Category: indonesia

  • A country consisting of over 17,000 islands the capability to project land forces across the water is a critical concern for Indonesia’s military. Yet, its amphibious assault capabilities have been largely limited to Soviet era BTR-50s. The Republic of Korea donated some LPTP-7s to Indonesia’s Korps Marinir in 2009 (hoping to spur a larger order). […]

    The post Filling Indonesia’s Amphibious Assault Vehicle Requirement appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • The works in this exhibition by Indonesian artists, Bulan Fi Sabilliah and Fitri DK, comment on the Indonesian New Order’s legacy of the primacy of prescribed beauty ideals and women’s domestic and reproductive roles over public and political roles. The artists’ playful images expose societal norms and offer alternatives to understanding women’s position in society that defy the restrictions of domesticity and beauty ideals and highlight the empowering and agentic potential of women’s solidarity and organising against patriarchal norms. The artists use print-making techniques as a reference to the medium’s role in the dissemination of information against the New Order regime and into Reformasi to advocate for social justice.

    Fitri DK

    Fitri DK, uses graphic art techniques such as woodcut and etching to critique and initiate dialogue on social and environmental issues. Fitri is committed to raising women’s issues through art and music. Fitri is lives and works in the South of Yogyakarta, Indonesia and is an active member of the SURVIVE!Garage community, Taring Padi art collective. Fitri is also lead vocalist of the band Dendang Kampungan. Over the past decade, Fitri has exhibited in Australia, Europe and the United States, as well as throughout the Indonesian archipelago. Instagram: fitridk

    Artist Statement

    My works record many memorable or important events in my life. This body of work is inspired by the Women’s March, a political action that I participated in 2019 in Yogyakarta. The Women’s March was organised to celebrate International Women’s Day.  This worldwide movement of solidarity, held in cities all across the world, draws on global challenges and encourages social, cultural, legal, and economic changes at the local levels so that women’s rights are recognized, fulfilled, and protected.

    The Women’s March in Yogyakarta in 2019 highlighted the ongoing local issues of violence against LGBTQI groups, protection of domestic workers and migrant workers, child marriage, dating violence, and protection of sex workers. I hope that through my artworks, I can spread the message to the world that gender rights are an essential part of human rights.

    Bulan Fi Sabilillah

    Bulan Fi Sabilillah is a visual artist living in the South of Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Bulan works with the medium of print and etching to discuss social issues. Her concerns are predominately about challenging beauty ideals imposed by a patriarchal society and imposed on young women by social media. Her messages are of body positivity and acceptance. Bulan is a recent graduate of ISI, the Indonesian Institute of the Arts, Yogyakarta. Instagram:  Bulalalan

    Artist’s Statement

    Commentary on people’s bodies – particularly women’s bodies – is part of everyday life in Indonesia. For example, when you meet a friend in the street, often the first thing they will comment is your physical appearance; your weight and the colour of your skin. Digital media often reinforces this everyday practice to comment and make comparisons on people’s appearances. Often people don’t understand the impact this seemingly meaningless ‘banter’ has on people’s self-esteem.

    My religion teaches women that they must cover their aurat – their bodies. However, men are not required to change at all. This leads to unjust outcomes. In cases of sexual violence, often society and the media consider the woman to be responsible because she wasn’t covering her body and becomes re-victimised, as a victim of stigma.

    All of these experiences, both personal and from society at large, form the basis of this series. As a young woman living in Indonesia, I want to share my interpretation of what positive body image means, and provide a perspective on why women should feel body confident without being forced to cover it or compare to others, or be discriminated against.

    The post “Perempuan Merdeka” women’s art exhibition at the 39th Indonesia Update appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Tabloid Jubi in Jayapura

    The lawyer of the families of the victims of the Mimika murder case has criticised the military reconstruction of the killings and mutilation of the four Nduga residents, describing it as “odd” and calling for an independent investigation.

    “The reconstruction of the murder by the security forces is very odd,” lawyer Gustaf R Kawer said in Jayapura yesterday.

    “It is mostly the version of the perpetrators and less from the witnesses.”

    According to Kawer, the reconstruction that took place last Saturday demonstrated 40 scenes. Of these, only 10 showed the role of the Raider/20 Ima Jaya Keramo Infantry Brigade soldiers accused over the murder and mutilation.

