Category: China

  • Social psychosis is widespread.  In the words of the British psychiatrist, R. D. Laing, “The condition of alienation, of being asleep, of being unconscious, of being out of one’s mind, is the condition of the normal man.”

    He was not referring to raving, drooling, hitting-your-head-against-the-wall lunacy but a taken-for-granted acceptance of a world long teetering on the edge of nuclear extinction, to take the most extreme example, but surely only one of many.  The insouciant acceptance and support of psychotic rulers who promote first-strike nuclear war is very common.  First strike nuclear policy is United States policy.

    I recently wrote an article about the dangers of the fourteen U.S. Trident submarines.  These subs constantly cruise under the oceans carrying 3,360 nuclear warheads equivalent to 134,400 Hiroshima bombs.  All are on first strike triggers.  And, of course, these are supplemented by all the land and air based nukes.  My point was not very complicated: now that the United States government has abrogated all nuclear weapons treaties and continues to escalate its war against Russia in Ukraine, we are closer to nuclear annihilation than ever before.

    This conclusion is shared by many esteemed thinkers such as the late Daniel Ellsberg who died  on June 16, 2023 and whose 2017 book The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner, makes clear that nuclear war, waged intentionally or by mistake or accident, is very possible. In the months before he died, he warned that this is now especially true with the situation in Ukraine and the U.S. provocations against China.

    The Grayzone’s Max Blumenthal recently addressed the UN Security Council on the danger of U.S. actions in Ukraine and asked:

    Will we see another Douma deception, but this time in Zaporizhzhia?

    Why are we doing this? Why are we tempting nuclear annihilation by flooding Ukraine with advanced weapons and sabotaging negotiations at every turn?

    Finian Cunningham has just raised the specter of a thermonuclear catastrophe initiated by a U.S./Ukrainian false flag attack on the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant.

    So my article was in no way unusual, except for my concentration on the Trident submarines.

    When, against my better judgment, I read some commentators’ responses to my piece at a few websites where my article was posted, I was taken aback when I read the following [all emphases are mine]:

    • Like many other boomers, Edward J Curtin Jr is caught up in ‘nuclear terror’ … whereas on 4chan you see that a large portion of the young generation has come to accept the massive evidence that Hiroshima & Nagasaki were chemically firebombed like Tokyo, and ‘nuclear weapons’ most likely do not exist at all. The 10 alleged ‘nuclear powers’ have had reasons to hoax together, just like the global collusion on ‘covid’ & ‘vaccines’.
    • So, the point is? Subs with nukes have been cruising around the world’s oceans for over 60 years, back to the time when they tried to scare us with the Cuban missile crisis. I was on a fast attack sub during the Vietnam war, friend of mine got boomer duty, which is what they call the ones that carry the missiles. They’re there for show, they aren’t going to use them. Yes, they should be banned internationally, just in case. But as with the Nuremberg trials and principles, that’s not nearly enough. We’re going to need to create our own New World Order
    • This is the way the world ends
      This is the way the world ends
      This is the way the world ends
      Not with a bang but a whimper

            I vote for the bang!

    • The nuke is exaggerated. Reality is that too many will survive a nuclear WWIII.
      There will still be too many useless eaters and psychos left in the underground bunkers no matter how many nukes we drop. Like Chernobyl it will only develop to paradises for animals, natives and homeless on food stamps, while we the exceptionals will suffer from an underground life for 50 years without seeing natural light . A global virus and for double insurance a coupled vaxx, will be a much more effective tool to clean the filth and double shareholders profit..,
    • Dear Ed the sea monsters about as real as nukes.
    • Another one of the “elites” hoaxes.

    To hear that there are no nuclear weapons and never were; to learn that some in their embrace of nihilism hope for a nuclear holocaust; to read that nuclear weapons are never going to be used because they only exist for show – well, this at least confirmed my suspicion that many who comment on articles are either bonkers or trolls or both.  Some probably have nothing better to do than inform writers how wrong they are.  It frightened me.  It made me wonder how many of the millions of silent ones think similarly or have come to embrace hopelessness as a way of life – the feeling that they have no power because that has been drilled into them from birth.  I have long thought that cultural normality can be understood as the use of one’s freedom to create a prison, a cell in which one can convince oneself that one is safe because the authorities have established a sacred umbrella to protect one from an apocalyptic hard rain that they never think is going to fall.

    The Pew Research Center recently surveyed the American public on their sixteen greatest fears.  Nuclear war was not one them.  It was as if nuclear weapons did not exist, as if they have been buried in the cellar of public awareness.  As if Mad Magazine’s  Alfred E. Newman’s motto was the national motto: “What? Me worry?”  No doubt more Americans are aware of the gross public spectacle of Joey Chestnut stuffing his mouth with sixty-five hot dogs in ten minutes than they are of the Biden administration’s insane escalation toward nuclear war in Ukraine.  We live in Guy Debord’s “Society of the Spectacle.”

    Although he was writing years ago, Ronald Laing’s words sound ironically prescient today after so many years of endless propaganda, the destruction of human experience resulting in destructive behavior, and the relentless diminishment of human beings to the status of machines:

    At this moment in history, we are all caught in the hell of frenetic passivity. We find ourselves threatened by extermination that will be reciprocal, that no one wishes, that everyone fears, that may just happen to us ‘because’ no one knows how to stop it. There is one possibility of doing so if we can understand the structure of this alienation of ourselves from our experience, our experience from our deeds, our deeds from human authorship. Everyone will be carrying out orders. Where do they come from? Always from elsewhere. Is it still possible to reconstitute our destiny out of the hellish and inhuman fatality?

    That is the key question now that more than fifty years have elapsed since Laing penned those words in his now classic book, The Politics of Experience (isbn.nu)He said then, which is exponentially truer today, that “machines are already becoming better at communicating with each other than human beings with each other.”  Talking about deep things has become passé for so many.

    If we don’t start worrying and unlove the machines, we are doomed sooner or later.  Sooner is probable.  Nuclear weapons are very real.  They are poised and ready to fly.  If we continue to live in denial of the madness of those who provoke their use while calmly promoting first-strike policies as the U.S. government does, we are worse than fools.  We are suicidal.

    As Daniel Ellsberg told us, “Don’t wait ‘till the bombs are actually falling.”  That will be too late.  There is no doubt that before a nuclear war can happen, we must go insane, normally so.

    Let’s make the few protest voices in the wilderness the cries of hundreds of millions:

    End nuclear weapons now before they end us.

    Stop escalating the war in Ukraine now.

    Make peace with Russia and China now.

    “There is such a thing as being too late,” Martin Luther King, Jr. told us on April 4, 1967, one year to the day before he was assassinated in a U.S. government plot.

    “We still have a choice today: nonviolent coexistence or violent coannihilation.”

    This post was originally published on Dissident Voice.

  • U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen touched down in Beijing on Thursday and ate at a popular Yunnan restaurant with the U.S. ambassador before meeting with key officials on Friday.

    Yellen met with China’s central bank governor Yi Gang, former economy point-man Liu He and State Premier Li Qiang on Friday to discuss the global, U.S. and Chinese economies.

    In prepared remarks, Yellen told Li she hoped her visit would spur more regular channels of communication between the world’s two largest economies, adding that both countries had a duty to “show leadership” on global challenges such as climate change.

    She said Washington would “in certain circumstances, need to pursue targeted actions to protect its national security,” but disagreements over such moves should not jeopardize the broader relationship.

    “We seek healthy economic competition that is not winner-take-all but that, with a fair set of rules, can benefit both countries over time,” she said.

    Separately, speaking at the American Chamber of Commerce on Friday, Yellen noted concerns in the U.S. business community. 

    “I am communicating the concerns that I’ve heard from the U.S. business community, including China’s use of non-market tools like expanded subsidies for its state-owned enterprises and domestic firms, as well as barriers to market access for foreign firms,” she said.

    Meanwhile, in a sign of a possible thaw in China-U.S. relations, the usually provocative nationalist state tabloid Global Times asked in a tweet, what’s Yellen’s “preferred choice of food while in China?

    “It seems that Yunnan cuisine takes the top spot, as a popular Yunnan restaurant in Beijing’s Sanlitun area recently shared a picture of Yellen using chopsticks to enjoy a meal shortly after her arrival in Beijing on Thursday.”

    Yellen is in Beijing amid a flurry of visits aimed at breaking the ice between Washington and Beijing after the U.S. military shot down a Chinese government balloon over the United States.

    Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Beijing in late June and U.S. climate envoy John Kerry will visit Beijing later this month Bloomberg reported.

    Mediating influence

    Yellen has a near “mission impossible” – to convince China that its measures in the interests of state security, restricting technology exports to China, are not intended to harm China’s interests as a rising nation state.

    But Chinese state media showed signs that Beijing may be in the mood for compromise – at least when it comes to trade and investment.

    China’s Global Times, in an uncharacteristically positive turn, editorialized that even though U.S. officials are downplaying any expectations from Yellen’s visit, “Chinese experts believe that one major point of significance of Yellen’s trip is to keep high-level communication channels open, which may help bilateral relations walk out of their downward spiral.”

    YellenWalks.JPG
    U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen walks after arriving at Beijing Capital International Airport in Beijing, China, Thursday, July 6, 2023. Credit: Mark Schiefelbein/Pool via Reuters

    Ahead of Yellen’s visit, in a response to restrictions on China’s access to high-technology semiconductor chips, on Monday, China announced it was restricting exports of two critical components in the chips that modern life runs on.

    “This is just the beginning,” Wei Jianguo, a former Chinese vice-minister of commerce, told the China Daily. “China’s tool box has many more types of measures available.”

    The trade and investment entanglement of China and the U.S. makes what the U.S. is now referring to as “de-risking,” rather than decoupling, hugely complex due to the entangled nature of the two nations’ trade.

    Firm on security

    It’s likely Beijing may think that accepting Yellen’s visit and appearing to be more receptive, as opposed to the cooler reception Secretary of State Antony Blinken received, could give the U.S. pause for thought about its tech restrictions.

    But Yellen reiterated that her mission, like Blinken’s, was to open up lines of communication and avoid a catastrophic confrontation between the world’s two leading superpowers.

    “I am glad to be in Beijing to meet with Chinese officials and business leaders. We seek a healthy economic competition that benefits American workers and firms and to collaborate on global challenges,” Yellen said in a tweet.

    “We will take action to protect our national security when needed, and this trip presents an opportunity to communicate and avoid miscommunication or misunderstanding.”

    A possible thaw

    “Yellen is a more rational voice on China issues within the Biden administration,” Wu Xinbo, dean of the Institute of International Studies at Shanghai’s Fudan University told The Wall Street Journal.

    But her visit comes amid “unsafe” moves in the South China Sea, a war of words over Chinese fentanyl exports, revelations of a multibillion-dollar Chinese spy base in Cuba and daily military harassment of Taiwan.

    Wendy Cutler, a former diplomat and Vice President at the Asia Society Policy Institute, talking to Taiwan +, an English-language TV news service, said of Yellen’s visit, “No 1, she has to go through the list of U.S. grievances, including their recent announcement of [export restrictions on] two critical minerals, the way U.S. companies are being treated in China and recent legislation to create more uncertainty in the business climate.”

    Cutler added that, as Yellen has previously pointed out, the U.S. doesn’t seek to decouple the two superpower’s economies, but “there are sectors of national security concern [and] we’re not going to be shy about protecting that.”

    Back to business

    Yellen took a jab at China’s planned economy, saying that Beijing should return to the era of market reforms that former leader Deng Xiaoping ushered in and which led to decades of rocket-fueled economic growth.

    “A shift toward market reforms would be in China’s interests,” Yellen told U.S. business executives on Friday, according to reports.

    “A market-based approach helped spur rapid growth in China and helped lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. This is a remarkable economic success story,” Yellen added.

    YellenBusinessLeaders.JPG
    U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen meets with representatives of the U.S. business community in China, in Beijing, July 7, 2023. Credit: Reuters/Thomas Peter

    Yellen said that China’s vast middle-class was a market for American goods and services, again stressing that Washington’s bevy of restrictions on trade against China were about national security and not holding back Chinese development.

    “We seek to diversify, not to decouple,” she said. “A decoupling of the world’s two largest economies would be destabilizing for the global economy, and it would be virtually impossible to undertake.”

    Edited by Mike Firn.

    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Chris Taylor for RFA.

  • Unverified imagery being circulated on Chinese social media have indicated that aerospace prime Chengdu Aircraft Industries Company (CAC) have successfully test-flown a new variant of the J-20 stealth fighter with two new indigenously developed Shenyang Woshan-15 (WS-15) turbofan engines for the first time. Images purportedly linked to the test event, which is understood to have […]

    The post China hints at indigenous engine breakthrough for J-20 appeared first on Asian Military Review.

  • Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare will head to China this weekend for his second visit to the Asian superpower in four years, an official from the island nation’s foreign ministry confirmed Friday, underlining U.S.-China rivalry in the Pacific region.

    China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin announced the week-long visit at a regular ministry press conference on Thursday, though the government in Honiara is yet to issue a statement about the trip.

    A Solomon Islands foreign ministry official told BenarNews that Sogavare will travel to Beijing on Sunday.

    “The leaders of the two countries will have in-depth exchanges of views on bilateral relations and international and regional issues of mutual interest,” Wang said at the press conference. Sogavare will visit Beijing, Jiangsu and Guangdong, he said.

    The Solomon Islands, home to about 700,000 people, has become a focal point of China-U.S. rivalry in the Pacific. Under Sogavare, it switched its diplomatic recognition to Beijing from Taiwan in 2019 and signed a secretive security pact with China last year, alarming the United States and allies such as Australia. 

    Sogavare’s trip to China comes after Australia offered to extend its military and police deployment in the Solomon Islands. The Pacific island country is preparing to host a regional sporting event later this year – bankrolled by China, Australia and Indonesia – and hold postponed elections in the first half of 2024. 

    Australia sent more than 200 troops and police to the Solomon Islands in late 2021 at the request of Sogavare’s government following anti-China and anti-government riots in the capital Honiara. So far, the Solomons Islands government has neither publicly accepted nor rejected Australia’s offer.

    The Sogavare government’s apparent secrecy about the trip to China has caused some disquiet in the Solomon Islands.

    Honiara resident Wilson Kako, enjoying a public holiday to mark Solomon Islands’ Independence Day, said previous prime ministers usually announced their overseas travel to the public several days beforehand.

    “I have issues when such big and important visits are kept secret or unannounced,” he said. “This has left many of us wondering whether this trip is for the good of the nation or for the prime minister’s personal interest only.” 

    kako.jpg
    Wilson Kako, pictured in Honiara on July 7, 2023, said he was concerned that the Solomon Islands government had not announced details of Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare’s visit to China. Credit: Gina Maka’a/BenarNews

    Jason Mone, however, said he was happy that Sogavare would visit China because the country had helped change the image of the Solomon Islands.

    “Development is what every Solomon Islander wants,” he said.

    China’s influence in the Pacific has burgeoned over several decades through a combination of increased trade, infrastructure investment and aid as it seeks to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and gain allies in international institutions. The Pacific island nation of Kiribati also switched its diplomatic recognition to China from Taiwan in 2019.

    Both China and Australia have been training Solomon Islands police and donating equipment, including water cannons gifted by China and guns courtesy of Australia. The most recent largesse – in the past week – included seven Nissan X-Trail SUVs from Australia as well as night-vision devices, drones, a wireless signal jammer and two vehicles from China. 

    Wang, at the press conference, said relations between China and Solomon Islands have grown rapidly since they established diplomatic relations in 2019. 

    Sogavare’s visit, Wang said, will provide “new impetus” to further develop China-Solomon Islands ties. The visit will be an “opportunity to deepen political mutual trust, expand practical cooperation and enhance cultural and people-to-people exchange,” he said.

    BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated online news organization.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Gina Maka’a for BenarNews.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Fan Wennan (China), 中国 2098: 太阳照常升起 (‘China 2098: The Sun Rises Just the Same’), 2019–2022.

    At the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development held in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), member states decided to replace the Millennium Development Goals (established in 2000) with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The first SDG was to ‘end poverty in all its forms everywhere’. Despite the enthusiastic verbiage, it was clear that poverty was simply not going to be ended across the world. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the data showed that poverty had become intractable.

    In October 2022, the UN Development Programme and the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative released its 2022 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index report, which showed that at least 1.2 billion people in 111 developing countries live in acute multidimensional poverty. The ‘deprivation bundles’ referred to in the full title of the report explore how a range of necessary facilities are absent for over a billion people. For example, the report notes, ‘Almost half of poor people (470.1 million) are deprived in both nutrition and sanitation, potentially making them more vulnerable to infectious diseases. In addition, over half of poor people (593.3 million) are simultaneously deprived in both cooking fuel and electricity’. These ‘deprivation bundles’ – the absence of both electricity and clean cooking fuel, for instance – amplify the low incomes earned by billions of people.

    In 2017, the World Bank determined that the income threshold for poverty, which had been set at $1.90 per day, was far too low. They set the new poverty line at $2.15 per day, which accounted for over 700 million people. The World Bank’s 2022 Poverty and Shared Prosperity report showed, using data from 2019, that if the poverty line is set at $3.65 a day, 23 percent of the world lives in poverty, and if the line is set at $6.85 a day, then almost half of the world’s population (47 percent) lives below the poverty line. These numbers are horrifying.

    Fan Wennan, (China), 嫦娥同志 (‘Comrade Cháng’é’), 2022.

