Category: indonesia

  • By Veronica Koman in Sydney

    As an Indonesian lawyer living in exile in Australia, I find it deeply troubling that the changes to the Indonesian Criminal Code are seen through the lens that touchy tourists will be denied their freedom to fornicate on holiday in Bali.

    What the far-reaching amendments will actually mean is that hundreds of millions of Indonesians will not be able to criticise any government officials, including the president, police and military.

    You can be assured that the implementation of the Criminal Code will not affect the lucrative tourism industry which the Indonesian government depends on – it will affect ordinary people in what is the world’s third largest democracy.

    With just 18 out of 575 parliamentarians physically attending the plenary session, Indonesia passed the problematic revised Criminal Code last week. It’s a death knell to democracy in Indonesia.

    I live here as an exile because of my work on the armed conflict in West Papua. The United Nations has repeatedly asked Indonesia to drop the politicised charges against me. One of the six laws used against me, about “distributing fake news”, is now incorporated into the Criminal Code.

    In West Papua, any other version of events that are different to the statement of police and military, are often labelled “fake news”. In 2019, a piece from independent news agency Reuters was called a hoax by the Indonesian armed forces.

    Now, the authors of that article can be charged under the new Criminal Code which will effectively silence journalists and human rights defenders.

    Same-sex couples marginalised
    Moreover, the ban on sex outside marriage is heteronormative and effectively further marginalises same-sex couples because they can’t marry under Indonesian law.

    The law requires as little as a complaint from a relative of someone in a same sex relationship to be enforced, meaning LGBTQIA+ people would live in fear of their disapproving family members weaponising their identity against them.

    Meanwhile, technically speaking, the heteronormative cohabitation clause exempts same-sex couples. However, based on existing practice, LGBTQIA+ people would be disproportionately targeted now that people have the moral licence to do it.

    The criminal code has predictably sparked Islamophobic commentary from the international community but, for us, this is about the continued erosion of democracy under President Joko Widodo. This is about consolidated power of the oligarchs including the conservatives shrinking the civic space.

    Back when I was still able to live in my home country, it was acceptable to notify the police a day prior, or even on the day of a protest. About six years ago, police started to treat the notification as if it was a permit and made the requirements much stricter.

    The new Criminal Code makes snap protests illegal, violating international human rights law.

    Under the new code, any discussion about Marxism and Communism is illegal. Indonesia is still trapped in the past without any truth-telling about the crimes against humanity that occurred in 1965-66. At least 500,000 Communists and people accused of being communists were killed.

    Justice never served
    Justice has never been served despite time running out because the remaining survivors are getting older.

    It will be West Papuans rather than frisky Australian tourists who bear the brunt of the updated criminal code. The repression there, which I have seen first hand, is beyond anything I’ve seen anywhere else in the country.

    Treason charges which normally carry life imprisonment are often abused to silence West Papuans. Just last week, three West Papuans were charged with treason for peacefully flying the symbol of West Papuan independence — the Morning Star flag. The new treason law comes with the death penalty.

    It’s shameful that Australia just awarded the chief of Indonesian armed forces the Order of Australia, given that his institution is the main perpetrator of human rights abuses in West Papua.

    The new Criminal Code will take effect in three years. There is a window open for the international community, including Australia, to help safeguard the world’s third largest democracy.

    Indonesians need you to raise your voice and not just because you’re worried about your trip to Bali.

    Veronica Koman is an Indonesian human rights lawyer in exile and a campaigner at Amnesty International Australia. This article was first published by The Sydney Morning Herald and is republished by Asia Pacific Report with the author’s permission.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Amnesty International

    Amnesty International Indonesia and Amnesty International Australia have condemned the repression used against the people in West Papua when they were commemorating Human Rights Day yesterday — December 10, which marks the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

    Indonesian authorities made 116 arrests and injured at least 17 people during multiple forced dispersals of rallies in the lead up to and during December 10 in four regencies across West Papua.

    “We are appalled to hear about these mass arrests. Many were arrested when the rally had not even started,” Amnesty International Indonesia executive director Usman Hamid said.

    “This shows Indonesian authorities’ utter disregard of West Papuans’ right to peaceful assembly.

    “Criminalising them for simply peacefully exercising such right will only breed further resentment and distrust. That discriminatory treatment against them has to stop,” said Hamid.

    “People all over the globe commemorated Human Rights Day. The fact that West Papuan people could not enjoy the same right, shows that there is a human rights emergency in West Papua.”

    Amnesty International Australia national director Sam Klintworth said: “Australia needs to demand accountability from Indonesian authorities, especially as they are recipients of so much Australian aid.”

    23 arrested in Wamena
    On December 8, 23 people in Wamena were arrested for several hours when they were distributing leaflets for people to join the Human Rights Day rally.

    On December 10, forced dispersals and mass arrests took place in Wamena and Jayapura.

    In Jayapura, 56 people were arrested and at least 16 people were known to be injured during forced dispersals in multiple locations.

    In Wamena, 37 people were arrested and at least one person was injured when the multiple rallies were forcibly dispersed.

    Also on December 10, a rally in Sorong was forcibly dispersed, and the protest in Manokwari was blocked by police.

    Most of the protesters were members of the West Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat – KNPB), a peaceful grassroots organisation campaigning for the right to self-determination.

    Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Indonesia has ratified through Law No. 12/2005, explicitly guarantees the right of any person to hold opinions without interference.

    Freedom of peaceful assembly is also guaranteed under Article 21 of the ICCPR.

    Amnesty International does not take any position regarding political status within Indonesia, including calls for independence.

    However, the organisation believes that the right to freedom of expression includes the right to peacefully advocate for independence referenda, or other political positions.

  • Asia Pacific Report

    Civil society organisations which make up the National Alliance for Criminal Code Reform have slammed the decision by the Indonesian government and the House of Representatives (DPR) to ratify the Draft Criminal Code (RKUHP) which is seen as still containing a number of controversial articles, reports CNN Indonesia.

    Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) chairperson Muhammad Isnur criticised the DPR and the government because the enactment of the law was rushed and did not involve public participation.

    According to Isnur, a number of articles in the RKUHP will take Indonesian society into a period of being “colonised” by its own government.

    “Indeed the latest version of this draft regulation was only published on November 30, 2022, and still contained a series of problematic articles which have been opposed by the public because it will carry Indonesian society into an era of being colonised by its own government,” said Isnur in a statement.

    The Civil Coalition, as conveyed by Isnur, has highlighted a number of articles in the RKUHP which are anti-democratic, perpetuate corruption, silence press freedom, obstruct academic freedom and regulate the public’s private lives.

    According to Isnur, these articles will only be “sharp below but blunt above”, meaning they will come down hard on the poor but go easy on the rich, and it would make it difficult to prosecute crimes committed by corporations against the people.

    “Once again this will be a regulation which is sharp below, blunt above, because it will be difficult to prosecute criminal corporations that violate the rights of communities and workers,” he said.

    Criminalised over ideas
    The Coalition for example highlighted Article 188 which criminalises anyone who spreads communist, Marxist or Leninist ideas, or other ideas which conflict with the state ideology of Pancasila.

    According to Isnur, the article is ambiguous because it does not contain an explanation on who has the authority to determine if an idea conflicts with Pancasila.

    According to Isnur, Article 188 has the potential to criminalise anyone, particularly government opponents, because it does not contain an explanation about which ideas conflict with Pancasila.

    “This is a rubber [catchall] article and could revive the concept of crimes of subversion as occurred in the New Order era [of former president Suharto],” he said.

    Then there are Articles 240 and 241 on insulting the government and state institutions.

    He believes that these articles also have the potential to be “rubber” articles because they do not provide a definition of an insult. He is also concerned that the articles will be used to silence criticism against the government or state institutions.

    The Coalition believes that there are still at least 14 problematic articles in the RKUHP. Aside from the spreading of communist ideas and insulting state institutions, there are several other articles such as those on morality, cohabitation and criminalising parades and protest actions.

    Law ‘confusing’
    The DPR earlier passed the RKUHP into law during a plenary meeting. A number of parties believe that the new law is confusing and contains problematic articles. These include the articles on insulting the president, makar (treason, subversion, rebellion), insulting state institutions, adultery and cohabitation and “fake news”.

    Justice and Human Rights Minister Yasonna H. Laoly has invited members of the public to challenge the law in the Constitutional Court if they feel that there are articles that conflict with the constitution.

    “So we must go through constitutional mechanisms, right. So we’re more civilised, be better at obeying the constitution, the law. So if it’s ratified into law the most correct mechanism is a judicial review,” said Laoly earlier.

    Deputy Justice and Prosperity Minister Edward Omar Sharif Hiariej, meanwhile, is asking those who consider the law to be problematic or rushed to come and debate the issue with the ministry.

    “You try answering yourself, yeah, is 59 years rushed? If it is said that many oppose it, how many? What is the substance? Come and debate it with us, we’re ready and we are truly convinced that if its tested it will be rejected,” said Hiariej.

    Translated by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. The original title of the article was YLBHI Kecam Pengesahan RKUHP: Masyarakat Dijajah Pemerintah Sendiri. Republished with permission.

  • After years of debate, protest, and delay, the Indonesian parliament passed a new criminal code (Undang Undang Kitab Hukum Pidana, or KUHP) that gives the state new tools to punish a wide range of ideological, moral and political offences. International attention has focused on those passages of the law that ban sex outside of marriage. But the KUHP’s real power lies in provisions that threaten political dissent with prison sentences and have the potential to muzzle public debate about the purview of the state in citizens’ private and political lives. Here we examine the divergent interests that coalesced to pass the most regressive provisions of the new criminal code, and consider their implications for Indonesian democracy.

    A compromise between two illiberal agendas

    Indonesia’s old criminal code was inherited from the Dutch colonial state and included a range of outdated provisions. The effort to revise the law began in the 1980s under the New Order regime but went nowhere after several fully formed drafts were discarded. After the democratic transition in 1998, attempts to revamp the code became entangled in ideological battles between nationalist parliamentary factions who sought to purge Dutch influence, and religious conservatives who saw the revisions as an opportunity to push for a greater role for the state in regulating public morality.

    The new KUHP, passed unanimously by all parties on 6 December, represents a compromise between these two factions. Nationalists, led by PDI–P, drove provisions that not only retain existing criminal charges for expressions of support for “Communist/Marxist-Leninist” thought, but also ban expression of “ideas that contradict Pancasila”, the state’s pluralist ideology. Legal activists in Indonesia believe these provisions smack of the Sukarno-era Anti-Subversion Law, a vaguely-worded statute that was used to great effect by the Suharto regime to repress and intimidate dissidents.

    At the same time, the new law, which bans all sexual relations outside of marriage, also represents a major victory for Islamist groups. The Islamist PKS party has long championed efforts to regulate public morality through its proposed Family Resilience bill. The draft of this law was brought up for discussion in the parliament several times but failed to garner broader support because of its extreme provisions — which among other things regulated sleeping arrangements of siblings within households and compelled family members to report homosexual relatives to state authorities. The new KUHP, which designates sex outside of marriage and cohabitation between unmarried couples as jailable offences, if reported by close relatives, incorporates watered-down versions of passages in the Family Resilience bill.

    Why did a compromise become possible when the governing coalition is ostensibly dominated by religiously “pluralist” parties that could have mustered the votes to pass the new code without accommodating Islamist demands?

    Since Indonesia’s deeply polarising presidential elections in 2019, Jokowi’s government has imposed a “repressive pluralist” agenda to counter political opposition by banning Islamist groups and purging state agencies of religiously conservative civil servants. But neither Jokowi nor his allies in parliament can afford to isolate conservative Muslim groups more broadly, especially as the 2024 elections approach. This consideration became even more important when the morality provisions in the KUHP bill gained endorsement from mainstream Islamic organisations, including Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, who are also under pressure to guard their conservative flanks in the wake of the 212 movement’s bringing divergent views about the role of Islam in public life to a head. This is evident from NU and Muhammadiyah’s conservative stance on recent issues concerning morality, especially their opposition to using a consent-based definition of rape in the Sexual Violence Law passed earlier in 2022. Placating religious conservatives with policy concessions in the social domain has thus become an expedient way of containing the potential fallout from subduing their opposition in the political arena.

    Apart from striking these compromises, the new KUHP also serves the goals of political elites across ideological divides of curbing the role of civil society in the policy-making processes. Over the past few years the government has been subject to mounting public criticism for passing legislation that is seen as protecting interests of powerful oligarchs and reducing accountability. Changes to legislation governing the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in 2019, which effectively dismantled the popular anti-graft body, prompted the largest pro-democracy protests since the student mobilisations of the late 1990s that toppled the New Order regime. In 2020, the rushed passage of the Omnibus Law on Jobs Creation—which reduced labour protections, dismantled environmental safeguards and expedited forcible land acquisition by the government, with the aim of attracting foreign investment—also galvanised widespread protests.

