The Chinese military held a new combat readiness exercise around a flashpoint with the Philippines in the South China Sea, its Southern Theater Command said, adding to a number of such exercises that Beijing has been conducting in the region.
The command on Thursday “organized naval and air forces to carry out combat readiness patrols in the territorial waters and airspace of China’s Huangyan Island and surrounding areas,” it said in a statement, referring to the disputed Scarborough Shoal by its Chinese name.
Scarborough Shoal, known in the Philippines as Bajo de Masinloc, has served as a traditional fishing ground for generations of local fishermen. It lies well inside Manila’s exclusive economic zone, just 125 nautical miles (232 kilometers) from the main island of Luzon.
China, however, claims historical rights over the shoal as it is inside the so-called nine-dash line it displays on its maps. Vessels from both countries have been confronting each other here.
Since the beginning of the month, Southern Command’s troops have been holding drills around the shoal in order to “further strengthen the control of relevant sea and air areas, resolutely defend national sovereignty, and security and resolutely maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea,” it added.
The Chinese military also released a video clip depicting Thursday’s combat patrol, in which at least two warships and several aircraft, including fighter jets and bombers, were seen operating in the Scarborough area.
The Philippine military has yet to react to the Chinese patrols.
Chinese military aircraft during the combat patrol over Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea on Feb. 27, 2025.(PLA Southern Theater Command)
Last week, Manila accused a Chinese military helicopter of flying dangerously within 3 meters (10 feet) of a Philippine aircraft over the shoal, saying the “reckless action posed a serious risk to the safety” of the Filipino pilots and passengers.
China ramping up military operations
Also on Thursday, the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA,- completed a four-day live-fire exercise in the Gulf of Tonkin, territory shared with Vietnam. The exercise was announced just as Hanoi released a map of territorial borders in the gulf.
On Wednesday, Beijing unilaterally and unexpectedly designated an area for live-fire shooting just 40 nautical miles (74 kilometers) from the Taiwanese port city of Kaohsiung, prompting the island’s military to immediately dispatch naval, air and land forces while condemning the move.
Taiwan’s ministry of defense on Friday said Beijing “has been escalating its military threats,” and has become “the biggest troublemaker” in the Indo-Pacific.
The live-fire shooting has yet to take place, but analysts warned against the dangerous practice of conducting military exercises without giving notice. A similar incident happened last weekend in the waters between Australia and New Zealand.
China’s frigate Sanya (574) during the combat patrol at Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea on Feb. 27, 2025.(PLA Southern Theater Command)
“The live-fire exercises were a display to show that China’s military forces could cut off the air and sea links between Australia and New Zealand at any time, with no warning,” wrote Anne-Marie Brady, a professor at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand.
They were “a demonstration of China’s growing sea power in the Southwest Pacific and meant to normalize the PLA presence there,” Brady wrote in The Diplomat.
The past week’s exercises around the region are a clear example of saber-rattling, according to regional specialist Carl Thayer, an emeritus professor at Australia’s University of New South Wales.
“Given China’s continued bullying of the Philippines, Beijing is sending a message to regional states as well as the Trump administration that it will defend its sovereign rights and interests whenever they are challenged,” he told Radio Free Asia.
Edited by Mike Firn.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Staff.
China still has more than half a million Uyghurs in prisons or detention centers and has expanded its repression of the ethnic group, a new report says, despite Beijing’s assurances that the northwestern region of Xinjiang has returned to normalcy.
Another 3 million Uyghurs were subjected to forced labor in 2023, according to the 30-page report by the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington.
Using Chinese state documents, satellite imagery, survivor testimony and findings from recent academic publications, researchers concluded that between 2022 and 2024, China continued all its main repressive policies, including those that led the United States to conclude that China was imposing a genocide on the Uyghur people.
“In some cases, such as mass detention, the institutional forms of the policy have changed without substantially changing their effects, while in others, such as forced labor and the transfer of Turkic minority children to Han care in residential schools, the repressive actions have expanded,” the report says.
The report outlines nine key findings, including an estimate that the current number of Turkic minority individuals in prisons or extrajudicial internment likely exceeds half a million, though it could be higher.
New type of internment
Additionally, as China closed its so-called vocational training centers, it increased the use of another type of internment facility known as kanshousuo — nominally jails for temporary, pretrial detention and interrogation.
A Uyghur detention facility in Artux, capital of Kizilsu Prefecture in China’s northwestern Xinjiang region, July 19, 2023.(Pedro Pardo/AFP)
Many of those who had been interned in the camps have been moved into forced labor or into the formal prison system, said Rian Thum, the report’s author.
“The other element of significance is that the Chinese state has continued to produce evidence and share online evidence for what they’re doing,” Thum told RFA. “So, we have now very recent evidence that these activities are ongoing.”
The report’s other findings are:
The annual rate of new formal imprisonments has surpassed levels seen before the initiation of the Strike Hard campaign in 2014, which is still ongoing. However, despite somewhat unreliable government data, it appears these rates have significantly decreased, nearing those of other provinces.
The number of assimilationist boarding schools for Uyghur and other Turkic children continues to grow, with the aim of enrolling 100% of the middle-school population. New facilities are either under construction or in the bidding process.
Population growth in the region has continued to decline, dropping to nearly zero growth in 2021 and 2022, according to recent government statistics, amid strict birth control policies targeting minority groups.
Forced labor programs for Turkic minorities have expanded further, with close to 3 million individuals placed in forced labor assignments in 2023.
The government is rapidly increasing the number of state-run nursing homes, aiming to triple the number of facilities available to care for elderly people separated from their families on account of the forced labor program.
State-led land appropriation has risen as part of efforts to push farmers into industrial labor camps.
Visible surveillance and police checkpoints have decreased.
A view of a Uyghur cemetery in Yengisar county of Kashgar Prefecture in northwestern China’s Xinjiang region, July 19, 2023.(Pedro Pardo/AFP)
“That does not include surveillance that people cannot immediately see or experience, for example, some kinds of digital surveillance,” Ryan Thum, the report’s author, told RFA. “But in terms of controls on everyday movement checkpoints, these kinds of highly visible, highly disruptive surveillance seem to have seemed to have decreased.”
Accusations of whitewashing
Human rights organizations and Uyghur advocacy groups have criticized China for attempting to whitewash the ongoing atrocities in Xinjiang by organizing scripted tours for diplomats and select individuals, showcasing Uyghurs living seemingly happy lives.
“We know from history that perpetrators will go to great lengths to try to hide the evidence of their crimes,” said Naomi Kikoler, director of the Simon-Skjodt Center.
“We also know that they will evolve their techniques to enable them to continue to perpetrate mass atrocities without the international attention,” she said. “This is what the Chinese government has, and continues to do.”
The report came after a decision by a nonbinding Uyghur Tribunal in December 2021 that China had committed genocide against the Uyghurs via birth control and forced sterilization measures, as well as found evidence of crimes against humanity, torture and sexual abuse of Uyghurs in re-education camps.
Additionally, several Western governments and parliaments, including the United States, declared that the atrocities amounted to crimes against humanity or genocide.
Armed Chinese paramilitary police patrol a street in Urumqi, capital of northwestern China’s Xinjiang region, May 23, 2014.(GOH CHAI HIN/AFP)
“In their totality, the policies described in this report threaten to erase Turkic minority cultures and lifeways, interrupt cultural transmission across generations, dispossess indigenous populations, reduce the proportion of minority populations in the region, break apart families, and subordinate survivors to Han Chinese colonial goals,” the report concludes.
“Evidence from the last two years suggests that the state’s progress toward these ends continues, at the cost of immense suffering for millions of members of the targeted groups.”
To address the repressive measures, the U.S. Congress must maintain its broad bipartisan backing for Uyghurs in Xinjiang, Kikoler told Radio Free Asia.
“Policymakers can’t take their eye off of the grave threats facing the Uyghur and other Turkic communities,” she said. “Congress needs to sustain its strong bipartisan support for the Uyghurs.”
“China’s efforts to deceive can’t be allowed to succeed,” she said. “The existence of the Uyghur community is at risk.”
Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Uyghar and Alim Seytoff for RFA Uyghur.
BANGKOK – Thailand deported at least 40 Uyghurs to China on Thursday, ignoring calls from the U.S., the U.N. and rights groups not to send back the men, who had been detained in Thailand for more than a decade, because of the risk of torture.
The deportation was shrouded in secrecy and Thai officials declined to comment on it.
China’s state run CCTV confirmed it hours later.
“Today, 40 Chinese illegal immigrants were repatriated from Thailand. The repatriation was carried out in accordance with the laws of China and Thailand, international law and international practice,” CCTV reported.
It did not identify those deported as Uyghurs and it was not clear why the broadcaster reported 40 people were deported when Thailand has been holding 48 Uyghurs, most of them in a Bangkok immigration center.
China’s Ministry of Public Security did not give a number for how many people had been returned.
“The Chinese citizens repatriated this time were deceived by criminal organizations and illegally left the country and then stranded in Thailand,” the ministry said, adding that their legal rights were “fully protected.”
Earlier, human rights activists and a Thai media outlet reported that several trucks, some with windows blocked with sheets of black plastic, left Bangkok’s main immigration detention center after 2 a.m. and headed north towards the city’s Don Mueang airport.
An elevated highway to the airport was blocked off to other traffic as the trucks passed, said a human right activist.
Media later cited a flight tracker app as showing a chartered China Southern Airlines flight left Don Mueang at 4.48 a.m. The app did not give the flight’s destination but it later showed it had landed in the Xinjiang region.
“I think they are gone,” Chalida Tajaroensuk, director at People’s Empowerment Foundation, who had been assisting the Uyghurs, told Radio Free Asia.
The men from the mostly Muslim minority from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China have been held at Thailand’s Immigration Detention Center since 2014, after attempting to escape Beijing’s persecution through Thailand.
A rights group said in early January that reports from the detained men indicated that Thai authorities were preparing to deport them but Thailand dismissed the concerns and said there was no plan to send them to China.
A U.S. State Department spokesperson said on Wednesday that the U.S. was deeply concerned about reports the 48 were about to be deported and it called on Thailand to respect the principle of non-refoulement – or not deporting people to places where they risk torture and other abuse – and to uphold its international obligations.
Opposition lawmaker Kannavee Suebsang said the government had questions to answer.
“What is the Thai government doing? The prime minister must answer to the people urgently,” Kannavee said in a post on Facebook after the rights activists reported the trucks leaving the Bangkok detention center.
“There must not be Uyghur deportation to face persecution. They were jailed for 11 years. We violated their human rights for too long. There must be a better way out.”
Government spokesman Jirayu Huangsap said the police had not informed the government of any deportation.
“I don’t know about this matter and cannot confirm it,” Jirayu told BenarNews. “The Royal Thai Police will have to report to the government. So far, there has been no report, so I don’t know if it is true or false.”
Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra was equally guarded when asked at parliament to confirm the repatriation.
“I haven’t talked about this in detail yet,” she said, adding, “Any countries’ actions have to be consistent with rule of law, international protocol and human rights.”
Human Rights Watch said the situation was “very concerning”.
