Hey, you’re busy! We know rferl.orgisn’t the only website you read. And that it’s just possible you may have missed some of our most compelling journalism this week. To make sure you’re up-to-date, here are some of the highlights produced by RFE/RL’s team of correspondents, multimedia editors, and visual journalists over the past seven days.
After Brutal Attack On Government Critic, Uzbek Ministry Blames The Victim
Miraziz Bazarov, an Uzbek rights campaigner and government critic who has defended gay rights, remains hospitalized after three masked men assaulted him on March 28. Earlier the same day, attackers disrupted a cultural group led by Bazarov, beating at least two people. In response, Uzbekistan’s Interior Ministry issued a statement saying that Bazarov had provoked the incidents with videos that “humiliate our national culture.” By RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service
After Struggles With Hungarian Schools, Mother Of Autistic Boy Launches Aid Project
Goran’s parents say he’s an advanced reader who loves learning languages. But he also has a mild form of autism associated with difficulties in social skills and communication, and his family struggled to find support for him at a Hungarian public school. His mother, Henrietta Zadori, decided to launch her own foundation to help other families navigate the same system. By RFE/RL’s Hungarian Service
As Domestic Violence Surges Amid Pandemic, Russia Targets Victims’ Support Group
Russian help lines have recorded a surge in domestic violence during the year of COVID-19 restrictions. Meanwhile, a leading organization dealing with the issue is being evicted from its premises after being declared a “foreign agent” by the authorities, who say its calls for government agencies to help protect victims constitute “political activity.” By Current Time
With relatives and supporters of imprisoned opposition leader Aleksei Navalny raising the alarm over the deterioration of his health in custody, the situation has echoes of the 2009 death in custody of tax attorney Sergei Magnitsky. Magnitsky’s death after numerous complaints that he was being denied medical care prompted the West to impose targeted sanctions against alleged human rights abusers in Russia and other countries, marking a significant shift in international diplomacy. By Robert Coalson
Uzbek Singer Warned Of Beating After Announcing Run For President
Well-known Uzbek singer Jahongir Otajonov says he was threatened with bodily harm after announcing plans to run for president of the Central Asian nation. Security-camera footage in Otajonov’s Istanbul office showed three men warning him that there was a contract out for his beating. By RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service and Stuart Greer
To receive Steve Gutterman’s Week In Russia via e-mail every Friday, subscribe by clicking here. If you have thoughts or feedback, you can reach us directly at newsletters@rferl.org.
Aleksei Navalny started a hunger strike in prison, while the father of a top ally of the Kremlin opponent was arrested in a move that one political analyst said echoed the Stalin era. The war in Syria passed the 10-year mark, the Kremlin tried damage control following a full-throated expression of support for Burma’s junta as it massacred protesters, and tensions rose amid fresh questions about Russia’s intentions in the Donbas.
Here are some of the key developments in Russia over the past week and some of the takeaways going forward.
‘Getting Worrisome’
So far in 2021, the biggest Russia news has come from inside the country — certainly since January 17, when Kremlin foe Aleksei Navalny was arrested at the airport upon his return from Germany, where he spent five months in treatment after a nerve-agent poisoning he blames on President Vladimir Putin and the Federal Security Service (FSB).
Since then, events have rushed along at a rapid pace — but at the same time may seem almost like they are occurring in slow motion, a nightmare sequence that one might like to stop with the push of a button but is powerless to affect. Almost every day brings a new development that seems worse than the last, or at least equally bad.
There have been large protests, a harsh crackdown, and a 2 1/2-year prison sentence for Navalny, who charges that he is being denied adequate medical treatment in what he called a “deliberate strategy” of harm — and is essentially being tortured in his cell through sleep deprivation.
A screenshot of an Instagram post published on March 31 shows a photo of a handwritten statement in which Navalny declared a hunger strike.
On March 31, Navalny announced a hunger strike to protest his treatment, demanding that his jailers adhere to the law and that a doctor of his choice be allowed to visit him.
“I have the right to invite a doctor and to receive medicine. They are not allowing me either one,” Navalny said in an Instagram post. “The pain in my back has spread to my leg. Parts of my right and now also my left leg have lost sensation.All joking aside, this is getting worrisome.”
Another Kremlin opponent, Vladimir Kara-Murza, expressed concern in more concrete terms, writing in The Washington Post that after the nerve-agent poisoning in August, which Navalny and many others say was an assassination attempt, “the Kremlin is trying to kill him again — this time slowly, painfully and in the confinement” of the prison where he is being held.
The situation contains echoes of the fatal plight of Sergei Magnitsky, a whistle-blower whose death in jail in 2009 has played a substantial part in defining Putin’s rule and souring Russia’s relations with the West.
Navalny himself is not the only one under pressure: Many of his associates and allies across Russia have been prosecuted, mainly on administrative charges linked to the protests held in January, and jailed, fined, or placed under house arrest in what Kremlin critics say is a concerted campaign to curtail Navalny’s reach from behind bars, blunt the challenge he poses, and reduce the chances of fresh protestsahead of parliamentary elections expected in September.
‘Fathers And Sons’
Associates, allies — and also their relatives, in at least one case. On March 27, the father of Ivan Zhdanov, director of Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), was detained and jailed on an abuse-of-office charge stemming from a matter related to his preretirement job as a small-town official.
Zhdanov said he had “no doubt” that the arrest of his father was Kremlin-orchestrated punishment for his own work at FBK, which has produced several investigative reports revealing evidence of high-level corruption — including an exposé, published two days before Navalny returned to Russia, on a sprawling Black Sea estate that it called “a palace for Putin.”
Yury Zhdanov, 66, faces up to four years in prison if tried and convicted. Pretrial detention puts “what remains of his health” in jeopardy, said Ivan Zhdanov, who blamed the Kremlin and said Putin’s administration had reached a “new level of villainy and turpitude.”
Pretrial detention puts “what remains of [my father’s] health” in jeopardy, says Ivan Zhdanov, the director of Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation.
The elder Zhdanov’s arrest was “in keeping with Soviet-style ‘justice,’ in which not only were parents made to pay for the ‘sins’ of their children and vice versa, but also siblings and other relatives were punished for each other’s ‘misdeeds,’” wrote Andrei Kolesnikov, head of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center.
“By arresting family members of persecuted individuals, today’s authorities openly declare themselves to be the direct successors of Stalin’s repressive system,” Kolesnikov wrote in an opinion article in The Moscow Times under the headline: Fathers and Sons: A Kremlin-KGB Remake.
The Kremlin’s main focus seems likely to remain on domestic events through the end of summer, given the test that United Russia — the party that serves as one of Putin’s main levers of power nationwide but is deeply unpopular — faces in the State Duma elections, which must be held by September 19.
The timing of the vote means there is little chance of a letup in the pressure on Navalny, his allies, and anyone inside Russia who is seen as threat to the Kremlin.
But there’s plenty happening beyond Russia’s borders.
For one thing, the month of March marked a decade since the start of the war in Syria — and a decade of Russian support for President Bashar al-Assad’s government in a conflict that has killed hundreds of thousands of people and driven millions from their homes.
Moscow’s involvement in the war is often described as having begun in September 2015, when Russia launched a campaign of air strikes targeting Assad’s foes and also stepped up its military presence on the ground, helping turn the tide in his favor when his back was against the wall.
A fresh reminder of Moscow’s role since 2015 came on March 30, when U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced a humanitarian aid package for Syrians in their own country and abroad.
In a statement, Blinken said that the Syrian people “have faced atrocities, including Assad regime and Russian air strikes, forced disappearances, [Islamic State] brutality, and chemical-weapons attacks.”
Aiding Assad
Concerns about Russia’s actions in Syria are mainly focused on the last half-decade as well. Among many other reports, they were underscored by an October 2019 report in The New York Times about an investigation that found that Russian pilots had bombed hospitals four times in the space of 24 hours that May.
But Moscow has been behind Assad since the war started in 2011 with a government crackdown on protests, lending him military support — albeit on a smaller scale before 2015 — and crucial diplomatic backing in the UN Security Council and other forums.
Moscow’s backing for Assad — not to mention Alyaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus, Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro, and others — might make a recent incident in Burma seem unsurprising. But the timing was such that the Kremlin, which rarely if ever admits to much of anything, let alone apologizes, appears to have felt the need to distance itself in this case.
Visiting Burma to mark the Southeast Asian country’s Armed Forces Day, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Aleksandr Fomin met on March 26 with General Min Aung Hlaing, the leader of the junta that took over after a military coup on February 1.
Fomin called Burma a reliable ally and strategic partner and said that Russia “is committed to a strategy aimed at bolstering relations between the two countries.”
Russian Deputy Defense Minister Aleksandr Fomin meets with Burmese military officials on March 26.
The following day, the junta chief called Russia a “true friend” — and, amidst lavish cerebrations of Armed Forces Day, security forces killed 114 people, according to local media, in the deadliest violence since mainly peaceful protests erupted after the military coup.
Even given Russia’s other relationships, the Kremlin’s tendency to shrug off accusations of violating human rights at home or condoning such actions abroad, the military official’s visit left observers wondering what the Russian state thought it had to gain with an expression of strong support for the junta amid the bloodshed.
‘Really Worried’
In any case, the Kremlin climbed down — or sought to soften the damage to its image amid outrage over the deadly violence — two days later.
“We are really worried by the growing number of civilian casualties,” Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, told reporters in a regular phone briefing with Russian and foreign media outlets. “It is a source of deep concern and we are following the unfolding situation in [Burma] really closely.”
Peskov, Putin, and other Russian officials have also voiced concern about the prospect of a new flare-up in the seven-year-old war in eastern Ukraine, where Moscow has given military, political, and financial backing to anti-Kyiv forces who have held parts of two provinces in the region known as the Donbas.
The sincerity of such remarks has been questioned in Kyiv and the West, where an escalation of fighting in the Donbas and Russian troop maneuvers near the Ukrainian border — as well as in Russian-controlled Crimea — have sparked concern about Moscow’s intentions at a time when its ties with the United States and the European Union are severely strained.
Kyiv has accused the Russia-backed forces in the Donbas of stepping up cease-fire violations, and four Ukrainian servicemen were killed on March 26 in what the Ukrainian military said was a mortar attack — the highest single-day toll since 2019.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy visited the front line in the eastern Donetsk region on February 11.
The war in the Donbas has killed more than 13,000 people since April 2014, when it erupted after Russia fomented separatism across eastern and southern Ukraine and seized the Crimean Peninsula after Moscow-friendly Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was pushed from power by a pro-Western, anti-corruption protest movement known as the Maidan.
Observers are wondering whether Russia may be gearing up for a new offensive in Ukraine or sending signals to the West, making a show of force to warn Washington and the EU against imposing new sanctions or other forms of pressure on Russia over its treatment of Navalny and other issues.
That seems to be just what Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was doing — sending a signal, a warning, a threat — when he said on April 1, quoting what he described as remarks by Putin, that “anyone who tried to start a new war in the Donbas will destroy Ukraine.”
Putin spokesman Peskov, commenting on the reported movements of Russian military forces near the Ukrainian border and in Crimea, said that Russia “moves its troops within its own territory as it sees fit” and that these movements “pose no threat to anyone.”
“That’s not exactly going to assure anyone,” Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, wrote on Twitter.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif took to the new Clubhouse social media app on March 31 to defend Tehran’s controversial recent strategic cooperation pact with China — a deal criticized for lacking transparency and “selling out to China” amid crushing U.S. sanctions.
In past days, small scattered protests against the 25-year China deal have been reported in Tehran and several other Iranian cities — with protesters warning that “Iran is not for sale.”
Zarif’s use of Clubhouse, an audio-based social media application, is seen as a way to counter those critics in Iran and abroad.
Zarif, a prolific Twitter user with a significant following on Instagram, said in his Clubhouse message that he was in discussions with Chinese officials to release details about the agreement.
He described the deal as a road map for relations between Tehran and Beijing. Zarif also noted that China has not published details of similar agreements Beijing has reached with other countries.
An 18-page document leaked online in 2020 outlined future cooperation between the countries, including Chinese investment in Iran’s energy sector.
Zarif said that, despite the agreement, there are still “barriers” that make it difficult for Iran to “look to the East” and expand ties with China and other countries.
He said those obstacles include ongoing U.S. sanctions and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) — an international financial crime watchdog that Iran has failed to comply with.
U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration has offered to resume negotiations over a 2015 nuclear deal, which President Donald Trump withdrew from while imposing sanctions.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (file photo)
But Tehran has rejected direct talks with U.S. officials and has called for the removal of all sanctions.
“I don’t believe in the [policy] of looking to the East or the West,” Zarif said on Clubhouse, adding that Iran’s foreign policy should be balanced and engaged with the whole world.
Disillusioned Iranians
Zarif’s decision to join Clubhouse highlighted the growing popularity of the social media application in Iran.
In recent weeks, Iranians have joined discussions in virtual “rooms” about diverse issues that have included the country’s June presidential election.
Critics say Iranian authorities are using Clubhouse to present the appearance of free debate and to encourage increasingly disillusioned Iranians to vote.
Iranian Clubhouse talks have usually been attended by a few hundred people to as many as 2,000.
But Zarif’s presentation quickly attracted the maximum number of 8,000 listeners in the virtual “room.”
The moderator of the discussion with Zarif was later quoted as saying that officials had agreed to participate in the discussion under the condition that reporters with Persian-language media based outside of Iran would not be allowed to ask questions.
Also using the app during Zarif’s presentation were Foreign Ministry Spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh and Iran’s Minister of Information and Technology Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi.
Reporters with the Persian Service of the BBC and others confirmed that they were not called upon to ask questions even though they had signaled that they wanted to ask questions.
During the discussion, Zarif reiterated that he is not planning to run as a candidate for president in June – an election which comes amid a power struggle between moderate and hard-line factions of the Iranian establishment.
Following the discussion, some observers inside Iran suggested that hard-liners could push for filtering the Clubhouse app to prevent moderates and reformists from using it ahead of the vote.
One drawback for Iranian users of the Clubhouse social media app has been its availability only for those with an iPhone. (illustrative photo)
Others, however, said that banning Clubhouse could turn away potential voters.
Zarif said that neither he nor Iran’s information minister support the idea of filtering, “nor do we have the power to filter.”
Twitter and Facebook are already filtered in Iran. Hard-liners have made calls for the blocking of the popular Instagram.
Despite such restrictions, Iranians continue to use banned social media and websites via anti-filtering tools.
Numerous Discussions
Iranian activists and journalists have in past weeks organized numerous discussions on Clubhouse on issues such as the mandatory Hijab law — which requires women to cover themselves in public.
Iran’s use of solitary confinement against political prisoners has also been a topic on the new social media app.
There have also been discussions with human rights advocates, including Narges Mohammadi and politicians like former Interior Ministry official Mostafa Tajzadeh.
But the June presidential election has so far garnered little interest among ordinary Iranians who are struggling to make ends meet amid a deteriorating economy.
Earlier this week, former oil minister and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander Rostam Ghasemi, a potential presidential candidate, joined a Clubhouse discussion where he answered questions from participants — including a reporter with RFE/RL’s Radio Farda.
The Clubhouse virtual “rooms” have brought together Iranians from inside and outside the country, including those from opposing political sides, reformists, and advocates of regime change.
One drawback to the social media app has been its availability only for those with an iPhone. That has limited the number of Iranians inside the country who can join.
Zarif said he joined Clubhouse with an Android phone, saying he used beta software that allows Android owners to use it.
Eghtesadonline.com predicted recently that the number of Iranians using Clubhouse could increase significantly if the social media application became available for Android phones — the type of devices used by the majority of Iranian cell phone users.
MOSCOW — Milana Magomedova is a 22-year-old woman who, until recently, lived with her parents and younger brother and sister in the Siberian oil city of Tyumen.
Since December, Magomedova has been trying to escape her parents, natives of the North Caucasus region of Daghestan who ran their family life according to a strict interpretation of their region’s traditional Islamic values.
Magomedova was not allowed to have a job or to leave the house without permission. Her parents were avidly attempting to arrange a marriage for her. Last year, she decided to leave the dental institute where her parents had sent her to study, she told RFE/RL. She knew there would be a scandal when she got home, and she was right. Her father struck her, she recalled, and threatened to send her back to his native village in Daghestan to live with relatives, who, he assured her, would see to it that she got no education at all.
“I just wanted to get a job as a cashier or something, but they wouldn’t let me,” she said. “Because of the whole situation, I had no friends except for one girlfriend. Who would want to be friends with someone who can’t leave the house? I started to understand that there was no point in sitting there any longer. I had to run away.”
The Russian authorities have long turned a blind eye to the human rights issues presented by many of the customs of the North Caucasus.
Ramzan Kadyrov, the strongman leader of Chechnya, adjacent to Daghestan, has been frequently accused by domestic and international rights groups of overseeing massive human rights abuses including abductions, torture, extrajudicial killings, the persecution of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people, and political and personal assassinations. Kadyrov himself routinely berates and humiliates critics in the media, compelling them from fear to apologize.
‘Tip Of The Iceberg’
According to a 2018 report by the Dutch NGO Stichting Justice Initiative, there were at least 33 cases of so-called honor killings in the Russian North Caucasus between 2008 and 2017. Of the 39 victims, 36 were female.
“Most of the victims were daughters, sisters, wives, cousins or stepdaughters of their killers,” the report said. Only 14 of the incidents led to criminal prosecutions, producing 13 convictions and prison sentences ranging between six and 15 years.
“But this is just the tip of the iceberg,” the report added. “In reality, only a small portion of such crimes ever become known and are taken up by law enforcement and the media.” Most cases are dismissed by local authorities as “accidents.”
Toward the end of last year, Magomedova became acquainted via the Internet with Vladislav Khorev, a 32-year-old man from Ufa in the Bashkortostan region. After hearing of her plight, Khorev decided to help her escape, and he flew to Tyumen at the end of December. Shortly after New Year’s, Magomedova gathered a few belongings and the pair flew off, first to Moscow and then on to Turkey, which was one of the few countries open to Russians because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Vladislav Khorev and Milana Magomedova in Istanbul.
After a few days in Istanbul, the pair traveled to St. Petersburg, where Khorev helped Magomedova rent an apartment. She was almost immediately contacted by the police, who informed her that her parents had filed a missing person report about her in Tyumen. As Magomedova later found out, a police source in Tyumen gave her address to her parents and, on January 18, her mother, Gyulliser Magomedova, appeared at her door. Later that night, her father, Musa Magomedov, showed up, and the couple tried to take her away by force. RFE/RL has heard an audio recording of the encounter, during which Magomedov struck his daughter.
During the conflict, Magomedova was able to contact Khorev, who called the police. When they arrived, they supposedly found nothing out of order. Khorev watched from the street as Magomedova was put into a waiting car (he photographed the car and shared the photo with RFE/RL). He followed them to another address and again called the police. When they arrived, they took everyone, including Khorev, to a police station.
“At the police station, they first listened to my father because he refused to leave me alone,” Magomedova said. “Then they spoke to me. I told them my side of the story and they said, ‘OK, so you are so independent, but you don’t understand that [Khorev] is a human trafficker.’”
Passport Seized
She said that they asked in detail about her relationship with Khorev. She told them that she had looked through his phone and his computer, that she had taken photocopies of his identification documents. She assured them that she did not owe Khorev any money.
“Finally, I added that even if he is a human trafficker, I didn’t want to go back with my parents,” she said. “I asked them to accept my complaint that they were trying to take me away by force. And one of them said to me, ‘Milana, don’t you understand that is your custom?’”
Vladislav Khorev,
Khorev told RFE/RL that he was questioned by an officer of the Interior Ministry’s Center E, which combats extremism and terrorism. Khorev had been holding Magomedova’s passport at her request, he said, to prevent her parents from taking it.
The police, however, found this suspicious and ordered him to give it to them.
In the end, the St. Petersburg police gave turned Magomedova and her documents over to her parents and allowed them to take her back to Tyumen.
“When I arrived home, I thought we would have some sort of conversation, that they would ask me what had happened,” Magomedova recalled. “But they started immediately threatening me, saying that if I ran away again, they would send me to Daghestan and there I would have no education or anything else. They said I had shamed them and had deprived myself…of any future.”
“My aunt, my father’s sister, told me that if they take me to Daghestan, I could easily be killed,” Magomedova said. “That no one there would remember anything about me, that everything would be dismissed as an accident, that no one would look into anything. She said that there are special cemeteries there for my type. I thought I knew my parents, but I never imagined that they would threaten to kill me or have me committed to a mental hospital.”
In order to calm her parents, Magomedova acted contrite, promised that she wouldn’t run away again, and began seeing a therapist to “calm her nerves.” But on February 10, she ran away a second time, in her pajamas and without her telephone or any money. Khorev was able to help her travel to Yekaterinburg, in the Urals, where she contacted human rights lawyer Fyodor Akchermyshev. He applied to the regional office of the Interior Ministry and was able to have Magomedova removed from the missing person’s list.
Her parents, however, did not give up. They filed complaint after complaint with the police in Tyumen. Somehow, her file from Yekaterinburg ended up with the police in Tyumen, who passed the information on to Magomedova’s parents. They began calling Akchermyshev and urging him to stop helping their daughter, saying that she was mentally ill. They also began calling Khorev.