    The new KUHP makes these expressions of opposition high-risk. Citizens can now be jailed for up to three years for making comments about the president and vice president that the latter deem derogatory. It also contains provisions for punishing anyone who circulates derogatory material about government institutions more broadly, including government ministries, the courts or the parliament. When it was passed into law in a sparsely-attended plenary session of parliament, the PKS representative staged a walk-out to protest these “insult” provisions, and its fellow opposition party Partai Demokrat offered a perfunctory warning of the risks to free speech, perhaps to save face with their constituents. But both had already formally endorsed the final version of the law in the committee that drafted it.

    Government reassurances fall flat

    In the face of widespread criticism of the KUHP, government officials have been quick to defend the new criminal code by urging the public to celebrate the fact that Indonesia has finally managed to shake off its colonial legacy. These platitudes offer cold comfort to the journalists and activists who are most likely to be targeted by the law and have repeatedly pointed out that it actually retains and repurposes the most repressive aspects of the original version inherited from the Dutch.

    For example, provisions for punishing insult to the president that were part of the old KUHP were annulled by the Constitutional Court in 2006, which ruled that general defamation laws were sufficient to protect holders of public office from personal attacks. The new law reinserts these provisions and expands their scope to cover other state institutions, with two alterations. First, it makes them complaint-based offences, meaning they can only be applied if the “insulted party” reports them. Second, it stipulates that criticisms that are made in the public interest will be exempt from prosecution. Lawmakers claim that these limitations offer a safeguard against potential misuse of the law, which they argue is not meant to forbid dissent but reasonably regulate it.

    Such arguments presume that powerholders will exercise restraint. But in reality several litigious ministers within Jokowi’s cabinet already have a track record of suing critics. The new KUHP’s provisions on insulting the government give such actors a greater incentive to go after activists, who will now bear the additional burden of proving their innocence for the obvious reason that there is no clear or explicitly defined difference between an ‘insult’ and a critique of the state or heads of government.

    Another reason activists don’t trust the government line is that these revisions follow years of relentless state harassment of activists using existing regulations, especially the anti-“defamation” provisions of the Electronic Transactions Law (UU ITE) and the authorities’ increasingly unrestrained use of force against demonstrators, as seen during the student protests of 2019–2020. The chilling effects of this trend can be seen in the fact that while the protests against the previous attempt to pass a new KUHP in 2019 were massive, this time the streets are relatively empty. Additional provisions in the new code that increase criminal penalties for organising protests without prior notice to authorities are likely to reinforce these trends.

    Regardless of whether and how these rules are applied, legal experts in Indonesia have pointed out that they have no place in a democracy. Indonesia is not the only country that has laws to protect heads of state from wilful defamation, but these regulations are generally rooted in a history of monarchy, where sovereigns are considered sanctified entities. When applied in a representative democracy like Indonesia, these provisions have the potential to transform the role of government officials from public servants, who are subject to criticism from the citizens who elect them, to entitled rulers who ought not be defied.

    When it comes to the law’s morality provisions, proponents claim that they codify Indonesia’s shared moral values and increasing the role of state authorities in enforcing them will prevent vigilantes from taking the law into their own hands. The evidence suggests the opposite might be the outcome: we know that in Aceh province — which enforces the strictest public morality regulations in the country, punishing fornication, adultery and homosexuality with public canning — the incidence of mob violence to punish moral offences is three times higher than the Indonesian average.

    Jokowi forges a tool of repression

    Indonesia’s parliament has approved Jokowi’s decree on mass organisations. Here’s why the law threatens the freedoms of all Indonesians.

    Lawmakers have sought to address concerns about vigilantism in the final draft of the KUHP by stipulating that criminal charges against sexual offences can only be brought against individuals who are reported to the authorities by close family members, specifically by parents, children and spouses. But far from solving the problem, these provisions are likely to encourage vigilantes to pressure state officials and victims’ families into doing their bidding.

    Finally, proponents argue that dissatisfied citizens are free to critique and even challenge the law. Indeed, the government has developed a template response to public opposition to its legislative agenda: “just take your complaint to the Constitutional Court”. This phrase is routinely dropped by ministers, party leaders, and the president himself.

    But even this avenue for recourse is closing fast. Over the past two years, the government has led a systematic effort to undermine judicial oversight of the legislative process. In September 2020, the parliament voted to extend the tenure of Constitutional Court judges from 5 to 15 years, which was criticised by legal experts as a bid to incentivise a favourable ruling on the judicial review of the Omnibus Law. Following the Court’s conditional annulment of that legislation, however, the government is now mounting a more direct attack on judicial independence. In November 2022, lawmakers removed Justice Aswanto from the Constitutional Court for voting to strike down the Omnibus Law, and replaced him with a new judge who they claim would defend the parliament’s interests.

    A nail in the coffin?

    The new KUHP’s implementation is on hold for three years. And once it is implemented we are unlikely see an immediate widespread crackdown against dissidents of the sort seen in places like Turkey or Thailand. The code’s vague, nebulous provisions will probably be applied selectively and inconsistently. But this is precisely the point: uncertainty invokes fears and stifles dissent. The code’s provisions can be thought of as warning shots, designed to compel critics to adjust their behaviour.

    There is no doubt this law resurrects elements of Indonesia’s authoritarian past. Democracy has been under extraordinary strain here for the past decade. The resilience of its civil society and parts of the media have helped to thwart some of the most brazen attempts to roll back democracy, like the 2014 proposal to end direct elections and Jokowi’s attempt to extend presidential term limits.

    But aside from preserving the institution of elections, all of Indonesia’s other democratic norms and institutions are now under attack. The new criminal code is not the final nail in democracy’s coffin—but it gives a hammer to anyone who wants to drive one in.

    The post Indonesia’s new criminal code turns representatives into rulers appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • We’d like to hear from people living in or who are planning to visit Indonesia what their views are on the country’s new controversial legislation outlawing extramarital sex

    Indonesia, the world’s third-largest democracy, has approved legislation that outlaws sex outside marriage as one of several sweeping changes to the country’s criminal code.

    The new code, which will apply to Indonesians and visiting foreigners alike and has prompted alarm from human rights campaigners, will also prohibit cohabitation between unmarried couples.

    Continue reading…

    This post was originally published on Human rights | The Guardian.

  • Rights groups say amended criminal code underscores shift towards fundamentalism

    Indonesia’s parliament has overhauled the country’s criminal code to outlaw sex outside marriage and curtail free speech, in a dramatic setback to freedoms in the world’s third-largest democracy.

    Passed with support from all political parties, the draconian legislation has shocked not only rights activists but also the country’s booming tourism sector, which relies on a stream of visitors to its tropical islands.

    Continue reading…

    This post was originally published on Human rights | The Guardian.

  • 4 Mins Read

    A new report by Green Queen Media argues that while plant-based meat sales may be flat in the US and Europe, in Asia Pacific, the alternative protein industry is booming.

    Green Queen Media has published the 2022 edition of its award-winning APAC Alternative Protein Industry Report today, titled The Future is Asian and presented by plant-based chicken leader TiNDLE. The 150-page report, now in its third year, is the result of over 14 months of original reporting and dozens of first-hand interviews, as well as featuring expertise and insights from over 30 ecosystem insiders and sector investors.

    Both the 2020 and 2021 editions grabbed the top prize in the category of Special Awards for best Global Report at the Hallbars Sustainability Reports Awards in Sweden. Hallbars is an organization that recognizes the best climate-forward publications around the world. 

    Representation matters

    It’s been a challenging year for alternative protein, particularly for plant-based meats, with flat sales in the US and some European markets, a challenging environment for public plant-based companies like Beyond Meat and Oatly, and constant media attacks by pro-meat and pro-dairy lobbies. However, these headlines belie the global picture. “Across the Asia Pacific region, alternative protein companies have been going from strength to strength, hitting major milestones, attracting significant government support and raising record funding rounds,” said Sonalie Figueiras, the report publisher and Green Queen Media’s founder and editor-in-chief, in a statement. “Our report illustrates the importance of reporting and media representation. Western-centric media would have you believe that alternative protein is an industry in trouble. In reality, the sector is headed for boom times in Asia and beyond.”

    “What is perhaps obvious to some, but became incredibly clear upon writing the report and working with our industry experts, is just how differently the various countries within APAC approach alternative proteins, both in terms of technology and consumer behaviour,” said Nicola Spalding, the report author.

    The future is Asian

    Where the 2020 report focused on examining making the case for why alternative protein was necessary in a region that boasts 60% of the world’s population but only 20% of the world’s agricultural land, and the 2021 report provided an exhaustive look at the industry in APAC and dug deep into the three technology pillars, the 2022 edition highlights the 10 most important growth stories and historic firsts that the industry has achieved, as well as the unique products created to serve consumers with vastly different food traditions, culinary tastes and dining preferences.

    On the funding front, record-breaking rounds made headlines across the globe, as APAC was home to both the largest cultivated meat Series A ever and the largest plant-based meat Series A ever. The report chronicles every round raised in 2022, with an emphasis on the 10 biggest.

    In addition, precision fermentation, which in 2021 was a fledging sector in Asia, experienced real traction this past year, with China’s first animal-free dairy company coming out of stealth and the launch of the region’s first animal-free dairy milk onto supermarket shelves amongst many other announcements.

    Several APAC cultivated meat players celebrated major product firsts, from the first cultivated pork belly to the first cultivated duck breast to the first cultivated fishball to the first cultivated Dokdo shrimp- huge leaps, especially given how young the sector is.

    The Future is Asian features extensive interviews with 10 local ecosystem insiders from Japan to Taiwan to India, and spotlights the insights of the top venture capitalists investing in the region’s startups.

    For the first time, the report authors provided recommendations aimed at the many players of the region’s ecosystem on the road ahead amidst a changing global landscape fraught with supply chain disruption, the ongoing Ukraine war, rising food inflation and the looming threat of a worldwide recession, on top of a worsening climate crisis.

    In-depth: APAC’s alt protein pioneers

    After years of ecosystem building, the region now boasts hundreds of startups working towards a future of food that promises to feed over three billion people sustainably, safely, and ethically.

    The report showcases a range of in-depth case studies spotlighting some of the region’s most exciting players such as South Korean cultivated meat and seafood startup CellMEAT, Singaporean plant-based chicken and seafood player Growthwell Foods, US-Australian animal-free casein maker Change Foods, global fats leader AAK, specialty distributor Classic Fine Foods, Californian precision fermentation company Perfect Day and Hong Kong-based foodtech accelerator Brinc.

    Also included are greater China-based plant-based pork and dumpling brand Plant Sifu, US whole-cut fermentation-based seafood pioneer Aqua Cultured Foods, Singaporean cultivated seafood startup Umami Meats and Swiss flavor manufacturer Givaudan.

    The climate crisis presents a clear and present danger for Asian countries. The region will feel the brunt of many of the worst tolls of environmental degradation from worsening air pollution to mass climate migration to declining food security. As Figueiras writes in the report’s introduction, “Alternative protein is an important part of the future food toolbox if we are to build a stronger, more resilient regional food system that will face water shortages, land degradation, and more frequent climate-related weather events, amongst many other challenges.”

    Download The APAC Alternative Protein Industry Report 2022 – The Future is Asian now. 


    Lead image courtesy of Green Queen Media.

    The post The Future is Asian: Green Queen Publishes 2022 Edition of Award-Winning APAC Alt Protein Report appeared first on Green Queen.

  • RNZ Pacific

    Activists have protested at Indonesia’s Ternate Police headquarters in North Maluku demanding that the security forces release eight people arrested while commemorating West Papua Independence Day on December 1.

    December 1 marked 61 years since the first raising of West Papua’s symbol of independence, the Morning Star flag.

    Tabloid Jubi reports Anton Trisno of the Indonesian People’s Front for West Papua (FRI-WP) saying the demonstration where the group was arrested was a peaceful one.

    “We expressed our aspirations peacefully. Some ojek (motorcycle taxi) drivers infiltrated the crowd to disperse the protesters. This is a violation to our freedom of speech,” he said.

    Trisno asked the police to immediately release eight of his colleagues.

    “We urge the Ternate police chief to immediately release the eight activists who are still detained. We demand the police release them unconditionally,” he said.