“It has been 48 hours since we’ve been able to contact the Uyghurs in detention,” Sunai Phasuk, senior Thailand researcher at Human Rights Watch, told BenarNews.
“There are no answers from the Immigration Bureau to the government. The silence from the operational level officers all the way to the prime minister is unusually surprising.”
A Thai court has been considering a petition filed by a Thai lawyer for the men to be freed. It said last week it saw merit in the petition and had asked for more information from authorities and scheduled the next hearing for March 27.
“Thailand has laws preventing people from being sent back to face danger,” Sunai said, referring to a 2022 law on the prevention of torture that contained a provision on non-refoulment
“If they really send the Uyghurs back to China, it means the government is not only violating international law but also its own domestic laws,” he said.
Thai immigration department trucks, with windows covered, leave the main immigration detention center in Bangkok on Feb. 27. 2025.(Natthaphon Meksophon/BenarNews)
The 48 were part of a cohort of more than 350 Uyghur men, women and children, who left China in the hope of finding resettlement abroad and were stopped in Thailand.
Uyghurs in China’s vast Xinjiang region have been subjected to widespread human rights abuses, including detention in massive concentration camps. Beijing denies that.
Turkey did accept 172 of them while Thailand sent 109 of them back to China in 2015, triggering a storm of international criticism for the decision.
Thailand had in recent weeks brushed off the concern of rights groups that the Uyghurs being held would also be deported. U.N. experts on Jan. 21 urged the kingdom not to repatriate them saying they would likely face torture in China.
Edited by Taejun Kang and Mike Firn.
Nontarat Phaicharoen and Jon Preechawong in Bangkok contributed to this report.
BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated news service.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Kunnawut Boonreak for BenarNews and Pimuk Rakkanam for RFA.
Prime Minister Mark Brown has survived a motion in the Cook Islands Parliament aimed at ousting his government, the second Pacific Island leader to face a no-confidence vote this week.
In a vote yesterday afternoon (Tuesday, Cook Islands time), the man who has been at the centre of controversy in the past few weeks, defeated the motion by 13 votes to 9. Two government ministers were absent for the vote.
The motion was put forward by the opposition MP Teariki Heather, the leader of the Cook Islands United Party.
“These are the merits that I am presenting before this House. We have the support of our people and those living outside the country, and so it is my challenge. Where do you stand in this House?” Heather said.
Brown said his country has been so successful in its development in recent years that it graduated to first world status in 2020.
‘Engage on equal footing’
“We need to stand on our own two feet, and we need to engage with our partners on an equal footing,” he said.
“Economic and financial independence must come first before political independence, and that was what I discussed and made clear when I met with the New Zealand prime minister and deputy prime minister in Wellington in November.”
Brown said the issues Cook Islanders faced today were not just about passports and agreements but about Cook Islands expressing its self-determination.
“This is not about consultation. This is about control.”
“We cannot compete with New Zealand. When their one-sided messaging is so compelling that even our opposition members will be swayed.
“We never once talked to the New Zealand government about cutting our ties with New Zealand but the message our people received was that we were cutting our ties with New Zealand.
“We have been discussing the comprehensive partnership with New Zealand for months. But the messaging that got out is that we have not consulted.
Cook Islands PM accuses NZ media, experts of thinking ‘we are too dumb’ https://t.co/ADrWN4Yjp9
‘We are not a child’
“We are a partner in the relationship with New Zealand. We are not a child.”
He said the motion of no confidence had been built on misinformation to the extent that the mover of the motion has stated publicly that he was moving this motion in support of New Zealand.
“The influence of New Zealand in this motion of no confidence should be of concern to all Cook Islands who value . . . who value our country.
“My job is not to fly the New Zealand flag. My job is to fly my own country’s flag.”
Last week, hundreds of Cook Islanders opposing Brown’s political decisions rallied in Avarua, demanding that he step down for damaging the relationship between Aotearoa and Cook Islands.
The Cook Islands is a self-governing state in free association with New Zealand. It is part of the Realm of New Zealand, sharing the same Head of State.
This year, the island marks its 60th year of self-governance.
According to Cook Islands 2021 Census, its population is less than 15,000.
New Zealand remains the largest home to the Cook Islands community, with over 80,000 Cook Islands Māori, while about 28,000 live in Australia.
This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.
Authorities in central China have banned doctors working for online clinics from using AI to prescribe medication to patients, according to several media reports.
“Online healthcare providers must be connected to the provincial medical insurance electronic prescription center and circulate electronic prescriptions in accordance with regulations,” health authorities in Hunan province said in a statement dated Feb. 25.
“It is strictly prohibited to use artificial intelligence and other automated methods to generate prescriptions,” it said.
The ban comes as healthcare providers around the country rush to embrace DeepSeek and other homegrown AI tools, potentially eroding trust in an already corrupt healthcare system.
Under current regulations, doctors in China are allowed to use AI tools to aid them in their work, including reading medical images, organizing data and formulating treatment plans, AI Hospital Operation and Management Research Institute director Wei Zining told the Chengdu Business Daily newspaper on Feb. 23.
“It’s hard to say how things will be in 100 years’ time, but [for now], AI is only allowed to assist doctors, not replace them,” Wei said.
Doctors working for online prescribing services must also undergo real-name authentication before seeing patients, to ensure that the medical services are provided by them alone, and are banned from using human or AI substitutes, the paper said.
State media have published a slew of recent reports about healthcare providers who use China’s newly emerging homegrown generative AI tools, including DeepSeek, in their treatment of patients.
The Fuyang People’s Hospital in the eastern province of Anhui announced on Feb. 21 it would be using DeepSeek to “analyze cases, discover potential patterns of disease, and to assist in optimizing diagnosis and treatment plans,” according to a report published on the Anhui provincial government website.
‘Consultation guidance system’
The model is also being used to carry out medical triage and signposting, the article said.
“The DeepSeek consultation guidance system can understand the symptoms described by patients through natural language processing technology, recommend appropriate departments and doctors, and provide the best appointment options based on doctor schedules and patient time preferences,” it said.
The ban comes as state media outlets including state broadcaster CCTV have been quick to laud the use of AI in medical settings.
“Patients only need to open our hospital’s WeChat official account and ask in voice or text, ‘What should I do if I have stomach pain?’ or ‘Which department should I go to for a headache?,’ and AI can quickly give thoughtful advice and medical guidance,” it quoted Fu Qihua, deputy director of Sichuan Provincial People’s Hospital as saying.
“Some automated tasks, like intelligent medical guidance, drug distribution and other repetitive and mechanical nursing tasks, are being replaced by automated systems,” Kang Dan, a nurse at the Huaihua No. 2 People’s Hospital, told the station.
“Be we also need to be particularly vigilant about issues such as nursing ethics, nursing data security and patient privacy protection,” Kang said.
China’s recent advances in AI and big data, including its recently launched DeepSeek AI model, will also likely boost the government’s surveillance capabilities, given its widespread access to personal and private data on its citizens, according to Feb. 11 report from the Washington-based National Endowment for Democracy.
Translated with additional reporting by Luisetta Mudie. Edited by Malcolm Foster.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Cantonese.
TAIPEI, Taiwan – China has set up a live-fire exercise area 40 nautical miles (75 kilometers) off the coast of the Taiwan port city of Kaohsiung without warning in a provocation to the region’s security that posed a risk to air and sea transport, Taiwan’s ministry of defense said Wednesday.
It said Beijing “blatantly violated international norms by unilaterally designating” the drill zone.
It strongly condemned the zone and said in a statement it had “immediately dispatched naval, air and land forces to monitor and take appropriate measures” after learning of it via “temporary radio broadcast” between the two sides in the area.
As a normal practice, relevant authorities of coastal countries are obliged to issue prior warnings to vessels that may enter the exercise areas in order to avoid accidents.
“This move not only poses a high risk to the navigation safety of international flights and ships at sea, but is also a blatant provocation to regional security and stability,” it said.
Aircraft of the Eastern Theater Command of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army conduct a joint combat training exercises around Taiwan, Aug. 7, 2022.(Li Bingyu/AP)
The Taiwan ministry also said that in the 24 hours up to Wednesday morning, it had detected 32 sorties by Chinese aircraft and warships near Taiwan. Twenty-two of them crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait which serves as the de-facto border between the island and the Chinese mainland.
On Tuesday, the Taiwan Coast Guard detained a Chinese crewed civilian vessel it suspected of cutting a communications cable off Taiwan’s coast. The island’s government said it couldn’t rule out that the Togo-registered tanker was engaging in “gray zone” tactics for Beijing.
The Chinese foreign ministry on Wednesday declined to comment on the zone for exercises off Taiwan.
China has been holding live-fire exercises across the region over the past week.
On Monday, it began shooting live ammunition in a four-day drill in the Gulf of Tonkin shared with Vietnam, days after Hanoi released a map defining its territory in the gulf.
A screen shows news footage of military drills conducted in the Taiwan Strait and areas to the north, south and east of Taiwan, by the Eastern Theatre Command of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, in Beijing, China October 14, 2024.(Tingshu Wang/Reuters)
Last Friday, several commercial flights between Australia and New Zealand had to be diverted as Chinese warships conducted live-fire shooting in the Tasman sea. The same flotilla held another exercise a day after near New Zealand.
Both drills were held in international waters but Canberra complained that Beijing did not provide it with adequate notice.
On Sunday, China’s defense ministry spokesperson Wu Qian said that Australian complaints were “hyped up” and “inconsistent with the facts”.
The past week’s exercises around the region are a clear example of saber rattling according to regional specialist Carl Thayer, an emeritus professor at Australia’s University of New South Wales.
“Given China’s continued bullying of the Philippines, Beijing is sending a message to regional states as well as the Trump Administration that Beijing will defend its sovereign rights and interests whenever they are challenged,” he told Radio Free Asia.
Edited by Mike Firn.
Updated with comment from Carl Thayer.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Staff.
TAIPEI, Taiwan – Hong Kong plans to eliminate 10,000 civil service jobs and freeze public sector salaries as part of an effort to curb a growing fiscal deficit, its top finance official announced on Wednesday, as the city grapples with its third year of budget shortfalls.
Hong Kong’s deficit for the fiscal year ending in March 2025 stands at an estimated HK$87.2 billion (US$11.2 billion), following deficits of HK$122 billion in 2022/23 and HK$101.6 billion the previous year.
Hong Kong Financial Secretary Paul Chan outlined in his 2025 budget speech on Wednesday measures to address the financial challenges, including a 7% reduction in government spending over the next three years.
As part of the initiative, the government will cut 10,000 civil service positions by April 2027, representing a 2% workforce reduction per year over the next two years, said Chan.
“The spending cut will establish a sustainable fiscal foundation for future development,” said Chan. “It provides a clear pathway toward restoring fiscal balance in the operating account in a planned and progressive manner.”
Chan added he had also instructed all government bureaus and departments to reassess resource allocation and work priorities. He emphasized the need for streamlining procedures, consolidating resources and leveraging technology to deliver public services more effectively.
