Category: China

  • Prabowo Subianto’s foreign and defense policies have come under the spotlight after the former army general and current defense minister claimed victory in Indonesia’s presidential election this week.

    Prabowo won almost 60% of the votes, according to several polling agencies drawing attention to his policies amid rising tensions in the South China Sea and China-United States rivalry. 

    Indonesia is not a party to the South China Sea dispute but it has a strategic and economic interest in maintaining peace and stability there as its exclusive economic zone overlaps with several neighboring countries, as well as with the so-called nine-dash line that Beijing uses to claim China’s historic rights over most of the sea.

    The South China Sea dispute has become one of Indonesia’s most important security issues and it could also spark a major conflict between the United States and China, according to Aristyo Rizka Darmawan, a senior researcher at the Center for Sustainable Ocean Policy at the University of Indonesia. 

    Prabowo’s campaign documents state that Indonesia needs to prepare for future conflicts and plan how to reduce potential risks. 

    “Prabowo’s narrative on the South China Sea has been more about how we [should] have a strong defense capacity,” Darmawan told BenarNews, a news service affiliated with Radio Free Asia. 

    protest (1).JPG
    People protest outside the Chinese embassy following reports that China has encroached on Indonesia’s maritime area in the South China Sea, in Jakarta, Indonesia, December 8, 2021. (Reuters)

    Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat, a researcher at the National University of Singapore (NUS), said that the former general “has had a history of advocating for a more assertive and independent foreign policy for Indonesia.”

    “His victory in the election might lead to a recalibration of Indonesia’s approach to the South China Sea issue and regional security,” Zulfikar told RFA. “Prabowo may prioritize strengthening Indonesia’s military capabilities in the disputed waters.”

    Aristyo Rizka Darmawan said Prabowo would likely focus on building up the naval forces as a deterrent in the waters around the Natuna islands, where encroachments by Chinese fishing vessels and patrols have become regular.

    “Defense and maritime capabilities of the Indonesian navy are important. With such a strategy, Prabowo would most likely implement a more assertive policy in the North Natuna Sea,” the senior researcher from the University of Indonesia said.

    Strategic continuity

    Indonesia is a founding member of ASEAN and under its chairmanship in 2023, the bloc and China embarked on a new round of draft agreement discussion for a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea.

    However, Prabowo “has not offered any new ideas for promoting dialogue or accelerating the COC negotiations,” Darmawan  said.

    “Relying solely on military capabilities would not help much in maintaining peace and security in the contested waters. To show leadership in ASEAN, Indonesia should not only think of itself but also think of a bigger role in helping the region avoid escalation and conflict,” he added.

    The new president will take a middle-of-the-road position on the South China Sea dispute without offering anything new, according to Muradi, a military analyst and professor of political and security studies at Padjadjaran University.

    “It is clear that his politics will be more focused on domestic affairs. This is the characteristic of a soldier who was born and raised in the Cold War era,” Muradi, who goes by one name, said. 

    China ship.JPG
    A China Coast Guard ship is seen from an Indonesian Naval ship during a patrol at Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the north of Natuna island, Indonesia, January 11, 2020 . (Antara Foto/M Risyal Hidayat/via Reuters)

    The analyst warned that the situation in the South China Sea is evolving and so is the threat from China to ASEAN. China’s military modernization is expected to be completed by 2027 and many predict that by then Beijing would be confident enough to wage an open conflict in the region and the U.S. would have to intervene to support its allies. 

    “This requires more fundamental steps, not just saying we need this or that but concrete actions,” he said.

    Zulfikar from the NUS, meanwhile, said Prabowo’s stance on China and the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy may not be straightforward. 

    “While he has expressed interest in cultivating closer ties with China, particularly in terms of economic cooperation, Prabowo has also emphasized the importance of maintaining Indonesia’s sovereignty and independence in its foreign policy,” Zulfikar said.

    That may see Prabowo “seeking to enhance regional cooperation with ASEAN countries and other regional powers to address security challenges.”

    “Prabowo may adopt a pragmatic approach, seeking to balance Indonesia’s relations with both China and the United States to maximize its own interests.” 

    “Regarding the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and AUKUS grouping [between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.], he may approach them cautiously, emphasizing Indonesia’s non-alignment stance while exploring potential benefits and risks associated with increased engagement with these initiatives,” the NUS researcher added.

    Huong Le Thu, Asia deputy director at the International Crisis Group said that she doesn’t “expect major changes in foreign policy as Prabowo takes over, not in the early days, at least.” 

    The former general repeatedly promised to continue the domestic and foreign policies of his predecessor, the widely popular president Joko Widodo.

    “After all, ‘continuity’ was among the main aspects of his campaign,” she said, “If anything, I would expect more of the old – and old old – than of the new.”

    Edited by Mike Firn and Elaine Chan.

    BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated online news organization.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Pizaro Gozali Idrus for BenarNews and RFA Staff.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The U.S. House of Representatives on Thursday passed a bill that urges China to resolve issues related to Tibet through dialogue with the Dalai Lama or Tibetan leaders and directs the State Department to actively counter disinformation about the history of the formerly independent country.

    The Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act, also known as the Resolve Tibet Act, passed by a vote of 392-28, with 11 abstentions. 

    To become law, it still needs to pass the Senate.

    It calls for a resumption in negotiations between Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhists, or his representatives. Since 2010, no formal dialogue has happened and Chinese officials continue to make unreasonable demands of the Dalai Lama as a condition for further dialogue. 

    The bipartisan bill was introduced by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul, a Texas Republican, and Rep. Jim McGovern, a Democrat from Massachusetts, along with Senators Todd Young, an Indiana Republican, and Jeff Merkley, an Oregon Democrat. 

    The Dalai Lama fled Tibet into exile in India in the midst of a failed 1959 uprising against rule by China, which invaded the then independent Himalayan country in 1950.

    Since then, Beijing has sought to legitimize Chinese rule through the suppression of dissent and policies undermining Tibetan culture and language. 

    ‘Clear message’

    The legislation articulates that Tibet includes the Tibetan-populated regions of Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces, in addition to the Tibet Autonomous Region, thereby challenging China’s claim that Tibet is restricted to that latter region alone.

    The bill’s passage “sends a clear message to China that Tibet has always been an independent nation and negates the Chinese government’s claim that Tibet has historically been a part of China,” said Namgyal Choedup, the representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration to North America.

    The bill states that “claims made by officials of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that Tibet has been a part of China since ancient times are historically inaccurate.” 

    TIB-House.2.jpg
    Rep. Jim McGovern speaks during a hearing on the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 in the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., on May 30, 2023. (Mandel Ngan/AFP)

    On Tuesday, McGovern, one of the lead sponsors of the bill, urged Congress to support the legislation, saying, “A vote for this bill is a vote to recognize the rights of the Tibetan people. And it is a vote to insist on resolving the dispute between Tibet and the People’s Republic of China peacefully, in accordance with international law, through dialogue, without preconditions. There is still an opportunity to do this. But time is running out.”

    Beijing believes that the Dalai Lama, who lives in Dharamsala, India, wants to split off the Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetan-populated areas in China’s Sichuan and Qinghai provinces from the rest of the country. 

    Chinese authorities have urged Tibetan monks to denounce the Dalai Lama, and even possessing a photo of him is a crime.

    However, the Dalai Lama does not advocate for independence but rather a “Middle Way” that accepts Tibet’s status as a part of China and urges greater cultural and religious freedoms, including strengthened language rights that are guaranteed for ethnic minorities under China’s constitution.

    “Today’s vote shows that U.S. support for Tibet is only growing stronger even after 65 years of China’s control and occupation,” International Campaign for Tibet President Tencho Gyatso told RFA.

    “China has been playing a waiting game, hoping that the international community would eventually abandon Tibet. Clearly that is not the case,” he said. “The Chinese government should take the hint and restart the dialogue process with Tibetan leaders.”


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Tenzin Pema and Tashi Wangchuk for RFA Tibetan.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • A $40 million grants program designed to build resilience into the local critical minerals supply chain and reduce Australia’s reliance on China has been launched by the Albanese government. Grants of up to $20 million are now available to applicants through the International Partnerships in Critical Minerals Program, which Resources minister Madeleine King opened late…

    The post $40m to secure Australia’s rare earths supply chain appeared first on InnovationAus.com.

    This post was originally published on InnovationAus.com.

  • As many celebrate the Lunar New Year this week, the English use of the word “dragon” has struck controversy in China, including its most international city, Hong Kong.

    Chinese state media like CCTV and CGTN have abandoned the use of “dragon” for a phonetic transliteration “loong”. “Loong” doesn’t follow the official romanization system used for Chinese in the country, hanyu pinyu, which would write it as “long”.

    CGTN also released a video about the “Long History of Loong,” in which the “dragon year” became the “loong year” and “dragon dance” was “loong dance” in English.

    In Hong Kong, which in recent years has embraced sinicization rapidly, Chief Executive John Lee also followed Beijing’s example when he made his remarks at the opening of the 2024 International Chinese New Year Night Parade.

    “We are all here to welcome the Year of the ‘Loong.’ In Chinese culture, the ‘loong – people usually call it the dragon – symbolizes nobility, good fortune and vitality. It is going to be a year of auspicious opportunities, and dragon-sized blessings for us all!”

    Some commentators believe that the move reflects China’s lack of cultural self-confidence and that it wants to regain the right to speak culturally by changing the word into Chinese. 

    It isn’t the first example of transliteration. Beijing has also replaced the use of the term “Tibet” with “Xizang” as the romanized Chinese name on official diplomatic and foreign affairs ministry documents. The change comes as Chinese Communist Party scholars advocate an amendment to the translated name which they claim will prevent the Dalai Lama from reestablishing the right to speak about Tibet. 

    Netizens’ mockery 

    The use of “loong” for “dragon” has aroused online discussion among netizens in mainland China and Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, many ridiculed “loong” as sounding like being burnt in Cantonese, and loan – indebted – in English. That is, the year of being burnt, or the year of the loan, neither being auspicious.

    On China’s Weibo, some comments pointed out that “dragons in Chinese culture bear positive meanings such as good luck, while dragons in the West are mostly regarded as symbols of evil.” Some netizens said, “Let’s use ‘loong’ first, and we can invent better terms later.”

    Chinese netizens also corrected the New Year greeting posted by Tesla CEO Elon Musk from “The Year of the Dragon” to “The Year of the LOONG.”

    Cultural discourse power

    UK-based Hong Kong historian Hans Yeung told Radio Free Asia that the West holds a one-sided view of the dragon, perceiving it to be hostile to people and vicious while the Chinese believe that the dragon is a beautiful and auspicious object. He said the Chinese Communist Party’s move is to regain the right to speak culturally.

    “It now feels that it is a big cultural country, and it hopes that everything will only tell good Chinese stories, and doesn’t want others to think that Chinese dragons are evil.”

    Yeung noted that, to a certain extent, China is whitewashing its own culture to promote its good side, “a kind of cultural hypnosis.”

    Current affairs commentator Chip Tsao said the move reflected China’s lack of cultural self-confidence, using trivial matters to hype up issues.

    “[China] feels a sense of inferiority, but changing the name is useless because the word ‘loong’ is illogical and the meaning cannot be conveyed to Westerners at all,” Tsao said.

    “Of course, ‘dragon’ cannot  be used, but the dragon character in Chinese culture can be seen as a unity of good and evil, where the evil is Qin Shi Huang.”

    Symbol of imperial power

    In Chinese history, the acquisition and consolidation of royal power was closely related to the dragon. The dragon was a symbol of imperial power. The emperor was also called the “The True Dragon” or “Son of Heaven” and items used in the palace were decorated with dragons. The dragon is worshiped by the Chinese people and represents nobility and good fortune.

    However, the dragon has also been seen as degenerating into a symbol of cruelty in Chinese culture. Tsao noted that the largest dragon in China is the “ancestral dragon”, the first emperor of the Qin dynasty Qin Shi Huang who ushered in tyranny. Dragon does not symbolize peace; “dragon war” is a war between separatist regimes and the struggle to become emperor.

    In Western societies, dragons are used on flags, including that of Wales. There is a red dragon in the center of the flag, which was historically used in battles against invaders.

    Translated by RFA staff. Edited by Mike Firn.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Cheryl Tung for RFA Cantonese.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • 6 Mins Read

    With leading beauty conglomerates announcing new beauty lines featuring recombinant collagen, the potential for China to be a leader in the synthetic biotechnology ingredient industry.

    In December 2023, the leading international beauty brand, L’Oréal launched the second generation of its Age Perfect Collagen Royal Anti-Aging Face Cream, tailored exclusively for the discerning Chinese market. This groundbreaking release marked a pivotal moment for L’Oréal Paris skincare as it introduced the pioneering inclusion of recombinant collagen into its product line for the very first time, and also marks an important step in the commercialization of the recombinant collagen industry. The recombinant collagen incorporated into this formulation is said to feature an amino acid sequence that claims 100% homology to type III collagen found in human skin. Its touted unique triple-helix flexible bending structure purportedly allows this collagen variant to seamlessly interact with the skin’s natural collagen, potentially stimulating collagen production at its core. 

    L’Oréal’s launch of this product seems to underscore their commitment to capitalizing on scientific advancements and biotech innovations in skin care. More importantly, the entry of international brand L’Oréal has made China’s hot recombinant protein market even more topical. 

    What is collagen?

    There are at least 28 identified types of collagen, classified according to homology and biological function, each characterized by distinct structures and varying prevalence in the animal body. Collagen is crucial for various functions, including skin elasticity, joint flexibility, hair and nail well-being, and overall tissue health. Its versatility is evident in skin care, where collagen is a common ingredient, potentially imparting anti-ageing effects and promoting smoother, resilient skin. The pharmaceutical field utilizes collagen in medical treatments, wound healing, and regenerative medicine due to its biocompatibility and bioactive properties. Collagen’s influence extends beyond healthcare into the food industry, where it plays a role in dietary supplements, functional foods, and beverages. This multifaceted protein serves as a cornerstone in addressing diverse health and cosmetic needs, highlighting its significance across healthcare, skincare, and nutrition. Moreover, in the culinary world, collagen is used as a gelling agent and thickener, particularly in broths and gelatinous desserts.

    Collagen can be manufactured through two primary methods: natural extraction and synthetic biotechnology. In the natural extraction process, collagen is derived from animal sources like cattle, pigs, and marine animals. Typically, collagen is extracted from specific animal parts, such as the skin, bones, or scales. On the other hand, synthetic biotechnology employs genetically engineered microorganisms, such as bacteria and yeast, to express collagen. The resulting product, known as recombinant collagen, undergoes fermentation and downstream purification processes.