    Different tactic
    Meanwhile, an activist group has reported a different tactic used by the security forces, which it says is concerning.

    “The Papuan People’s Petition Action (PRP) in commemoration of the 61st anniversary of the ‘West Papua Declaration of Independence’ received escort and security unlike usual actions from the Indonesian Security (colonial military),” a statement said.

    “Apart from vehicles such as patrol cars, dalmas, combat tactical vehicles, sniffer dogs, intelligence/bin, bais, and tear gas launchers or other weapons.

    “There is also security in the form of hidden security, such as a [sniper] placed on the balcony of Ramayana Mall and Hotel Sahit Mariat which are near the location or point of action.

    “This certainly shows that there is something planned to actually push back and close the democratic space for the people and resistance movements in the Land of Papua, especially in the city of Sorong.”

    In Port Vila, Vanuatu’s Minister of Climate Change and a long-time supporter of the West Papua people, Ralph Regenvanu, attended the West Papua flag-raising day.

    In line with Vanuatu’s stand in support of West Papua freedom, the Morning Star flag was raised to fly alongside the Vanuatu flag outside the West Papua International Office.

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ. 

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • By Shayal Devi in Suva

    In solidarity with West Papua, the Pacific Conference of Churches (PCC) has called for a boycott of all Indonesian products and programmess by the Indonesian government.

    The Fiji-based PCC said this should be done until Indonesia facilitated a visit by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to investigate alleged human rights abuses in West Papua, which included torture, extrajudicial killings, and systemic police and military violence.

    General secretary Reverend James Bhagwan said the call for a boycott came in response to the lack of political will by the Indonesian government to honour its commitment to the visit, which had been made four years ago.

    “Our Pacific church leaders are deeply concerned that the urge by our Pacific Island states through the Pacific Islands Forum has been ignored,” he said.

    “We are also concerned that Indonesia is using ‘cheque-book diplomacy’ to silence some Pacific states on this issue. Our only option in the face of this to apply our own financial pressure to this cause.

    “We know that the Pacific is a market for Indonesian products and we hope that this mobilisation of consumers will show that Pacific people stand in solidarity with our sisters and brothers of Tanah Papua.”

    On Thursday, the Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre (FWCC) held a flag-raising ceremony to mark 61 years since the Morning Star, the West Papuan national flag, was first raised.

    Women, girls suffered
    FWCC coordinator Shamima Ali said as part of the 16 Days of Activism campaign, FWCC remembered the people of West Papua, particularly women and girls, who suffered due to the increased militarisation of the province by the Indonesian government.

    “We also remember those women, girls, men and children who have died and those who are still suffering from state violence perpetrated on them and the violence and struggle within their own religious, cultural and societal settings,” she said.

    Ali said Pacific islanders should not be quiet about the issue.

    “Fiji has been too silent on the issue of West Papua and the ignorance needs to stop,” she said.

    “Keeping quiet is not the answer when our own people are suffering.”

    Shayal Devi is a Fiji Times reporter. Republished with permission.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • COMMENTARY: By Yamin Kogoya

    On 30 June 2022, the Indonesian Parliament in Jakarta passed legislation to split West Papua into three more pieces.

    The Papuan people’s unifying name for their independence struggle — “West Papua” — is now being shattered by Jakarta’s draconian policies. Under this new legislation, the two existing provinces have been divided into five, which include South Papua, Central Papua, and Highland Papua.

    Indonesia’s Vice-President, Ma’ruf Amin said while addressing an audience at the Special Autonomy Law Change in Jayapura, Papua’s capital, on Tuesday, 29 November 2022, “right now, we are building Papua better”,  reported the Indonesian news agency Antara.

    “Changes to special autonomy are a natural thing and are in the process of the national policy cycle to make things even better,” continued the Vice-President.

    While Jakarta is busy tearing apart West Papua with these deceitful words, Papuans everywhere are called to raise the banned Morning Star flag today to commemorate West Papua’s 61st Independence Day on 1 December 1961, stolen by Jakarta in May 1963.

    The day is significant and historic because it was on 19 October 1961 that the first New Guinea Council, known as Nieuw Guinea Raad, named West Papua as the name of a new modern nation-state — the Papuan Independent State was founded.

    It was before Papua New Guinea (PNG) gained independence in 1975 from Australia.

    Papuans were subjected to all kinds of abuse and violations due to how this island of New Guinea was named and described in colonial literature.

    Foreign reinventions
    Foreign powers continue to dissect West Papua, renaming it, creating new identities, and reinventing new definitions by making it merely an outpost of foreign imperialism in the periphery where abundant food and minerals are extracted and stolen, without penalty or consequence.

    Papuans do not appear to give up their sacred ancestral land without a fight.

    The name “West Papua”, however, remains a burning flame in the hearts of all living beings who yearn for freedom and justice. The name was chosen 61 years ago because of this reason. This is the name of a newborn nation-state.

    After Indonesia invaded West Papua on May 1, 1963, the name West Papua was changed to Irian Jaya. West Papua had been called The Netherlands New Guinea up to the point of the first New Guinea Council in 1961.

    The year 2000 marked another significant period in the history of West Papua. The former Indonesian president, Abdurrahman Wahid — famously known as Gusdur — renamed it from Irian Jaya to Papua, a move that etched a special place in the hearts of Papuans for Gusdur.

    In 2003, not only did West Papua’s name change. But West Papua was split in half — Papua and West Papua. This fragmentation was achieved by Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of the first Indonesian president, Sukarno, the man responsible for 60 years of Papuan bloodshed.

    She violated a provision of the Special Autonomy Law 2001, which was based on the idea that Papua remain a single territory. As prescribed by law, any division would need to be approved by the Papuan provincial legislature and local Papuan cultural assembly.

    Tragic turning point
    They were institutions set up by Jakarta itself to safeguard Papuan people, language, and culture.

    One significant aspect of the first Special Autonomy Law was, any new policy introduced by the central government in relation to changing, adjusting, or creating a new identity of the region (West Papua) must be approved by the Papuan People’s Assembly (MRP). But this has never happened to date.

    The year 2022 marks another tragic turning point in the fate of West Papua. West Papua is being divided again this year under President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, in the same manner that Jakarta did 20 years ago.

    It is common for Jakarta elites to act inconsistently with their own laws when dealing with West Papua. Jakarta violated both the UN Charter and the New York Agreement, which they themselves agreed to and signed.

    For example, chapters 11 (XI), 12 (XII), and 13 (XIII) of the UN Charter governing decolonisation and Papua’s right to self-determination, as specified in the New York Agreement’s Articles 18 (XVII), 19 (XIX), 20 (XX), 21 (XXI), and 22 (XXII) have not been followed. The words, texts and practices all contradict each other — demonstrating possible psychological disturbance — traumatising Papuans by being administered by such a pathological entity.

    The disdain and demeaning behaviour shown by Indonesian governments towards Papuans in West Papua over the past 61 years are unforgivable and stained permanently in the soul of every living being in West Papua and New Guinea island.

    “Right now, we are building Papua better,” declared Indonesia’s Vice-President, a narcissistic utterance from the highest office of the country, and this illustrates Jakarta’s complete disconnect from West Papua.

    Random Morning Star flag-waiving images from West Papua Day 2022
    Morning Star flag-waving images from West Papua Independence Day 2022. Images: Papua Voulken

    What led to this tragic situation?
    West Papua has endured a lot for more than half a century, having been renamed and re-described numerous times by foreign invaders, from “IIha de papo” and “o’ Papuas” to “Isla de Oro”, or “Island of Gold”, to New Guinea, and New Guinea to Netherlands, English and German Papua and New Guinea. From this emerged Papua New Guinea, West Papua and Irian Jaya, and from Irian Jaya to Papua and West Papua.

    As a result of renaming and colonial descriptions of Papuans as unintelligent pygmies, cannibals, and pagan savages; people without value, different foreign colonial intruders were able to enter West Papua and exploit and treat the Papuan people and their land, in accordance with the myth they created based on these names.

    In addition to fostering a racist mindset, this depiction misrepresented reality as it was experienced and understood by Papuans over thousands of years.

    The Jakarta settler colonial government continues to engage with West Papua with these profoundly misconstrued ideas. Hence the total disregard for what Papuans want or feel regarding their fate is a result of colonial renaming and accounts.

    Now the eastern half remains under one name: Papua New Guinea. Jakarta’s settler colonial rulers just created five more settler provinces on the Western side of the island: South Papua Province, Central Papua Province, and Central Highlands Papua Province.

    All these new settler colonial provinces are in the heart of New Guinea. Looking at West Papua’s history, we see so many marks and bruises of abuse and torture on her sacred body. In the future, West Papua is likely to suffer yet another grim fate of more torture with such dishonest words from Indonesia’s Vice-President.

    Another sacred day
    Today, December 1, marks yet another sacred day where we hold West Papua in our hearts and rally to her defence as her enemy marches to cut her into pieces on the settler colonial’s bed of Procrustes.

    Let us remember and give glory to West Papua with the following words:

    West Papua is an ancient and original particle, an atom of light and hope. It is a story about survival, resistance, betrayal, destruction, genocide, and survival against the odds. It is the last frontier where humanity’s greatness and wickedness are tested, where tragedy, aspiration, and hope are revealed. Papua is an innocent sacrificial lamb, a peace broker among the planet’s monsters, but no one knows her story — hidden deep beneath the earth – supporting sacred treaties between savages and warlords. West Papua is the home of the last original magic, the magic of nature. West Papua is the home of our original ancestors, the archaic Autochthons, the spiritual ancestors of our dream-time spiritual warriors — the pioneers of nature — the first voyageur across dangerous seas and land — the first agriculturalist — the most authentic, the original — we are the past and we are the future. West Papua is the original dream that has yet to be realised — a dream in the process of restoration to its original glory.

    This is where West Papua is now. You cut me into pieces millions of times in millions of years, I will rebuild West Papua with these pieces a million times over again.

    Happy West Papua Independence Day!

    Yamin Kogoya is a West Papuan academic who has a Master of Applied Anthropology and Participatory Development from the Australian National University and who contributes to Asia Pacific Report. From the Lani tribe in the Papuan Highlands, he is currently living in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia.

  • Today marks 1 December 1961 when the West Papuan national flag, the Morning Star was first raised and the date has been honoured across the world ever since. The flag was raised by West Papuan legislators who had been promised independence by then-colonial ruler, the Netherlands, but this hope was dashed by Indonesian annexation in 1969. Today marks the 61st anniversary of that first flag-raising. West Papuans raising the flag risk prison sentences of up to 15 years. The following article from Tabloid Jubi newspaper in the Papuan capital Jayapura is part of a five-part series exposing the cruel and inhumane treatment of flag-raisers by Indonesian authorities.


    Seven West Papuan makar — “treason” — convicts who were found guilty of raising the Morning Star flag were released on September 27 this year after completing their prison term of 10 months.

    Until today, Papua activist and treason convict Melvin Yobe still does not know the result of his medical check-up at Dian Harapan Hospital earlier this year on February 16.

    Maksimus Simon Petrus You also doesn’t know what punishment was given to the prison guard who brutally beat him.

    Even more disturbing, however, is the fate of Zode Hilapok. He was unable to stand trial as his health continued to deteriorate due to tuberculosis. Zode Hilapok died while undergoing treatment at Yowari Regional General Hospital in Jayapura Regency on October 22.

    Since detaining Zode Hilapok on December 2, 2021, law enforcement officials at all levels failed to provide adequate health services for his recovery and he was never put on trial.

    Melvin Yobe and his friends when they were released from Abepura Prison on 27 September 2022
    Melvin Yobe and his friends when they were released from Abepura Prison on 27 September 2022. Image: Theo Kelen/Tabloid Jubi

    Violating human rights
    A law faculty lecturer at Cenderawasih University, Melkias Hetharia, says treason charges against Papuan activists violated human rights — namely the right to freedom of speech and expression. He argues the treason law enforced against Melvin Yobe and his seven friends was enacted by the Dutch colonial government to punish coups and revolutions and was based on the experience of the Russian revolution.

    Hetharia told Jubi that the enforcement of the Dutch East Indies’ Criminal Code did not consider the social, cultural and philosophical aspects of the Indonesian nation.

    “The formation of treason articles in the Criminal Code did not consider aspects of human rights, therefore it is oppressive and injures a sense of justice,” Hetharia said.

    He said the term “treason” as regulated in articles 104, 106, 107, 108 and 110 of the Criminal Code had been interpreted very broadly and was not in line with the meaning of aanslag as intended in Dutch, which means “attack”. An attack in that sense was using full force in an attempt to seize power.