Challenges after National Security Law
Since the introduction of a National Security Law in 2020, in response to sometimes violent pro-democracy protests the year before, Hong Kong’s economy has faced mounting challenges, including U.S. and Western sanctions, capital outflows, and shifts in investor confidence.
Gross domestic product contracted by 6.1% in 2020 before rebounding to 6.4% in 2021, but growth has since slowed to 3.2% in 2023 and 2.5% in 2024.
The real estate sector has been hit hard, with property prices dropping nearly 30%, significantly reducing government revenue from land sales, which once contributed over 20% but now make up only about 5%.
The city’s financial sector has remained a cornerstone of its economy, attracting Chinese company listings.
In 2024, funds raised through initial public offerings, or IPOs, in Hong Kong more than doubled in the first three quarters, despite a global downturn in IPO activity. This surge is attributed to market efficiency improvements and enhanced access to mainland financial markets.
However, the landscape has shifted, with multinationals increasingly reconsidering their presence in the city. Western banks play a diminished role in major IPOs, leading to layoffs and a strategic pivot towards wealth management over investment banking – a trend reflecting Hong Kong’s closer alignment with Beijing and a retreat of Western financial players.
The retail and tourism sectors, once vital to the city’s economy, have faced significant challenges due to pandemic restrictions and a decline in mainland Chinese visitors.
In November 2024, retail sales fell by 7.3% year-on-year, marking the ninth consecutive month of decline. Notably, 53% of mainland visitors were day-trippers, spending about HK$1,400 each – 42% less than in 2018.
Edited by Mike Firn.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Taejun Kang for RFA.
TAIPEI, Taiwan – Taiwan’s coastguard detained a cargo ship and its Chinese crew after an undersea cable in the Taiwan Strait was damaged on Tuesday, saying it cannot rule out the possibility it was a deliberate “gray zone” act.
Gray zone activities are covert, ambiguous, and low-intensity tactics used to achieve strategic goals without provoking open warfare, something Taiwan has frequently said China was employing around the self-ruled island.
Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration, or CGA, said that it received a report about the damaged cable from its telecommunication service on Tuesday morning and dispatched personnel to detain the Chinese-crewed Hong Tai 58, registered in Togo, which dropped anchor near the cable off the southwestern coast of Taiwan around the time it was disconnected.
“The suspected Togo-flagged cargo ship, Hong Tai, was found to be a Chinese-invested convenience-flag vessel with all eight crew members being Chinese nationals,” said CGA.
The Hong Tai remained stationary near the damaged Taiwan-Penghu No.3 submarine cable from Saturday to Tuesday, prompting Taiwan’s coast guard to monitor and attempt radio contact, which went unanswered, according to CGA.
The vessel was later escorted to Anping Port, though initial boarding efforts failed due to rough seas, the coastguard said, adding that the case was being treated as a national security matter.
“Authorities are not ruling out the possibility of a Chinese gray-zone operation,” the agency said.
Lin Jian, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, told a briefing on Tuesday that he was not aware of the situation, though adding that it was not a “diplomatic issue.” He did not elaborate.
Taiwan has reported five cases of sea cable malfunctions this year, compared with three each in 2024 and 2023.
In 2023, for instance, two undersea cables connecting the Matsu islands were cut, disconnecting the internet.
At that time, Taiwan authorities said that two Chinese vessels caused the disruption, but that there was no evidence Beijing deliberately tampered with the cables.
Taiwan has repeatedly accused China of employing gray zone tactics to destabilize the region without direct military conflict, citing Chinese military incursions, cyberattacks, economic coercion, election interference and undersea cable damage.
Beijing regards Taiwan as its territory while the democratic island has been self-governing since it effectively separated from mainland China in 1949 after the Chinese Civil War.
Taipei has condemned Beijing’s trade restrictions on the island’s exports and suspected disinformation campaigns ahead of elections, warning of growing threats to regional security.
China, however, denies these accusations, asserting that its military activities are routine operations and that economic measures are based on regulatory concerns. Beijing insists Taiwan is a domestic issue and warns against foreign interference, maintaining that its actions are lawful and necessary to safeguard national sovereignty.
Edited by Taejun Kang.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Alan Lu for RFA.
TAIPEI, Taiwan – Chinese fishing vessels used North Korean forced labor, keeping workers at sea for up to a decade, a U.K.-based non-governmental organization said, potentially in breach of U.N. sanctions.
United Nations member states are subject to strict sanctions prohibiting the use of North Korean labor. Enforced by the U.N. Security Council, these measures are intended to curb Pyongyang’s practice of exporting labor and goods to finance its weapons programs.
But the Environmental Justice Foundation, or EJF, said in its report on Monday that at least 12 Chinese deep-water fishing vessels employed North Korean crew between 2019 and 2024 in the Indian Ocean.
The group cited Indonesian and Philippine workers who had worked on Chinese fishing boats as saying some North Korean crew were kept at sea for up to a decade, transferred from vessel to vessel and often temporarily transferred to other ships to avoid being detected at foreign ports, with their salary given to their government.
“This indicates that vessel captains, and likely vessel owners, were aware that the use of this labour was prohibited,” said the rights group.
Mauritian authorities in 2022 reportedly detained six North Korean workers when a Chinese fishing vessel docked at Port Louis, the group said.
Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2397 adopted in 2017, member states were required to repatriate all North Koreans earning income within their jurisdiction by December 2019.
Another crew member testified to having worked with North Koreans who “had never stepped foot on land for eight years.”
“Concerted efforts were made to hide the presence of North Koreans on these vessels, and that those North Koreans on board were forced to work for as many as 10 years at sea, in some instances without ever stepping foot on land,” the group said, citing testimony from other crewmen.
The North Koreans described in the EJF report were likely sent to work on the boats by their government, which is one of several forms of forced labour which the U.N. office of the human rights high commissioner says has become “deeply institutionalized” in the closed-off authoritarian country.
The group also said that North Korean workers were not allowed to contact their families.
“They never communicated with their wives or others while at sea as they were not allowed to bring a mobile phone,” one interviewee told EJF.
Lin Jian, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, said on Thursday that he was “not familiar with” the report.
“Let me say more broadly that China all along carries out offshore fishing in accordance with laws and regulations. China’s relevant cooperation with the DPRK is conducted within the framework of international law,” Lin told a regular briefing. He did not elaborate.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK, is North Korea’s official name.
A Chinese flag flutters on a fishing boat while a China Coast Guard patrols at the disputed Scarborough Shoal, April 5, 2017.(Erik De Castro/Reuters)
China operates the world’s largest deep-sea fishing fleet, with thousands of vessels operating in international waters and along the coasts of other nations.
The fleet has faced widespread criticism for exploitative practices, including the use of forced labor, human trafficking, and inhumane working conditions.
Reports from international media and human rights organizations have documented cases of crew members, often from developing countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, being subjected to long working hours, withheld wages, physical abuse, and even fatalities due to harsh conditions at sea.
The fleet has also been accused of engaging in illegal fishing practices, depleting marine resources, and violating the sovereignty of other nations’ waters. Despite mounting scrutiny, regulatory oversight remains weak, and many abuses go unchecked.
Despite international sanctions prohibiting their employment, China remains one of the primary destinations for North Korean workers
Tens of thousands are reportedly employed in Chinese factories, seafood processing plants, and textile industries, often under exploitative conditions.
These workers, whose wages are largely funneled back to the North Korean regime, are subjected to strict surveillance, poor living conditions, and limited freedom of movement.
Human rights organizations have raised concerns over forced labor, excessive working hours, and wage confiscation, highlighting violations of U.N. sanctions.
Edited by Mike Firn.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Taejun Kang for RFA.
The Donald Trump administration is holding talks between the United States and Russia, and he says he wants to end the war in Ukraine.
Trump’s Secretary of State Marco Rubio has even proposed that the US could “partner with the Russians, geopolitically”.
What is happening here? The simple answer is that this is all about China.
Trump is trying to divide Russia from China, in an attempt to isolate Beijing.
The United States sees China as the number one threat to its global dominance. This has been stated clearly by top officials in both the Trump administration and the previous Joe Biden administration.
TAIPEI, Taiwan – Taiwan barred the island’s universities from collaborating with three mainland Chinese institutions, citing their ties with Beijing’s overseas propaganda arm, in what Taiwan opposition lawmakers said was a blow to cross-strait exchanges that have historically served as a bridge for dialogue despite geopolitical rifts.
China and Taiwan have maintained educational exchanges, despite political and military tensions, allowing students and scholars from both sides to participate in academic collaborations, research projects and university partnerships.
But on Thursday, Taiwan banned its universities from working with China’s Jinan University in the city of Guangzhou, Huaqiao University in Xiamen and Quanzhou, and Beijing Chinese Language and Culture College, citing their ties with the United Front Work Department.
“Chinese universities affiliated with the United Front Work Department serve a political purpose rather than a purely academic one,” said Taiwan’s Minister of Education Cheng Ying-yao.
The United Front Work Departmen is a key arm of the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP, that conducts influence operations, propaganda and political engagement globally. It works to shape narratives, co-opt elites, and extend Beijing’s reach into academia, media, and diaspora communities.
Critics, including Taipei, accuse it of covert interference, disinformation, and suppressing dissent, with several governments warning of its role in election meddling, intellectual property theft, and undermining democratic institutions.
“To prevent political influence operations we must halt cooperation and exchanges,” Cheng added.
The ban drew criticism from Taiwan’s main opposition Kuomintang, or KMT, which criticized it as “politically motivated” and “detrimental” to cross-strait exchanges.
“Students from over 80 countries attend these universities. It is shortsighted for the DPP to isolate Taiwan academically,” KMT legislative Fu Kun-chi said, referring to the island’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party.
KMT chairman Eric Chu Li-luan also said the policy would do more damage to Taiwan’s higher education sector.
“Academic cooperation should be based on international accreditation, not political considerations,” Chu said. “The DPP is using this as part of its broader political strategy for 2025, creating division instead of fostering engagement.”
A DPP legislator, Wu Szu-yao, however, defended the ban, comparing it to the global shutdown of Confucius Institutes due to similar concerns over Chinese influence.
Confucius Institutes are Chinese-funded language and cultural centers, which have drawn suspicion around the world of Chinese propaganda and influence. The U.S., Europe and Australia have closed many of the institutes, citing threats to academic freedom and security.
“Taiwan has never restricted normal academic and cultural exchanges, as long as they are free from official influence. But these schools, being under the United Front Work Department control, inherently serve political purposes and follow political directives,” Wu said.
Taiwanese students have long pursued degrees in Chinese universities, drawn by lower tuition fees, scholarship opportunities, and career prospects in the mainland.
Chinese students also study in Taiwan, though in smaller numbers due to political restrictions. Universities from both sides have established joint research programs and academic agreements, facilitating faculty collaboration and student mobility.
But exchanges have not been immune to political influence. China has at times limited the number of its students permitted to study in Taiwan, citing political concerns, while Taipei has imposed tighter regulations on Chinese scholars and researchers due to security considerations.