    The ascent of recombinant collagen has captured significant attention, driven by its advanced biotechnological approach that ensures precise control over collagen characteristics and the production of high-purity products. Noteworthy advantages encompass enhanced safety features, such as heightened hydrophilicity, reduced immune rejection, and robust processability, addressing concerns linked to animal-derived collagen. Its positive environmental impact is evident in the elimination of the need for animal husbandry and fishing practices, thereby contributing to marine biodiversity conservation and improved animal welfare. This innovation also eliminates the requirement for cold chain transportation, facilitating easy storage and offering a more sustainable alternative. As fermentation preparation scales up, the economic viability of recombinant collagen increases. 

    Despite these advantages, challenges persist in the commercialization process, focusing on the expression of the triple helix structure, gene fragment selection, triple helix structure construction, and overcoming obstacles in cell transfection and protein purification. While recombinant collagen is still in its early commercialization stage, the current emphasis is on scaling up production and reducing costs to facilitate broader adoption.

    Courtesy: L’Oréal China

    The history of recombinant collagen in China

    Research into recombinant collagen in China has a substantial history. In the 2000s, a research team initiated the exploration of synthetic biology technology for developing recombinant collagen. This effort eventually culminated in the establishment of the first publicly listed company in this domain, Xi’an Giant Biogene. Notably, in 2014, Nanjing University of Science and Technology collaborated with Jiangsu Jland Biotech to jointly undertake the “Key technologies for high-density fermentation of genetically engineered bacteria to express collagen, efficient separation processes, and their Industrialization” project as part of the China National High-tech Research and Development Program, commonly known as the 863 Program. This initiative has since led to the incubation of numerous research and commercialization projects in the field.  

    The start of 2024 brings optimistic developments to the industry. Jiangsu Trautec, a recombinant collagen company backed by Japanese beauty brand Shiseido and French luxury brand LVMH, initiated the process of registering for listing guidance with the Jiangsu Securities Regulatory Bureau on January 8. This marks a promising start for the sector. As of today, it is estimated that more than 30 companies are actively developing and commercializing recombinant collagen pipelines in China. Jiangsu Trautec, Jiangsu Jland Biotech, Shanxi Jinbo Biopharmaceuticals (a supplier of recombinant collagen ingredients to L’Oréal), and Xi’an Giant Biogene currently stand at the forefront of the industry.

    Vegan Collagen Broth; courtesy: Liven Proteins

    Recombinant collagen: the economic opportunity

    According to research by Frost & Sullivan, the retail sales for China’s animal-derived collagen and recombinant collagen markets in 2021 are projected to be 17.9 billion yuan (2.77 billion USD) and 10.8 billion yuan (1.67 billion USD), respectively. The CAGRs from 2017 to 2021 of animal-derived collagen and recombinant collagen markets stand at 21.8% and 63.0%, respectively. The collagen market is anticipated to sustain a robust growth trajectory in the coming years. By 2027, the overall size of China’s collagen product market is estimated to reach 173.8 billion yuan (24.42 billion USD), exhibiting a CAGR of 34.3%. Within this, the CAGR for recombinant collagen is forecasted to be 42.4%, surpassing that for collagen derived from animal sources at 25.3%. The expected increase in the penetration rate of recombinant collagen from 37.7% in 2021 to 62.3% in 2027 is noteworthy, indicating a substantial market shift. Consequently, the market size for recombinant collagen is predicted to reach 108.3 billion yuan (15.22 billion USD).

    Courtesy: Liven Proteins

    The recombinant collagen startup landscape

    For example, Liven Proteins is a Canada-based company focused on the production of animal-free collagen ingredients for China and the global market. Liven uniquely plays in the food and nutrition sector, particularly focusing on functional foods, beverages, and nutraceuticals to support healthy ageing. In comparison with collagen for skin, hair and nails, collagen ingredients for health benefits, such as Type II collagen for joint health, are premium ingredients with 10-100x price compared with commodity collagen. Odourless and completely soluble, Liven’s ingredients also offer adaptability for creating consumer-friendly products that meet the increasing demand for health-conscious choices.

    Other recognizable international players in the field of recombinant collagen encompass Avantor, ProColl, Merck, ACROBiosystems, Geltor, and Jellatech. Still, with the fast development and commercialization in China, it will be difficult for China to be left behind, not only for collagen but in all coming applications in the recombinant protein space. As of today, there are numerous examples of Chinese companies’ successful commercialization of fermentation products and holding leading positions in the subsectors, such as hyaluronic acid, amino acids, and erythritol.

    The development of the recombinant collagen market in China for skincare applications is indicative of the increasing power of synthetic biology to replace traditional animal-based sources. The application of recombinant collagen in the medical and cosmetics industries is just the beginning. We expect that with the development of technology and the expansion of production scale, recombinant collagen will soon be applied in other areas with lower cost structures, such as nutraceuticals, functional foods and beverages, and even bulk raw materials for food production. 

    This post was authored by Rouyu Wu, Director of Investment and Innovation at Dao Foods. For a more in-depth view of China’s developments in fermentation and new proteins, download The New Protein Adoption in China Report.

    The post L’Oréal Launches Animal-Free Collagen Skincare in China, As Recombinant Technology Gains St appeared first on Green Queen.

    This post was originally published on Green Queen.

  • They stick on the eyelids and provide more volume than mascara ever could. False eyelashes are big business. But consumers who buy them may be indirectly funding North Korea’s missile program.

    Though they come in blister packs that say “Made in China,” they may have actually been made in North Korea and shipped to China – in possible violation of sanctions.

    A Chinese trader provided Radio Free Asia with a shipping statement showing that a North Korean company based in the border city of Sinuiju last month exported 190,000 false eyelash products to a company in Donggang, a city in China’s Liaoning province.

    “North Korean trading companies produce artificial eyelashes using raw materials imported from Chinese companies,” the trader told RFA Korean, insisting on not being identified for fear of punishment. “Then they sell them back to companies in China. North Korean workers receive 1 Chinese yuan (14 U.S. cents) for every three artificial eyelash products they make.”

    Through this singular transaction, the state-run North Korean company made 63,000 yuan (US$8,800) in profit for the cash-strapped government, which is trying to develop missiles that would threaten the United States. Washington has in turn slapped sanctions on North Korea to keep it from exporting goods.

    The transaction also included 18,000 wigs, which she said takes two or three days to make.

    “Some people make more than 100 eyelashes a day,” she said. “The inspection standards are strict and very picky.”

    ‘Made in China’

    The statement and the trader’s testimony corroborates a story that Reuters broke last week that fake eyelashes and other beauty products made in North Korea are sent to China and disguised as Chinese products to avoid sanctions. 

    The products are stamped “Made in China” and  exported to the United States, Brazil, Russia and elsewhere, the report said.

    Pingdu, in China’s Shandong province, is known as the center of the supply chain for North Korean artificial eyelashes. Reuters reported that this region produces 70% of artificial eyelash production in the world.

    According to a 2023 estimate posted on its website by Kali, a Chinese manufacturer of eyelash boxes, about 80% of Pingdu’s artificial eyelash factories purchase or reprocess raw materials and semi-finished artificial eyelash products from North Korea.

    The Reuters report said this kind of country-of-origin-laundering operation is being carried out openly in China, and according to Chinese customs data, North Korea exported a total of 1,680 tons of artificial eyelashes, beards and wigs to China last year, worth about US$167 million.

    The eyelash business is so lucrative that North Korean workers dispatched by their government to earn foreign cash in China by working in factories there are being given extra eyelash work. 

    “A seafood company in China that employs North Korean workers is forcing workers to undergo additional eyelash processing,” the trader said. “The workers are complaining.”

    The trader said that North Korea even uses prison labor to fill its eyelash contracts.

    ENG_KOR_Eyelashes_02092024.2.JPG
    Employees work on a Monsheery production line for false eyelashes in Pingdu, China, Nov. 16, 2023. (Tingshu Wang/Reuters)

    In June 2019, RFA reported that female prisoners in North Korea were doing additional work of making wigs and eyelashes even after their assigned work 

    RFA reported in April 2021 that the North Korean government wanted to steer young workers into other industries so there was a labor shortage for eyelash and wig makers that year.

    Sanctions violation?

    While the North Korean export of eyelashes violates U.S. sanctions against North Korea, they are not subject to U.N. sanctions, Troy Stangarone, at the Washington-based Korea Economic Institute told RFA.

    Technically speaking, the export of eyelashes is not sanctioned under the United Nations,” he said. “What is prohibited is the export of North Korean goods to the United States without a license to import from North Korea.” 

    “Any fake eyelash products processed in North Korea by Chinese firms would be ineligible to be shipped to the United States,” he said. “So, this is really a difference between U.N. and U.S. sanctions.”

    The U.S. firm e.l.f. Cosmetics was fined US$1 million in 2019 after it was discovered that the company had over a period of five years imported eyelashes from China that had North Korean components. 

    “Ultimately North Korean export of eyelashes or other fake hair products is a small part of their economy and exports,” Stangarone said. “It’s unlikely that North Korea will be able to really drive its own economic growth without diversifying into other areas.”

    Translated by Claire S. Lee and Leejin J. Chung. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Cho Jinwoo and Kim Jieun for RFA Korean.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.


  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Times were supposedly better in 2022.  That is, if you were a lawmaker in the Australian state of Victoria, a busy Israeli arms manufacturer, or cash counting corporate middleman keen to make a stash along the way between the two.  That view is premised on the notion that what happened on October 7, 2023 in Israel was stunningly remarkable, a historical blot dripped and dribbled from nothingness, leaving the Jewish state vengeful and yearning to avenge 1200 deaths and the taking of 240 hostages.  All things prior were dandy and uncontroversial.

    Last month, word got out that the Victorian government had inked a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Israeli Defence Ministry in December 2022.  “As Australia’s advanced manufacturing capital, we are always exploring economic and trade opportunities for our state – especially those that create local jobs,” a government spokesperson stated in January.  It’s just business.

    No one half observant to this should have been surprised, though no evidence of the MoU, in form or substance, exists on Victorian government websites.  (It is, however, listed on the Australian government’s Foreign Arrangements Scheme register.)  For one thing, Israel’s Ministry of Defense had happily trumpeted it, stating that its International Defense Cooperation Directorate (SIBAT) and the Victorian statement government had “signed an industrial defense cooperation statement” that December.  Those present at the signing ceremony were retired General Yair Kulas, who heads SIBAT and Penelope McKay, acting secretary for Victoria’s Department of Jobs, Precincts, and Regions.

    That an MoU should grow from this was a logical outcome, a feature of the State’s distinctly free approach to entering into agreements with foreign entities.  In April 2021, the previous Morrison government terminated four agreements made by the Victorian government with Iran, Syria and China.  The agreements with Iran and Syria, signed in November 2004 and March 1999 respectively, were intended as educational, scientific and training ventures.  The two agreements with China came in the form of an MoU and framework agreement with the National Development and Reform Commission of the PRC, both part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

    The Israeli arms industry has taken something of a shine to Victoria.  One of its most aggressive, enterprising representatives has been Elbit Systems, Israel’s prolific drone manufacturing company.  Through Elbit Systems of Australia (ELSA), it established a Centre of Excellence in Human-Machine Teaming and Artificial Intelligence in Port Melbourne after announcing its plans to do so in February 2021.

    One of its main co-sponsors is the state government’s Invest Victoria branch.  The body is tasked with, in the tortured words of the government, “leading new entrant Foreign Direct Investment and investment opportunities of significance as well as enhancing the business investment environment, developing and providing whole-of-government levers and strengthening the governance of investment attraction activities.”  RMIT University’s Centre for Industrial AI Research and Innovation also did its bit alongside the state government in furnishing support.

    The two-year partnership with ELSA’s Centre of Excellence had rosy, arcadian goals.  The company’s then managing director and retired Major General Paul McLachlan wanted to impress his audience with glossily innocent reasons behind developing drone technology, which entailed counting any “number of people in designated evacuation zones, then to co-ordinate and communicate the most efficient evacuation routes to everyone in the zone, as well as monitoring the area to ensure that everyone has been accounted for.”

    McLachlan, in focusing on “the complex problems that emergency management organisations face during natural disasters” skipped around the nastily obvious fact that the technology’s antecedents have been lethal in nature.  They had been used to account for the killing and monitoring of Palestinians in Gaza, with its star performer being Elbit’s Hermes drone.  A grisly fact from the summer months of July 2014, when the IDF was making much use of Elbit’s murderous products in Gaza, company profits increased by 6.1%.

    This was not a record that worried the director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s defence, strategy and national security program, Michael Shoebridge.  As he told the ABC, the MoU “would have been entirely uncontroversial before the Israel-Hamas war.  But now, of course, there’s a live domestic debate about the war, and … most people are concerned about civilian casualties.”

    It is exactly the slipshod reasoning that gives the think-tankers a bad name.  It means that Israel’s predatory policies towards Palestinians since 1948 can be dismissed as peripheral and inconsequential to the current bloodbath.  The racial-administrative policies of the Jewish state in terms of controlling and dispossessing Palestinians in the West Bank and the trampling, sealing and suffocating of Gaza, can be put down to footnotes of varying, uncontroversial relevance.

    The Victorian Greens disagree.  On February 7, the party released a statement promising to introduce a motion calling on the Victorian government “to end its secretive relationship with the Israeli Ministry of Defence.”  They also demanded the government to “sever any ties with companies arming Israel’s Defence Force, which has killed 27,500 Palestinians in less than four month.”

    Given the federal government’s brusque termination of previous agreements entered into by Victoria with purportedly undesirable entities, the Albanese government has a useful precedent.  With legal proceedings underway in the International Court of Justice in The Hague seeking to determine whether genocide is taking place in Gaza, along with an interim order warning Israel to abide by the UN Genocide Convention, a sound justification has presented itself.  Complicity with genocide – actual, potential or as yet unassessed by a court – can hardly be in Canberra’s interest.  Over to you, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.

    The post When Times Were Better: Victoria’s Ties with Israel’s Defence Industry first appeared on Dissident Voice.

    This post was originally published on Dissident Voice.

  • By Lawrence Fong of the PNG Post-Courier

    Papua New Guinea and Australia created another piece of history yesterday when James Marape became the first international leader to address the Australian Federal Parliament since 2020.

    In a speech laden with heartfelt gratitude and sentimental recollections of the shared history of both nations, the PNG Prime Minister thanked Australia for all it had done for his country – from giving it independence, to sending missionaries and public servants to help develop the country, to fighting together with Papua New Guineans during World War II, to all the current economic and other assistance.