    What is extraordinary is that the UN report on deprivation bundles did not refer to the programme to eradicate extreme poverty in China. On 25 February 2021, the Chinese government announced that the last 100 million people living below the poverty line had been lifted above it by the efforts of the Chinese people, thereby ending absolute poverty in China. In June 2021, the authors of China’s submission for the voluntary national review of the SDGs wrote, ‘All the 98.99 million rural residents living under the current poverty line have been lifted out of poverty, marking the realisation of poverty eradication goal of the 2030 Agenda 10 years ahead of schedule’. ‘The rice bowl of the Chinese people’, the review noted, ‘is held firmly in their own hands’. A few months later, UN Secretary General António Guterres lauded China’s ‘strong commitment and significant progress to eradicate poverty in all forms and dimensions, one of the world’s leading challenges’. Even a study by a former UN official which contested some of the Chinese data nonetheless accepted the enormity of this achievement. In April 2022, the World Bank and China’s Development Research Centre of the State Council released an important study, Four Decades of Poverty Reduction in China, which tracked the trajectory of this historic achievement. And yet, the UN report neglected to highlight that the Chinese had eradicated absolute poverty, nor did it offer an assessment of how they did so.

    Fan Wennan (China), 中国2098: 迎回家 (‘China 2098: Welcome Home’), 2019–2022.

    At Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, we have been very interested in China’s project to abolish absolute poverty. In July 2021, we published a study entitled Serve the People: The Eradication of Extreme Poverty in China, which looked into the methods used by the Chinese state and by Chinese social institutions to break the back of what the UN’s Guterres called ‘one of the world’s leading challenges’. China’s achievement, we wrote, ‘is neither a miracle nor a coincidence, but rather a testament to its socialist commitment’. That phrase – ‘socialist commitment’ – governs our understanding of what has occurred in China since 1949. We explore this idea of China’s ‘socialist commitment’ and the eradication of extreme poverty in issue no. 2 of the international edition of Wenhua Zongheng, ‘China’s Path from Extreme Poverty to Socialist Modernisation’. This issue contains three important essays:

    1. ‘Socialism 3.0: The Practice and Prospects of Socialism in China’ by the Longway Foundation
    2. ‘The Battle Against Poverty: An Alternative Revolutionary Practice in China’s Post-Revolutionary Era’ by Li Xiaoyun and Yang Chengxue
    3. ‘How Targeted Poverty Alleviation Has Changed the Structure of Rural Governance in China’ by Wang Xiaoyi

    The articles by the Longway Foundation and by Li Xiaoyun and Yang Chengxue foreground the importance of poverty alleviation throughout the historical stages of China’s socialist project, with the dual strategy of transforming the relations of production and expanding social wealth. Li and Yang emphasise the role of the Communist Party of China (CPC) during the targeted phase of the poverty alleviation campaign, which took place under President Xi Jinping and included the participation of 800,000 cadre in surveys carried out in 2014, the dispatching of three million cadres who went to live in the poor villages for at least two years, and the 1,800 cadre who died during this fight against poverty. This enormous transformation, led by the CPC, re-established the party’s moral authority and brought the issue of socialism and social justice to the centre of Chinese discussions.

    Wang Xiaoyi takes us to the countryside, where the problems of poverty once seemed intractable, and looks at how rural areas had been hollowed out by mass migrations and rural institutions impoverished during the post-1978 reform period. Central to the programme to eradicate extreme poverty, Wang points out, was the rebuilding of rural institutions, which was enabled by the transfer of three million CPC cadre to the countryside, mobilised by experiments that drew from the campaign-style governance of the Mao Zedong era. Wang hopes that the new rural infrastructure created by the programme to eradicate extreme poverty will remain in place, including the ‘high level of villagers’ participation in public affairs’ through their village committees.

    Fan Wennan (China), 中国2098: 塔里木湖南段––若羌 (‘China 2098: Tarim Hunan Section – Ruoqiang Pumping Station’), 2019–2022.

    A key point made by the essays in this second issue of Wenhua Zongheng is that the principle of socialism and the socialist infrastructure – especially the CPC – that enabled it are central to the eradication of extreme poverty. It will be difficult for the Chinese path to socialist modernisation to be seen as a model to be adopted by other countries unless these countries also ground their programmes on a socialist footing. Poverty was not eradicated by cash transfer schemes or by rural medical programmes alone, though these are valuable policy options: it was eradicated by a socialist commitment to take ideas such as dignity and realise them in the world.

    When our team of researchers went to the Wangjia community in Guizhou Province to track the programmes to eradicate extreme poverty, they met He Ying, who became a CPC leader during her attempt to lift herself from being a poor migrant labourer. A member of the All-China Women’s Federation, He Ying described how she works with newly migrated peasant women to give them the confidence to transform their reality. Village life of the old kind is behind them. He Ying now lives in a community of housing complexes that have kindergartens, elementary and middle schools, and community health centres. As she showed us photographs of her former home, old and dilapidated, she said – without romanticism but with a sense of loyalty – ‘I’ll bring my children back to my old village so that they can remember the life of yesterday and cherish the life of today’.

    This post was originally published on Dissident Voice.

  • The authorities have put a price on activists who fled abroad. They are speaking out anyway – governments must do likewise

    Unless the forces of history conspire in their favour, the fate of most exiled dissidents is a slow fade into obscurity. However admirable their cause or brilliant their tactics, it is hard to maintain the world’s interest and support as time passes. Hong Kong’s exiles are conscious of this problem. But it is Hong Kong’s government which has catapulted them back into the spotlight, by placing a bounty of 1m Hong Kong dollars each – around £100,000 – on eight activists. Three of them – Nathan Law, Finn Lau and Mung Siu-tat – now live in the UK.

    They were part of the massive uprising that wanted Beijing to uphold the promise it made at the handover in 1997: that Hong Kong could enjoy its way of life and freedoms until 2047. After the authorities crushed resistance there, they tried to keep alive the cause from overseas. For this, they are accused of collusion with foreign forces, incitement of secession, and subversion. Hong Kong’s chief executive, John Lee, has said the city will pursue them “to the ends of the earth”, and that they must “live in fear” – all for peaceful political advocacy.

    Continue reading…

    This post was originally published on Human rights | The Guardian.

  • A 2-inch (50.8 mm) gallium oxide wafer is displayed at Hangzhou International Science and Technology Innovation Center of Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province on May 30, 2022. Photo: VCG

    A 2-inch (50.8 mm) gallium oxide wafer is displayed at Hangzhou International Science and Technology Innovation Center of Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province on May 30, 2022. Photo: VCG

    The measures taken by China in recent years to safeguard national security and interests have often been subjected to excessive interpretation and reaction from the US and Western countries. The recent decision by China to implement export controls on gallium and germanium-related items is no exception. Although Chinese authorities have said this is a common international practice and not targeted at any specific country, certain countries have felt “targeted,” leading to a series of doubts, questions, and even accusations.

    There are mainly two points that these people are criticizing about. First, they believe that China is indeed targeting specific countries by precisely counterattacking the semiconductor equipment export controls imposed by the US, Japan and the Netherlands. Does this contradict China’s consistent opposition to the abuse of export controls? Second, they claim China’s actions may violate regulations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and are detrimental to the stability of the semiconductor supply chain. Both of these points are baseless.

    Whether it is a precise counterattack against the discriminatory policies of the US, Japan, and the Netherlands toward China can be left for them to ponder. It is nothing wrong to make those who have done bad things to China feel uneasy and unsettled. Gallium and germanium are key raw materials used in the production of semiconductors, missile systems, solar cells, and other high-tech products. If China exports them to these countries, but they prohibit the export of high-tech products made from these materials to China, this is clearly unfair in terms of trade. If the US uses them to produce high-end military equipment, it may even pose a threat to China’s national security. China’s export control is justifiable in terms of reason and law. It needs to be emphasized that this is entirely different from the US’ abuse of export controls.

    China’s export control measures have always adhered to the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and non-discrimination, and are committed to maintaining the security and stability of the global production and supply chains. As for whether these measures violate WTO regulations this time, it is more of a technical issue. China is recognized as an exemplary member of the WTO, in sharp contrast with the US, who has trampled on WTO rules and principles. Despite having larger reserves of germanium than China, the US has protected germanium as a defense reserve resource since 1984 and has hardly conducted any mining activities. In a sense, China’s implementation of export controls on gallium and germanium may have come a bit late. China has no reason to excessively deplete its strategic resources to meet the demands of unfriendly countries.

    Currently, there is an abnormal phenomenon in the international community. The US has engaged in too many acts of undermining international rules and seems to be unconcerned about the accumulating “debts.” It is a bit taken for granted. On the other hand, China’s legitimate actions are often magnified and exaggerated by external forces. What’s even more despicable is that the US often takes the lead in pointing fingers at China, without any sense of guilt or shame. The US, which seriously lacks a moral bottom line in the international arena, enjoys morally blackmailing China, which is truly absurd. Dealing with such a US, China also needs to adapt.

    To contain and suppress China, the US has imposed various export restrictions on China to an unprecedented extent, and these restrictions are escalating and expanding. There are currently no signs of any easing or cessation. It is reported that the Biden administration is considering a new round of high-tech investment bans on China. When the US treats China in this way, it should not expect China to remain silent and not fight back; that is impossible. However, China will not be as unscrupulous and rule-breaking as the US. Nevertheless, we do have a considerable toolbox to retaliate and make countries that harm China’s interests pay a price.

    The US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen is about to visit China. Is China announcing the export control measures at this time to give Yellen a warning? This is overthinking. China doesn’t need to do this, but it will not postpone or cancel planned measures just because a senior US official is coming to create a favorable atmosphere. That’s how things stand. The people who are most dramatic about China’s every move are often the ones with the strongest malicious intent toward China. Their interpretations are bound to be distorted, so it is necessary to make them feel uncomfortable.

    This post was originally published on Dissident Voice.

  • China continues to be battered by extreme weather, with extensive flooding in the Southwest and an ongoing heatwave that is putting pressure on electricity supplies in the North.

    The mercury began hitting unseasonal record levels in May and June of this year, with peak electricity demand recorded in late May, a month earlier than last year and Shanghai recording a 150-year-record-high temperature for the month on May 29 at 36.7 C (98 F), eclipsing the previous high of 35.7 C (96.3 F) recorded in May 1876.

    A red alert – the highest in a three-tier alert system – was issued for Beijing on Thursday, while Hebei and Henan provinces expected to see temperatures hit 40 degrees and above.

    000_33MN682.jpg
    A boy plays with jets of water amid hot weather in Beijing, China, July 5, 2023. Credit: Pedro Pardo/AFP

    Employers in Beijing were ordered to stop work outdoors on Thursday with the heat in the capital forecast to reach 40 C (104 F).

    Government departments were ordered to ensure the elderly and ill could stay cool in Beijing.

    In the Southwest – in particular in Sichuan Province and the Chongqing municipality, an urban sprawl of some 31 million people – floods swept away vehicles and homes, leading to 15 deaths and four missing on Wednesday.

    Tens of thousands of people have been displaced so far in Sichuan Province alone, with the authorities predicting that heavy rains are expected in at least 11 of China’s 31 provinces.

    2023-07-05T004012Z_1541779099_RC20W1AKI9H3_RTRMADP_3_ASIA-WEATHER-CHINA.JPG
    Rescue workers evacuate stranded residents on a flooded street after heavy rainfall in Wanzhou district of Chongqing, China, July 4, 2023. Credit: cnsphoto via Reuters

    Chongqing’s flood warning was upgraded from level four to level three on Wednesday in a sign that the floods are likely to continue unabated in the days ahead.

    Rescue teams ferried villagers to safety in inflatable boats, while video widely shared on social media showed entire buildings being washed away in the deluge.

    Floods are routine in southern China during the summer season, but according to reports, in some areas this year’s floods are the worst in 50 years.

    Global warming meets El Niño

    Forecasters expect more bad weather to come, and not just for China. On Tuesday, the World Meteorological Organization said that El Niño, a cyclical weather phenomenon that warms the surface temperature of the Pacific Ocean, was making a return after an absence of seven years. The organization warned that the phenomenon would likely lead to extreme weather events worldwide in the second half of this year.

    Meteorological experts roundly concur that the convergence of El Niño and human-induced global warming – also known as anthropogenic climate change – will lock-step accelerate record-breaking extreme weather events

    2023-06-23T064442Z_215616855_RC2TO1AW20XH_RTRMADP_3_ASIA-WEATHER-CHINA.JPG
    A woman walks with cold patches on her forehead and neck amid a red alert for heatwave in Beijing, China June 23, 2023. Credit: Reuters/Tingshu Wang

    On Tuesday, the entire planet’s temperature peaked to its “hottest day in decades and likely centuries,” according to reports, breaking a record that had been made just the day before. Wednesday saw a third record high, matching Tuesday’s top temperature.

    It is now expected that this year’s ongoing heatwave in China will eclipse last year’s record-breaking heatwave, when industry was forced to scale back on production in order to prioritize electricity supplies to residential areas.

    According to China’s National Climate Center, this year has already seen the highest number of hot days in six decades.

    Enter the ‘facekini’

    Meanwhile, the mercury-nudging temperatures are at least good news for manufacturers of what has come to be known as the “facekini,” China’s state media reported, explaining that the term “was coined several years ago to describe a swimming cap that is extended to cover almost the entire head, with openings for the nose, eyes and mouth.”

    The latest iteration of the facekini – let’s call it Facekini 2.0 – could hardly be described as haut fashion, but it protects the face of wearers from the fierce summer sunlight. It is made from synthetic fabrics such as nylon and polyester and it protects the entire face, while still allowing wearers to see.

    “This product sells well because it covers the canthus, or the corner of the eye, where freckles may grow easily,” said Dong Wei, a merchant at Yiwu International Trade Market, a major market for gadgets and merchandise in Zhejiang province, according to a report in the China Daily. She said she had seen a 30% increase in sales this year compared to last year.

    2023-07-05T103954Z_346137587_RC2WW1AY5G2D_RTRMADP_3_ASIA-WEATHER-CHINA.JPG
    A woman walks on a street as she shields herself from the sun with a hat and mask, on a hot day in Shanghai, China, July 5, 2023. Credit: Reuters/Aly Song

    In related news, sales of air conditioners and fans are also booming, according to Chinese media reports.

    “Industry data analysis company All View Cloud said that sales of air conditioners during the promotion period reached nearly 12 million, a 36 percent year-on-year increase,” the China Daily reported.

    Edited by Mike Firn.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Chris Taylor for RFA.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The lack of a domestic solar manufacturing industry is placing Australia’s green energy transition at “high risk”, two local renewable energy firms have argued, urging the federal government to ramp up incentives. Appearing before a parliamentary inquiry into developing advanced manufacturing capability on Wednesday, Sun Drive and Sun Cable flagged the need for Australia to…

    The post Energy transition at ‘high risk’ without local solar manufacturing appeared first on InnovationAus.com.

    This post was originally published on InnovationAus.com.

  • Vietnam has banned distribution of “Barbie” because the Hollywood movie includes a map showing China’s territorial claims in the disputed South China Sea, state media reported, as angry netizens called for a boycott of a tour by the popular K-Pop group BlackPink for the same alleged offense.

    The planned July 21 release of the Warner Brothers feature film, starring Margot Robbie as Barbie and Ryan Gosling as her boyfriend Ken, has been scrapped by the Central Council of Feature Film Evaluation and Classification, state media reported, citing Vi Kien Thanh, head of the Vietnam Cinema Department. 

    “‘Barbie’ is banned from screening in Vietnam for featuring a map depicting the illicit ‘nine-dash line’ that China uses to illegally claim its sovereignty over most of the East Vietnam Sea,” the Tuoi Tre (Youth) newspaper said.

    “Vietnam had earlier either blocked many films or removed some from cinemas as these movies, mainly produced by China, contain the illegal nine-dash line map,” the English-language report said. All cinema chains across Vietnam had pulled the movie, it added.

    Attempts by Radio Free Asia to reach Warner Brothers for comment were unsuccessful.

    The nine-dash line is a boundary used by Beijing on its maps to demarcate territorial claims over most of the South China Sea, including sections of the waterway that fall within areas claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries.

    For example, the line – often literally consisting of nine dashes on a map encompassing the entire South China Sea – includes the Paracel Islands claimed by Vietnam and the Spratly Islands claimed by the Philippines. And it wasn’t immediately evident what role the map played in the movie.

    K-Pop group BlackPink arrives at MTV Video Music Awards in Newark, Aug. 28, 2022. Angry netizens called for a boycott of a tour by BlackPink for including a “nine-dash line” map of the South China Sea, showing China’s territorial claims. Credit: Evan Agostini/Invision via AP
    K-Pop group BlackPink arrives at MTV Video Music Awards in Newark, Aug. 28, 2022. Angry netizens called for a boycott of a tour by BlackPink for including a “nine-dash line” map of the South China Sea, showing China’s territorial claims. Credit: Evan Agostini/Invision via AP

    The problem has emerged before. In 2019, Vietnam halted showings of the DreamWorks film “Abominable” over a scene that showed the “nine-dash line” and drew an outcry among viewers. Netflix offerings including “Pine Gap,” “Madam Secretary,”  and “Put Your Head on My Shoulder” also ran afoul of Hanoi over the sea map.

    The dust over the Barbie row had barely settled when angry Vietnamese netizens started calling for boycotting a concert by the South Korea K-Pop band BlackPink, after they said concert promoters of the “Born Pink World Tour Hanoi” scheduled for late July also had shared the “nine-dash line” map of the South China Sea.

    State media quoted Le Thanh Liem, chief inspector of the Vietnam Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, as saying on Wednesday that a ministry department was conducting checks to verify the reported use of  the map on the homepage of iMe Entertainment Co. and its Vietnam fan page.

    The map or related links could not be seen on the websites on Wednesday.

    The Philippines might follow suit

    Following Vietnam’s ban of “Barbie” on Tuesday,  the Philippine Movie and Television Review and Classification Board said it was also reviewing whether to approve the release of the film in cinemas. Last year, the film review board pulled the Hollywood action movie “Uncharted” from Philippine cinemas over a scene showing the “nine-dash line.”

    In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines and threw out China’s expansive claims in the waterway, but Beijing has never recognized the ruling.