Magomedova said she has a distant relative named Shamil Radzhabov who works for the Interior Ministry in Tyumen. Some of her acquaintances told her that they had been questioned by Radzhabov about her disappearance. She suspects he could be leaking her personal information to her parents.
She told RFE/RL that when she and Akchermyshev went to the police in Yekaterinburg to file a second complaint, they were told that her mother had visited the address that Magomedova had written on the first complaint and found no one there. Magomedova had written an incorrect address because she did not want to reveal her whereabouts.
‘Physical Force’
Magomedova’s parents filed a complaint saying that Khorev had kidnapped their daughter. But when police searched his apartment and questioned him, they found nothing incriminating. Her parents then filed a similar complaint about Akchermyshev.
In an interview with RFE/RL, Magomedova’s mother repeated her unsubstantiated allegations, saying that her daughter had been kidnapped, first by Khorev and then by Akchermyshev, in order to be sold as a prostitute to the militant group Islamic State, which is classified in Russia as a terrorist organization.
On March 23, Magomedova and Akchermyshev arrived at the office of the migration service to pick up her replacement passport. Although everyone else in line simply waited and then was handed the prepared document, Magomedova was told that she would have to wait longer because a stamp was missing.
“We understood that they were calling the police,” she said. When the police arrived, the two were taken to a a precinct house and questioned again about the accusation that Akchermyshev had kidnapped her.
During the questioning, a man Magomedova did not know entered the room. The officers did nothing while the man ushered Akchermyshev out and continued questioning Magomedova. Meanwhile, Akchermyshev was able to telephone journalists, telling them that the unknown man had used “physical force” against him in front of police officers.
Fyodor Akchermyshev says he has identified the man who accosted him at the police station as a senior officer of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Interior Ministry named Magomedimin Kurbanov (left).
Local journalists arrived at the station and found cars parked outside with license plates from Daghestan and Tyumen. Police informed Magomedova that her mother wanted to talk to her, but she refused.
After the journalists began photographing the cars and the people in them, they drove away. Magomedova and Akchermyshev were released after spending five hours at the police station.
Two days later, Akchermyshev said that he was able to identify the man who accosted him at the police station as a senior officer of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Interior Ministry named Magomedimin Kurbanov. He told RFE/RL that he has filed a complaint against Kurbanov with the Sverdlovsk police and the Investigative Committee.
“I never did get my passport,” Magomedova told RFE/RL. “I don’t know what will happen next. I think I’ll just lay low – it is terrifying just to go outside.”
Written by RFE/RL senior correspondent Robert Coalson based on reporting from Moscow by RFE/RL Russian Service correspondent Sergei Khazov-Cassia
MOSCOW — Milana Magomedova is a 22-year-old woman who, until recently, lived with her parents and younger brother and sister in the Siberian oil city of Tyumen.
Since December, Magomedova has been trying to escape her parents, natives of the North Caucasus region of Daghestan who ran their family life according to a strict interpretation of their region’s traditional Islamic values.
Magomedova was not allowed to have a job or to leave the house without permission. Her parents were avidly attempting to arrange a marriage for her. Last year, she decided to leave the dental institute where her parents had sent her to study, she told RFE/RL. She knew there would be a scandal when she got home, and she was right. Her father struck her, she recalled, and threatened to send her back to his native village in Daghestan to live with relatives, who, he assured her, would see to it that she got no education at all.
“I just wanted to get a job as a cashier or something, but they wouldn’t let me,” she said. “Because of the whole situation, I had no friends except for one girlfriend. Who would want to be friends with someone who can’t leave the house? I started to understand that there was no point in sitting there any longer. I had to run away.”
The Russian authorities have long turned a blind eye to the human rights issues presented by many of the customs of the North Caucasus.
Ramzan Kadyrov, the strongman leader of Chechnya, adjacent to Daghestan, has been frequently accused by domestic and international rights groups of overseeing massive human rights abuses including abductions, torture, extrajudicial killings, the persecution of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people, and political and personal assassinations. Kadyrov himself routinely berates and humiliates critics in the media, compelling them from fear to apologize.
‘Tip Of The Iceberg’
According to a 2018 report by the Dutch NGO Stichting Justice Initiative, there were at least 33 cases of so-called honor killings in the Russian North Caucasus between 2008 and 2017. Of the 39 victims, 36 were female.
“Most of the victims were daughters, sisters, wives, cousins or stepdaughters of their killers,” the report said. Only 14 of the incidents led to criminal prosecutions, producing 13 convictions and prison sentences ranging between six and 15 years.
“But this is just the tip of the iceberg,” the report added. “In reality, only a small portion of such crimes ever become known and are taken up by law enforcement and the media.” Most cases are dismissed by local authorities as “accidents.”
Toward the end of last year, Magomedova became acquainted via the Internet with Vladislav Khorev, a 32-year-old man from Ufa in the Bashkortostan region. After hearing of her plight, Khorev decided to help her escape, and he flew to Tyumen at the end of December. Shortly after New Year’s, Magomedova gathered a few belongings and the pair flew off, first to Moscow and then on to Turkey, which was one of the few countries open to Russians because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Vladislav Khorev and Milana Magomedova in Istanbul
After a few days in Istanbul, the pair traveled to St. Petersburg, where Khorev helped Magomedova rent an apartment. She was almost immediately contacted by the police, who informed her that her parents had filed a missing person report about her in Tyumen. As Magomedova later found out, a police source in Tyumen gave her address to her parents and, on January 18, her mother, Gyulliser Magomedova, appeared at her door. Later that night, her father, Musa Magomedov, showed up, and the couple tried to take her away by force. RFE/RL has heard an audio recording of the encounter, during which Magomedov struck his daughter.
During the conflict, Magomedova was able to contact Khorev, who called the police. When they arrived, they supposedly found nothing out of order. Khorev watched from the street as Magomedova was put into a waiting car (he photographed the car and shared the photo with RFE/RL). He followed them to another address and again called the police. When they arrived, they took everyone, including Khorev, to a police station.
“At the police station, they first listened to my father because he refused to leave me alone,” Magomedova said. “Then they spoke to me. I told them my side of the story and they said, ‘OK, so you are so independent, but you don’t understand that [Khorev] is a human trafficker.’”
Passport Seized
She said that they asked in detail about her relationship with Khorev. She told them that she had looked through his phone and his computer, that she had taken photocopies of his identification documents. She assured them that she did not owe Khorev any money.
“Finally, I added that even if he is a human trafficker, I didn’t want to go back with my parents,” she said. “I asked them to accept my complaint that they were trying to take me away by force. And one of them said to me, ‘Milana, don’t you understand that is your custom?’”
Vladislav Khorev
Khorev told RFE/RL that he was questioned by an officer of the Interior Ministry’s Center E, which combats extremism and terrorism. Khorev had been holding Magomedova’s passport at her request, he said, to prevent her parents from taking it.
The police, however, found this suspicious and ordered him to give it to them.
In the end, the St. Petersburg police gave turned Magomedova and her documents over to her parents and allowed them to take her back to Tyumen.
“When I arrived home, I thought we would have some sort of conversation, that they would ask me what had happened,” Magomedova recalled. “But they started immediately threatening me, saying that if I ran away again, they would send me to Daghestan and there I would have no education or anything else. They said I had shamed them and had deprived myself…of any future.”
“My aunt, my father’s sister, told me that if they take me to Daghestan, I could easily be killed,” Magomedova said. “That no one there would remember anything about me, that everything would be dismissed as an accident, that no one would look into anything. She said that there are special cemeteries there for my type. I thought I knew my parents, but I never imagined that they would threaten to kill me or have me committed to a mental hospital.”
In order to calm her parents, Magomedova acted contrite, promised that she wouldn’t run away again, and began seeing a therapist to “calm her nerves.” But on February 10, she ran away a second time, in her pajamas and without her telephone or any money. Khorev was able to help her travel to Yekaterinburg, in the Urals, where she contacted human rights lawyer Fyodor Akchermyshev. He applied to the regional office of the Interior Ministry and was able to have Magomedova removed from the missing person’s list.
Her parents, however, did not give up. They filed complaint after complaint with the police in Tyumen. Somehow, her file from Yekaterinburg ended up with the police in Tyumen, who passed the information on to Magomedova’s parents. They began calling Akchermyshev and urging him to stop helping their daughter, saying that she was mentally ill. They also began calling Khorev.
Magomedova said she has a distant relative named Shamil Radzhabov who works for the Interior Ministry in Tyumen. Some of her acquaintances told her that they had been questioned by Radzhabov about her disappearance. She suspects he could be leaking her personal information to her parents.
She told RFE/RL that when she and Akchermyshev went to the police in Yekaterinburg to file a second complaint, they were told that her mother had visited the address that Magomedova had written on the first complaint and found no one there. Magomedova had written an incorrect address because she did not want to reveal her whereabouts.
‘Physical Force’
Magomedova’s parents filed a complaint saying that Khorev had kidnapped their daughter. But when police searched his apartment and questioned him, they found nothing incriminating. Her parents then filed a similar complaint about Akchermyshev.
In an interview with RFE/RL, Magomedova’s mother repeated her unsubstantiated allegations, saying that her daughter had been kidnapped, first by Khorev and then by Akchermyshev, in order to be sold as a prostitute to the militant group Islamic State, which is classified in Russia as a terrorist organization.
On March 23, Magomedova and Akchermyshev arrived at the office of the migration service to pick up her replacement passport. Although everyone else in line simply waited and then was handed the prepared document, Magomedova was told that she would have to wait longer because a stamp was missing.
“We understood that they were calling the police,” she said. When the police arrived, the two were taken to a a precinct house and questioned again about the accusation that Akchermyshev had kidnapped her.
During the questioning, a man Magomedova did not know entered the room. The officers did nothing while the man ushered Akchermyshev out and continued questioning Magomedova. Meanwhile, Akchermyshev was able to telephone journalists, telling them that the unknown man had used “physical force” against him in front of police officers.
Fyodor Akchermyshev says he has identified the man who accosted him at the police station as a senior officer of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Interior Ministry named Magomedimin Kurbanov (left).
Local journalists arrived at the station and found cars parked outside with license plates from Daghestan and Tyumen. Police informed Magomedova that her mother wanted to talk to her, but she refused.
After the journalists began photographing the cars and the people in them, they drove away. Magomedova and Akchermyshev were released after spending five hours at the police station.
Two days later, Akchermyshev said that he was able to identify the man who accosted him at the police station as a senior officer of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Interior Ministry named Magomedimin Kurbanov. He told RFE/RL that he has filed a complaint against Kurbanov with the Sverdlovsk police and the Investigative Committee.
“I never did get my passport,” Magomedova told RFE/RL. “I don’t know what will happen next. I think I’ll just lay low – it is terrifying just to go outside.”
Written by RFE/RL senior correspondent Robert Coalson based on reporting from Moscow by RFE/RL Russian Service correspondent Sergei Khazov-Cassia
If you’re thinking that we’re going to have a beverage today for our backyard quarantine-style National Beer Day festivities, you’d be correct. But what you might not know is that we’re stepping up our brew game by featuring seven plant-based dishes that are made with this frosty drink. Beer has made its way into the food-trend scene, which means everyone can enjoy a frosty libation. From moist stout cupcakes and beer-battered tofu tacos to chocolate stout brownies and beer macaroni and cheese, we’ve compiled a list of the tastiest beer-infused vegan dishes to whet your appetite. So, raise your glass, but don’t take a sip. Instead, enjoy beer cooked into your food. Cheers!
With baseball season in swing, Beer-infused brats are the perfect addition to any Beer Day celebration. Do like Thyme & Love and cook your favorite Beyond Meat brats in a bath of your go-to summer brew for a flavor you won’t soon forget. Served between soft pretzel buns and loaded with all the fixings, dress up this classic with a side of potato salad (or even baked beans!) for the ultimate meal.
If you’re the kind of person who likes to experiment with your food, try these inventive sliders from cookbook author (and VegNews contributor) Jackie Sobon. Packed with barbecued beer cabbage (which involves gutting a cabbage, adding beer into it, and slow-grilling the beer-stuffed cabbage until tender and infused with hoppy goodness), the sandwich’s Asian-inspired barbecue sauce and bright daikon slaw make for an incredible handheld.
Another delicious culinary invention from the kitchen of Jackie Sobon, this Oktoberfest-worthy macaroni and cheese is the ultimate comfort food. The cashew-based sauce is completely swoon-worthy thanks to its luxuriously creamy texture and added oomph from the Golden Ale beer. We’d smother almost anything with it, but Sobon pairs it with perfectly cooked pasta and hearty chunks of vegan seitan bratwurst.
Is it okay to drink alone if you pour the beer into a pot of chili? We say yes, which is why Minimalist Baker’s one-bowl wonder is our staple for nights spent curled up on the couch. Although the recipe serves eight, we find it’s best suited for the single lifestyle. Simple ingredients? Check. Easy prep? Yep (less than an hour). Freezer-friendly? You bet! Plus, the beer gives it a robust flavor, and the beans give this soup substance. Serve it in a pint glass for a festive touch and enjoy your party of one.
Beer and cheese is the harmonious adult equivalent to peanut butter and jelly, which might explain why Hot for Food created the ultimate gooey, cheesy, plant-based dip perfect for a movie night in (Seaspiracy, anyone?). The dip relies on potatoes and cashews for its classically thick consistency, while the beer, spices, and pickled jalapeños enhance its bold, complex flavor. The dip is poured into a bread bowl and topped with vegan cheddar, green onion, and coconut bacon, so forgo the accoutrements and start ripping this bowl apart.
Those who say they don’t like tofu obviously have never had Kathy Patalsky’s beer-battered creation. The blogger transforms these bland bricks of soy into craveable, beer-soaked bites that are simple yet satisfying when paired with pickled onions, cabbage, avocado, vegan chipotle mayonnaise, and hot sauce. The tofu is crispy on the outside, tender on the inside, and tastes delicious inside a warm tortilla. We’re making extra to add to our salads, sandwiches, and Buddha bowls.
Stout is an acquired taste, but everyone can learn to love its chocolate accents, thanks to these decadent vegan brownies. Concocted by healthy vegan dessert blog Chocolate Covered Katie, these guiltless brownies are fudgy, stuffed with chocolate-chips, and are a surefire pleaser. Note: Katie highly recommends you let these sit overnight in the refrigerator before serving, so plan ahead and make these the night before. We won’t judge if you celebrate a day early by eating the batter.
Tanya Flink is a certified Master Personal Trainer based in Orange County, CA and host of The Vegan Potluck podcast.
If you’re thinking that we’re going to have a beverage today for our backyard quarantine-style National Beer Day festivities, you’d be correct. But what you might not know is that we’re stepping up our brew game by featuring seven plant-based dishes that are made with this frosty drink. Beer has made its way into the food-trend scene, which means everyone can enjoy a frosty libation. From moist stout cupcakes and beer-battered tofu tacos to chocolate stout brownies and beer macaroni and cheese, we’ve compiled a list of the tastiest beer-infused vegan dishes to whet your appetite. So, raise your glass, but don’t take a sip. Instead, enjoy beer cooked into your food. Cheers!
With baseball season in swing, Beer-infused brats are the perfect addition to any Beer Day celebration. Do like Thyme & Love and cook your favorite Beyond Meat brats in a bath of your go-to summer brew for a flavor you won’t soon forget. Served between soft pretzel buns and loaded with all the fixings, dress up this classic with a side of potato salad (or even baked beans!) for the ultimate meal.
If you’re the kind of person who likes to experiment with your food, try these inventive sliders from cookbook author (and VegNews contributor) Jackie Sobon. Packed with barbecued beer cabbage (which involves gutting a cabbage, adding beer into it, and slow-grilling the beer-stuffed cabbage until tender and infused with hoppy goodness), the sandwich’s Asian-inspired barbecue sauce and bright daikon slaw make for an incredible handheld.
Another delicious culinary invention from the kitchen of Jackie Sobon, this Oktoberfest-worthy macaroni and cheese is the ultimate comfort food. The cashew-based sauce is completely swoon-worthy thanks to its luxuriously creamy texture and added oomph from the Golden Ale beer. We’d smother almost anything with it, but Sobon pairs it with perfectly cooked pasta and hearty chunks of vegan seitan bratwurst.
Is it okay to drink alone if you pour the beer into a pot of chili? We say yes, which is why Minimalist Baker’s one-bowl wonder is our staple for nights spent curled up on the couch. Although the recipe serves eight, we find it’s best suited for the single lifestyle. Simple ingredients? Check. Easy prep? Yep (less than an hour). Freezer-friendly? You bet! Plus, the beer gives it a robust flavor, and the beans give this soup substance. Serve it in a pint glass for a festive touch and enjoy your party of one.
Beer and cheese is the harmonious adult equivalent to peanut butter and jelly, which might explain why Hot for Food created the ultimate gooey, cheesy, plant-based dip perfect for a movie night in (Seaspiracy, anyone?). The dip relies on potatoes and cashews for its classically thick consistency, while the beer, spices, and pickled jalapeños enhance its bold, complex flavor. The dip is poured into a bread bowl and topped with vegan cheddar, green onion, and coconut bacon, so forgo the accoutrements and start ripping this bowl apart.
Those who say they don’t like tofu obviously have never had Kathy Patalsky’s beer-battered creation. The blogger transforms these bland bricks of soy into craveable, beer-soaked bites that are simple yet satisfying when paired with pickled onions, cabbage, avocado, vegan chipotle mayonnaise, and hot sauce. The tofu is crispy on the outside, tender on the inside, and tastes delicious inside a warm tortilla. We’re making extra to add to our salads, sandwiches, and Buddha bowls.
Stout is an acquired taste, but everyone can learn to love its chocolate accents, thanks to these decadent vegan brownies. Concocted by healthy vegan dessert blog Chocolate Covered Katie, these guiltless brownies are fudgy, stuffed with chocolate-chips, and are a surefire pleaser. Note: Katie highly recommends you let these sit overnight in the refrigerator before serving, so plan ahead and make these the night before. We won’t judge if you celebrate a day early by eating the batter.
Tanya Flink is a certified Master Personal Trainer based in Orange County, CA and host of The Vegan Potluck podcast.
Then and now photographs of the April 1941 “terror bombing” that forever changed the face of the Serbian capital.
Click or tap on the images to reveal the same place in 2021.
The Old Palace in central Belgrade, which once featured cupolas and an elaborate entrance gate. After the 1941 bombing, the palace was rebuilt without the decorative flourishes.
Belgrade’s Old Palace was one of several buildings shattered by Nazi bombs on April 6, 1941. The air raid destroyed much of the center of the capital, killed thousands of people, and wiped out much of the published cultural heritage of Serbia when the National Library burned to the ground.
Republic Square lies largely in ruins after the bombing.
The attack that targeted central Belgrade, which had no apparent military objective, was ordered by Nazi leader Adolf Hitler after a coup overthrew Yugoslavia’s royal regent, Prince Peter, in late March 1941.
Obliterated buildings near the Belgrade Fortress
Before the coup, Yugoslavia had come under intense pressure to align itself with fascist Germany, as Yugoslavia’s neighbors Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania had done.
An apartment block in a Belgrade suburb lies in ruins. Only the building on the far right remains the same.
Shortly after Yugoslavia signed a pact with Nazi Germany and her allies — seen as the “lesser of two evils” compared to the inevitable invasion if Yugoslavia had refused — senior Yugoslav Air Force officials overthrew Prince Peter.
The iconic Hotel Moscow (right) barely escaped destruction during the bombing.
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill responded to news of the coup by saying: “Early this morning, the Yugoslav nation found its soul.
A revolution has taken place in Belgrade, and the ministers who but yesterday signed away the honor and freedom of the country are reported to be under arrest.
This patriotic movement arises from the wrath of a valiant and warlike race at the betrayal of their country by the weakness of their rulers and the foul intrigues of the Axis powers.”
People walk along a street near the Danube River on which several buildings were wiped out.
Some believe British intelligence was involved in the coup, but England had no concrete way to help Yugoslavia.
The coup was reportedly popular with many Belgrade locals who chanted “better graves than to be slaves.”
Hitler condemned thousands of Belgraders to exactly that fate when he ordered a Nazi response to the coup of “merciless severity.”
A destroyed building stands in downtown Belgrade after the bombing.
The building housing Yugoslavia’s Defense Ministry replaced the ruined structure in 1965 and was itself blasted by NATO bombs in 1999. It is itself now mostly unused.
Italian war correspondent and novelist Curzio Malaparte said the waves of bombings on April 6 caused the ground to shake “as if it were an earthquake.” The correspondent recalled that “houses hit each other, there was a terrible crash of collapsing walls and [broken windows] falling on the sidewalks.”
A destroyed tram sits on a road alongside the Belgrade Fortress.
In the pauses between the German bombing runs, Malaparte described “devastating, terrified screams, lamentations, moans, curses, and the roar of a distraught people…”
The main entrance to Belgrade’s train station, which was gutted by explosions and fire caused by incendiary bombs.
After Belgrade’s zoo was hit, Churchill wrote that “out of the nightmare of smoke and fire came the maddened animals released from their shattered cages…”
Damaged buildings opposite Belgrade’s main train station
The photo above and several others in this gallery were made by an Italian soldier who was part of the fascist invasion of Yugoslavia and arrived in Belgrade shortly after the bombing.
The gap left by a large building that was wiped out during the bombing was filled with a new structure.
