnam began reclaiming in the 2020s.

    It is not a secret that Vietnam wants to strengthen defenses against China’s dominance in the Spratly islands and the island building has received strong support from the Vietnamese public as the sign of a refusal to compromise on sovereignty.

    “If you listen to leaders’ speeches on both sides, Vietnam-China relations appear to be warm and flourishing,” said Dinh Kim Phuc, a South China Sea researcher. “But Hanoi’s developments in the South China Sea show that they don’t really trust each other very much.”

    A supply vessel sprays water near the Lan Tay gas platform, operated by Rosneft Vietnam, in the South China Sea off  Vietnam on April 29, 2018.
    A supply vessel sprays water near the Lan Tay gas platform, operated by Rosneft Vietnam, in the South China Sea off Vietnam on April 29, 2018.
    (Maxim Shemetov/Reuters)

    With China’s first public protest against the island building, it seems that an “informal understanding” with Vietnam is over, noted Bill Hayton, an associate fellow at the British think tank Chatham House. This tacit compromise meant that for a few years Vietnam did not look for oil and gas inside China’s nine-dash line and China said nothing about Vietnam’s island building, Hayton said.

    There may be several explanations for China’s objection but analysts believe Vietnam’s expanding ties with the United States is a major factor.

    Looking at overseas trips by Vietnam’s leaders, including the new Communist Party chief To Lam, Vietnam also seems to “emphasize the values of ASEAN and the West” in its strategic thinking, according to Phuc.

    Vietnam has been reported as wanting to elevate ties with fellow ASEAN members Indonesia and Singapore to comprehensive strategic partnerships, the highest level of bilateral relations, this year.

    But that doesn’t mean that a decoupling from China would happen any time soon, analysts say, as Vietnam’s economy depends greatly on Chinese trade and investment.

    On the same day that China criticized Vietnam’s “illegal occupation” in the South China Sea, Vietnam’s parliament approved a multi-billion-dollar railway running from the Chinese border to the South China Sea. Part of the funding is expected to come from China, despite some public unease about the potential debt.

    Gestures by General Secretary To and other leaders that can be seen as “pro-West” or “anti-China” are deemed as “merely populist” by Dang Dinh Manh, a Vietnamese dissident lawyer now living in the U.S.

    “They need to appease the general domestic public, which is increasingly nationalistic,” Manh said, adding that in his opinion the Hanoi leadership needed to appease China, too, and how to strike a balance can be “a serious task”, especially when it comes to sovereignty in the South China Sea.

    Edited by Mike Firn

    Pizaro Gozali Idrus in Jakarta and Iman Muttaqin Yusof in Kuala Lumpur contributed to this article.

    BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated news organization.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA and BenarNews Staff.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Hong Kong’s Democratic Party, which was once the largest party in an active opposition camp, held a meeting on Thursday at which it said it would discuss its own dissolution, amid an ongoing crackdown on all forms of public dissent under two national security laws.

    Party Chairman Lo Kin-hei told journalists that the topic will be up for discussion at the meeting, describing the topic as “inevitable” in the current climate.

    The party’s central committee will also discuss many other matters, including its suggestions ahead of the government’s budget on Feb. 26, Lo told a news conference on Wednesday.

    The news came just weeks after a court in Hong Kong sentenced 45 democratic politicians and activists to jail terms of up to 10 years for “subversion” after they took part in a democratic primary in the summer of 2020.

    The ongoing political crackdown has already seen the dissolution of the Civic Party, which disbanded in May 2023 after its lawmakers were barred from running for re-election in the wake of the 2020 National Security Law.

    The pro-democracy youth activist party Demosisto disbanded in June 2020.

    The logo of the Democratic Party is seen in its office, in Hong Kong, China Sep. 26, 2021.
    The logo of the Democratic Party is seen in its office, in Hong Kong, China Sep. 26, 2021.
    (Tyrone Siu/Reuters)

    Lo has previously suggested that the Democratic Party, which was formed in 1994, should try to hold on despite the threat of being targeted by national security police.

    “I have no baggage here,” Lo said. “If we really need to [disband], then we will.”

    “I’ve said publicly many times over the past two or three years that if the day comes, we will just have to face up to it.”

    Few remaining options

    A person familiar with the workings of the party told RFA Cantonese that the Democratic Party can only be formally dissolved after multiple discussions and procedures involving the members and the central committee, and after a general assembly vote with 75% attendance.

    Exiled former Democratic Party lawmaker Ted Hui said there are few options left for his former party.

    “I understand that a lot of party members and central committee members are becoming more and more worried about their personal safety,” Hui said. “They run the risk of arrest at any time.”

    He said if the party does eventually disband, the move would show “the total destruction of any democratic process in Hong Kong.”

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    The government has blamed several waves of pro-democracy protests in recent years on “foreign forces” trying to instigate a democratic revolution in Hong Kong.

    Recent electoral reforms now ensure that almost nobody in the city’s once-vibrant opposition camp will stand for election again, amid the jailing of dozens of pro-democracy figures and rule changes requiring political vetting.

    The last directly elected District Council, which saw a landslide victory for pro-democracy candidates amid record turnout that was widely seen as a ringing public endorsement of the 2019 protest movement.

    The first Legislative Council election after the rule change saw plummeting turnout, while Chief Executive John Lee was given the top job after an “election” in which he was the only candidate.

    Since Beijing imposed the two national security laws banning public opposition and dissent in the city and blamed “hostile foreign forces” for the resulting protests, hundreds of thousands have voted with their feet amid plummeting human rights rankings, shrinking press freedom and widespread government propaganda in schools.