    “If the term treason in the articles is interpreted not as aanslag or attack, then the articles on treason are indeed contrary to human rights guaranteed and protected in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia,” he said.

    In fact, Melvin Yobe, Zode Hilapok, and their six friends are not the only Papuan activists who peacefully protested but have been charged with treason.

    An infographic of Papuan activists who were charged with treason 2013-2022
    An infographic of Papuan activists who were charged with treason at the Jayapura District Court, Central Jakarta District Court, and Balikpapan District Court during 2013-2022. Graphic: Leon/Tabloid Jubi

    From 2013 to 2022, at least 44 Papuan activists have been charged with treason. Among them — from Jayapura District Court data — from 2013 to 2022 there were 31 people, while in Balikpapan District Court in 2020 seven people and in the Central Jakarta Court in 2019 six people.

    Treason ‘structural criminalisation’
    Emanuel Gobay, director of the Papua Legal Aid Institute (LBH Papua), who is also the legal counsel for Melvin Yobe and his friends, believes the treason charges against Papuan activists are part of a systematic and structural criminalisation.

    “The majority of those accused of treason are human rights activists and political activists,” Gobay told Jubi.

    Gobay said the Morning Star flag was a cultural symbol of the Papuan people. According to Gobay, these cultural symbols are guaranteed under Papua Special Autonomy Law No, 21/2001.

    Gobay said the raising of the Morning Star by Melvin Yobe and other Papuan activists was part of the demand for the government to resolve Papua’s political problems.

    “They are asking the state to immediately implement the Special Autonomy Law,” said Gobay.

    On that basis, Gobay considered the use of the treason article against Papuan activists as a form of criminalisation. He also emphasised that the raising of the Morning Star flag did not automatically make Papua independent from Indonesia, therefore the element of treason was not fulfilled.

    Apart from the controversy on the use of treason legal articles for Papuan activists, the discriminative treatment received by prisoners of treason cases is also inappropriate, argues Gobay.

    Prisoners treated badly
    Gobay, who often provides legal assistance to Papuan activists suspected or charged with treason, said his clients were often treated badly.

    Zode Hilapok’s health condition was the worst of all, said Gobay. During his detention in Abepura Prison, Hilapok’s health condition deteriorated and he lost weight rapidly.

    Gobay said Abepura Prison was not suitable for detainees with a history of tuberculosis, such as Melvin Yobe and Zode Hilapok.

    “After we surveyed and compared the condition of the prison with the guidelines on handling tuberculosis patients, the prison is not suitable for accommodating prisoners with tuberculosis,” he said.

    Minister of Health Regulation No. 67/2016 on Tuberculosis Patient Treatment Guideline states that the treatment centre for tuberculosis patients must be open and have good air circulation and sunlight.

    Gobay said the regulation also stipulated that local health offices and hospitals provide special units to treat tuberculosis patients.

    “We hope that judges, prosecutors, and hospitals can implement the regulation,” he said.

    This report is supported by Transparency International Indonesia (TII), The European Union and the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) in the Anticorruption Residency programme “Reporting Legal Journalism”. It is the final article in a five-part series in Tabloid Jubi and is republished by Asia Pacific Report with permission.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • The Indonesian Ministry of Defense (MoD) revealed that it has conducted developmental testing of an indigenous air-launched smart munition in a social media post on 17 November. The Smart Bomb Development (SDB) is aimed at the medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) being developed by a local consortium of state-owned and public companies (PTTA […]

    The post Indonesia tests indigenous air launched munition appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • My research focuses on women entrepreneurs in Halmahera, Moluccas, in positioning themselves within the local cultural perspective, and their positive contribution as initiators supporting tourism development. Within a male-dominated social structure, they face challenges running their businesses, but persist in spite of marginalising geographical, economic and cultural conditions. Preliminary data reveals that the patriarchal culture in North Halmahera remain strong but does not eliminate the desire of women entrepreneurs to run their businesses, even though the results are still limited. In addition, they can still position themselves both as entrepreneurs and housewives. Through small businesses initiatives women entrepreneurs contribute to their local community.

    This publication was supported by an ANU Gender Institute grant which provided funds for New Mandala and Connecting Designs to run a series of workshops supporting early career academics investigating issues of gender and sexuality in Southeast Asia to develop their audio-visual research communication skills.

    The post Women entrepreneurs in Halmahera: quiet contributors appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Airbus, Bell, Leonardo and Sikorsky participated in an AMR survey to gauge their perspectives of business opportunities within the Asia-Pacific military rotorcraft market over the next few years. Military rotorcraft sales face several challenges in the Asian Pacific market. Predominantly there is a lack on requirement among potential customers to place large orders that could […]

    The post Budget versus Necessity – How New, How Soon? appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • Citarum River in West Java province is dubbed one of the dirtiest river in the world, and cleaning it up is an almost unmanageable job. The government has to deal with more than 3000 businesses along the river bank, with a large portion of them being multinationals. That excludes the tens of millions of households depending on water from the river. My research fieldwork, conducted in West Java from March to May 2022, attempted to verify what the authorities have applied to revitalise the river, and their types of relations. Apparently, massive financial and technological resources have been poured into the Citarum Watershed, including from overseas. Citarum is one of the most strategic rivers in Indonesia, and historically attractive for investors and foreign aid donors.

    Cikapundung River in Bandung in March 2022. Image supplied by the author.

    The armed forces, police, lawyers, and private businesses have been tasked with preventing the river from excessive pollution, and the mobilisation of scrutinising powers have created a situation where the river clean-up is politically motivated. Practices of subcontracting government aid projects are evident, as well as alleged collusion between district commandants and factory owners.

    There are contending concepts of Citarum River between policy planners, the actors and their respective roles in the execution, and on the reframing of pollution management politics in the Citarum Watershed. My fieldwork followed Citarum sub-streams along Majalaya, Bojongsoang, Dayeuhkolot, City of Bandung, and City of Bekasi. The pollution level is more precarious mid-stream and downstream. As Citarum spans 297 kilometres, only very selective site visits and interviews were conducted.

    A protest banner in a local community opposing the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, which they claim has under compensated them for land transfer contracts for drinking water projects in Bekasi. March 2022. Image supplied by the author.

    After President Joko Widodo issued Presidential Regulation no. 15 in 2018 on Acceleration of Pollution and Damage Control on Citarum Watershed, Special Task Force (Satgas PPK Citarum) was founded. Currently, there are 23 sectors of Citarum watershed, with each sector having a commandant, often called Dansektor (acronym of Komandan Sektor or Sectoral Commandant) from Military Command III Siliwangi in West Java. In an interview with one of the chiefs of the Task force in South Bandung, I was told there are different opinions about territorial divisions of Citarum for more effective execution. The government’s action plan sanctions greater discretion and observation of ecological features of the watershed. Nevertheless, the plan has repeatedly failed to come into force. This was due to lack of facilitators, lack of state expenditure, and relatively low bargaining power with business owners. Moreover, my source said that the original Presidential Regulation was legislated in a rush without proper academic reviews.

    Military perspectives divided Citarum based on military territorial operations. From originally just a few, it has expanded into 23 areas, regardless of each of the sub-streams’ ecological function. River clean-up activities include regular garbage cleaning in the river with communities and NGOs, mainly based in “kelurahan” (villages). The military and police officers also inspect the waste management systems regularly, often with surprise visits. However, my observations show that one command post was located just outside the gate of a textile factory in Dayeuhkolot, raising a question about neutrality.

    The right to water: governing private and communal provision in rural Indonesia

    Three cases illustrate that the role of private providers and communal works, or a combination of the two, are the norm among poor, rural communities

    About IDR 200 billion (approx. AUD 19,815,000) has been allocated for the armed forces from the budget of The Ministry of Public Works and Housing. A local environment activist commented that the military role was exaggerated. He implied that long before the military came, local environmental champions have been campaigning and working on the pollution issues. Moreover, he claimed that dispatching the army just meant more cost for the state instead of allocating the funds for civilian initiatives. However, according to a foreign project consultant, inviting the army into river rehabilitation program is one of the best decisions. It had not been done prior to 2018 and according to him, the army could expedite the clean-up to just a few years.

    At UNFCCC COP 26 Summit in Glasgow, UK, Governor of West Java, Ridwan Kamil presented the progress of the rehabilitation of the Citarum, claiming  that the  the river has progressed from a state of “heavily polluted” to “lightly polluted”. One of the objectives of this presentation was to attract additional investment in Indonesia by repairing its environmental image on the global stage.

    Polluted water flowing through a weir in the Bekasi River, March, 2022. Image supplied by the author.

    Industrial waste management in Indonesia can be political. It is toxic and overflowing. In the case of Citarum particularly, it is also become exorbitantly expensive. Not only state expenditure, but also programs from overseas, such as the Asian Development Bank’s Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (ICWRMIP),attend to the pollution. Savings and Loans Cooperatives (KSP) in West Java also provide loans for wastewater management. However, the costs are not only generated from neutralising heavy metal hazard from the river, but also in cleaning up the costly bureaucracy and execution of the policy.

    Andir Retention Pool prevents flooding in Andir, Bandung, by modifying water flow in Citarum River. May 2022. Image supplied by the author.

    Fixing the “pollution” of resource misallocation begins with the planning process. Currently there are two key Citarum plan documents, one from National Planning Agency (Bappenas) and one from the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. Despite the existence of the Presidential regulation, the Citarum task force is not directly under the supervision of the president, so funding disbursement and power delegation become entwined. Operational divisions of  the river should consider its natural segmentation and transboundary coordination among regions. Civil society initiatives and lawsuits, including from those who were a part of “anti-wastewater coalition,” are often ignored. Moreover, to keep the contamination level at bay by 2025 as planned, the government need to be extra vigilant in its execution. Another ambitious target is that by 2025, Citarum water can be filtered into drinking water supply. Yet, if current patterns continue and they are granted massive investment and technical assistance for such a short period of completion, the exercise will be prone to low accountability and resource capture.

    All action plans have their limits. River pollution is not only a result of overwhelming waste, but a problem of resource capture across all levels of governance. However, in decentralised Indonesia, the integration of a Citarum clean-up campaign faces even broader political and administration challenges.

    The post Can Indonesia clean up political pollution along the Citarum River? appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Earthquakes, much like lightning, can strike the same place again. This point was tragically driven home tragically in Cianjur in West Java struck by a deadly earthquake on 21 November 2022. The same area was heavily impacted by an earthquake on 28 March 1879. The same immediate region in West Java was again struck on 14 January 1900, impacting the nearby town of Sukabumi. Therefore, knowledge of where an earthquake has occurred in the past, and how large it was, is crucial. This forms a valuable input into modern seismic hazard maps. These help to determine how buildings and other critical infrastructure need to be safely constructed in a particular region. Reliable records of past earthquakes for the purpose of seismic hazard can be acquired from instrumental records. But on a geological time scale, the length of the instrumental record is short (~120yrs). It is, therefore, supplemented by evidence of earthquakes that occurred before instruments were available that are preserved in the geological and/or written historical record.

    Damage in the Chinese district of Cianjur as a result of an earthquake on 28 March, 1879. (CCL in the Southeast Asian and Carribean Images Collection of KITLV)

    Such inputs are vital to understand seismic hazard in Indonesia. It is among the world’s most densely populated countries and is also very tectonically active. This makes it particularly vulnerable to frequent earthquakes that can have major socioeconomic impacts, as we saw in Palu on Sulawesi in 2018. While the instrumental and geological record has been and continues to be investigated in Indonesia, little work has been done to systematically re-evaluate historical earthquakes in the archipelago for close to three decades. This includes locating and analysing written descriptions of shaking effects during earthquakes.

    For these reasons, my co-authors Phil Cummins, Aron Meltzner, and I explored the historical earthquake catalogue for Indonesia in our recent study published in the Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America. We called our database the Gempa Nusantara database (also available via GitHub) which is collection of felt shaking intensity, or macroseismic intensity, observations for 1,200 earthquakes in the region of Indonesia spanning four centuries from 1546 until 1950. The name of our database which means “Earthquakes of the Indonesian Archipelago” in Bahasa Indonesia is derived from a combination of the Indonesian words for “earthquake” (gempa bumi, shortened colloquially to gempa) and “archipelago” (nusantara).

    Figure 1: Colour filled circles display each of the 7380 macroseismic observations in Gempa Nusantara with colour bar indicating severity of shaking (inset: location of Indonesia in red).