After Belgrade was occupied on April 12, some 375,000 Yugoslav soldiers became Nazi prisoners of war.
Jewish men were rounded up by the Nazis and forced to clear the rubble left in their city.
A man accused of being an anti-Nazi “partisan” hangs from a lamppost in central Belgrade.
The Moscow branch of the ruling United Russia party has raised eyebrows with a social media video that features the 7-year-old son of former Deputy Prime Minister and opposition politician Boris Nemtsov, who was shot dead outside the Kremlin in February 2015.
The video, issued to mark International Theater Day on March 27, shows the boy – also named Boris Nemtsov — reciting outside downtown Moscow’s Pushkin Drama Theater in brilliant spring sunshine.
It was deleted briefly and later reposted, this time without wording that had referred to the boy by name and explained that he recited a poem written by the 19th-century poet Aleksandr Pushkin toward the end of his life as part of an Easter triptych.
In aninterview with MBX Media, the child’s mother, Yekaterina Iftodi, said that her son “has participated in and will participate in” United Russia activities.
“The leadership of this country has shown great understanding and profound respect for this child,” she said.
“This is just a child,” she added. “I think it is dumb to attribute any principles to this because of his father. He doesn’t have any political views.”
Iftodi herself joined United Russia, the structure that holds a near monopoly on political power at all levels in President Vladimir Putin’s Russia, earlier this year. With polls indicating its popular support is close to record lows, United Russia faces a test in elections to the State Duma, Russia’s lower parliament chamber, that are expected in September.
“Thanks to the leadership of this country, we got some sort of justice, and we will never forget that,” she told MBX Media.
Nemtsov was an outspoken critic of Putin and United Russia. In 2017, a Moscow military court convicted five ethnic Chechens of murdering Nemtsov on a bridge outside the Kremlin on February 27, 2015 and sentenced them to prison terms from 11 to 20 years. The organizers of the killing have never been identified, but Nemtsov’s family believes it was organized by people with ties to Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov and Putin.
Iftodi, who met Nemtsov in 2013, sued to have her son acknowledged as his child shortly after he was killed. His other children refused to cooperate, but a DNA test was performed using material from the crime scene.
In September 2017, a Moscow district court, in closed session, ruled that the child was Nemtsov’s and ordered that he be issued a passport with the name Boris Borisovich Nemtsov.
Nemtsov, who was 55 when he was killed, had one child, daughter Zhanna, born in 1984, with his wife, Raisa Nemtsova. The couple separated in the 1990s, but never divorced.
The charismatic politician also had two children with journalist Yekaterina Odintsova. Their son Anton was born in 1995 and their daughter Dina, in 2002.
In 2004, Nemtsov had a daughter, Sofya, with his secretary, Irina Korolyova.
The poem the child recited ends with a prayer asking God to protect the narrator from “the love of power.”
“Give to me, o Lord, to see my own faults, and may my brother not be judged by me,” it states.
Nearly all of the world’s national statistical snapshots this year will be skewed by distance working and learning, travel bans, and other household anomalies brought on by lockdowns in one of the most transformative global health crises in human history.
With COVID-19 still a serious threat, governments and census organizers face stark challenges that arise with the decennial tallies.
Data collection that began last week in England, Wales, and the Czech Republic is, for the first time, mostly electronic and online. Internet servers in the Czech Republic were briefly overwhelmed.
Russia is due to gather all of its data in April for the third national census under President Vladimir Putin, who will have overseen each of his country’s post-Soviet censuses — highlighting population decline fed partly by cronyism and denied opportunity.
The United States is still readying its 2020 census following a Supreme Court challenge over the counting of noncitizens and other delays, as well as concerns about deliberate disruption.
Meanwhile, in the Balkans, a handful of census efforts have been postponed indefinitely or placed on last-minute hold because questions of ethnicity and nationality remain especially sensitive since the violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
After decades of steady emigration for aspiring EU states in the Western Balkans, statistical overviews that will shape public and private life for a generation are pivotal for populations with newly won sovereignty or recognition and sizable minorities that identify with a neighboring state.
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is still governed under a structure set out by the international Dayton accords 25 years ago, is the exception because it managed to conduct a census in 2013.
A census taker (left) talks to an ethnic Albanian family from the Serbian village of Veliki Trnovac on the Serbia-Kosovo border during a census in April 2002.
Kosovo has already postponed its nationwide headcount until at least 2022 in the face of political paralysis and logistical obstacles at least partly stemming from COVID-19.
But from Belgrade to Podgorica to Skopje, three other former Yugoslav republics in a region synonymous with cultural and historical fragmentation are offering fresh reminders of how fraught a census can be.
North Macedonia in March began an initial phase of its census-taking for Macedonians abroad before abruptly postponing its scheduled April launch of data gathering until September.
Serbia and Montenegro outwardly hope to hold their censuses after postponements of their own, with the stakes high for political and ethnic reasons.
Each has treaded carefully amid potentially divisive cross-border political pronouncements with ethnic components that threaten to undermine confidence in representative government and infrastructure planning.
North Macedonia
Registering abroad had already begun in March for the census of North Macedonia, which comes just two years since the country was renamed to assuage the cultural and territorial concerns of neighboring Greece.
Counting within North Macedonia was scheduled to begin on April 1 and continue for three weeks.
But Prime Minister Zoran Zaev announced on March 29 after a meeting with the main opposition leader that they had agreed to delay the enumeration until September, citing a surge of coronavirus infections and a vaccine shortage.
It was an abrupt reversal for Zaev, who had recently demanded the census go ahead despite opposition complaints that the pandemic threatened its accuracy.
“Probably some countries can afford to postpone, but they have a census from 10 years ago and we haven’t had a census for almost 20 years,” Zaev said.
The lack of reliable census data, he said, puts institutions “in the position of working in a fog, in the unknown.”
One of the major questions Skopje’s census should answer is the ethnic makeup of the country, including its sizable ethnic Albanian population.
Officials conduct a census for homeless families in the village of Vizbegovo near Skopje on March 3. North Macedonia began a census of its diaspora, prisoners, the army, and the homeless one month before the official census was due to begin on April 1. It has now been postponed until September.
Ethnic Albanians are generally estimated to make up around one-quarter of North Macedonia’s 2.1 million people.
Some minority rights in North Macedonia, including the inclusion of official languages, are dependent on a group composing at least 20 percent of the local population.
There have already been notable calls from ethnic Albanians within North Macedonia’s opposition and in neighboring Kosovo for ethnic Albanians to make their mark on the tally.
Arber Ademi is a leading member of the junior coalition party in North Macedonia that represents ethnic Albanians, the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI). Ademi has already threatened to discount the results of the census if Albanians don’t reach the 20 percent mark.
In neighboring Kosovo, one of the first actions that Albin Kurti took after being elected prime minister this month was to appeal to ethnic Albanians in North Macedonia to participate in the census.
An Albanian nationalist, Kurti has led the upstart Self-Determination (Vetevendosje) party to successive electoral upsets — in 2019 and again in February. Tens of thousands of diaspora ballots, in a country of under 2 million people that allows noncitizens of Kosovar descent to vote, were crucial to those victories.
“Since even with the current constitution, the political rights of the citizens in Northern Macedonia are dictated and derived from the numbers, the registration of every citizen is extremely important,” Kurti saidin a Facebook post.
“The registration of every citizen is extremely important,” Kosovar Prime Minister Albin Kurti said in a Facebook post.
Aiming a statement at a neighboring country’s census might have seemed like a curious opening gambit for a prime minister.
But Kosovar President Vjosa Osmani did the same.
And the very next day, North Macedonia’s First Deputy Prime Minister Artan Grubi — an ethnic Albanian — went to Kosovo to seemingly urge further public participation.
Kurti’s main domestic opponent, Democratic Party of Kosovo acting Chairman Enver Hoxhaj, responded that North Macedonia’s census was more than “technical” but rather “a very important political process.”
We are not interfering in the [Montenegrin] census…but it’s important for us that the Serbian people don’t disappear and disappear.”
It was a clear riposte to Prime Minister Zaev’s attempt to assure minorities that “no one can challenge…acquired rights of minority peoples,” regardless of census results that he has downplayed as “a statistical operation for administrative needs and planning.”
Ethnic Albanians in North Macedonia must “prove through statistics that they are to the Balkans what the Germans are to Europe,” Hoxhaj said.
Sefer Selimi, founding head of the Democracy Lab, a nonprofit organization aimed at “strengthening democratic values” in North Macedonia and the Balkans, warned that opposition attacks on the census could undermine a crucial process that should lead to more sound government policies.
“These obstructions are influenced by nationalism and set us back at least 10 years,” Selimi told RFE/RL’s Balkan Service.
It is partly a result of making “the rights of one group of citizens dependent on their population,” he said.
Selimi cited a political narrative that has emerged portraying the opposition — and ethnic Albanians — as beholden to “extreme national movements” seeking to unfairly eclipse the “famous 20 percent” in an effort to get overrepresented.
Montenegro
In Montenegro, which declared independence from Serbia in 2006, a recently elected administration has already delayed a census scheduled for April to later this year.
But organizational obstacles, a lack of political consensus, and implied risks to Podgorica’s authority could imperil even that time frame.
Montenegro’s government was elected in August on a razor-thin margin and includes disparate groups with a Serbian nationalist grouping at its head for the first time in three decades.
The senior coalition alliance of Prime Minister Zdravko Krivokapic, For The Future Of Montenegro, a pro-Serb and pro-Serbian Orthodox alliance, faces increasing pressure from junior allies to commit to a full four-year cabinet to replace the current government of technocrats.
Such a transition could expose political fissures, including with ethnic Albanian Deputy Prime Minister Dritan Abazovic and his Black On White bloc.
A woman walks past a billboard reading “Free Census 2011” in downtown Podgorica, Montenegro, in April 2011.
Meanwhile, because of their shared culture, religion, and history, many Montenegrins remain reluctant to shed the Serb identity. The resulting morass of national identity and politics is sure to affect any census campaign.
And the pressure, even from abroad, to assert minority presence is strong.
Belgrade has long sought to leverage Serb identity in Montenegro’s populace to reinforce its national presence in a splintered neighborhood and boost regional influence.
Even without the census, 2021 would be dynamic. With the census, we should expect heightened tensions and an aggressive campaign of both blocs.”
A billboard campaign during the last Montenegrin census, in 2011, showed Serbian tennis superstar Novak Djokovic encouraging respondents to “be what you are.” In the end, nearly 29 percent of those in Montenegro declared themselves Serbs in that count.
At least twice in the past 18 months, Serbian President Aleskandar Vucic has publicly stressed the importance of Serb participation in Montenegro’s census.
“We are not interfering in the census…but it’s important for us that the Serbian people don’t disappear and disappear,” Vucic said last May.
Months later, in August, he said it was essential “to keep Serb numbers up in Montenegro because then we can say that we succeeded in helping our people.”
Respondents to Montenegro’s census can skip questions about nationality, language, and religion. But doing so risks legislatively determined rights for minorities with significant representation.
“Even without the census, 2021 would be dynamic,” Daliborka Uljarevic, who heads the NGO Center for Civic Education in Podgorica, said recently. “With the census, we should expect heightened tensions and an aggressive campaign of both blocs.”
In February, Krivokapic further stirred the ethno-nationalist pot by backing a path to citizenship for people who have lived there for decades but hold foreign citizenship.
Krivokapic’s government is unlikely to muster the votes for such a change — if it is even permissible. But it struck a nerve in a country still scarred by the breakup of Yugoslavia and animated by its own declaration of sovereignty just 14 years ago.
Serbia
Back in Vucic’s own country, meanwhile, officials have already postponed census work from April to October, citing the obstacles to recruiting and training enumerators in a pandemic.
Serbia has lost hundreds of thousands of people to emigration since its last official count in 2011, with many complaining of political stagnation, corruption and state capture by Vucic and his allies, and a lack of economic opportunity.
The most serious challenges to its upcoming census might lie in convincing all sides of its credibility.
An opposition boycott of the rescheduled national elections in June 2020, during a reopening amid the pandemic, left Vucic’s Progressive Party with a supermajority that mostly excludes serious political oversight of the census process.
But officials will also have to overcome an ethnically fueled credibility problem.
An ethnic Albanian man rests near graffiti reading “Boycott of the census” in the southern Serbian city of Bujanovac in October 2011.
Around 6 million of Serbia’s roughly 7 million people declared themselves Serbs in the last census.
Minority groups included more than a quarter of a million ethnic Hungarians, followed by 150,000 or so Roma, nearly as many Bosniaks, and other much smaller contingents.
But many Bosniaks and ethnic Albanians boycotted the enumeration a decade ago, complaining that language and distribution of census takers were contributing to an undercount.
It is unclear whether this time will be any different.
Shaip Kamberi, a lawmaker for the Albanian Democratic Alternative-United Valley grouping, told RFE/RL that ethnic Albanian political representatives were still unsure and would wait to see how local elections were conducted in Presevo, in southern Serbia, on March 28.
“Our path to the boycott in 2011 was a consequence of the state not wanting to listen to our demands,” Kamberi said. “At this initial stage, we left it to the National Council of the Albanian national minority to establish contact with the [Serbian national] Bureau of Statistics and agree on terms.”
In addition to technical hurdles, Kamberi cited the de facto disenfranchisement of many ethnic Albanians forced out by violence in the late 1990s between Serbian forces and Kosovar independence fighters.
Decades later, he said, many are still in legal limbo despite being among the demands in a “Seven-Point Plan” lodged with the Serbian government in 2013.
Serbia’s Statistical Office told RFE/RL’s Balkan Service that they are cooperating with the official coordination body of national councils of minorities to identify key problems.
Meetings are scheduled with representatives of local self-government and with such national councils, the office said.
“We will certainly talk to everyone in order to remove any doubts about the census,” the office said. “It is in everyone’s interest to collect quality census data.”
He scrabbled in the vacuum of Czechoslovakia’s postcommunist, early 1990s with photocopiers and office supplies. He rose to the moneyed heights of the Czech business world, becoming the country’s wealthiest businessman, a media magnate, publicity-shy philanthropist, and government whisperer.
Petr Kellner, who died over the weekend in a helicopter crash on a ski trip in Alaska, was both admired and feared, as his company PPF Group morphed in a financial behemoth with holdings ranging from insurance to real estate to telecommunications, from Central Europe to China and beyond.
Bloomberg put his wealth at $15.7 billion, Forbes at $17.5 billion.
U.S. authorities say, for the moment, that there is nothing to suggest anything other than an accident — possibly human error, possibly mechanical problems. Federal aviation officials and state police are still investigating. Four other people including the pilot also died in the incident. https://dailydispatch.dps.alaska.gov/Home/DisplayIncident?incidentNumber=AK21031918
Kellner’s death reverberated in the Czech Republic, where the reports led newscasts and the top of newspaper websites all day on March 29, and throughout much of Central Europe.
Here’s a quick look at who Kellner was.
Privatization
Trained in economics, Kellner, 56, cut his capitalist teeth after the 1989 Velvet Revolution that brought an end to communism in the country. His official biography says that, for several years, he worked as an office supply salesman, including in the import and servicing of photocopiers.
He also garnered sufficient financial capital, and business connections, to start an investment fund to invest in the state assets being privatized by the postcommunist government through a “voucher-for-shares” scheme.
The Prvni Privatizacni Fond (PPF) became his main investment vehicle, buying stock and shares in more than 200 enterprises, and later acquiring a 20 percent stake in the country’s largest insurer, Ceska Pojistovna.
PPF propelled Kellner on a yearslong buying spree of assets not only in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, after the Czechoslovak breakup, but in other Central and Eastern European countries. PPF Group’s holdings grew to include biotechnology, media broadcasting, real estate, banking, and consumer finance. The group is a major player in Russia’s home lending industry, and has also invested in Russia’s booming agriculture and farming industry.
A 2007 deal between Ceska Pojistovna and Italy’s Generali created an insurance giant for Central and Eastern Europe, adding further to Kellner’s fortune when he exited the partnership in 2012 for 2.5 billion euros.
Media Magnate
PPF Group’s telecom holdings include majority ownership of the O2 cell phone and Internet operations in the Czech Republic in 2014. In 2018, the company closed on a 2.8 billion-euro purchase of the telecom assets of Norwegian-owned Telenor located in Hungary, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia. https://www.ppf.eu/en/press-releases/ppf-group-completes-its-acquisition-of-telenors-telecommunications-assets-in-cee-countries
But it was his holdings of media and TV companies that garnered not only profits but also scrutiny. In 2004, PPF Group restructured the largest domestic Czech television channel, TV Nova, and then sold it to Central European Media Enterprises, a U.S.-based holding company known as CME. Kellner later joined the company’s board.
Over the next decade, CME bought — and sold — media and distribution companies in Romania. And in 2019, PPF Group said it would buy out the other shareholders in CME — including U.S. media giant Time Warner — to become CME’s sole owner, a deal estimated to be valued at $2.1 billion. https://www.ppf.eu/en/press-releases/ppf-signs-agreement-to-acquire-cme
The company’s media operations now over cover five European countries, with more than 30 TV channels, which PPF says reach over 45 million viewers. The company also has four radio stations in Bulgaria.
The CME purchase by Kellner’s group, and the larger trend of independent news media groups being bought or controlled by powerful business interests, prompted a Czech media watchdog group to issue a public warning.
“Recent years have shown that the situation where the largest entrepreneurs and their groups buy the most influential media in the country fundamentally undermines confidence in their independence and puts pressure on the journalists themselves,” the Endowment Fund for Independent Journalism said in 2019. “Petr Kellner’s latest transaction continues on this path.” https://www.nfnz.cz/aktuality/vyjadreni-nfnz-ke-koupi-cme-skupinou-ppf/
A Czech In China
One of PPF Group’s biggest profit-making engines has been one of its earliest investments: the consumer lending division, Home Credit.
In the late 1990s, Kellner used Home Credit to buy up banks in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and then later expanded into Russia, where it quickly gained a dominant position, focusing on quick, uncomplicated consumer lending.
Two years after first testing the water in China, Home Credit in 2010 became that country’s first fully-licensed foreign consumer lender, harnessing the country’s economic growth and Chinese consumers’ appetite for everything from mortgages and easy retail loans on things like cell phones, cars, or home computers. The strategy has paid off, making Home Credit a major source of value for PPF Group overall. https://www.ft.com/content/49095500-fcac-11df-bfdd-00144feab49a
According to a 2019 report by the Czech online news site Aktualne.cz, Home Credit has lent about 300 billion Czech crowns (US$13 billion) in China since first entering the market.
Home Credit’s push into China hit major road bumps in late 2019 and 2020 when the country, and consumers, went into lockdown, amid the government’s efforts to curtail the COVID-19 pandemic. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-31/how-a-bet-on-china-s-consumers-is-backfiring-for-richest-czech?sref=Uk5xAhoO
Back home, PPF Group’s Chinese investments are reflected in Kellner’s support for closer Czech ties with China. He has accompanied President Milos Zeman on business junkets to China, something that has drawn controversy in some Czech political circles.
In 2019, Aktualne.cz reported that Home Credit had secretly hired a public relations company to burnish China’s image within the Czech Republic. https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/home-credit-ppf-petr-kellner-campaign-china/r~265579361bf511ea926e0cc47ab5f122/
The company, and Kellner, were battered by criticism from liberal Czech lawmakers, who are sympathetic to Taiwan’s fights with Beijing and opposed to China’s heavy-handed Communism. Home Credit officials later said the goal of the campaign was merely to “weaken extreme positions in the public sphere” about business and life in China.
PPF’s Future
The Czech Republic’s most prominent political figures, including Zeman and Prime Minister Andrej Babis, publicly mourned the news of Kellner’s death. https://twitter.com/AndrejBabis/status/1376420780850970627?s=20
Investors and analysts meanwhile turned to the question of what Kellner’s death would mean for the future of PPF Group, of which he held 99 percent ownership.
Home Credit had been planning to go public through an initial public offering in Hong Kong, plans that were already shelved due to the pandemic. PPF Group earlier this year indicated it was looking to consolidate some of its European banking operations and its digital start-up bank Air Bank.
Among those who analysts say are contenders to take the leadership of PPF Group are Jean-Pascal Duvieusart, who is CEO of Home Credit, and, along with Ladislav Bartonicek, is the other holder of outstanding shares not held by Kellner.
In a statement, PPF Group, which is now formally headquartered in the Netherlands, expressed “deepest grief” at the death of its founder.
“His professional life was known for his incredible work ethic and creativity, but his private life belonged to his family,” the company said.
Kellner was well known for shunning publicity and gave few media interviews over the years. He and his family had a well-known philanthropic foundation that donated millions for Czech educational causes.
In the company’s most recent annual report, Kellner offered his own musings about his company, and the previous year, when the Czech Republic, and the rest of the world, was battered by the COVID-19 pandemic.
“We know that every crisis is also an opportunity, and that problems are there to be confronted and resolved. Life is what we make of it. What our work brings to others. The real and tangible outcomes we can see behind us indicate what lies ahead,” he said in the 2019 report. https://www.ppf.eu/files/ppf-vz2019-eng-web.pdf
Beijing has pledged to invest $400 billion in Iran over 25 years in a deal that could see China’s economic, political, and military influence there and across the Middle East expand.