    ‘Not surprised’

    Democratic Party founding chairman Martin Lee, who has been dubbed the “father of Hong Kong democracy,” told the Ming Pao newspaper that he hasn’t heard from the central committee on the matter, but that he was “not surprised” by the talk of dissolution.

    The Communist Party-backed newspaper Ta Kung Pao said the party was heading for dissolution, accusing it of having “committed many evil deeds over the years.”

    “If this political cancer isn’t completely eliminated, it will inevitably endanger national security and bring disaster to Hong Kong,” the paper warned.

    The party has survived threatening op-eds before.

    A 2022 article in the Ming Pao by Lu Wenduan, who plays a leading role in the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front influence operations, warned that the party would be doomed if it “turns a deaf ear to warnings issued by the Wen Wei Po and the Ta Kung Pao.”

    Following the jailing of 45 opposition activists in December 2024, the Wen Wei Po said the party was incompatible with the principle of “patriots ruling Hong Kong,” adding that “disbandment is the only option.”

    The party has made some nods toward the new political climate, trying to demonstrate its “patriotism” and and being careful not to run afoul of security laws.

    But the calls for its demise haven’t let up.

    Party members have received harassing and threatening emails and text messages from people describing themselves as “patriotic, Hong Kong-loving citizens,” Lo told the news conference.

    And its attempts to hold fundraising events have been forcibly canceled by venues, likely under pressure from the authorities, putting it under financial strain and limiting the scope of its activities.

    Translated by Luisetta Mudie.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Ha Syut and Yam Chi Yau for RFA Cantonese.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.


  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • MAE SOT, Thailand – Two hundred Chinese nationals were due to be flown to their homeland on Thursday in aircraft laid on by their government after leaving online fraud centers in an eastern Myanmar district on the border with Thailand, Thai officials said.

    The Chinese people were brought on buses, 50 at a time, from Myanmar’s Myawaddy district, over a border bridge to the Thai town of Mae Sot, and then taken to a nearby airport for their flight home, witnesses said.

    “Myanmar authorities and the Border Guard Force have brought Chinese nationals to the second Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge, and are handing them over to Thai officials,” Maj. Gen. Maitree Chupreecha, commander of the Thai military’s Naresuan Task Force, told reporters.

    “A total of 200 people will be repatriated today in groups of 50 every two hours,” he said.

    It was not clear if the people being flown back to China were organizers of the online fraud that has proliferated in recent years in Myanmar and other parts of Southeast Asia, or were victims of human traffickers and forced to work in the centers defrauding people online and over the telephone.

    A first flight left Mae Sot bound for China shortly before noon and three more were due to leave through the day. More flights to China are due on Friday and Saturday, taking more than 1,000 Chinese people home, Thai officials said.

    Thursday’s flights were the latest in a series of actions over recent weeks aimed at ending the scam center operations that have flourished largely unimpeded in different parts of Southeast Asia for several years.

    The scamming, known as “pig butchering” in China, involves making contact with unsuspecting people online, building a relationship with them and then defrauding them. Researchers say billions of dollars have been stolen this way from victims around the world.

    Huge fraud operation complexes are often staffed by people lured by false job advertisements and forced to work, sometimes under threat of violence, rescued workers and rights groups say.

    Researchers have said governments and businesses across the region have been enabling the operations by failing to take action against the profitable flows they generate.

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    Thousands of victims

    But that has changed in recent weeks amid a blizzard of bad publicity triggered by the kidnap and rescue last month of Chinese actor Wang Xing, who was lured to work one of Myawaddy’s fraud operations.

    The growing public alarm across Asia about kidnapping and forced labor threatened to damage Thailand’s tourist industry and forced China to insist on action by authorities in its southern neighbors to crack down.

    China’s Assistant Minister of Public Security Liu Zhongyi visited Thailand in late January to focus efforts to combat the call center operations and the human trafficking that supplies their labor force.

    Thailand took its most decisive action ever against the fraud networks on Feb. 5, cutting cross-border power and internet services and blocking fuel exports to the Myanmar scam zones.

    The Myanmar junta also stopped fuel shipments to the Myawaddy district controlled by an ethnic minority militia force that is allied with the military government.

    The ethnic Karen militia that controls Myawaddy and has been hosting and profiting from the online fraud operations said last month it was going to stop fraud and forced labor and send back thousands of the people who have been working in the centers.

    A Thai activist group, the Civil Society Network for Victim Assistance in Human Trafficking, which has been helping scam center victims, said it has identified at least 2,000 people from more than a dozen countries forced to work at defrauding people around the world.

    But many thousands more people are believed to be still in the scam centers, in eastern Myanmar and beyond.

    A Thai member of parliament and head of its National Security Committee said it was important to gather as much information as possible from people being brought out of the scam centers to identify the kingpins and end their operations once and for all.

    “We need to gather information,” legislator Rangsiman Rome told reporters.

    “We must verify if they are victims or criminals and whether they know who is behind the call center gangs. This information is crucial for dismantling the transnational crime syndicates,” said Rangsiman.

    Edited by Mike Firn.

    RFA Burmese Service contributed to this report.

    BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated news organization.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Nontarat Phaicharoen for BenarNews and Pimuk Rakkanam for RFA.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Pacific Media Watch

    A New Zealand-based community education provider, Dark Times Academy, has had a US Embassy grant to deliver a course teaching Pacific Islands journalists about disinformation terminated after the new Trump administration took office.