    In our study, we sought primary documentary sources from the colonial period in Indonesia. This was driven by the fact that many modern catalogues of historical earthquakes for Indonesia can be affected by inconsistencies that stem from a reliance on unvetted sources and/or the unwitting repetition of errors in earlier catalogues. In fact, many of these catalogues are by-products of a multi-lingual historical earthquake catalogue compiled by a German earth scientist, Arthur Wichmann. His work covers two periods: prior to 1857 and from 1858 to 1877. But these modern catalogues often fail to consult the primary sources used by Arthur Wichmann, nor do they add new information from unused primary sources such as historical newspapers.

    The documental material we examined included those available to Arthur Wichmann such as colonial Dutch journals and official reports of post-earthquake damage reconnaissance. We added to this collection, new information gathered from other previously unused sources such as colonial Dutch newspapers and transcriptions of official correspondence by the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC (also known as the Dutch East India Company). Like the Wichmann compilation, and all modern catalogues derived from it, the sources for our study are largely derived from colonial sources, with one exception. Information on earthquakes from such sources diminish greatly during World War II, when Indonesia was occupied by Japan. However, we were able to fill this gap by searching archives of local Indonesian newspapers from this period.

    To classify the severity of shaking during earthquakes in the absence of instruments we use an intensity scale called the European Macroseismic Scale (EMS-98). This allowed us to convert the descriptive observations we collected to numeric data. The EMS-98 scale is similar to the relatively well-known Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) scale. The different colour-coded circles displayed in Figure 1 indicate weak (cool colours) versus strong (warm colours) shaking for all 1,200 earthquakes in the Gempa Nusantara database. Very damaging shaking is displayed as darkening reds.

    Given that Indonesia is prone to very large magnitude earthquakes and that it covers a region comparable to the east-west extent of Europe, it was surprising that reports of damaging shaking were few, accounting for barely 2% of all 7,380 macroseismic observations. Yet a handful of extreme observations exist such as for an earthquake in Ambon in 1898 which literally threw people several metres and even shifted heavy cannons. In other cases, the original materials we sought also helped bring about clarity. For example, an inaccurate translation from German to Dutch by Arthur Wichmann misled his contemporaries that an earthquake in 1820 in the Flores Sea made cannons “bounce” upon their gun carriages at Bulukumbu in southern Sulawesi. Material we found showed this to be factually incorrect. While the earthquake shook the cannons in questions, it did not produce as violent vertical shaking as was previously assumed.

    Figure 2: Chronological differences in the completeness of macroseismic data for Indonesia.

    The historical record is known to be influenced by geopolitics and socioeconomics. Given that our source materials were largely in European languages, and almost entirely from the Dutch, it was no surprise that the chronologically longest written records of felt earthquakes are from regions where the VOC established trading posts, that is, in western Java and in the Maluku region as can be seen in Figure 2. Observations from these regions increase after political control shifted into the hands of the Dutch. This contrasts with the written record of felt earthquakes in regions known to be very seismically active such as Papua which remained outside the Dutch sphere of interest until the early 20th century.

    In the Gempa Nusantara database, we documented 1,200 earthquakes. This is a significantly greater number in comparison to those known previously. In three rare cases, we could discriminate the causative fault lines that were responsible for historical earthquakes in Sulawesi in 1909 and on Sumatra in 1892 and 1933. We also uncovered evidence for an undated tsunami in the region of Palu Bay in the 1800s. A particularly unexpected find was the discovery of severe liquefaction in rice fields near Batukarang on Sumatra in 1936. These press accounts from Sumatra were reminiscent in both description and spatial extent of the catastrophic liquefaction observed in the Palu region in 2018. We were also able to show for the first time that paleoseismic markers examined by paleoseismologists in coral microatolls along Sumatra’s west coast (Figure 3) preserve only the largest megathrust earthquakes. Smaller events known only from the historical record can often be hidden depending on the location of their source zones or are overwritten by larger climate signals also preserved in coral microatolls.

    Figure 3: Locations of historical earthquakes ruptures on the Sunda Megathrust and on the Sumatran Fault (SFZ) along with coral microatolls (white and coloured circles) examined in the past by paleoseismologists.

    Crucially, our dataset of numerical observations allowed a simple evaluation of the latest version of the 2017 Indonesian seismic hazard map (Figure 4). Using observations from out dataset, we calculated how often a certain level of intensity occurred in any given year in 12 Indonesian cities. This was compared with independent models from the 2017 Indonesian seismic hazard map to predict the same information for those same cities. The correspondence between observations and the hazard curves was good for some cities such as Surabaya. But for others such as Yogyakarta, it appears that damaging shaking occurs more frequently than the modern hazard curves suggest. We speculate a number of reasons for this ranging from, but not limited to, yet-to-be mapped faults and to the poorly known rates at which mapped faults move. It is not uncommon for future seismic hazard maps to be updated as newer, more accurate data becomes available and we believe the Indonesian hazard map will be the same.

    Figure 4: The 2017 National Seismic Hazard map for Indonesia.

    The well-known naturalist James Hutton stated, “that from what has actually been, we have data for concluding with regard to that which is to happen hereafter.” This applies broadly to research in general but also to the collection, curation and collation of written documentary materials pertinent to the study of historical earthquakes. Much work remains to be done on the historical earthquake catalogue for Indonesia that taps non-European sources, both local and regional, on the lines of recent historical investigations of Indonesian manuscripts. Our work on Gempa Nusantara demonstrates how a carefully vetted and well-documented historical record not only complements studies of seismic hazard but is itself an important standalone tool for the study of earthquake hazards. We hope it will ignite further research and policy conversations about seismic hazard in Indonesia.

    The post Bridging historical archives and earthquake hazard studies in Indonesia appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Indonesia has areas devoted to production purposes, one of which is in Semarang Regency, Central Java. This special zone consists of a glut of mostly garment factories. The majority of workers in this production are women, because this work is considered to require the rigor that is identified with women. Engels’ “The Condition of the Working Class in England” is still relevant in reflecting the conditions of this labor, by extension drawing attention to the well-being of women workers as important figures in the process of capital production.

    Amid the rush of women leaving work one evening, I encountered two women waiting for public transport. Atun (34), is a vocational high school graduate who has been a garment worker for the past three years. She has three children, two from her first marriage, and one from her second marriage. The eldest is in the 6th grade of elementary school, the second child is three years old, and the youngest is one. Her husband now works as a hotel employee and sometimes moonlights as an electronic device technician and driver. During her work, Atun entrusts her children to her mother.

    Atun has to work an eight hour shift each day because of their urgent economic conditions. She finds the work environment very sensitive. Even getting caught a little off guard can bring problems because colleagues are always looking for mistakes. There, fellow workers are perceived as rivals, not as a group of equals.

    After work, there is no rest; there is housework to be done. Even then, it doesn’t end there. In order to supplement her income, she took sells food to her colleagues in the factory. So, after all the housework is done, she cooks meals for sale the next day. Usually, she takes orders for food and drinks in between breaks, so that she doesn’t have to hawk her wares like other vendors. On top of this, she takes a primary role in caring for her son at night, giving up her sleeping hours when he is restless.

    Meanwhile, Choli (22) has had a slightly different experience. She works in a factory not far from Atun’s factory. She has an undergraduate degree and is classified as a new worker because she has only been there a few months. In position, she is not much different from Atun. But she is not married and is trying a build working career. Like Atun, she also perceives a sensitive work environment. There are no friends at work.

    Often Choli has to work beyond the allotted time. In the applicable regulations, she should only work eight hours a day. In fact, she often works nine to ten hours and does not count overtime. She often cries with tiredness. The factory requires staff to arrive 15 minutes before business hours with penalties for arriving late and no paid overtime. This is her factory’s way of extending the service life of a day.

    Sometimes, her break time is inconsistent. All is adapted to the production process. Often the break-times are reduced and the day extended, making working hours much longer.

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    Neither Atun nor Choli can do anything other than be grateful. This is better than not working at all, especially in a culture that is thick with patriarchal practices, being able to work is something to be grateful for. This is what makes them accept every burdensome aspect of their work. Furthermore, it also leaves them powerless when they are admonished by their superiors for trivial reasons.

    The absence of associations among workers exacerbates the problem. Instead of being able to unite on the basis of a shared burden, they are suspicious of and competitive with each other. According to Choli and Atun, workers prefer to curry favor with superiors, even if it means knocking down fellow workers. Labor unions are never a point of discussion.

    Their only relief is to be able go home after work and immediately be free from that torturous job. But ironically, the house that should offer them rest actually increases their workload, as Atun experiences. There is no real freedom for a woman like herself, and her situation makes the factory and its organs of power stronger. Increased factory profits is the priority, and workers’ rights to rest, set hours and clear tasks are not protected.

    The conditions of the workers are not at all a priority for these businesses. The conditions of women workers should be a serious concern for the government and human rights activists. Herstory has shown them vulnerable to being used and abused for the benefit of production.

    The post The other side of Indonesian women workers appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Asia Pacific Report

    The solidarity group West Papua Action Aotearoa has criticised New Zealand for not “being stronger” over growing global concern about Indonesian human rights violations in West Papua, and contrasted this with Vanuatu’s leadership.

    The group was reacting to the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review into Indonesia report in Geneva last week.

    “Eight countries raised issues about human rights in West Papua and it is good to see our government among them,” said Catherine Delahunty, spokesperson for West Papua Action Aotearoa, in a statement.

    New Zealand called for Indonesia to uphold, respect and promote human rights obligations in West Papua, but did not call for Indonesia to immediately allow the visit of the UN Commissioner for Human Rights.

    Of the eight countries raising the issues only Vanuatu and the Marshall Islands made direct statements calling for the visit and Australia “made a better statement” than New Zealand, calling for Indonesia to “ensure access, including by credible, independent observers”.

    “In the light of recent events including the concerns around the death of Filep Karma and the attacks on demonstrators in West Papua by the state, just calling for human rights to be upheld is clearly not enough,” said Delahunty.

    “We need our government to speak out strongly in all UN Forums in support of the UN Commissioner of Human Rights proposed visit to West Papua.

    “The Pacific Island Forum (PIF) has supported this call and our Foreign Minister has told our group that she supports it. However the UNHR review was an opportunity missed.

    “Our foreign policy position should support the position of Vanuatu whose clear, sustained challenge to the violent colonisation of West Papua by Indonesia is admirable.

    “Human rights will never be upheld when a regime occupies a country against the will of the people, and other Pacific countries need to demand better, starting with greater transparency over human rights violations, opening the borders to the UN High Commissioner and all international journalists.”

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Green Rebel's new dairy-free products
    2 Mins Read

    Following the first-ever dairy-free festival in Jakarta, Indonesia-based Green Rebel Foods has launched into the plant-based dairy category.

    Green Rebel is a leading producer of plant-based protein across Southeast Asia. Its new category launch, dubbed Creamy Crew, which includes cheese, sauces, and dressings, builds on its continuing innovation in the plant-based sector.

    The new range is available now through the company’s website and select partners, and the company says it will begin shipping across other Asian markets early next year. The inaugural products in the dairy-free range include egg-free mayonnaise, a caesar-style dressing, and cheddar-style block cheese.

    Plant-based alternatives for Asian communities

    “While dairy and dairy products are not a traditional part of Asian cuisine, it is not uncommon for these products to be found and eaten in many Asian households due to globalisation and global trade,” Max Mandias, Co-Founder and Chief Innovation Officer of Green Rebel Foods, said in a statement. “We at Green Rebel Foods have a vision of creating plant-based alternatives that suit Asian communities around the world, and this category, Creamy Crew, is a continuation of that promise.”

    Green Rebel co-founders Max Mandias and Helga Angelina
    Green Rebel co-founders Max Mandias and Helga Angelina

    The demand for dairy-free options in Asia is increasing as the prevalence of lactose intolerance is extremely high; more than 90 percent of Asian populations can’t tolerate dairy. A recent survey from Rakuten Insight found that plant-based milk is the leading plant-based category in Indonesia.

    Dairy 2.0

    Unlike other parts of the world where younger generations are embracing the alternatives, Indonesia’s largest demographic is the 40-54-year-old segment, driven in large part by concerns over diabetes as well as lactose intolerance.

    Green Rebel Cheese
    Green Rebel debuts cheddar-style blocks | Courtesy

    Like meat, conventional dairy is also a key contributor to climate change, with livestock responsible for about 60 percent of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions.

    Green Rebel says its new dairy-free products contain less fat than the conventional and lower in calories.

    “Through Creamy Crew, we continue to innovate to introduce plant-based products that are healthy and delicious,” Mandias said, helping consumers to enjoy their favorite variety of dishes even without milk and eggs.”