    Australian actor Margot Robbie walks during an event to promote the Warner Bros. film "Barbie" in Seoul, July 2023. Credit: Jung Yeon-je/AFP
    Australian actor Margot Robbie walks during an event to promote the Warner Bros. film “Barbie” in Seoul, July 2023. Credit: Jung Yeon-je/AFP

    Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning told reporters that “China’s position on the South China Sea issue is clear and consistent.”

    “We believe that the countries concerned should not link the South China Sea issue with normal cultural and people-to-people exchanges,” Mao said at a daily briefing on Tuesday.

    Despite Mao’s assertions, China has a history of pressuring foreign retailers, fashion firms, hotels and airlines over perceived misrepresentation of its borders, including that with self-governing Taiwan, over which Beijing claims sovereignty.

    Although some voices in Vietnam said banning Barbie over the map was oversensitive, South China Sea expert Dinh Kim Phuc told RFA Vietnamese that Hanoi had to act in order to prevent China from propagating its claims in the contested waterway.

    “If (authorities) let it be shown throughout the territory of Vietnam, China would make a point that Vietnam has accepted the nine-dash line–that is to say, accepted China’s sovereignty claims in the South China Sea,” said Phuc.

    Phuc, a former lecturer at the Open University of Ho Chi Minh City, said Vietnam reacts sharply to seemingly small slights in order to drive home the point that it does not accept the nine-dash line, to win international support for the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, and to protect its sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the South China Sea.

    Vietnam expert Carlyle Thayer called the Vietnamese moves “an overreaction, and it distracts the public from China’s aggressive behavior that has been taking place.”

    “If Vietnam kept quiet, how would anyone know?” asked Thayer, emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales in Canberra, Australia.

    The Liaoning aircraft carrier is accompanied by navy frigates and submarines conducting an exercise in the South China Sea in 2018. Credit: Li Gang/Xinhua via AP
    The Liaoning aircraft carrier is accompanied by navy frigates and submarines conducting an exercise in the South China Sea in 2018. Credit: Li Gang/Xinhua via AP

    Translated by RFA Vietnamese. Written by Paul Eckert. Edited by Malcolm Foster.

    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Vietnamese.

  • Laos has begun importing gasoline from China instead of purchasing it from neighboring Thailand amid an ongoing economic crisis, including surging inflation that has prompted one lawmaker to call for an increase in salaries for domestic workers and state employees.

    The first shipments of gasoline arrived in Laos last week following the signing of a memorandum of understanding in late May by the Vientiane Petroleum State Enterprise, managed by the Lao Ministry of National Security, SINOPEC Hong Kong and SINOLAO. 

    Under the deal, Laos will import fuel from China for wholesale and retail distribution, according to the Laotian Times.

    SINOPEC Hong Kong delivered the initial fuel consignments to the two Lao entities at the Boten international border crossing in Luang Namtha province on June 27. 

    Gasoline prices in Laos have increased four times this year amid a serious economic slump characterized by high inflation, worsening public finances and the devaluation of the Lao currency, the kip.

    But some consumers said they believe that the price of petrol will drop slightly or remain the same because the Chinese entered the deal to make a profit. 

    “It’s businesses — not policy, not aid,” said a Lao entrepreneur who imports fuel, asking not to be identified to speak freely. “If the government imports more, it will reduce gas prices in Laos, and the price at the pumps will go down.”

    The Lao government has turned to China for gasoline because it doesn’t have the foreign currency to buy it from Thailand, which accepts payments only in Thai baht or U.S. dollars, said a Lao intellectual who is familiar with the situation. 

    China, however, accepts Lao kip or Chinese yuan as payment, or allows the Lao government to take out a loan with a high interest rate to pay for gasoline imports, ensnaring the country in a debt trap, he said.

    Landlocked Lao does not have its own gasoline production company, but rather a business in Xiengkhouang province that refines imported crude oil from overseas.

    Call to raise salaries

    As rising prices, including that of gasoline, hit Laotians hard in their wallets, some officials are trying to mitigate the financial pain.

    Also on June 27, Oudom Vongkaysone, a lawmaker from Borikhamxay province, urged the government to increase the salaries of both ordinary Lao workers and state employees.

    He urged the government to increase the monthly minimum wage to 1.8 million-2 million kip (US$94-104).

    During a meeting of the National Assembly, Vongkaysone said that if the government could not increase salaries, it should find other ways to lessen their financial hardship, such as issuing more bonuses, paying overtime or increasing pension amounts. 

    Otherwise more state employees will quit their jobs and more workers will head to neighboring countries for better-paying jobs, he said.

    He also called on the Lao government to rein in inflation and urged citizens to use the kip in financial transactions instead of foreign currency.

    A Lao garment factory worker told Radio Free Asia that she cannot live on her 1.3 million kip monthly salary, and wants to see her pay raised to 2 million-3 million kip so she and her family can survive the country’s high inflation.

    An official from the Lao Federation of Trade Unions who requested anonymity so as to speak freely told RFA that a decision to raise the minimum wage would take a long time to implement if adopted.

    “The government has to conduct a survey of the price of goods in the market first to find out if it is necessary or not to raise the minimum wage,” he said.

    Businesses opposed

    Some Laotians have headed to Thailand and South Korea for jobs, where wages are higher than at home.

    “The rate of exchange is high, 1 million Lao kip can’t buy much, and foods and essential things are more expensive than before,” said one Laotian. “Workers have gone to work in Thailand because the pay rate is higher over there.”

    But entrepreneurs who own businesses in Laos are against raising the minimum wage, saying the move would threaten their survival. They would not be able to pay their workers 1.8 million-2 million kip per month if the lawmaker’s proposal is adopted, some of them said.

    “Entrepreneurs don’t want to pay high salaries,” said one business owner.

    A factory owner said his enterprise could not afford to pay higher salaries of about 1.6 million-1.8 million kip, but no more.

    “It would be too much to pay,” he told RFA.

    A garment factory owner in the capital Vientiane said she could not immediately raise salaries to 1.8 million kip or more because of high production costs and the kip’s devaluation, and that any future increases should be incrementally implemented over several months.

    An official at the Ministry of Finance said the government’s ability to raise the monthly minimum wage depends on the state budget, and salaries cannot be increased if there is a deficit.

    “We want to raise the salaries of state employees between 1.8 million and 2.5 million kip per month, but it depends on the state budget,” he said.

    Translated by Sidney Khotpanya for RFA Lao. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • When China put an end to the grueling lockdowns, mass testing and compulsory quarantines of the zero-COVID era, most people were hoping life would get back to normal. 

    But a local government debt crisis, weak domestic demand and the collapse of property prices have left the economy in poor shape. At the same time, unemployment among young people has hit a five-year high. 

    According to official data released in April, 20.4% of job seekers between the ages of 16 and 24 are unemployed. 

    Added to all of that, there is the “Curse of 35.” 

    Recruitment ads these days often call for candidates under 35, and the age barrier has become yet another ceiling on the aspirations of people who only want the chance to make a living. 

    The current labor market also makes it much harder for people who want to settle down and start a family

    Uncompensated OT

    Age discrimination has been worsening in China for some time now, as companies seek younger employees willing to work large amounts of uncompensated overtime under the 996 system — working from 9.00 a.m. to 9.00 p.m., Monday to Saturday.

    Much of the demand for excessive overtime comes from the tech sector, according to a 39-year-old former Huawei employee who gave only the nickname Emma, for fear of reprisals.

    “The internet industry has developed rapidly in mainland China over the past 10 years,” she said. “It’s an industry that has heavy overtime requirements, so it often discriminates against older people.” 

    ENG_CHN_WorkplaceAgeism_07052023_02.jpg
    Job seekers at a job fair booth in Wuhan, Hubei province, Feb. 9, 2023. According to official data released in April, 20.4% of job seekers between the ages of 16 and 24 are unemployed in China. Credit: CNS Photo via Reuters

    That includes global tech giants like Huawei, where she used to work.

    “Shortly after I started working there, Huawei would regularly lay off older employees,” Emma said.

    But the “Curse of 35” only started to become widely noticeable in recent years, as economic growth has slowed, she said.

    “Age discrimination in the job market is now very severe, and there are also various kinds of invisible discrimination at work, such as assumptions about whether you plan to marry and have kids,” Emma said.

    This means that many young people are afraid to leave jobs once they have them, for fear of never finding another.

    Civil service exams

    A 34-year-old employee of a culture-related state-owned enterprise who gave only the surname Chen said he counts himself among their number.   

    “I’ve managed to hang onto this job for five years, and I haven’t once thought about jumping ship,” Chen said. “The labor market has gotten much tougher due to the pandemic, and I’m also nearly 35, nearly at that threshold, and I’ll be much less able to compete within it.” 

    “I’ve seen that a lot of companies basically want to hire young people, fresh graduates, or people with a few years’ experience,” he said. “A lot of my friends are in a similar situation.”

    Chen agrees that 35 has become something of a magic number in the labor market because it’s the upper age limit for candidates wanting to sit exams to enter the civil service, thereby gaining a foothold in “the system” of Communist Party officialdom, which offers healthcare, a pension and which can lead to wealth and power

    Anyone under that age still has this option open to them, so employees under the age of 35 can still view the civil service as a backup plan, in case they can’t stand their jobs any more. As soon as they hit 35, that option is no longer there, he said.

    Companies know this too, so the threshold affects what they are willing to pay younger employees. 

    “I have friends who have gone for interviews at this age, and their salaries have basically been cut in half,” Chen said.

    Chen, who describes his job as “labor-intensive,” is competing with people just out of college, who have far more strength and resilience than older employees can offer.   

    “Basically, all of the professional knowledge and management experience that someone of 35 has been able to accumulate isn’t valued at all,” he said.  “Younger people who are new to the labor market can put in more hours, so companies prefer to hire them.”

    Marriage and family?

    When work is that precarious, it’s hard to even think about starting a family, Chen said.   

    “Insecure work means an unstable income, and worse prospects for the future,” he said. “This means that marriage and children are off the agenda.” 

    ENG_CHN_WorkplaceAgeism_07052023_03.jpg
    A young woman is silhouetted near a ferry boat at a lake in Hangzhou in eastern China’s Zhejiang province, June 26, 2023. Credit: Ng Han Guan/AP

    The worries about ageism in the Chinese workplace are leading many young people to “run” to the United States in search of jobs.

    A 25-year-old Seattle-based student who gave only the surname Wang said she wants to stay in the United States after graduation because she fears being discriminated against in the Chinese job market. 

    “I heard a lot of stories about age discrimination [in China] after I graduated college, even though I was only 22 at the time,” Wang said. “For example, internet companies undergo optimization of the workforce, which means layoffs, once they reach 35.”   

    “Originally, I wanted to apply to the civil service or government agencies, but some positions state very clearly that there are upper age limits of 25 or 30 years old,” she said. “And as a woman, I felt the problem of age discrimination was even more acute.” 

    “I chose to study and work in the United States because I didn’t want to be discriminated against and I wanted a healthier work environment,” Wang said.

    Weak labor laws

    High unemployment and weak labor laws are also to blame for ageism, she said.

    “With such a large population, China has an oversupply of labor,” she said. “And demand for labor has fallen, particularly during the pandemic, when the economy slowed.” 

    “That has led to a basic lack of respect for workers, because there is a never-ending stream of younger people waiting to replace workers over 35,” she said. “[There is also] a lack of legal channels through which employees can defend their rights and interests,” 

    “When they are discriminated against, they often have to swallow their anger and put up with it,” Wang said.

    A 37-year-old job-seeker from the eastern city of Hangzhou who gave only the surname Ge, said he has been through this himself.  

    “I was unemployed for a time at the end of 2021, which was still during the zero-COVID policy,” he said. “The first issue I faced was my age.” 

    Ge said he was told point-blank by human resources departments that this was a factor working against his application.

    “They also weren’t shy about asking me about my financial situation, whether or not I had a mortgage, and whether or not having a family life was in the cards,” he said.

    Cheaper and easier

    But why do Chinese employers prefer fresh graduates over experienced employees? 

    Hua Haifeng, an investigator with the U.S.-based rights group China Labor Watch, said it’s because they are cheaper and easier to manage. 

    “They may not be able to pay [people over 35] what they need, and young people are more manageable because of their lack of experience,” Hua said. “Especially when it comes to regular jobs in industries like manufacturing — they are far more likely to hire younger people,” he said. 

    He said employers are able to pick and choose due to high unemployment rates and the economic downturn.  

    “Problems like this did occur before, but there were more jobs back then, and [ageist discrimination] has become far more obvious now,” Hua said. “There used to be far greater demand for labor, and companies couldn’t afford to be too picky, or to place too many limits on their workforce.” 

    Independent economist Qin Weiping said the structural changes are affecting people’s plans to marry and raise children, a key aim of the ruling Chinese Communist Party amid an aging and shrinking population. 

    “Young people under the age of 35 are easier to manage because they lack social experience and it’s easier for companies to force them to work overtime,” Qin said.

    Translated by Luisetta Mudie. Additional reporting by Sun Cheng, Wang Yun, and Kai Di. Edited by Malcolm Foster.

    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Jenny Tang for RFA Mandarin.

  • Amid increasing tensions in Asia during his first year in power, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has embraced the United States and other democratic allies, and shifted away from six years of his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte’s pivot to China. 

    Marcos, whose late father dictator was a staunch U.S. ally, has sought to achieve an elusive balance between the rival superpowers in his administration’s foreign policy. 

    “Marcos’ so-called pivot to the U.S. became a highlight because Philippines-U.S. ties reached its low point during his predecessor’s time. It became big simply because the baseline was set so low,” Aries Arugay, a political scientist at the University of the Philippines, told BenarNews, an RFA-affiliated online news service. 

    Since taking office on June 30, 2022, Marcos Jr. has issued strong pronouncements on disputes in the South China Sea and promised to not abandon “even one square inch” of Philippine territory there to any foreign power. This raised expectations for a hardline approach toward Chinese incursions

    During his first year in office, Marcos visited both superpowers. His official working visit to Washington in May was the first by a Philippine president in more than a decadeMarcos began 2023 with a state visit to China.

    “When asked which side are you on, I said I don’t work for Beijing, I don’t work for Washington D.C., I work for the Philippines. So I’m on the side of the Philippines and that really translates into a very simple statement of foreign policy, which is that I promote the national interest,” Marcos said during a dialogue at the World Economic Forum in January. 

    Striking a U.S.-China balance in foreign policy is not an easy feat, according to another analyst. 

    “That is the goal of the administration. But it raises the question, is it in the interest of the two powers for the Philippines to be balanced? The major challenge here is China,” defense analyst Renato de Castro told BenarNews. 

    “For China, it’s a zero-sum game. Beijing would never accept any compromise. Any effort to balance or repair U.S. ties is viewed by China with extreme hostility,” said de Castro, professor of international studies at the De La Salle University in Manila

    When Marcos granted the U.S. expanded access to more Philippine military bases under the bilateral Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), he said it was to boost his country’s defense capabilities and response to natural disasters.

    Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is briefed by American and Philippine soldiers about a multiple rocket launcher during joint exercises in San Antonio town, Zambales, northern Philippines, April 26, 2023. [Jojo Riñoza/BenarNews]

    China reacted angrily, with its envoy Huang Xilian advising Manila to “unequivocally oppose” the independence of Taiwan if it cared about the 150,000 Filipinos working there.

    Marcos summoned Huang to a meeting but did not expel him from the Philippines, despite calls for him to do so. For Arugay, this was another form of delicate balancing.

    “Other ambassadors have been expelled from their host countries for far less controversial statements. But Marcos did not do that, knowing the implication of such action,” Arugay said. 

    At the same time, analysts noted Marcos’ relative transparency concerning Chinese aggression in the West Philippine Sea, Manila’s name for South China Sea waters within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 

    The Philippine navy and coast guard have more frequently publicized evidence of harassment of Philippine ships, personnel and fishermen. Journalists, too, have been allowed to monitor routine resupply missions to West Philippine Sea outposts. 

    ‘At least he’s not a killer’ 

    Analysts and opposition members have given Marcos a passing grade on foreign policy in his first year. Even jailed former Sen. Leila de Lima, a key opposition figure, gave him credit. 

    “He has restored the image of the Philippines vis-à-vis the democratic world, to the U.S. and other traditional allies. In his speeches abroad, he has at least committed to uphold the rule of law,” de Lima told BenarNews. 

    “At least he’s not a killer. The bar has been set so low,” said de Lima, a fierce critic of Duterte and his bloody campaign against illegal drugs. 

    Arugay shared a similar view.

    “Marcos was so far able to regain the country’s reputation as a very cordial, welcoming and accommodating nation to all those who wish to cooperate,” he said. “Somehow, he was able to retrieve the country’s international political capital that was severely undermined in the six years of Duterte.” 

    Still, Marcos has signaled he would protect Duterte from prosecution over his internationally criticized drug war, saying in March that the Philippines would officially no longer deal with the International Criminal Court

    Marcos has insisted the domestic justice system works and that any investigation must be carried out by Philippine authorities. At the same time, he has acknowledged that the drug problem must be approached differently than Duterte’s scorched earth policy. 

    About 8,000 suspected dealers and addicts were killed in Duterte’s drug war during his term (2016-2022), according to police statistics. Human rights groups said the figure could be three times higher, alleging that many others were killed by pro-Duterte vigilantes working with police.

    Last week, Human Rights Watch called on Marcos to formally announce an end to the drug war and order an investigation into officials linked to killings.

    “Without concrete action to break old patterns of abuses and secure accountability for past crimes, his words have little credibility,” HRW said.

    ‘Pleasant surprise’

    Rommel Jude Ong, a retired Philippine Navy rear admiral, said Marcos’ pivot to democracies was “a pleasant surprise,” owing to his rhetoric during the presidential campaign. 

    “His pivot shows that the government is sensitive to the public opinion with respect to how we manage our alliance with the U.S. and other partners,” Ong told BenarNews. “It also brings up front our national interest as the driver of our foreign policy posture.” 

    National polls over the years have shown that the majority of Filipinos prefer the U.S., with China being respondents’ least trusted country.