Cross-strait relations under Taiwan’s pro-independence leadership have further strained the programs, leading to a decline in Chinese enrollment in Taiwan. The COVID-19 pandemic also disrupted exchanges, though some academic collaboration has resumed.
China sees Taiwan as a breakaway province that must eventually reunite, even by force if necessary. Beijing views the island’s leader, Lai Ching-te, a pro-independence advocate, as a separatist and has increased military drills, economic pressure and diplomatic isolation to counter his leadership.
Edited by Taejun Kang.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Alan Lu for RFA.
The Chinese military has announced a live-fire exercise in an area in the Gulf of Tonkin from Monday to Thursday this week, warning ships not to enter the zone.
The warning came as Vietnam issued a formal map defining the baseline to demarcate its territory in the gulf. Though neither side linked their action to that of the other, it was unlikely to be a coincidence, some observers said.
China’s exercise comes amid the latest wrangle between the neighbors over Vietnam’s island building in the Spratly archipelago in the South China Sea.
A baseline under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, is the line that runs along the coast of a country, from which the extent of the territorial sea and other maritime zones is measured.
In March 2024 China released its baseline in the northern part of the Gulf of Tonkin, deemed by analysts as “excessive.” Radio Free Asia was the first media outlet to report in April 2024 that Vietnam was considering its own baseline amid concern that China may seek to expand its maritime zones.
(RFA)
The Chinese baseline at some points encroaches about 50 nautical miles (93 kilometers) into international waters, according to analysts.
The U.S. military, which promotes freedom of navigation across the world, criticized China’s baseline, saying it may provide a pretext for China to “unlawfully impede navigational rights and freedoms guaranteed to all nations, including transit passage through the Hainan Strait.”
Chinese drills not ‘a pure coincidence’
“The establishment of the baseline in the Gulf of Tonkin aims to uphold Vietnam’s rights and obligations,” the Vietnamese foreign ministry said in a statement, “It provides a robust legal basis for safeguarding and exercising Vietnam’s sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction.”
China has yet to comment on its neighbor’s announcement but some Vietnam watchers said China’s live-fire drills appeared to be a response to Vietnam’s baseline.
“Although the exercise area off northwest Hainan island is relatively far from Vietnam’s waters, the timing seems too close to be a pure coincidence,” said Song Phan, a maritime researcher.
The new baseline that runs along Vietnam’s coast “conforms strictly to UNCLOS unlike the Chinese baseline,” he said.
Hanoi and Beijing in 2000 signed a Delimitation Agreement to demarcate their shares of the gulf from the mainland of Vietnam and China in the North to the mouth of the gulf in the South.
The two countries, however, have yet to renegotiate a joint fishery cooperation agreement in the Gulf of Tonkin after the old one expired in 2020.
Edited by Mike Firn.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Staff.
Admiral Alvin Hosley demonstrated selective outrage over the fear of multipolarity in the Western Hemisphere. The Southcom commander confirmed the official US military doctrine for the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region on February 13, before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
In a poorly disguised assertion of US hegemony, Hosley envisioned, “an enduring commitment to democratic principles…to engender security, capability, democratic norms, and resilience that fuel regional peace, prosperity, and sovereignty.”
Threats to the vision of a Pax Americana
Foremost of the “threats to this vision” is the “methodical incursion into the region” by China, secondarily by Russia, and a distant third by Iran.
Hosley charged China with a “long-term global campaign to become the world’s dominant strategic power in the Western Hemisphere” and Russia with continuing support for “anti-American authoritarian regimes” and spreading “misinformation throughout the region.” Meanwhile, the “theocratic regime” in Iran, “seeks to build political, military, and economic clout in Latin America… where it believes cooperation is achievable.”
These “malign actions,” Holsey argued, run against US national interests, threaten our sovereignty, and pose a “global risk.” Not questioned, of course, is the US presence in the region as part of Washington’s official “full spectrum [world] dominance” posture.
Rather, he lauded US regional military programs: acquisitions of F-16s by Argentina and Black Hawk helicopters by Brazil, the International Military Education and Training program spanning 27 regional countries, and the Joint Exercise Program with over 10,000 participants from 38 countries.
Unlike the US with 76 regional military bases, neither China nor Russia has formal alliances, joint command structures, or large-scale military agreements in the region. In contrast, Colombia is a NATO “global partner,” Argentina and Brazil are “major non-NATO Allies,” and Chile is a key cooperator with NATO. The US is making Guyana a military hotspot, while the US occupation of Cuba with the Guantánamo naval base is rendered invisible.
Hosley also cited humanitarian assistance as “an essential soft power tool,” later adding “with empathy and compassion at the forefront.”
“Erosion of democratic capitalism”
The admiral’s double-speak continued with the claim that the Western Hemisphere suffers from an “erosion of democratic capitalism, which in too many countries is being replaced by…authoritarianism.” Not mentioned is the recent US support of Bukele in El Salvador, Bolsonaro in Brazil, Moreno, Lasso and Noboa in Ecuador, Boluarte in Peru, Añez in Bolivia, Uribe and Duque in Colombia, or Milei in Argentina.
China is accused of interfering in “our south,” a new euphemism of “our backyard,” but with the same chauvinistic implications. Hosley testified that Chinese presence “at strategic chokepoints such as the Panama Canal imperil the US’s ability to rapidly respond in the Indo-Pacific should a crisis unfold.” Might such a contingency include US military deployment to the Asia-Pacific, which has been the practice since at least 2003?
The admiral charged China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with doing what the US has consistently failed to do; namely going “beyond raw materials and commodities to include” infrastructure improvements. China accomplished becoming the region’s second major trading partner and the first specifically in South America in less than two decades, where the US had previously enjoyed nearly uncontested dominance for well over a century.
Hosley lauded the region’s abundant natural resources (20% of the world’s oil reserves, 25% of its strategic metals, etc.). That these are resources which US multinationals have been pillaging, leaving little in return, remained unstated.
Meanwhile, China is accused of chicanery by providing benevolent short-term benefits to leave regional countries “vulnerable to unsustainable debt, environmental degradation, and informational security risks.” In fact, “no country…owes Chinese creditors more than it owes other major creditor categories, including bondholders, Paris Club creditors, multilateral development banks (MDBs) or other creditors.”
And what are the security risks? Satellites for Venezuela and Bolivia? DeepSeek? Technology transfer? Millions of anti-COVID vaccines?
Outlandishly, the admiral asserted that “the malign activities, harmful influence, and autocratic philosophy of China are a direct threat to the democratic will.” In contrast, he claims the US “offers economic prosperity, sustainable development, and true partnership.” This would be laughable if it weren’t so tragically false. Consider Haiti, under US domination, where the country is in ruins and any pretence of democratic elections has long been dropped.
Predictably, Hosley also charged Russia with “malign” aims because it “seeks to undermine the US regional interests” by supporting “like-minded authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela.”
His concern with Russia’s “state-controlled media to disseminate disinformation and propaganda,” is far eclipsed by the 6,200 journalists and the 707 non-state media outlets in more than 30 countries financed by USAID. This is without mentioning the Western giant media conglomerates that overwhelmingly dominate the world’s news reporting.
Transnational criminal organizations and Russian acolytes
Hosley reported that transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) engaged in drug trafficking are connected to the “death of thousands of US citizens.” Not only that but, “TCO-driven corruption and instability open space for China, Russia, and other malign actors to achieve strategic ends and further their agendas.”
Yet, as Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum noted, organized crime and drug distribution are prevalent within the US itself, which is the largest market for illicit drugs and the source of most weapons used by the cartels to the south. She rhetorically asked: “Who is in charge of distributing the drug? Who sells it in the cities of the US?…Let them start with their country.”
Venezuela is presented as exemplifying the “devastating effects and consequences of authoritarian rule.” Citing the “widespread inability to access life-sustaining necessities” driving economic refugees from Venezuela, Hosley warned: “The large numbers of migrants transiting the region strains our Partner Nations.”
Nicaragua is accused of harbouring a global positioning system, a vaccination plant, and a police academy, all of which are collaborations with Russia, which – horrors – “enjoys the diplomatic status of an embassy.” The “repressive Ortega-Murillo regime” joined the BRI and a free trade agreement with China, including building “a massive solar power plant.”
“Instead of addressing the ongoing humanitarian crises,” the Cuban “authoritarian regime” is accused of “strengthening ties with our Strategic Competitors and adversaries.” Hypocritically, he mourns: “The long-suffering populace does not have sufficient access to medicine, food, and essential services.”
Outrageously omitted are the effects of draconian Yankee unilateral coercive measures (aka sanctions) on what Hosley calls the “ideological acolytes” of Russia. His narrative blames the victims for the severe consequences of Washington’s sanctions imposed to deliberately produce what the admiral laments.
“The challenge”
“Time is not on our side” were the possibly prescient words by the commander of Southcom to the senators about the LAC region, which is “on the front lines of a decisive and urgent contest to define the future of our world.”
This may be because the US is not prepared to accept that sovereign and independent nations enter into beneficial trade agreements about their raw materials and infrastructure and join multipolar bodies such as BRI and BRICS. The ultimate logic of US policy is to prevent the region from being part of a multipolar world. As the admiral admitted, “we have redoubled our efforts to nest military engagement with diplomatic, informational and economic initiatives.”
After nearly a decade covering China as an NPR correspondent, Emily Feng returned to Washington, D.C. Her reporting spanned a period of profound social and economic change : Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power; the Xinjiang detention camps; Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement and the crackdown against it; China’s strict zero-COVID policy; and the country’s transformation into a surveillance state.
Ultimately, Feng was caught in the crossfire of the U.S.-China rivalry — her visa was unexpectedly rejected, forcing her to relocate to Taiwan for the final years of her reporting.
Her new book, “Let Only Red Flowers Bloom,” is a reflection on the search for identity and belonging under Xi Jinping’s rule. It will be published March 18. The following interview has been edited for length and clarity.
RFA:You moved to China in 2015 at the age of 22. What was the biggest question you had, and did you find the answer?
Emily Feng: I wanted to see China for myself. I had visited family in the south a few times, but I was curious about how the country was changing, especially under Xi Jinping, who was then in his third year as leader. I wondered if China would continue opening up — economically, politically and culturally. I had just started consuming more Chinese-language culture, and I was interested in how cultural production would evolve.
The day I arrived was about a week after the July 9 crackdown on human rights lawyers. I didn’t realize it at the time, but that was a watershed moment in Chinese politics. It shaped the China I would experience over the next several years.
RFA: The July 9 crackdown shocked many. What were its lasting effects?
Emily Feng: It had systemic impacts. Many influential lawyers lost their licenses — people who had been shaping ideas about China’s legal and political future. It wasn’t just about individuals; it rippled across corporations, organizations and society as a whole.
“Let Only Red Flowers Bloom” by Emily Feng.(Penguin Random House)
RFA:Your book’s title, ‘Let Only Red Flowers Bloom,’ is a twist on Mao’s famous slogan, ‘Let a hundred flowers bloom.’ You write that a source told you, ‘That’s the state now.’ What did they mean, and why did it stay with you?