    Lead image courtesy Green Rebel.

    The post Indonesia’s Green Rebel Launches Into Plant-Based Dairy Category appeared first on Green Queen.

    This post was originally published on Green Queen.

  • Indonesia’s PT Dahana has in early November signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Edge Group subsidiary Lahab Defence Systems for a possible joint venture in the construction of a TNT plant at the Dahana Energetic Material Center (EMC) area in Subang. The MoU also calls for co-operation in the production of several types of […]

    The post Indonesia and UAE signs deal to boost explosive production appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • Indonesia’s PT Republik Armamen recently debuted its new IFAR22 shoulder-fired assault rifle at Indo Defence. The IFAR, Indonesian Future Assault Rifle, is Bullpup configuration in 5.56×45 NATO calibre. The Bullpup features the receiver and magazine to the rear of the trigger. This approach allows for a longer barrel without an increase in the overall length […]

    The post Indonesia’s Future Assault Rifle? appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • Restoring religious and cultural complexity to the study of Southeast Asian Islam

    In recent decades, scholarship on Southeast Asian Islam – as with Islam elsewhere – has become dominated by the fields of politics, international relations or security studies. These studies often characterise faith as something delineated, measurable and susceptible to state-directed change. Much of these analyses overlook the subtle variations in Islamic life, and the disjunctions between formal orthodoxy and everyday religious experience. How Muslims comprehend and express their faith ranges widely, crosses typological boundaries, and confounds many of the accepted categories applied to Islam.

    Our speaker Greg Fealy is emeritus professor in the Department of Political and Social Change. He specialises in the study of Islamic politics and history, primarily in Indonesia, but also other Muslim-majority regions in Southeast Asia.

    Hosted by the ANU Indonesia Institute, this annual lecture series honours both Tony and Yohanni’s enduring legacy at ANU, focussing on humanities studies across Nusantara and the Malay and Islamic worlds, as well as the examination of Austronesian identity.

    Read the lecture below:

    It is a privilege to be invited to give this inaugural address in honour of Tony and Yohanni Johns.  In the long and distinguished history of Southeast Asian studies at ANU, no other couple have made such a sustained and substantial contribution.  For more than three decades, Tony and Yohanni were the bedrock upon which studies of the region, and especially Indonesia, rested.  Over the next 40 minutes, I will be talking mainly about Tony’s remarkable academic achievements, because I have worked more closely with him than with Yohanni. But this endowment honours the work of both Yohanni and Tony, and they have indeed had an extraordinary and mutually supportive partnership.  Both shared in and contributed to the successes of the other and, when needed, they provided candid counsel to each other. The bond between them has been indissoluble and no account of the rise of Asian studies at ANU is complete without the story of Tony and Yohanni.  Having said that, I will be spending less time discussing Yohanni than Tony and for that, I apologise, Yohanni.  Hopefully this imbalance will be redressed in a later annual Johns’ lecture.

    My talk is divided into three sections: first, I will outline the careers of Tony and Yohanni; second, I will examine in more detail Tony’s scholarship and teaching; and third, I will turn to the thematic part of my talk in which I will address the topic of “Restoring Religious and Cultural Complexity to the Study of Southeast Asian Islam”.

    Tony and Yohanni’s Careers

    Tony was born in England in 1928 and Yohanni a year later in the province of West Sumatra, IndonesiaIn Tony’s childhood he had come to know something of Islam by reading books such as T. E. Lawrence’s The Seven Pillars of Wisdom that he found in his grandfather’s library. He was conscripted into the British army in 1946 and sent to Singapore and Malaya the following year.  There he became bewitched with the Malay world and language, as well as with the rich Muslim life that he observed around him: the daily devotions, the design and function of the mosques, the role of the imam.  He later wrote:

    A seed of understanding was sown when Malay friends in 1949 invited me to be present at the congregational prayer of the Idul Adha in the Abu Bakr mosque in Johor Baru.  For half an hour before the formal prayer began, I listened to the takbir, the congregational chanting of the phrase and prayer Allahu Akbar.  There was rhythm, movement, exultation in their voices that rolled like the swell of the sea.  It stayed in my mind and haunted my memory.  It was an introduction to the resonances of Arabic as a liturgical language.

    After concluding military service, Tony returned to England and studied classical Malay language, culture and literature at the School of Oriental and Asian Studies in London, eventually graduating with a PhD.  He yearned to return to Southeast Asia and got his chance in 1954 when the Ford Foundation employed him as an English-language teacher in Indonesia. He was very quickly swept up in the vibrancy of the country.  After the staidness of Malaya, he found Indonesia, to use his own words, ‘a mind-blowing experience!’  He was fascinated with the swirl of revolutionary fervour within the newly independent nation.  He listened to the soaring rhetoric of Sukarno and beheld the clamorous campaigning of the diverse array of politicians and parties contesting elections in the mid-1950s. He devoured the works of contemporary authors is they wrote of their hopes or despair about their nation’s direction.  A gifted musician himself, he also took in the diverse palette of music and arts that surrounded him, including learning to sing Javanese music.  After years of studying classical Malay texts from centuries past, he now found himself immersed in something immediate and brimming with passion – as he later wrote, he had found ‘something to relate to from the heart’.  Most of all he found that Indonesia presented a ‘gateway to the world of Islam’, with a far greater range of Muslim expression than he had encountered in Malaya.

    It was also in West Sumatra, Indonesia, where Tony met and fell in love with Yohanni, a young in-service trainer in the Ford Foundation project in early 1955.  As their romance blossomed a large obstacle presented itself: she was from a strict Muslim family and he was a devout Catholic.  Interfaith marriages were (and indeed still are) frowned upon in Indonesia and often implacably rejected by families.  But Tony and Yohanni were not deterred and, in an early display of their combined resolve and resourcefulness, they were eventually married in Singapore in 1956.  They recently celebrated their 66th wedding anniversary.  They represent a salutory example of how marriages across faiths can flourish, with the religiosity of each partner accepted and respected in a relationship underpinned by mutual love.

    In 1958, Tony was appointed to what was then known as Canberra University College, soon to become ANU, to teach Malay and Indonesian studies.  The initial years of this Indonesian program were funded by the Indonesian government as part of a ‘reverse Colombo Plan’ for Australian students.  Tony soon put together a team which would make ANU one of the leading centres for studying Indonesian.  He recruited Soebardi and later Supomo from Indonesia, who would become dear colleagues, and employed many other Indonesians in the program in the ensuing years.

    Yohanni, herself a skilled linguist and experienced teacher, became a tutor in 1961 and a few years later was appointed lecturer.  Over the next three decades, she became a central figure in the Indonesian program.  She wrote two very popular textbooks: Bahasa Indonesia: Introduction to Indonesian Language and Culture, volumes one and two, which became pretty much standard texts for secondary and tertiary students (including me!) across Australia. The books were reprinted many times and used in the Netherlands and the United States, and probably many other countries as well.  In the following years, Yohanni’s teaching left an indelible impression on the many hundreds of students who passed through ANU’s Indonesian program, not to mention the thousands of people across numerous countries who learned Indonesian through her textbooks.

    Tony was promoted to professor in 1963 and served several terms as dean of the then Faculty of Oriental Studies (later to be the Faculty of Asian Studies).  The mid-1960s were watershed years for Tony, as he shifted the focus of his research more intently to Arabic and Islamic disciplines.  He took study leave in Egypt and various other parts of the Middle East, which initially he found deeply challenging.  He felt his Arabic was inadequate and it took intensive study for him to begin to use the kinds of texts that he regarded as essential to the next phase of his academic life.  His concentration on Arabic met with disapproval from some of his Southeast Asianist colleagues, who feared he would move away from the study of the region.  But in fact, his reason for becoming an Arabist was to better understand Indonesian Islam.  Deeper knowledge of Indonesian scholarship could only be gained by gaining first-hand access to the great texts and disciplines that Indonesian Islamic scholars themselves used, and this required high-level Arabic competency.

    In the late 1960s, Tony began teaching Arabic at ANU.  He had a vision that Arabic should be located within Southeast Asian studies, a unique initiative that would, in later years, produce a string of excellent scholars, such as Tony Street, now Reader at Cambridge University, Fr Laurie Fitzgerald, who taught at ANU and The Australian Catholic University, Peter Riddell, who recently retired as professor at the Melbourne School of Theology, and Mike Laffan, who is professor of history at Princeton University.  Sadly, this novel integration of Southeast Asian, Arabic and Islamic Studies came to an end a little over 20 years ago and no similar program exists now, to my knowledge, outside of Southeast Asia. Tony retired in 1993 after 35 years of service to ANU; Yohanni retired as a senior lecturer two years later.

    Tony’s Scholarship and Teaching

    Tony’s scholarly output has been immense and I am pleased to note that it is still growing!  By my reckoning, he has published 78 articles in scholarly journals, 47 book chapters, 19 reviews and 10 books, and that is without mentioning his many entries in major reference works, such as his seven articles in Brill’s monumental Encyclopedia of Islam – a signal honour to be invited to write multiple contributions.

    The broad arc of Tony’s work is as follows: he began in Southeast Asia studying Sufi Malay-language texts, then graduated to the study of the teachers of Indonesian Islamic scholars in the Middle East and the Arabic language foundational texts that they used, and ended with the study of the Qur’an.  Within this arc, the scope of his work was remarkable, including translations and commentaries on classical Malay Islamic texts, translations of modern Indonesian literature, descriptions and analysis of Islamic mysticism, Qur’anic exegesis, Islamic theology and comparative theology, accounts of Australia’s Muslim community, interfaith relations, historical accounts of Islam’s coming to and influence upon Southeast Asia, and studies of prophets present in Islamic, Christian and Jewish scripture.  It is this later work on the prophets of which Tony is most proud.  Across these topics, Tony was capable of writing on highly specialised, narrow and sometimes obscure texts or issues, producing findings that were accessible to a small expert audience.  But he was equally capable of addressing big questions in the field and engaging in rigorous debate with other eminent scholars.

    It is in his articles in scholarly journal articles, rather than in his books, where much of Tony’s finest work is to be found.  Many of these are the leading journals in their fields, such as: the Journal of Islamic Studies, the Journal of Asian Studies, the Journal of Qur’anic Studies, Archipel, the Journal of Southeast Asian History, the Review of Middle Eastern Studies and Hamdard Islamicus.  He even published pieces in the Australian literary journals Meanjin Quarterly and Quadrant, which indicated his desire to reach a much broader audience.

    An example of Tony’s tackling of big issues was his article challenging the accepted view that it had been traders who were primarily responsible for the spread of Islam in Southeast Asia.  He did not dispute that merchants had played a role but he argued that the deeper penetration of Islam was due to learned men, mystics and Islamic scholars, rather than traders.  This was later often referred to as the Drewes-Johns debate, a reference to the Dutch Indologist, DWJ Drewes.  Tony later substantially revised his opinion on this but nonetheless it was a substantial contribution to scholarly debate.

    What of the essence of Tony’s writings?  What hallmarks of his scholarship might we find within them? He recently wrote that ‘his concerns throughout his career were, and always have been, language, character and human responses to crises – of pain, joy and hope.’  So it is at once technical – to have a high command of the necessary languages to undertake this work – but also quintessentially human-focused.  Tony was ultimately concerned about people.  Linguistic, literary and historical skills were all means of gaining insight into the lives and motivations of individuals or communities.  And for him, Arabic was a sub-text behind vernacular writings showing how faith was understood.  Tony was always talking about layers; the task of the scholar was to explore what these layers contained.  The outward, superficial layer was perhaps at best a small part of the story.  One had to have the linguistic and disciplinary skills plus the imagination to delve further.  This subtle, sensitive exploration of sources and human feelings was present in all of Tony’s teaching and his writings.

    He brought a similar sensibility to his teaching. In classes he was always urging students to feel within themselves the rhythm of Qur’anic phrases or feel the sounds of Indonesian or Arabic words.  He urged memorisation of at least some verses of the Qur’an because that way students could experience the words unfettered by the printed page.  There was nothing detached or mechanical about this method; one had to embrace the language and its culture wholeheartedly.  One also had to be precise and to show full respect to the original text, fully understanding words and how their meaning might change within sentences and different contexts.

    In an Introduction to a forthcoming volume, Tony has written that his scholarly journey has been ‘as much one of unlearning as learning’.  This typifies his humility and constant introspection.  In his later work, he is frequently at pains to reflect back upon his earlier writings, diligently noting where there may have been errors in fact or interpretation. This sense of fallibility and striving for improvement is a feature of his scholarship.  I now want to turn to the thematic part of this address.