    One likely reason for Marcos’ “good performance as head of state,” Arugay said, has been his goal to rehabilitate his family’s name linked to ill-gotten wealth, a brutal dictatorship and human rights abuses. 

    His father, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, was toppled in a “people-power” uprising in 1986 that forced the family into exile in Hawaii, where he died three years later. Authorities said the elder Marcos plundered up to U.S. $10 billion from state coffers.

    “I doubt that his only foreign policy goal is the country’s goals – we’re not expecting him to be a saint. Part of it is the redemption of the family name, not just here in the country but also abroad,” Arugay said.  

    While the Marcos family was allowed to return and reestablish its political fortunes at home, it has faced legal challenges abroad. 

    In 2012, a U.S. court held the younger Marcos, his mother Imelda, and the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos in contempt for violating an order reserving their U.S. assets for potential damages to be paid to victims of 14 years of martial law under the elder Marcos.  

    Next steps 

    Marcos Jr. – whose term is expected to end in 2028 – may face tougher years ahead, experts said, in the face of an increasingly aggressive China. 

    There are calls to raise the issue of China’s bullying before the United Nations General Assembly and to urge members to sponsor a resolution calling on Beijing to respect Manila’s landmark international arbitration court victory in 2016. 

    China has failed to recognize the ruling that invalidated its sweeping claims to nearly all of the South China Sea. Along with the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and Taiwan have territorial claims to the South China Sea. 

    U.S. President Joe Biden speaks as he meets with Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in the Oval Office of the White House, in Washington, May 1, 2023. [Carolyn Kaster/AP]

    Opposition Sen. Risa Hontiveros said that while U.N. resolutions are not legally binding, they carry “significant political weight” showing the international community’s will and consensus.

    Antonio Carpio, a former Supreme Court justice and South China Sea expert, said it’s high time to raise the issue before the U.N. 

    “But before we actually file the resolution with the general assembly, the Department of Foreign Affairs should campaign for votes and make a head count,” Carpio told BenarNews. 

    “I think we will win there,” he said in a separate online forum. 

    The department, he said, should coordinate with other coastal states and regional blocs, such as the European Union, that have strongly supported the arbitral ruling.  

    “Remember, the majority of the [U.N.] members are coastal states,” Carpio said in the forum. “They are afraid that their big neighbors might seize their exclusive economic zones.” 

    BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated news service.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Camille Elemia for BenarNews.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Concerns are growing that China could start using the Interpol “red notice” arrest warrant system to target anyone overseas, of any nationality, who says or does something the ruling Communist Party doesn’t like, using Hong Kong’s three-year-old national security law.

    Dozens of rights groups on Tuesday called on governments to suspend any remaining extradition treaties with China and Hong Kong after the city’s government issued arrest warrants and bounties for eight prominent figures in the overseas democracy movement on Monday, vowing to pursue them for the rest of their lives.

    “We urge governments to suspend the remaining extradition treaties that exist between democracies and the Hong Kong and Chinese governments and work towards coordinating an Interpol early warning system to protect Hong Kongers and other dissidents abroad,” an open letter dated July 4 and signed by more than 50 Hong Kong-linked civil society groups around the world said.

    “Hong Kong activists in exile must be protected in their peaceful fight for basic human rights, freedoms and democracy,” said the letter, which was signed by dozens of local Hong Kong exile groups from around the world, as well as by Human Rights in China and the World Uyghur Congress.

    Hong Kong’s national security law, according to its own Article 38, applies anywhere in the world, to people of all nationalities.

    The warrants came days after the Beijing-backed Ta Kung Pao newspaper said Interpol red notices could be used to pursue people “who do not have permanent resident status of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and commit crimes against Hong Kong outside Hong Kong.” 

    “If the Hong Kong [government] wants to extradite foreign criminals back to Hong Kong for trial, [it] must formally notify the relevant countries and request that local law enforcement agencies arrest the fugitives and send them back to Hong Kong for trial,” the paper said.

    While Interpol’s red notice system isn’t designed for political arrests, China has built close ties and influence with the international body in recent years, with its former security minister Meng Hongwei rising to become president prior to his sudden arrest and prosecution in 2019, and another former top Chinese cop elected to the board in 2021.

    And there are signs that Hong Kong’s national security police are already starting to target overseas citizens carrying out activities seen as hostile to China on foreign soil.

    Hong Kong police in March wrote to the London-based rights group Hong Kong Watch ordering it to take down its website.

    And people of Chinese descent who are citizens of other countries have already been targeted by Beijing for “national security” related charges.

    Call to ignore

    To address a growing sense of insecurity among overseas rights advocates concerned with Hong Kong, the letter called on authorities in the United Kingdom, United States of America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Europe to reiterate that the Hong Kong National Security Law does not apply in their jurisdictions, and to reaffirm that the Hong Kong arrest warrants won’t be recognized.

    The New York-based Human Rights Watch said the “unlawful activities” the eight are accused of should all be protected under human rights guarantees in Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, the Basic Law.

    ENG_CHN_HKNatSec_07042023.2.jpg
    Hong Kong police on Monday, July 3, 2023, issued arrest warrants and offered bounties for eight activists and former lawmakers who have fled the city. They are [clockwise from top left] Kevin Yam, Elmer Yuen, Anna Kwok, Dennis Kwok, Nathan Law, Finn Lau, Mung Siu-tat and Ted Hui. Credit: Screenshot from Reuters video

    “In recent years, the Chinese government has expanded efforts to control information and intimidate activists around the world by manipulation of bodies such as Interpol,” it said in a statement, adding that more than 100,000 Hong Kongers have fled the city since the crackdown on dissent began.

    “The Hong Kong government’s charges and bounties against eight Hong Kong people in exile reflects the growing importance of the diaspora’s political activism,” Maya Wang, associate director in the group’s Asia division, said in a statement.

    “Foreign governments should not only publicly reject cooperating with National Security Law cases, but should take concrete actions to hold top Beijing and Hong Kong officials accountable,” she said.

    Hong Kong’s Chief Executive John Lee told reporters on Tuesday that the only way for the activists to “end their destiny of being an abscondee who will be pursued for life is to surrender” and urged them “to give themselves up as soon as possible”.

    The Communist Party-backed Wen Wei Po newspaper cited Yiu Chi Shing, who represents Hong Kong on the standing committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, as saying that those who have fled overseas will continue to oppose the government from wherever they are.

    “Anyone who crosses the red lines in the national security law will be punished, no matter how far away,” Yiu told the paper.

    The rights groups warned that Monday’s arrest warrants represent a significant escalation in “long-arm” law enforcement by authorities in Beijing and Hong Kong.

    Extradition

    While the U.S., U.K. and several other countries suspended their extradition agreements with Hong Kong after the national security law criminalized public dissent and criticism of the authorities from July 1, 2020, several countries still have extradition arrangements in force, including the Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa and Sri Lanka.

    South Korea, Malaysia, India and Indonesia could also still allow extradition to Hong Kong, according to a Wikipedia article on the topic.

    Meanwhile, several European countries have extradition agreements in place with China, including Belgium, Italy and France, while others have sent fugitives to China at the request of its police.

    However, a landmark ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in October 2022 could mean an end to extraditions to China among 46 signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights.

    “The eight [on the wanted list] should be safe for now, but if they were to travel overseas and arrive in a country that has an extradition agreement with either mainland China or Hong Kong, then they could be arrested on request,” researcher Wang Hsin-li of Taiwan’s Association of Strategic Foresight said.

    ENG_CHN_HKNatSec_07042023.3.jpg
    Hong Kong’s Chief Executive John Lee on Tuesday urged the eight Hong Kong activists who are sought under arrest warrants “to give themselves up as soon as possible.” Credit: Peter Parks/AFP

    But he said he doesn’t believe that the government in China or Hong Kong cares much about the international outcry in response to the warrants, which have included growing calls for Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee to be barred from entering the United States to attend the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in San Francisco in November.

    “They’re pretty indifferent to international calls for sanctions,” Wang said. “Their thinking now is that national security trumps everything else.”

    UK ‘strongly objects’

    Lawyer and current affairs commentator Sang Pu agreed that officials could start using Interpol red notices, adding that the purpose of such international pressure seems to be to stop people from speaking up or protesting against the Chinese Communist Party overseas.

    “This wasn’t aimed at those eight in particular, but at many more like them who are engaged in human rights advocacy and community building work,” Sang said of the Hong Kong warrants.

    “There are many people like that in Taiwan, Britain, the United States, Canada and Australia.”

    British Foreign Secretary James Cleverley said his government “strongly objects” to the national security law.

    “The decision to issue arrest warrants for 8 activists, some of whom are in the UK, is a further example of the authoritarian reach of China’s extraterritorial law,” Cleverley said via Twitter, echoing earlier objections from the State Department.

    Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said such criticisms were “flagrant slander,” and said the eight activists were “acting as pawns for anti-China forces overseas.”

    “Relevant countries need to respect China’s sovereignty and the rule of law in Hong Kong, stop lending support for anti-China elements destabilizing Hong Kong, and stop providing a safe haven for fugitives,” she told a regular news conference in Beijing.

    British Security Minister Tom Tugendhat said the warrants were “trying to interfere with our internal affairs.”

    “Nathan Law and his fellow pro-democracy activists are under our protection, and enjoy our full support,” he said via Twitter in response to the arrest warrants.

    Translated by Luisetta Mudie. Edited by Malcolm Foster.

    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Gao Feng for RFA Mandarin.

  • Radio Free Asia sat down for a chat with Raymond Powell, a 35-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force who retired in 2021 and now runs Project Myoushu. Part of Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation, the project seeks to develop tools to counter Beijing’s “gray zone” tactics in the South China Sea. 

    The following has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Radio Free Asia: Project Myoushu is about China’s “gray zone tactics” in the South China Sea. Can we start by defining that?

    Raymond Powell: We are talking about activities of a state actor – in this case, we’re talking about China – that can’t be directly attributed to them, or which fall in a nebulous legal area where they can act without being directly seen, or noticed, or publicly held accountable.

    What makes the South China Sea a hotbed of gray zone activity is that most of what happens there happens outside the public eye. If China, for example, harasses a Filipino fisherman, or points a laser at a Philippine Coast Guard ship, they can attempt to say “That didn’t actually happen, you’re making that up. How do you know it was us?” So what the Philippines has been doing with releasing photos and videos of incidents has been trying to illuminate this gray zone. 

    Our hypothesis is that if you illuminate gray zone activity, you do two things: You build resilience into your own society against that activity, so that people begin to expect and give you room to push back. And then, also, in the long-term, you hope to deter that activity because now, the gray zone actor – China – is paying a reputational cost.

    ENG_CHN_RaymondPowell_06272023.2.png
    Raymond Powell runs a project that seeks to develop tools to counter Beijing’s “gray zone” tactics in the South China Sea. (Provided by Raymond Powell)

    RFA: Beijing has claimed the South China Sea for a very long time. When did we first see gray zone tactics emerge?

    Powell: It’s very hard to put a date on it. I would say that the real sea change in gray zone activities probably can be traced back to the Scarborough Shoal Incident in 2012 – where they essentially took the shoal from the Philippines – and then their island-building campaign, where we saw them turn reefs and rocks into islands and military bases and station Navy and Coast Guard militia ships at those places. They began patrolling around those places in a way that expanded the assertion of their sovereignty. So again it’s hard to put a date on it.

    To back up for a second, when I first started looking at the South China Sea in the 1980s, it was very much about “features.” It was about this rock, or this reef, or this island. Everything was centered on who had had actual possession of a particular feature. Obviously, there were overlapping claims, but the thing that mattered was the features. 

    Now that China has these bases, it is able to project power outwards in a way that it’s very much more about the water, and who has a presence there. It’s about who has an actual military or paramilitary force that is able to push forward into the exclusive economic zones of its neighbors and take possession of things, either physically by rafting a whole bunch of malicious ships together or just by patrolling. 

    Even patrolling is a gray zone activity, because patrolling by a Chinese Coast Guard ship among Malaysia’s oil and gas activities is an assertion of jurisdiction. It’s saying “We have sovereign rights over your exclusive economic zone, because it falls within our nine-dash line.”

    RFA: I’m curious to hear you’ve been looking into the South China Sea since the 1980s. What did it look like then in terms of China’s presence and how has it changed over the last 40 years?

    Powell: Because it was mostly about “features,” China’s presence was not actually that noticeable. They had fewer features than, say, the Vietnamese. There was one major clash in 1988 over South Johnson Reef, in which a Chinese ship opened fire on 60 or so Vietnamese sailors who were standing on the reef – actually in the water – but it was very much about who had possession of which feature. 

    There was not a lot of patrolling happening back then. China simply didn’t have the assets to control all of that water. So that has really changed in the last 15 years, where they have vastly expanded their maritime militia, in particular and their Coast Guard. The Coast Guard and the maritime militia have become their instruments of power projection for the South China Sea. Their maritime militia’s activities are very much gray-zone because they’re very deniable. 

    They can say, “Well, they’re fishing ships.” But they don’t fish. They exist to patrol or simply to lay claim by sheer presence in an area.

    RFA: What about the spate of near-accidents that we’ve seen in the last few years, and particularly in the past few months?

    Powell: A similar thing occurred in 2018 with the USS Decatur, which was in the South China Sea doing a freedom of navigation operation. It was similar in that the Chinese ship attempted to cut off the United States ship, and in both cases they came very close to doing so. More recently, we saw a Philippine Coast Guard vessel that was outside of Second Thomas Shoal also nearly collide with a Chinese ship. 

    What is different now – in particular when you’re talking about the Philippines – is that the Philippines is releasing the photos and the video of the incidents. I think that is actually a quite effective deterrent measure, because part of China’s model for gray zone activity is that it’s just meant to be a message for the Philippine government, but now it’s exposed for the world and they have to recalculate its value.

    ENG_CHN_RaymondPowell_06272023.3.JPG
    An activist burns a flag of China during a protest to demand that the Chinese government pull out from the Scarborough Shoal during a rally in front of the Chinese consular office in Makati’s financial district of Manila, May 8, 2012. (Cheryl Ravelo/Reuters)

    RFA: What is the message that they’re trying to send to the Philippines, and to the United States when it happens with U.S. ships and planes? How does publicizing it alter the calculus?

    Powell: When it’s a gray zone activity, generally speaking, the message is to the government of the country involved, and the message is: “You don’t want to escalate this. You want to have your relationship with China be as uncomplicated as possible. So now that you know we’re the jurisdiction here, keep this between us.”

    What publicizing the incidents does is impose a reputational cost on China for doing those kinds of things. For many governments, the temptation is to go along, be quiet and not publicize anything, because you want everything to go back to normal. The problem is that the creeping normal is becoming less and less and less favorable for the region and for the other Southeast Asian countries. 

    So the more you normalize the gray zone activity, the more they simply become expected, and eventually you will normalize yourself right out of all of your own legal and internationally lawful rights to your own exclusive economic zone. That is the tactic they call “salami slicing” – you take a slice of salami, another slice and another slice. 

    So every time they sail through your waters and do a survey or a petrol, or they harass your oil and gas operations, or they stop your fisherfolk from fishing, and you acquiesce, it brings into normalcy the fact that you are no longer in charge of your own waters.

    RFA: It’s changing “the facts on the ground.”

    Powell: Right. So bringing it back to the U.S., one of the things that China does not like at all is U.S. freedom of navigation operations. The entire reason the freedom of navigation operations exist – and have existed for over four decades – is for this exact circumstance. 

    Because if you allow a country to say “I’m going to draw a circle around this thing right here, which does not have a status under international law, but I’m going to say it belongs to me and nobody is allowed in here without my consent,” and we say, “Okay, the facts on the ground have now changed, even if the legal status has not,” then we have acquiesced. We’ve said that we will not go where you tell us not to go. 

    The problem with that is it doesn’t have a logical stopping point. So the reason that freedom of navigation operations exist is that we simply say we will go wherever international law allows us. If the law allows us to go, say, in a straight line through this area, or to do maneuvers in that area, we will do exactly that, simply as an assertion of our rights.

    RFA: So when China says it’s provocative, that’s the point?

    Powell: I used to have diplomatic friends on the Chinese side say, “But why do you have to go through these very sensitive areas? The South China Sea is so big, you can easily go to other areas.” But you can’t just say something is sensitive to you and make a circle around it, and deny other people their right to go there. Eventually what will happen is that international law has no meaning, and might simply makes right. 

    A freedom of navigation operation is a specific thing that is meant to counter excessive maritime claims. It’s very narrowly defined. The thing to remember is it’s not unique to the South China Sea or to China. We do freedom of navigation operations against excessive claims in the Mediterranean Sea, and against allies who have excessive claims. Some of them may write a protest letter to the embassy. We will file it and it goes unremarked on. Only China reacts the way that they do.

    ENG_CHN_RaymondPowell_06272023.4.jpg
    In this photo provided by the U.S. Navy, the USS Chung-Hoon observes a Chinese navy ship conduct what it called an “unsafe” Chinese maneuver in the Taiwan Strait, June 3, 2023, in which the Chinese navy ship cut sharply across the path of the American destroyer, forcing the U.S. ship to slow to avoid a collision. (Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Andre T. Richard/U.S. Navy via AP)

    RFA: Do you think that part of the submarine sale to Australia under the AUKUS deal, in spite of the massive backlogs at U.S. shipyards, is meant to expand who’s doing these operations?

    Powell: It’s very hard for a country to just start doing them.

    RFA: But Australia does do freedom of navigation operations, even if not as frequently as the United States.

    Powell: This is a technical question. Under the U.S. definition of a freedom of navigation operation, there are certain classifications. So, for example, Australia does not go within 12 nautical miles of a Chinese-held feature in the South China Sea. We do. Australia does not go through the Paracel Islands, around which China draws what we call straight baselines and says “You can’t go in here.” We do.