    Marape had said before leaving for Canberra that he would not be asking Australia for any help.

    "Historic moment" PNGPC 9Feb24
    “Historic moment” . . . Today’s front page coverage in the PNG Post-Courier. Image: PC screenshot APR

    He repeated that in his address yesterday — even though he really shouldn’t have, for help from Australia has, is, and will be constant going into the future.

    But he did appeal to the Australians not to forget Papua New Guinea during its current, ongoing challenges.

    “Today, I carry the humble and deep, deep gratitude of my people, the thousand tribes. On behalf of my people, I thank Australia for everything you have done and continue to do for us,” Marape said.

    “I appreciate all governments of Australia which have assisted our governments since 1975.

    ‘Crucial role in develoment’
    “Thank you for continuing to support us throughout the life of our nationhood. Your assistance in education, health, infrastructure development in ports, roads and telecommunications continue to a play a crucial role in our development as a country.

    “I appreciate, also, all Australian investors, who, to date, comprise the biggest pool of investors in Papua New Guinea.

    “We realise our success as a nation will be the ultimate payoff for the work put in by many Australians.

    “Thus, I commit my generation of Papua New Guineans to augmenting the sanctity of our democracy and progressing our economy.

    “We pledge to work hard to ensure that PNG emerges as an economically self-sustaining nation so that we too help keep our region safe, secure and prosperous for our two people and those in our Indo-Pacific family.”

    Marape’s address comes during a period of constant domestic and external challenges.

    He is facing a potential vote of no confidence on his leadership this month and his government is also dealing with competition for influence from world powers, including China, USA, India, Indonesia, France and Australia.

    Australia’s ‘real friend’
    But he assured Australia that Papua New Guinea is its “real friend”.

    This is despite revelations last week that his government was in talks with China over a potential security deal, a revelation that has worried Australia and the United States.

    “In a world of many relations with other nations, nothing will come in between our two nations because we are family and through tears, blood, pain and sacrifice plus our eternal past our nations are constructed today,” he promised.

    “These have all been our challenges. But as I visit with you in Australia today, I ask of you please, do not give up hope on Papua New Guinea.

    “We have always bounced back from low moments and we will continue to grow,” Marape said.

    Republished with permission.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Feeling snubbed, Chinese state media and Hong Kong politicians have lashed out at Argentine soccer superstar Lionel Messi for playing in a match in Tokyo three days after sitting out a much-anticipated game in Hong Kong with a groin injury.

    “Hong Kong people hate Messi, Inter-Miami, and the black hand behind them, for the deliberate and calculated snub to Hong Kong,” senior Chinese government adviser and former Hong Kong lawmaker Regina Ip said via her X account, referring to Messi’s U.S. club.

    “Messi should never be allowed to return to Hong Kong,” she posted. “His lies and hypocrisy are disgusting.”

    The Communist Party-backed Wen Wei Po said in an editorial that Messi’s non-appearance was “premeditated manipulation,” asking if there was a “huge and mysterious mastermind” behind the incident.

    The Ta Kung Pao, also backed by the party, went so far as to speculate that there may be a link between Inter Miami and the CIA. In a front-page article, it claimed that the father of the club’s founders Jorge and Jose Mas was Cuban exile Jorge Lincoln Mas Canosa, who “fled to Miami in 1960 and worked extensively with the CIA.”

    Some people also claimed that Messi deliberately avoided shaking the hand of Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee after the match.

    Apology… to no avail

    Messi apologized to fans in a post on the Chinese social media platform Weibo on Wednesday, saying he sat out the match due to a “swollen and painful” groin injury.

    “Anyone who knows me knows that I always want to play… especially in these games where we travel so far and people are excited to see our games. Hopefully we can come back and play a game in Hong Kong,” he wrote in Chinese and Spanish.

    But China’s nationalistic newspaper the Global Times, which has close ties to ruling Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece the People’s Daily, said that wasn’t enough. 

    It wanted to know why he had managed to play for 30 minutes in Tokyo on Wednesday night, suggesting that a March fixture between China and Argentina could now be in jeopardy.

    ENG_CHN_HKMessi_02082024.2.jpg
    Inter Miami’s Lionel Messi, left, looks on from the bench during the friendly match between Hong Kong XI and Inter Miami in Hong Kong on Feb. 4, 2024. (Peter Parks/AFP)

    In a front page op-ed piece, the paper said it hoped for a “reasonable explanation” from Messi before he takes part in two scheduled fixtures for Argentina in China in March.

    “The disappointment of the [Hong Kong] government and the fans is entirely understandable. The impact of this incident has far exceeded the realm of sports,” it said of the match, in which 38,000 fans turned up to see Messi play, with some booing when it became obvious that wouldn’t happen.

    “Anyone who deviates from the original intention of this sport, regardless of their motive, will not achieve good results,” it said.

    Chinese footballer Xu Zexin followed up with a Weibo post claiming that the Chinese Football Association had “suspended cooperation with the Argentinian Football Association” over the incident.

    “It is understood that @Chinese_Football_Association has suspended relevant cooperation with the Argentine Football Association, including the Argentine national team,” Xu wrote.

    “At the same time, the Chinese Football Association has deleted all news about Lionel Messi from its official website,” he said, adding that there had been several items on the site before.

    However, a Google search for Messi’s Chinese name on the site turned up several articles about the player.

    Xu also claimed in his post that “Argentina’s trip to China in March is likely to be canceled.”

    Demanding explanations

    Hong Kong officials have demanded an explanation from match organizers, who have since withdrawn an application for a government grant linked to the match, Lee, the Hong Kong chief, told reporters on Feb. 6.

    Lee also appeared to suggest that the government wasn’t fully familiar with the full details of the contractual agreements for the match that were in force between promoters Tatler Asia and U.S.-based pro soccer team Inter Miami.

    “While the organizer has … withdrawn the application for the subsidy for the sponsorship, they still have the responsibility to explain to members of the public, particularly those who have bought tickets to get into the stadium to watch the match,” Lee said.

    ENG_CHN_HKMessi_02082024.3.png
    The Hong Kong government’s Major Sporting Events Committee website touted Lionel Messi in its promotion of the match between Miami and Hong Kong. (Major Sporting Events Committee)

    “It is their responsibility … to answer to the disappointment of all the audience there, in particular, those young children who were there with full passion and hope.”

    “We will keep on urging the organizer to explain to the public in detail what actually happened, what were the details of the agreement between them and the team,” Lee added.

    Joseph Ngan, former assistant controller at Hong Kong’s i-CABLE News, told the RFA Cantonese financial talk show “Speak Freely” that the government had “mishandled” the arrangements for the match.

    “This was to have been an event funded by [the government], we can see their negligence throughout the entire approval process, the way officials handled it,” Ngan said. “Especially now that [Secretary for Culture, Sports and Tourism] Kevin Yeung has broken the news that the government itself didn’t fully understand the terms of the contract between Tatler Asia and Inter Miami.”

    “It’s ridiculous,” Ngan said, in a reference to earlier comments from Yeung to a Hong Kong radio station, and a report by broadcast CNBC alleging that the entire funding application was rushed, condensed from what is normally a six-month process to a few weeks.

    45-minute commitment

    According to Yeung, the organizers had committed to have Messi play for at least 45 minutes, or half of the 90-minute match, during the fixture, but that they had only submitted “preliminary details” of the contractual agreements between all parties during their application for government funding.

    “The other party provided preliminary information but the details consisted of sensitive business information, so we didn’t need to know the details of every item,” Yeung said.

    ENG_CHN_HKMessi_02082024.4.jpg
    A junk bearing an image of Inter Miami forward Lionel Messi sails across Hong Kong’s Victoria Harbour on Feb. 2, 2024. (Peter Parks/AFP)

    Hong Kong’s Culture, Sports and Tourism Bureau said in a later statement that it was very disappointed that Messi could not play in Hong Kong due to injury, but pointed to his participation in a similar match against Japan’s Vissel Kobe in Tokyo on Wednesday

    “Three days later, Messi was able to play actively and freely in Japan … the government hopes the organizers and teams can provide reasonable explanations,” the department said in comments reported by Reuters.

    Comments on Reddit under the viral video of Messi sidling away as players lined up to receive post-match medals from Lee suggested he could have been making a political point in the wake of a widespread crackdown on dissent in Hong Kong.

    But other comments pointed out that Lee was shaking the hands of players and handing out medals to those who took part in the match, and that it was natural for Messi not to be among them, as he didn’t actually play.

    Hong Kong current affairs commentator Sang Pu said it was possible that Messi’s actions in Hong Kong were politically motivated, pointing to attempts in 2017 to send a signed photo of Messi to Liu Xia, wife of late Nobel peace laureate Liu Xiaobo, while she was under house arrest at the couple’s home in Beijing.

    But he said Messi may have felt unable to make any public criticisms while on tour with Inter Miami.

    Translated by Luisetta Mudie. Edited by Malcolm Foster.





    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by .

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Amid the spate of economic policy announced in recent days and Beijing’s intervention to arrest a plummeting stock market, Chinese equities rebounded Tuesday and Wednesday, but the overall gloom may be far from over for the world’s second-largest economy.

    News broke on Tuesday that the “national team” – Beijing-charged fund managers – had stepped in to rescue the market as the country’s three major stock indexes continued to dive. 

    In a statement Tuesday, Central Huijin Investment, a subsidiary of China’s sovereign wealth fund China Investment Corp, said it endorsed the A-share [stock] market valuation, had recently expanded its holdings of exchange-traded open-end index funds, and would continue to increase and expand such holdings to ensure the stability of the capital markets.

    The benchmark Shanghai Composite Index fell below 2,700 points at one point on Monday, with thousands of stocks falling beyond their 10% daily limit. But Huijin’s statement which was widely disseminated via multiple state media outlets apparently took effect. The Shanghai Composite Index gained 3%, Shenzhen Component and ChiNext indexes rose 6% each on Tuesday.

    A staggering 3 trillion yuan (US$422 billion) has been wiped off from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets since the end of last year, according to some analysts who say the rescue measures may still be insufficient.

    According to a Wall Street Journal report citing financial consultancy Z-Ben Advisors, China’s five largest ETFs tracking the CSI 300 Index and the Shanghai Composite Index received a net fund of US$20.2 billion in January. The inflows – more than 10 times last year’s monthly average – was a sign of China’s “national team” in action. The report also cast doubt on investors’ skepticism if the “national team” can end the stock market rout.

    Wang Guo-Chen, an assistant research fellow at the First Research Division of the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER) in Taiwan, told Radio Free Asia he saw the national team’s attempt to reverse the bear market in the past few days as futile.

    “We estimated that the market value of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets has evaporated by about 3 trillion yuan since the end of last year. It was reported that 2 trillion yuan was injected to rescue the market, but it’s simply not enough to offset the past few weeks’ losses,” Wang said.

    Separately, Bloomberg reported that the China Securities Regulatory Commission briefed Chinese President Xi Jinping on the state of the stock market on Tuesday. However, it was uncertain whether the authorities would table new measures.

    Broader economic woes

    While the stock market is not the economy, it is a barometer of where the latter may be heading and how investors view China’s prospects.

    China is likely to set a 5% increase in GDP this year after about half of its provinces missed their 2023 targets. The country’s growth slowed to 5.2% in 2023, weighed by structural problems like mounting local government debts and the prolonged crisis in the real estate industry – a longtime driver of economic expansion – that authorities are struggling to fix.

    On Tuesday, the National Financial Regulatory Administration said commercial banks have offered more loans to developers for projects under the favorable “white list.”

    ENG_CHN_MktWoes_02072024_2.jpg
    A man rides an electric bike past residential buildings under construction in Beijing on June 5, 2023. China promised more help for renters as it rolls out a flurry of measures to prop up its ailing property market, while also promising to keep government spending at a “necessary intensity.” (Andy Wong/AP)

    Chu Chen-Chih, president of Marbo Investment Consulting pointed out that the various measures introduced by the Chinese government, including Premier Li Qiang’s pledge to inject more funds into the capital markets on Jan. 22, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission’s move to evaluate stock market performance of enterprise controlled by Beijing, wouldn’t resolve China’s economic problems.

    “The biggest problem in China now is the problem of the economy itself, not stock market policy. To cure a disease, you must treat it. The root cause of the disease is not just the external symptoms,” said Chu. “The Chinese government is trying to take some anti-fever drugs in the hope of alleviating a serious situation, but it isn’t the way to solve economic problems.”

    On the street, the average Chinese retail investor likened the recent rout to the 2015 stock market carnage, according to vox pops conducted by China Business News. Almost nine years ago, Chinese shares plunged more than 40% between June and August, eliminating US$5 trillion of value, as the stock market bubble burst after regulators cracked down on illegal leverage trading.

    In addition to the national team’s rescue this week, a CSRC statement on Monday said it had discovered multiple cases of malicious short selling suspected of manipulating the market. Among them, an illegal gang controlled more than 100 securities accounts to manipulate a certain stock through continuous bidding and reverse trading to influence its price.

    Wang from CIER said apart from vigorously promoting the market, China has three other options: first, to continue talking up China’s economy; if unsustainable, settle for the next best thing and tell the people, “It’s not good, but it will be better tomorrow”; and lastly, resort to coercive measures such as restrict IPOs [new share sales] or stock trading.

    Translated by RFA staff. Edited by Taejun Kang and Mike Firn.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Huang Chunmei for RFA Mandarin and RFA Staff.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Last week, on 23 January 2024, the UN Human Rights Council reviewed the human rights record of China during its fourth Universal Periodic Review (UPR). The International Service for Human Rights reporst back on its successful campaign: Following ISHR campaign and your messages to UN member States, six countries, including France, Luxembourg, the UK, the US, Sweden, and Australia urged Beijing to put an end to the practice of ‘Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location’ (RSDL) – which UN experts have branded a form of enforced disappearance. This would not have been possible without you! 

    See also: https://humanrightsdefenders.blog/tag/residential-surveillance-at-a-designated-location-rsdl/

    Following this session, the Chinese government must review the recommendations and decide whether to accept or simply note them, and report back to the Human Rights Council at its 56th session (June 2024). ISHR will closely monitor this and keep you informed.  Our call to raise the case of Cao Shunli got unanswered. Cao was detained by Chinese police in September 2013 in retaliation for her work to seek meaningful civil society participation in China’s second UPR cycle. Ten years ago, on 14 March 2014, Cao died of multiple organ failure following continued denial of medical treatment in custody. Despite the emblematic nature of her case Cao’s name was not once cited by UN member States. Nevertheless, at least four States recommended to China to end reprisals against human rights defenders seeking to engage with the United Nations.  We’re ramping up efforts for honouring the memory of Cao Shunli and calling for accountability in her case. We are preparing a small event on 14 March 2024 in Geneva. Stay tuned for more very soon!   