    Restoring Religious and Cultural Complexity to the Study of Southeast Asian Islam

     Over the past 20-30 years, we have seen a change in the scholarly and policy discourse on Islam.  Whereas once this field gave prominence to scholars of religion and its culture and history, now social scientists, particularly political scientists and experts in international relations and security studies have come to dominate.  This is especially the case since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC in Sept 2001 – the 911 attacks.  With this catastrophic event, Islam suddenly leapt to being a paramount issue for governments, especially Western governments, and also, to some extent, the public.  There was urgent demand for expertise to help states and the public comprehend what had happened and what could be done to reduce the threat of further attacks.  Very soon, this discourse came to crystalise around what was often termed the ‘Islam problem’, that Islam contained within it radical tendencies that needed to be denounced, repressed or even expunged.  This became part of a broader discussion about Islam’s nature which was often cast in essentialising terms.   You will be very familiar with some of these: that Islam was ‘a religion of peace’, that Muslims were fundamentally irenic, that radicalism sprang from a misunderstanding or ‘deliberate distortion of Islam’s true teachings’.  And so the policy priorities that flowed from this were based on a need to identify who or what represented ‘true’ Islam, and how could these been helped, while, at the same time, identifying the deviant radicals.  Such policies were seen as not only preventing horrific terrorism but also restoring Islam to a benign and pristine form.  Counter-terrorism and anti-radicalisation programs were rolled out and projects to foster moderate, tolerant, pro-Western views were initiated.

    Relatively few scholars involved in these policy processes were experts in religion per se, let alone Islam. Instead, it was political scientists, IR experts and security studies specialists who held sway, both in shaping public debate and in informing governments of policy options.  These social scientists brought very specific views and indeed assumptions to their work on religion.  They saw it as a distinct, generalisable component of social and political analysis; religion was something that stood apart from other factors, such as history, the economy and culture.  It was possible to understand Islam by itself, shorn of its local particularities and variations.  Especially for quantitative scholars, Islam was seen as something objectively measurable through surveys and big data sets.  Such approaches and analyses could produce universal theories and broadly applicable templates for action. They could measure the presence of radical or moderate attitudes and pinpoint opportunities for programmatic intervention.  Perhaps predictably, instant experts and think tanks and university centres quickly emerged that readily joined in the efforts to ‘fix’ Islam.

    Elizabeth Shakman Hurd in her excellent book Beyond Religious Freedom called the phenomenon ‘The Religious Reform Project’.  This referred to the efforts of Western governments to intervene in Islamic communities in ‘at risk’ nations in order to overcome Islam’s problems.  In fact, what was proposed was extensive state engineering of religious attitudes.  Islam became the object of government intervention, not just by Western governments, but very often by governments of Muslim-majority nations, many of which brought their own political and social agendas to the combatting radicalism and promoting moderation.  Few institutions better epitomised this thinking than the Tony Blair Foundation in Britain.  Blair held forth frequently about the ‘two faces of Islam’: the bad and the good. Let me quote:

    There are two faces of faith in our world today.  One is seen not just in acts of religious extremism but also in the desire of religious people to wear their faith as a badge of identity in opposition to those who are different.  The other face is defined by extraordinary acts of sacrifice and compassion – for example in caring for the sick, disabled or destitute.  All over the world this battle between the two faces of faith is being played out.

    Thus, all good resided on one side and all bad on another.  His foundation committed itself to repressing the bad and encouraging the good. It was generously funded and provided a high-profile, post-prime ministerial platform for Blair’s international activism.  The Blair Foundation is one of dozens of such institutions that seeks nothing less than to transform religion.  Hurd notes this Religious Reform agenda has almost replaced the secularist project: religion is no longer seen as a private, internal matter for communities; it is now essential to improving life in the public sphere.  In short, religion is an agent of public good.

    So, what is problem with this model?  Could one not argue that it is commendable to assist Muslims in combatting militancy within their faith and promoting tolerance and peace? Would this not help to bring security and harmony to the world as well as to Muslim communities?  Well, the answer to these questions is that these Religious Reform agendas are far less successful than claimed and indeed may often be counter-productive.

    First of all, the problem with religious interventions is the sheer shallowness of analysis and the failure to explore the assumptions that lie within.  To begin with, the social science assumption that religion is distinct, is deeply flawed.  Religion is not easily made a separate variable of analysis because it is inextricably linked to a range of other factors and cannot be easily disaggregated.  Religious Reform agendas actually carry secularist assumptions because they treat religion as something that autonomous and circumscribed.  Asef Bayat, the influential Iranian-American sociologist, dismissed attempts to isolate Islam from other domains:

    Muslim societies’, he wrote, ‘are never monolithic as such, are never religious by definition, nor are their cultures confined to mere religion.  National cultures, historical experiences, political trajectories as well as class affiliation have all produced different cultures and sub-cultures of Islam, religious perceptions and practices across and within Muslim nations.

    William T. Cavanaugh, who has written extensively (and it must be admitted controversially) on the folly of isolating religions as a cause of war or peace, argues that faith is socially constructed and is inextricably tied to a complex of other factors.

    Second, the reductive binary categories are inimical to any nuanced understanding as to what is actually going on in Muslim communities.  To classify Muslims as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ makes no allowance of the range of views that Muslims might hold.  A Muslim might favour democracy and the rule of law, but also be opposed to gender equality, LGBT rights and inter-faith dialogue.  Does such a person fit into the good or bad box?  Governments like binaries because provide clear options, but in reality they are Procrustean: they just ignore or chop off the bits that do not neatly fit the category.  Binary approaches fail to do justice to subtle elements of political and religious life.

    Let me give another example of Sufism and counter-terrorism.  There was a time in mid-2000s when various US think tanks became convinced that Islamic mysticism was the solution to radicalism – a proposal of astonishing gormlessness.  So, conferences and workshops were held and papers and articles published to this end.  Needless to say, the ‘initiative’ achieved little apart from directing funding to an array of Sufi leaders and counter-terrorism experts.  (When I told Tony about this at the time he burst out laughing and wondered how anyone could be so credulous!)

    Third, the religious reform process produced harmful policies for Muslim communities.  One of the most notable was the ‘securitisation’ of state relations with Muslim communities. Muslims were seen first and foremost in terms of the supposed threat that they posed.

    This, in itself, produced mistrust of government and resentment in Muslim communities because the faithful were only viewed through the narrow filter of radicalism.  It also distorts power relations within communities because government programs and money is being made available on the basis of whether they fit externally imposed criteria rather than the genuine needs of communities.   Certain groups privileged; others treated with prejudice.  The frequent result has been increased tensions within the Islamic community as favoured leaders and institutions reap the benefits of government support, while others miss out, regardless of their need.  We can see this currently in Indonesia where Nahdlatul Ulama is the recipient of Religious Reform largesse from various countries yet other major organisations such as Muhammadiyah and Persis are largely excluded.

    There is a hubris here, a conceit that deeply embedded religious norms can be altered with a few years of aid programs or international initiatives.  States can repress certain types of Islam and foster others, but that is unlikely to greatly change what happens deep within society and its religious communities.  There are limits to what state-run or top-down religious agendas can achieve and most of these programs are usually top-down.  Expectation that Muslims will follow pre-ordained sets of behaviours.

    My central argument here is that it is the absence of religious studies scholars from these global and domestic Religious Reform projects that undermines their effectiveness.  Lived religion, as any scholar of religion can tell you, is extraordinarily varied and mutable.  Great care is needed when generalising and typologising, particularly when concerned with predicting behaviour. The religion as set out by state religious authorities or by mainstream Islamic organisations is not necessarily rigidly adhered to by grassroots Muslims, even within those organisations. Prescriptions of orthopraxy might be followed only partially. Real religious life is often messy and contradictory; there are competing traditions and interests at play.  Muslims may aspire to a particular version of piety but not fulfil this.

    So many on-the-ground studies have found enormous variety and behaviour that often confound the conventional categorisations of religious type. I could point to Chris Chaplin’s research on Salafis, for example.  This community is seen as culturally Arabised, ultra-puritanical and a threat to Indonesia’s pluralistic traditions.  But Chaplin shows significant indigenisation of their practices and considerable desire to compromise in order to expand their mainstream support and protect their educational and preaching activities.  Many assume that the term Salafist denotes one single, undifferentiated entity.  What is required is the close study of people and communities; what they say and write, the texts that influence them and how they communicate.  This needs language skills, patience and erudition.  Such skills are seldom found among quantitative social scientists or security studies experts.  This is not to disparage big data approaches.  They have the ability to tell us things that qualitative research cannot.  But to devise policies without scholarship on religious studies, without its care for details and an eye for nuance and variegation, is to risk miscomprehension and failure.  Religious studies scholars do not see faith as ‘clear cut’ and that is a sound starting point for policy formulation.

    This brings me back to the work of Tony.  His concern to probe the layers of meaning in a text or a statement, his priority in reading what shapes the thinking of Indonesian Muslims – this is critical.  It means coming to Muslim communities not with a set of preconceived ideas or theories into which people can be sorted, but rather researching with an open mind.  Literature, social media discourses, preachers’ sermons, these are what needs studying.  we not assume that official Islam – that promulgated by governments or major Islamic organisations – is actually lived Islam.

    Let me close on a personal note.  I must confess to having considerable apprehension in accepting this invitation to talk about Tony’s scholarship and contribution because I felt that I lacked the scholarly skills to do justice to what he has achieved.  I don’t speak Arabic, I’m not a scholar of the Qur’an and Islamic sciences.  I study Muslim politics, its doctrines and behaviour but I am not a scholar of Islam as such.  But I accepted the invitation because I am so deeply grateful for what Tony has provided to me and to so many other researchers on Southeast Asian Islam through his writings and his personal mentorship.  In my case, for thirty years Tony has encouraged me and with great patience, forbearance even, he has answered my many queries.  Tony never gave simple or obvious answers.  He would ponder the question for a moment before responding, often plucking apposite quotes from a bewildering array of sources that seemed to be forever circulating in his mind just waiting to be presented to a questioner.  These could be from the Bible or the Qur’an, from Shakespeare or Keats, or even from his favourite television satire, Yes Minister!  His answers often led to more questions, which would require more research and reflection on my part.  The thing about these answers was that they always opened vistas onto much broader fields of study and understanding.  I have a continuing sense of marvel at how Tony does this.

    Let me return to where I started, by acknowledging the combined achievements of Tony and Yohanni, and thanking them for all the care and encouragement they have provided for students like me over so many years.  And for the wonderful example that they provide for us all, in their dedication to each other and to the fostering of Indonesian studies.  It is most fitting that so many people have gathered here this afternoon to celebrate these two wonderful careers.

    The post Watch now: The inaugural Tony and Yohanni Johns lecture by Greg Fealy appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • The trade in Southeast Asian box turtles from Indonesia is happening at a scale much higher than annual quotas allow, according to a new paper. It estimated that turtle collectors supply traders in one province alone with tens of thousands of individuals annually, even though their quota is meant to be hundreds.

    The study’s authors have called on the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Indonesian government to take action against the illegal trade.

    CITES is holding its 19th Conference of the Parties (CoP19) in Panama between 14 and 25 November. The decisions that the parties, meaning nation-states, make at the meeting will impact the conservation of hundreds of species.

    CITES listing

    Southeast Asian box turtles live in freshwater habitats across a number of Asian countries. They play an important part in the ecosystems they inhabit, such as ingesting and then dispersing seeds. The turtles also appear to be fairly adaptable to humans, meaning they could theoretically thrive in this human-dominated world.

    However, people also commonly trade the turtles for their meat and other body parts, and as pets. The International Union for Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) Red List assessment lists them as endangered, largely due to overexploitation.

    The study, which MDPI‘s Diversity journal published, highlights the scale of the trade in these turtles in Indonesia. It pointed out that previous reports identified a vast, unregulated trade in Southeast Asian box turtles beginning around the mid-1990s. CITES began regulating the international trade in 2000 by adding the species to its Appendix II listings. CITES lists species in three appendices, depending on how at risk they are.

    Since the CITES listing, Indonesia has set annual quotas for the amount of the turtles people can harvest from the wild. Most of Indonesia’s quota – around 90% – is destined for the international market, the study said.

    Trade “continues unabated”

    CITES listings are supposed to ensure the international trade is conducted – and limited, where necessary – so as not to further endanger species. But in the case of the Southeast Asian box turtle, probes have found that a vast illegal trade is happening, largely in plain sight.