    Oftentimes, my Australian friends would say, “Well, we do them, we just don’t go within 12 nautical miles.” But those are the ones that meet the technical definition of what our program calls “freedom of navigation operations.” So when my Australian friends would say “We do them,” I say that we’re using different definitions of the term. 

    Australia has operations in the South China Sea, which they will say asserts their freedom to navigate the South China Sea. They will not, though, go the next step of going within 12 nautical miles of a feature. I understand why – because the first time that they do, everyone will notice and will want to know who they did it against. And if they do it against China, then China will treat it very much as a provocation. 

    ENG_CHN_RaymondPowell_06272023.5.jpg
    A Philippine flag is seen between Philippine Navy ships at the Philippine-claimed island of Thitu, locally known as Pag-asa island at the South China Sea, April 21, 2023. A Chinese navy ship shadowed the two Philippine patrol vessels in the darkness after midnight as they cruised near Subi, one of seven barren reefs that China has transformed into bases in the past decade. (Aaron Favila/Associated Press)

    RFA: It sounds like you’re saying the “salami slicing” is working, if Australia is unable to go near these Chinese-held features?

    Powell: Yes, you can say that China has – to every country in the world except for the United States – successfully been able to draw a 12 nautical mile circle around a number of claims, and say that nobody else can come close to them. They’ve sliced the salami that far.

    RFA: How do you see this developing by 2030? What discussions will be taking place in Washington about the South China Sea?

    Powell: If everything sort of stays on its current trajectory, the danger is that China consolidates its claims simply by increasing the number and frequency of its patrols, and essentially pushes its claim all the way to the edges of the nine-dash line, so that it becomes the effective sheriff, if you will, or the effective constabulary for the entire nine-dash line.

    In some ways, they’ve already done that in many places. For example, the Philippines cannot fish at Scarborough Shoal except for in the way specifically allowed by China. China has not yet been able to entirely push that into, for example, hydrocarbon fields like Vietnam’s Vanguard Bank, or Malaysia’s of Luconia Shoals. But it has stopped any new exploitation there, if ever somebody wants to survey a new area.

    There are a couple of flashpoints. One is that the Philippines is running out of natural gas from its existing gas fields, and it believes that it has exploitable natural gas at Reed Bank, which is within the nine-dash line. At some point, there will be an increasingly acute need to address that in some way that doesn’t violate the Philippines’ sovereignty.

    Another is that the Philippines has a ship, the BRP Sierra Madre, which they ran aground in 1999 at Second Thomas Shoal. It effectively serves as their outpost there and asserts the Philippines’ claim over the shoal, which is in their exclusive economic zone. That ship is getting very old and increasingly rusted and brittle, and China has been very effective in not allowing repairs. At some point, that ship could easily begin to break up, or to slide off the shoal, which could provoke a crisis: What would the Philippines and its U.S. ally do about that? 

    RFA: Everything you’re saying is leading me to think that there’s two possible conclusions: Either China does take control over the nine-dash line area of South China Sea, or there will be some kind of conflict with the U.S. military. Is there a third option?

    Powell: Even under President Xi Jinping, it is not in China’s national interests to be in a constant state of tension and conflict with every country, everywhere, all the time, over everything. 

    ENG_CHN_RaymondPowell_06272023.6.jpg
    The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Milius (DDG 69) conducts routine operations in the South China Sea, March 24, 2023. China threatened “serious consequences” after a U.S. destroyer sailed around the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea for the second day in a row. (Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Greg Johnson/U.S. Navy via AP)

    At some point it has to decide which battles it really wants to fight. So it’s in the interests of each country along its periphery to see if they can push back to the point where China realizes it’s not in its interests to have constant tension and there is instead a settlement somewhere short of yielding sovereignty over the entire nine-dash line.

    RFA: That sounds like a far way off.

    Powell: Every country needs to be thinking in the long-term. 

    In the short term – and this goes back to the point of our program – countries like the Philippines can use transparency into gray-zone tactics as their friend. There is something to be gained, because it forces China to recalculate the cost/benefit of pushing that hard.

    There’s an old saying that is attributed to Vladimir Lenin: “Probe with the bayonet. If you meet steel, withdraw. If you meet mush, press forward.” You need to have some steel in there, so that they know how hard they can push before you will start pushing back.

    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Alex Willemyns for RFA.

  • COMMENTARY: By John Minto

    No government likes to be called out for human rights abuses and it’s uncomfortable to do so, particularly when the abuser is either a friend or a country with which we have strong economic links.

    In our relations with China, this is a difficult issue for us.

    However, we should always expect our government to speak out for human rights and the case can be made that Chris Hipkins was too soft on his visit to China last week. The impression was of a laid-back Prime Minister failing to convey any of the serious concerns expressed by credible and principled human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

    It seems New Zealand is leaving the heavy lifting on human rights to Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta who, in her own words, had a robust discussion with China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs on these issues earlier this year.

    An Australian report said she was “harangued” from the Chinese side, although this was denied by Mahuta.

    Hipkins, as Prime Minister, has our loudest voice and he should have publicly backed up our Foreign Minister.

    If we want to be regarded as a good global citizen, we have to speak out clearly and act consistently, irrespective of where human rights abuses take place. This is where New Zealand has fallen down repeatedly.

    Looking the other way
    We have been happy to strongly condemn Russia and announced economic and diplomatic sanctions within a few hours of its invasion of Ukraine but we look the other way when a country guilty of abuses is close to the US.

    In regard to the longest military occupation in modern history, Israel’s occupation of Palestine, we have been weak and inconsistent over many decades in calling for Palestinian human rights.

    It hasn’t always been like that.

    In late 2016, the National government, under John Key as prime minister, co-sponsored a United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSC2334 – NZ was a security council member at the time) which was passed in a 14–0 vote. The US abstained.

    The resolution states that, in the occupied Palestinian territories, Israeli settlements had “no legal validity” and constituted “a flagrant violation under international law”. It said they were a “major obstacle to the achievement of the two-state solution and a just, lasting and comprehensive peace” in the Middle East.

    So why does this matter now?

    Because Israel has elected a new extremist government that has declared its intention to make illegal settlement building on Palestinian land its “top priority”. Early this week it announced plans for 5000 more homes for these illegal settlements, which a Palestinian official described as “part of an open war against the Palestinian people”.

    Israel shows world middle finger
    Israel is showing Palestinians, and the world, its middle finger.

    At least nine people have been killed and scores wounded in the latest Israeli military attack on Palestinians in what is being described as a “real massacre” in Jenin refugee camp.

    UNSC 2334 didn’t just criticise Israel. It called for action. It also asked member countries of the United Nations “to distinguish, in their relevant dealings, between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967″.

    In practical terms, this means requiring our government and local authorities to refuse to purchase any goods or services from companies (both Israeli and foreign-owned) that operate in illegal Israeli settlements.

    A map showing the location of the Jenin refugee camp in Israeli Occupied Palestine
    A map showing the location of the Jenin refugee camp in Israeli Occupied Palestine . . . 5.9 Palestinian refugees comprise the world’s largest stateless community. Map: Al Jazeera/Creative Commons

    This ban should also be extended to the 112 companies identified by the UN Human Rights Council as complicit in the building and maintenance of these illegal Israeli settlements.

    The government should be actively discouraging our Superannuation Fund and KiwiSaver providers from investing in these complicit companies but an analysis earlier this year showed the Super Fund investments in these companies have close to doubled in the past two years.

    Some countries have begun following through on UNSC 2334 but New Zealand has been inert. We have not been prepared to back up our words at the United Nations with action here.

    West Papua deserves our voice
    Following through would mean we were standing up for human rights for everyone living in Palestine. We could expect our government to face false smears of anti-semitism from Israel’s leaders and their friends here but we would receive heartfelt thanks from a people who have suffered immeasurably for 75 years.

    Palestinians are the largest group of refugees internationally — 5.9 million — after being driven off their land by Israeli militias in 1947-1949. Every day, more of their land is stolen for illegal settlements while we avert our gaze.

    The Indonesian military occupation of West Papua and Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara also deserve our voice on the side of the victims.

    Standing up for human rights is not comfortable when it means challenging supposed friends or allies. But we owe it to ourselves, and to those being brutally oppressed, to do more than mouth platitudes.

    These peoples deserve our support and solidarity. Let’s not look the other way. Let’s act.

    John Minto is national chair of Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa. This article was first published in The New Zealand Herald but is republished with the permission of the author.

  • Americans should reconsider any travel to China due to “arbitrary enforcement of local law,” “exit bans” and “wrongful detentions,” the U.S. State Department says in an updated travel advisory.

    The update, which is dated Friday, removes concerns about COVID lockdowns but warns of “exit bans on U.S. citizens and citizens of other countries, without fair and transparent process under the law,” and says there is also a risk of “wrongful detention” of foreign citizens. 

    “U.S. citizens traveling or residing in the PRC may be detained without access to U.S. consular services or information about their alleged crime,” it says, using an acronym for the People’s Republic of China.

    The advisory says businesspeople, journalists, academics, relatives of Chinese nationals and “former foreign-government personnel” have all recently been detained and interrogated on national security grounds, with “exit bans” also being used as a tool to leverage cooperation.

    “U.S. citizens might only become aware of an exit ban when they attempt to depart the PRC, and there may be no available legal process to contest an exit ban,” it says, adding that “relatives, including minor children” may also be prevented from leaving China.

    ENG_CHN_TravelAdvisory_070320230_2.JPG
    Passengers walk at Beijing Daxing International Airport in April 2023. Americans should reconsider any travel to China due to “arbitrary enforcement of local law,” “exit bans” and “wrongful detentions,” the U.S. State Department says in an updated travel advisory. (Jade Gao/AFP)

    The previous State Department advisory also recommended Americans reconsider travel to China, but it instead focused on the surge in COVID-19 cases and pandemic-related restrictions.

    China’s foreign ministry has yet to respond to the update.

    The new advisory follows the passage of China’s foreign relations law that takes a broad view of what constitutes “espionage,” and which critics suggest could be used to target foreign businesspeople, journalists and any other foreigners who displease authorities.

    It also follows the life sentence given in May to dual U.S.-Chinese citizen Leung Shing-wan, who also went by John Leung and headed a Beijing-backed overseas Chinese group, on “espionage” charges. 

    ENG_CHN_TravelAdvisory_070320230_3.JPG
    A man takes a photo of arrival times at the international arrivals at Beijing Capital International Airport in Beijing in March 2023. China reopened its borders to tourists and resumed issuing visas as it tries to revive tourism and its economy following a three-year halt during the COVID-19 pandemic. (Mark Schiefelbein/AP)

    In the decade since China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping took power, China has increased its use of exit bans, applying them to human rights defenders, businesspeople, foreign journalists and ethnic minorities, according to a recent report by an NGO. 

    The bans are applied on national security grounds, involvement in criminal or civil cases, and other justifications and many subjects are unaware of their exit ban until they attempt to leave China, it said.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Alex Willemyns for RFA.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • This year marks the 10th anniversary of President Xi Jinping’s launch of China’s flagship, One Belt One Road (OBOR), later referred to as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Echoing the historic Silk Road, the ancient trade network of Eurasia that connected the East and West, BRI is the most ambitious and expensive infrastructure plan in world history. Writing about BRI’s future, the British Economist once worried that “All roads lead to Beijing.”

    In September 2013, on a visit to Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan, President Xi advocated the establishment of a “Silk Road Economic Belt.” A month later, addressing the Indonesian parliament, he proposed a “Maritime Silk Road of the 20th Century. The trans-continental corridor links China with Southeast Asia, South Asia, Russia and Europe by land. The new sea trade route connects Chinese coast regions with southeast and south Asia, the South Pacific, the Middle East and Eastern Africa, all the way to Europe.

    BRI was later extended to include Latin America and initiatives to Polar regions through the “Silk Road on Ice” in the Arctic, a Digital Silk Road and another to outer space via the Space Information Corridor. Lastly, special mention should be made of The Green Silk Road, the scope of which includes reducing climate emissions, reducing pollution and protecting biodiversity. This is part of China’s prioritizing sustainable development under the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In sum, the BRI seeks to promote economic globalization, multipolarity, poverty reduction, livelihood improvement, cultural diversification and environmental protection.

    The BRI is China’s signature foreign policy effort, in Xi’s words, to help achieve a “community of common destiny” which encompasses a “commonality of shared interests” as it “complements other economies” on the way to providing “one home for man.” Tang Qifang, a scholar at the China Institute of International Studies, describes BRI as “The concept of a community of common destiny transcending all sorts of differences in human society and targets the greatest possible benefits for all.” This embodies, “The Chinese aspiration to share power and development with the world.” (When Noam Chomsky was asked what he thought about the China-proposed “human community with a shared future, he replied “That’s exactly what we need.”)

    And, Xi has repeatedly stressed that the nation’s destiny is “interwoven with that of another dialogue rather than confrontation, partnerships instead of alliances should be the pursuit of all nations in a win-win project.” [1] In keeping with this sentiment, China will transfer its competitive productive capacity as its industries possess a competitive edge. 

    In a 2018 speech Xi said,

    To respond to the call of the times, China is ready to jointly promote the Belt and Road Initiative with partners. We hope to create new drivers to power common development through this new platform of international cooperation; and we hope to turn it into a road of peace, prosperity, openness, green development and innovation. And a road brings together different civilizations.” [2]

    On numerous occasions, Xi has stressed that “We Chinese love peace. No matter how strong it may become China will never seek hegemony or expansion. It will never inflict its past suffering on any nation.”

    It’s not lost on the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America that when colonizers built infrastructure it facilitated outward-bound routes whereas the Chinese infrastructure serves internal connections within the continent. W. Gyude Moore, former Minister for Public Works in Liberia, didn’t mince words when he said, “China has built more infrastructure in Africa than the West did in centuries.” [3]

    As of January 2023, 152 countries and 32 international organizations had signed a Memorandum of  Understanding (MOU)  and this includes 75% of the world’s population and half of the world GDP. Some economic forecasts predict that by 2027, BRI’s worldwide projects will number 2,600 valued at $3.7 trillion.

     The banishment of selfishness from foreign policy. What a concept. Brotherhood in action.

    Further, data show that the cumulative value of trade in goods between China and countries along the BRI routes reached nearly $11 trillion between 2013 and 2021, with a two-way investment reaching more than $230 billion.

    According to a 2022 World Bank forecast, if only the BRI transportation infrastructure projects are eventually carried out, by 2030, the BRI will generate $1.6 trillion in revenues for the globe or 1.3 percent of global GDP. And up to 90 percent of the revenues will go the partnering countries. [4]

    Thousands of projects (3,000 in Africa, alone), initially focused on roads. ports, railways, pipelines, power stations. More recently, there are cross-border fiber optic cables, space networks, schools, hospitals, solar panels, health care and financial services. Projects range from the Sudanese Railways Authority receiving a first installment of 21 locomotives which will significantly improve rail capacity, and 620 Lifan taxi cars in Montevideo, Uruguay to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. At a cost of $95.5 billion, it involves a port, highways, airport, fiber optic cables, railways and power plants.  Many of the latter are running on solar, hydro and wind power.

     In June, 2023, Egypt and China announced a BRI investment deal worth more than $8 billion for the Suez Canal Zone which will allow Chinese companies access to African and European markets, while taking advantage of the canal’s strategic position. Another notable project, the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail in Indonesia at at cost between $6-8 billion encountered logistical problems after being scheduled to begin service in July, 2023. The Chinese would be the first to acknowledge that BRI is not a miracle worker, success is not invariably guaranteed and although it originated in China, BRI belongs to all the members.

    Recent BRI projects in Latin America include the $1.52 billion Fourth Bridge over the Panama Canal and the $5 billion Bogota metro line 1 in Colombia. In early June, 2023(, in official visits to Beijing, Honduran President Xiomara Castro expressed interest in joining BRI and signed 17 trade agreements with China and Argentina agreed to projects involving infrastructure, energy, economy and trade. Other projects are underway in Chile, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. At the end of 2021, Chinese investments in Latin America exceeded $450 billion.  It should be noted that the U.S. has expressed its pique over BRI projects, especially in Panama, and has warned Latin America about Chinese BRI deals that were “too good to be true.”

    Clearly, Latin America will not be amenable if China exhibits neo-imperial behavior and begins contradicting Xi’s pledge of “providing harmony, security and prosperity to both China and its neighbors” and seeks to impose its influence. Seemingly recognizing this, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi has taken pains to emphasize that BRI “should not be viewed “through the outdated Cold War mentality.” [5]

    Addressing and expanding this concern, Peng Guangquin, a retired major general and advisor to the Chinese National Security Commission, writes that:  “BRI does not limit the nature of a given country’s  political system, is not underline by ideology, does not create tiny circles of friends, does not set up trade protectionism, does not set up economic blockade, does not exercise control of other countries’ economic lifelines or change other countries’ political systems. [6]

    Finally, more than 700 million of the globe’s extremely poor people live along the BRI’s and addressing the wealth disparity of the international order imposed on the Global South is a BRI priority. China, with a population of 1.4 billion, is now free of extreme poverty after it was eradicated for 850 million people. Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang has said that the Belt and Road initiative had accomplished this for 40 million people. This number accords with a World Bank study from four years ago that concluded BRI could lift 32 million out of moderate poverty and 7.6 out of extreme poverty.

    Will BRI flounder and fizzle out? Back in 2017, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres praised BRI’s “immense potential,” lauded it for having “sustainable development as the overarching objective” and pledged the “United Nations system stands ready to travel this road with you.” [7] In 2022, China’s engagement through financial investment and contractural cooperation in 147 countries was USD 67-8 billion on over 200 deals. This was about the same as in 2021 and for 2023, and more BRI engagement is expected because strict COVID restrictions were lifted.