    The new US administration requested a list of course participants and to review the programme material amid controversy over a “freeze” on federal aid policies.

    The course presentation team refused and the contract was terminated by “mutual agreement” — but the eight-week Pacific workshop is going ahead anyway from next week.

    Dark Times Academy's Mandy Henk
    Dark Times Academy’s co-founder Mandy Henk . . . “A Bit Sus”, an evidence-based peer-reviewed series of classes on disinfiormation for Pacific media. Image: Newsroom

    “As far as I can tell, the current foreign policy priorities of the US government seem to involve terrorising the people of Gaza, annexing Canada, invading Greenland, and bullying Panama,” said Dark Times Academy co-founder Mandy Henk.

    “We felt confident that a review of our materials would not find them to be aligned with those priorities.”

    The course, called “A Bit Sus”, is an evidence-based peer-reviewed series of classes that teach key professions the skills needed to identify and counter disinformation and misinformation in their particular field.

    The classes focus on “prebunking”, lateral reading, and how technology, including generative AI, influences disinformation.

    Awarded competitive funds
    Dark Times Academy was originally awarded the funds to run the programme through a public competitive grant offered by the US Embassy in New Zealand in 2023 under the previous US administration.

    The US Embassy grant was focused on strengthening the capacity of Pacific media to identify and counter disinformation. While funded by the US, the course was to be a completely independent programme overseen by Dark Times Academy and its academic consultants.

    Co-founder Henk was preparing to deliver the education programme to a group of Pacific Island journalists and media professionals, but received a request from the US Embassy in New Zealand to review the course materials to “ensure they are in line with US foreign policy priorities”.

    Henk said she and the other course presenters refused to allow US government officials to review the course material for this purpose.

    She said the US Embassy had also requested a “list of registered participants for the online classes,” which Dark Times Academy also declined to provide as compliance would have violated the New Zealand Privacy Act 2020.

    Henk said the refusal to provide the course materials for review led immediately to further discussions with the US Embassy in New Zealand that ultimately resulted in the termination of the grant “by mutual agreement”.

    However, she said Dark Times Academy would still go ahead with running the course for the Pacific Island journalists who had signed up so far, starting on February 26.

    Continuing the programme
    “The Dark Times Academy team fully intends to continue to bring the ‘A Bit Sus’ programme and other classes to the Pacific region and New Zealand, even without the support of the US government,” Henk said.

    “As noted when we first announced this course, the Pacific Islands have experienced accelerated growth in digital connectivity over the past few years thanks to new submarine cable networks and satellite technology.

    “Alongside this, the region has also seen a surge in harmful rumours and disinformation that is increasingly disrupting the ability to share accurate and truthful information across Pacific communities.

    “This course will help participants from the media recognise common tactics used by disinformation agents and support them to deploy proven educational and communications techniques.

    “By taking a skills-based approach to countering disinformation, our programme can help to spread the techniques needed to mitigate the risks posed by digital technologies,” Henk said.

    Especially valuable for journalists
    Dark Times Academy co-founder Byron Clark said the course would be especially valuable for journalists in the Pacific region given the recent shifts in global politics and the current state of the planet.

    Dark Times Academy co-founder and author Byron C Clark
    Dark Times Academy co-founder and author Byron Clark . . . “We saw the devastating impacts of disinformation in the Pacific region during the measles outbreak in Samoa.” Image: APR

    “We saw the devastating impacts of disinformation in the Pacific region during the measles outbreak in Samoa, for example,” said Clark, author of the best-selling book Fear: New Zealand’s Underworld of Hostile Extremists.

    “With Pacific Island states bearing the brunt of climate change, as well as being caught between a geopolitical stoush between China and the West, a course like this one is timely.”

    Henk said the “A Bit Sus” programme used a “high-touch teaching model” that combined the current best evidence on how to counter disinformation with a “learner-focused pedagogy that combines discussion, activities, and a project”.

    Past classes led to the creation of the New Zealand version of the “Euphorigen Investigation” escape room, a board game, and a card game.

    These materials remain in use across New Zealand schools and community learning centres.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • In January, the Chinese tech startup DeepSeek stunned the world with the release of its R1 artificial intelligence model, which outperforms its major US-based competitors, at a fraction of the cost of development, requiring orders of magnitude less energy, and not relying on the latest and greatest semiconductors. The model is fully open source, and has been made available for free worldwide. The release of DeepSeek R1 led to an unprecedented drop in share price for several US tech giants, most notably chip-maker Nvidia, which has been attracting enormous investment on the premise that the future of AI relies on faster and better semiconductors.

    The post While China Uses AI To Benefit Humanity, The US Uses It To Wage War appeared first on PopularResistance.Org.

    This post was originally published on PopularResistance.Org.

  • In January, the Chinese tech startup DeepSeek stunned the world with the release of its R1 artificial intelligence model, which outperforms its major US-based competitors, at a fraction of the cost of development, requiring orders of magnitude less energy, and not relying on the latest and greatest semiconductors. The model is fully open source, and has been made available for free worldwide. The release of DeepSeek R1 led to an unprecedented drop in share price for several US tech giants, most notably chip-maker Nvidia, which has been attracting enormous investment on the premise that the future of AI relies on faster and better semiconductors.

    The post While China Uses AI To Benefit Humanity, The US Uses It To Wage War appeared first on PopularResistance.Org.

    This post was originally published on PopularResistance.Org.


  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The son of jailed pro-democracy media magnate Jimmy Lai has warned that “time is running out” for his father’s health, and called on Britain and the United States to push for his release.