    This post was originally published on Hans Thoolen on Human Rights Defenders and their awards.

  • China has reaffirmed its stance that it would consistently support the improvement of inter-Korean relations amid rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

    North Korea has recently ramped up military provocations against South Korea and its allies with multiple missile launches and nuclear tests, labeling Seoul as a “primary enemy.”

    South Korea, under the conservative Yoon Suk Yul administration, has been implementing a hardline policy towards Pyongyang, with his  government openly vowing to respond to the North’s military provocation. 

    When asked by a reporter about China’s stance on inter-Korean relations during a regular press briefing on Monday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said China “noted” the situation, adding that Beijing “always supports the DPRK and the ROK in improving their relations.”

    DPRK, or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, refers to North Korea, while ROK, or Republic of Korea, stands for the South.

    “The situation on the Korean Peninsula has come to where it stands today for a reason. Tensions on the Peninsular do not serve the common interests of relevant parties,” said Wang. 

    “Relevant parties need to work towards the same direction, keep to the major direction of political settlement and jointly safeguard peace and stability on the Peninsula,” Wang added, while noting that Pyongyang’s statement on its policy is a “sovereign matter.”

    Wang’s remarks came a few days after the South Korean government reaffirmed its position on respecting Beijing’s One China principle.

    Under this principle, the Chinese Communist Party asserts sovereignty over the democratic island of Taiwan.

    “Our government will continue to promote practical cooperation with Taiwan in various fields based on its stance of respect for ‘One China [principle]’,” said Chung Jaeho, South Korea’s ambassador to China, speaking to South Korean correspondents at the embassy in Beijing last Friday.

    “We hope that peace and stability will be maintained across the Taiwan Strait and cross-Strait relations will develop peacefully,” he added. 

    The Taiwan issue has emerged as a source of conflict between China and South Korea in recent years, as the current Yoon administration has been more vocal than in the past in opposing China’s “unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force” in the Taiwan Strait.

    Chung added that South Korea was “making necessary communications” to ensure that the trilateral summit agreed to last year among South Korea, Japan and China could be held in the first half of this year in South Korea.

    Separately, Chung also called on China to “play a more active and responsible role,” emphasizing that North Korea’s threats to the South and its nuclear and missile development are adversely affecting not only the situation on the Korean Peninsula, but also global stability and peace.

    Edited by Elaine Chan and Mike Firn.





    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Taejun Kang for RFA.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • A recent X post from Tucker Carlson featured biologist and podcaster Bret Weinstein (DarkHorse) to talk about the US immigration crisis after a visit to the Darién Gap. The gap is a jungle in the Panamanian isthmus where the Pan American Highway is interrupted on its way to South America. There, at the incitement of weblogger and US Special Forces officer Michael Yon, Weinstein went to see the immigration camps and learn how people from all over the world are trekking to the Rio Bravo border to enter the US.

    His detailed description was rational and cautious, yet it raised a specter which was clearly alarming. Weinstein described the conditions and the character of two camps that he saw. One fit the description of a classic refugee camp. It was visibly managed by a number of NGOs as well as US government agencies. The other appeared to be full of Chinese. He was able to talk to numerous migrants in the first camp but was unable to enter the one which appeared to be Chinese.

    The “Chinese” camp seemed to be full of military age young men who when addressed outside the camp were reluctant to talk.

    After discussing the discrepancies, Carlson asked if he had any explanation. Weinstein was exceptionally cautious and only uttered hypotheses. However, the direction implied the possibility that China was sending men to the US behind the migrant screen.

    Then Weinstein shifted to the possible relation between a Chinese contingent and Covid with the mRNA injections that the US government (along with nearly all Western governments) forced on much of the population. Although Weinstein was very explicit that his hypotheses were not facts and that he did not know if there was any relationship to verify, the discussion proceeded to cover possible motives and objectives of both policies supported by the US regime.

    The speculation is provocative and not to be easily dismissed. Nonetheless, it also revealed how little many people seem to understand about how covert operations can work. Michael Yon can be recognized as a special operations professional. While popular imagination continues to portray these men as mere super soldiers, the reality is that Special Forces are the armed cadres of the CIA and other covert action (state terrorism) agencies. A quick look at Yon’s website shows him as a super-soldier or soldier of fortune who has been a dedicated operator in all the CIA managed wars of the past three decades. That alone ought to raise suspicions about his coverage and why he was so interested to show a biologist and popular podcaster the frontier of what are undoubtedly covert operations. Weinstein was taken into Yon’s confidence much like the journalist character in John Wayne’s notorious The Green Berets film, promoting the war against Vietnam.

    Allowing that Weinstein reported what he honestly saw, the question remains whether he saw what he was supposed to see. That returns us to the question “why Chinese?” The ensuing discussion raised legitimate questions about connections between US immigration policy and the Covid War. However before considering them it is necessary to return to the first camp. Weinstein named several organisations supporting the migrant camp. He identified USG agencies and the UN agency IOM. What he either did not know or did not recognise is that the International Organization for Migration is run by the US national security bureaucrat Amy Pope.1There is general confusion about how the UN and its specialized agencies are run. The WHO is essentially an arm of the Gates Foundation and the international pharmaceuticals (pharmaments) cartel. It would not be unreasonable to suppose Ms Pope assures that the IOM complies with the policies set by those who rule the US. Weinstein’s conclusion is that such policies as those articulated by the Biden administration reflect corruption on a global scale. However that does not answer the question who benefits from those policies and how?

    To return to the compulsory mass injection, especially of the military and other health and safety services, Weinstein and Carlson both expressed their bewilderment and shock that the compulsion was so rigorous in what might be called the public services sector. Then more speculation returned to COVID and mRNA injections and what these were doing to people in the US. Consensus prevailed that this was biological weaponry deployed. While there is no reason to doubt that assertion, the next step was to repeat the half truth that China was the source of the raw material both for the pathogen and for the injections since the latter were based on the former. Neither Weinstein nor Carlson could recall that the actual origin was Eco-Health Alliance, a cutout for US bioweapons development and Ralph Baric at UNC-Chapel Hill, the principal investigator commissioned for the DoD gain of function (weapons) development. Weinstein is probably not savvy enough to understand how cut-outs work or the details of false flag operations. Carlson probably does know but rarely if ever discusses such details. The accuracy of the media depictions of COVID in China were accepted as debunked. Yet the sources of that “information” were not examined. Thus, Chinese authorship was implied.

    While discussing the implications of the migration crisis + “Chinese”, the hypothesis was aired that both the managed “uncontrolled” migration and the covid/mRNA weapons aimed to weaken the US from within. This might serve the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by mass infiltration of potentially militarized immigrants who would then create the conditions most favorable to alleged Chinese expansionism. This it was suggested might be due to China having essentially bought the US government. This hypothesis has been peppered by regular reports of bribes paid to inter alia the Biden family by Chinese interests.

    Striking in the discussion is the absence of two considerations: a) the complex of US anti-China war propaganda which naturally compromises any reporting about China in the West as a whole and b) the interests of the Western oligarchy in redesigning the West as a neo-feudal regime. Leave that eyesore, the CIA-founded WEF, aside for a moment. There are purely national phenomena which provide a far more efficient explanation.

    As a matter of record Mr Gates is now the largest private owner of farm land in the US. There is no indication that he has stopped buying. Since the 2008 mortgage crisis, the hedge funds like Black Rock have become the largest owners of rental property (residential and commercial). This feat was accomplished by the massive derivatives fraud that forced millions of mortgagees to forfeit their real property. The economic devastation continued this process. Sane economists, of which Michael Hudson is one of the few, have charted this conversion of home ownership to rental tenancy and its acceleration. The Anglo-American finance oligarchy is aggressively pursuing through the banking, tax and monetary system an unparalleled expropriation of rank and file Americans.

    During the mass incarceration, I wrote several times that COVID was political-economic warfare using biological agents and financial terror. My argument, then and now, was that this is atomic grade social engineering. In the worst case — for the oligarchy — this neutralization of the country’s majority was a clearing of the decks for open world war. Masses who might, under pressure of extermination — especially in the military and armed citizenry — actually rebel and mutiny leading to an October scenario. However, there is another scenario compatible with the history of North American conquest. In the 19th century, the tiny oligarchy was incapable of fulfilling its manifest destiny by stealing the whole continent. So bonded labor and massive immigration were used to take and hold everything between the Allegheny and the Pacific. Poor immigrants were granted the freedom to fight and die in battle against the indigenous population. Afterwards the land won was handed to railroads, finance, miners and ranchers. Successive economic crises bankrupted smallholders regularly. They abandoned their homes and moved westward. “Indians” and Chinese-bonded labor kept those settlers busy while the usual suspects seized all the land and loot, selling it back to successive suckers. Forced displacement was fundamental to the business model that “won the West”. Even to this day, the oligarchy represented in Washington understates the use of biological agents to eradicate the indigenous peoples. Few 19th century immigrants admit how they were used to enrich East Coast elites. Perhaps that is the policy followed today, the one at home which bears examination. The immigrants are driven by plane and on foot from the South. Meanwhile, mRNA injections provided the same comfort as smallpox-treated blankets.

    ENDNOTE

    It is after all just a hypothesis, but with tradition.

    The post Darién Gaps and Injun Country first appeared on Dissident Voice.
    1    IOM mission statement
    Harnessing the Power of Migration

    Comprehensive solutions to the world’s biggest challenges – from poverty and inequality to climate change, and conflict – are all inextricably linked to migration. IOM knows that migration has the power to transform the lives of individuals, their families, their communities and societies for the better. It is clear that the Sustainable Development Goals cannot be reached without safe, orderly and regular migration. For this reason, our vision is: to deliver on the promise of migration, while supporting the world’s most vulnerable.

    This post was originally published on Dissident Voice.

  • China has expanded its visa-free entry policy for tourists and business travelers from more than a dozen European and Asian countries, opening up its borders further in recent months as it struggles to shore up foreign interests to help arrest an economic slowdown.

    In January, the Chinese government announced that it would provide unilateral visa exemption for Ireland and Switzerland and  introduce a mutual visa exemption for Singapore for 30 days. Additionally, from March 1, China and Thailand will also allow permanent visa exemption for citizens of both sides. In the past six months, Beijing has implemented a visa-free policy to tourists from Brunei, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Malaysia.

    While the number of foreign tourist arrivals has jumped nearly seven times to 35.478 million last year from 4.473 million in 2022, it’s still a far cry from the 97.675 million recorded in pre-pandemic 2019, according to China’s National Immigration Administration.

    But foreign nationals would be hesitant to travel to China for several factors: the high cost of air tickets, the inconveniences upon arrival without a Chinese mobile phone number – which is needed for mobile payment apps as many businesses and restaurants do not take cash – as well as being closely surveilled and controlled by the authorities.

    “I recently returned to China and the biggest inconvenience was that overseas credit cards are difficult to use in China. China’s WeChat Pay or Alipay require a Chinese domestic WeChat account to install,” an Australian citizen surnamed Yang lamented to Radio Free Asia.

    “Moreover, without a mobile phone number in China, I can’t even hail a taxi. I have to ask someone to hail one for me every time.”

    Yang said another issue was the close surveillance he endured.

    After registering for accommodation with the neighborhood police station – a requisite – the neighborhood committee cadres would come to verify, and also inform him they knew of his comings and goings from the residence. 

    “It was nothing more than a warning to me: the Public Security Bureau is closely monitoring my every move and deliberately putting pressure on me.”

    Not only was Yang under close surveillance, but his work partners were not spared either. 

    “I used my Australian mobile phone in China to make a call to a female boss in Zhejiang to discuss possible cooperation. A few hours after the call, the lady was summoned to the police station. The police told her that it was an overseas fraud call and made a record. She was so scared that she never dared to answer my call again.”

    Yang added he was scarred from the experience and would try to avoid going to China, which he described as “a hysterical country.”

    ENG_CHN_VisaFree02052024_2.JPG
    A CCTV security surveillance camera overlooks a street as people walk past in Beijing, China. (Thomas Peter/Reuters)

    Costly airfares and politics

    A woman who works in the United States and only gave her name as Angela said the air ticket price from the U.S. to China remains high, albeit a slight decline which led her to return last month.

    Angela said that compared to her experience three years ago, the Chinese government has stepped up its controls on the people.

    “One thing that makes it very inconvenient is: everywhere I go, I am being checked for my identity – be it to get on the high-speed rail, book a ticket for a tourist attraction, and even to register a shared bike account. The purpose of this is probably to collect and control information and capture everyone’s whereabouts, but it is very annoying.”

    Separately, a travel agent in the U.S. who only gave her surname Cai noted that middle-aged and elderly overseas Chinese are reluctant to travel to China because of the political environment.

    “It’s not that we don’t do business in the Chinese market, now is not the right time, whether it is political or other factors.” 

    Beijing is trying to rebuild its international image and trust with the international community, and the visa-free policy was one of the measures to improve relations with foreign countries, said 

    Riley Walters, a senior researcher on international economics at the Hudson Institute, a Washington think tank.

    “The slowdown in the economy and stock market has made China’s demand for foreign investment high. Relaxing visa restrictions will also help the tourism industry,” Walters said.

    But how effective Beijing’s visa-free policy in shoring up foreign investment remains to be seen. 

    Ralph Weber, a professor from the European Center for Global Studies at the University of Basel in Switzerland, believes the policy to have limited effect on attracting business travelers 

    “Investors are hesitant to go to China because they feel uneasy. They’re worried about what’s happening in China, like the espionage laws. So the impact created by the visa-free policy is unworth mentioning. I can’t imagine a Swiss business traveler thinking, ‘Wow, I now don’t have to pay for a Chinese visa, so I’m going to invest in China,’ that’s not the logic,” Weber said.

    China’s actual foreign direct investment fell 8% to 1.13 trillion yuan (US$159 billion) last year, according to the Ministry of Commerce.