    Kawer questioned how the reenactment of the crime emphasised the role of Roy or RMH — a fugitive still at large who did not participate in the reconstruction.

    “The story that was built in the reenactment from the beginning to the end revolved around Roy. But the person was not even there.

    “It was as if Roy was made the sole perpetrator even though there were Indonesian military [TNI] members named as suspects,” Kawer said.

    ‘Finding it strange’
    The murder and mutilation of four civilians from Nduga Regency occurred at Settlement Unit 1, Mimika Baru District, Mimika Regency on August 22, 2022.

    The four victims were Arnold Lokbere, Leman Nirigi, Irian Nirigi and Atis Tini.

    Kawer said the reenactment showed one of the victims, Arnold Lokbere, in front of a mosque at 10pm local time.

    “We find it strange that people around the location who are mentioned in the reenactment do not know about the murder,” he said.

    Kawer called for an independent team to fully investigate the chronology and reconstruction of the Mimika murder and mutilation.

    “The case has now been handed over to the military police and the police, and will be tried in the general court and military court as a general criminal case,” Kawer said.

    Meanwhile, Papua Legislative Council member Namantus Gwijangge said the victims’ families considered the reenactment of the murder scene as “rushed”.

    Call for ‘death sentence’
    “The family asked the Papua Legislative Council to have the case investigated by an independent team, and the perpetrators be sentenced to death,” Gwijangge said.

    On Monday, the Papua Office of the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM Papua) said the reconstruction had not fully revealed the murder and mutilation.

    Komnas HAM Papua head Frits Ramandey noted that several accused refused to act out certain scenes so some roles were replaced by other people.

    Komnas HAM Papua also said that the reconstruction raised suspicion that there were two more soldiers of the Raider/20 Ima Jaya Keramo Infantry Brigade involved in the murder and mutilation but they had not been named as suspects.

    However, Komnas HAM Papua did not mention the names or ranks of the two other soldiers allegedly involved.

    Republished from Tabloid Jubi/West Papua Daily with permission.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Recently, New Mandala intern Timothy Barham caught up with Patrick Anderson, a policy advisor with the Forest Peoples Programme, a human rights group that supports forest peoples’ struggles throughout the wet tropics. Patrick has lived in Canberra for the last ten years.  During the previous decade, he was based in Jakarta and was campaigns advisor at WALHI, the Indonesian Forum for Environment. Patrick is Chair of the Executive Committee of the High Carbon Stock Approach. The HCSA is a multi-stakeholder standard that assists groups wishing to apply commitments to zero deforestation.

    Despite choosing not to study at university, Patrick has a close relationship with the Australian National University where he has held positions as a guest lecturer, visiting fellow, and research associate. Patrick’s dedication to supporting environmental justice has spanned his life and led him to work in forest areas the world over.

    To begin our discussion today, I would love to hear how you first become interested in issues of environmental justice and land rights? 

    Growing up my parents were politically active on many issues so social justice was part of my upbringing. After high school I moved to Northern New South Wales where I became engaged with environmental justice movements. I participated in protests which succeeded in getting a moratorium on a contract to log Terania creek, an area which is ecologically important and of significance to the Bundjalung peoples. Subsequently, myself and some others who had been involved in the protest started a group called Rainforest Information Centre.

    One day we received a letter from a community leader in the Solomon Islands informing us that the same Australian companies were now on his island and, without community consent, were logging their forests. This demonstrated the need to work in solidarity globally and at the intersection of environmental protection and human rights.

    In the 1990s I took a job as director of Greenpeace International’s rainforest protection campaign, which generated international pressure to support local struggles against destructive logging and deforestation and, where possible, worked closely with forest peoples to support their interests.

    What did you learn from your early volunteer and professional experiences? 

    One of the biggest lessons I learnt was the value of market pressure. Cooperating with Government is of course ultimately essential, however, in many cases governments follow industry. One of the big levers for incentivising industry change is to go after their markets.

    In most cases, when a forestry industry is expanding it is to sell to export markets and will be aided by foreign capital. These international links can be the industry’s Achilles heel. When you try to transform an industry such as logging you often encounter local resistance from industry and government, raising arguments about loss of revenue, jobs and taxes. For foreign corporate purchasers and investors the decision matrix is importantly different. They are not concerned about job losses in a distant forestry company, but about their reputation to their customers, and being branded as supporting environmental destruction. Thus, their concern for the environment and forest peoples being displaced isn’t weakened by arguments about jobs and revenue.