China and Iran signed the expansive deal during a ceremony in Tehran on March 27 between their respective foreign ministers, Mohammad Javad Zarif and Wang Yi. The agreement, in which Iran offered a steady supply of oil in exchange for Chinese investment under a vast economic and security accord, capped off a two-day visit that reflects Beijing’s growing desire to play a defining role in the region.
“China firmly supports Iran in safeguarding its state sovereignty and national dignity,” Wang said during a meeting with Iranian President Hassan Rohani before calling on the United States to drop its sanctions against Tehran and “remove its long arm of jurisdictional measures that have been aimed at China, among others.”
China became a lifeline for Iran’s economy and ties between Beijing and Iranian political leaders have warmed in recent years, as both have grappled with intensified diplomatic and economic confrontations with the West.
Warships in the Sea of Oman take part in joint Iranian-Chinese-Russian naval exercises in December 2019.
Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration pursued a policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran over the latter’s nuclear and missile programs after withdrawing unilaterally from a 2015 nuclear agreement between Tehran and six world powers, including China. His successor, President Joe Biden, has kept those tough policies in place while also signaling a readiness to revive the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
While the Chinese deal with Iran is about furthering Beijing’s regional and global ambitions as a leading power, they also undercut Washington’s efforts to keep Iran isolated and better position Beijing ahead of any future nuclear negotiations regarding Iran.
“China wants to show that it is indispensable in solving some of the world’s thorniest problems,” Daniel Markey, a professor at Johns Hopkins University and the author of China’s Western Horizon, told RFE/RL. “Beijing is looking to portray itself as an evenhanded broker, while painting the United States as the more problematic global player.”
Decades And Hundreds Of Billions
Neither the Iranian nor the Chinese government gave specifics about the agreement during the signing, but a leaked draft obtained by Western newspapers in July pointed to large investments in Iranian infrastructure.
Subscribe To Our New China Newsletter
It has become impossible to tell the biggest stories shaping Eurasia without considering China’s resurgent influence in local business, politics, security, and culture.
China In Eurasia is the new monthly newsletter by correspondent Reid Standish in which he builds on local reporting from RFE/RL’s journalists across Eurasia to give you unique insights into Beijing’s ambitions. It’s sent on the first Wednesday of each month.
The draft covered $400 billion of Chinese investments in exchange for a steady supply of discounted oil to fuel China’s economy. Those investments would focus on energy and high-tech sectors as well as plans for other fields such as telecommunications, ports, railways, and health care, while also promoting Iran’s role in Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy project, the Belt and Road Initiative, over the next quarter century.
The leaked draft also reportedly called for deepening military cooperation, including joint training and exercises, as well as intelligence sharing.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has publicly backed the deal, which was said to have been proposed by Xi during a January 2016 trip to Iran.
But the deal has been met with criticism inside Iran that officials are hiding details amid fears that Tehran may be giving too much and selling off the country’s resources to Beijing.
After last year’s leak of the draft agreement, Iranians were skeptical and lashed out on social media, with many urging the government not to sign the deal.
Critics have cited previous Chinese investment projects that have left countries in Africa and Asia indebted and ultimately beholden to Beijing and Chinese firms.
Beyond internal pushback, it is also not immediately clear how much of the agreement can be implemented with U.S. financial sanctions reimposed after the JCPOA withdrawal limiting how much business Chinese entities can conduct in Iran.
“The agreement’s success will depend on either de-escalation of tensions between Iran and the [United States] or further escalation of competition between China and the [United States],” Ali Vaez, the International Crisis Group’s Iran project director, told RFE/RL.
Delivering On The Deal
It also remains to be seen how many of the ambitious projects detailed in the agreement will come to fruition.
Should the nuclear agreement remain stalled or worse, Chinese firms could face secondary sanctions from Washington. Beijing also has a mixed track record in Iran when it comes to executing large projects.
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the state-owned oil and gas company, signed a contract to develop Iran’s South Azadegan oil field in 2009 after a Japanese firm pulled out. But Tehran ultimately ended the arrangement due to alleged underperformance and delays.
A natural gas refinery at the South Pars gas field on the northern coast of the Persian Gulf, in Asaluyeh, Iran. China’s state oil company pulled out of a $5 billion deal to develop a portion of Iran’s massive offshore natural gas field in 2019. (file photo)
“Signing an agreement is one thing; its materialization is quite another,” said Vaez. “China’s track record indicates that it often overpromises but underdelivers to Iran.”
‘A Friend for Hard Times’
Despite lingering concerns over the controversial deal signed with China, Beijing has offered Tehran a vital economic and political lifeline.
While Xi first proposed the strategic investment deal back in 2016, negotiations moved slowly.
Iranian President Hassan Rohani (right) meets with his Chinese countrpart, Xi Jinping, in Tehran January 2016.
Tehran signing the JCPOA nearly six years ago and reaching a deal with Washington to ease sanctions on its economy opened the door for European companies, who courted Iran with investments and plans to develop oil and gas fields.
But the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the deal and ensuing sanctions forced European companies to leave, leading Tehran to look east to China once again.
After signing the deal with Wang, Zarif said that “China is a friend for hard times,” referring to the economic and diplomatic support that Beijing has provided in recent years.
As the Biden administration looks to revive nuclear talks with Iran since taking over in January, Chinese support will be crucial for Tehran.
(Left to right:) Foreign ministers/secretaries of state Wang Yi (China), Laurent Fabius (France), Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Germany), Federica Mogherini (EU), Mohammad Javad Zarif (Iran), Philip Hammond (UK), and John Kerry (United States) pose for a group photograph at a meeting in Vienna that saw the conclusion of the JCPOA nuclear agreement with Iran on July 14, 2015.
U.S. officials say that steps can be taken to bring Iran back into compliance with the terms of the agreement while the United States gradually lifts sanctions, but Tehran insists those penalties be lifted before any negotiations resume.
While calling for a return to the nuclear deal, China has so far backed Iran and demanded that the United States act first to return to the agreement by lifting sanctions that have strangled Iran’s economy and its currency.
John Calabrese, an expert on China-Iran relations at The Middle East Institute, a Washington-based think tank, said he thinks Beijing is looking to preserve the JCPOA and prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapons program. He warned that such a program could lead to further regional instability and jeopardize Beijing’s diplomatic inroads in the Middle East, where “Chinese stakes in energy and other economic sectors have grown significantly.”
Regional Ambitions
China continues to play a growing role in the Middle East.
Prior to his visit to Iran, Wang visited Saudi Arabia, Tehran’s main rival, and was warmly received in Riyadh. The Chinese foreign minister also visited Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, with additional stops in Bahrain and Oman.
Beijing has long avoided taking sides in conflicts in the Middle East, and Wang has offered China’s diplomatic capital to be a “peace broker” in the region. At a press conference at the annual National People’s Congress on March 8, Wang talked up Beijing’s deepening ties with the Arab world and said a host of agreements heralded “a new chapter” of Sino-Arab relations.
Calabrese, who is also an assistant professor at American University, said that given China’s diverse ties in the region and ambitions for the Middle East, it will be treading cautiously following this month’s deal not to alarm Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Iran’s regional rivals.
Moving forward, he said, Beijing is positioning itself to play a more central role in reviving the Iran nuclear agreement and de-escalating tensions between powers in the Middle East, which could be a major diplomatic win for China.
“If that is the case and [it] bears fruit, then Beijing comes out stronger and [looks] stronger all around,” Calabrese said.
SHYMKENT, Kazakhstan — Turn out the lights, the party’s over.
But for officials in the southern Kazakh city of Shymkent, the trouble may have just begun.
Some residents are demanding an investigation after the local government said it spent around $1.3 million on Norouz celebrations this month.
The statement on the public procurement agency’s website sparked angry public criticism from people who want to know where the money went. They say the mostly online events were far more modest than previous years and didn’t look like a million-dollar party.
The average monthly salary in Kazakhstan is a little over $500, according to CEIC Data, an economics website.
After the burst of public criticism, Shymkent city authorities belatedly said that the amounts represented all the funds set aside by the city for all of the year’s celebrations. But an itemized list of the spending suggested otherwise, and the damage to public trust appears to have been done.
Shymkent’s celebrations to mark the Persian New Year included music and poetry competitions, an event to mark the anniversary of a local magazine, and advertisements of local cultural sites, among other things.
Norouz events throughout the Central Asian state of around 19 million people on March 21-23 were heavily scaled down due to the COVID-19 pandemic. “Norouz celebrations were not as big as previous years. It invites the question: Where have all those funds gone?” one Shymkent resident asked.
She added that throwing parties during the pandemic wasn’t necessary in the first place, and the “money should have been spent for more important purposes.”
One Shymkent man told RFE/RL that he hadn’t noticed a single major Norouz event in Shymkent this year.
Another resident agreed. “They installed several traditional yurts in the old town. Did that cost that much money?” he said. “It boggles the mind to waste [that much] public money. It’s very irresponsible, it’s recklessness with public funds.”
Changing Sums
According to the public procurement agency’s website, the Norouz expenditure included the equivalent of $188,000 for a music contest, $117,600 for an anniversary event of a popular magazine called Haikap, and about $54,000 for the promotion of cultural spots.
Another $94,000 was said to have been spent to organize the “aitys,” a traditional song-and-poetry competition held between poets, known locally as “aqyns.”
Local journalist Miyat Kashibai said he compared the Norouz events in Shymkent and the city of Taraz and found that Shymkent’s authorities claimed to have spent a lot more money for a similar scale of events. “According to my calculations, Taraz spent about $35,000 for its aitys, which took place shortly before the event in Shymkent. The aitys competitions in both cities were exactly on the same level,” Kashibai said.
City officials later said there had been a mistake and that the reported $1.3 million was the amount set aside for all of this year’s celebrations.
Deputy Governor Shyngys Mukan did not respond to journalists’ questions about the statement on the official website. But he said the city’s Norouz budget was about $494,000 this year.
Meanwhile, the anti-corruption agency announced that it will probe the allegations of corruption.
Written by Farangis Najibullah based on reporting by RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service
As pro-democracy supporters marched down the streets of Minsk on March 25, a reporter did a video interview with Nina Bahinskaya, a frail yet fiery veteran of protests in Belarus for decades.
As Bahinskaya speaks while she walks, a chilling scene plays out a few meters behind her. A woman — later identified as film student Maria Tsikhanava — is quickly approached by what appears to be a black-clad, balaclava-wearing Belarusian security officer, who grabs her and whisks her away, all in a few seconds and all unbeknownst to Bahinskaya, who marches on.
Belarusian leader Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya had hoped the rally on March 25 — or Freedom Day, as it is also the day commemorating the founding of a short-lived democratic Belarusian republic more than 100 years ago — would breathe new life into the country’s protest movement demanding Alyaksandr Lukashenka, in power since 1994, step down.
The country has been rocked by protests since Lukashenka claimed a landslide victory and a sixth straight term in an August presidential election that many Belarusians believe was rigged in his favor. Supporters of Tsikhanouskaya, a political novice who was buoyed by big crowds at campaign rallies, was the actual winner. She is now in exile in neighboring Lithuania.
Tens of thousands marched in the wake of the disputed vote, but those numbers have dwindled in the last few months. Winter weather and weariness have contributed, but the incident filmed on the streets of Minsk on March 25 highlights the huge risk Belarusians take in coming out to voice opposition to Lukashenka.
More than 33,000 have been detained, hundreds beaten on the streets or in detention, some described by rights groups as torture, at least four people have been killed, and independent reporters targeted in the government crackdown. “The Belarusian authorities are conducting a targeted campaign of intimidation against civil society in an effort to silence all critics of the government,” Human Rights Watch said on March 18 in a statement.
Crushing Protests
Ahead of the planned action, the commander of Interior Ministry troops, Mikalay Karpyankou, described Belarusian protesters as “enemies of our state,” before vowing to “deal with them quickly,” and harshly as in the past “with pleasure.”
Crisis In Belarus
Read our coverage as Belarusians continue to demand the resignation of Alyaksandr Lukashenka amid a brutal crackdown on protesters. The West refuses to recognize him as the country’s legitimate leader after an August 9 election considered fraudulent.
Ivan Tertel, the head of the KGB, told Lukashenka on March 9 that foreign actors were applying “unprecedented pressure on our state,” claiming — without providing evidence — that plans had been discovered to “destabilize the situation” in Belarus on March 25-27.
State-run TV had aired footage of Interior Ministry forces drilling ahead of the planned demonstrations. On March 25, police and army officers, police vans, military vehicles, were out in force across Minsk in a not so subtle hint to the public to stay away.
Lukashenka’s government has justified its actions by casting protesters as pawns of foreign forces and being bent on causing havoc.
To avoid being swept up in any mass police crackdown, the Nexta Telegram channel, which has mobilized and coordinated demonstrations, had urged protesters to march through courtyards and organize flash mobs.
Even with less-concentrated crowds, the Belarusian human rights monitor Vyasna said a total of 245 people were detained in 23 cities and towns across Belarus on March 25, including 176 in Minsk.
Franak Viacorka, an adviser to Tsikhanouskaya, said there had been “hundreds of actions,” including fireworks, flash mobs, performances, and courtyard rallies, but acknowledged the “tanks and armored vehicles” deployed by Lukashenka, had “frightened” people along with the earlier repressions and beatings. “It is clear this all had an impact on the number of people [who turned out on March 25],” Viacorka told Current Time, the Russian-language network led by RFE/RL in cooperation with VOA.
Growing International Pressure
While Lukashenka may for now “control the streets,” as Tsikhanouskaya herself acknowledged in February, he is losing what leverage he had left on the international stage, at least in the West.
The UN’s top human rights body on March 24 voted to investigate allegations of widespread human rights abuses in Belarus. Russia, which has close ties to Belarus and has helped prop up Lukashenka since the disputed election, was one of the countries to vote against the measure.
UN human rights chief Michelle Bachelet has been asked to lead the investigation aiming to bring alleged perpetrators to justice. The rights council authorized a budget of $2.5 million and the hiring of 20 experts and staff to carry out the investigation.
Washington, subdued in its criticism under former President Donald Trump, has become more vocal under President Joe Biden. On March 25, the U.S. State Department demanded the immediate release of the more than 290 political prisoners in Belarus, and highlighted the plight of Ihar Losik and Maryya Kalesnikava.
Kalesnikava, who faces national-security charges that supporters say are absurd, had her pretrial detention extended on March 22. Arrested in September, Kalesnikava, a key aide to Tsikhanouskaya and a senior member of the opposition’s Coordination Council, was ordered to remain in detention until May 8.
Losik, a popular blogger and RFE/RL consultant, has been held since June on charges his supporters say are trumped up. He had been charged initially with allegedly using his popular Telegram channel to “prepare to disrupt public order” ahead of the August 9 presidential election.
Losik, 28, tried to slit his wrists and launched a four-day hunger strike on March 11 after being informed he faced new unspecified charges.
The statement by State Department spokesman Ned Price came a day after the top two members of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee also called for the release of all political prisoners in Belarus and pledged their support for the pro-democracy movement in the country. “We will continue to support the Belarusian people’s democratic aspirations until the illegitimate Lukashenka steps down, all political prisoners — including RFE/RL consultant Ihar Losik — are released and, new free and fair elections are held,” Representatives Gregory Meeks (Democrat-New York) and Representative Michael McCaul (Republican-Texas) said in a statement.
The European Union, United States, Canada, and other countries have refused to recognize the 66-year-old as the legitimate leader of Belarus and have slapped him and senior Belarusian officials with sanctions in response to the “falsification” of the vote and postelection crackdown.
Angry Neighbors
On March 25, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania imposed travel bans on another 118 Belarusian officials. The first round of bans since November expands the list of the sanctioned, already containing Lukashenka, to a total of 274, the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry said.
Lukashenka also faces worsening relations with Poland, which accuses Belarus of persecuting the ethnic Polish community.
Andrzej Poczobut, a journalist and a member of the Association of Poles in Belarus was detained in Hrodna early on March 25, two days after the association’s leader, Andzelika Borys, was arrested and sentenced to 15 days in jail. The arrest came amid a worsening standoff following tit-for-tat diplomatic expulsions this month, including the heads of the Polish consulates in Brest and Hrodna.
And while Belarusians may be for now reluctant to return to the street, more than 750,000 have added their signature to an online campaign launched by Tsikhanouskaya to demand Lukashenka enter internationally mediated talks on ending the political crisis.
Nexta has called for mass protests on March 27, casting it as “the day we start the second wave of street protests.”
Despite the fear instilled by the Lukashenka government crackdown, Viacorka is convinced it is only a matter of time before Belarusians turn out in larger numbers.
“People need to be shoulder to shoulder with one another, to see again that they are the majority, to feel that energy they got from those large marches,” he said.
With reporting by Current Time and RFE/RL’s Belarus Service
“Did they want to kill him?” wondered Jamison Firestone in a November 2009 interview with RFE/RL’s Russian Service. “I don’t know.”
Firestone was the managing partner of Firestone Duncan, a Moscow law firm that hired Sergei Magnitsky to look into suspicions of massive tax fraud and theft in the takeover of companies belonging to the investment firm Hermitage Capital Management. Magnitsky died after 358 days in a Moscow pretrial-remand prison on November 16, 2009. He had not been charged with any crime.
“Magnitsky showed that a group of Interior Ministry officers were guilty of embezzling from the state budget the sum of $230 million,” Firestone said. “And these officers were among the group that arrested him. They did this in order to silence him. After his arrest, they had to justify their actions and create some accusations. It took them 10 months to fabricate their nonsensical story,” he said. “Clearly, the investigators were trying to force him to confess to things that were not true.”
‘A Deliberate Strategy’
Magnitsky, who was 37, had repeatedly said he was being denied medical treatment, and rights activists said his mistreatment amounted to torture.
More than a decade later, supporters of imprisoned opposition leader Aleksei Navalny are issuing increasingly alarming warnings that Navalny’s health has deteriorated in the weeks since his arrest upon returning to Russia from Germany in January and particularly since he was moved to a prison in the Vladimir region earlier this month.
Navalny lawyer Vadim Kobzev accused the authorities of “a deliberate strategy…to undermine his health,” while Navalny’s wife, Yulia Navalnaya, said her husband’s treatment was “personal revenge” for his political activity.
Navalny had been in Germany since August 2020, when he was flown there for treatment following a near-fatal poisoning with a Novichok-type nerve agent on a trip to Siberia. He has blamed Russian President Vladimir Putin for the incident, which open-source investigators have argued was carried out by a team of Federal Security Service (FSB) operatives. In December, Navalny claimed he had duped one of the alleged FSB operatives, Konstantin Kudryavtsev, into confessing to participating in the poisoning during a 49-minute telephone conversation in which Navalny posed as a Kremlin official.
Navalny has complained of severe back pain and a loss of sensation in his right leg that has made it “practically nonfunctional.” He did not appear for a scheduled meeting with his lawyers on March 24. The following day, Russian prison officials issued a terse statement saying that Navalny’s health was “stable” and “satisfactory.”
After being allowed to see him, his lawyers disputed that claim, with one saying his condition was “extremely unfavorable.”
In two recent letters to the authorities that were made public on March 25, Navalny charged that his jailers were torturing him through sleep deprivation and withholding medical treatment in a deliberate effort to harm his health.
“This is exact deja-vu from the Magnitsky case,” wrote Hermitage Capital CEO and head of the Global Magnitsky Justice Campaign Bill Browder in a post on Twitter on March 25. “The medical neglect that Putin is inflicting on Alexei Navalny is deliberate and Putin wants the world to know he’s doing it.”
‘A Torture Chamber’
Speaking to RFE/RL in 2009, just a month before Magnitsky’s death, Browder noted the prisoner’s deteriorating health. “He has been in custody for 11 months now,” he said. “He has not been granted one single visit with his family. He has lost 18 kilograms.”
“Sergei Magnitsky was held in the pretrial jail under inhuman conditions,” Firestone said in the interview conducted shortly after Magnitsky’s death. “He had serious health problems, including a serious digestive illness. The prison knew perfectly well about this because at first they gave him medical help. Later the authorities began pressuring him to force him to give false testimony. So they stopped giving him medical treatment. They took away his medications. They refused to allow him to consult with his doctor. Magnitsky complained about this many times. During this time, he lost more than 20 kilograms.”
Magnitsky filed many complaints about his treatment, Firestone added. “Just the list of his complaints about this takes up four pages,” he said.
Although Magnitsky was transferred to Moscow’s Matrosskaya Tishina jail on the day of his death, he spent most of his imprisonment in the notorious Cell Block No. 2 of the Butyrka remand prison. Roman Popkov was an activist with the illegal radical leftist National Bolshevik movement who spent two years in the same building at Butyrka and was released the year before Magnitsky’s death.
“As I read his diaries, I understood that nothing has changed in the last year,” he told RFE/RL in December 2009. “I could see this cell block remained a torture chamber.”
“They throw people in there with a single aim — to convince them deep down of their complete helplessness in the face of the system,” Popkov added. “The police investigations unit sends them to Butyrka and the Butyrka administration sends them into those basements so that they will be more agreeable with the investigators and the court.”