    Translated by RFA staff. Edited by Taejun Kang and Mike Firn.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Jenny Tang for RFA Mandarin.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Bloated hype beyond all reason. Illustration: Liu Rui/GT
    Illustration: Liu Rui/GT

    The director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Christopher Wray, made sensational remarks on Wednesday in Congress, elevating the “China threat theory” to a new level. He claimed that hackers associated with the Chinese government are “positioning on American infrastructure in preparation to wreak havoc and cause real-world harm to American citizens and communities.” Targets include water treatment plants, electrical infrastructure and oil and natural gas pipelines, he said. In response, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin explicitly stated that China firmly opposes and cracks down on all forms of cyberattacks in accordance with law. Without valid evident, the US jumped to an unwarranted conclusion and made groundless accusations against China. It is extremely irresponsible and is a complete distortion of facts.

    On the same day, the US government added more than a dozen Chinese companies to a list created by the Defense Department to highlight firms it says are allegedly working with China’s military. US Secretary of Commerce, Gina Raimondo, exaggerated the potential national security risks posed by Chinese electric vehicles entering European market in talks with EU officials. From public opinion manipulation to actual actions, the US’ measures containing China were both intensive and frequent in recent days. The US once again unleashed a cold wind, at a time when communication and exchanges between high-level officials of China and the US have rapidly resumed since the beginning of 2024, and signs of stabilization in China-US relations have increased.

    This has become an increasingly common phenomenon in China-US relations, reflecting the high complexity and uncertainty of US policy toward China and the depth of distortions in the US understanding of China. However, we also notice that Jake Sullivan, the national security advisor to the US president, in his latest remarks on China-US relations on January 30, while emphasizing the need for the US to strengthen its “competitive position,” also highlighted the importance of building stability, managing differences, and stressed the significance of maintaining communication and intensive diplomacy.

    Taking a comprehensive view, US policy toward China is increasingly resembling a tightrope walk, with the key technique lying in maintaining balance. The US government is currently managing this with difficulty, and the challenge of maintaining balance is rapidly intensifying. The US clearly recognizes the serious consequences if balance cannot be upheld, but without timely adjustments, it is only a matter of time before it falls off the tightrope.

    This year is the US presidential election year, and negative topics concerning China will be further magnified and intensified. However, aside from the election factors, people can see at a glance that the two ends of the “balance pole” between the US and China are gradually shifting, with the rational end toward China becoming shorter and the irrational end toward China becoming longer. One major manifestation is the continuous innovation and upgrading of the “China threat theory,” which has contaminated the decision-making atmosphere and environment toward China, resulting in an increasingly imbalanced US policy toward China, even to the extent of losing control. This poses a significant risk for the US, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world.

    Why do American officials and politicians like Christopher Wray work so hard to create and spread the “China threat theory”? The reasons are multifaceted. For example, the most common occasions are often in the US Congress, both because Congress has become a gathering place for anti-China politicians and because Congress controls the purse strings. Using the “China threat” as a gimmick is the best way to secure funding. Additionally, some individuals project their inner world onto China. There are also those who have developed a delusion about China, where anything related to the word “China” becomes a “terrifying monster” that must be guarded against. This is a result of extreme lack of confidence, anxiety, and even delusion in the face of China’s rapid development.

    Also on January 31, the Senate Judiciary Committee hosted a hearing titled “Big Tech and the Online Child Sexual Exploitation Crisis.” The chief executives of five major social media giants, including TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew attended to testify. Although the meeting had a predetermined theme and many attendees, Chew once again became the focus. Many senators bypassed the main topic and questioned Chew about his relationship with China. Republican Senator Tom Cotton even aggressively questioned Chew’s citizenship with eight questions. It is well known that Chew is from Singapore. Even netizens on X platform couldn’t stand it and condemned Cotton for his “xenophobia” and “blatant racism.” Isn’t this a microcosm of Washington politicians?

    It is evident that the US authorities have the intention to use anti-China rhetoric and need a strategic imaginary enemy or scapegoat in Washington politics. However, this is feeding a monster with malice and hostility toward China. The monster is growing day by day, with an increasing appetite and becoming more cunning. In the past, stories about “Chinese hackers” could satisfy it for a while, but now the story has to be escalated to the level of threatening all Americans. When this monster breaks free, its first target will be the US itself.

    The post How to Interpret Washington’s New Version of “Hacker Script” first appeared on Dissident Voice.

    This post was originally published on Dissident Voice.

  • The state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) is developing an updated version of its turbofan-powered high-altitude Cai Hong 7 (CH-7) Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV), according to local reports. It is understood that development of the CH-7 is expected to be completed by the end of 2024 after further testing. The company unveiled […]

    The post China readies updated stealth UCAV appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.


  • This content originally appeared on Human Rights Watch and was authored by Human Rights Watch.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Companies such as Toyota, Volkswagen, Tesla, General Motors and BYD could do more to ensure their strict standards are applied in China, Human Rights Watch says

    Car manufacturers Toyota, Volkswagen, Tesla, General Motors and BYD may be using aluminium made by Uyghur forced labour in their supply chains and could do more to minimise that risk, Human Rights Watch says.

    An investigation conducted by HRW has alleged that while most automotive companies have strict human rights standards to audit their global supply chains, they may not be applying the same rigorous sourcing rules for their operations inside China.

    Continue reading…

    This post was originally published on Human rights | The Guardian.

  • China’s economy may never surpass the size of America’s, with long-running predictions of a flip at the top of the world pecking order repeatedly pushed back, a White House official said Tuesday.

    With “the strongest post-pandemic recovery and among the lowest inflation of any leading economy in the world,” the United States has been “showing its capacity for resilience and reinvention” while China struggles, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said.

    The comments came days after a Hong Kong court ordered the liquidation of Chinese real estate giant Evergrande – which still owes more than US$300 billion to investors – and amid broader problems, with official youth unemployment figures recently as high as 20%.

    Speaking at a Council on Foreign Relations event in Washington on the future of U.S.-China relations, Sullivan said he rejected the notion that “the East was rising and the West was falling” and that China’s annual gross domestic product was destined to overtake America’s.

    ENG_CHN_JakeSullivan_01312024.2.jpg

    “For years, economists were predicting that the PRC would overtake the United States in GDP, either in this decade or the next,” Sullivan noted, using an acronym for the People’s Republic of China. 

    “Now those projections are moving further and further out,” he said. It was becoming possible that “that moment may never come,” he added, with the Chinese economy facing “its own set of challenges.”

    U.S. annual GDP currently stands at approximately $28 trillion, compared with China’s roughly $18.5 trillion, according to International Monetary Fund figures. America’s economy last year also grew at a rate of about 6.3% in nominal terms – that is, not accounting for inflation – which unexpectedly outpaced China’s growth of 4.6%.

    However, China’s economy has grown at a far greater rate than the U.S. economy over the past 35 years: In 1990, China’s economy was less than 10% of the size of America’s, according to the IMF.

    ‘An armchair analyst’

    Despite his comments, Sullivan said he did not want to “get myself in trouble” or “make news” by hamfistedly evaluating China’s economy, noting that many experts differed markedly in their analyses.

    “I just don’t see a huge amount of upside in the U.S. national security adviser kind of holding forth as an armchair analyst on China’s economy,” he said. 

    He said he just wanted to reject “the conventional wisdom about relative trajectories of the U.S. and the PRC.”

    The idea that China could only rise and that the United States was destined to recede had been “openly proclaimed” in Beijing until recently, Sullivan explained, but President Joe Biden had long stressed this was not a fundamental characteristic of ties.

    “The president didn’t accept that, I didn’t accept that and our team did not,” he said. “We continue to push back against this idea.”

    The U.S. national security adviser also defended a slew of policies intended to shore-up national security by reducing America’s trade reliance on China and by subsidizing key industries such as microchip manufacturing, which Beijing has said is economically damaging.

    Sullivan said he discussed that with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Bangkok last week, with both sides offering views about where “the boundary between economics and national security” should lie.

    But he acknowledged they did not have “completely converging perspectives” on the issue, or even who was most at fault.

    “For a very long time, the PRC has taken measures on explicit grounds of national security that have had an adverse impact on American workers, American businesses, and the American economy,” he said. “So this cannot be a one-way street of a conversation.”

    Edited by Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Alex Willemyns for RFA.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • A Russian Pacific Fleet warship has conducted an anti-submarine exercise in the South China Sea as part of the fleet’s training program, Russia’s ministry of defense confirmed in a news release.

    The Marshal Shaposhnikov, assisted by a Ka-27 helicopter, was searching for an “enemy” submarine at an undisclosed location in the South China Sea before firing torpedoes and anti-submarine depth charges at it, according to the ministry.

    The firing was conducted entirely in “a training manner” and did not use the frigate’s actual weapons, the ministry said.

    Frigate Marshal Shaposhnikov, together with the Pacific Fleet’s flagship missile cruiser Varyag, is on a long-distance training mission to the Asia-Pacific.

    The ships left the fleet’s home base in Vladivostok in Russia’s Far East on Jan. 22 and, besides training exercises, planned to make some port calls. The news release did not reveal the length of the mission or the countries the ship detachment plans to visit.

    Before entering the South China Sea, the ships took part in several exercises against sea and air targets in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan.

    South China Sea presence

    The Pacific Fleet is part of Russia’s Eastern Military District, with the Pacific Ocean as its main operation area.

    Such training exercises have become regular as the Russian Navy asserts its presence in the region.

    A similar anti-submarine exercise was conducted by another detachment from the Pacific Fleet in Oct., 2023, when destroyers Admiral Tributs and Admiral Panteleev were on a long-distance sea voyage to the Pacific.

    South China Sea’s littoral states have yet to comment on the Russian drills, as they were likely “conducted as a user state’s exercise of high seas rights and no permission would have been required,” said Collin Koh, a Singapore-based regional military expert. 

    Other navies, including the U.S., have also been carrying out exercises and freedom of navigation operations in the area.

    Cruiser Varyag.jpg
    In this photo taken from a video released by the Russian Defense Ministry Press Service on Dec. 19, 2022, the Varyag missile cruiser of Russia’s Pacific Fleet sails off for a joint naval drill planned by Russia and China in the East China Sea. (Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP)

    Russia has recently sought to bolster its presence in the Asia Pacific and forge a closer relationship with China. The two countries have conducted a number of joint exercises in the East China and South China seas.

    Yet according to Koh, the Kremlin would be careful not to express explicit support for Beijing in the contested South China Sea.

    “While I understand that bilateral ties are closer since the war in Ukraine, I don’t see why Russia doesn’t want to choose to assert itself as a power in its own right that pursues its own interest.

    “Vietnam remains a key partner in Southeast Asia to Russia, so I’m leery of Moscow seeking to alienate Hanoi by showing support for Beijing in the South China Sea,” he said.

    Edited by Mike Firn and Taejun Kang.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Staff.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Vietnam and the Philippines on Tuesday signed two memoranda of understanding on cooperation in the South China Sea during the visit by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to Hanoi, the Philippine Presidential Communications Office said.

    One covered incident prevention and management in the South China Sea. The other was on maritime cooperation, the office said in a news release.

    A memorandum of understanding, or MOU, is a non-binding agreement that clarifies the parties’ intentions and working relationships.

    On incident prevention and management “the two nations agreed to enhance coordination regarding maritime issues bilaterally, within the ASEAN and with other dialogue partners, with both sides intensifying efforts to promote trust, confidence, and understanding, through dialogue and cooperative activities,” the office said.

    The MOU on maritime cooperation is “aimed at strengthening the understanding, mutual trust, and confidence between the two parties through development of a Joint Coast Guard Committee” to discuss common issues and interests between the two coast guard forces.

    A hotline will be established between them, it added. No further details were provided.

    Both Vietnam and the Philippines are claimants in the South China Sea, alongside China, Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan. 

    As the risk of escalation caused by competing claims arises, “the ability to resolve mutual disputes amicably demonstrates strength and non-interference of a third party,” according to Pooja Bhatt, an independent maritime security analyst.

    “This is a good solid step even before you face a common challenge or threat,” she said.

    “It will also set precedence for other similar maritime disputes that South China Sea littorals face,” added the Delhi-based analyst.

    Risk of provoking China

    President Marcos is in Hanoi on a two-day state visit, during which he’s set to meet with Vietnam’s top leaders – the president, the prime minister and the chair of the National Assembly – but not the general secretary of Vietnam Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong, who is believed to be in poor health.

    Marcos is the first Philippine head of state to visit Vietnam in nearly a decade, after a visit by former president Rodrigo Duterte in 2016.

    Welcome ceremony.jpg
    Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., right, and Vietnamese President Vo Van Thuong inspect honor guards during a welcome ceremony in Hanoi, Vietnam Tuesday, Jan. 30, 2024. (Hoang Thong Nhat/VNA via AP)

    Before leaving for Hanoi on Monday, the president said that maritime cooperation would be “one of the cornerstones of the strategic partnership which we are going to forge” with Vietnam.

    The two countries in 2015 established a so-called strategic partnership, the only such association the Philippines has with an ASEAN member state.

    Vietnamese media, while covering President Marcos’ movements in Hanoi extensively, have so far not reported on the maritime cooperation agreements, which analysts say may risk provoking China.

    The official Vietnam News Agency only said that the two sides “pledged to maintain and foster peace, security, stability and freedom of navigation” in the South China Sea.

    Beijing claims most of the South China Sea and Chinese vessels have recently had tense confrontations with Philippine coast guard ships near some atolls also claimed by Manila. 

    “You can see most of the statements about the South China Sea have been issued by the Philippines and not Vietnam,” said a Vietnamese analyst who wished to stay anonymous due to the sensitivity of the issue.

    “Manila is keen to get Hanoi involved to form a united front [against China] but Hanoi does not want to publicly show that,” the analyst said.

    Bilateral cooperation

    Another Vietnamese analyst, however, hailed the agreements on maritime cooperation as “a clever move in breaking China’s dominance by peaceful means.”

    “China has been stalling the negotiations for a Code of Conduct [COC] in the South China Sea but step by step Vietnam and other neighbors could cooperate to work out a COC for ASEAN,” Dinh Kim Phuc, a well-known scholar, said.

    “Beijing may retaliate by increasing maritime patrols near Vietnam’s oil fields such as the Vanguard Bank, but I don’t think they will react more than that,” Phuc told Radio Free Asia.

    Back in November 2023, President Marcos said during a livestreamed event that his country is seeking separate risk-reducing agreements with Southeast Asian neighbors.

    “We have taken the initiative to approach those other countries around ASEAN whom we have existing territorial conflicts with, Vietnam being one of them, Malaysia being another and to make our own code of conduct,” the president said.

    Chinese media, meanwhile, have warned of further risks of conflict should the cooperation between Vietnam and the Philippines “target a third party and harm others’ interests.”