    We do know, from a report issued by Ernst & Young that Chinese trade with BRI countries in Q1 of this year was U.S. $31.66 billion, an increase of 9.2%. It should be mentioned that there is no budget line for BRI in the Chinese government’s budget, rather, it remains a platform for launching a multitude of projects from vision to reality. In the future, we should expect less bilateral arrangements and more emphasis on bringing other countries into a quasi-governance structure, something on the order of BRI steering committee. And also more collaboration with the UN acting as an umbrella-type body. [8]

    In 2017, the BRI was written into the Chinese Communist Party’s Constitution as an indicator of its importance. Australian Professor Jane Colley, who has studied BRI from its inception, believes “They are absolutely still advancing it” and as far as outside pressure, she adds that, “Any idea of containing them or forcing countries to pick a side — it’s a very risky game to play.” [9] And after a comprehensive look at BRI, the mainstream publication Euromoney, concedes that,“The BRI is neither dead nor dying but is quietly mutating into something much larger and — whisper it — perhaps better.” [10]

    Will the BRI prove to be a platform that offers an alternative to the capitalist world order?  The most comprehensive and objective  attempt at predicting what BRI will resemble in 2035 contains various scenarios. The most optimistic, the “international BRI,” assumes the world will have entered a new phase of globalization. This world will be less Chinese, although the renminbi RMB) will be widely accepted as a reserve currency.

    This BRI will incorporate “Chinese values” but this stage will be neither Western nor Chinese nor will it lead to China as the new hegemonal state. There will be increased cooperation, the option China committed to at the 75th UN General Assembly. [11] In short, it will be a “thoroughly hybrid paradigm of global cooperation. [12] One factor, that might tend to mitigate that optimistic rendering is that the amount of finance available to for BRI projects might be constrained by the need to focus on domestic economic priorities.

    U.S Opposition to BRI

    In 2011, two years before President Xi unveiled BRI, Yan Xuetang penned an opinion piece in the New York Times, titled “How China Can Defeat America.”

    Yan, one of China’s foremost international relations scholars and Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing, offered his explanation for China’s eventual rise and the slow decline of the United States. By interrogating the particulars of national leadership in China’s past, Yan concluded that morality might well play a key role in competition between the two great powers.

    Yan identifies  himself as a political realist, a school which assumes international international politics is a zero-sum game. But unlike most scholars in this field, Yen argued that “morally informed authority”can play a key role in shaping international competition between the China and the United States. This “humane authority,” creates a desirable model at home that inspires people abroad” and in the international competition between the two great powers, this will win hearts and minds and “separate the winners from the losers.” [13] One gets the sense that Yan is implicitly implying that the U.S. will fail in this competition but he’s also challenging his own government to take advantage of this opportunity.

    Eight years later, in his 2019 groundbreaking book “Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers,” Yan wrote that “moral actions help [a rising power] to establish credibility.” Yan never abjures the existence of power hierarchies and that anarchy prevails in relations among nations. However, morally informed leadership can determine the outcome of the competition — without resorting to military confrontation. This moral realism “with Chinese characteristics” can be described as a form of enlightened self-interest.

    This “morally informed leadership… the side that wins the most international support will win the competition.” This should be a prime consideration in conducting foreign policy gains and “enables its leadership to become favorable to the majority of UN members.”

    When the BRI was first announced by China in 2013, it did not immediately set off alarm bells in Washington. But later, a study done for the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, an organization which sets the American empire’s imperial agenda, warned that “The BRI is here to stay and poses significant risks to U.S. economic and political interests and to longer term security implications.” [14]

    After the BRI had been in existence for seven years, it was characterized as China’s “means of weaponizing globalization to create commercial and political order centered around dependence on China.” [15]  Both of these succinct summations reveal that the U.S. view of the BRI cannot be divorced from how U.S. oligarchs and the military industrial complex perceive China more generally and here we return to the aforementioned realist school of international relations.

    American political scientist Hans Morgenthau’s book Politics Among Nations, first published in 1948, became the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy for at least four decades. It’s fair to say that Morgenthau was the father of the realist school and his book was adopted as the primary text in colleges and universities across the country. My undergraduate political science professor had been one of Morgenthau’s graduate students at the University of Chicago and my copy of Politics Among Nations was heavily underlined in preparation for class discussion and exams.

    In brief, the political realist assumes that all people are by “nature” greedy, aggressive and fiercely competitive. Morgenthau counseled that “Politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.” [16] Further, “The struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an unavoidable fact of experience.” As such, the realist concludes that states, the actors on the international stage, must focus on power. No universal morality exists and power politics is amoral.

    At the time his book was published, the outcome of the Chinese Revolution was still a year away but in an essay written in the 1960s, Morgenthau predicted that “China may well in the long run carry the gravest implications for the rest of the world.” Given this likelihood, he advised that U.S. strategy should be to establish an island chain running from Japan down to the Philippines so that one power could not attain a hegemonic position in Asia. [17] It should noted that prudence was a key concept in Morgenthau’s theory and the wise leader should be extremely careful in determining the national interest. It was on that basis that he was an early and active opponent of the Vietnam War. Whether Morgenthau would find common cause with those willing to go war over Taiwan remains an open question.

    John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago political science professor and arguably the most influential realist today, asserts that “The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually to dominate the system.” [18] In terms of geopolitics “The U.S. will have no choice but to adopt a realist policy, simply because it must prevent China from becoming a regional hegemon in Asia.” Further, he explains that,

    The U.S. does not tolerate peer competitors. As it demonstrated in the 20th century, it is determined to remain the world’s only regional hegemon. Therefore, the U.S. can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of ruling the roost in Asia. In essence, the U.S. is likely to behave towards China much the way it behaved towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

    A contemporary and highly influential iteration of the realist school is defense analyst Elsbridge Colby’s Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict. [19] Colby, grandson of former CIA Director William Colby, was the primary architect of the Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy. Colby’s effort is the best example I know of that lays out, chapter and verse, how the U.S. foreign policy elite is preparing for possible limited war with China and if necessary, nuclear war. Reaction from other realist strategies is typified by Robert Kaplan’s book cover blurb in which he gushes that Colby “reaches a level of theoretical mastery akin to Hans Morgenthau’s “Politics Among Nations.”

    To maintain U.S. global domination, Colby  states the following about China:

    We are facing a peer superpower — a generational challenger…China’s first step is a hegemonic position over Asia…then from that position they will be able to gain global predominance from which China will be able to essentially hold sway or influence over the entire world, including of course, Europe, but also the United States.

    To prevent this outcome,

    Requires that we ruthlessly focus, and that take controversial and aggressive steps ready ourselves now to avoid worse outcomes later. The problem is that we have not been doing nearly enough of these things. On our current course we are courting disaster.

    And further, if all else fails, “If China is willing to use nuclear weapons and the United States is not, Beijing will dominate over whatever interests are at stake — whether Taiwan’s fate, that of another U.S. ally or free American access to Asia more generally.” And in a dire warning, Colby asserts that “If China succeeds we can forget about housing, food, savings, affording college for our kids and other domestic needs. The end of ordinary citizen’s property will be here. China would make American society worse off and more susceptible to intense disputes over a stagnant economic pie.”

    Prudence was a key concept in Morgenthau’s theory and the wise leader should be careful in circumscribing the “national interest.” It was on that basis that Morgenthau was an early and active opponent of the Vietnam War which he felt lay outside U.S. national interest.

    Given the preceding, it’s my sense that U.S. realists view BRI as vast and growing phalanx of Trojan Horses out of which will emerge the means to challenge Washington’s unipolar position. A system that features peaceful development and the promise of “common prosperity” can’t be accommodated within the realist school. As Mearsheimer asserts, irrespective of ideology, “The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the globe.”

    The BRI is seen as part of a zero-sum game in which Washington’s unipolar world dominance will be eliminated along with a “rules-based international order. ” Speaking on the CBS program 60 Minutes (May 2, 2021), U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said, “Our purpose is…to uphold this rules-based order that China is posing a challenge to. Anyone who poses a challenge to that order, we’re doing to stand up and defend it.” In truth, this order is one which the United States imposed on the world to perpetuate its hegemony. This elusive set of rules, a copy of which ordinary Americans have yet to see, has been thoroughly dissected by Kim Petersen who notes: “It is a given that the rules-based order is an American linguistic instrument designed to preserve it as a global hegemon.”

    BRI notions of win-win outcomes and a common destiny for mankind simply can’t be accommodated in the mindset of the realist practitioners within the U.S. national security state.  They only see it as a geopolitical tool, wielded by China, who CIA Director William Burns claims, is the “most important geopolitical threat facing” the United States and if not stopped will eventually challenge American global hegemony.

    Given the preceding, it’s unwarranted to surmise that a decade of BRI’s positive contributions to national development and the promise of more to come, is even viewed as more of a threat to U.S. monopoly capital’s interests than China’s rapidly growing military preparedness. That is, BRI is a type of normative power that might allow for the creation of a new international order with multilateral institutions that replace the existing ones without engaging in military conflict with the United States, thus “killing two birds with one stone.” For the realist, intent on defending the U.S. empire:

    It goes without saying that this counter-hegemonic geopolitical endeavor is much more threatening to the United States than the geo-strategic actorness of China than the territorial empire which is mainly limited to military actions in China’s maritime vicinity. [20]

    This is because BRI’s projects in the Global South stand in sharp relief to their collective memory of the American empire’s history brutal exploitation at the expense of other, of military intervention, giving covert support to opposition groups, stealing natural resources, regime change, CIA coups, assassinations and, of course, the prolongation of structural violence. And even after achieving independence, sometimes after years of liberation struggles, the only development option available has been the capitalist one with its mandated austerity measures that further hastened widespread misery.

    The U.S. and its European vassals cannot compete in terms of scale, financing or political will and therefore have nothing to offer but more of the same. Biden’s “Build Back Better” and the EU’s “Global Gateway” are rudderless and lack any domestic support. BRI has no serious competitors. Predatory capitalism is in deep trouble and the window of opportunity to act is closing. As such, the Pentagon may try to sabotage BRI by other means, including provoking China into a military confrontation, possibly in the South China Sea, with all the risks of confrontation between two nuclear powers.

    Earlier this year, Air Force General Mike “unrepentant lethality” Minihan predicted a war with China within the next two years. In a memo to those under his command, he stressed preparing “to fight and win inside the first island range, running through Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. And in speech last September for a 16,000 member aerospace convention, Gen. Minihan declared: “Lethality matters most. When you kill your enemy, every part of life is better. Your food tastes better. Your marriage is stronger.” It’s not clear to what degree Minihan is an outlier but the Pentagon may try to indirectly sabotage BRI by other means, including provoking China into a military confrontation, possibly in the South China Sea, with of all the risks of a war between two nuclear powers.

    This requires fostering public fears and paranoia about China and that explains why the mass media machine’s demonization of China is picking up speed. It seems to be working: A March 20-26, 2023 Pew Research Poll, a large majority (84%) of adult Americans now hold a negative view of China and only 14% a positive view, the lowest share ever recorded. And 4 in 10 describe China as “an enemy of the United States,” up 13 points since last year and a majority say the U.S. and China cannot work together to solve international problems. 75% of young Americans (18-25) have an unfavorable opinion of the country and those with a college degree are more likely to hold an unfavorable view than those with some college or less. It’s my sense that within this fevered smearing of “evil” China is an implicit war-mongering message: Something must be done to stop China’s rise in the world. Whether exposure to relentless Sino-phobia will translate into public support for an actual war should never be assumed. And leaves a very narrow and perhaps only temporary opening for counter-narratives that might preserve BRI as an antidote to Western imperialism while increasing the chances for “a human community with a shared destiny.”

    ENDNOTES

    1. Xi’s World Vision: A Community of Common Destiny, A Shared Home for Humanity, January 15,2017.

    2. Chinese President Xi Jinping, speech at the opening ceremony of the 2018 FOCAC Beijing Summit.

    3. W. Gyde Moore, Africa-China Review, August, 2020. China has been involved in Africa since the 1950s. Africa welcomed China’s role as a new source of finance and Beijing generally played a constructive role. Deborah Brautigam provides the comprehensive, definitive and corrective account in, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009; also, “Chinese Investors in Africa Have Had ‘Significant and Persistently Positive’ Long-Term Effects Despite Controversy,” Eurasia Review, February 1, 2021; And for a thorough debunking of the “Chinese Debt Trap Myth.”

    4. “China’s BRI ‘circle of friends’ expanding,” Helsinki Times, 1/16/2023.

    5. Z.Wang, “Understanding the Belt and Road Initiative from the Relational Perspective,” Chinese Journal of International Relations, Vol.3, No.1 (2021). As such the BRI will assist the gradual evolution of the existing system “into a more fair and more inclusive system.” Fu Ying, “Is China’s Choice to Submit to the U.S. or Challenge It?” Huffington Post, May 26, 2015.

    6. As found in Nedege Rolland, China’s Vision For A New World Order, NBR Special Report, No. 83. January 2020, p. 40-41.

    7. Antonio Guerres, “Remarks at the opening of the Belt and Road Forum,” United Nations, May 14, 2017.

    9. Silk Road briefing 2023-05-15 on China’s overseas investments.

    10. For more on the subject, see Huiyao Wang, “How China can multilaterialize the BRI,” East Asian Forum, 11 March 2023.

    11. “What is going on with China’s Belt and Road Initiative?” 23 May 2023.

    12. Ozturk, I (2019) “The belt and road initiative as a hybrid international goal,” Working Papers in East Asian Studies, November 2019.

    12. Elliot Wilson, “Not dead yet: The future of China’s belt and road,” Euromoney, September 22, 2022.

    13. Yan Xuetang, “How China Can Defeat America,” New York Times, January 12, 2011.

    14. “China’s belt and road: implications for the United States,” CFR, Independent Task Force Report No. 79.

    15. U.S. Economic and Security Review Commission. 2020 Report to the Congress of the U.S. – Economic and Security Review.

    16. It’s no coincidence that the realist take on human nature is congruent with the assumptions underlying capitalism and provide an ideological rationale for its practitioners. For a fact-based refutation, see, Gary Olson, Empathy Imperiled: Capitalism, Culture and the Brain (New York: Springer Publishing, 2012).

    17. Hans Morgenthau, Essays of a Decade: 1960-70. (New York: Praeger, 1970).

    18. John Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?” The National Interest, October 25, 2014.

    19. Eldridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021. For an extensive look at Colby’s family, wealthy connections and the genesis of this book, see, William A. Shoup, “Giving War a Chance” Monthly Review, May 1, 2022.

    20. Theodore Tudoroiu, “The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s New International Order,” Munk School, February 14, 2023.

  • By Blessen Tom, RNZ News journalist

    Fifteen artists have been selected as the inaugural beneficiaries of NZ On Air’s New Music Pan-Asian funding.

    The initiative, the first of its kind, aims to support the Asian music community in New Zealand.

    The fund was established due to a lack of equitable representation of Asian musicians in the country’s music sector, says Teresa Patterson, head of music at NZ On Air.

    “Our Music Diversity Report clearly showed the under-representation of Pan-Asian New Zealand musicians in the Aotearoa music sector,” she said.

    “This is reflected in the number of funding applications we received for this focus round.”

    The funding provides musicians with up to $10,000 for recording, mixing and mastering a single, some of which can be set aside for the promotion and creation of visual content to accompany the song’s release.

    “We received 107 applications for 15 grants, which is outstanding,” Patterson said.

    ‘Wonderful range’
    “The range of genre, gender and ethnicity among the applicants was wonderful. We received applications from artists who identify as Chinese, Indian, Filipino, South Korean, Japanese, Indonesian, Sri Lankan, Malaysian, Thai and Iraqi.

    “The genres varied from alternative/indie and pop to hip-hop/RnB, dance/electro and folk/country.”

    Phoebe Rings members Crystal Choi, Simeon Kavanagh-Vincent, Benjamin Locke and Alex Freer.
    Phoebe Rings members Crystal Choi, Simeon Kavanagh-Vincent, Benjamin Locke and Alex Freer. Image: Phoebe Rings/RNZ News

    Six of the 15 songs that secured funding are bilingual, featuring Asian languages such as Cantonese, Korean, Japanese, Malay and Punjabi.

    Patterson believed this variety would “really help to reflect the many voices of Aotearoa New Zealand” and add to the vibrant cultural music mix experienced by local audiences.

    Swap Gomez, a drummer, visual director and academic lecturer, was one of the panel members responsible for selecting the musicians for the funding. He emphasised the challenges faced by Asian musicians in New Zealand.

    “What was awesome to see was so many Pan-Asian artists applying; artists we had never heard of coming out of the woodwork now that a space has been created to celebrate their work,” Gomez said.

    “This is the time we can celebrate those Pan-Asian artists who have previously felt overlooked by the wider industry.

    “Now there is an environment and sector where they can feel appreciated for their success in music. As a multicultural industry, developing initiatives such as this one is more crucial than ever.”

    NZ On Air has announced that funding opportunities for Asian musicians will continue in the next financial year.

    “The response we have had to this inaugural NZ On Air New Music Pan-Asian focus funding round has been phenomenal,” Patterson said.

    “It tells us that there is a real need, so NZ On Air is excited to confirm that it will return in the new financial year.”

    The full NZ On Air’s Pan-Asian New Music recipient list:

    • Amol; cool asf
    • Charlotte Avery; just before you go
    • Crystal Chen; love letter
    • hanbee; deeper
    • Hans.; Porcelain
    • Hugo Chan; bite
    • Julius Black; After You
    • LA FELIX; Waiting
    • Lauren Gin; Don’t Stop
    • Memory Foam; Moon Power
    • Phoebe Rings; 아스라이
    • RESHMA; Kuih Lapis (Layer Cake)
    • tei.; sabre
    • Terrible Sons; Thank You, Thank You
    • Valere; Lily’s March

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

  • Each time it happens, the world insists: ‘never again’. But the political and moral blindspots that allow these atrocities will persist until the lessons of history are learned

    It’s happening again. In Darfur, scene of a genocide that killed 300,000 people and displaced millions 20 years ago, armed militias are on the rampage once more. Now, as then, they are targeting ethnic African tribes, murdering, raping and stealing with impunity. “They” are nomadic, ethnic Arab raiders, the much-feared “devils on horseback” – except now they ride in trucks. They’re called the Janjaweed. And they’re back.