According to The New York Times, at 11 a.m. on November 16, Butyrka prison doctor Larisa Litvinova ordered Magnitsky’s transfer to Matrosskaya Tishina because his health situation had become urgent. After six hours, an ambulance arrived for him. He arrived at 6:30 p.m. A doctor prescribed him a painkiller, ordered a psychiatric evaluation, and left. Staff found him unconscious on his cell floor at 9:20 p.m. and he was pronounced dead half an hour later.
The official cause of death was given as toxic shock and heart failure brought on by pancreatitis.
In an open letter to the Russian government in March 2010, human rights activist and then-head of the Moscow Helsinki Group Lyudmila Alekseyeva wrote that Magnitsky’s death “resulted from willfully cruel treatment.”
“Torture was used by officers of the Interior Ministry as a method to pressure Mr. Sergei Magnitsky in the course of the investigation of a criminal case,” Alekseyeva wrote. “Mr. Sergei Magnitsky died from torture that was willfully inflicted on him.”
An initial investigation by the Kremlin’s advisory Human Rights Council concluded that Magnitsky had been severely beaten and denied treatment.
Hitting Rights Abusers ‘Where It Hurts Most’
After years of international campaigning by Browder and others, the United States in 2012 passed the original Magnitsky Act that allowed Washington to impose targeted sanctions on individuals in Russia accused of human rights violations. In 2015, the United States adopted the Global Magnitsky Act that extended the same penalties to alleged rights abusers in other countries.
The anti-corruption NGO Global Witness has called the U.S. Magnitsky laws “an important tool” in the fight against abuses. “It’s a successful example of concrete action being taken against the corrupt and the worst human rights abusers, hitting them where it hurts most — in their pocket,” Global Witness wrote in December 2019.
Over the next few years, Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and others adopted similar legislation. The EU’s European Magnitsky Act was adopted in December 2020.
Taken together, the laws “fundamentally changed the role of targeted financial measures in the global fight against human rights abuses and corruption,” Atlantic Council senior fellow Hagar Hajjar Chemali wrote after the EU adopted the measure.
“The EU has said it would impose its first round of sanctions under this law at the beginning of 2021 and it is expected that Russian targets involved not only in the death of Sergei Magnitsky but also those tied to the recent attempted murder of key Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny will be included,” Chemali wrote. “Navalny has encouraged the EU to target Russian oligarchs and those close to Russian President Vladimir Putin, in particular because of the assets and estates they have in Europe.”
On March 24, Browder posted on Twitter: “Alexei Navalny says health has sharply deteriorated in jail. This is how the hell that Putin has in store for him begins. I’ve seen it before with Sergei Magnitsky and its horrific. We must be ready to sanction a lot more Putin regime people.”
After the United Kingdom imposed Magnitsky Act sanctions on 25 Russians and 20 Saudis allegedly involved in laundering “blood money” in July 2020, British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab lauded the new diplomatic tool.
“I think it’s absolutely right, particularly as a tool of foreign policy, that we subject the individuals responsible for…abuses — whether it’s torture, extrajudicial killing, or whatever it may be — to asset freezes and visa bans,” Raab told Reuters at the time. “I think it’s right as a statement of our international posture to say that we don’t want people responsible for these appalling crimes, with blood on their hands, coming to this country, doing their Christmas shopping in Knightsbridge or the King’s Road or trying to invest in British banks or British property.”
On March 26, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov dismissed most of the parallels between the Magnitsky case and Navalny’s. He noted, however, that Magnitsky was posthumously convicted of large-scale tax evasion in July 2013, in what observers believe was the first-ever posthumous trial in Russia’s modern history.
“We don’t see any parallels,” Peskov said, “apart from the fact that unfortunately, the deceased Magnitsky was convicted and sentenced. Navalny is also convicted and sentenced.”
Navalny has been convicted at two trials on financial-crimes charges that he and supporters contend were fabricated to blunt his challenge to Putin. They also contend that the parole-violation claim that resulted in his current prison term is absurd and unfounded.
Hey, you’re busy! We know rferl.orgisn’t the only website you read. And that it’s just possible you may have missed some of our most compelling journalism this week. To make sure you’re up-to-date, here are some of the highlights produced by RFE/RL’s team of correspondents, multimedia editors, and visual journalists over the past seven days.
Russian law enforcement officers play a key role in the industrial-scale theft of oil from the nation’s network of pipelines, an illicit business that robs the public coffers of hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue and wreaks damage on the environment, a new RFE/RL investigation shows. By Sergei Khazov-Cassia
Vladimir is less than two hours by train from Moscow but average wages in the city pale by comparison. It is in such places that jailed opposition leader Aleksei Navalny’s beleaguered movement is working to highlight corruption and change mindsets despite unrelenting pressure from the Russian state. By Matthew Luxmoore
In the city of Ovruch in the Zhytomyr region of Ukraine, the number of patients with COVID-19 continues to grow and the government has already designated the region a “red zone” for its high rate of new cases. RFE/RL visited the regional hospital and spoke with Viktoria Lytkivska, a doctor who has been treating patients since the start of the pandemic. Over 30,000 COVID-19-related deaths have so far been recorded in the country, with infections now at their highest level since November. By RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service and Neil Bowdler
In 1999, Saeed Zinali was arrested amid student protests that rocked Iran. More than two decades later, his mother continues to search for him. By RFE/RL’s Radio Farda
Russia’s remote Kurgan region, near Kazakhstan, is the location of about one-sixth of the country’s uranium reserves. A subsidiary of the state nuclear agency is expanding its operations there, using sulfuric acid to leach out the uranium ore. But for many local residents, the growth of the mines means not greater wealth, but greater dangers. By Harutyun Mansuyan and Current Time’s Unknown Russia
RFE/RL spoke with three Russians from the Urals region who emigrated from Russia after despairing that their efforts to reform their country would produce no good. By Yelena Shukayeva and Robert Coalson
Raman Bandarenka died from his injuries after being beaten up by masked men in November 2020, but the authorities in Belarus claimed he was drunk before he was detained by police. It was the start of an alleged cover-up that has seen a doctor jailed for disclosing that there was no alcohol in his body and evidence that senior regime figures were at the scene when Bandarenka was attacked. By Ray Furlong, Current Time, and RFE/RL’s Belarus Service
When the KGB sanctioned the opening of the Leningrad Rock Club in March 1981, it probably had no idea that this small, “alternative” venue would become synonymous with the tumultuous changes that swept through the Soviet Union just a few years later. By Coilin O’Connor
They come from Ukraine, Moldova, and Kyrgyzstan — and they have been deported from Russia for joining peaceful protests in support of jailed opposition leader Aleksei Navalny. They are now divided from their Russian wives and children. The head of a parliamentary commission into alleged foreign interference in Russian affairs said any foreigners involved in demonstrations should face automatic deportation. By Ray Furlong and Current Time
Competition between Beijing and Washington will shape the supercontinent, but Eurasia won’t be a flashpoint for tensions between the two world powers. By Reid Standish
To receive Steve Gutterman’s Week In Russia via e-mail every Friday, subscribe by clicking here. We’ve updated the format, so don’t be surprised if it looks slightly different when it lands in your in-box. And please check your spam folder if you didn’t receive it. If you have thoughts or feedback, you can reach us directly at newsletters@rferl.org.
The peculiarities of Putin’s propaganda were in the spotlight as a Siberian sojourn in sheepskin is captured on camera, while his alleged COVID-19 vaccination is not. Also unseen: imprisoned Kremlin foe Aleksei Navalny, whose lawyers raised the alarm about his treatment, saying he is in severe pain and accusing the authorities of a “deliberate campaign” to undermine his health.
And as the State Duma passed legislation formalizing Putin’s option of seeking two more terms as president — a change that analysts say has emboldened already powerful security agencies and police — new RFE/RL reports reveal further evidence of far-reaching ties between Russian law enforcement and the criminals it’s supposed to be catching.
Here are some of the key developments in Russia over the past week and some of the takeaways going forward.
Killer Coda
In the wake of an indirect but acrimonious exchange with U.S. President Joe Biden, Putin traveled to Siberia for a weekend in the woods with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, as he has done at least once in the past.
The cameras were rolling as Putin and Shoigu drove over snow-covered ground in a camouflaged all-terrain vehicle, drank tea from tin cups at a table in the open air, and checked out what one observer called the defense chief’s “bits of old wood collection.”
Some of Putin’s past action-man photo shoots have featured him bare-chested, but in this case more attention was paid to what he was wearing — a matching shearling coat and pants, lacking only a vest for a three-piece sheepskin suit — than to what he wasn’t.
Putin’s taiga time-out had apparently been planned earlier: He mentioned it when he challenged Biden to an “open discussion” — a debate, that is — saying that the weekend would be no good but that Friday or Monday would work. Biden’s response: “I’m sure we’ll talk at some point.”
As a propaganda exercise, it’s hard to imagine that Putin’s weekend activities could help move the needle much on his popularity ratings or hand Russian more confidence about their personal finances.
Propaganda Fail?
For example, such displays seem unlikely to affect the views of the 57 percent of Russian adults under 25, or the 51 percent from 25 to 40, who have decided they don’t want him to president after his current term ends in 2024, according to a survey by independent polling agency Levada Center.
But the Kremlin may have seen it as a way to showaudiences at home and abroad that Putin has priorities — namely, his own country — other than how to respond after Biden was asked whether he thought the Russian president was a killer and answered, “Mm-hmm, I do.”
Later in the week, Putin missed what many observers agreed was a chance to make a sizable impact with a brief on-camera appearance: More than seven months after he announced that the first of Russia’s three coronavirus vaccines was approved for use, he was inoculated against COVID-19 on March 23, according to the Kremlin – but not on camera.
Given the trouble his government has had getting Russian citizens behind the idea that they should be vaccinated, and ensuring there are doses on hand when they do, refraining from getting the shot in public seemed hard to explain. It sparked speculation about his motives and whether he was vaccinated at all.
Putin was not shy about showing this doctor’s consultation after he reportedly injured his shoulder during judo practice in 2011. But he would not allow cameras to record his alleged coronavirus vaccination on March 23.
Russia has aggressively marketed the vaccine abroad, signaling even with its name — a nod to the satellite that stunned the West and heated up the U.S.-Soviet space race in 1957 — that the Kremlin sees distribution of vaccines as a competition.
But less than 5 percent of Russian adults have received both doses of a two-shot vaccine. In late December, a poll conducted by the Levada Center found that 58 percent of Russians were not prepared to be vaccinated with Sputnik V, which Putin announced on August 11 had received regulatory approval — the first in the world.
Russia has recorded nearly 4.5 million coronavirus cases since the pandemic began in early 2020 — fourth in the world after the United States, Brazil, and India, which have much bigger populations.
Distractions
Its official death toll reached 96,612 on March 25, but state mortality statistics indicate that the real number of coronavirus-related deaths is more than 200,000, and some researchers suspect it is still higher.
In any case, Putin’s appearances and nonappearances may have served to draw attention away from far more momentous developments — and that may have been the point, at least in part, as it often is.
One such development was a technicality: The State Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament, passed a bill that will align electoral legislation with a change that was inserted into the constitution last year, after a choreographed campaign and a controversial nationwide vote, enabling Putin to seek two more six-year terms as president, in 2024 and 2030.
When the constitutional amendments were in the works, heading for certain adoption, political analysts and rights activists predicted that one result would be to embolden law enforcement and security agencies, such as the Federal Security Service (FSB).
At the time, Georgy Satarov, a Moscow think-tank head and former aide to Putin’s predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, said that the changes figuratively sounded the death knell for the constitution, and that “when the constitution ceases to exist, one thing remains: power.”
An array of developments seems to have proved those predictions accurate. Some of them are connected to Navalny, Putin’s most prominent foe, who was poisoned with a powerful nerve agent in Siberia on August 20, less than two months after the constitutional amendments entered into force.
Navalny was flown to Germany for treatment and was arrested upon his return to Russia on January 17. His jailing, along with anger at Putin and his government over a range of issues, sparked nationwide protests later that month that were the biggest in years — and were met with one of the harshest police crackdowns in years.
‘Torture’
On February 2, Navalny was handed a 2 1/2-year prison sentence on a parole-violation claim he calls absurd, stemming from a conviction on financial-crimes charges he contends were fabricated. And on March 25, lawyers who visited him in prison after several delays said that he was in “extremely unfavorable” condition, with severe back pain and problems that made his right leg “practically nonfunctional.”
Navalny had been complaining of sharp back pain for the past month and was denied treatment, lawyer Vadim Kobzev tweeted, accusing his jailers of pursuing “a deliberate strategy to harm his health.” He asserted that they were “essentially subjecting him to torture by lack of sleep” and were giving him two ibuprofen tablets daily for the pain — treatment he said was “obvious mockery.”
A security guard outside Correctional Colony No. 2 where Navalny is being held, in the town of Pokrov, outside Moscow.
The Russian prison service, in what came across for many as something far closer to trolling than a reliable medical assessment, said that Navalny’s condition was “satisfactory.”
The concerns about Navalny’s health and treatment will draw comparisons with the fatal ordeal suffered by whistle-blower Sergei Magnitsky, who died in Moscow’s Matrosskaya Tishina jail in December 2009 after being denied medical treatment and subjected to abuse that he and rights activists said amounted to torture.
A 2012 U.S. law that enables Washington to impose sanctions on Russians deemed to have committed human rights abuses is called the Magnitsky Act, and other Western countries have passed similar legislation. Earlier in March, under different legislation, the United States and the European Union imposed sanctions on senior Russian officials — including the FSB director, the prosecutor-general, and the prison service chief — over the poisoning and jailing of Navalny.
In an Instagram post in which she said that “everyone who knows Aleksei knows that he would never complain until the last minute,” Navalny’s wife, Yulia Navalnaya, wrote that his back problems began a month ago, when he was being held at Matrosskaya Tishina, and had worsened since his transfer to a prison in Pokrov, east of Moscow.
Navalny blames Putin for his near-fatal poisoning and, along with open-source investigative outfit Bellingcat and its media partners, has produced detailed evidence — including a phone call in which an operative appeared to admit involvement — indicating that it was carried out by the FSB.
In Cahoots
While the FSB, police, prosecutors, and other law enforcement agencies may be feeling increasingly emboldened, their outsize clout is nothing new: It’s been a phenomenon since Putin, a longtime Soviet KGB officer who head the FSB for a year in 1998-99, came to power months later.
In 1999, before Yeltsin stepped down on New Year’s Eve and made him acting president, Putin pledged to make Russia into a “dictatorship of law.” Kremlin critics say what has emerged instead is a country in which law enforcement and organized crime are deeply and seemingly inextricably intertwined.
Two recent RFE/RL reports have added to the evidence of those ties, which span a broad swath of economy sectors and have withstood several campaigns with the stated goal of curbing such corruption.
One describes how a forest ranger at a nature reserve near Lake Baikal helped arrest five suspected poachers — and found himself facing criminal charges for “exceeding his authority,” a turn of events activists say may have resulted from friendly ties between poachers and prosecutors, police, and local politicians.
The other is a detailed and revealing report grounded in a far-reaching investigation that captures the scale and scope of the theft of oil from pipelines in Russia and the role that law enforcement officers play in it.
‘Emblematic’
On a smaller scale, there’s the article that author and analyst Mark Galeotti, an expert on the Russian security agencies, posted along with a seemingly rhetorical question: “How much of Putin’s Russia is encapsulated in this story?”
Assailants abducted a retired FSB general and tortured him until he led them to his home outside Moscow and dug up seven plastic containers in the yard that held about $5 million in a mix of currencies, the tabloid Moskovsky Komsomlets reported on March 25. Two suspects were caught, convicted of kidnapping and extortion, and sentenced to 10 years in prison apiece.
Meanwhile, with the testimony about containers stuffed with cash, the trial “attracted the attention of prosecutors” to the retired FSB officer’s undeclared wealth, which far exceeded the possibilities provided by his state salary and pension. In the end, the authorities seized a safe-deposit box holding $1.1 million and 5 million rubles ($66,000) as well as a house near Moscow valued at 36 million rubles ($475,000).
According to the business daily Kommersant, the retired general argued that his assailants had not taken any money from him. And the defendants claimed their confessions were extracted through torture.
MOSCOW — A Moscow book fair has prompted accusations of censorship after it canceled an appearance by a debut author who is a top aide to jailed opposition politician Aleksei Navalny.
Kira Yarmysh, Navalny’s longtime spokeswoman and a prominent activist in her own right, was set to present her novel Incredible Incidents In Women’s Cell No. 3 at the Non/Fiction book festival, which will be held at an exhibition space near the Kremlin from March 24 to 28.
But the book’s publisher, Corpus, revealed that its parent company had given in to pressure by the event’s organizers to withdraw Yarmysh’s appearance from the event.
“It’s the typical argument,” Corpus chief editor Varvara Gornostayeva wrote in a Facebook post on March 23. “We need to preserve the book fair at any price, and an appearance by a opposition figure, and Aleksei Navalny’s spokesperson at that, places the fair’s existence under threat.”
Vitaly Kogtyev, a representative of the book fair, confirmed the decision to withdraw Yarmysh’s invitation in comments to Russian media, though he did not cite a reason. Non/Fiction did not immediately respond to a request for comment, but the event program published on its website includes no mention of Yarmysh or her book.
Kira Yarmysh (left) and Aleksei Navalny arrive for a meeting in 2015.
The controversial decision comes at a tense time for Russia’s opposition, and specifically Navalny and his regional network of campaign offices. The anti-corruption crusader incited a nationwide wave of protests in January that was brutally suppressed by police, and on February 2 he was sentenced to 2 1/2 years in prison over a parole violation charge he contends is absurd.
Since his return to Russia in mid-January after five months in Germany recovering from the effects of a nerve-agent poisoning he blames on President Vladimir Putin, Navalny’s movement has faced a targeted campaign against its activists and coordinators throughout Russia, some of whom are in custody or face criminal prosecution in connection with rallies.
Last week, Navalny’s award nomination for a series of investigative documentaries revealing evidence of corruption among the country’s top officials prompted a bitter conflict in Russia’s filmmaking community and led the Russian Guild of Film Critics to drop its prestigious cinema prize.
Yarmysh’s book, about six women who share stories while stuck in a jail cell, came out in the fall. Since February 2, she has been under house arrest pending trial on charges that she and nine other defendants created a risk to public health by promoting the January protests.
On March 18, a Moscow court extended her confinement by another three months, rendering her incapable of attending the scheduled book presentation even if it had gone ahead.
Yarmysh faces up to two years in prison if she’s convicted, and she is banned from communicating online. But in a post to her Facebook account, published by her aides, she issued a scathing assessment of the decision, calling it “base and cowardly” and a case of “direct collaboration with the authorities.”
“Censorship and self-censorship are among the worst traits of authoritarianism,” she wrote. “This can’t be explained with any virtuous intention to ‘save the book fair’…. On the contrary, silent tolerance of a division between permitted and prohibited writers is what will sooner or later destroy it.”
Over the winter, fewer Belarusians have taken to the streets to demand the ouster of longtime authoritarian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka amid cold weather, a brutal government crackdown, and perhaps fatigue.
Opposition leader Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya lamented in February that the pro-democracy movement had “lost the streets,” but vowed to seek a revival come spring — starting with a nationwide rally on March 25, which coincides with Freedom Day, the anniversary of a short-lived Belarusian republic founded in 1918.
Lukashenka shows no signs of willingness to compromise, however, and his top security officials have vowed to deal harshly with any new large-scale protests.
Belarus has been in turmoil since Lukashenka, who has been in power since 1994, claimed a landslide victory and a sixth term in the presidential election that millions of Belarusians believe was fixed. The vote followed large rallies across the country that pointed to strong support for Tsikhanouskaya, and her backers contend that she was the actual winner despite an official tally of 10 percent.
No ballot held under Lukashenka has been deemed free, fair, and democratic by impartial international observers.
Since the election, more than 30,000 people have been arrested, hundreds beaten in detention and during demonstrations, and at least four people have been killed in the government crackdown. Allegations of torture abound. Lukashenka and his inner circle have been put under sanctions by the West, which also refused to recognize him as the legitimate leader of Belarus, prompting him to turn to ally Russia even more for support.
On March 18, Tsikhanouskaya, who left for Lithuania under intense pressure from the state after the election, announced an online campaign to demand Lukashenka enter into talks with Belarus’s democratic movement. She proposes that the talks be mediated by the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
“Each of you knows the country is in crisis and it can only be resolved peacefully thru internationally mediated talks,” Tsikhanouskaya said in a statement.
She said the online vote initiative also had the backing of the Coordination Council, which is tasked with overseeing a hoped-for democratic transition, and By_Pol, which brings together former Belarusian security officers and officials who have switched over to the opposition, as well as other democratic forces.
Tsikhanouskaya said that the more Belarusians vote in the online campaign, “the louder the world will hear our demand to resolve the crisis peacefully without any more victims.” She excoriated Lukashenka for “spitting in the face of millions of Belarusians” by refusing to step down after the August 9 election.
As of March 19, some 460,000 people had added their names to support the calls for dialogue on the independent platform Golos, which launched in Belarus last year to monitor the disputed presidential election and is overseeing the online vote.
Tsikhanouskaya’s appeal to Belarusians came a day after she spoke at a videoconference hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, urging Washington to step up sanctions by targeting judges, state-owned enterprises, security officers, government-friendly tycoons, and educational and sports officials.
“People are suffering and dying now. Belarusians, more than ever, need your help,” she told the hearing on March 17.