    “His body is breaking down … It’s akin to torture,” Sebastien Lai told Reuters ahead of the Human Rights and Democracy summit in Geneva on Feb. 18. “Time is running out for my father.”

    Lai, 77, has spent more than 1,500 days behind bars, and is diabetic. He is a British citizen.

    In jail since his arrest in December 2020, Lai is currently standing trial for “collusion with foreign forces” under Hong Kong’s National Security Law. He has also been handed separate sentences for lighting a candle and praying for the victims of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, for irregularities in the use of his newspaper’s office space, and for taking part in the 2019 protests.

    Media tycoon Jimmy Lai, founder of Apple Daily, looks on as he leaves the Court of Final Appeal by prison van, in Hong Kong, Feb. 1, 2021.
    Media tycoon Jimmy Lai, founder of Apple Daily, looks on as he leaves the Court of Final Appeal by prison van, in Hong Kong, Feb. 1, 2021.
    (Tyrone Siu/Reuters)

    Sebastien Lai called on global leaders, including U.S. President Donald Trump — who has pledged to help get Lai out of jail — and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, to take urgent action, as his father faces his fourth year of solitary confinement.

    “We are incredibly grateful that [Trump] said that. It gives us a lot of hope,” Sebastien Lai said, but called for a stronger response from the United Kingdom.

    “If (Britain) wants to normalize relations, they shouldn’t normalize citizens being arrested for standing up for democracy,” he said.

    The Hong Kong government told Reuters that Hong Kong “strongly disapproves of and rejects misinformation and smearing remarks made by Sebastien Lai,” while China’s permanent mission in Geneva described the claims about Lai’s health as “slanderous.”

    Sebastien Lai called on governments to “champion” his father, who decided not to flee the city when Beijing imposed the first of two national security laws in 2020, despite knowing he’d be a target.

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    “He refused to leave,” he told Voice of America. “Six decades after landing on the shore of this island in pursuit of freedom, he decided to stay and stand with his fellow protesters.”

    Human rights groups say Lai’s trial is a “sham” and part of a broad crackdown on dissent in Hong Kong that has all but destroyed its reputation as the only place in Greater China where the rule of law and freedoms of speech and assembly were preserved.

    In November 2024, a Hong Kong court jailed 45 democracy supporters at the end of the city’s biggest national security trial to date.

    Those sentences drew international condemnation and calls for further sanctions on Hong Kong and the expansion of lifeboat visa schemes for those fleeing the political crackdown in the city.

    Translated by Luisetta Mudie. Edited by Roseanne Gerin.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Alice Yam for RFA Cantonese.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • China on Wednesday voiced opposition to Vietnam’s recent developments in the Spratly archipelago in a rare public protest.

    Foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said that the Nansha Qundao are China’s inherent territory, referring to the group of islands and reefs known internationally as the Spratlys.

    Hanoi has been reclaiming several features within the Spratlys, and is building a 3000-meter (10,000-foot) airstrip on one of them, Barque Canada Reef.

    Guo said that the Barque Canada Reef, or Bai Jiao in Chinese, “is a part of the Nansha Qundao and China always opposes relevant countries conducting construction activities on illegally-occupied islands and reefs.”

    The reef is actually a rock under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, and Vietnam first took possession of it in 1987. It has undergone development at a fast pace since 2021 and the total landfill area more than doubled in one year to nearly 250 hectares (620 acres), as of October 2024.

    The Washington-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, or AMTI, said that between November 2023 and June 2024, Hanoi created a record 280 hectares (690 acres) of new land across 10 of 27 features it occupies in the Spratly archipelago.

    Beijing until now has stayed quiet as China was the first country in the region that built up artificial islands in the South China Sea and militarized them.

    By 2021, when Vietnam began its island building program, China had already completed the construction of its “Big Three” artificial islands in the South China Sea – Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi reefs – and equipped them with runways and military facilities.

    Hanoi’s overall dredging and landfill in the South China Sea is roughly half of China’s, according to AMTI.

    Vietnam’s ‘Look West’ policy

    The Vietnamese government has said little about its work at the features apart from it is intended to protect them and provide typhoon shelter to fishermen.

    Vietnam has not responded to the Chinese spokesperson’s rebuke but a Vietnamese analyst said that China’s first known public and official protest may stem from Beijing’s disapproval of the Vietnamese leadership’s ‘look West’ policies.

    Hanoi and Washington in 2023 established a comprehensive strategic partnership, on par with Beijing’s partnership with Hanoi.

    The new general secretary of the ruling Vietnamese communist party, To Lam, has repeatedly expressed his willingness to develop a strong relationship and cooperation with the United States, said Hoang Viet, a South China Sea analyst.

    RELATED STORIES

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    Lam has recently also made an unprecedented visit to a war cemetery, where thousands of soldiers who lost their lives fighting invading Chinese troops between 1979-1989 were buried.

    “The Chinese must not be pleased with such a visit by Vietnam’s party chief,” said Viet, adding that the protest over Vietnam’s island building revealed that the China-Vietnam relationship, “although it appears close and strong on the outside, has deep cracks inside.”

    Another Vietnamese analyst told RFA that in his opinion, “Vietnam is aware of the risks brought by its activities in the South China Sea in relation to China.”

    “I hope that the leaders in Hanoi will be wise enough not to be caught up in the middle of the U.S.-China strategic competition,” said Dinh Kim Phuc.

    “But they should be firm and decisive when it comes to Vietnam’s sovereignty in the South China Sea,” he added.