    When did you become primarily focused on environmental justice in Indonesia and what projects are you currently working on?

    After ten years working for Greenpeace International in Amsterdam, in 2000 I moved to Indonesia. I initially worked as an advisor to WALHI the National Forum for Environment. Then in 2005 I joined the Forest Peoples Program, where I still work. I primarily work on international policy relating to voluntary standards for palm oil, pulp paper, timber, and a standard that’s been recently developed for companies committed to zero deforestation.

    None of these standards are government initiatives. Rather, non-government organisations have worked with progressive industry to develop standards, based on international environmental and human rights norms. International market campaigns put pressure on companies to abandon destructive practices and products. Voluntary industry standards help companies to implement their commitments to sustainability and justice.  Once these standards become widely adopted by industry, governments, which are often initially resistant, can become interested in adopting them into law, so that they apply to all players in that sector in their jurisdiction. For example, there are now several district governments in Indonesia that have committed to applying a standard for oil palm production called the Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil.

    Once a standard is adopted by a company or a government, its effective implementation depends on regular independent assessments, and an effective and responsive complaints mechanism accessible to all interested parties. Work on developing and implementing such standards has been taken up by many environmental organisations and a few human rights organisations; creating standards and then assisting communities and civil society to use them effectively.

    Palm oil is Indonesia’s biggest export and has played a major role in its economic growth over the last two decades. Consequently, palm oil has been credited with contributing to poverty reduction, increased employment, and by extension improving food and health security. With this in mind, why is establishing such voluntary palm oil standards so important?

    Indonesia is approaching 20 million hectares of palm oil, which is about 10% of the land area of the nation. As you can imagine this has had massive impacts. About half of that area was established by clearing rainforests and many of the plantations displaced local communities and their agroforestry systems. In most cases, communities and farmers were effectively forced to give up their farms and forests to large-scale agribusiness, while receiving very little compensation (typically less than $100 per hectare).

    So, both the environmental and human impacts have been monumental and projections show the palm industry may expand to 30 million hectares. The voluntary sustainability standard for palm oil is designed to stop environmental damage such as deforestation and human rights abuses such as forced land acquisition, and so is one mechanism to limit the damage from further palm oil expansion in Indonesia.

    In the past ten years, in response to international concern about carbon emissions and forest loss, the Indonesian government had enacted a moratorium on further clearance of forest and on granting new palm oil licences. Following the COVID-19 pandemic and associated economic contraction, the government has been promoting economic recovery through agribusiness expansion, and in particular by stripping away social and environmental safeguards that protected forests and community rights. This creates alarming risks for human exploitation and environmental degradation, but given that the major industry players in the oil palm sector are members of the RSPO, it is expected that they will not revert to deforestation and land theft.

    Fictional forest koperasi: a new pattern of land grabs in Indonesia

    Fake cooperatives acting as representatives of farmers can seek land concessions and conveniently serve as an extension of corporations.

    Do you think that there are risks associated with the limited diversity of Indonesia’s agricultural sector?

     Yes, traditionally much of Indonesia’s farming at the local level was based on a mosaic of crops and forest products. Close to a village, farmers would grow annual crops, including wet or dry rice, then further out there would be tree crops, and further still there would typically be a forest area that was managed for products including timber, resins, water and honey. The expansion of industries like palm oil has led to literally millions of people transitioning from this kind of model to becoming palm oil farmers or day workers on company plantations for cash payments.

    Now this is not inherently negative. There are plenty of issues associated with those kinds of farming models, primarily relating to the fact that it provides only a very limited cash income. What it did provide, however, was a basic level of food security and nutritional diversity, within structures of local culture and tradition. Once communities lose their lands and their members become exclusively palm oil farmers or plantation workers, their economic security is in the hands of the industry. If there are not satisfactory standards in place this can expose farmers and workers to low wages and poor working conditions.