Emily Feng: The title reflects a duality. On one hand, it’s about celebrating the diversity that exists in China — different voices, perspectives and identities, along with varying views on the role of private business, ethnicity and languages beyond Mandarin Chinese. On the other hand, it reflects how the state is increasingly trying to constrain that diversity.
One of the people I interviewed told me, ‘At this point, the state only lets one color of flower bloom—red flowers.’ That quote captured the theme of my book: the tension between the natural diversity within Chinese society and the state’s efforts to control it.
RFA:You spent nearly a decade covering China. What’s the biggest shift you’ve seen?
Emily Feng: The Communist Party is much more present in everyday life. When I first moved there, political control felt more distant for many people. But over the years, the government became more involved — even in the small details of daily life. COVID-19 made that even more visible, with strict movement controls and surveillance.
I felt it in my reporting as well. When I first got there, there was concern that talking to people could get them in trouble. People needed to be anonymous for their safety. But as my years in China continued, the level of surveillance, particularly online, really intensified.
That said, I want people to know that there are still many voices in China. Despite the tightening restrictions, there are still compelling stories to tell, and I hope more journalists can continue working there.
A security guard watches from a tower at a detention facility in Yarkent county in China’s Xinjiang region on March 21, 2021.(Ng Han Guan/AP)
RFA:Were there any key moments during this period when you felt that social control was tightening?
Emily Feng: I started thinking about this issue because of what was happening in Xinjiang. In 2017, I began reporting on Xinjiang, and at first, I had only heard about the existence of some camps.
But as I continued following the story, I realized that the Xinjiang issue and the situation of the Uyghurs had much broader significance for the entire country. It wasn’t just a problem in the western region — it was connected to policies on ethnicity, identity, language and culture at the time. It also tied into a larger question of what kind of nation China and the Communist Party were trying to create. So, starting from Xinjiang as an entry point, I began to ask: Why does identity play such a central role in contemporary Chinese politics?
RFA:How did you build trust with the people you interviewed, and how did you weigh the risks, both for yourself and for them?
Emily Feng: It’s a daily conversation — with editors, with yourself, and, most importantly, with your sources. Many of my stories weren’t about government leaks; they were about personal experiences. Earning trust meant showing that I was willing to listen and making the effort to be there.
Sometimes, it took years for people to open up. One Uyghur family I interviewed, for example, only felt comfortable sharing their full story after they had processed what had happened to them. In China, I might have to spend a lot of time exploring 10 different stories, but there’s only a 20% or even just a 10% chance of success.
RFA:Did you ever face danger yourself?
Emily Feng: Yes. I was investigated for my work, and my news organization was audited as part of the U.S.-China media tensions. Many reporting trips were cut short, and interviewees were sometimes detained while I was speaking with them. People I talked to risked losing jobs or public benefits. It’s not a black-and-white situation, but it’s something I had to be aware of when reporting in China.
A worker wearing protective gear and standing behind a fence in a residential area under COVID-19 lockdown talks with a man on a scooter in the Xuhui district of Shanghai on June 16, 2022.(Hector Retamal/AFP)
RFA:Your reporting often focuses on human stories. Under Xi’s rule, how is the younger generation navigating identity?
Emily Feng: For me, identity was the central theme in all the stories I found most interesting in China. It’s also why I decided to collect many of them and write a book about it. I argue that identity is key not only to understanding this vast country, which is so important economically and geopolitically, but also to understanding how China sees itself and, consequently, what its future holds.
Every decade or so, there’s this question: What kind of country can China become? The expectations of what Chinese people thought their country would become 10 years ago — before COVID, before the economic downturn — are vastly different from what a 20-year-old in Beijing or Shanghai envisions today.
The theme of identity also allowed me to give a personal twist to these big, weighty questions that often dominate newsroom discussions. What gets lost in much of that coverage is the fact that these issues affect real people. Despite being a country so far away from the U.S., I wanted to humanize these stories, to make readers ask, ‘What if this were happening to my friend?’ I wanted to help people feel what it’s like to live in their world, because that’s what I’ve lost since leaving China — and, I think, what we’ve all lost now that there are fewer reporters on the ground in mainland China.
RFA:In this era of tighter control, how do people carve out personal or ideological space?
Emily Feng: It’s increasingly difficult. Many of the people I interviewed for the book have since left China. Some persisted for years, even decades, within the system. I tell the story of a former state prosecutor who later became a human rights lawyer. She worked inside the system for years before stepping out to fight it.
There’s a lot of resilience among people, and a good sense of survival about when to be outspoken and when to be quieter. But I think even that small degree of flexibility is disappearing. Most of the characters in the book have since left China since I wrote the first draft.
RFA:Foreign correspondents have played a crucial role in shaping global understanding of China. With fewer journalists on the ground, what do you hope your coverage conveys to readers who have never been to China?
Emily Feng: I want people to see that, at the end of the day, people are people everywhere. No matter the country or language, human nature is universal.
For me, this book is also personal. My parents were born in China, and I still have family there. I never held a Chinese passport, but I have a deep connection to the place. When I lived there, I realized I had seen only a tiny bit of it. I had seen it through my family’s eyes, through their immigration story. But there are many different versions of China, depending on who you are in China.
Edited by Boer Deng.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Jane Tang for RFA and Jeff Wang for RFA Mandarin.
After nearly a decade covering China as an NPR correspondent, Emily Feng returned to Washington, D.C. Her reporting spanned a period of profound social and economic change : Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power; the Xinjiang detention camps; Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement and the crackdown against it; China’s strict zero-COVID policy; and the country’s transformation into a surveillance state.
Ultimately, Feng was caught in the crossfire of the U.S.-China rivalry — her visa was unexpectedly rejected, forcing her to relocate to Taiwan for the final years of her reporting.
Her new book, “Let Only Red Flowers Bloom,” is a reflection on the search for identity and belonging under Xi Jinping’s rule. It will be published March 18. The following interview has been edited for length and clarity.
RFA:You moved to China in 2015 at the age of 22. What was the biggest question you had, and did you find the answer?
Emily Feng: I wanted to see China for myself. I had visited family in the south a few times, but I was curious about how the country was changing, especially under Xi Jinping, who was then in his third year as leader. I wondered if China would continue opening up — economically, politically and culturally. I had just started consuming more Chinese-language culture, and I was interested in how cultural production would evolve.
The day I arrived was about a week after the July 9 crackdown on human rights lawyers. I didn’t realize it at the time, but that was a watershed moment in Chinese politics. It shaped the China I would experience over the next several years.
RFA: The July 9 crackdown shocked many. What were its lasting effects?
Emily Feng: It had systemic impacts. Many influential lawyers lost their licenses — people who had been shaping ideas about China’s legal and political future. It wasn’t just about individuals; it rippled across corporations, organizations and society as a whole.
“Let Only Red Flowers Bloom” by Emily Feng.(Penguin Random House)
RFA:Your book’s title, ‘Let Only Red Flowers Bloom,’ is a twist on Mao’s famous slogan, ‘Let a hundred flowers bloom.’ You write that a source told you, ‘That’s the state now.’ What did they mean, and why did it stay with you?
Emily Feng: The title reflects a duality. On one hand, it’s about celebrating the diversity that exists in China — different voices, perspectives and identities, along with varying views on the role of private business, ethnicity and languages beyond Mandarin Chinese. On the other hand, it reflects how the state is increasingly trying to constrain that diversity.
One of the people I interviewed told me, ‘At this point, the state only lets one color of flower bloom—red flowers.’ That quote captured the theme of my book: the tension between the natural diversity within Chinese society and the state’s efforts to control it.
RFA:You spent nearly a decade covering China. What’s the biggest shift you’ve seen?
Emily Feng: The Communist Party is much more present in everyday life. When I first moved there, political control felt more distant for many people. But over the years, the government became more involved — even in the small details of daily life. COVID-19 made that even more visible, with strict movement controls and surveillance.
I felt it in my reporting as well. When I first got there, there was concern that talking to people could get them in trouble. People needed to be anonymous for their safety. But as my years in China continued, the level of surveillance, particularly online, really intensified.
That said, I want people to know that there are still many voices in China. Despite the tightening restrictions, there are still compelling stories to tell, and I hope more journalists can continue working there.
A security guard watches from a tower at a detention facility in Yarkent county in China’s Xinjiang region on March 21, 2021.(Ng Han Guan/AP)
RFA:Were there any key moments during this period when you felt that social control was tightening?
Emily Feng: I started thinking about this issue because of what was happening in Xinjiang. In 2017, I began reporting on Xinjiang, and at first, I had only heard about the existence of some camps.
But as I continued following the story, I realized that the Xinjiang issue and the situation of the Uyghurs had much broader significance for the entire country. It wasn’t just a problem in the western region — it was connected to policies on ethnicity, identity, language and culture at the time. It also tied into a larger question of what kind of nation China and the Communist Party were trying to create. So, starting from Xinjiang as an entry point, I began to ask: Why does identity play such a central role in contemporary Chinese politics?
RFA:How did you build trust with the people you interviewed, and how did you weigh the risks, both for yourself and for them?
Emily Feng: It’s a daily conversation — with editors, with yourself, and, most importantly, with your sources. Many of my stories weren’t about government leaks; they were about personal experiences. Earning trust meant showing that I was willing to listen and making the effort to be there.
Sometimes, it took years for people to open up. One Uyghur family I interviewed, for example, only felt comfortable sharing their full story after they had processed what had happened to them. In China, I might have to spend a lot of time exploring 10 different stories, but there’s only a 20% or even just a 10% chance of success.
RFA:Did you ever face danger yourself?
Emily Feng: Yes. I was investigated for my work, and my news organization was audited as part of the U.S.-China media tensions. Many reporting trips were cut short, and interviewees were sometimes detained while I was speaking with them. People I talked to risked losing jobs or public benefits. It’s not a black-and-white situation, but it’s something I had to be aware of when reporting in China.
A worker wearing protective gear and standing behind a fence in a residential area under COVID-19 lockdown talks with a man on a scooter in the Xuhui district of Shanghai on June 16, 2022.(Hector Retamal/AFP)
RFA:Your reporting often focuses on human stories. Under Xi’s rule, how is the younger generation navigating identity?
Emily Feng: For me, identity was the central theme in all the stories I found most interesting in China. It’s also why I decided to collect many of them and write a book about it. I argue that identity is key not only to understanding this vast country, which is so important economically and geopolitically, but also to understanding how China sees itself and, consequently, what its future holds.
Every decade or so, there’s this question: What kind of country can China become? The expectations of what Chinese people thought their country would become 10 years ago — before COVID, before the economic downturn — are vastly different from what a 20-year-old in Beijing or Shanghai envisions today.
The theme of identity also allowed me to give a personal twist to these big, weighty questions that often dominate newsroom discussions. What gets lost in much of that coverage is the fact that these issues affect real people. Despite being a country so far away from the U.S., I wanted to humanize these stories, to make readers ask, ‘What if this were happening to my friend?’ I wanted to help people feel what it’s like to live in their world, because that’s what I’ve lost since leaving China — and, I think, what we’ve all lost now that there are fewer reporters on the ground in mainland China.
RFA:In this era of tighter control, how do people carve out personal or ideological space?