    Edited by Mike Firn.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Staff.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Emile Dirks, Noura Aljizawi, Siena Anstis and Ron Deibert wrote in the The Globe and Mail of 10 February 2025 about the problem of transnational repression.

    The final report of the public inquiry into foreign interference (the Hogue Commission) offers a measure of reassurance to Canadians; there is no evidence that Canadian MPs worked with foreign states to undermine the 2019 or 2021 federal elections. Justice Marie-Josée Hogue’s findings, however, are cold comfort to people at risk. While the commission’s work has ended, distant autocrats continue to target Canadians and Canadian residents with transnational repression, the most coercive form of foreign interference.

    Commissioner Justice Marie-Josee Hogue Patrick Doyle/Reuters

    Through digital harassment, assault and even assassination, authoritarians reach across borders to silence their foes abroad. Victims include activists, human-rights defenders, exiled critics and asylum seekers tied by citizenship or ancestry to repressive states like China, Russia, India or Saudi Arabia. For authoritarians, these people are not citizens, but disloyal subjects to silence.

    The danger that transnational repression poses is not new. A 2020 report by the Canadian Coalition on Human Rights in China demanded the Canadian government address threats against pro-democracy activists, while a 2022 report by the Citizen Lab highlighted the lack of support to victims of digital transnational repression. Prior to the 2024 election, the Biden-Harris administration adopted a whole-of-government approach to ensure government agencies like the State Department, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and the FBI worked together to provide recommendations to victims on how to better protect themselves.

    Researchers and civil society have long worried that Canadian authorities are overlooking transnational repression as a unique challenge that requires tailored responses. Considering the seriousness of the threat and the stark absence of action by the government, many researchers anticipated the commission’s final report would explore transnational repression as a distinct form of foreign interference. Yet, while Justice Hogue wrote that “it would be challenging to overstate the seriousness of transnational repression,” she ultimately reasoned the issue lay outside her mandate.

    This was a mistake. The final report was a missed opportunity to fully explore the corrosive impact of transnational repression on Canadian democracy. A recent report by the Citizen Lab highlights the profound toll transnational repression takes on vulnerable people, especially women, in Canada and beyond. Intimidation, surveillance and physical attacks prevent victims from participating fully in civic life and create a climate of persistent fear.

    Transnational repression harms victims in more subtle ways, too. Our research shows that the mere threat of an online or offline attack is enough to frighten many diaspora members into silence. Victims become wary of participating in social media or even using digital devices. They report being afraid to engage with members of their communities, leaving them increasingly isolated. It has an insidious, chilling effect on targeted communities.

    Unfortunately, the future looks bleak. Democratic backsliding in the United States threatens to deprive Canada of an ally in the fight and reverse whatever measures U.S. agencies might have taken on the issue. Our research shows that suspicion of law enforcement discourages victims from contacting authorities. Proposed moves by the Trump administration – including halting asylum hearings, ending resettlement programs, and sending “criminal” migrants to Guantanamo Bay – will further erode victims’ confidence in the U.S.’s willingness to protect them.

    Big Tech is also worsening the problem. Across social-media platforms, state-backed harassment of vulnerable diaspora members is rife. Elon Musk’s X tolerates and even promotes hate-mongering accounts, while Mark Zuckerberg’s announcement that Meta will stop using “politically biased” fact-checkers signals a worrying disinterest in robust content moderation. We should expect a tsunami of digital transnational repression targeting vulnerable Canadians now that tech CEOs are loosening the restraints.

    Canada cannot rely on outside leadership or corporate actors to tackle this problem. What is needed is a commission on transnational repression. On Jan. 24, the British parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights launched such an inquiry. Once our House of Commons sits again we can follow our British counterparts and resume the Subcommittee on International Human Rights’s work on transnational repression. The new Parliament should launch a multiparty inquiry into the crisis, with a mandate to examine repression outside of federal elections. Crucially, it must earn the trust of victims, something the Hogue Commission lacked. The Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project and the Canadian Friends of Hong Kong both pulled out of the inquiry, citing the participation of three legislators with alleged links to the Chinese government.

    This is not a partisan issue. Whoever wins the next federal election will have a duty to contend with the continuing threat transnational repression poses to Canada. With global authoritarianism on the rise, the problem is only likely to worsen in the years to come.

    see also: https://humanrightsdefenders.blog/2024/03/19/transnational-repression-human-rights-watch-and-other-reports/

    https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-final-hogue-report-was-a-missed-opportunity-to-tackle/

    This post was originally published on Hans Thoolen on Human Rights Defenders and their awards.

  • The signs aren’t good so far, but playing on Trump’s desperation to be seen as a great dealmaker would pay dividends

    • Kenneth Roth is a former executive director of Human Rights Watch. His book, Righting Wrongs, is published on 25 February

    The common wisdom is that Donald Trump’s foreign policy will be a disaster for human rights. Certainly his penchant for embracing autocrats and breaching norms bodes poorly, such as his outrageous proposal to force two million Palestinians out of Gaza – which would be a blatant war crime – or his suggestion that Ukraine is to blame for Russia’s invasion. But Trump also likes to cut a deal, as shown by his paradoxically positive role in securing the current (precarious) Gaza ceasefire. If Trump the dealmaker can be nudged in the right direction, he might, against all odds, be brought to play a productive role for human rights.

    As executive director of Human Rights Watch, I spent more than three decades devising strategies to pressure or cajole leaders to better respect rights. I have dealt with brutal dictators, self-serving autocrats and misguided democrats. My experience shows that there is always an angle – something the leader cares about – that can be used to steer them in a more rights-respecting direction.