    In some cases this has led to what is effectively slavery, where people are brought from one island to another to work on plantations and kept in camps where their mobility is restricted and they are forced to spend their small wages within company stores. Farmers who gave up their lands to palm oil plantations were often persuaded to do so based on the promise of obtaining title to two hectares of land planted with palm oil trees established by the company. These schemes come with a debt for all the company’s development costs, and some farmers have found themselves unable to service the debt, becoming permanently trapped in debt bondage.

    Additionally, there are serious ecological risks where you have an agricultural sector that is dominated by a limited range of crops. For example, the palm oil industry in Indonesia is currently being threatened by a range of pathogens, funguses, viruses, and insects. So, I think that Indonesia’s dependence on the palm oil industry, while obviously very profitable for big industry and a major revenue source for government, is also risky from environmental, social, and ecological perspectives and these risks will only grow as the industry expands.

    What are your thoughts on relocating the capital to Kalimantan?

    The government listed two or three primary reasons in its rationale for relocating the capital: Jakarta is congested, sustainability concerns, and a desire to diversify the distribution of government. In my personal opinion I don’t believe that any of these factors justify building a new capital in the middle of a jungle in Kalimantan.

    Jakarta is a city of 10 million people and without a doubt it needs more infrastructure. That said, it is possible to build your way out of congestion. In the early 2000s Bangkok had a comparable population and geographical characteristics to Jakarta, and similarly faced major problems with congestion, poor air quality, limited infrastructure, and a deteriorating urban environment. Over two decades it invested significantly in infrastructure and initiatives to improve air quality. This investment improved the functionality of the city. A similar approach could be applied to Jakarta, but would require roughly five times the level of investment that the city is currently able to organise. By moving the capital the government has removed national revenue that could have fuelled such an initiative.

    If the government’s concern is to diversify the concentration of the government then spending $30-40 billion on a new capital is a perplexing approach. This funding could instead be channelled to the existing constellation of provincial and local governments to support initiatives to decentralise government systems and services.

    Finally, the location of the new capital in Kalimantan will lead to quite a lot of deforestation. This raises environmental concerns, but there are also dozens of Indigenous communities from at least 12 ethnicities who occupy that area. So, it will almost certainly create a multitude of human rights abuses, forced displacements, impoverishment, and environmental degradation.

     I think to some people your career path would sound unconventional. Based on this experience, what advice would you give to young people interested in environmental justice?

    Well, as mentioned I never went to university and so most of my learning has been grounded in practical on the job experiences. My dad, Don Anderson who was a sociologist at the ANU, always used to tease me “when are you going to get a proper education?” Since I moved back to Australia in 2013, I’ve had the pleasure of giving guest lectures, and holding positions as a visiting fellow and research associate at the ANU.

    I’m quite proud of the fact that my life experience allows me to bring unique perspectives and insights to these roles. And my dad has come to appreciate how I continue to educate myself through extensive reading, field research, and by being open to learn from every person and situation I encounter.  I don’t intend this to in any way discredit the crucial work of academics, which I use in my work all the time, but rather to stress that there are many avenues for learning.

    Something I would recommend to absolutely anyone is volunteering. I personally have volunteered all my life. Even when working full-time I make sure to make time to volunteer somewhere. I think this is important because it is a great way to stay connected to the movement. Environmental justice causes aren’t the exclusive realm of professionals. It is crucial that everyone is able to act on their feelings of concern for the environment and social justice, and it is a challenge to groups working in these sectors to make space for volunteers to be involved, so that together we can change our world in the direction of sustainability and justice.

    The post Profile: Patrick Anderson’s career in environmental and human rights movements appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • ANALYSIS: By David Engel, Albert Zhang and Jake Wallis

    The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has analysed thousands of suspicious tweets posted in 2021 relating to the Indonesian region of West Papua and assessed that they are inauthentic and were crafted to promote the policies and activities of the Indonesian government while condemning opponents such as Papuan pro-independence activists.

    This work continues ASPI’s research collaboration with Twitter focusing on information manipulation in the Indo-Pacific to encourage transparency around these activities and norms of behaviour that are conducive to open democracies in the region.

    It follows our August 24 analysis of a dataset made up of thousands of tweets relating to developments in Indonesia in late 2020, which Twitter had removed for breaching its platform manipulation and spam policies.

    This report on Papua focuses on similar Twitter activity from late February to late July 2021 that relates to developments in and about Indonesia’s easternmost region.