Emily Feng: It’s increasingly difficult. Many of the people I interviewed for the book have since left China. Some persisted for years, even decades, within the system. I tell the story of a former state prosecutor who later became a human rights lawyer. She worked inside the system for years before stepping out to fight it.
There’s a lot of resilience among people, and a good sense of survival about when to be outspoken and when to be quieter. But I think even that small degree of flexibility is disappearing. Most of the characters in the book have since left China since I wrote the first draft.
RFA:Foreign correspondents have played a crucial role in shaping global understanding of China. With fewer journalists on the ground, what do you hope your coverage conveys to readers who have never been to China?
Emily Feng: I want people to see that, at the end of the day, people are people everywhere. No matter the country or language, human nature is universal.
For me, this book is also personal. My parents were born in China, and I still have family there. I never held a Chinese passport, but I have a deep connection to the place. When I lived there, I realized I had seen only a tiny bit of it. I had seen it through my family’s eyes, through their immigration story. But there are many different versions of China, depending on who you are in China.
Edited by Boer Deng.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Jane Tang for RFA and Jeff Wang for RFA Mandarin.
The Chinese company DeepSeek has made a major breakthrough in the development of artificial intelligence (AI), with the release of its deep learning model R1. As the Financial Times put it, “With DeepSeek, China innovates and the US imitates”.
Until now, the West had deemed China incapable of innovation, and Western monopoly capitalism was considered the summit of technological development. China has quietly and gradually overcome not only crucial internal contradictions but, above all, impediments imposed by the West that sought to curb its development.
Once Hong Kong’s biggest opposition party, the Democratic Party has announced plans to disband amid a political crackdown in the city under two security laws.
“It is a decision that we made based on our understanding of the overall political environment,” Chairman Lo Kin-hei told journalists following a meeting of the party’s central committee on Thursday.
“Developing democracy in Hong Kong is always difficult, and it’s been especially difficult in the past few years,” Lo told reporters in the party’s headquarters, adding: “This is not what we wanted to see.”
Lo said he hoped that Hong Kong would return to the values of “diversity, tolerance and democracy” that were the cornerstones of the city’s past success.
The move is widely seen as the symbolic end of any formal political opposition in Hong Kong, where critics of the authorities can face prosecution under security legislation brought in to quell dissent in the wake of the 2019 protests.
It follows repeated calls for the party’s dissolution in Chinese Communist Party-backed media like the Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Po.
The news came just weeks after a court in Hong Kong sentenced 45 democratic politicians and activists to jail terms of up to 10 years for “subversion” after they took part in a democratic primary in the summer of 2020.
The ongoing political crackdown has already seen the dissolution of the Civic Party, which disbanded in May 2023 after its lawmakers were barred from running for re-election in the wake of the 2020 National Security Law.
Lo said the disbandment couldn’t go ahead without a vote from a general meeting attended by 75% of the party’s members.
He said he will chair a three-person working group to handle the process following what he called a “collective decision” by the Central Committee.
Lo declined to comment on reports that party members had been harassed or threatened by people acting as messengers for the Chinese government. He said the party wasn’t in financial difficulty.
Founding party member Fred Li said the Democratic Party had “done its duty and shone its light on Hong Kong.”
Office workers join pro-democracy protesters during a demonstration in Central in Hong Kong, Nov. 12, 2019 following a day of pro-democracy protests.(Anthony Wallace/AFP)
Taiwan-based bookseller Lam Wing-kei, who was detained in mainland China for selling banned political books from Hong Kong, said there was “no point in pretending” that there is still any room for political opposition under Chinese rule.
“This is the total end of party politics in Hong Kong,” Lam told RFA Mandarin in an interview on Friday. “There’s no way the Communist Party is going to allow an opposition party to carry on existing. Under their rule, nobody else is allowed a voice.”
He said he worries that Beijing’s attention may now focus on moves to destroy democracy in Taiwan, which has never been ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, nor formed part of the People’s Republic of China.
“The pace could accelerate in the next few years,” he said of Chinese infiltration in Taiwan.
Taiwan-based Hong Kong artist Kacey Wong said the party had played a hugely important role in the development of Hong Kong’s democracy before the current crackdown.
“Its founder Martin Lee and the kind of values he represented embodied the attitudes of many Hong Kong people towards freedom and democracy — they were pretty moderate,” Wong said.
Martin Lee, known as the “father of democracy” in Hong Kong, April 26, 2021.(Anthony Wallace/AFP)
He said its death would mark the end of democratic party politics in Hong Kong.
“The Democratic Party was once the most important party when it came to gauging public opinion, so its death actually represents the ultimate death of public opinion [as a political force] in Hong Kong,” Wong said.
‘We must be vigilant’
He said fears that Hong Kong would become a base for opposition to Chinese Communist Party rule had led Beijing to break its promise that the city could keep its freedoms for 50 years after the 1997 handover.
He warned that Beijing was trying to undermine Taiwan’s democracy by placing its supporters in positions of power, much as it did in Hong Kong.
“Taiwanese people must be vigilant and must not believe the Chinese Communist Party’s promises to Taiwan that it can keep its freedoms if it submits to Beijing’s rule,” Wong said. “We must be vigilant, and we must resist.”
Political commentator Sang Pu said the Democratic Party would never be allowed to field candidates under the current system in Hong Kong.
“A political party that doesn’t run for election has no way to raise funds,” Sang said. “They get rejected [by venues] even when they try to hold party events … for spurious reasons like chefs getting into a fight or broken water meters.”
“They are being badly suppressed, so at this point it’s probably better to give up,” he said.
The last directly elected District Council, which saw a landslide victory for pro-democracy candidates amid record turnout that was widely seen as a ringing public endorsement of the 2019 protest movement.
The first Legislative Council election after the rule change saw plummeting turnout, while Chief Executive John Lee was given the top job after an “election” in which he was the only candidate.
The government has blamed several waves of pro-democracy protests in recent years on “foreign forces” trying to instigate a democratic revolution in Hong Kong.
Translated by Luisetta Mudie. Edited by Malcolm Foster.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Kwong Wing for RFA Cantonese, Wang Yun and Hsia Hsiao-hwa for RFA Mandarin.
Chinese authorities have extended the prison sentence of a Tibetan environmental activist from Sichuan province by an additional eight months after he rejected charges of “disrupting social order,” two sources from inside Tibet told Radio Free Asia.
“The large-scale and indiscriminate extraction of sand from the river has led to serious soil erosion in the surrounding area and is posing a threat to the foundations of residents’ homes,” he said in the video, in which he holds up his government ID card.
In January, the Kyungchu County People’s Court extended Tsering’s prison sentence by eight more months, increasing his total prison sentence to 16 months.
Strict surveillance
Tsering’s case illustrates the risks Tibetans face for speaking out, and the swift action authorities take to silence those who raise concerns about environmental degradation in their communities, especially when linked to Chinese companies.
Tsering’s parents have been kept under virtual house arrest with strict surveillance, sources said, adding that his mother’s health has been impacted due to anxiety and concerns over her son.
Chinese authorities have also placed tight restrictions on movement in the historic Amdo region of Tibet, specifically in the Atsoknb Tsenyi Gon Monastery in Ngaba county, Sichuan province, sources said.
Tsering has since been transferred from Kyungchu county to a prison in Barkham, the prefectural capital of Ngaba Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, said Tenzin Dawa, director of the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, which first reported the news on Thursday.
“The Chinese authorities told Tsongon Tsering that he would be relieved of his prison sentence if he made a statement admitting to the charges that he posted the video online to incite social disorder, but Tsongon and his family rejected this,” the first source said.
“They stood by their concerns, stating that the Chinese government is causing major environmental damage in the region,” he said. “The authorities are now trying to make Tsongon Tsering’s situation more difficult for him.”
In December 2024, sources told RFA that Tsering had been held in Kyungchu County Prison since October and that he faced “continued investigation and threats of extended sentencing.”
At the time, sources said authorities had indicated to Tsering’s family that the eight-month prison sentence was “not final” and said they would “continue to investigate the matter completely before making a conclusive ruling.”
‘Respect Tibetans’ rights’
On Thursday, the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, reported that authorities have forbidden Tsering’s family from participating in any religious activities during the Tibetan New Year, or Losar, which begins on Feb. 28.
Authorities also have warned Tsering’s relatives against speaking out about his case, the center said.
The rights group also called on Chinese authorities to “immediately overturn” the conviction and sentence of Tsering and “uphold and respect the fundamental rights of all Tibetans, including human rights defenders and activists, allowing them to freely express their opinions without fear of persecution.”
Other Tibetan environmental defenders, such as Anya Sengdra, have faced persecution for their activism.
In 2019, Chinese authorities sentenced Sengdra to a seven-year prison term on charges of disturbing social order after he complained online about corrupt officials, illegal mining and the hunting of protected wildlife.
Additional reporting by Dorjee Damdul, Tenzin Norzom, Thaklha Gyal and Tsewang Norbu for RFA Tibetan. Translated by Tenzin Palmo and Tenzin Dickyi, Edited by Tenzin Pema, Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Tibetan.
WASHINGTON – U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng discussed President Donald Trump’s plans for sweeping tariffs on Chinese imports during an introductory video call on Friday morning, according to readouts from both sides.
Trump has vowed tariffs of “more than” 60% on Chinese imports, and earlier this month began with a 10% levy on all goods from China. That led Beijing to introduce a 15% retaliatory tariff on certain U.S. energy exports to China, leading to concerns about a renewed trade war.
A brief readout from the U.S. Treasury Department said that the “introductory call” between Bessent and Lifeng had largely focused on trade, with the American side raising concerns about the U.S. trade deficit with China, which has long been a bugbear of Trump.
Bessent “expressed serious concerns about the PRC’s counternarcotics efforts, economic imbalances, and unfair policies,” the readout said, using an acronym for the People’s Republic of China.
Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng speaks at the 11th China-UK Economic and Financial Dialogue in Beijing, Jan. 11, 2025.(Aaron Favila/AP)
The Treasury secretary “stressed the [Trump] Administration’s commitment to pursue trade and economic policies that protect the American economy, the American worker, and our national security,” but committed to communication with the Chinese side, it said.
According to the Chinese readout released by state news agency Xinhua, Lifeng meanwhile “expressed serious concerns over recent U.S. additional tariffs and other restrictive measures against China.”
However, both Bessent and Lifeng “recognized the significance of bilateral economic and trade relations,” the Chinese readout said.
US State Department website changes
The video call came days after the U.S. State Department updated its bilateral relations “fact sheet” on China to add a series of grievances about Beijing, leading to a backlash from the Chinese government.
The Feb. 13 changes, which themselves came days after the State Department removed previously standard language about not supporting Taiwanese independence, signaled the Trump administration’s concerns about U.S.-China trade relations.
China is “one of the most restrictive investment climates in the world” the page on U.S.-China relations now reads, before pledging to carry out Trump’s “America First” approach to trade and diplomatic ties.
“In its bilateral economic relations with China, the United States will place U.S. interests and the American people first and work to end China’s abusive, unfair, and illegal economic practices,” it says.