    The state-run Global Times said that “if Vietnam and the Philippines cooperate in certain areas to the detriment of China’s interests in the South China Sea, it will only irritate the situation in the South China Sea and make the risk of conflict higher.”

    Philippines China.jpg
    Chinese coast guard ships block Philippine coast guard BRP Cabra as it tries to head towards Second Thomas Shoal, locally known as Ayungin Shoal, in the disputed South China Sea during a rotation and resupply mission on Aug. 22, 2023. (AP Photo/Aaron Favila)

      

    In a related development, ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Luang Prabang, Laos, on Monday also discussed the current situation in the South China Sea.

    “We reaffirmed the importance of maintaining and promoting peace, security, stability, safety, and freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea,” the bloc’s ministers said in a joint statement.

    Some of them expressed concern “on the land reclamations and activities, which have eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions, and may undermine peace, security, and stability in the region” without naming any country.

    “We emphasized the importance of self-restraint in the conduct of all activities by claimants and all other states,” the statement said, calling on all countries “to pursue peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS [UN Convention on the Law of the Sea].”

    Edited by Mike Firn and Elaine Chan.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Staff.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • RNZ Pacific

    Eight of Tuvalu’s 16-member Parliament are newcomers following the 2024 general election which saw former Prime Minister Kausea Natano ousted.

    The country went to the polls on Friday to elect a new Parliament with 6000 people registered to cast their votes in eight constituencies in the island nation.

    There are no political parties in Tuvalu, which means that all candidates run as independents, and voters will select two lawmakers in each of the eight electorates.

    Former Prime Minister Kausea Natano failed to get enough votes to return to Parliament in the Funafuti constituency.

    Dr Puakena Boreham, the only female candidate in this year’s election, represented Nui in the 2015 and 2019 elections but failed to get the numbers this time.

    Two noticeable new MPs are former Governor-General Sir Iakoba Italeli Taeia, and Feleti Teo, former executive director of the Tuna Commission.

    The Commissioner of Election, Dr Tufoua Panapa, thanked everyone who took part in the 2024 general election, from his team, the voters and all the volunteers.

    Second hurdle forming coalition
    Simon Kofe told RNZ Pacific before all the votes were tallied, that he was confident that he would get back into parliament.

    “The second hurdle will be negotiating with other MPs to form a coalition to form a government,” he said.

    “Given the nature of our system here where everyone comes in as an independent, I think there are a few key issues that might influence the various groupings after the election.

    “As you probably see in the media, there is one politician in particular who has expressed interest in revisiting the relationship with Taiwan and whether or not we should be switching to China.

    “Some politicians have also expressed their view on the treaty with Australia, and there was some strong opposition on that as well, so I think those are probably two key issues that may influence the groupings after the election results come out,” Kofe said.

    The results:

    Each of Tuvalu’s eight districts elects two members of Parliament. Nukulaelae only had two candidates for that seat. The number of votes received are next to each candidate, a * denotes a newly-elected member.

    Nukulaelae

    • Seve Paeniu
    • Namoliki Sualiki Neemia

    Nanumea

    • Ampelosa Manoa Tehulu (490)
    • Tiimi Melei (296)
    • Temetiu Maliga (246)
    • Satini Tulaga Manuella (178)
    • Falasese Tupou (130)

    Nanumaga

    • Monise Tuivaka Laafai (292)
    • Hamoa Holona* (265)
    • Malofou Sopoaga (251)
    • Kitiona Tausi (167)

    Funafuti

    • Tuafafa Latasi* (351)
    • Simon Kofe (348)
    • Kausea Natano (331)
    • Iosua Samasoni (53)
    • Luke Paeniu (37)
    • Jack Mataio Taleka (9)

    Nui

    • Mckenzie Kiritome (352)
    • Sir Iakoba Italeli Taeia* (311)
    • Dr Puakena Boreham (291)

    Niutao

    • Feleti Penitala Teo* (581)
    • Saaga Talu Teafa* (499)
    • Sam Penitala Teo (172)

    Nukufetau

    • Panapasi Nelesoni* (408)
    • Enele Sopoaga (402)
    • Taimitasi Paelati (374)
    • Nikolasi Apenelu (324)

    Vaitupu

    • Paulson Panapa* (585)
    • Maina Talia* (448)
    • Nielu Meisake (420)
    • Isaia Taape (349)

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has asked Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to use Beijing’s influence on Iran to push it to stop the Houthis in Yemen from attacking Red Sea trade routes.

    The appeal came during two days of meetings in Bangkok between the pair, according to a senior Biden administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity according to rules set by the White House.

    Over 12 hours, the pair also discussed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Myanmar’s civil war, North Korea, Israel’s war with Hamas, the South China Sea, fentanyl and artificial intelligence, the official said.

    It was their first meeting since Oct. 26, when Wang visited Washington in the run-up to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to San Francisco in November for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, during which he also held direct talks with U.S. President Joe Biden.

    The official said the meeting was meant to build on the commitments made during that summit, including to reinstate military-to-military talks and to stem illicit Chinese exports of precursors for fentanyl, which has been called a leading cause of death for American adults.

    A working group on counternarcotics would be established on Tuesday and both Military-Maritime Consultative Agreement Meetings and talks about regulating artificial intelligence would be held in the Spring. 

    “The two sides are committed to continuing these strategic channels of communication,” the official said, adding there would be “a telephone call between the two leaders at some point in the coming months.”

    Diplomatic telephone

    On the apparently widening conflict in the Middle East that began with the attack on Israel by Hamas on Oct. 7, the White House official said Sullivan had pressed Wang to use Beijing’s influence on Iran to push it to end attacks by Houthis on trade ships transiting the Red Sea.

    The Houthis’ latest attack took place Friday and this time directly targeted a U.S. warship, the USS Carney, which was patrolling the area to try to prevent further attacks in the lucrative trade route.

    Both Hamas and the Houthis have been labeled “proxies” of Iran by the United States, with Tehran not viewed as having direct control of either group but being accused of funding and training both. The Houthis, meanwhile, are accused of targeting trade ships off Yemen’s coast in response to Israel’s invasion of Hamas-controlled Gaza.

    As a major trading nation, China had its own interests in stopping the attacks on the Red Sea route and had the ability to pressure Iran as one of the biggest buyers of its oil, the White House official said.

    “We would characterize both the economic and trade relationship as giving Beijing leverage over Iran to some extent. How they choose to use that, of course, is China’s choice,” the official said.

    “Iran’s influence over the Houthis, and the Houthis’ destabilization of global shipping, raises serious concerns not just for the U.S. and China but for global trade,” they added. “There should be a clear interest in China in trying to quiet some of those attacks.”

    The civil war in Myanmar was also discussed by Sullivan and Wang, building off talks between Sullivan and Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin on Friday, during which the official said Sullivan “stressed the importance” of getting humanitarian aid into Myanmar.

    However, the official said the United States was less hopeful about China’s assistance in pushing North Korea to end its growing nuclear weapons program or its recent provision of ballistic missiles to Russia.

    “I’m not sure I would characterize anything recently as constructive,” the official said, adding the United States still hoped China would come round to helping “bring us back to the path of denuclearization.”


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Alex Willemyns for RFA.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • It is not only missiles that are being lobbed as U.S. and U.K. air strikes aim to stop the Iran-backed Huthi rebels in Yemen from targeting ships in a key global trade route — mutual threats of continued attacks are flying around, too.

    The question is how far each side might go in carrying out their warnings without drawing Tehran into a broader Middle East conflict in defense of the Huthis, whose sustained attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden led to its redesignation as a terrorist organization by Washington last week.

    “Our aim remains to de-escalate tensions and restore stability in the Red Sea,” the United States and the United Kingdom said in a joint statement following their latest round of air strikes on Huthi targets in Yemen on January 21. “But let us reiterate our warning to [the] Huthi leadership: we will not hesitate to defend lives and the free flow of commerce in one of the world’s most critical waterways in the face of continued threats.”

    The Huthis responded with vows to continue their war against what they called Israel’s “genocide” of the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip.

    “The American-British aggression will only increase the Yemeni people’s determination to carry out their moral and humanitarian responsibilities toward the oppressed in Gaza,” said Muhammad al-Bukhaiti, a senior Huthi political official.

    “These attacks will not go unanswered and unpunished,” said Huthi military spokesman Yahya Saree.

    On cue, the two sides clashed again on January 24 when the Huthis said they fired ballistic missiles at several U.S. warships protecting U.S. commercial vessels transiting the Bab al-Mandab Strait off the coast of Yemen. U.S. Central Command said three anti-ship missiles were fired at a U.S.-flagged container ship and that two were shot down by a U.S. missile destroyer while the third fell into the Gulf of Aden.

    With the stage set for more such encounters, Iran’s open backing and clandestine arming of the Huthis looms large. While continuing to state its support for the Huthis, Tehran has continued to deny directing their actions or providing them with weapons. At the same time, Iran has showcased its own advanced missile capabilities as a warning of the strength it could bring to a broader Middle East conflict.

    The United States, emphasizing that the goal is to de-escalate tensions in the region, appears to be focusing on preventing the Huthis from obtaining more arms and funding. In addition to returning the Huthis to its list of terrorist groups, Washington said on January 16 that it had seized Iranian weapons bound for the Huthis in a raid in the Arabian Sea.

    The U.S. Navy responds to Huthi missile and drone strikes in the Red Sea earlier this month.
    The U.S. Navy responds to Huthi missile and drone strikes in the Red Sea earlier this month.

    The United States and United Kingdom also appear to be focusing on precision strikes on the Huthis’ military infrastructure while avoiding extensive human casualties or a larger operation that could heighten Iran’s ire.

    On January 24, the Pentagon clarified that, despite the U.S. strikes in Yemen, “we are not at war in the Middle East” and the focus is on deterrence and preventing a broader conflict.

    “The United States is only using a very small portion of what it’s capable of against the Huthis right now,” said Kenneth Katzman, a senior adviser for the New York-based Soufan Group intelligence consultancy, and expert on geopolitics in the Middle East.

    Terrorist Designation

    The effectiveness of Washington’s restoration on January 17 of the Huthis’ terrorist organization label and accompanying U.S. sanctions — which was removed early last year in recognition of the dire humanitarian situation in Yemen and to foster dialogue aimed at ending the Yemeni civil war involving the Huthis and the country’s Saudi-backed government forces — is “marginal,” according to Katzman.

    “They don’t really use the international banking system and are very much cut off,” Katzman said. “They get their arms from Iran, which is under extremely heavy sanctions and is certainly not going to be deterred from trying to ship them more weapons by this designation.”

    But the strikes being carried out by the United States and the United Kingdom, with the support of Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands, are another matter.

    The January 21 strikes against eight Huthi targets — followed shortly afterward by what was the ninth attack overall — were intended to disrupt and degrade the group’s capabilities to threaten global trade. They were a response to more than 30 attacks on international and commercial vessels since mid-November and were the largest strikes since a similar coalition operation on January 11.

    Such strikes against the Huthis “have the potential to deter them and to degrade them, but it’s going to take many more strikes, and I think the U.S. is preparing for that,” Katzman said. “You’re not going to degrade their capabilities in one or two volleys or even several volleys, it’s going to take months.”

    The Huthis have significant experience in riding out aerial strikes, having been under relentless bombardment by a Saudi-led military collation during the nine-year Yemeni civil war, in which fighting has ended owing to a UN-brokered cease-fire in early 2022 that the warring parties recommitted to in December.

    “They weathered that pretty well,” said Jeremy Binnie, a Middle East defense analyst with the global intelligence company Janes.

    “On the battlefield, airpower can still be fairly decisive,” Binnie said, noting that air strikes were critical in thwarting Huthi offensives during the Yemeni civil war. “But in terms of the Huthis’ overall ability to weather the air campaign of the Saudi-led coalition, they did that fine, from their point of view.”

    Since the cease-fire, Binnie said, the situation may have changed somewhat as the Huthis built up their forces, with more advanced missiles and aging tanks — a heavier presence that “might make them a bit more vulnerable.”

    “But I don’t think they will, at the same time, have any problem reverting to a lighter force that is more resilient to air strikes as they have been in the past,” Binnie said.

    Both Binnie and Katzman suggested that the Huthis appear willing to sustain battlefield losses in pursuit of their aims, which makes the group difficult to deter from the air.

    A cargo ship seized by Huthis in the Red Sea in November 2023.
    A cargo ship seized by Huthis in the Red Sea in November 2023.

    The Huthis have clearly displayed their intent on continuing to disrupt maritime shipping in the Red Sea, which they claim has targeted only vessels linked to Israel despite evidence to the contrary, until there is a cease-fire in the Gaza Strip.

    This has brought the Huthis’ complicated relationship with Iran under intense scrutiny.

    ‘Axis Of Resistance’

    The Huthis have established themselves as a potent element of Iran’s so-called “axis of resistance” against Israel and the United States, as well as against Tehran’s regional archrival, Saudi Arabia.

    But analysts who spoke to RFE/RL widely dismissed the idea that the Huthis are a direct Iranian proxy, describing the relationship as more one of mutual benefit in which the Huthis can be belligerent and go beyond what Tehran wants them to.

    While accused by Western states and UN experts of secretly shipping arms to the Huthis and other members of the axis of resistance, Iran has portrayed the loose-knit band of proxies and partners and militant groups as independent in their decision-making.

    The grouping includes the Iran-backed Hamas — the U.S. and EU designated terrorist group whose attack on Israel sparked the war in the Gaza Strip — and Lebanese Hizballah — a Iranian proxy and U.S. designated terrorist group that, like the Huthis, has launched strikes against Israel in defense of Hamas.

    “The success of the axis of resistance … is that since Tehran has either created or co-opted these groups, there is more often than not fusion rather than tension,” between members of the network and Iran, explained Behnam Ben Taleblu, senior fellow at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank.

    But the relationship is not simply about “Iran telling its proxies to jump and them saying how high,” Taleblu said. “It’s about Iran’s ability to find and materially support those who are willing to or can be persuaded to shoot at those Tehran wants to shoot at.”

    Iran’s interest in a certain axis member’s success in a given area and its perception of how endangered that partner might be, could play a crucial role in Tehran’s willingness to come to their defense, according to Taleblu.

    Middle East observers who spoke to RFE/RL suggested that it would take a significant escalation — an existential threat to Tehran itself or a proxy, like Lebanese Hizballah — for Iran to become directly involved.

    “The Islamic republic would react differently to the near eradication of Hizballah which it created, versus Hamas, which it co-opted,” Taleblu said. “Context is key.”