Will The Crowds Return?
Lukashenka’s opponents could face a hard road ahead.
Crisis In Belarus
Read our coverage as Belarusians continue to demand the resignation of Alyaksandr Lukashenka amid a brutal crackdown on protesters. The West refuses to recognize him as the country’s legitimate leader after an August 9 election considered fraudulent.
The chances of recreating the crowds that swelled to over 100,000 in the early days of the protests after the disputed vote are doubtful, argues Kamil Klysinski, a senior fellow at the Warsaw-based OSW Center for Eastern Studies. “[Belarusian] people are indeed tired, disappointed and first of all intimidated by the huge repression which we observe within recent months,” Klysinski said in e-mailed comments.
Belarus is undergoing a “human rights crisis of unprecedented dimension,” said a report that UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet submitted to the UN Human Rights Council on February 25.
The mass protests were met with “mass arbitrary arrests and detentions” of largely peaceful demonstrators, along with “hundreds of allegations of torture and ill-treatment,” Bachelet said in comments that day to a Geneva forum, adding that “not one of the hundreds of complaints for acts of torture and ill-treatment” had been investigated.
Harsh Sentences
In a posthumous ruling issued the same day, a court in Belarus found Henadz Shutau, who was killed by security forces in August 2020, guilty of disobeying police orders.
Human Rights Watch on February 17 said that law enforcement the day before had conducted nationwide raids targeting human rights defenders and activists, searching their homes and offices and detaining at least 40 people.
More than 400 people have been convicted “in connection with participation in illegal mass events and protests that grossly violate public order,” the Belarusian Prosecutor-General’s Office said on March 17. Prosecutors listed examples of people they had pursued, including a 35-year-old man who had “posted insulting comments against law enforcement on the Odnoklassniki social network.” The highest sentence handed out was 10 years.
Journalist Katsyaryna Barysevich (right) and doctor Artsyom Sarokin stand inside a defendants’ cage during a court hearing in Minsk on March 2 in their trial for sharing information about a slain protester.
Last month, 16-year-old Mikita Zalatarou, who suffers from epilepsy, was sentenced to five years in a juvenile prison for participating in what authorities described as “mass riots.” The Belarusian human rights monitor Vyasna lists him as a political prisoner.
On March 16, blogger Ihar Losik, who was arrested in June 2020 on charges of preparing public disorder ahead of the August vote, ended a hunger strike and was placed in solitary confinement. Losik, who is a consultant to RFE/RL on new-media technologies, tried to slit his wrists and launched the hunger strike on March 11 when new, unspecified charges were leveled against him.
‘Enemies Of The State’
Lukashenka’s government has justified its actions by casting protesters as pawns of foreign forces and being bent on causing havoc.
In a meeting with Lukashenka on March 9, Ivan Tertel, the head of the KGB state security agency, spoke of “unprecedented pressure on our state” by foreign actors, without elaborating. Without providing evidence, he claimed his agency had discovered plans to “destabilize the situation” in Belarus on March 25-27.
“Tertel said on state TV…that the KGB ‘knows everything’ about all preparations for the March 25 demonstrations and their reactions will be accordingly quite hard,” Klysinski said.
The commander of Interior Ministry troops, Mikalay Karpyankou, recently described Belarusian protesters as “enemies of our state,” before vowing to “deal with them quickly,” and harshly as in the past “with pleasure.”
Karpyankou is notorious for not only chasing down and beating protesters in Minsk, but has defended the use of firearms against them, and was apparently caught on audio discussing plans to build internment camps for those rounded up in the crackdown.
Karpyankou’s comments came as state TV reported that Interior Ministry troops were drilling for possible mass disorder, displaying some of the hardware that could be deployed in such cases.
With Belarusians facing growing repression and protest numbers down, Lukashenka remains defiant.
At a gathering of thousands of loyalists in Minsk in February, Lukashenka slammed the protests against his rule as a foreign-directed “rebellion,” and vowed that 2021 “will be decisive.”
“No transfer [of power] is possible in Belarus,” Lukashenka said on March 2, discussing his talks last month with Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi. He said that a new constitution would be adopted early in 2022 but suggested that it would not lead to a transition away from his rule and added that a “transfer of power” was not on the agenda when he met with Putin.
‘Volcano Of Discontent’
The talks were the first time the two leaders had met in person since September 2020, when Putin extended $1.5 billion in state-backed loans to Lukashenka. The event was preceded by the signing of an agreement on the transshipment of Belarusian fuels (redirected from Lithuania) to Russian ports by the transport ministers of both countries in Moscow on February 19. There were rumors that Putin would extend a further $3 billion to Lukashenka’s government during their talks, but those were denied.
Belarus’s economy has been hit hard not only by the political turmoil, as businesses, especially the extremely profitable IT business, flee Belarus, but the COVID-19 pandemic, which Lukashenka has been accused of mishandling for his failure to enact any lockdown measures.
Lukashenka has other worries as well. The opposition-linked Telegram channel Nexta aired a documentary on March 8 detailing what it alleged to be his luxurious lifestyle, including 17 palatial residences, a fleet of luxury cars and watches, and a “harem.”
Besides the blow to his image as a man of the people, Lukashenka could face a challenge on the political front in his quest to curry favor with the Kremlin, which up till now has stuck with him, rejecting the Tsikhanouskaya-led opposition as Western puppets.
On March 6, the founding congress of the pro-Russian party Soyuz (Union) took place in Minsk. Soyuz casts itself as an opposition faction, favoring tighter Belarusian-Russian integration. Its chairman, Syarhey Lushch, has said the “violent dispersal of the very first protests in Minsk” had left “Lukashenka effectively illegitimate,” while calling for Russia to “play a more active role in stabilizing the situation.”
In the short term, Lukashenka may be able to deal with a fresh wave of protests, Klysinski said.
“But this doesn’t mean that Lukashenka has definitively won,” he added. “He is sitting on a ‘volcano’ of discontent felt by a majority of Belarusians, and he cannot be sure that everything is under full control.”
With reporting by RFE/RL’s Belarus Service and Current Time
Akram Neghabi has been searching for her son for more than two decades, despite threats, state pressure, and numerous futile attempts to get information from Iranian officials.
Neghabi’s son, computer science student Saeed Zeinali, was arrested at his home in the Iranian capital in July 1999, a few days after big student protests at Tehran University that were met with force.
Three armed agents said they were taking Zeinali, 22, in for questioning,
They said he would be back soon.
When my husband was detained, we were told not to look for Saeed anymore. They said you have to end this.”
Some three months later, Zeinali made a brief phone call to his family, telling them that he was in Tehran’s notorious Evin prison and urging them to follow up on his case with the authorities.
“I’m well,” he said.
That was the last time they heard from him.
Since then, Neghabi has been trying to find him and determine his fate, contacting the judiciary, prison officials, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the police, and even the office of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
But no one has given her a clear answer.
“There is no organization that we have not contacted,” she said, adding that “they don’t even accept our letters anymore. They don’t want Saeed’s name to be heard.”
Despite all of her efforts, Zeinali’s whereabouts are unknown and the mother of three says she doesn’t even know if her son is dead or alive.
Akram Neghabi (left) with other grieving mothers whose children were either killed or are in prison after participating in anti-government protests
In 2016, a judiciary spokesman said that “no document” had been found proving that Zeinali was arrested, adding that he appeared to be “missing.”
“I’m a mother whose child was taken away 22 years ago. I want to know what happened to him. Is he alive? I have been left with nothing — not a sign or a grave — and I’m not sure what to do,” Neghabi said in an interview with RFE/RL’s Radio Farda.
One day, the pain of the mothers, the sound of their cries, will bring [change].”
She said in past years she even spent hours outside Evin prison and other detention centers with a photo of her son.
“I would go in front of prisons holding a [big] picture photo of my Saeed, [hoping] that maybe someone had seen him,” she said. “Maybe my Saeed is an old man now. I [used to] go outside prisons with this hope, but unfortunately [state] pressure and arrests [now] prevent me from doing so.”
Neghabi and her daughter were arrested in 2010 and held in prison for two months, where they were questioned and threatened. She has said that she was told by her IRGC interrogators that her son had been “martyred.”
Her husband, Hashem Zeinali, was detained in 2015 and sentenced to nearly three months in prison and 74 lashes for “disturbing public order” after he took part in a gathering outside Evin prison in support of the jailed leader of a spiritual group.
Neghabi said her husband got mixed up with those protesters while demanding answers about his son.
“When my husband was detained, we were told not to look for Saeed anymore. They said you have to end this,” Neghabi said, adding that such pressure has failed to stop her quest.
Neghabi said she will keep demanding justice and accountability along with other mothers whose sons have become victims of Iranian state violence in recent years, including in November 2019, when at least several hundred protesters were killed in the government’s brutal crackdown on antiestablishment protests started by a sharp rise in gasoline prices.
The mothers of the missing children have gotten together in recent years to offer each other support while also raising their voices against state repression.
“One day, the pain of the mothers, the sound of their cries, will bring [change],” said Neghabi, adding that her only hope is that other mothers don’t have to mourn a child as she has.
“I pray that no more young people are killed or arrested, [beaten, or] tortured,” she said. “I hope to see that day.”
Written by Golnaz Esfandiari based on an interview by Radio Farda’s Fereshteh Ghazi
Whether you need to eat in a rush, have screaming kids in the backseat, or you’re just having cravings, fast food serves its purpose. Now that vegan products have integrated into so many chains, it’s easy to pop by nearly any drive-thru window and find something to fill you up. Don’t hold up the line scanning the menu—rely on this guide to order with confidence at 10 of your favorite fast-food restaurants in the US.
1. Del Taco No modifications needed; Del Taco has partnered with Beyond Meat to create a designated Vegetarian & Vegan menu. The new one-pound Epic Beyond Original Mex and Beyond Fresh Avocado Burritos are vegan as-is, along with the Beyond Avocado Crunchy Taco. All feature seasoned Beyond Beef crumbles that are accompanied by an assortment of fillings including cilantro-lime rice, fresh guacamole, sliced avocado, pico de gallo, salsa, seasoned black beans, and shredded lettuce. The Beyond Tacos are also vegan if you order them without the cheese. The Crinkle Cut Fries, Hash Brown Sticks, and Avocado Veggie Bowl are also vegan-approved.
2. Auntie Anne’s Pretzels Little-known vegan fast-food fact: Auntie Anne’s Original, Cinnamon Sugar, Sweet Almond, Garlic, Jalapeño, and Raisin pretzels can be veganized by ordering them without the butter. This process takes an extra five minutes, but it’s worth it for a hot, soft mall pretzel.
3. Burger King Breakfast, lunch, or dinner—Burger King has the vegan options covered. In the morning, opt for the French Toast Sticks served warm with a side of maple syrup. During the day, quell your burger craving with the Impossible Whopper (ask for no mayo) and a side of fries, then polish off that sweets craving with a Dutch Apple Pie. Yes, the pie is “accidentally vegan.” For a comprehensive look at BK’s menu, check out our VegNews Guide to Eating Vegan at Burger King.
4. Carl’s Jr. (and Hardee’s) Get your Famous Star fix with the Beyond Famous Star burger made with Beyond Meat. Ask for no mayo or cheese and you’re set. As of fall 2019, plant-curious patrons can also order the Beyond BBQ Cheeseburger or the Beyond BBQ Spicy Cheeseburger (the latter includes jalapeños). Both are made with dairy cheese and onion rings that contain whey, so to veganize, simply ask for no cheese or onion rings. Another handy hack: customization. Order a plain hamburger with a Beyond Meat patty, then add your choice of toppings: raw onions, ketchup, mustard, pickles, barbecue sauce, jalapeños, tomatoes, and lettuce are all fair game. Accompany the sandwich with a crispy fried potato side—the French fries, CrissCut fries, hash rounds, and hash-brown nuggets are all vegan.
5. Chipotle Mexican Grill There are countless build-your-own options with Chipotle’s offerings! You can customize your own bowl, burrito, salad, or tacos with a plethora of vegan ingredients—including beans, lettuce, cilantro-lime rice, veggie fajitas, and fan-favorite Sofritas—the chain’s signature spicy braised tofu. When in doubt, rely on Chipotle, and keep our Vegan Guide to Chipotle handy when you open your mobile ordering app.
6. Bareburger This chain has seriously stepped up its vegan game in the past year. What began as a partnership between Beyond Meat and Impossible Foods sprouted into a fully developed vegan menu—complete with vegan cheese, Vrioche buns (aka vegan brioche), non-dairy milkshakes, and JUST Egg sandwiches. The menu features sandwiches and sides, hot dogs and melts, and even kids’ meals and carrot cake. The most challenging part of ordering at a Bareburger isn’t finding something you can eat, but deciding how much can fit in your stomach.
7. KFC What we once launched as an April Fool’s joke has now become reality: KFC serves vegan fried chicken. The partnership with Beyond Meat debuted for a very limited time during late summer of 2019, and it has been tested in major markets across the US, Canada, Hong Kong, and Shanghai ever since. As of summer 2020, Southern Californians are being treated to the new plant-based Secret Recipe. Order the Beyond Meat nuggets (either in a six or 12-piece) with the vegan-friendly Sweet N Tangy dipping sauce. Vegan-friendly sides include green beans, baked beans, corn on the cob, and potato wedges (just remember to emphasize no butter).
8. Taco Bell Like its competitor, Del Taco, this fast-food Mexican chain was early to jump on the vegan bandwagon. While it has yet to offer vegan meat (don’t worry, that’s coming in 2021), Taco Bell does offer a fairly extensive vegetarian menu that is easily veganizable. Just use the magic words: “Fresco style.” This phrase replaces the cheese, ranch sauce, sour cream, and essentially any dairy-based condiment with fresh pico de gallo. Add potatoes to customize other vegetarian favorites including the Black Bean Crunchwrap Supreme, Power Menu Bowl-Veggie, and simple Beans and Rice bowl. No matter what you order, grab a side of accidentally vegan Cinnamon Twists for dessert. When in doubt, read up on our How to Order Vegan at Taco Bell Guide.
9. El Pollo Loco Introducing the new and improved Chickenless Pollo. The nationwide chicken chain first launched this vegetarian option in February 2020, but it was simmered in a sauce made with an egg enzyme. As of July 2020, the reformulated recipe is completely vegan. When ordering your Chickenless Pollo taco, burrito, bowl, or salad, just say “Make it vegan.” That will alert the cashier to remove all dairy from your order. Complete your meal with a vegan-friendly side such as the broccoli or Loco Side Salad (hold the cheese). Refrain from the corn side—it contains dairy.
10. White Castle Harold and Kumar approve of White Castle’s vegan sliders made with the Impossible Burger. Order these bite-sized beauties plain or with a sweet Thai sauce, but hold the cheese. The chain started testing out vegan cheese options using GOOD PLANeT cheese in March 2020, but only in select markets for a trial period. Complete your order with a side of fries.
Tanya Flinkis a Digital Editor at VegNews as well as a writer and runner living in Orange County, CA.
This post was originally published on VegNews.com.
Baibolat Kunbolatuly is one of the millions of Muslims from China’s western Xinjiang region who has a family member imprisoned or in an internment camp amid Beijing’s oppressive campaign against Muslims.
The 40-year-old Kunbolatuly has been staging protests in front of the Chinese Embassy in Nur-Sultan and the consulate in Almaty since early 2020, always holding a portrait of his younger brother, Baimurat.
A naturalized Kazakh citizen, Kunbolatuly has been seeking information about his brother, who vanished in Xinjiang three years ago.
Locked Up In China: The Plight Of Xinjiang’s Muslims
Radio Free Radio/Radio Liberty is partnering with its sister organization, Radio Free Asia, to highlight the plight of Muslims living in China’s western province of Xinjiang.
But Kunbolatuly’s protests came to an abrupt end when he was detained and sent to 10 days of “administrative arrest” on February 10 for breaching laws on protests.
Unsanctioned rallies — including solo protests — are banned in Kazakhstan.
Kunbolatuly says that, while in custody, he came under pressure from officials who demanded that he end his campaign.
He adds that officials threatened that he might “end up like Dulat Aghadil,” a prominent Kazakh activist who died in custody from an alleged heart attack last year in a death that raised suspicions of foul play.
“An official told me: ‘Your heart might stop, too,’” Kunbolatuly told RFE/RL after his release.
He says officials told him that his actions could harm his children’s future.
“They told me: ‘When your children grow up, they might want to work in government agencies, but they won’t be able to do so [because of your actions]. Then your children would hate you. You’re causing them to suffer,’” Kunbolatuly said.
Officials at the detention facility in Almaty refused to comment on Kunbolatuly’s charges when contacted by RFE/RL.
Kunbolatuly admits that he is worried about the potential impact his actions could have on his family if he continues his campaign and is rearrested.
“I think about what would happen to my children if I were to die [in prison],” he says. “What happens to my elderly parents who are already suffering because of my [brother’s disappearance]?”
‘We Don’t Know If He’s Still Alive’
Kunbolatuly lives in a modest apartment in Almaty with his wife and their three children. He arrived in Kazakhstan in 2002 and received a passport six years later.
Kazakhstan offers citizenship to ethnic Kazakhs who return to their ancestral country. Thousands of ethnic Kazakhs moved from China to Kazakhstan after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In 2005, Kunbolatuly’s parents left China to join him in Kazakhstan. Close family members and other relatives followed them.
People protest on February 9 outside the Chinese Consulate in Almaty to demand the release of their loved ones who they believe are being held against their will in China’s northwestern region of Xinjiang.
His brother, Baimurat, decided to return to Xinjiang in 2012 to look after an elderly aunt. Initially, Baimurat would frequently call or exchange texts with his family in Kazakhstan.
But the family soon lost contact with him. The aunt and other relatives also didn’t respond to Kunbolatuly’s calls and letters.
Many people in Xinjiang are afraid to keep in touch with their relatives abroad because even answering a foreign phone call could land them in jail.
The only information Kunbolatuly was able to get about his brother over many years were from other ethnic Kazakhs who would manage to call someone in Xinjiang who knew something about him.
Kunbolatuly said he heard from someone that Baimurat was sent to one of China’s notorious internment camps. Another rumor had it that Baimurat was forced to teach Mandarin to ethnic Kazakhs being held at a camp. Baimurat was fluent in Mandarin, which many ethnic minorities in Xinjiang don’t speak, his brother recalls.
Kunbolatuly says he doesn’t know if what he heard about his brother’s fate is true. “I don’t even know if my brother is still alive or not,” he adds.
Baibolat Kunbolatuly protests in front of the Chinese Consulate in Almaty in January 2020.
Right groups say about 1 million people — almost all of them from Muslim minority groups, primarily Uyghurs — have been detained in internment camps in Xinjiang.
There are widespread reports of systematic torture, starvation, rape, and even forced sterilization of the people being held in the vast camps, which are located behind barbed wire and watchtowers.
In January, the United States declared that China has committed genocide in its repression of Uyghurs and other mostly Muslim ethnic minorities.
Beijing rejects the claims and says the camps are “vocational training centers” where people voluntarily attend classes.
Message From Embassy
After years of waiting for a message from his brother and looking for information about him, Kunbolatuly had had enough.
He began a protest in front of the Chinese Consulate in Almaty as well as at the embassy in the capital, Nur-Sultan, in 2020, asking that Chinese officials provide information about his missing brother.
He eventually got a text message from the embassy that read: “On March 20, 2012, your brother shared content on the Chinese social [media] site Baidu Tieba that incited ethnic strife. Therefore, on April 11, 2018, a city court…in Xinjiang sentenced him to 10 years in prison. He is currently serving his sentence.”
Kunbolatuly says he thoroughly studied all social-media posts shared by his brother and didn’t find a single message that could even remotely be linked to “inciting ethnic strife.”
He also doesn’t know why it took six years for Chinese authorities to target his brother over the alleged post. Kunbolatuly didn’t receive any further comment from Chinese diplomats.
There are many other ethnic Kazakh natives from Xinjiang who protest in front of China’s embassy and consulate in Kazakhstan.
Their stories are similar to Kunbolatuly’s: They, too, are desperate to discover the fate of their loved ones who disappeared in Xinjiang. They, too, don’t know if their relatives are dead or alive, if they are in prison or being held in the internment camps.
Kazakhstan is reluctant to condemn the widely documented human rights abuses against ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. The Kazakh government says it doesn’t interfere in China’s treatment of its own citizens, calling it an internal matter.
The largest country in Central Asia is also wary of harming its relations with Beijing, a major investor in Kazakhstan’s vast natural resources and other sectors of the economy.
Kazakh authorities have been criticized for putting pressure on activists who call on the government in Nur-Sultan to speak up about the plight of Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.
Like Kunbolatuly, several others have been detained by police for protesting in front of Chinese diplomatic offices. The Internet signal often disappears or weakens in certain areas when protesters gather so they cannot organize or post photos or reports online.
Kunbolatuly says his Facebook account was first hacked into and then deleted while he was livestreaming a demonstration by ethnic Kazakhs near the Chinese Consulate in Almaty on March 16.
An RFE/RL correspondent who was friends with him on Facebook confirms that he can no longer find Kunbolatuly’s account. Kunbolatuly says he has also lost access to his e-mail account.
Almaty police, meanwhile, are always pushing the protesters away from the consulate, demanding they keep at least 50 meters from the building.