    This four-month period was noteworthy for several serious security incidents as well as an array of state-supported activities and events in the Papua region, then made up of the provinces of West Papua and Papua.

    These incidents were among many related to the long-running pro-independence conflict in the region.

    A report from Indonesia’s Human Rights Commission detailed 53 violent incidents in 2021 across the Papua region in which 24 people were killed at the hands of both security forces and the armed wing of the Free Papua Organisation (OPM) separatist movement, the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB).

    ‘Armed criminal group’
    Jakarta normally referred to this group by the acronym “KKB”, which stands for “armed criminal group”.

    This upsurge in violence followed earlier cases involving multiple deaths. The most notorious took place in December 2018, when TPNPB insurgents reportedly murdered a soldier and at least 16 construction workers working on a part of the Trans-Papua Highway in the Nduga regency of Papua province (official Indonesian sources have put the death toll as high as 31).

    The Indonesian government responded by conducting Operation Nemangkawi, a major national police (POLRI) security operation by a taskforce comprising police and military units, including additional troops brought in from outside the province.

    The security operation led to bloody clashes, allegations of human rights abuses and extrajudicial killings, and the internal displacement of many thousands of Papuans, hundreds of whom, according to Amnesty International Indonesia, later died of hunger or illness.

    Besides anti-insurgency actions, an important component of the operation was the establishment of Binmas Noken Polri, a community policing initiative designed to conduct “humanitarian police missions or operations” and assist “community empowerment” through programmes covering education, agriculture and tourism development.

    “Noken” refers to a traditional Papuan bag that indigenous Papuans regard as a symbol of “dignity, civilisation and life”. Binmas Noken Polri was initiated by the then national police chief, Tito Karnavian, the same person who created the recently disbanded, shadowy Red and White Special Task Force highlighted in our August 24 report.

    A key development occurred in April 2021 when pro-independence militants killed the regional chief of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) in an ambush. Coming on the back of other murders by independence fighters (including of two teachers alleged to be police spies earlier that month), this prompted the government to declare the KKB in Papua—that is, the TPNPB “and its affiliated organisations”—”terrorists” and President Joko Widodo to order a crackdown on the group.

    9 insurgents killed
    Nine alleged insurgents were killed shortly afterwards.

    In May 2021, hundreds of additional troops from outside Papua deployed to the province, some of which were part of an elite battalion nicknamed “Satan’s forces” that had earned notoriety in earlier conflicts in Indonesia’s Aceh province and Timir-Leste.

    During the same month, there were large-scale protests in Papua and elsewhere over the government’s moves to renew and revise the special autonomy law, under which the region had enjoyed particular rights and benefits since 2001.

    The protests included demonstrations staged by Papuan activists and students in Jakarta and the Javanese cities of Bandung and Yogyakarta from May 21-24. The revised law was ushered in by Karnavian, who was then (and is still) Indonesia’s Home Affairs Minister.

    The period also saw ongoing preparations for the staging of the National Sports Week (PON) in Papua. Delayed by one year because of the covid-19 pandemic, the event eventually was held in October at several specially built venues across the province.

    The dataset we analysed represents a diverse collection of thousands of tweets put out under such hashtags as #BinmasNokenPolri, #MenolakLupa (Refuse to forget), #TumpasKKBPapua (Annihilate the Papuan armed criminal group), #PapuaNKRI (Papua unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia), #Papua and #BongkarBiangRusuh (Take apart the culprits of the riots).

    Most were overtly political, either associating the Indonesian state with success and public benefits for Papuans or condemning the state’s opponents as criminals, and sometimes doing both in the same tweet.

    Papuan Games tweets
    Among several tweets under #Papua proclaiming that the province was ready to host the forthcoming PON thanks to Jakarta’s investment in facilities and security, 18 dispatched on June 25 proclaimed: “PAPUA IS READY TO IMPLEMENT PON 2020!!! Papua is safe, peaceful and already prepared to implement PON 2020. So there’s no need to be afraid. Shootings by the KKB … are far from the PON cluster [the various sports facilities] … Therefore everyone #ponpapua #papua”.

    Many tweets were clearly aimed at shaping public perceptions of the pro-independence militia and others challenging the state.