    “Iran is doing what it feels it can to try to keep the United States at bay,” Katzman said, singling out the missile strikes carried out on targets this month in Syria, Iraq, and Pakistan that were widely seen as a warning to Israel and the United States of Tehran’s growing military capabilities. Iran is “trying to show support for the Huthis without getting dragged in.”

    Iran is believed to have members of its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps on the ground in Yemen. Tehran also continues to be accused of delivering arms to the Huthis, and at the start of the year deployed a ship to the Gulf of Aden in a show of support for the Huthis before withdrawing it after the U.S.-led coalition launched strikes in Yemen on January 11.

    “So, they are helping,” Katzman said, “but I think they are trying to do it as quietly and as under the radar as possible.

    A U.S.-led ground operation against the Huthis, if it came to that, could change Iran’s calculations. “Then Iran might deploy forces to help them out,” Katzman said.


    This content originally appeared on News – Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty and was authored by News – Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.


  • Premise

    Consider this paradox: without the Soviet Union (U.S.-designated nemesis since 1917), the United States would have never succeeded at placing the planet under its unilateral grip—often referred to by U.S. imperialists as the “new world order”. Or, rephrased differently, a world whereby the U.S. wants to rule unchallenged. This how it started: first, forget the Soviet Politburo—Mikhail Gorbachev practically annulled its role as the supreme decision-maker body of the Soviet Communist Party before proceeding to dismantle the Soviet state. In sequence, he, his foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, other anti-communists in his inner circle, and the Yeltsin group were the material instruments in the downfall of the USSR thus leading to U.S. success.

    By a twist of events, with its unrelenting policy of economic, geopolitical, and military pressure to submit the new Russia to its will, the United States effectively forced it to intervene in Ukraine many years later. After 33 years from the dismantling the Soviet Union (first by Gorbachev’s contraptions of perestroika and glasnost, and then by Yeltsin’s pro-Western free-marketers), Russia is now breaking up the monstrous American order it helped create. Today, it seems that Russia have reprised its founding principles in the world arena—not as an ideologically anti-imperialist Soviet socialist republic, but as an anti-hegemonic capitalistic state.

    The process for the U.S. world control worked like this: taking advantage of Gorbachev’s dismantlement of the socialist system in Eastern Europe and his planned breakup of the USSR, the United States followed a multi-pronged strategy to assert itself as the sole judge of world affairs. The starting point was the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. With the success of its two-stage war to end that occupation (Operations: Desert Shield, 1990, and Operation: Desert Storm, 1991) the United States achieved multiple objectives. Notably, it removed the USSR completely from the world scene even before it was officially dismantled, and it put Iraq and the entire Arab world under its effective control, and it tested its new world order.

    Far more important, with a considerably weakened Russia taking the seat of the USSR at the Security Council, the United States finally completed its takeover of the United Nations. Although the hyperpower is known for routinely operating out of the international norms and treaties, and has myriad methods to enforce its influence or control over foreign nations, it is a fact that whoever controls the Security Council can use its resolutions—and their ever-changing interpretations— as authorization for military interventions in the name of so-called collective international legality.

    Still, it is incorrect to say that the United States has become the omnipotent controller without considering the other three permanent members of the Security Council:  Britain, France, and China. First, aside from being the two states with a known history of imperialism and colonialism, Britain and France are NATO countries. As such, they pose no threat to U.S. authority. This leaves China. (For now, I shall briefly discuss China’s role vis-à-vis the U.S. taking control of the Security Council after the demise of the USSR, while deferring its relevance to U.S. plans in Ukraine to the upcoming parts)

    China has been rising as world power since the early 1990s onward. That being said, China’s world outlook has been consistently based on cooperation and peace among nations. China is neither an imperialist nor expansionist or interventionist state, and its claim on taking back Taiwan is historical, legal, and legitimate. That being said, China’s abstention from voting on serious issues is seriously questionable. Interpretation: China seems primarily focused on building its economic and technological structures instead of antagonizing U.S. policies that could slow its pace due to its [China] growing integration in the global capitalistic system of production. Consider the following two Western viewpoints on China’s voting practices:

    • The Australian think tank, Lowy Institute, states, “China used its UN Security Council rotating presidency in August … China did not veto any UN Security Council resolutions between 2000 and 2006.”

    Observation: but the period 2000–2006 was the post-9/11 Orwellian environment in which the United States broke all laws of the U.N. and turned the organization into its private fiefdom. Does that mean China had caved in to U.S. pressure and subscribed to its objectives? Based on its history, ideals, stated foreign policy principles, and political makeup, my answer is no. Yet, we do know that China has often been moving alongside U.S. objectives—by remaining silent on them. Examples include the U.S. 13-year blockade of and sanctions on Iraq (starting in 1990 and theoretically ending after the U.S. invasion in 2003), as well post-invasion occupation that is lasting through present by diverse ways and methods.

    • Wikipedia (Caveat: never take anything printed on this website seriously unless you verify content rigorously) stated the following on China, “From 1971 to 2011, China used its veto sparingly, preferring to abstain rather than veto resolutions not directly related to Chinese interests. China turned abstention into an “art form”, abstaining on 30% of Security Council Resolutions between 1971 and 1976. Since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, China has joined Russia in many double vetoes. China has not cast a lone veto since 1999.”

    Observation: by abstaining, China seems playing politics and patently taking sides with Washington on critical issues. Is china conspiring, in some form, with the U.S. for selfish reasons? Are there other reasons?

    No science is needed to prove that China is neither fearful of the United States nor subservient to it or uncertain about its own great place in the world. Simply, China favors dialogue over confrontation and patience over nervous impulses. Although such conduct may unnerve some who want to see China stand up to the hyper-imperialist bully, the fact is, China is no hurry to play its cards before the issue of Taiwan is resolved. Still, by its own problematic actions at the Security Council, China is not a dependable obstacle to U.S. plans. Of interest to the anti-imperialist front, however, is that China’s voting record on Iraq, Libya, and Yemen has left dire consequences on those nations.

    Russia’s Intervention in Ukraine: Dialectics 

    Russia’s intervention in Ukraine was calculated and consequential. It was calculated based on symmetric response to U.S. long-term planning aiming at destabilizing it. The consequentiality factor is significant. Russia’s action did not precede but followed a protracted standoff with Ukraine following U.S.-organized coup in 2014. Not only did that coup topple the legitimate government of Viktor Yanukovych, but also veered Ukraine’s new rulers toward a fanatical confrontation with Russia and ethnic Russians—a sizable minority in Donbass.

    Could comparing U.S. and Russian reactions to each other’s interventions shed light on the scope of their respective world policies? How does all this apply to Ukraine? First, Ukraine is not a conflict about territory, democracy, sovereignty, and all that jargon made to distract from the real issues and for the idle consumption of news. Second, to understand the war on Ukraine, we need to place Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in a historical context that —at least since the dismantlement of the USSR.

    Premise 

    The study of reactions by political states to military interventions and wars is an empirical science. By knowing who is intervening, who is approving, and who is opposing, and by observing and cataloging their conduct vis-à-vis a conflict, we can definitely identify pretexts, motives, and objectives. For example, when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, the reaction of the United States, key European countries, Israel, Arab Gulf states, Egypt, and Jordan were unanimously approving—and supporting with instigation, money, weapons, and logistics. The Soviet Union on the other hand, called for dialogue, negotiation, and other ways to end the conflict.

    In the Iraq-Iran War, the U.S., Europe, and Israel wanted the war to continue so both would perish by it. Henry Kissinger the top priest of U.S. Zionism simplified the U.S. objective with these words, “The ultimate American interest in the war (is) that both should lose”. Consequently, Western weapons sales to both contenders skyrocketed—war is business. The Arab Gulf states, for example, financed and wanted Iraq to defeat Iran—its revolutionary model threatened their feudal family systems of government. They also looked for surgical ways to weaken Iraq thus stopping its calls for the unification of Arab states.

    It turned out, when the war ended after eight years without losers and winners, that U.S. and Israel’s objective evolved to defeat Iraq that had become, in the meanwhile, a regional power. The opportunity came up when Iraq, falling in the U.S. trap (April Glaspie’s deception; also read, “Wikileaks, April Glaspie, and Saddam Hussein”) invaded Kuwait consequent to oil disputes and debts from its Gulf-U.S.-instigated war with Iran. As for Iran, it became the subject of harsh American containment and sanction regimes lasting to this very date.

    Another example is the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. While the USSR, China, Arab States, and countless others only condemned but did nothing else as usual, Ronald Reagan, on the other hand, approved and sent his marines to break up the Palestinian Resistance and expel it from Lebanon, which was an Israeli primary objective.

    United States: Reaction to the Russian Invasion of Afghanistan

    When the USSR intervened in Afghanistan in 1979, that country became an American issue instantly. Cold war paradigms played a paramount role in the U.S. response. Not only did the U.S. (with Saudi Arabia’s money) invent so-called Islamist mujahedeen against the Russian “atheists” (operation Cyclone), but also created ad hoc regional “alliances’—similar to those operating in Ukraine today—to counter the Soviet intervention.

    Russia: Reaction to U.S.’s many interventions and invasions 

    When Lyndon Johnson invaded the Dominican Republic (1965), when Ronald Reagan mined the Nicaraguan ports (1981-85), and when George H.W. Bush invaded Panama (1989) and moved its president to U.S. prisons, the USSR reacted by invoking the rules of international law—albeit knowing that said law never mattered to the United States. The Kremlin of Mikhail Gorbachev stated that the invasion is “A flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and norms of relations among states”.

    But did he do anything to hold the U.S. accountable? Gorbachev knew well that words are cheap, and that from an American perspective such charter and norms are ready for activation only when they serve U.S. imperialist purpose. The U.S., of course, did not give a hoot to Gorbachev’s protestation—and that is the problem with Russian leaders: they avoid principled confrontation with the futile expectation that the United States would refrain from bullying Russia. One can spot this tendency when Russian leaders kept calling U.S. and European politicians “our partners” while fully knowing that the recipients are probably smirking in secret.

    Another catastrophic example is Gorbachev’s voting (alongside the United States) for the U.N. Resolution 678 to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait by January 15, 1991. According to my research, that was the first time in which a resolution came with a deadline. Meaning, the United States (and Gorbachev) were in a hurry to implement Bush’s plan for world control.

    Not only did the Gorbachev regime approve Resolution 678, but also approved all U.S. resolutions pertaining to Iraq since the day it invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The statement is important. It means that Gorbachev’s role was structurally fundamental in allowing the United States to become the de facto “chief executive officer” of world affairs. At the same time, his role was also the material instrument in turning Russia into a U.S. vassal for over two decades since the dissolution of the USSR. [After becoming a former president of a superpower, Gorbachev made a living by taking commissioned speeches at various U.S. universities and think tanks]

    From attentively reading Resolution 678, it is very clear that the objective was not about the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. Decisively, it was about the disarming of Iraq for the sake of the Zionist entity in Palestine. In fact, the U.S. bombing of Iraq in 1991 was never meant just to end that occupation by dislodging Iraqi forces from Kuwait. It was enacted to destroy Iraq’s civilian structures and infrastructures, its army, and its nascent military industry including its nuclear capabilities.

    The point: Gorbachev as a convert from communism to capitalism closed his eyes to U.S. objectives in Iraq and the world—these were unimportant to his plan since he obviously tied a deeply altered USSR to the wheel of U.S. imperialism while thinking he and his regime still mattered. With that, he doomed future Russia to protracted hardship and the world to suffer at the hands of U.S. violent imperialists and Zionists.

    The Example of Libya: Zionist hyper-imperialist Barack Obama bombed Libya in 2011. [For the record, the Jerusalem Post (top publication in the Zionist state) called Obama, “An insider’s view: Eight years watching the first Jewish US president”. (Describing Obama as Jewish is irrelevant. He was a Zionist at the service of Israel via a constructed career powered by opportunism and sycophancy) Obama’s bombing of Libya is testimony to Russia’s betrayal of just causes when that suits its calculations.

    Russia of Dmitry Medvedev (and Putin as his prime minister) explicitly accepted the U.S. plan by not vetoing UNSC 1970, and UNSC Resolution 1973 that declared the whole of Libya a No-Fly Zone. Once the resolution was passed, the U.S. (and NATO) transformed it at once into a colossal bombing of that country. (Debating whether Russian’s general conduct toward U.S. tactics was an expression of pragmatism, concession, collusion, or weakness goes beyond the scope of this work. I reported on Lavrov’s statement on the Libyan issue further down in this series.)

    As for the United States, a fascist Hillary Clinton disguised as an “intelligent diplomat” epitomized the U.S. role for government change in Libya as follows. Referring to the brutal murder of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, Obama’s Secretary of State said, “We came, we saw, he died”. Aside from theatrically debasing Mark Anthony’s famous victory exclamation with her crazed laughter, Clinton’s “WE” confirmed the basics: Odyssey Dawn was a code name, not for a romantic beginning for Libya but for Obama’s imperialist war to conquer its oil and depose its leader.

    Two other events are significant for their long-term implications: U.S. invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Regardless of U.S. pretexts, Russia reacted to each invasion differently. In the case of Afghanistan, it sided with the United States in spite of the fact that Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban had nothing to do with the still very much suspicious attack on the United States on September 11, 2021. It is imperative to recall what Tony Blair said prior to the Anglo-American invasion. Media and public records of the British government can confirm that Blair thundered to the Taliban, “Surrender Bin Laden, or lose power”. The Taliban offered to comply if the U.S. could prove that Bin Laden was behind the attack. The U.S. never responded—it just invaded.

    In the case of Iraq, Russia, together with France and Germany, vehemently opposed the planned invasion but only within the realm of the UNSC. The U.S. and Britain invaded nevertheless. Aside from protesting, however, neither Russia nor any other country took any punitive action against the top two imperialist powers. More than that, Russia of the first Putin presidency sent neither weapons nor money to Iraq and Afghanistan to help them fight the invaders. Germany and France did the same. Was that for “solidarity” with invaders or fear from U.S. retribution?

    What is worse, Russia and China had even accepted the U.S.‑imposed U.N. resolution 1483 that crowned the United States and Britain as the occupying powers of Iraq. That acceptance is a moral, historical, and legal blunder that the passing of time will never erase. This how it should be interpreted politically: with the passing of that resolution, Russia and China had not only legalized the U.S. imperialist occupation of Iraq, but also lent international legitimacy to the invasion and it is false motives.

    A question: why did not the United States and Britain try to declare themselves as the occupying powers of Afghanistan? The answer is prompt: look no farther than the Zionist Israeli project to re-shape and control Iraq and other Arab countries via the United States. Accordingly, Afghanistan is not relevant to this scheme.