Despite the pressures, the Kunbolatuly family is determined not to stay silent. When Kunbolatuly was in detention, his mother, Zauatkhan Tursyn, joined with the other protesters in Almaty.
The family also says it has not lost hope that one day Baimurat will be freed and join his family in Kazakhstan.
Until then, the Kunbolatulys say they will continue to demand answers from Beijing.
Written by Farangis Najibullah based on reporting by RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service
Iran is boasting that its ability to make coronavirus vaccines exemplifies its self-sufficiency, with one top official comparing the feat to its ability to build missiles.
“Just as we were forced to manufacture missiles ourselves, we produced a coronavirus vaccine,” Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said on March 15, the semiofficial news agency ISNA reported.
Despite Tehran posing as a vaccine-manufacturing hub, its coronavirus vaccine candidates are still undergoing trials and have not received official approval.
Instead, the country has bought Russian, Chinese, and Indian injections amid a sluggish, opaque vaccination campaign launched last month with a small number of doses of Russia’s Sputnik V. Authorities say health-care workers and those with chronic conditions are currently being inoculated.
The latest Iranian coronavirus vaccine to emerge with scant details about it is named Fakhra after the country’s late nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who was assassinated near Tehran in November.
Fakhra was reportedly first unveiled on March 16, when its first clinical trial was launched in a ceremony attended by senior officials, including Health Minister Saeed Namaki. The minister pledged that Iran would soon become a “world leader” in COVID-19 vaccine production.
One of Fakhrizadeh’s two sons, Hamed Fakhrizadeh, became the first volunteer to receive a test dose of Fakhra, which was produced by the Defense Ministry’s Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research. The department was previously headed by Fakhrizadeh, whose killing has been blamed on Israeli agents.
A son of slain scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh receives a Fakhra coronavirus vaccine as Defense Minister Gen. Amir Hatami (left) and Health Minister Saeed Namaki (2nd left) look on at a staged event in Tehran on March 16.
An official claimed Fakhra was “100 percent safe” and the government said it had some 20,000 volunteers to officially test it.
Optimistic Targets
The Health Ministry has said it will vaccinate all Iranian adults by September, a goal that many find overly optimistic.
Iran launched a human trial of at least two domestic vaccines last year that it hopes will be help curtail the spread of the pandemic, which Tehran has desperately struggled to stem since it emerged there more than a year ago.
Some 1.76 million Iranians have contracted the virus and nearly 61,500 have died of COVID-19 as of March 16, according to official figures. The actual number of infections and dead from the pandemic is likely to be two or three times higher, officials and experts have said.
Iranian officials say they have so far received 410,000 doses of Sputnik V, 250,000 shots of China’s Sinopharm, and 125,000 doses of India’s COVAXIN vaccine. Tehran has also accepted 100,000 doses of the unapproved Cuban Soberana-02 vaccine, which will be administered to 100,000 people in the third phase of its human trial.
An additional 375,000 doses of COVAXIN are expected in the country by March 17, bringing the total number of imported shots to 1.26 million.
Despite a ban on U.S. and British coronavirus vaccines by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranian health officials said in early February the country will also receive more than 4 million doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine under the World Health Organization’s COVAX vaccine-distribution project.
Use of the British-Swedish AstraZeneca shots are currently being shelved by several European countries after reports of health problems in people who had received the vaccine.
Iranian officials have added that they eventually expect to import more than 16 million doses of vaccines from COVAX, which could inoculate nearly 10 percent of the country’s some 84 million people.
Mostafa Ghanei, the director of the Scientific Commission in Iran’s National Headquarters for Combating the Coronavirus, said in an interview in February that the country will need 160 million doses of coronavirus vaccines in order to bring the pandemic fully under control.
Speaking on March 15, Zarif blasted Western countries for hoarding vaccines “three times more than they need” and accused the United States of hampering Tehran’s access to vaccines through tough sanctions and financial restrictions imposed under ex-President Donald Trump.
“Can those who prevented the transfer of our money for purchasing vaccines say that they learned a lesson in humanity and humility from the coronavirus outbreak?” Zarif asked, failing to mention Khamenei’s January ban on Western-made vaccines.
That act by the supreme leader has been blasted as a politicization of the health and well-being of Iranians, who have been hit harder by the pandemic than any other country in the Middle East.
Khamenei has called U.S.- and British-made vaccines “untrustworthy,” while his chief of staff, Ayatollah Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani, recently falsely claimed that the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine had killed several people, with “some countries refusing to accept it.”
Golpayegani made the comments while praising Iran’s main vaccine candidate, Barekat, which is being developed by Setad, a powerful organization controlled by Khamenei’s office that owns billions of dollars in property seized after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
After declaring victories over extreme poverty and the coronavirus, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has laid out a new path for China’s economic rise at home and abroad that could force Beijing to adapt to new difficulties caused by the pandemic.
The future direction came as the Chinese Communist Party’s legislature, the National People’s Congress, convened in Beijing on March 5 for a more-than-week-long gathering to unveil a new economic blueprint — known as the country’s 14th five-year plan — and chart a broad course for China to claim its place as a modern nation and true global power.
The annual summit of Chinese lawmakers laid out broad guidelines that would shape the country’s growth model over the next 15 years.
Preoccupied with growing China’s tech industry amid a deepening rivalry with the United States, it also provided a platform for Xi to tout the merits of his autocratic style and tightening grip on power at home.
While the stagecraft of the conclave focused on China’s domestic goals, they remain deeply intertwined with Beijing’s global ambitions, particularly the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — a blanket term for the multibillion-dollar centerpiece of Xi’s foreign policy that builds influence through infrastructure, investment, and closer political ties.
“The message is a continuation and doubling-down of what we’ve been seeing for years, which is that China is growing stronger and it feels confident to elbow its way in even more around the world,” Raffaello Pantucci, a senior associate fellow at London’s Royal United Services Institute, told RFE/RL.
A giant screen shows Chinese President Xi Jinping attending the closing session of the National People’s Congress at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 11.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi echoed this during an expansive March 8 press conference on the sidelines of the congress in Beijing, where he said there would be no pause for BRI and that it had and would continue to evolve amid the constraints and opportunities caused by the pandemic.
“[BRI] isn’t so much a specific project as it is a broad vision,” Pantucci said, “and visions can be reshaped as needed, which is what we’re seeing now.”
An Evolving Vision
Despite the display of strength and unity coming out of Beijing over the country’s success in curbing the spread of COVID-19 and keeping its economy growing amid the pressures of the pandemic, Beijing finds itself facing new global pressure.
The BRI has suffered setbacks recently due to concerns in host countries over mounting debts, with many governments — from Africa to Central Asia — asking China for debt forgiveness and restructuring. Beijing is also looking to rebuild its credibility, which was hurt over its early handling of COVID-19 in the central city of Wuhan, and navigate growing pressure from Western countries that have begun to push back against Chinese tech and political policies.
In the face of this, Beijing has looked for new opportunities to demonstrate global leadership, providing vaccines and medical equipment to countries across the globe and raising climate-change concerns.
This has also applied to the BRI.
During his press conference, Wang focused on the initiative’s traditional infrastructure emphasis, but also pointed towards new horizons for the policy, such as medical diplomacy as well as a shifting focus on tech and foreign aid. China is the world’s largest emerging donor and a new white paper released in January by the Chinese government outlined its plans to play an ambitious leading role in the international aid system.
Many experts also say Beijing will look to build off its growing “vaccine diplomacy” campaign and use China’s recent success in fighting poverty to find new ways to build ties and deepen cooperation around the world.
“Fighting poverty and medical coordination linked to the pandemic and its aftermath will be a major focus of Chinese diplomacy moving forward,” Zhang Xin, a research fellow at Shanghai’s East China Normal University, told RFE/RL. “[BRI] is an umbrella initiative that can include everything and this will be one of the new fronts under that umbrella.”
Realities On The Ground
Despite the growing opportunities, China’s flagship project is also facing plenty of challenges from the COVID-19 pandemic on the ground.
In addition to debt concerns, closed or partially open borders with China’s neighbors in South and Central Asia due to China’s strict COVID restrictions remain a point of tension, and have led to massive lines, trade bottlenecks, and ballooning transportation costs.
China’s overseas energy lending has likewise dropped to its lowest level since 2008, after the pandemic severely hampered deal-making in developing states, according to Boston University’s Global Energy Finance Database, which saw financing for foreign energy projects fall by 43 percent to $4.6 billion in 2020.
And while the pandemic provided an all-time high for freight-train traffic to Europe from China, it has slowed trade from Central Asia to China. Only limited traffic is allowed to pass through China’s border post with Kyrgyzstan, something the new government in Bishkek is trying to change as it deals with the economic blows of the pandemic.
Kyrgyz Prime Minister Ulukbek Maripov met with Du Dewen, China’s ambassador to Bishkek, on March 3 to discuss speeding up border crossings and increasing trade, but progress remains uncertain as long as China stays wary of the spread of COVID-19 in Central Asia.
Similarly, traders in Tajikistan are still grappling with border closures as they remain cut off from their main export destination. Many of the merchants complain they are being squeezed out by Chinese competitors.
Preliminary Chinese trade data for 2020 shows that imports to China from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan fell by more than 45 percent compared to 2019.
Tensions also continue to flare in Pakistan, where the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China’s flagship BRI project, is progressing slowly amid multiple setbacks and delays. While problems with the initiative are not new, Beijing has aired its frustrations and supported the Pakistani military taking greater control over CPEC, which it views as a more reliable partner than the country’s political class.
Global Headwinds
Trade and relations with neighboring Russia, however, appear to still be a bright spot for Beijing. Russian customs figures show that China continues to make up a growing share of its trade as Moscow increasingly finds itself sanctioned and cut off from the West.
Political ties between Beijing and Moscow are also deepening. Wang spoke at length at his press conference about how the two governments were working closer together in a variety of fields, from plans to build a lunar space station to joint efforts in vaccine production.
Wang also said that the two countries were working to combat “color revolutions” and to fight against a “political virus,” hinting at their shared animosity towards the United States.
“The overall tone is quite clear, the partnership between China and Russia is being heavily valued,” Zhang said. “The Chinese state is emphasizing this relationship and how they can act together [with Russia] to face shared challenges around the world.”
Chief among those challenges for Beijing is continuing to grow its economy at home and navigate its rivalry with the United States.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and national-security adviser Jake Sullivan will meet with their Chinese counterparts in Alaska on March 18 for the first meeting between Beijing and the administration of President Joe Biden.
China is also looking to take successful policies at home and build upon them abroad under the banner of the BRI. China was the only major world economy to expand last year and many of its neighbors across Eurasia are hoping Chinese economic growth can help them with a post-pandemic recovery.
But China’s own recovery remains fragile in some areas, including in consumer spending, and regulators are growing more worried about real-estate prices rising to unsustainable levels. The Chinese stock market began to recover on March 11 after a large rout that saw officials censor the word “stock market” from social media searches in the country, showcasing the sensitivity to anything that can derail Beijing’s ambitions at home or abroad.
“There are many challenges ahead for the Chinese leadership to navigate and maintaining economic growth is the biggest one,” Ho-Fung Hung, a professor of political economy at Johns Hopkins University, told RFE/RL. “Xi cares about political power and boosting economic growth is the best way to hold on to political power.”
Just as many Uzbek farmers began sowing the seeds for this season’s crops, President Shavkat Mirziyoev called on them to give some of their agricultural land to young people without jobs.
“Every farmer should allocate two hectares of land [that will] be given to four young people, [each of them getting] half a hectare,” Mirziyoev said at a cabinet meeting in Tashkent on January 27. “They will grow whatever crop they like on that land.”
The president ordered that one hectare from every 10 hectares of farmland should be given to young people.
Six weeks since the announcement, many farmers told RFE/RL they were unhappy watching their income diminish. But in an authoritarian country where the president enjoys enormous power, farmers have no choice but to comply.
“Representatives from local governments and prosecutor’s offices gathered us together and said there were 300 young unemployed people in our district that should be given land,” a farmer from the eastern Namangon Province’s Uichi district told RFE/RL. “We had to agree, what else can we do? This is a government order and we have to agree or we could lose all of our land,” he said, on condition of anonymity.
RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service received similar complaints from many other farmers from across Central Asia’s most populous country.
“We still have to pay taxes for that part of the land that was taken from us,” said a farmer from the Qushrabot district of Samarkand Province. “Those who received our land [for free] don’t have to pay for anything.”
Uzbek officials have insisted they are not forcing anyone to give up their land.
Helping Your Neighbor
An official from the Agriculture Department in Namangan Province told RFE/RL the project was being implemented carefully, taking into consideration the situation on the ground. “The land is being allocated depending on the capacity of each farming enterprise and each district,” the official said. He pointed out that many people had welcomed the project, which he said provided young people with an opportunity to earn their own money.
In the eastern Andijon Province, one farmer says he supports the idea of helping others, although he admits “it does hurts” his own income. “It’s impossible not to give a part of your land to your neighbors when you see they’re struggling without work,” said Elyorbek Hakimov, the head of the Sobitkhon-Ota farming enterprise in Andijon’s Ulughnor district.
Hakimov said his farming enterprise had allocated farmland to four young people who were unemployed. He said they’d already grown corn and potatoes and he believes that if the new farmers work hard, “they can harvest two crops in one season.”
“Our young people can’t go anywhere to find jobs now,” Hakimov said. “But [if they get land] at home they will make at least some money by growing crops.”
President Shavkat Mirziyoev (left) talks with a farmer in the Buka district of the Tashkent region. Mirziyoev has said that about 14,000 young people applied to receive agricultural land last year.
Jobs are hard to come by in Uzbekistan, where many households in the country of some 35 million depend on worker remittances sent from Russia, Kazakhstan, and other countries. According to government statistics, unemployment in Uzbekistan in 2020 was about 13 percent, although the real figures could be higher than the official statement.
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, experts estimated that about 6 million Uzbeks worked abroad, many of them engaged in seasonal jobs such as construction work and farming. Since last year, millions of Uzbek migrant workers have been unable to travel abroad as the pandemic led to border closures and travel restrictions.
‘Give Them Incentives’
Mirziyoev has said that about 14,000 young people applied to receive agricultural land last year.
Meanwhile, some of those who received free farmland told RFE/RL that in a few cases the authorities took the land back just days later without providing any reason.
For example, in Samarkand’s Qushrabot region, officials canceled the allocation of some 22 hectares of land a week after the documents had been signed.
RFE/RL spoke to one young person in Qushrabot who was given about 40 acres of land before it was taken back by the local government. He said several unemployed youth were given agricultural land under the president’s plan. But the decision was reversed by district officials who gave no reason.
Uzbekistan analyst Saparboy Jubaev says the government must use its own resources to create jobs for young people in rural areas. “Such projects shouldn’t be implemented at the expense of farmers,” said Jubaev, a former official in the Uzbek Finance Ministry.
“For example, in Kazakhstan, the government provides incentives for young people willing to move to remote, rural areas in the country’s north,” said Jubaev, who works at the Eurasian National University in Almaty, Kazakhstan. “The government offers them land parcels, livestock, machinery, and financial aid.”
In a separate action, Mirziyoev has also urged private entrepreneurs to give jobs to younger people. That project, too, has been unpopular with many businessmen, who complain they are on the verge of bankruptcy after many months of quarantines and restrictions due to the pandemic.
Analysts note that Mirziyoev’s predeccessor, autocratic leader Islam Karimov, tried at various times during his turbulent rule to carry out agrarian reform, the last time in 2008.
Trader Joe’s is consistently changing the game with innovative new vegan twists on classic eats. Plant-based ice cream, mochi, cookies, and more are keeping our sweet tooth satisfied, and at budget-friendly prices, our wallets happy. Here are 12 desserts at TJ’s we can’t live without.
1. Dark Chocolate Sunflower Seed Butter Cups Who needs Reese’s? We’re so here for these peanut-free dark chocolate sweets, conveniently located by the registers, for a grab-and-go sweet tooth fix.
2. Organic Almond Beverage Chocolate Bar The name is a bit confusing here. What Trader Joe’s is trying to say is “vegan milk chocolate.” That’s right. Run, don’t walk, to your nearest location now.
3. Soy Creamy Cherry Chocolate Chip Ice Cream Make the ultimate ice cream sundae with giant scoops of this ice cream studded with Oregon-grown Bing cherries and dairy-free dark chocolate chunks, all for under $4!
4. Créme Sandwich Cookies Whether you prefer lemon or chocolate, TJ’s has you covered. We highly recommend trying one of each flavor of these vegan soft-baked sandwich cookies. The Lemon Créme has a wonderful pucker and the Chocolate Brownie & Vanilla Créme is deliciously decadent.
5. Vegan Marshmallows We load up our steamy mugs of soy hot cocoa with these fluffy treats in the winter and roast them over campfires in the summer, but no matter the season, we’ll always keep a bag of these gelatin-free marshmallows on hand.
6. Dark Chocolate Orange Sticks Once you pick up a bag of these, they’ll become a staple! The jelly-like orange sticks are coated in a thick layer of dairy-free chocolate and totally addictive.
7. Non-Dairy Oat Frozen Dessert in Strawberry Don’t pass up this pint assuming it’s plain strawberry—the super-smooth ice cream is packed with delightfully crunchy almond brittle and sweet candied strawberries that pump up the flavor and texture. This creamy treat will make a strawberry ice cream lover out of anyone.
8. Cheese-Less “Cheesecake” Two mini vegan cheesecakes come in a package, and the nutrition facts suggest two servings, but we easily polished off both in one indulgent sitting. The only downside: they require two to three hours to thaw. Don’t even bother putting them in the freezer when you get them home from the store.
9. Vanilla Non-Dairy Frozen Dessert This almond-milk-based ice cream tastes like cake batter. If this is what true vanilla tastes like, we’ve been missing out for years.
10. Jumbo Cinnamon Rolls Let’s be honest, cinnamon rolls are more of a dessert than a breakfast. But there’s absolutely nothing stopping us from gobbling down these ready-to-bake accidentally vegan treats in the morning. Plus, don’t miss the pumpkin variety during the fall months.
11. Chocolate Hummus Explore the sweeter side of hummus with this creamy cocoa-packed spread. Scoop it up with TJ’s Vegan Chocolate Chip Cookies, slather it on a banana, scoop it into hollowed-out strawberries, or simply spoon it into your mouth.
12. Joe-Joe’s And last but not least … who could forget these classic Trader Joe’s créme-filled cookies? Buyer beware: the gluten-free Joe-Joe’s are not vegan (they contain dairy). Thankfully, the various seasonal flavors such as Matcha, Mango, and Candy Cane provide vegans with plenty of tasty options.
Sarah McLaughlin is the New Products Editor at VegNews who can often be found wandering the aisles at her local Trader Joe’s.
This post was originally published on VegNews.com.
California-based singer Sassan Heydari-Yafteh, better known to fans as Sasy Mankan, has prompted threats and detentions by Iranian authorities who say his new music clip featuring a hard-core porn actress is obscene.
The video, Tehran Tokyo, features sex star Alexis Texas dancing alongside the Iranian-American performer and at one point wearing — and then shedding — a head scarf.
Head scarves, known as hijabs, are obligatory for women under Iran’s strict Islamic dress code and are a frequent target of protest by activists seeking reform of Iran’s discriminatory patriarchal system.
Sasy’s video has also been criticized for exposing Sasy’s fans — including children and young Iranians — to the world of porn.
The 32-year-old singer posted promotional snippets last week before releasing the full clip on March 11 despite a threat by Iranian authorities that they would take action against the singer through “international legal authorities.”
Iranian media reported this week that two brothers who arranged the song — identified as Mohsen and Behroz Manuchehri — were arrested at their home in the southwestern city of Shiraz.
It is unclear what charges are being levied against the two.
The semiofficial Tasnim news agency affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) quoted Tehran’s guidance court as warning that anyone who collaborated on the song or even who lip-syncs it and publishes it online will face prosecution.
A Tehran Tokyo promotional clip posted online on March 2 has been viewed over 18 million times, while a longer version has 2.6 million views on Sasy Mankan’s Instagram page, which has 4.7 million followers.
The music video led to renewed calls by Iranian hard-liners for the blocking of Instagram, which remains the only Western social-media site that has not been filtered by Iranian authorities.
“All parents are worried about cyberspace’s psychological harm to helpless children; this is the common denominator of all political thought. Others have taken serious steps to protect their children many years before us,” lawmaker Mojtaba Tavangar said via Twitter while tagging Minister of Information and Communications Technology Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi. “Child protection requires everyone’s support. Mr. Minister, [and] we are ready to help resolve this issue.”
Many people have countered that in order to protect children, authorities should take other steps that include protection against child labor and child marriages.
“The thoughts of children realizing that [Alexis Texas] is a porn star and searching for her [name on the Internet] make me tremble,” said journalist Emily Amraee, adding that “due to [state] filtering, all children have access to anti-filtering tools.”
Mohammad Ali Abtahi, a vice president under reformist President Mohammad Khatami two decades ago, said that while Sasy’s video clip “with its special guests” was being viewed by millions of Iranians, some people in the country also view women bicyclists as a problem.
“What a deep [gap] between these thoughts and the reality of the society,” Abtahi said on Twitter.
Sasy, who left Iran in 2012, declined an interview request by RFE/RL’s Radio Farda.