    Kenneth Roth is a former executive director of Human Rights Watch. His book, Righting Wrongs, is published on 25 February

    Continue reading…

    This post was originally published on Human rights | The Guardian.

  • Wow. In a series of rapid-fire developments last week, the new Trump regime has decisively joined the battle with the deep state on the national security side. This is big, or could be. Either Donald Trump will begin to exert political control over the invisible government or the invisible government will sink Donald Trump just as it did during his first term as president. Let us be attentive.

    The attack on USAID, the telephone call with Vladimir Putin, the incipient alienation of the Kiev regime, new talk of talks with the Islamic Republic, Tulsi Gabbard’s confirmation as director of national intelligence: I don’t know if these events and their timing reflect a concerted plan, back-of-an-envelope inspirations, or the president’s thinking but not necessarily the thinking of those around him.

    The post Trump Vs. The Deep State appeared first on PopularResistance.Org.

    This post was originally published on PopularResistance.Org.

  • MANILA, Philippines — A Chinese military helicopter flew dangerously close to within 3 meters (10 feet) of a Philippine aircraft in the skies above the contested Scarborough Shoal, a Filipino coast guard spokesman said.

    A Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, or BFAR, Cessna turboprop plane was conducting a low-altitude tracking flight on Tuesday over the shoal, which is within South China Sea waters of the country’s exclusive economic zone, when the standoff took place. It saw the Chinese helicopter hovering close to or above the Filipino aircraft.

    About 90 minutes into the flight, a People’s Liberation Army Navy helicopter “performed dangerous flight maneuvers toward the BFAR aircraft,” coast guard spokesman Jay Tarriela said.

    The Chinese helicopter “came as close as three meters [10 feet] to the port side and above the BFAR aircraft,” he said in a statement, adding that the Chinese flight blatantly disregarded international aviation regulations established by the International Civil Aviation Organization.

    “This reckless action posed a serious risk to the safety of the pilots and passengers during the MDA flight,” Tarriela said, referring to a maritime domain awareness flight.

    “The PCG [Philippine Coast Guard] and BFAR remain committed to asserting our sovereignty, sovereign rights and maritime jurisdiction in the West Philippine Sea, despite the aggressive and escalatory actions of China,” he said. Manila refers to South China Sea waters within its EEZ as the West Philippine Sea.

    Filipino journalists working for international news agencies were on the BFAR flight, which involved Philippine Coast Guard personnel. During the encounter, a photographer for Agence France-Presse, who was aboard the Philippine plane, took a photo showing a member of the Chinese helicopter crew aiming a camera at the BFAR Cessna (pictured below).

    The Associated Press, which had a television cameraman aboard the Filipino aircraft, said the Filipino pilot warned the Chinese helicopter on radio that it was flying too close.

    A Chinese Navy member takes photos as his helicopter passes within a few meters of a Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources aircraft in the South China Sea, Feb. 18, 2025.
    A Chinese Navy member takes photos as his helicopter passes within a few meters of a Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources aircraft in the South China Sea, Feb. 18, 2025.
    (Jam Sta Rosa/AFP)

    Scarborough Shoal, considered a rich fishing ground by Filipino fishermen, is a triangular chain of reefs about 125 nautical miles (232 km) from Luzon, the country’s main island. It has been under Beijing’s de facto control since 2012, but in 2016 an international arbitration tribunal ruled against all of China’s claims to the area.

    The ruling also said that the Scarborough Shoal was a rock – not an island – meaning that even if it was entitled to a 12-nautical mile territorial sea, it couldn’t generate its own EEZ. Instead, the shoal is recognized as part of the Philippines’ EEZ and continental shelf.

    The Chinese Embassy in Manila said the Philippine aircraft had “intruded into China’s airspace” without permission. It confirmed that the military organized naval and air assets to track, monitor and “drive away” the Philippine aircraft.

    “Without the approval of the Chinese government, the Philippine aircraft illegally intruded into Chinese airspace,” military spokesman Tian Junli said, according to Xinhua, China’s state news agency.

    Air incident last week

    Tuesday’s incident came days after Australia protested what it called an “unsafe and unprofessional interaction” involving a Chinese J-16 fighter aircraft on Feb. 11. An Australian Air Force P-8A Poseidon aircraft was patrolling over the Paracel islands in the South China Sea when the incident occurred.

    No one was injured in the incident, but Australia criticized the unsafe maneuver by the Chinese fighter jet. China rejected Australia’s complaint, saying that its aircraft flew into Chinese airspace over Xisha Qundao, its name for the Paracels that is also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan.

    China has controlled the territory since 1974 when its troops took it from South Vietnam in a battle that killed 74 Vietnamese sailors.

    Manila’s foreign department spoke out on behalf of Australia last week, and said all countries must avoid “interference in legitimate activities” in international waters and airspace.

    BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated online news organization.

    RELATED STORIES

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    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Jason Gutierrez for BenarNews.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • A court in Hong Kong has seized the assets of exiled former pro-democracy lawmaker Ted Hui, claiming they were “obtained from committing offenses endangering national security.”

    Hui’s assets–funds totaling more than US$300,000–were frozen by court order on Feb. 17 after an application by the city’s Department of Justice, the government said in a statement on Tuesday.

    Hui had transferred this amount to his wife and mother prior to leaving the country in 2020, while he was out on bail.

    The move comes amid an ongoing crackdown by Beijing on public dissent in Hong Kong under two security laws.