    Under #MenolakLupa in particular, numerous tweets related to past and contemporary acts of violence by the pro-independence militants. Two sets of tweets from March 22 and 24 that recall the 2018 attack at Nduga are especially noteworthy, in that both injected the term “terrorist” into the armed criminal group moniker that the state had been using hitherto, making it “KKTB”. This was a month before the formal designation of the OPM as a “terrorist” organisation.

    As if to stress the OPM’s terrorist nature, subsequent tweets under #MenolakLupa carried through with this loaded terminology. For example, tweets on June 15 stated that in 2017 “KKTB committed sexual violence” against as many as 12 women in two villages in Papua.

    A fortnight later, another set of tweets said that in 2018 the “armed terrorist criminal group” had held 14 teachers hostage and had taken turns in raping one of them, causing her “trauma”. Others claimed former pro-independence militants had converted to the cause of the Indonesian unitary state and therefore recognised its sovereignty over Papua.

    Some tweets relate directly to specific contemporary events. Examples are flurries of tweets posted on July 24-25 in response to the protests against the special autonomy law’s renewal that highlight the alleged irresponsibility of demonstrations during the pandemic, such as: “Let’s reject the invitation to demo and don’t be easily provoked by irresponsible [malign] people. Stay home and stay healthy always.”

    Others are tweets put out under #TumpasKKBPapua after the shooting of the two teachers, such as: “Any religion in the world surely opposes murder or any other such offence, let alone of this teacher. Secure the land of the Bird of Paradise.”

    Warning over ‘hoax’ allegations
    Other tweets warn Papuans not to succumb to “hoax” allegations about the security forces’ behaviour or other claims by overseas-based spokespeople such as United Liberation Movement of West Papua’s Benny Wenda and Amnesty International human rights lawyer Veronica Koman.

    Tweets on April 1 under #PapuaNKRI, for example, warned recipients not to “believe the KKB’s Media Propaganda, let’s be smart and wise in using the media lest we be swayed by fake news.”

    Many of the tweets in the dataset are strikingly mundane, with content that state agencies already were, or would have been, publicising openly. A tweet on February 27 under #Papua, for example, announced that the Transport Minister would prioritise the construction of transport infrastructure in the two provinces.

    Those under #BinmasNokenPolri often echoed advice that receivers of the tweet could just as easily see on other media, such as POLRI’s official Binmas Noken website.

    Some were public announcements about market conditions and community policing events where, for example, people could receive government assistance such as rice, basic items and other support.

    Most reflected Binmas Noken’s community engagement purpose, ranging from a series on May 20 promoting a child’s “trauma healing” session with Binmas Noken personnel to another tweeted out on June 20 advising of a badminton contest involving villages and police arranged under the Nemangkawi Task Force.

    ‘Healthy body, strong spirit’
    A further 34 tweets on June 20 advised that “inside a healthy body is a strong spirit”, of which the first nine began with the same broad sentiment expressed in the Latin motto derived from the Roman poet Juvenal, “Mens sana in corpore sano.” (Presumably, after this first group of tweets it dawned on the sender that his or her classical erudition was likely to be lost on indigenous Papuan residents.)

    As with the tweets analysed in our August 24 report, based on behavioural patterns within the data, we judge that these tweets are likely to be inauthentic—that is, they were the result of coordinated and covert activity intended to influence public opinion rather than organic expressions by genuine users on the platform.

    Without conclusively identifying the actors responsible, we assess that the tweets mirror the Widodo government’s general position on the Papuan region as being an inalienable part of the Indonesian state, as well as the government’s security policies and development agenda in the region.

    The vast majority are purposive: by promoting the government’s policies and activities and condemning opponents of those policies (whether pro-independence militia or protesters), the tweets are clearly designed to persuade recipients that the state is providing vital public goods such as security, development and basic support in the face of malignant, hostile forces, and hence that being Indonesian is in their interests.

    Dr David Engel is senior analyst on Indonesia in ASPI’s Defence and Strategy Programme. Albert Zhang is an analyst with ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre. His research interests include information and influence operations, and disinformation. Dr Jake Wallis is the Head of Programme, Information Operations and Disinformation with ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre. This article is republished from The Strategist with permission.