    The Diversity study’s authors analysed trade in one of 32 provinces where the species lives to provide an illustration. Specifically, they looked into two out of five traders in Central Kalimantan. From 2019 onwards, Indonesia’s quota for the province has been 1,000 turtles, with the two traders allocated 400 of these between them. But the data suggests that collectors supply the traders with between 32,000 and 45,000 turtles a year.

    Although data on supplies to the other three traders isn’t available, the authors asserted that their findings and other research shows that the illegal trade “continues unabated”.

    Severely threatened

    The paper also suggested that the trade, when practised legally, supports the livelihoods of very few people. The two traders would, for example, secure profits of $400 annually if they stayed within their quota. The authors’ calculations suggested that the legal turtle trade can support around only 500 people across Indonesia.

    The Canary contacted the Indonesian CITES authorities and the CITES secretariat for comment. Neither responded by the time of publication.

    The study questioned how the vast illegal trade endures under the watch of the relevant authorities. As the Wildlife Conservation Society’s Susan Lieberman said in relation to turtle proposals on the table at COP19, an Appendix II listing is meant to “ensure exports are legal and sustainable” for turtle species, which are “one of the most severely threatened vertebrate groups”.

    In the case of Southeast Asian box turtles, this clearly doesn’t appear to be the case.

    Featured image via Wilfried Burns / Wikimedia, cropped to 770×403, licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0 DE

    By Tracy Keeling

    This post was originally published on Canary.

  • The Indonesian military has signed contracts to acquire both air defence and surface-to-surface ballistic missiles from the Turkish firm Roketsan. The contacts were executed at the recent Indo Defence Expo & Forum in Jakarta. The Czech firm Excalibur, which has a history of prior contracts with the Indonesian Ministry of Defence, is the prime contractor […]

    The post Indonesia Acquiring Roketsan Missiles appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • On Oct 1st, 2022, 33 years after the Hillsborough disaster in Sheffield a stadium tragedy reoccurred. This time, one of the world’s worst stadium disasters happened in Kanjuruhan Stadium, Indonesia, with at least 125 supporters killed at a match between Arema FC and Persebaya FC. After losing the game 2-3, upset Arema supporters reportedly invaded the pitch. The authorities in Malang, East Java fired tear gas to “control” the crowd, triggering a stampede among supporters. Ironically, although supporters followed the FIFA order of flare prohibition, the authorities in Kanjuruhan armed themselves with tear gas which they shot into the mostly peaceful crowds.

    This event is now the pinnacle of tragedies in Indonesia’s sporting history. On one side, “rivalry” is a distinct character of football supporters, which is marketed as a unique selling point. On the other side, do the labels “violence” and “hooliganism” portrayed by mainstream media truly reflect the rivalry of Indonesian supporters? Negative narratives, such as “violence is not uncommon” and “police hunt Aremania” (Arema supporters) who kill Bonek (Persebaya supporters), are produced by media at all levels, constructing bad representation of Indonesian football fans as offenders. Such stories place supporters as citizens’ enemy. Moreover, following the corporate media logic of “prime time”, kick-off was in the evening (at 8:00 PM). Due to the broadcasting rewards, New Indonesian League administrators rejected an afternoon kick off time suggested by the police. Supporters are indeed the targeted audience for football broadcasts, yet a sensationalising media predominantly frame them as hooligans.

    Prior to the match, at a trilateral meeting between both clubs and the Football Association of Indonesia (PSSI), it was agreed that Persebaya supporters would not attend. The assumption was that “no rivalry” equated to “no violence.” The depth of this logical fallacy was illuminated as Arema supporters became the victims of bloody violence unrelated to rivalry. The possibility that the number of tickets sold exceeded the stadium capacity is also generating unanswered questions.

    Manipulation of football supporters by political elites is not uncommon. Football supporters are also a voter base in regional and national level elections. Eddy Rumpoko, the 2007-2017 Mayor of Batu (a city in the greater area of Malang), for instance, established connections with Arema FC and supporters using his city budget resources. The former mayor was sentenced to prison in 2019 and punished again in 2022 because of corruption.

    Most of the leaders of PSSI are closely affiliated with political parties or retired army/police commissioners, who act in unison to serve the interests of the oligarchs of Indonesia. For example, Eddy Rumpoko was one out of nine nominees in PSSI Chairman election (2016-2020). Furthermore, PSSI pointed fingers to other stakeholders, including banning Arema FC from playing matches at their home stadium and issuing fines. While the government task force highlighted the unprofessionalism of PSSI and Indonesian football league stakeholders, PSSI rejected their recommendations. The credibility of PSSI and the police is said to be falling apart at the seams, reflected in declining trust among football supporters.

    The Kanjuruhan disaster shows that Arema fans, like other supporters, are victims of the commodification and politicisation of Indonesian football. The pot of supporter fanaticism is continually stirred by broadcasters and is marketed to consumers of football. The supporters are also vulnerable to a violent, corrupt, and precarious Indonesian football structure. Supporters were killed by the violence of the state, yet they are the ones who are portrayed as “rioters”. Not only victims of the structure, fans remain trapped within a conflict of interests between predatory and rapacious actors in the turbulent world of Indonesian football.

    In the era of football commodification and democracy in post-reformasi Indonesia, supporters should be placed as “original fans” rather than “superficial consumers”. With the idea of mediatisation, supporters seem to play a greater role in claiming their position. Supporters need recognition, including an environment in which to express their collective identity and to articulate their role as active citizens. Starting from the mourning, the public petitioned for the rights of the Kanjuruhan victims, particularly those who were killed. Responding to this catastrophe, there were at least six petitions on change.org, from “refusing tear gas” (signed by around 50,000 people), “urging PSSI chief and management to resign” (signed by around 18,000 people) to “reformasi PSSI” (signed by around 300 people). The presence of these digital platforms facilitates the coordination and collection of signatures and signifies solidarity among oppressed supporters.

    Football has increasingly become “family friendly” entertainment, consequently rights should be (re)distributed equitably. Here, safety must be the top priority. The game’s authorities should be responsive to football fans’ characteristics, including the tendency for mass gatherings and established rivalries as is exemplified in major footballing leagues around the world. Profit maximisation, including media ratings and ticket sales, must be revisited. Midday kick-off times and below capacity ticket sales are some alternatives. FIFA has advised against the use of tear gas inside stadiums. The Hillsborough disaster brought about regulatory changes for safety inside stadiums and those in control of large crowds. One of the fiercest footballing derbies in world football, Celtic and Rangers, has shifted the kick-off time from evening to midday to prevent potential violence between supporters in Glasgow.

    Lastly, representation of supporters is key to reforming footballing structures in Indonesia, liberating the code from the current oligarchical system. Supporters, as active citizens, are the counter to the “violence” narrative. Instead of frequently attaching the term “hooligan” to supporters in media coverage, other roles taken by supporters as active citizens, such as anti-racism activism (hoomanity-hooligan for humanity from IG @bdgsupporteralliance) and resistance to oppression (football fans enemy from IG @makassarsupporter.collective), should be voiced, especially in everyday discourse. The idea of hoomanity shifts the image from brutal to caring hooligan, successfully inviting supporters to participate in fundraising to face the initial pandemic (e.g., distributiing hand soap and hand sanitizer) and providing aid for flood victims in the area. Their engagement shows camaraderie among supporters across Indonesia dealing with Kanjuruhan tragedy. The message reminds supporters that their enemies are not supporters of rival team. Yet, their “true enemies” are dictatorial police forces, a broken PSSI, as well as management and capital holders, that degenerate the team(s) and the essential meaning of football.

    Removing and dismissing some officials, such as the police officers who fired tear gas, is not a silver bullet, as it only tackles the symptoms and not the root cause of the chaotic structure of Indonesian football. The configuration of Indonesian football is problematic, reflecting the Indonesian democracy moving from stagnation to regression. Commercialisation and politicisation of football establishes a pseudo-modern football with corrupt mismanagement. However, mediatisation provides opportunities of media manifold for football supporters as the victims to create and construct the meaning of their environment (e.g., supporter not customer from IG @bdgsupporteralliance and how poor management performance unfolded from IG @frontlineboys33). From the above stories, football fans communities construct their mediatised world, from in-person literacy, information sharing and networking on various digital platforms (e.g., WhatsApp, Twitter, Instagram, and change.org), mediated communication coverage, to performing offline activism. While supporters work to create the football culture from below, authorities ought to take major steps, including recognition, rights redistribution and representation, to create a football system from above in which it desists from slaying the golden goose through systematic violence.

    The post The Kanjuruhan catastrophe: A mirror of Indonesia’s tumultuous football politics appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Elettronica has signed a contract to equip two Indonesian Navy 90m Offshore Patrol Vessels currently under construction at PT Daya Radar Utama shipyard with its Naval Radar Electronic Counter-Measures systems and further 90m Offshore Patrol Vessels are expected to be built by Indonesian shipyards for the Navy. This is the first contract in Indonesia in […]

    The post Elettronica signs a Contract to provide latest-generation of Naval Radar Electronic Counter-Measures system to Indonesia appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • Thales has entered into an agreement with state-owned defence electronics specialist PT Len Industri to provide a range of C4ISR enhancements to the Indonesian Navy’s (TNI-AL’s) four Diponegoro-class guided missile corvettes, among other work announced on 4 November. The company said it will refurbish the ships with “an Integrated Missions System including the TACTICOS Combat […]

    The post Indonesian corvettes to get further upgrades appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) hosted the latest iteration of its international fleet review (IFR) in the waters of Sagami Bay south of Tokyo on 6 November, an event which also commemorated the 70th anniversary of the service’s founding. Twenty JMSDF assets, including surface combatants and submarines, as well as 18 vessels from Australia, […]

    The post JMSDF hosts multinational fleet review appeared first on Asian Military Review.

  • In Indonesia, the government formally acknowledges only two genders, male and female. Transwomen (along with gay and lesbian individuals) are categorized under People with Social Welfare Problem or known as Penyandang Masalah Kesejahteraan Sosial (PMKS). This is based on four criteria, i.e., a) social functioning disorder, b) discrimination, c) marginalisation, and d) deviant social behaviour. Despite giving up on the legislative situation that discriminates against them, Surabaya transwomen who are members of Surabaya Transwomen Association (Perwakos) fight against it by engaging actively in public activity. This is story about them fighting Covid-19 together with East Java Regional Disaster Management Agency.

    LGBTQ+ community leaders in Indonesia: overcoming pandemic hardship

    LGBTQ+ Indonesians are driving some of the most effective community responses to the hardships of the pandemic.

    My engagement with Perwakos started years ago, during an HIV-AIDS campaign activity when I was still an undergraduate student.  I worked with them again years later, through Circle Indonesia—a local organisation based in Yogyakarta—on a USAID-funded project that focused on scaling-up integrated interventions serving populations most-at-risk to HIV transmission in Indonesia. While working on that project, I also wrote my masters thesis about transwomen’s performativity and their space in Surabaya city.

    My concern with gender diversity is founded on my long experiences working as gender specialist for development and humanitarian projects for international agencies/organisations. I face a lot of rejection when trying to raise the issue. Government officials will always refer to the abovementioned existing formal regulations on gender. Further, in daily life a recent trend in Indonesia since sees people tending to rejection everything related to LGBT issues, including trans* people. The term LGBT is indeed now notorious now in Indonesia, almost always with negative connotations. There are also a lot of persecution of non-binary people.

    Specifically, regarding disaster management—an issue that I often engage with—I presented a paper about heteronormative practice of Indonesia disaster management at the 8th Asian Graduate Forum on Southeast Asia Studies at National University of Singapore in 2013. The paper addressed the work of transwomen in Yogyakarta trying to break the stigma by engaging in disaster response activity in the aftermath of the 2010 Mt. Merapi eruption.

    This video is part of my efforts to raise concerns about how regulation of gender impacts non-binary individuals, and how they fight back against it.

    This publication was supported by an ANU Gender Institute grant which provided funds for New Mandala and Connecting Designs to run a series of workshops supporting early career academics investigating issues of gender and sexuality in Southeast Asia to develop their audio-visual research communication skills.

    The post Surabaya’s transwomen fighting COVID-19 appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • EDGE entity ADSB, the UAE’s leader in the design, new build, repair, maintenance, refit, and conversion of naval and commercial vessels, today signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with PT PAL Indonesia, Indonesia’s state-owned shipbuilder, to strengthen cooperation and to leverage the capabilities of both partners to build a range of interceptors, landing craft, and […]

    The post Abu Dhabi Ship Building Signs MoU with PT PAL Indonesia at Indo Defence 2022 appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.