    To close, I’m not suggesting that interventions by any country are tolerable as long as “A” can do whatever “B” does or vice versa, or, as long as they do not stand in the way of each other. That would void the struggle for a just world system where natural states could enjoy independence and security. Rather, to address persistent questions on the current configuration of the world order, we must tackle first the issue of exclusive entitlement. That is, we like to know according to what rule Russia, China, or any other country should remain mute while the dictatorial, violent hyper-empire continues staking its claim to arrange the world according to its vision? If this rule turns out to be by means of fire, death, and printed money, then we may finally understand the miserable situation of the world today and find all possible means to end it.

    It is no small matter, but the “indispensable nation” [Madeleine Albright’s words] seems to think it deserves this exclusivity. American biblical preachers, hyper-imperialists, multi-term politicians, think tanks, proselytes of all types, military industry, and neophyte politicians seeking promotions within the system, and, before I forget, Zionist neocon empire builders often declare that the U.S. is predestined to rule over others. Biden, a self-declared Zionist has recently re-baptized the notion of U.S. ruling over others when he declared that the U.S. must lead the new world order.

    Another Subject: American ideologues of permanent wars persistently talk about what appears to be a fixed target: Ukraine must win and Russia must lose. What hides behind such frivolous theatrics? First off, why Ukraine must win and Russia must lose? Stating so because Russia intervened in Ukraine is non sequitur. The United States, Britain, France, and Israel have been punching the world with invasions for decades without anyone being able to stop them. Ineluctably, therefore, there should be fundamental reasons for wanting to see Russia lose.

    To begin, U.S. tactics to frame wars in terms of winning and losing is at the very least childish and makes no sense. Further, whereas waging wars of domination are built on a hypothetical model that ends with “we win they lose”, the resulting indoctrination paradigm is invariably translated into an ideological construct whereby winning is a sign of power and losing is a sign weakness. Again, that makes no sense. One could lose not out of weakness or could win not out of strength. In endless situations, winning or losing in any field is a function of varied dynamic and static forces leading to either outcome by default.

    In real context, the fabricated philosophy pivoting around the must-win scenario while discarding potential devastating reactions by a designated adversary is of paramount significance to understand the dangerous mindset of American politicians and war planners. As they prepare pretexts for a war by choice, they completely jump over the possibility that an opposite response could devastate them. How does the process work?

    Read Part 1 and 2.

    The post Imperialism and Anti-imperialism Collide in Ukraine (Part 3 of 16) first appeared on Dissident Voice.

    This post was originally published on Dissident Voice.

  • China sent its vice foreign minister to Pyongyang for a discussion that could set the stage for high-level bilateral engagements including a summit, as North Korea aims to concrete its relations with its regime backer in the face of its economic difficulties.

    “A delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China headed by Sun Weidong, Vice Foreign Minister, arrived in Pyongyang via Sinuiju, on the 25th,” North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency said Friday.

    “He was greeted at the border bridge by the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK and the minister of the embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the DPRK,” KCNA added, referring to North Korea’s formal name.

    The visit comes as China and North Korea mark the 75th anniversary of normalization of bilateral relations. The two countries last month vowed to use this occasion as an opportunity to further upgrade their cooperation in the fields of “mutual interest.”

    Separately, in December, North Korea’s vice foreign minister Pak Myong Ho visited Beijing and met with Sun, as well as China’s foreign minister Wang Yi.

    The meeting was described by the North’s state media as a platform where “both sides exchanged views on strengthening and developing bilateral relations in 2024, marking the 75th anniversary of the establishment of North Korea-China diplomatic relations.”

    The report added that the two sides will continue to discuss ways to enhance their “mutual interest” and “strategic cooperation.”

    Kim In-ae, South Korea’s vice spokesperson for the unification ministry, said in a regular briefing Friday that Seoul saw Sun’s visit as an extension of the December talks, indicating ongoing discussions to further boost cooperation between the two countries. 

    South Korea’s government and parliamentary sources who are familiar with the development, requesting anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter, told Radio Free Asia that there have been constant signs of a summit preparation between China and North Korea since last year. 

    Apart from China, North Korea has recently beefed up its efforts to enhance relations with Russia. In September, for instance, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin held a summit in Russia’s Far East and agreed to upgrade their relations in all fields including economy, technology and military. 

    Since then, accusations have been made that Pyongyang and Moscow are engaged in arms trading, with Ukraine alleging that North Korean missiles have been used in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine – a claim that both Pyongyang and Moscow have denied. 

    China, on the other hand, has kept a distance from the Pyongyang-Moscow cooperation so far, but this might change.

    The sources who talked to RFA said Putin’s possible visit to Pyongyang this year, as discussed during North Korea’s foreign minister Choe Son Hui’s visit to Moscow last week, may expedite a summit between China and North Korea, adding that China is likely to intervene in regional diplomacy to optimize its diplomatic interests.

    Economic hardship 

    North Korea’s economic struggles could be prompting Pyongyang to seek closer ties with regional allies. 

    Its leader Kim made a rare acknowledgement this week of the dire state of his country’s economy, labeling the economic problem as a “serious political issue.”

    His government revealed the “inability to provide even basic necessities such as food, groceries, and consumer goods to the local people,” Kim said, adding that the “overall local economy is currently in a very pitiful state, lacking even basic conditions.”

    2024-01-24T230935Z_1824506880_RC2NO5AUNBKL_RTRMADP_3_NORTHKOREA-POLITICS.JPG
    North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attends the 19th expanded political bureau meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which was held from Jan 23 to 24, in Pyongyang, North Korea, in this image released by the Korean Central News Agency on Jan. 25, 2024. (KCNA via Reuters)

    North Korea’s economy contracted for the third consecutive year in 2022, according to the South’s Statistics Korea report in December. The latest available data showed a 0.2% year-on-year drop in North Korea’s GDP in 2022, following a 0.1 % decrease in 2021, and a 4.5 % contraction in 2020.

    But the North’s economic hardship may be eased this year, with support from its regime backers, according to the Korea Development Institute.

    The Seoul-based think tank said in a report released earlier this month that North Korea’s economy could experience a turnaround, contingent on economic support from China and Russia. 

    It also noted that resuming and expanding tourism cooperation with China and Russia is one of Pyongyang’s prioritized economic goals for this year.

    Pressure from Seoul

    Besides economic difficulties, Pyongyang is also facing intensified diplomatic pressure from South Korea on the international stage.

    Kim Gunn, South Korea’s Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs, for instance, requested the support of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in raising international awareness about North Korea’s human rights issues during his visit to Geneva on Thursday. 

    The South Korean envoy “lamented North Korea’s intensification of social control and oppression to support its military buildup at the expense of the economy and people’s livelihoods,” the South’s foreign ministry said in a statement Friday, at his meeting with with the Acting United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Nada Al-Nashif.

    Separately, Kim Gunn also visited the E.U. headquarters in Brussels on Tuesday and emphasized the necessity of collective responses, proposing collaboration in blocking funding for North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. 

    Edited by Taejun Kang and Mike Firn.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Lee Jeong-Ho for RFA.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • ANALYSIS: By Tess Newton Cain

    As the new year gets underway, now is the time to look ahead to what will be significant in the Pacific islands region. Chances are this part of the world will continue to be a focus for the media and commentariat who will view what happens through their own lenses.

    However, more now than ever, it is imperative to see the events of the Pacific in their context, with the nuance that allows for them to be more fully understood.

    The Pacific will play a small part in the year in which more than half of the global population will go to the polls. We have already seen Dr Hilda Heine sworn in as the 10th President of Marshall Islands following elections late last year.

    Next cab off the rank is Tuvalu, with voting to take place at the end of January. Of particular interest here is how, if at all, a change of government might affect the future of the Falepili Union with Australia that was signed in November 2023.

    Perhaps most closely watched will be the elections in Solomon Islands, scheduled to take place in April. The Sogavare government is now in caretaker mode, but a date for the polls is yet to be announced.

    These are the first general elections since the controversial “switch” in 2019 which saw diplomatic relations between Solomon Islands and Taiwan come to an end and China established as a leading development and security partner for Sogavare’s government.

    It is hard to know how significant this switch will be for voters more than three years down the track. Sogavare can point to last year’s Pacific Games as a stellar achievement for his government and one in which the support of China was key.

    Largely irrelevant outside Honiara
    But this is unlikely to have much resonance for those Solomon Islanders who live outside Honiara and for whom the games were largely irrelevant.

    Other Pacific island countries holding elections this year are Palau (November) and Kiribati (date to be confirmed).

    In addition, Vanuatu is expected to hold its first-ever referendum on proposed constitutional changes intended to address chronic political instability.

    The issue of security will continue to be vexed in 2024 in the Pacific islands region. As we have seen in recent years, narratives around climate change and those centred on “traditional” security concerns will become increasingly enmeshed.

    The apparent acceptance of the significance of climate change as a security threat by partners such as the US is no doubt welcome. However, it is not enough to assuage concern among those who warn against the increased militarisation of the region.

    Preliminary findings from the Rules of Engagement project led by Associate Professor Anna Powles and I show that “defence diplomacy” has become an important aspect of international engagement with Pacific island countries. We can expect this to continue throughout this year.

    We need to understand better the extent to which these engagements add to feelings of security and safety in Pacific communities and how, if at all, they influence how Pacific people feel about the relationships between their countries and their international partners.

    Internal security threats
    As we have seen already this year, internal security threats will be front of mind in Papua New Guinea, and likely elsewhere in the region. Given the mix of cost-of-living pressures, political instability, and a febrile (social) media environment fuelled by rumour and counter-rumour, maintaining social cohesion will become increasingly challenging.

    With globalisation in retreat and geopolitical competition on the rise, there is every reason to expect that the high tempo of international strategic engagement with Pacific policymakers, businesses, civil society leaders, and communities will continue throughout 2024.

    While this provides numerous opportunities to secure resources for development and other initiatives, it can also create a serious burden in terms of transaction costs, particularly for small resource-constrained administrations.

    Last year, the government of Solomon Islands announced that it would have a “block out” period during which senior officials are unavailable to meet with visiting delegations. This is an approach that could be beneficial for other countries to preserve valuable time for budget preparation or key policy work.

    At the regional level, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) is still in the process of determining how best to manage the increased attention the organisation is receiving from countries that want to become dialogue partners. There are currently six applications awaiting consideration (Denmark, Ecuador, Israel, Portugal, Saudi Arabia and Ukraine).

    Last year at the PIF Leaders Meeting it was made clear that the ongoing review of regional architecture includes a refreshed framework for engagement with dialogue partners — one that is led and driven by Pacific priorities.

    In conclusion, 2024 holds both challenges and opportunities for the Pacific islands region. With elections, security concerns, and regionalism on the agenda, policymakers, businesses, civil society leaders, and communities must work together to tackle these issues.

    Tess Newton Cain is the project lead for the Pacific Hub at the Griffith Asia Institute and is an associate of the Development Policy Centre. The author’s Pacific Predictions have been produced annually since 2012. Republished under a Creative Commons licence.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • South Korea has intensified its diplomatic efforts against North Korea and China, strengthening its alliance with the European Union in Brussels to counter threats from Pyongyang, while confronting Beijing at the United Nations over the repatriation of North Korean defectors. 

    Kim Gunn, South Korea’s Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs, visited the E.U. headquarters in Brussels on Tuesday and emphasized the necessity of collaborative responses to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile threats, the South’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement Wednesday.

    Kim, who participated in the E.U. Political and Security Committee, strongly denounced the reported arms deal and technology cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow, calling them “clear violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions.” 

    The South Korean envoy also emphasized that the alleged Pyongyang-Moscow cooperation  illustrates the “inseparable connection between the security of the Indo-Pacific region and Europe.”

    Pyongyang has beefed up its efforts to bolster ties with key regime backers, notably Russia, indicating its intent to solidify its support network. For instance, Russian President Vladimir Putin met North Korea’s Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui in Moscow last week and vowed to closely collaborate on efforts to jointly deal with global security matters.

    Choe’s visit to Russia came amid accusations that Pyongyang and Moscow are engaged in arms trading, with Ukraine alleging that North Korean missiles have been used in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine – a claim that both Pyongyang and Moscow have denied. 

    Referring to the alleged arms trade, Kim said that Seoul and Brussels must “closely coordinate and take resolute actions against North Korea’s unlawful activities that pose a significant threat to peace and stability in both the Korean Peninsula and Europe.”

    In particular, the envoy proposed collaboration in blocking funding for North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. 

    Earlier this month, South Korea imposed a new set of unilateral sanctions against North Korea, adding ships, such as the New Konk and Unica, which had already been sanctioned by the European Union in 2022, to its unilateral sanctions list. This move was widely seen as a move by Seoul to align its sanctions with international entities.

    Hours after South Korea’s diplomatic push in the E.U., North Korea launched a series of cruise missiles, according to the South’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

    “North Korea launched several cruise missiles into the West Sea [Yellow Sea],” the JCS said in a statement on Wednesday. “Detailed specifications and other information are currently undergoing precise analysis by the authorities.”

    Separately, in Geneva, South Korea escalated its diplomatic pressure on China, North Korea’s biggest regime backer. During a U.N. review session, Seoul urged China to safeguard the human rights of North Korean defectors.

    At the fourth Universal Periodic Review, or UPR, for China held under the auspices of the United Nations Human Rights Council, South Korean Ambassador Yun Seong-deok urged Beijing to provide North Korean defectors with the required protections and humanitarian support.  

    The UPR is a mechanism that requires each U.N. member state to undergo a peer review of its human rights record every four-and-a-half years.

    Yun asked China to halt the forced repatriation of North Korean defectors and to consider establishing its own refugee law as part of efforts to adhere to the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, which sets out the rights of refugees and the international standards for their protection.

    It was Seoul’s first time to have raised the issue at the U.N. peer-review process against China. 

    Ahead of China’s fourth UPR, Seoul sent written questions to Beijing to inquire about its stance on the issue of North Korean defectors.

    China repatriated more than 500 North Koreans shortly after the Hangzhou Asian Games last year, multiple sources working to rescue North Koreans in China had told Radio Free Asia.

    Edited by Taejun Kang and Mike Firn.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Lee Jeong-Ho for RFA.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • It appears that the China Coast Guard could have reached its limit in terms of size and utility. Within the space of a decade the China Coast Guard (CCG) has become the largest coast guard force in the world. It was created by unifying five different maritime constabulary forces and allocated a huge number of […]

    The post Has the China Coast Guard Reached Its Limit? appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.