    The statement said Hui had committed “numerous heinous crimes,” including “conspiring with foreign politicians in 2020 to forge documents and deceive the court with false information in order to obtain the court’s permission to leave Hong Kong while he was on bail,” and added that he had “jumped bail and absconded overseas.”

    But Hui is also accused of committing offenses “endangering national security” overseas, the statement said, adding that he stands accused of “inciting secession” and “inciting subversion of state power,” as well as “colluding with foreign or external forces to endanger national security.”

    Hui said the confiscation order was “absurd and a blatant violation of my human rights,” and a form of political retaliation amid the crackdown.

    According to the government, Hui had transferred nearly $2.5 million Hong Kong dollars (US$321,500) in personal assets as gifts to his mother and wife before he skipped bail.

    Under Hong Kong law, if a defendant benefits from committing an offense endangering national security and makes a gift at any time from six years before the date of prosecution onwards, the property held by the recipient of the gift may be regarded as the defendant’s property and confiscated, the spokesman said.

    Laws against dissent

    Since Beijing imposed the two national security laws banning public opposition and dissent in the city and blamed “hostile foreign forces” for the resulting protests, hundreds of thousands have voted with their feet amid plummeting human rights rankings, shrinking press freedom and widespread government propaganda in schools.

    Some fled to the United Kingdom on the British National Overseas, or BNO, visa program. Others have made their homes anew in the United States, Canada, Australia and Germany.

    Many are continuing their activism and lobbying activists, yet they struggle with exile in some way, worrying about loved ones back home while facing threats to their personal safety from supporters of Beijing overseas

    Hong Kong’s leaders have vowed to pursue activists in exile for life.

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    Hui said in a post to his Facebook page that the money he had given to his mother and wife had been intended as living expenses in his absence.

    “That works out at 10,000 Hong Kong dollars (US$1,286) a month over the six years since I left Hong Kong,” Hui said. “Some people might not even think that’s very much.”

    “The people of Hong Kong can see all too clearly what is happening, and they’ll be sure to take their money overseas.”

    He told RFA Mandarin in a later interview: “Luckily, my parents sold their home in Hong Kong a few years ago and transferred the proceeds elsewhere.”

    ‘No Money left in Hong Kong is safe.’

    He said the authorities had already frozen his bank accounts in Hong Kong after he fled the city amid a crackdown on dissent and political opposition.

    “What they confiscated on this occasion was our only asset left in Hong Kong,” he said. “This has shown us that our concerns were reasonable.”

    “A regime that violates human rights will do anything, and no money left in Hong Kong is safe,” Hui said.

    The government has also hit back at criticisms of the move.

    “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government has noted the unfounded smear and malicious attacks online regarding the actions taken by the Court in accordance with the law,” the statement said. “The HKSAR Government strongly condemned and opposed this.”

    The authorities “will do everything possible and use all legal means to pursue and combat criminals who endanger national security,” he said.

    Current affairs commentator Sang Pu said the authorities’ claim that Hui’s writings on Patreon had somehow paid for the money given to his wife and mother were ridiculous.

    “Now this precedent has been set, as long as they can attach a ‘national security’ label to it, everyone’s assets and personal freedom are under threat,” Sang said.

    Taiwan-based Hong Kong activist Fu Tong said the move on Hui’s assets is very worrying for Hong Kongers in exile.

    “I’m worried because their methods are escalating,” Fu said. “Anyone who continues to speak out overseas will find they can go after people you care about back in Hong Kong, to silence you.”

    But he said he would continue to protest and advocate for the return of Hong Kong’s former freedoms.

    Translated by Luisetta Mudie. Edited by Eugene Whong.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Alice Yam for RFA Cantonese, Chen Zifei for RFA Mandarin.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • TAIPEI, Taiwan – Taiwan is in the process of negotiating a new arms deal worth billions of dollars with the United States, Reuters news agency reported, citing unidentified sources.

    Meanwhile, the top US military commander in the Indo-Pacific, Adm. Samuel Paparo, has warned that Chinese military drills around Taiwan were actually “rehearsals” for an attack on the island.

    Three sources familiar with the situation, who wished to stay anonymous due to the sensitivity of the topic, told Reuters that Taipei was “in talks with Washington” about an arms purchase worth between US$7 billion and US$10 billion and that the package could include coastal defense cruise missiles and high mobility artillery rocket systems, or HIMARS.

    Taiwan’s ministry of defense declined to confirm the news but said Taipei was committed to strengthening national defense.

    Defense ministry spokesperson Sun Li-fang told reporters in Taipei that all defense budgets follow government policy and that plans would be disclosed to the public when they had been finalized.

    There was no confirmation from Washington either.

    There remains still a large backlog of arms sales from the U.S. to Taiwan. According to the Cato Institute think tank, the backlog is valued at US$21.95 billion, mostly of traditional weapons such as tanks and aircraft.

    At the annual Munich Security Conference on Saturday, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Japan Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya and South Korea Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul “emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity for the international community,” they said in a joint statement.

    They said their countries supported Taiwan’s “meaningful participation” in appropriate international organizations, and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues, and “opposed any attempts to unilaterally force or coerce changes to the status quo.”

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    The top commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command warned at a security forum in Hawaii last week that China’s increased military activity around Taiwan were not exercises but “rehearsals for the forced unification of Taiwan to the mainland.”

    U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Samuel Paparo attends the International Military Law and Operations Conference, in the Philippines, Aug. 27, 2024. (REUTERS/Lisa Marie David)
    U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Samuel Paparo attends the International Military Law and Operations Conference, in the Philippines, Aug. 27, 2024. (REUTERS/Lisa Marie David)
    (Lisa Marie David/Reuters)

    “We’re very close to that [point] where on a daily basis the fig leaf of an exercise could very well hide operational warning,” Adm. Samuel Paparo said.