    How is it possible such horrors can be repeated? The world condemned the 2003 slaughter. The UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigated. Sudan’s former president, Omar al-Bashir, was charged with genocide and crimes against humanity along with his principal allies. The trial of one suspect, known as Ali Kushayb, opened last year. Yet Bashir and the guilty men have evaded justice so far.

    Continue reading…

  • This week’s News on China.

    • Alibaba Cloud will broadcast 2024 Olympics
    • Taiwanese leader’s popularity slumps
    • World’s largest hydro-solar power plant
    • Village basketball and football championships

    This post was originally published on Dissident Voice.

  • RNZ News

    Prime Minister Chris Hipkins says New Zealand’s largest ever trade delegation to China has been “knocking on open doors”.

    Hipkins held a media briefing yesterday on the final day of his week-long trip to China.

    Hipkins has headed the trade delegation to China and has had successful meetings with top-ranking politicians, including Chinese President Xi Jingping.

    He said it had been a great trip, and he had been heartened by the positive reaction business leaders in the delegation had received.

    “There is a huge market here for New Zealand products and services and so I think for me one of the big insights was the door is wide open.”

    Hipkins said he had had the opportunity to see just how thriving the relationship between New Zealand and China was, “particularly building on a very successful event last night which had hundreds of local and New Zealand business people able to get together”.

    The relationship with China was “in good heart”, he said.

    He said he had navigated the relationship with China in the same way New Zealand always had, “to be open, to be candid, to be transparent and to be consistent in our position”.

    Watch the media briefing:


    Prime Minister Chris Hipkins in China media briefing.  Video: RNZ

     

    Visa issues
    Hipkins said the government had been well aware of difficulties with visas for a long time.

    “We knew it was going to be a bit of a bumpy road when we reopened the border and had this huge backlog to work our way through — particularly in areas like international student visas for example, which can be quite time consuming to process because there’s a lot more in them.

    “The timeliness around international student visa applications is looking pretty good, the timeliness around business visas is improving, the timeliness around visitor visas remains a challenging area for us because there’s a high volume of them and obviously the frequency with which they are flooding in continues to put the system under pressure.”

    He said things like identity verification were causing delays, but “certainly we’re working hard to try and speed that up”.

    PM Chris Hipkins in China
    NZ Prime Minister Chris Hipkins and the trade delegation . . . “A very positive vibe.” Image: Jane Patterson/RNZ News

    A ‘very positive vibe’
    Sealord chairperson Jamie Tuuta, the head of the business delegation, said there had been a “very positive vibe”.

    “It’s been wonderful to be part of the delegation, really promoting Aotearoa New Zealand as one and I think it’s been a real success.”

    He said the fact the prime minister had access to the top three politicians in China had been very important for business in China and economic relationships.

    “I think it really just demonstrates the longstanding relationship that New Zealand has had with China.”

    He said New Zealanders probably did not understand the level of coverage the trip has brought to the Chinese people in the media and social media, and said the large size of the delegation has been very beneficial.

    Tuuta said the feedback from everyone on the trip is that it has been “a great success and the nature of the conversations that have been had are warm and constructive, are such where actually it’s positioned us well as a country and as businesses to grow trade and to work constructively with our customers and market”.

    He said looking at other countries doing business in China, New Zealand businesses did punch above their weight.

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

  • In 2018, Le Le Farley took his first steps to a stand-up career with two nervous, and he says, poorly received, performances in China. Back then, Farley was among a vanguard of young entertainers experimenting with what was a relatively new form of comedy in the country.

    Much has changed in the five years since. Farley, an American who spent most of his 20s in China, is back in the States, where his comedy routines have grown more sure-footed. His YouTube videos, which often feature Chinese-related content, are viewed by hundreds of thousands of people, mostly fans in Taiwan and other countries overseas.

    But back in China where he started, stand-up faces a more uncertain future. A joke last month by the comedian “House” prompted canceled shows and a nearly US$2 million fine for Xiaoguo Culture, the production company that employs him.

    Farley, whose real name is Lawrence, equated doing comedy in the country with “playing football in a minefield.” 

    “You just don’t know how many things you’re not allowed to say,” he said. (Farley does know one thing not allowed: he says this bit got his performances banned in China.)

    July 1 is International Joke Day (and, for what it’s worth, International Chicken Wing Day), but one main source of punch lines in China – the stand-up – has effectively been placed on hiatus.

    INV_CHN_Comedy.2.jpg
    In this undated screenshot, stand-up comic Li Haoshi, known by his stage name “House,” performs. His employer, a Chinese comedy agency, suspended Li after he sparked public ire with a joke which some said likened feral dogs to soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army. Credit: Screenshot from Tencent Video Talk show

    House’s arrest has had a “deadening effect” on joke-telling, according to an American China scholar who has performed crosstalk, a comedic style with a much longer tradition in the country. 

    Stand-up is “still a very popular form, but now everyone’s kind of waiting to see if it’s going to have to go through some changes,” he said. 

    So sensitive is the environment now that the scholar, who lives in China, asked not to be named. Even figurative spotlights are shunned these days.

    Comedy’s evolution

    Comedy with Chinese characteristics has always been a bit of an uneasy fit. 

    Historically, crosstalk comedians were known to push the boundaries of good taste. (In crosstalk, one performer plays it funny while another plays it straight, like the “Who’s on First” routine made famous by Abbott and Costello.) But once the Communist Party took over, crosstalk shows, like other creative endeavors, were told to focus on promoting government ideology. 

    In the Cultural Revolution, they became “very unfunny,” the scholar said. “You couldn’t say anything.”

    Comedians got a little more room to maneuver in the decades after Mao’s death, as rules were loosened under the “socialism with Chinese characteristics” paradigm, the phrase coined by Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping. 

    But it wasn’t really until the past decade that stand-up, a Western style of comedy known for its tradition of provocation, began to flourish. There were around 18,500 shows at 180 stand-up clubs in China in 2021, according to the China Performance Industry Association’s annual report. The $54 million those performances generated represented a 50% jump from 2019.

    Xiaoguo Culture in particular came to dominate the stand-up scene. It produced a popular variety show called “Roast!,” which drew inspiration from celebrity roasts seen in the U.S. on Comedy Central, and the Stand-up Comedy Talent Show, where many of the country’s best known comedians got their start.

    Dogs, squirrels and soldiers

    But in May a Weibo user shared a post expressing discomfort with a stand-up segment the user alleged had insulted the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. 

    In the offending bit, House, whose real name is Li Haoshi, drew a parallel between his dogs chasing squirrels and the phrase “possessing a good fighting spirit and winning battles.” Chinese leader Xi Jinping once used the phrase to call for a capable and disciplined military.

    Authorities subsequently fined Xiaoguo nearly $1.9 million and charged House with “depicting severe insults towards the People’s Liberation Army, resulting in a negative societal impact.” 

    He was also accused of willfully altering approved content. 

    INV_CHN_Comedy.3.jpg
    A show cancellation notice is seen outside a Xiaoguo Comedy theater in Shanghai, May 17, 2023. Credit: AFP

    In China, public performance scripts are heavily scrutinized. The country’s “Regulation on the Administration of Commercial Performances” says that shows performed and broadcast can’t have a negative impact on the nation, its ethnicity, social stability or traditions.  

    Organizers of commercial shows must submit an application to the local authorities before performances, to include a word-for-word transcript and a video of the artist presenting the script.

    Joke inspectors on the job

    There is little room for improvisation. According to one report, Xiaoguo Culture sent in text for one show that extended to 1,000 pages. In another instance, authorities found that a Xiaoguo comedian had included approximately 10-20% of content that had not been approved. Company representatives were called in for questioning, which in China typically means a warning from authorities. 

    In Shanghai’s Huangpu District, where more stand-ups perform than anywhere else in China, a volunteer brigade of censors recruited by government cultural authorities actually go out into the city to monitor shows.

    Inspection reports, which volunteers are required to complete on the night of the performance, should include at least three on-site photos, a summary of the show, and an assessment of how well it aligned with the preapproved script, according to job announcements posted in 2021 and 2022. 

    A volunteer told Chinese media that she tries to be “sneaky” observing the comedian, using a hat or scarf to shield any light from her phone as she reads the word-for-word transcript to make sure it matches what she’s hearing. 

    A man and a woman walk into a bar

    Despite the guardrails, Chinese comedians still find ways to be funny, just as American comics in the 1960s when cultural norms were more conservative and legal rules regarding obscenity were tougher than today. 

    Chinese stand-ups rely on self-deprecation and anecdotes about life’s absurdities to make their audiences laugh, while steering clear of politics or issues known to be important to the Communist Party, like the 2008 Beijing Olympics. 

    The American scholar gave this example as a typical joke: A man and his date drive to dinner, then they drive to a bar for a drink, then to a park for a short walk, and finally back to her place. 

    Feigning dizziness at all the driving, the woman asks the man to help her upstairs to her apartment. But instead of recognizing the opportunity, the man gets angry at the suggestion he’s a bad driver and speeds off, dangerously.

    “They just naturally kind of wiggle their way into a sort of semantic space where they can be very funny but without being dirty or political,” the scholar said. 

    INV_CHN_Comedy.4.jpg
    Audience members laugh as a Chinese standup comedian performs during a comedy show at a bookstore in Beijing. May 24, 2015 photo. Credit: Mark Schiefelbein/Associated Press

    The list of offenders grows

    Comedians have occasionally pushed against the boundaries of their craft – and paid a price.  

    There have been at least two other instances where cultural officials found performances that strayed too far from their scripts since 2021, but in these cases the fines were relatively minimal: around $7,000 USD each. The nearly $2 million fine imposed on Xiaoguo Culture suggests a rising level of concern within the government. 

    Chizi, whose real name is Wang Yuechi, was reportedly banned on multiple online platforms in February after a stand-up tour in North America where he reportedly talked about taboo topics such as China’s epidemic prevention policies and censorship rules.

    Meng Chuan, who appeared on the Stand-up Comedy Talent Show from 2019 to 2022, was prohibited from performing after expressing support for White Paper protesters last fall.

    And Kamu, a Uyghur from Xinjiang whom the American comedian Farley considers to have been among the edgiest stand-ups in China, was arrested in 2020 for what the police said was facilitating drug use. He received an eight-month prison sentence. He is active on Chinese social media but isn’t allowed to perform offline or appear on television.

    In China, jokes travel

    Comedians who may want to press their luck face another issue, beyond just the chance of being identified by a cultural investigator: the audiences themselves.

    “What is said in the comedy club doesn’t stay in the comedy club,” said Jocelyn Chey, a University of Sydney professor and an expert on Chinese culture, including its humor. 

    Humorous events can acquire a range of “political factors or vortexes which rapidly engulf the comedian or cartoonist,” said Mark Rolfe of the University of New South Wales.

    “A whole lot of other people pile their agendas on.”

    As the House case shows, a cancel culture monitored by citizens exists in China as it does in the United States. 

    The difference, of course, is the role the government plays. 

    ‘There is power in funny’

    Rhetoric experts say authoritarian governments like China’s are particularly fearful of humor because of its effectiveness as a communications tool. Understanding a joke requires a shared knowledge base, so sharing a laugh is an easy way to find someone with a similar outlook (see Let’s Go Brandon memes).

    Humor can also help convey complex or difficult issues more simply or palatably. 

    Comedians can “couch very serious matters in humorous terms without losing the intended message,” said Beck Krefting, a professor at Skidmore College in New York who studies comedy. “Humor, as they say, helps the medicine go down.”

    In the U.S., stand-ups have a history of joining other cultural arbitrators to push social changes, said Krefting, who is a part-time stand-up herself.

    The civil rights movement, for example, “was aided and abetted by stand-up comedy and comedians, specifically [those] … who had established a presence with black audiences but were also welcomed by white audiences,” she said.

    But comedy is equally powerful in reinforcing an ideology, said Matthew Meier, an associate professor at DePauw University in Indiana. 

    “The point at which I’m laughing at things, I have taken the premise of those things so for granted that they must be true,” said Meier, who edited a book of essays on comedy called Standing Up, Speaking Out: Stand Up Comedy and the Rhetoric of Social Change.

    “Authoritarianism wants to control what is and isn’t funny because there is power in funny. And the power is, at least in part, its capacity to become viral.”

    Xi has a sense of humor … just ask him

    That desire for control extends beyond comedy. Chey said the case involving House reminded her of China’s recent crackdown on foreign consulting firms that analyze the country’s economic climate. 

    “In many areas I think people are very careful and are very conscious of increasing restrictions on what they can say and what they can repeat,” Chey told RFA.

    INV_CHN_Comedy.5.jpg
    Chinese President Xi Jinping laughs during a meeting at United Nations headquarters in New York, Sept. 27, 2015. Credit: Seth Wenig/Associated Press

    This isn’t to say – the Chinese government would like it known – that the party or Xi Jinping himself doesn’t have a sense of humor.

    CGTN, China’s foreign-language news propaganda channel, made a video showcasing Xi’s “light-hearted moments,” and the Central Propaganda Department endorsed a Shanghai government produced a “popular theory-based stand-up comedy show.”  (Chinese citizens displayed their own sense of humor in the comment section: “Please display instructions on the screen for when and how loudly to laugh, and indicate the maximum number of teeth I can reveal when laughing,” one said.) 

    “Xi Jinping’s humor is a reflection of wisdom and self-confidence,” said a 2018 propaganda piece intended to promote the leader’s funny side. 

    “Whether among the masses or among leaders at all levels, Xi-style humor is ubiquitous.”

    Given the government’s response to House, it may be the only style left.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Mary Zhao and Jim Snyder for RFA Investigative.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Merchants at Myanmar’s border with China say the junta’s trade policy is too unstable and that a new pay-by-bank system announced last week will severely restrict their ability to import goods.

    On June 23, the junta’s commerce ministry announced that importers at northeastern Myanmar’s border with China will have to pay for goods using their local bank accounts beginning on Aug. 1.

    Those who have been granted a license will receive a one-month grace period and must complete their imports by Aug. 31 or their license will be invalidated, the announcement said.

    The move comes days after the U.S. Treasury Department imposed new sanctions on two junta-controlled banks in connection with the Myanmar military’s purchases of arms from foreign sellers, in a bid to restrict foreign currency transactions.

    Analysts said the junta hopes that its new pay-by-bank system at the Chinese border will slow the outflow of foreign currency amid the tightening of sanctions.

    On Tuesday, the World Bank noted in a report that, over the six months leading up to June, Myanmar has pursued “a further expansion of export and import license requirements, increased regulation of fuel imports, and additional administrative restrictions on outbound financial transfers.”

    “The authorities have announced that imports will be subject to additional scrutiny, with the intent to promote import substitution with domestically produced goods,” the Bank said.

    An official from the junta’s Department of Economy and Commerce, who declined to be named because he wasn’t authorized to speak about the subject to the media, framed the pay-by-bank system as a way to “strengthen trade between the two countries and reduce money laundering.”

    But Min Thein, the vice president of the Muse Border Rice Association in Shan state, told RFA that the new banking system will “create challenges” for traders, as they will be required to submit proof of purchase via original bank statements and information about the income they generate to the junta’s trade department.

    Additionally, the Department of Commerce will only grant import licenses based on the total amount of money in an applicant’s bank account. Also, 65% of foreign currency income from exports must be sold to the regime at the central bank’s currency exchange rate, which is substantially lower than the market rate.

    As of Tuesday, the official exchange rate for the U.S. dollar hovered around 2,250 kyats, while the market rate was 3,200 kyats. On Thursday, the official exchange rate for the Chinese yuan was 290 kyats, while the market rate was 435 kyats.

    Controlling foreign currency

    A trader at the border who, like others interviewed for this report, spoke on condition of anonymity, citing security concerns, told RFA that the junta’s directive is aimed at controlling all foreign currency used for trading.

    He said requirements on the reporting of income and selling of 65% of foreign currency to the junta at the official exchange rate “won’t work for traders,” and will likely lead to a trade decline.

    A similar pay-by-bank system was put into place by Myanmar’s former junta, which ruled the country until 2011, but was later rescinded after traders complained that it forced them to deposit money in advance of their deals, requiring more personal outlay and leading to trade delays.

    Kan Pike Te gate at the China-Myanmar border in Kachin state in 2019. Credit: RFA
    Kan Pike Te gate at the China-Myanmar border in Kachin state in 2019. Credit: RFA

    A trader at the border in Shan state’s Chin Shwe Haw township, which is one of Myanmar’s five official border trade posts with China, said the junta’s frequent changes to the country’s trade policy had left importers and exporters scrambling to keep up.

    “We don’t exactly know which way to go,” he said. “The trade system changes too often. When one system was announced not long ago, another new system was ordered to replace it. Importers and exporters are all confused.”

    Other sources told RFA that if the new system slows trade, those who rely on the exchange of goods will also suffer.

    A trucker at the border said that his line of work would also be impacted by the new policy.

    “If traders have to pay too much to the government, we truckers will be out of work, too,” he said. “We will have to wait and see how it’s going to turn out, as the new policy was just announced, but I expect that the flow of goods will definitely be slowed.”

    Junta officials have pointed to the success of a similar pay-by-bank system implemented along Myanmar’s border with Thailand since Nov. 1.

    But a trader working along that border told RFA that the success is largely due to the strong banking connections between Thailand and Myanmar, while in some cases there aren’t even banks on the Chinese side of the border with Myanmar.

    Slowing trade

    Trade along Myanmar’s 2,200-kilometer (1,370-mile) border with China mostly takes place in the border towns of Lweje and Kanpaikti in Kachin state and in Muse and Chin Shwe Haw in Shan state.

    Trade with China was steady prior to 2019, but was impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and the political crisis in the aftermath of Myanmar’s Feb. 1, 2021 military coup d’etat.