“I don’t want to [comment]. In these cases, I usually let everyone do their thing,” he said.
Sasy’s manager, Farshid Rafe Rafahi, CEO of Los Angeles-based EMH Productions, told The Associated Press that Sassy was not trying to create controversy.
“It’s pretty crazy, she’s just dancing like any person in any ordinary music video. She’s not doing anything inappropriate in these scenes,” Rafahi, said. “Sasy’s mission isn’t to create havoc, it’s to make people happy.”
In 2019, Sasy, who used to work as un underground singer in Iran, outraged Iranian authorities with a video clip, titled Gentleman, that became a hit among Iranians. Schoolchildren were shown dancing to the song in multiple videos posted online.
Some officials later claimed the video clips were “fake” and that no dancing took place in Iranian schools.
Iranian authorities, who interfere in most aspects of their citizens’ lives, have cracked down on public dancing, mainly by women, in recent years.
In 2014, six men and women were detained for dancing in a YouTube video to the Pharrell Williams song Happy. They were later sentenced to suspended jail terms.
Radio Farda broadcaster Mohammad Zarghami contributed to this story
Movie theaters might be shuttered for the near future, but that doesn’t mean you have to forgo your vegan popcorn while watching Netflix at home—in fact, we encourage all the vegan snacking. Though you can always make your own popcorn if you feel so inclined (just don’t forget the nooch), numerous companies are now making ready-to-eat popcorn in various vegan flavors you can’t easily replicate at home. Here are 11 of our favorite brands.
Sink your teeth into Pipcorn’s Vegan Caramel popcorn and your sweet tooth will explode with gratitude. This flavor is a scrumptious splurge if you’re craving a dose of sugar with your popcorn. And “pip” is appropriate when describing the kernels, as the mini heirloom kernels are half the size of regular popcorn. Don’t shy away from the other two vegan flavors: Sea Salt and Truffle. They may not have “vegan” in their name, but rest assured they are. Perfect for: Sweet-toothed snackers
Not even movie theatre popcorn (with vegan butter, of course) can come close to Pop Zero. The kernels are bigger than what you would expect from bagged popcorn, and they’re packed with flavor. This vegan brand offers four flavors—Simply Cinema, Cinnamon Toast, Sea Salt, and Chili Lime—and a new White Cheddar flavor was introduced this month that will knock your socks off. The unique part is that the company uses algae oil instead of other plant oils. Why algae? Pop Zero says it’s an “omega-3 powerhouse, which helps support a healthy immune system.” Perfect for: The movie theater popcorn buff
This popcorn hails from Asheville, NC, which bodes well, given that the city is a beer capital—and where there’s good beer, there’s always good popcorn. The company prides itself on using simple, natural ingredients, and though it offers many flavors seasonally and in series, its four year-round vegan flavors include Everything Bagel, Vegan Salted Caramel, Salt & Pepper, and Thai Spice. And currently, the Southern Series Sweet Onion flavor is also vegan. Perfect for: The boutique brand shopper
Organic popcorn gets a makeover with Lesser Evil’s heavenly vegan lineup. There are eight vegan flavors, many of which use a unique combination of coconut oil and the company’s “butter type” flavor on its air-popped kernels. Try, for instance, the “No Cheese” Cheesiness, Avocado-licious, or the Himalayan Gold. Or if you want to step out of the bag and indulge your sweet tooth, the White Chocolate + Matcha, Himalayan Sweetness, and Dark Chocolate + Himalayan Pink Salt flavors are perfectly sweet and salty. Perfect for: The butter-loving popcorn fan
Angie’s popcorn is so good you won’t be able to close the bag. So, it’s a good thing that most of its vegan flavors (with the exception of Vegan Salted Caramel) contain only 35 or 40 calories per cup. Four flavors make up its vegan line: Sea Salt, Light Kettle Corn, Avocado Oil, and Salted Caramel. The company’s seasonal Rosé Flavored Kettle Corn is also vegan. Perfect for: The light-snack lover
Get your nooch on with these deliciously flavored all-vegan kernels. Choose from Classic, Spicy, or Cloudy (aka salty), all of which are topped with nutritional yeast instead of cheese. The fun part about the brand? This artisan popcorn is solar popped, meaning you can thank the sun for making the kernels so crispy and airy. Perfect for: Nooch lovers
Forget corn kernels. Instead, go with the grain that’s making headlines: sorghum. You might know sorghum best as a feed for animals, but this whole grain is slowly making its way into foods for humans, showing up on restaurant menus and in food products. Now, it’s being popped as a healthier alternative to popcorn, and Nature Nate’s has two flavors for vegans: Avocado Oil & Sea Salt and Coconut Oil Pink Himalayan Sea Salt. Perfect for: The health nut
Inside these bags is a big surprise: the “popped” comes from water lily seeds. According to the company, lily seeds are nutritionally superior to regular popcorn because they have 67 percent less fat, 20 percent fewer calories, and 50 percent more protein than popcorn. Here’s the bonus: No kernels get stuck in your teeth. Choose from four vegan flavors: Soulful Sriracha Spice, Pink Himalayan Salt, Sweet Cinnamon Drizzle, and Sea Salt Chocolatey Drizzle. Perfect for: Free-spirited souls
You can’t have a “best of” popcorn list without including Skinny Pop. Its name is its biggest selling point, as an average cup of its original popcorn contains only about 39 calories. Not all of its flavors are vegan, so check the packages to be sure, but the vegan options among the current lineup include Original, Dairy-Free White Cheddar, Sweet & Salty Kettle, Sea Salt & Pepper, and Twist of Lime. Perfect for: The calorie-conscious eater
Never tried drizzled popcorn? You’ll wonder what took you so long when you dig into a bag of Safe + Fair’s popcorn. The all-vegan flavors are among the most unique you’ll find in commercially available popcorn and include fun versions such as Strawberry Shortcake, Dark Chocolate, Blueberry Cobbler, and Birthday Cake. Perfect for: The adventurous eater
Talk about vegan flavor overload! Cornucopia currently has 15 vegan flavors in its lineup, and it’s not just the quantity but also the creative diversity that sets this brand apart. Maybe you’re a Caramel Apple fan, or you prefer Chili Lime instead. Or maybe you want to put a different spin on your popcorn snacking and opt for the fun colors of Cornfetti. Better yet, go for all 15! Got a flavor suggestion you think would be awesome? Cornucopia encourages you to submit your creations to get a free gallon tin. Perfect for: I-can’t-make-up-my-mind munchers
Karen Aspis the author of Anti-Aging Hacks and award-winning journalist, as well as a fitness pro certified in plant-based nutrition, world record-holding athlete (in Nordic walking), vegan mentor with PETA, and board member with Uplands PEAK Sanctuary, Indiana’s first farmed animal sanctuary.
Dismissed by Alyaksandr Lukashenka as too fragile to run Belarus, women have been at the vanguard of the pro-democracy movement that has swept the country since the disputed presidential election on August 9, 2020.
It’s a Belarusian development that has fueled a growing global trend, explained Oksana Antonenko, director of the London-based Control Risks Group and fellow at the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington.
“Women are playing an increasingly important role in political activism around the world, and the Belarus example has provided a great inspiration to other regions, including the latest protests in Russia, Thailand, and now Myanmar [Burma], where many participants are women,” Antonenko told RFE/RL in e-mailed comments. “Women-led protests are more likely to remain peaceful and connect with entire societies, their fears and aspirations. It is also great to see that these protests are creating a new generation of female leaders and politicians who can revive trust in democratic institutions.”
Here are six women in Belarus who are not only making a difference, but have paid a high price for it:
Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya
It was not Svyatlana, but her husband, Syarhey, who was expected to be among Lukashenka’s more credible challengers in the August 2020 poll. Syarhey Tsikhanouski had thousands of followers of his corruption-busting YouTube channel A Country For Life, and crowds heeded his call by showing up at rallies with slippers in hand to squash the “cockroach” Lukashenka.
But after her husband’s arrest on dubious charges, it was Tsikhanouskaya — an English teacher and translator — who filled the void.
Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya appears at a campaign rally in Brest on August 2, 2020.
It was not an easy decision — in a June 2020 video she had said she was reluctant to challenge Lukashenka after receiving threats that her two young children would be taken away if she did. (They were eventually safely taken out of the country.)
Crisis In Belarus
Read our coverage as Belarusians take to the streets to demand the resignation of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka and call for new elections after official results from the August 9 presidential poll gave Lukashenka a landslide victory.
And at one of her early rallies, in July 2020 in Navapolatsk, the 38-year-old political novice stumbled a bit before apologizing to the crowd, explaining she had never seen so many people before.
But her confidence grew along with the size of the crowds, reaching numbers rarely if ever seen for any candidate in Belarus. From the beginning, Tsikhanouskaya made it clear she was only in the race to force a repeat election that would include all banned candidates.
Shortly after an election-day showing that led her and her supporters to declare victory, she left for neighboring Lithuania after another apparent threat to her children.
From there, she has reached out to European and other leaders to shore up support for the pro-democracy movement back in Belarus and call for action to punish Lukashenka, now deemed an illegitimate leader by much of the international community.
Tsikhanouskaya spearheaded the creation of the Coordination Council to navigate Belarus toward democratic shores. But most of its top members on the presidium were either arrested or fled Belarus. It wasn’t the only setback for Tsikhanouskaya. Her calls for a national strike in October never gained traction, in part due to threats to employees at state-run factories if they joined and firings of many of those who did.
Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya speaks during an interview with the media in Helsinki on March 1.
On January 18, Tsikhanouskaya announced that she had requested the support of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to secure her safety when she returns to Belarus, and called for ONCE-facilitated talks between the European Union, Lukashenka, and the opposition to resolve the crisis.
Although crowds have dwindled due to winter weather and weariness in the face of an ongoing government crackdown, Tsikhanouskaya in Helsinki on March 3 predicted bigger and better-organized demonstrations against Lukashenka in the spring.
Tsikhanouskaya is among the more than 300 people who have been nominated for the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize.
Maryya Kalesnikava
Kalesnikava headed the presidential campaign of Viktar Babaryka, former chairman of the Russian-owned Belgazprombank, until it was derailed by his June 2020 arrest on embezzlement charges, which he and his supporters charge were a sham to keep him off the ballot.
Kalesnikava, 38, then teamed up with Tsikhanouskaya and Veranika Tsapkala, who headed the ill-fated campaign of her husband, Valer.
The trio were a hit on the campaign trail, drawing campaign crowds that grew in size as the August 9 presidential election approached. Tsikhanouskaya clenching her fist, Kalesnikava making a heart sign, and Tsapkala signaling a V for victory quickly became iconic symbols of the election.
Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya (center), Veranika Tsapkala (left), and Maryya Kalesnikava attend a campaign rally in Minsk on July 30, 2020.
“In Belarus 55 percent of voters are women — more than half. That means that our voice should be heard. In this way, they are trying to exclude us from the political process,” Kalesnikava told Current Time ahead of the vote. https://www.rferl.org/a/women-lead-the-charge-against-lukashenka-in-belarus/30743179.html
After the vote, which triggered an unrelenting and unprecedented wave of protests in Belarus, Kalesnikava was picked to serve on the presidium of the Coordination Council created by Tsikhanouskaya.
But as the authorities increasingly clamped down on the opposition, Kalesnikava was arrested in September and charged with calling for action aimed at damaging national security. On September 8, Kalesnikava was taken to the border with Ukraine, where she was to be forcibly deported. However, she foiled those plans by ripping up her passport, as was later recounted by two other Belarusian opposition activists who did pass into Ukraine.
On January 6, authorities extended Kalesnikava’s pretrial detention until March 8, which happens to coincide with International Women’s Day.
For her efforts, Kalesnikava was named one of the recipients of the 2021 International Women of Courage award, the U.S. State Department announced on March 4.
Kalesnikava, along with Tsikhanouskaya and Tsapkala, was also listed when the European Parliament’s 2020 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought was awarded to Belarus’s democratic opposition.
Nina Bahinskaya
Bahinskaya has been a mainstay at protests in Belarus for decades, dating back to the Soviet days. “I was motivated by all the injustice — social, political, and national. And I said, ‘If you’re not a coward, if you’re not a slave, then you should defend your country and homeland,’” she said in an interview with Current Time, the Russian-language network led by RFE/RL in cooperation with VOA.
Bahinskaya, 73, is rarely seen at demonstrations without her flag, the white-red-white symbol of the short-lived Belarusian People’s Republic, which existed for about a year in 1918-19. The flag was effectively banned by Lukashenka but has become an omnipresent symbol of the opposition to his rule.
Bahinskaya, a great grandmother, cuts a frail but resolute figure amid the crowds protesting in Belarus.
In a video from late August 2020, Bahinskaya was seen struggling with riot police in Minsk, demanding they return the flag they had snatched from her.
In September, Bahinskaya was among hundreds detained at a mostly women’s demonstration in Minsk. Men in green uniforms and black balaclavas encircled female protesters who shouted, “Only cowards beat women!”
Katsyaryna Barysevich
Barysevich, a reporter for Tut.by, an independent Belarusian news website that the authorities have targeted in a crackdown on the media, was jailed after reporting information that contradicted the government’s version of events in the death of a protester.
Barysevich was arrested on November 19 after writing an article about Raman Bandarenka, who died several days earlier following a beating by a group of masked assailants.
Barysevich disputed the official claim that Bandarenka was drunk, citing medical findings that no alcohol had been detected in his blood.
The doctor who provided the lab results, Artsyom Sarokin, was arrested, tried, and convicted along with Barysevich, ultimately receiving a suspended two-year prison sentence and fine equivalent to $555 for disclosing medical information.
Barysevich was handed a six-month prison term and fined the equivalent of $1,100 for disclosing medical information and instigating a crime by pressuring a first responder to share information.
Katsyaryna Barysevich attends a court hearing in Minsk on March 2.
In late November 2020, Amnesty International recognized Barysevich and Sarokin as prisoners of conscience and demanded their immediate release.
Katsyaryna Andreyeva, Darya Chultsova
Andreyeva and Chultsova are among the growing number of independent Belarusian journalists who have paid a high price for plying their trade. The two reporters for Belsat, a Poland-based satellite TV station, were arrested on November 15 while covering a rally in Minsk to commemorate Bandarenka.
Belarusian authorities saw their presence differently and charged the two with “organizing public events aimed at disrupting public order.” A court in Minsk on February 18 found Andreyeva and Chultsova guilty and sentenced them to two years in prison each, sparking international condemnation, with EU foreign affairs spokesman Peter Stano denouncing it as a “shameful crackdown on media.”
Katsyaryna Andreyeva (right) and Daryya Chultsova flash victory signs from the defendant’s cage during their trial in Minsk on February 18.
“EU strongly condemns and calls for reversal of sentencing of Belsat TV Katsiaryna Andreyeva and Darya Chultsova for just doing their jobs. We call on Belarus authorities to respect fundamental freedoms and stop targeting journalists,” Stano said on Twitter.
The sentencing of Andreyeva and Chultsova is “one of many ways Belarus’s government has retaliated against journalists for reporting on peaceful protests and human rights violations,” Anastasia Zlobina, coordinator for Europe and Central Asia at Human Rights Watch, said in a February statement.
She said at least seven other journalists were behind bars in Belarus awaiting trial on similar criminal charges. The Belarusian Association of Journalists said in a recent report that 481 journalists were detained in 2020. It said that was twice the number of detentions over the previous six years combined.
Despite being repeatedly threatened by Iran’s security apparatus, harassed, sent to prison multiple times, and prevented from seeing her children, the authorities have failed to silence Narges Mohammadi.
One of Iran’s leading human rights defenders, Mohammadi has long campaigned against the death penalty and defended victims of state violence.
While in prison, she has gone on several hunger strikes to protest the conditions there, attended a sit-in to condemn the security forces’ killing of several hundred protesters in November 2019, and spoke out about human rights abuses in open letters and statements smuggled out of her cell.
Since her release in October 2020, the award-winning Mohammadi has remained in a defiant mood, speaking out publicly against state tyranny and injustice. “Despite the price I’ve paid, I remain hopeful, and I’m confident that our efforts will bear fruit, although not immediately,” she says.
Mohammadi’s 10-year prison sentence on charges stemming from her human rights work was shortened due to concern for her health during the coronavirus outbreak in Iranian prisons and after calls for her release by the UN and rights groups.
Punished For Not Backing Down
A journalist and trained engineer, Mohammadi tells RFE/RL that despite everything she has endured, she remains positive and determined to keep fighting for better rights, freedom, and democracy in Iran.
Mohammadi, the spokeswoman of the banned Defenders of Human Rights Center co-founded by Nobel Peace Prize winner Shirin Ebadi, has been meeting with mothers whose sons were victims of the recent deadly state crackdowns while continuing to raise concerns about rights violations.
In a video posted online last week, she highlighted violence against female detainees, including herself, saying she was subjected to force during her 2019 prison transfer from Tehran to the northwest city of Zanjan, some 300 kilometers from the Iranian capital. Mohammadi, who suffers from a neurological illness, has said the prison transfer was aimed at punishing her for protesting the killing of demonstrators.
Mohammadi said she was physically assaulted by male guards and a prison director despite Islamic laws enforced in Iran that men should not touch women to whom they are not related. “How come you do not have to obey Islamic laws [in prison]? So what you’ve seen saying [about the need to uphold Islamic rules] was a lie,” she said.
“I protest against assault by the Islamic establishment’s men against women and I won’t be silenced,” Mohammadi said in the video, where she also mentioned jailed environmentalist Niloofar Bayani, who has accused her interrogators of sexual threats and pressure.
Narges Mohammadi (right) joins Behnam Mahjoubi’s mother (center) and others protesting in front of the hospital in Tehran where he died.
In late February, Mohammadi was among the activists demanding accountability for the situation of jailed Sufi Behnam Mahjubi, 33, who fell into a coma after suffering from what authorities said was medicinal poisoning.
In online videos, Mohammadi was seen asking hospital staff about Mahjubi, who later died amid accusations of medical neglect. She was also seen attempting to comfort Mahjubi’s mother outside the hospital where he was fighting for his life. She later criticized Mahjubi’s treatment in media interviews.
Earlier this month, Mohammadi joined a group of civil society activists and rights defenders to file an official complaint against the use of solitary confinement while calling for the prosecution of officials who authorize it. Political detainees in Iran are often held in solitary confinement for weeks or months with no access to the outside world.
Mohammadi, who has endured solitary confinement several times in prison, condemned the “inhuman” practice in a 2016 letter from Tehran’s Evin prison, where she called it “psychological torture” aimed at forcing prisoners to make false confessions.
Mohammadi’s outspokenness could be difficult for the authorities to ignore, especially as they are in no mood to tolerate dissent amid a deteriorating economy and a deadly coronavirus pandemic that Tehran has struggled to contain.
The prominent rights defender says she is well-aware of the risk she’s facing. “It’s not like I’m not worried, but the truth is that despite being concerned and despite the risk of arrest, I believe we have to keep working on issues that matter in our society,” Mohammadi tells RFE/RL.
“The efforts that are being made will definitely bring results in the mid- or long term and help remove injustices and discrimination against our people in different areas — including in the economy, culture, politics, and women’s rights — and allow society to grow,” she says.
Increasing The Pressure
In December, Iran executed Ruhollah Zam, the manager of the popular Amadnews Telegram channel, who was convicted of inciting violence during the anti-establishment protests in late 2017 and early 2018.
Scores of activists, academics and dual nationals have also been arrested, and a number have been sentenced to harsh prison terms. The authorities have also pressured a prominent NGO that fights against poverty, ordering its dissolution.
Even after her release from prison, the authorities kept pressure on Mohammadi by banning her from traveling outside the country and by bringing new charges against her over her 2019 prison protest.
She has said she will refuse to appear in court, saying her prison sit-in was a peaceful protest against “the repressive policies of the Islamic republic” and the “ruthless” crackdown on protesters two years ago who protested a large, sudden rise in the price of gasoline amid rising poverty in the country.
“Iranian authorities’ persecution of human rights defenders often continues even after they are released from prison,” Human Rights Watch Iran researcher Tara Sepehrifar told RFE/RL. “Yet Narges, like several other Iranian human rights defenders, continues to show resilience and commitment to peaceful resistance against repression by speaking up and also building pressure by utilizing potential legal avenues open for challenging authorities’ abusive behavior.”
Mohammad’s teenage daughter and son, Kiana and Ali, live in France with their father, political activist Taghi Rahmani, who left the country in 2012 to escape a jail sentence. Mohammadi remained behind, believing she could be more effective inside the country, and has not seen her children since July 2015.
Mohammadi says the authorities have rejected her demand to be allowed to visit her twins, who took to social media in late January to condemn the travel ban against their mother.
Even if the ban is lifted, Mohammadi is not planning to live in exile like many other activists who have been forced to flee Iran to escape state repression. “I told Tehran’s prosecutor that I want to be with my family for two months and then return. Unfortunately, they refused [my request] and I don’t plan to leave the country illegally,” she says.
Standing with the people is the principle that has guided her throughout her life, she adds.
![Pretrial detention puts “what remains of [my father's] health” in jeopardy, says Ivan Zhdanov, the director of Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation.](https://gdb.rferl.org/be75ab12-ed6c-49ee-928e-49469b563159_w250_r0_s.jpg)