    The Chinese People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, has been conducting regular military drills around Taiwan, especially at the times of heightened tensions on the island such as major political events or during visits by senior U.S. officials.

    Between Jan. 28 and Feb. 12, the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command held so-called combat patrols with aircraft and warships around Taiwan, the same time as U.S. Navy destroyer USS Ralph Johnson and oceanographic survey ship USNS Bowditch made a north-to-south passage through the Taiwan Strait.

    Paparo said that the U.S. must move quickly to close military capability gaps with China.

    “Our magazines run low. Our maintenance backlogs grow longer each month … We operate on increasingly thin margins for error,” he said, calling for reforms of the Pentagon’s procurement system.

    The Taiwanese ministry of national defense, meanwhile, stated that the island’s army “will continue to work hard to build up the army and prepare for war, and enhance asymmetric deterrence capabilities.”

    The ministry said in a statement to the media that it would “use joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance methods to closely monitor the dynamics of the sea and airspace around the Taiwan Strait, and dispatch appropriate troops to respond, and have the ability, determination and confidence to ensure national defense security.”

    Edited by Mike Firn.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Staff.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • China appeared to have sent two more warships to the Ream naval base in southwest Cambodia, indicating that transfer of two vessels to Cambodia may be imminent.

    Satellite images obtained by Radio Free Asia from the Earth imaging firm Planet Labs show two more vessels docked at a new, Chinese-developed pier at the base, opposite the two corvettes Aba and Tianmen that have been there since last year.

    Details of the ships were not clear in the images but they are about 90-meters long, similar in size and shape to the Chinese Type 056 missile corvettes.

    The two new ships were not there on Feb. 15.

    Cambodia’s defense ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

    Sources told RFA last year that China was expected to hand over new facilities at the base, together with the pier and two warships. In return, analysts said it was likely that the two countries had reached an agreement giving the Chinese navy privileged access to the new base.

    The Cambodian military later confirmed that China would transfer two corvettes and train Cambodian crews on how to operate them.

    The Chinese navy has 49 such corvettes, 20 of them in the South Sea Fleet responsible for the South China Sea.

    Two vessels of the same class arrived in Ream for the first time in December 2023. Those were replaced by the Aba and the Tianmen, which were used for on-ship training for Cambodian naval personnel.

    Two Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy Type 056 Corvettes and structures are seen at Cambodia’s Ream naval base in August 2024.
    Two Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy Type 056 Corvettes and structures are seen at Cambodia’s Ream naval base in August 2024.
    (Graphic by Paul Nelson/RFA; Images by RFA and Planet Labs)

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    China-built naval base

    This month, China’s ambassador to Cambodia Wang Wenbin visited the Ream base, accompanied by Cambodian Defense Minister Tea Seiha and his father, Tea Banh, a former defense minister who now serves as personal adviser to King Norodom Sihamoni.

    Tea Seiha said on his Facebook that the purpose of the visit was to inspect progress in the modernization of the base.

    Former Cambodian defense minister Tea Banh and Chinese ambassador Wang Wenbin inspecting Ream naval base, Feb. 9, 2025.
    Former Cambodian defense minister Tea Banh and Chinese ambassador Wang Wenbin inspecting Ream naval base, Feb. 9, 2025.
    (Tea Seiha/Facebook)

    China and Cambodia began developing the base with Chinese funding in June 2021 to the alarm of the United States and some of Cambodia’s neighbors, who said they were worried that Beijing had a growing military presence close to the disputed waters of the South China Sea.

    A senior U.S. defense official told RFA that there were concerns “about the precedent of China establishing bases overseas” with Ream.

    Cambodia has repeatedly denied that China has been given exclusive military access to the base, saying that would be a violation of the Cambodian constitution.

    However, the base has been off-limits to all foreign vessels, apart from those from China.

    Cambodia and the U.S. mark the 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties this year and a U.S. congressional delegation led by former navy intelligence officer Jimmy Panetta is visiting Phnom Penh this week to promote bilateral cooperation.

    It is not clear if the subject of the Ream naval base is on the delegation’s agenda.

    Edited by Mike Firn.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Staff.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • It is now widely acknowledged that the world is multipolar. This is so uncontroversial that the Munich Security Conference chose the title “Multipolarization” for its 2025 annual report.

    However, there is not a common definition of “multipolarity”. The Munich Security Report noted that, while “the world’s ‘multipolarization’ is a fact”, the “international system shows elements of unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity, and nonpolarity”, in which “multiple order models co-exist, compete, or clash”.

    Governments have radically different understandings of the meaning of multipolarity.

    The post What Is A ‘Multipolar’ World? appeared first on PopularResistance.Org.

    This post was originally published on PopularResistance.Org.

  • While a recent interview with the newly confirmed US Secretary of State Marco Rubio began with promising slogans, it quickly unraveled into threats of overt aggression, including outright calls to seize the Panama Canal and annex Greenland from Denmark under an implicit threat of military force.

    While the change in presidential administration is purely superficial, the intense urgency it pursues continuity of agenda with is not. It reflects the rapid rise of China, Russian resilience in the face of US proxy war in Ukraine, and an expanding multipolar world overwriting the US-led unipolar world order at ever-increasing speeds.

    The post US Seizing Panama And Greenland Aimed At China appeared first on PopularResistance.Org.

    This post was originally published on PopularResistance.Org.