    According to the junta’s Department of Commerce and Industry, exports to China from Muse – which sees the heaviest flow of trade across the border – amounted to US$3 billion in the fiscal year from 2019-2020, while imports were worth US$1.8 billion.

    As of May for the current fiscal year, exports had reached US$274 million, while imports were valued at US$157 million.

    Translated by Myo Min Aung. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Matt Reed.

    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Burmese.

  • The boom in renewable power projects in China will likely help the country reach its 2030 target five years early, boosting the effort to limit global carbon emissions far faster than expected, a new study said.

    China is on track to double its solar and wind power capacity and shatter Beijing’s ambitious 2030 target of 1,200 gigawatts (GW) five years ahead of schedule if all prospective projects are successfully built and commissioned, said the Global Energy Monitor (GEM) report, released on Thursday.

    Solar panel installations alone are growing at a pace that would increase global capacity by 85% and wind power by nearly 50% by 2025, said GEM, a San Francisco-based non-governmental organization that tracks energy projects worldwide. 

    China has approximately 379 GW of large utility-scale solar and 371 GW of wind capacity projects that have been announced or are in the pre-construction and construction phases. They will likely be finished by 2025, adding roughly the same amount of currently installed operating capacity. 

    The report projected that China would likely achieve the provincial targets of approximately 1,371 GW for wind and solar, which is higher than the 1,200 GW President Xi Jinping announced his government would install by 2030. 

    ENG_ENV_Chinarenewables_06302023.2.jpg
    A solar panel installation is seen in Ruicheng County in central China’s Shanxi Province, Nov. 27, 2019. Credit: AP

    “This new data provides unrivaled granularity about China’s jaw-dropping surge in solar and wind capacity,” said Dorothy Mei, project manager at Global Energy Monitor. 

    “As we closely monitor the implementation of prospective projects, this detailed information becomes indispensable in navigating the country’s energy landscape.”

    Half global renewable capacity in China

    China has emerged as the frontrunner in global renewable energy, leveraging a blend of incentives and regulatory policies to host approximately 50% of the world’s operational wind and solar capacity.

    The report said the ambitious renewable push has been geographically widespread, with every province and most counties developing large-scale solar and wind power. 

    China’s operating scale solar capacity has reached 228 GW, more than the rest of the world combined. 

    Map Solar.jpg
    This map shows prospective large utility-scale solar capacity in China. Credit: Global Energy Monitor.

    According to the report, China’s northern and northwest provinces have the largest number of solar projects. Shanxi, Xinjiang, and Hebei are the top three regions with the highest utility-scale solar capacity.

    Meanwhile, China’s combined onshore and offshore wind capacity has doubled since 2017, surpassing 310 GW, with the highest concentration of projects in the northern and northwestern regions, including Inner Mongolia, Hebei, and Xinjiang.

    China’s offshore wind capacity, which accounts for just 10% of its total wind capacity, is more than Europe’s offshore operating capacity.

    Map Wind.jpg
    This map shows prospective wind farm capacity in China. Credit: Global Energy Monitor.

    On Sunday, China successfully commenced operations of the Tibetan plateau’s largest hybrid solar-hydro power plant, Kela, which can generate 2 billion kilowatt hours of electricity annually, equivalent to the energy consumption of over 700,000 households.

    Currently boasting a capacity of 20 GW, the plant is projected to expand and achieve approximately 50 GW capacity by 2030.

    In the past, China has said that its greenhouse gas emissions will peak in 2030 before slowing down to reach net zero by 2060. 

    “Ramping up wind and solar capacity plays an essential role in China’s carbon emissions from the power sector,” Mei told Radio Free Asia.

    “When China reaches its emissions peak will essentially depend on how soon the growth of clean energy can start to outpace the increase in total energy demand, which could happen in the next few years given the current solar and wind boom.”

    China’s reliance on coal continues 

    Among the top 10 power sector emitters, China led the world by three times more than the U.S., the second-biggest carbon dioxide emitter, with fossil fuel power plants generating two-thirds of China’s electricity in 2022.

    In April, another energy research organization Ember said in a report that China produced the most CO2 emissions of any power sector in the world in 2022, accounting for 38% of total global emissions from electricity generation.

    Mei said that while China had made significant progress in renewable energy deployment, it continued to heavily rely on coal for power generation “due to its reliability and consistent electricity supply.”

    “The power supply model being adopted at the renewables bases in the northwest deserts still largely relies on new coal power plants to provide a steady, reliable flow of electricity through the long-distance direct current transmission lines to end users,” Mei said.

    In 2022, China alone accounted for 53% of the world’s coal-fired electricity generation, showing a dramatic revival in appetite for new coal power projects. 

    000_32GX22T.jpg
    A View of the Wujing coal-electricity power station is seen across the Huangpu River in the Minhang district of Shanghai on August 22, 2022. Credit: Hector Retamal/AFP

    Recent record heatwaves and drought have also renewed focus on China’s energy security concerns, as factories had to be shut down due to power shortages, forcing authorities to increase reliance on coal. 

    Last year, Beijing approved the highest new coal capacity in eight years. It continues this year, with environmental group Greenpeace saying in April that China had approved at least 20.45 GW of new coal capacity in the first three months of 2023, according to official approval documents.

    “As electricity demand during extreme weather events increases, China must resist turning to coal and should instead prioritize more optimal solutions to manage the variability of demand and clean power supply,” Mei said.

    Edited by Mike Firn.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Subel Rai Bhandari for RFA.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The Chinese government has denied compensation for residents, including Tibetan nomads, affected by the construction of the world’s largest hydro-solar plant, residents living near the plant told Radio Free Asia.

    Chinese state media reported Monday that the Kela mega hydro-photovoltaic complementary power station began full operation Sunday. The sprawling solar plant, which covers 16 million square meters, or more than 2,000 soccer fields, has a hydropower component that helps stabilize energy supply due to shifting weather conditions.

    It is capable of generating 2 billion kilowatt-hours each year, and can fully charge 15,000 electric vehicles with a range of 550 kilometers (340 miles) in just one hour.

    But nomadic Tibetans who once grazed their cattle in the area now covered by a sea of solar panels were forced away and offered nothing in return, a Tibetan resident living near Kela told RFA’s Tibetan Service.

    “The Chinese government has begun operating the largest solar power station along with the hydropower dams in Nyakchu county in Kardze [in Chinese, Ganzi] beginning June 24,” the resident said, referring to a separate hydropower project.

    “In order to build and facilitate these power plants, the Chinese government has displaced the local Tibetans in these regions in a land-grab and has not given any compensation yet.”

    ENG_TIB_SolarCompensation_06272023_02.JPG
    Tibetan nomads wait for tourists to offer their horses for rides at Namtso Lake in Tibet Autonomous Region, in 2006. Credit: Claro Cortes IV/Reuters

    The resident said that the displaced Tibetans were never informed before the project started.

    “Instead, police were stationed near these power plants and locals were not permitted near them,” the person said. “Though the authorities told the local Tibetans that these power plants would be beneficial to livestock and their pastures, but now the Tibetan nomads are being displaced and pushed away to other places.”

    The nomads had filed complaints with the Chinese government to no avail, another Tibetan resident said.

    “In April this year, the local Tibetans pleaded with the Chinese authorities to stop these projects,” the second person said. “However it is very clear that no opposition to displacement and resettlement is possible and that local Tibetans have no choice but to comply with the government’s orders.” 

    ENG_TIB_SolarCompensation_06272023_03.JPG
    A worker checks solar photovoltaic modules used for solar panels at a factory in Suqian in China’s eastern Jiangsu province, May 9, 2023. Credit: AFP

    The power plants pose a serious threat to Tibet’s fragile environment, Lobsang Yangtso, an environmental researcher at the San Francisco-based Tibet International Network.

    “China’s policies and the expansion of infrastructure in Tibet are the cause of earthquakes, floods and various types of irreversible damage to the ecosystem,” she said.

    Translated by Tenzin Dickyi. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Sangyal Kunchok for RFA Tibetan.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • After instigating a series of diplomatic disputes and displaying “toughness” toward China, Seoul’s attitude seems to have suddenly changed in the past couple of days, with a high-profile emphasis on “China-South Korean friendship.” On June 25, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin stated in a news program that the basic stance of the Yoon Suk-yeol government is to advance South Korea-China relations into that of a mature and healthy one based on mutual respect, reciprocity and common interest, and the Yoon government sees “no reason to antagonize China and has no will to do so.” He further expressed that Seoul will continue to strengthen strategic communication to promote friendship between South Korea and China.

    This statement has sparked discussions in both China and South Korea. From the perspective of Chinese society, we certainly welcome and hope that the two countries meet each other halfway. However, to be frank, many Chinese people have doubts about Seoul’s sincerity: Is it a realization of the overall trend or a measure of expediency? These doubts are not unfounded. An important “coincidence” is that South Korea’s denial of “antagonizing China” happened to occur after the visit of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to China.

    Actually, after the official announcement of Blinken’s visit to China, there has been a wave of voices in South Korean public opinion hoping to repair relations with China, because “China-US relations are entering a phase of easing tensions,” and South Korea should follow suit. Therefore, even though the stated intention is to enhance “China-South Korean friendship,” it still gives the impression of dancing to US’ tune. The effectiveness of such a “friendly gesture” is questionable.

    A government that cannot maintain independence and autonomy in foreign affairs will find it hard to help pull the China-South Korea relations out of a dilemma. Currently, when Washington wants to ease tensions, Seoul immediately responds with a “warm breeze.” However, if Washington wants to tighten the situation in the future, wouldn’t Seoul follow suit with immediate snowfall? The key issue is not just a matter of attitude. South Korea has cooperated with the US in damaging China’s interests on issues such as THAAD and chips. The consequences of these actual actions are not something that can be resolved by simply blowing some “warm breeze.”

    Frankly speaking, since the inauguration of the Yoon government, China-South Korea relations have been deteriorating, and it seems they have not yet hit the bottom. Many insightful individuals in South Korea are expressing deep concerns about the unnecessary difficulties that China-South Korea relations are experiencing due to external or emotional factors. They have also criticized the South Korean government for its actions.

    It is worth noting that China has never concluded or made the judgment that there is a reason for China and South Korea to antagonize each other. The self-defense of South Korea appears to be more of an attempt to ease domestic dissatisfaction and resentment toward the immature and unbalanced diplomacy of the Yoon government.

    Regardless of the reason, having the willingness to improve relations is always better than exchanging harsh words, but ultimately it depends on the actions of South Korea. For example, when it comes to the Taiwan question, can South Korea return to its original position as an “outsider?” In Washington’s strategy of “decoupling from” and containing China, does South Korea play the role of a communicator or an accomplice? In terms of security issues, does it want to maintain common peace or pave the way for an Asia-Pacific NATO? These will be important yardsticks for measuring whether the Yoon government truly wants to improve or stabilize China-South Korea relations.

    Of course, South Korea has the right to develop friendly relations with other countries. Whether it wants to develop relations with the US and Japan based on equality and mutual benefit, sacrifice its own interests, or engage in “humiliating diplomacy,” the Chinese people do not really care. However, if South Korea regards its relations with the US as a “guidebook” for developing relations with China, follows the US’ lead, parrots Washington’s tone, deals with China from a position of strength that is no longer what it used to be, or learns the bad US habit of “saying one thing while doing another,” it will be inevitably difficult for the Chinese people to have a good impression of Seoul. If trust is lost, how can “China-South Korean friendship” be discussed?

    In addition, South Koreans with a certain historical background will easily think of deeper issues. Some Korean media claimed that the US enjoys the logic of a great power, mobilizing the world to confront China while secretly seeking dialogue with China itself. Many South Koreans are worried that they may be “sold” by the US. As is well known, Japan has had a nightmare of “overhead diplomacy,” which is also true for South Korea. Under the “America First” doctrine and the US’ great power logic, the dilemma and nightmare of allies such as Japan and South Korea being abandoned have always existed. The more closely tied to the US, the more independence will be lost, and the heavier this nightmare will become.

    China and South Korea share significant common interests, which even the most conservative political groups in South Korea cannot deny or ignore. We have observed that the Yoon government has recently tilted heavily in diplomacy, but there has also been a significant backlash within South Korea. Returning to rationality and pragmatism will be the only correct option that the Yoon government will eventually have to face. We hope that this shift will occur voluntarily rather than being forced upon South Korea.

    This post was originally published on Dissident Voice.

  • This story originally appeared in Peoples Dispatch on June 22, 2023. It is shared here under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-SA) license.

    Labor leaders and organizers are banding together to demand justice for Chinese-American unionized worker and activist Li Tang “Henry” Liang. Liang was indicted and then arrested in early May in Boston in retaliation for exercising his free speech rights. “The federal government has targeted Liang for advocating peaceful relations between the US and China,” say labor activists in the Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance of the AFL-CIO, the largest trade union in the US.

    As a hotel worker, Liang was an active member in his union, UNITE HERE Local 26. He is also an activist in the Chinese-American community, rallying against the US’s propaganda war against China. He previously served on the board of directors for Chinatown Main Street, an organization promoting Chinese-American small businesses in Boston’s Chinatown, and the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association of New England, which “serves as the umbrella organization for the Chinese communities of New England” according to its website

    “Li Tang has been a participant in important fights for workers rights, including going on strike with his co-workers for 46 days in 2018,” Mike Kramer, Executive Vice President of Local 26, told Peoples Dispatch. “Despite working long hours as a hotel worker, he has dedicated his free time to being active in his community and to the service of others. The charges being brought against this man are a shameful, racist attack.”

    “Following his indictment, his employer placed him on indefinite suspension, unfairly depriving his family of income and assuming his guilt without due process,” reads APALA’s petition. “Someone undergoing trial should not be presumed guilty and should have the right to due process and the right to livelihood.”

    Liang has advocated for China’s reunification with regions such as Taiwan and peace between the US and China. He was indicted by a federal grand jury for “conspiracy to act as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification” and “acting as an agent of a foreign government without notice to the attorney general.”

    “Having a political view doesn’t make you an agent of a foreign government,” said Amrita Dani, unionized teacher in Boston and APALA member.

    Liang’s charges come in the context of the United States’ New Cold War against China. “Liang is facing charges under the Foreign Agents Relations Act (FARA),” states APALA. “In recent years, the US Department of Justice (DoJ) has used FARA to intimidate peace activists, journalists, and others for voicing opposition towards hawkish US foreign policy.” 

    With the rise of challenges to US hegemony by China and Russia, the United States has grown increasingly paranoid and has lashed out in various ways against these two countries. One way is the billions of dollars in funding funneled to the Russia–Ukraine war, or with the military drills in Chinese waters along with US bases strategically surrounding China. Part of the ongoing effort to rally mass support for the New Cold War is the persecution and repression of free speech in the Chinese-American community.

    Waves of Chinese-Americans and Chinese nationals including students, academics, researchers, and activists have been targeted for repression by the FBI due to the US’s orientation against China. In 2020, Trump signed an executive order to expel thousands of Chinese university students purportedly for having ties to the People’s Liberation Army, although many of these students had ties to civilian universities who merely provided scholarships through the PLA. The US is still to this day denying visas based on this proclamation.

    “[The US is] fighting tooth-and-nail to prevent, not countries that want to make war with them, but countries who want to develop their economies, to protect their people and sovereignty, and to have a multilateral world, not a unipolar world,” said Marxist militant Ronnie Kasrils, former Minister of Intelligence of South Africa, during a recent webinar. “The Yankees are panic-stricken… for the way their control [over these nations] are breaking down.”

    APALA is calling for Liang to be reinstated at his job, for the Department of Justice to stop racially profiling and restricting freedom of speech, and for the DOJ to drop all charges against Liang.

    This post was originally published on The Real News Network.

  • A discussion featuring Yakov Feygin, Daniela Gabor, Ho-fung Hung, Thea Riofrancos, and Quinn Slobodian.

  • Chinese authorities in Tibet are randomly searching monasteries and forcing monks to sign documents renouncing all ties to the “separatist” Dalai Lama, Tibetan Buddhism’s foremost spiritual leader, Tibetan sources living in exile told Radio Free Asia.

    The Dalai Lama is widely regarded by Chinese leaders as a separatist intent on splitting Tibet, a formerly independent nation that was invaded and incorporated into China by force in 1950, from Beijing’s control.

    The Dalai Lama, who now lives in exile in India, says only that he seeks a greater autonomy for Tibet as a part of China, with guaranteed protections for Tibet’s language, culture and religion.

    RFA reported last year that China began requiring Tibetans working in official government positions to renounce all ties to the Dalai Lama as a condition of employment. Authorities appear to be including monasteries under this rule.

    Beginning this month, Chinese authorities conducted searches of monasteries in Shentsa (in Chinese, Shenzha) and Sok (Suo) counties on the premise of maintaining security, a Tibetan living in exile, who requested anonymity for security reasons, told RFA’s Tibetan Service. 

    “The authorities search all the residences of the monks and the main shrines in the monasteries,” the exile said. “The monks of Shartsa Monastery are also forced into renouncing ties with His Holiness the Dalai Lama and be a part of anti-Dalai Lama groups.’ 

    ENG_TIB_NagchuMonks_06262023.2.jpg
    Chinese authorities conduct a search at a monastery in Nagchu. Credit: Citizen journalist

    In a photo received by RFA from Tibet, the Shartsa monks are seen signing their names on a board on the wall. 

    The text on the board states that “We will rigorously take part in opposing the Dalai Lama clique and will remain loyal and devoted to the country [China].”

    As part of their searches, the authorities have been scrutinizing the monks’ prayer manuscripts and books, and removing prayer flags from shrines, said another exiled Tibetan, who declined to be named.

    “They did not give any sort of warning before conducting these random searches,” said the second exile. The monks in these monasteries were summoned for a meeting where they were forced to sign documents renouncing the Dalai Lama and separatism.” 

    Translated by Tenzin Dickyi. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Sangyal Kunchok for RFA Tibetan.