  • Indonesia remains a rural country. With 45% of the population living in the countryside (approx. 123 million), Indonesia has the fourth-largest rural population in the global south. Agriculture is the lead sector in 20 of 34 provinces. Rural Indonesia is changing fast, with land reform and village government reforms, rapid migration to the city and overseas, and COVID-19 impacting rural life. While many people have moved above the poverty line over recent decades, rural people face the imminent threats of vulnerability, food security, stunting and climate change, with a large proportion still living below $2/day. Despite the importance of rural life to Indonesia and its region, scholarship has tended to overlook rural Indonesia. In August 2022 the Indonesia Institute held a panel discussion to commemorate Hari Tani and Indonesian Independence day and consider the need to rejuvenate research on rural Indonesia. We asked critical Indonesian thinkers to reflect on a simple question: What are the most important policy problems facing rural Indonesia, and what can researchers do about them? The panellists presentations were followed by an open discussion.

    Panel speakers:

    Land Reform: Noer Fauzi Rachman

    Food security in rural Indonesia: Sirojuddin Arif, SMERU

    Village Governance: Lian Gogali

    Rural migration: Suraya Affi

    The post Watch: Hari Tani Nasional, a forum on the future of rural Indonesia appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • RNZ Pacific

    Seven people have been found guilty of “treason” after raising the banned Morning Star flag in West Papua, a Melanesian region of Indonesia.

    In the Jayapura District Court this week, the seven were each jailed for 10 months and fined.

    The flag is considered a symbol of the West Papua struggle for independence and has been strictly barred by the Indonesian authorities.

    The group, one aged 19 and the others in their 20s, had raised the flag at the Cenderawasih Sports Centre, and although they were not carrying weapons they were convicted of treason.

    The Jubi website reported the judge said raising the Morning Star flag and marching while shouting “Free Papua” and “We are not Red and White, we are the Morning Star“, amounted to treason.

    And the act of unfurling banners with the words “Self Determination For West Papua, Stop West Papua Militarism” and “Indonesia Immediately Open Access for the UN Human Rights Commission Investigation Team to West Papua” was also considered treason.

    ‘Intention of separating’
    The verdict read “the defendants already have the intention of separating Papua and West Papua from the territory of Indonesia. The defendants have committed the beginning of treason as stipulated in Article 87 of the Criminal Code”.

    After the trial, the defendant’s lawyer Emanuel Gobay told Jubi “we firmly reject” the court’s verdict of treason.

    During the trial Gobay said no expert witnesses had been presented to explain their perspectives on the charges.

    According to Gobay, the conclusions drawn by the panel of judges seemed subjective because there was no information from expert witnesses.

    “We question the basis on which the panel of judges concluded the treason. It is as if the panel of judges acted as experts, interpreting and concluding themselves without relying on expert testimony,” Gobay said.

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

  • Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) is looking to ride on the momentum of recent successes to further expand the global footprint of its T-50/FA-50 Golden Eagle advanced jet trainer/light attack aircraft. The company’s latest order comes from Poland, with Warsaw committing to acquiring 48 FA-50PL light attack aircraft worth up to $3 billion under a broader […]

    The post KAI Eyes Further Success for Golden Eagle appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • RNZ News

    Floods have struck the West Papuan city of Sorong following heavy rains early this week.

    There are reports of 1.5 metre-high flooding and landslides with two people killed.

    Roads and thousands of houses in the city were inundated by floodwater.

    Two people died when their house was engulfed by a landslide. They were a 35-year-old mother and her eight-year-old son.

    The father survived.

    The city’s disaster mitigation agency head, Herlin Sasabone, said emergency authorities were continuing to monitor the flood situation.

    Herlin said the Sorong Regional Disaster Management Agency (BPBD), in collaboration with the National Search and Rescue Agency, the Indonesian Military, and the National Police continued to monitor the flood situation in the city.

    “People who need help and see their homes damaged by landslides can report to the Sorong BPBD office,” Herlin said.