It also accuses Beijing of profiting off “unfair trade practices,” with the United States, including by “using forced labor and massive state subsidies, putting American businesses at a disadvantage, and making them complicit in China’s human rights abuses.”
The updated page notably also discarded the usual American diplomatic practice of referring to China’s government as “The People’s Republic of China,” or by the acronym “PRC,” rather than “China.”
“The United States is firmly committed to countering China’s licit and illicit efforts to obtain U.S. technologies to advance its military modernization,” the page says in one example passage.
‘China’ not ‘PRC’
The State Department did not respond directly to a request from Radio Free Asia to comment about the change in the name used for China’s government, but said the changes to the page in general were made to bring it in line with the priorities of the new Trump administration.
“The China fact sheet on state.gov was updated to reflect the current Administration’s policies and priorities as they relate to China and the U.S.-China relationship,” a State Department spokesperson said.
Speaking at a regular press briefing in Beijing on Thursday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said his government “strongly deplores and firmly opposes” the tone of the new page.
“The changes made by the U.S. State Department on its ‘U.S.-China Relations’ page and ‘U.S. Relations With China’ fact sheet misrepresent the facts, attack China’s foreign policy and peddle the so-called China-U.S. strategic competition,” Guo said.
Edited by Malcolm Foster.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Alex Willemyns.
WASHINGTON – U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng discussed President Donald Trump’s plans for sweeping tariffs on Chinese imports during an introductory video call on Friday morning, according to readouts from both sides.
Trump has vowed tariffs of “more than” 60% on Chinese imports, and earlier this month began with a 10% levy on all goods from China. That led Beijing to introduce a 15% retaliatory tariff on certain U.S. energy exports to China, leading to concerns about a renewed trade war.
A brief readout from the U.S. Treasury Department said that the “introductory call” between Bessent and Lifeng had largely focused on trade, with the American side raising concerns about the U.S. trade deficit with China, which has long been a bugbear of Trump.
Bessent “expressed serious concerns about the PRC’s counternarcotics efforts, economic imbalances, and unfair policies,” the readout said, using an acronym for the People’s Republic of China.
Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng speaks at the 11th China-UK Economic and Financial Dialogue in Beijing, Jan. 11, 2025.(Aaron Favila/AP)
The Treasury secretary “stressed the [Trump] Administration’s commitment to pursue trade and economic policies that protect the American economy, the American worker, and our national security,” but committed to communication with the Chinese side, it said.
According to the Chinese readout released by state news agency Xinhua, Lifeng meanwhile “expressed serious concerns over recent U.S. additional tariffs and other restrictive measures against China.”
However, both Bessent and Lifeng “recognized the significance of bilateral economic and trade relations,” the Chinese readout said.
US State Department website changes
The video call came days after the U.S. State Department updated its bilateral relations “fact sheet” on China to add a series of grievances about Beijing, leading to a backlash from the Chinese government.
The Feb. 13 changes, which themselves came days after the State Department removed previously standard language about not supporting Taiwanese independence, signaled the Trump administration’s concerns about U.S.-China trade relations.
China is “one of the most restrictive investment climates in the world” the page on U.S.-China relations now reads, before pledging to carry out Trump’s “America First” approach to trade and diplomatic ties.
“In its bilateral economic relations with China, the United States will place U.S. interests and the American people first and work to end China’s abusive, unfair, and illegal economic practices,” it says.
It also accuses Beijing of profiting off “unfair trade practices,” with the United States, including by “using forced labor and massive state subsidies, putting American businesses at a disadvantage, and making them complicit in China’s human rights abuses.”
The updated page notably also discarded the usual American diplomatic practice of referring to China’s government as “The People’s Republic of China,” or by the acronym “PRC,” rather than “China.”
“The United States is firmly committed to countering China’s licit and illicit efforts to obtain U.S. technologies to advance its military modernization,” the page says in one example passage.
‘China’ not ‘PRC’
The State Department did not respond directly to a request from Radio Free Asia to comment about the change in the name used for China’s government, but said the changes to the page in general were made to bring it in line with the priorities of the new Trump administration.
“The China fact sheet on state.gov was updated to reflect the current Administration’s policies and priorities as they relate to China and the U.S.-China relationship,” a State Department spokesperson said.
Speaking at a regular press briefing in Beijing on Thursday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said his government “strongly deplores and firmly opposes” the tone of the new page.
“The changes made by the U.S. State Department on its ‘U.S.-China Relations’ page and ‘U.S. Relations With China’ fact sheet misrepresent the facts, attack China’s foreign policy and peddle the so-called China-U.S. strategic competition,” Guo said.
Edited by Malcolm Foster.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Alex Willemyns.
Several commercial flights between Australia and New Zealand had to divert on Friday because of a live-fire exercise conducted by Chinese warships, according to media reports.
The Associated Press quoted Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong as saying that Canberra had warned international airlines flying between the two countries to beware of the Chinese live-fire exercise in the Tasman Sea. Commercial pilots had been informed of potential hazards in the airspace.
Several international flights had been diverted as a result, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation reported without giving details.
It was not clear if the exercise had finished. The Chinese military has not commented on it.
The Tasman Sea between southeast Australia and New Zealand.(Google Maps)
A Chinese navy task group, including the frigate Hengyang, cruiser Zunyi and replenishment vessel Weishanhu, is believed to have conducted the live-fire exercise.
The Australian airline Qantas and its budget affiliate Jetstar had adjusted some flights across the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand, media reported.
Australia’s Civil Aviation Authority and the air traffic control agency Airservices Australia “are aware of reports of live firing in international waters,” the latter said in a statement quoted by Reuters news agency.
Although the live-fire exercise was observed in international waters, airlines with flights over the area were still advised to take precaution, it said.
China had only notified Australian authorities about the exercise off the coast of New South Wales state earlier on Friday, according to the Sydney Morning Herald.
“We will be discussing this with the Chinese, and we already have at officials’ level, in relation to the notice given and the transparency, that has been provided in relation to these exercises, particularly the live fire exercises,” Wong was quoted as saying.
On Thursday, the Australian defense department said the Chinese ships were spotted 150 nautical miles (276 kilometers) from Sydney, well inside Australia’s exclusive economic zone.
Some naval vessels were deployed to monitor the Chinese warships’ movements, given they were just exercising freedom of navigation under international law, the department said.
Some Australian analysts warned of the Chinese navy normalizing its presence and power projection overseas but Chinese media dismissed those concerts as “hype”, saying it was a normal part of the navy’s far seas drills.
Edited by Mike Firn
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Staff.
A photograph emerged in Chinese-language social media posts with a claim that it shows two Chinese ships, the Changsha 173 and the Yuncheng 571, shadowing Canada’s HMCS Ottawa in the South China Sea.
But the claim is false. The size and appearance of the three ships in the photo do not align with credible descriptions or verified images of the named vessels. AI detection tools show that the photo had likely been generated by AI.
“The Canadian ship HMCS Ottawa entered the South China Sea, and the Chinese Navy’s Changsha 173 and the Yuncheng 571 vessels quickly shadowed it for a welcoming,” the claim reads.
The claim was shared alongside a photo that shows two large vessels shadowing a smaller vessel.
Some X users claim that the photo shows Chinese warships shadowing a Canadian vessel in the South China Sea.(X)
The South China Sea is a strategically vital and resource-rich body of water in the western Pacific Ocean, bordered by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.
Covering approximately 3.5 million square kilometers, it serves as a key maritime trade route, carrying about one-third of global shipping traffic. The sea is also rich in fisheries, oil, and natural gas reserves, making it a focal point of economic and geopolitical interest.
It is highly contested due to overlapping territorial claims. China claims most of it, as illustrated by a “nine-dash line” on its maps, which includes parts of the exclusive economic zones of neighboring countries.
The region is a flash point for confrontations between various militaries and coast guard forces, triggering diplomatic tensions, involving not only regional countries but also external powers such as the United States, which conducts freedom of navigation operations to challenge China’s claims.
The same photo with similar claims was shared on X here, here and here.
But the claim is false.
Discrepancies
The Ottawa is 134 meters (440 feet) long and 16 meters (52 feet) wide.
While measurements for the Chinese vessels are unavailable, the U.S. Naval Institute estimates that the Yuncheng is about the same size as the Ottawa.
Meanwhile, Taiwanese navy estimates put the Changsha at 156 meters (511 feet) long and 17.5 meters (57 feet) wide, making it roughly 15% longer than the other two ships.
However, the ships in the photo appear disproportionate, with the two supposed Chinese vessels looking several times larger than the alleged Canadian ship.
The ships in the photo do not match the official measurements of the named vessels.(X, CCTV Military, Baidu and the Ottawa’s Facebook page. Annotations by AFCL)The ships in the photo do not match the official measurements of the named vessels.((X, CCTV Military, Baidu and the Ottawa’s Facebook page. Annotations by AFCL)The ships in the photo do not match the official measurements of the named vessels.(X, CCTV Military, Baidu and the Ottawa’s Facebook page. Annotations by AFCL)
The AI image detection software Hive found a 72.5% chance that the image was AI-generated, while a test with the different tool Sightengine placed this estimate at 98%.
AI detection tools Hive (left) and Sightengine (right) both judged that the image was likely AI-generated.(Hive and Sightengine)
January incident
Canadian broadcaster CTV reported on Jan. 9 and Jan. 10 that both the Changsha and the Yuncheng were seen in silhouette shadowing the Ottawa during its passage through the South China Sea.
A CTV journalist was reporting from the Ottawa during the incident.
While the two Chinese ships kept in sight for more than two days, the reports do not mention them trying to approach the Ottawa at close range.
Translated by Shen Ke. Edited by Taejun Kang.
Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) was established to counter disinformation in today’s complex media environment. We publish fact-checks, media-watches and in-depth reports that aim to sharpen and deepen our readers’ understanding of current affairs and public issues. If you like our content, you can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram and X.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Dong Zhe for Asia Fact Check Lab.
Tensions between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea have been making more headlines in 2025 after escalating alarmingly last year.
Some other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, meanwhile, are trying to maintain good relations with their big neighbor to the north, whose economic and political influence is only growing in importance, while protecting their interests in the disputed waterway.
Reporters from RFA and BenarNews, an RFA-affiliated news organization, look at how three countries on the South China Sea are approaching relations with China.
INDONESIA: Growing openness toward China
In November 2024, Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto, stunned South China Sea watchers with a sentence in a joint statement issued in China on his first overseas trip since becoming president.
Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, right, with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Nov. 9, 2024.(China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
The seemingly innocuous line explained that Jakarta and Beijing had reached an “important common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims” in the South China Sea.
But analysts were quick to point out that by acknowledging overlapping maritime boundaries, Prabowo and his officials had effectively acknowledged the legitimacy of China’s claims, something Indonesia had never done before.
Indonesia had always insisted that China’s so-called nine-dash line, which it uses on its maps to claim historic rights over most of the South China Sea, has no legal basis, as seen in a note verbale to the United Nations in May 2020.
Indonesia realized the mistake and issued a correction two days later, saying mutual recognition of differences and disputes does not equal accepting the other side’s legitimacy and China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea still lacked legal basis.
Muhammad Waffaa Kharisma, a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, in Jakarta said that nevertheless, there has been “a shift toward a closer relationship that could reduce Jakarta’s assertiveness in the South China Sea under President Prabowo Subianto.”
China is Indonesia’s largest trading partner and one of its biggest sources of foreign direct investment, and expanding economic ties have been a major factor in Jakarta’s decision-making.
This year, Indonesia became the first Southeast Asia member of the BRICS bloc led by China.
Raden Mokhamad Luthfi, a defense analyst at Al Azhar University Indonesia said that there was growing openness toward China, not just in trade and investment but also in security cooperation.
Prabowo’s dominant role in foreign policy appears to have sidelined Indonesia’s ministry of foreign affairs, he said.
“I am concerned that under Prabowo’s leadership, Indonesian diplomats may have less space to provide input and guidance on how the country’s foreign policy should be shaped,” Luthfi said.
Waffaa noted a sense that “Indonesia is increasingly practicing self-censorship when dealing with China.”
“One possible explanation is China’s proactive diplomatic approach, which includes strong responses, or even retaliatory measures, against criticism,” he said. “This makes Indonesia more cautious, possibly fearing economic repercussions and as a result, it has become difficult to openly address concerns over sovereignty and international law.”
Indonesia is one of the founding members of ASEAN and long served as its de-facto leader, playing a crucial role in mediating regional crises. Analysts warned that its leadership in the group on the South China Sea issue would wane if it stopped championing international legal norms.
Indonesian navy personnel welcome British Royal Navy’s HMS Spey, in Jakarta on Jan. 15, 2025.(BAY ISMOYO/AFP)
Indonesia has repeatedly said that it is not a party to territorial disputes in the South China Sea. But its law enforcement agencies have had to deal with encroachment and illegal fishing, including by Chinese vessels in the waters off the Natuna islands.
A major question now is whether warming relations will keep encroachments at bay.
MALAYSIA: Aligning with China’s preferences?
Malaysia’s leaders have always seen China as an important neighbor and partner with which they have to navigate a complex relationship.
The two countries established a comprehensive partnership in 2013 and China is Malaysia’s top economic partner, with trade worth more than US$200 billion in 2022. In comparison, Malaysia-U.S. trade was US$73 billion in the same year.
Since coming to power in 2022, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has made it clear that fostering good ties with China is one of his priorities.
Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim speaks at a World Economic Forum meeting in Switzerland, Jan. 22, 2025.(Yves Herman/Reuters)
Regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Malaysia’s long-standing policy has been to protect its sovereignty via international law. Malaysia has never recognized China’s nine-dash line and even ordered the removal of a scene from an animated movie that showed it.
Yet some of the prime minister’s comments have stirred controversy.
In March 2024, in a speech at the Australian National University in Canberra, Anwar said that countries needed to put themselves in China’s shoes and trying to block its economic and technological advancement would only bring grievances.
In November, after meeting President Xi Jinping in Beijing, Anwar said that Malaysia was “ready to negotiate” on the South China Sea, suggesting bilateral negotiations over conflicting claims in the waters off the coast of Sabah and Sarawak in East Malaysia.
At the World Economic Forum in Switzerland in January, once again the Malaysian leader stated that China should not be singled out for the tensions in the South China Sea, striking a clear pro-Beijing tone.
“Malaysia’s desire to exclude other countries, such as Australia, Japan and the United States, from South China Sea disputes aligns with China’s preferences,” wrote Euan Graham, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
“It also helps China’s behind-the-scenes efforts to influence negotiations with ASEAN on a code of conduct for the South China Sea,” Graham added.
China and ASEAN have been discussing the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea for years but have yet to reach a final agreement.
In February, during a trip to Brunei, Anwar called for the code to be completed “as soon as possible” to address escalating tensions in the waterway. Malaysia is the ASEAN chair this year.
“I believe Malaysia prefers to settle the issue among the stakeholders through dialogue and engagement without any intervention from outside,” said Lee Pei May, assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the International Islamic University Malaysia.
“If there is intervention from outside powers, I believe the situation would be chaotic,” Lee said. “The U.S., U.K. and other powers, they are not directly related to the dispute so they are considered outside powers.”
The U.S. and its regional allies, for their part, argue that they are also Pacific nations, and have interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Malaysia’s offshore patrol vessel KD Terengganu takes part in the AMAN-25 exercise off the coast of Karachi, Pakistan, on Feb. 10, 2025.(Asif Hassan/AFP)
Some analysts said that the Anwar administration, despite being criticized for its seemingly pro-Beijing stance, had not compromised Malaysia’s claims in the South China Sea.
“To be sure, Malaysia has adopted a very different approach to the South China Sea dispute than either Vietnam or the Philippines,” said Ian Storey, a senior fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.
Anwar’s policy still “allows Malaysia to maintain close ties with China while asserting its territorial claims and protecting its sovereign rights,” he said.
Foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said that China opposed construction on “illegally occupied islands and reefs,” referring to the features that Vietnam began reclaiming in the 2020s.
It is not a secret that Vietnam wants to strengthen defenses against China’s dominance in the Spratly islands and the island building has received strong support from the Vietnamese public as the sign of a refusal to compromise on sovereignty.
“If you listen to leaders’ speeches on both sides, Vietnam-China relations appear to be warm and flourishing,” said Dinh Kim Phuc, a South China Sea researcher. “But Hanoi’s developments in the South China Sea show that they don’t really trust each other very much.”
A supply vessel sprays water near the Lan Tay gas platform, operated by Rosneft Vietnam, in the South China Sea off Vietnam on April 29, 2018.(Maxim Shemetov/Reuters)
With China’s first public protest against the island building, it seems that an “informal understanding” with Vietnam is over, noted Bill Hayton, an associate fellow at the British think tank Chatham House. This tacit compromise meant that for a few years Vietnam did not look for oil and gas inside China’s nine-dash line and China said nothing about Vietnam’s island building, Hayton said.
There may be several explanations for China’s objection but analysts believe Vietnam’s expanding ties with the United States is a major factor.
Looking at overseas trips by Vietnam’s leaders, including the new Communist Party chief To Lam, Vietnam also seems to “emphasize the values of ASEAN and the West” in its strategic thinking, according to Phuc.
Vietnam has been reported as wanting to elevate ties with fellow ASEAN members Indonesia and Singapore to comprehensive strategic partnerships, the highest level of bilateral relations, this year.
But that doesn’t mean that a decoupling from China would happen any time soon, analysts say, as Vietnam’s economy depends greatly on Chinese trade and investment.
On the same day that China criticized Vietnam’s “illegal occupation” in the South China Sea, Vietnam’s parliament approved a multi-billion-dollar railway running from the Chinese border to the South China Sea. Part of the funding is expected to come from China, despite some public unease about the potential debt.
Gestures by General Secretary To and other leaders that can be seen as “pro-West” or “anti-China” are deemed as “merely populist” byDang Dinh Manh, a Vietnamese dissident lawyer now living in the U.S.
“They need to appease the general domestic public, which is increasingly nationalistic,” Manh said, adding that in his opinion the Hanoi leadership needed to appease China, too, and how to strike a balance can be “a serious task”, especially when it comes to sovereignty in the South China Sea.
Edited by Mike Firn
Pizaro Gozali Idrus in Jakarta and Iman Muttaqin Yusof in Kuala Lumpur contributed to this article.
BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated news organization.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA and BenarNews Staff.
Hong Kong’s Democratic Party, which was once the largest party in an active opposition camp, held a meeting on Thursday at which it said it would discuss its own dissolution, amid an ongoing crackdown on all forms of public dissent under two national security laws.
Party Chairman Lo Kin-hei told journalists that the topic will be up for discussion at the meeting, describing the topic as “inevitable” in the current climate.
The party’s central committee will also discuss many other matters, including its suggestions ahead of the government’s budget on Feb. 26, Lo told a news conference on Wednesday.
The news came just weeks after a court in Hong Kong sentenced 45 democratic politicians and activists to jail terms of up to 10 years for “subversion” after they took part in a democratic primary in the summer of 2020.
The ongoing political crackdown has already seen the dissolution of the Civic Party, which disbanded in May 2023 after its lawmakers were barred from running for re-election in the wake of the 2020 National Security Law.
The logo of the Democratic Party is seen in its office, in Hong Kong, China Sep. 26, 2021.(Tyrone Siu/Reuters)
Lo has previously suggested that the Democratic Party, which was formed in 1994, should try to hold on despite the threat of being targeted by national security police.
“I have no baggage here,” Lo said. “If we really need to [disband], then we will.”
“I’ve said publicly many times over the past two or three years that if the day comes, we will just have to face up to it.”
Few remaining options
A person familiar with the workings of the party told RFA Cantonese that the Democratic Party can only be formally dissolved after multiple discussions and procedures involving the members and the central committee, and after a general assembly vote with 75% attendance.
“I understand that a lot of party members and central committee members are becoming more and more worried about their personal safety,” Hui said. “They run the risk of arrest at any time.”
He said if the party does eventually disband, the move would show “the total destruction of any democratic process in Hong Kong.”
The government has blamed several waves of pro-democracy protests in recent years on “foreign forces” trying to instigate a democratic revolution in Hong Kong.
The last directly elected District Council, which saw a landslide victory for pro-democracy candidates amid record turnout that was widely seen as a ringing public endorsement of the 2019 protest movement.
The first Legislative Council election after the rule change saw plummeting turnout, while Chief Executive John Lee was given the top job after an “election” in which he was the only candidate.
Democratic Party founding chairman Martin Lee, who has been dubbed the “father of Hong Kong democracy,” told the Ming Pao newspaper that he hasn’t heard from the central committee on the matter, but that he was “not surprised” by the talk of dissolution.
The Communist Party-backed newspaper Ta Kung Pao said the party was heading for dissolution, accusing it of having “committed many evil deeds over the years.”
“If this political cancer isn’t completely eliminated, it will inevitably endanger national security and bring disaster to Hong Kong,” the paper warned.
The party has survived threatening op-eds before.
A 2022 article in the Ming Pao by Lu Wenduan, who plays a leading role in the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front influence operations, warned that the party would be doomed if it “turns a deaf ear to warnings issued by the Wen Wei Po and the Ta Kung Pao.”
Following the jailing of 45 opposition activists in December 2024, the Wen Wei Po said the party was incompatible with the principle of “patriots ruling Hong Kong,” adding that “disbandment is the only option.”
The party has made some nods toward the new political climate, trying to demonstrate its “patriotism” and and being careful not to run afoul of security laws.
But the calls for its demise haven’t let up.
Party members have received harassing and threatening emails and text messages from people describing themselves as “patriotic, Hong Kong-loving citizens,” Lo told the news conference.
And its attempts to hold fundraising events have been forcibly canceled by venues, likely under pressure from the authorities, putting it under financial strain and limiting the scope of its activities.
Translated by Luisetta Mudie.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Ha Syut and Yam Chi Yau for RFA Cantonese.
(RFA)