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

  • While travelling with colleagues to East Kalimantan to do fieldwork in the Indonesian capital city (IKN) in mid-July 2022, we collected 180 responses from people affected by the new capital site. In Java, the relocation of the Indonesian capital from Jakarta to purpose-built Nusantara in Kalimantan raises new hopes for both ruling elites and the Jakarta people. It is expected to eradicate severe congestion, unsustainable land use, and overpopulation in Jakarta, and the knock-on effects of these problems. These problems have haunted not only Jakarta, but also Java, for many decades. When we discussed these issues with our local respondents during informal and formal conversations, the first impression we encountered was scepticism. This came not only from local academics, activists, and local people, but even local bureaucrats from regency and provincial levels in East Kalimantan.

    These sceptical responses demonstrate a gap in knowledge and poor communication between ruling elites of Jakarta and those in East Kalimantan. While the former problem relates to a lack of aspiration to create bridges between national and local actors, the latter problem is misinformation on both the capital relocation and development of supporting facilities such as housing for civil servant and servicemen and governmental offices.

    These two factors inevitably lead to unwelcoming responses from most East Kalimantan locals towards the new capital. Their sombre responses reflect attitudes informed by past and existing problems in East Kalimantan, such as natural disasters, like unrehabilitated mine sites and inequitable funding allocations from all levels of government. Both problems remain unresolved as the capital city issues loom. The capital relocation promises to be another thorn in the side of East Kalimantan if prior problems are left unresolved.

    Most respondents agreed that there is no mutual dialogue  between Jakarta and East Kalimantan or inclusive participation offered to residents of East Kalimantan. For example, local representatives who were originally invited to Jakarta were actually members of a small local elite who were unfamiliar with the local situation. More specifically they have no idea of the impact that the project will have on local populations.

    This meant that information about relocation of people in East Kalimantan and the development of the new capital has not spread widely among the people of East Kalimantan. It resulted in the sudden increase in land prices in several sub districts, like Sepaku, Samboja and Bumi Harapan which lie between Nusantara and East Kalimantan’s two supporting cities, Balikpapan and Samarinda to be used for housing and other industries supporting the new capital. A so-called “land mafia” has emerged, which unilaterally decides the price of land and keeps this information from locals. Unfortunately, these current and upcoming booms do not benefit the small group of indigenous people, such as the Paser and Balik peoples, who have been forced to give up their customary land as a result of  government decisions to acquire it.  By contrast, those who have freehold title / SHM (sertifikat hak milik) can sell their land.

    The Capital Authority / BO (Badan Otorita) itself does not have a branch office in East Kalimantan yet. Ideally, it should it should establish an office from which to engage with the people of East Kalimantan. According to local bureaucrats the BO made few visits to hold talks with local governments and/or communities. Certainly, these conditions create a gap between national and local governments in finding common ground regarding power sharing.

    The main gap is the lack of coordination between government levels especially the central government, provincial government, and regency/municipal government. The issue of territorial expansion and spatial planning is causing major problems between BO and its local government counterparts. Although the new capital city bill already defines the capital territory in regulation, there is still the possibility of acquiring other land from the Kutai Kartanegara and North Penajam Paser regencies, and Balikpapan city. This would surely disrupt the existing spatial planning of the three regencies’ governments. One bureaucrat from the Local Development Agency (Bappeda) told me that there is no joint agreement to merge spatial planning between the new capital and regencies. Bappeda will run its own spatial planning programs independently from the Capital Authority. More specifically, there is budget inequality between the BO and its neighbouring governments.


    Lessons from Brasilia: on the empty modernity of Indonesia’s new capital

    Indonesian officials are raising Brasilia as a model for relocating the capital city to East Kalimantan. But Brazil’s experience with Brasilia is not a positive lesson from history, but a warning.


    The regencies are envious of large BO’s budget. In fact, East Kalimantan Province is the biggest fundraiser for the Indonesian national budget (APBN), contributing almost 500 trillion rupiah per year. But the special allocation fund (DAK) that transfers back to East Kalimantan from Jakarta is not always adequate for local infrastructure and public services. The BO, as the central government institution, will not be welcomed by surrounding local governments due to its institutional superiority and huge funding.

    On a social level the new capital city is colloquially known as the Second Betawi (Betawi Kedua) in East Kalimantan. This terminology refers to the Betawi people, the original inhabitants of Jakarta, who have been forced out by rapid development and modernisation. On the new capital site approximately 150-200 households in Paser, Balik, and Basap people will be removed from their ancestral land due to disputed legal standing. The government does not acknowledge ancestral land claims because it believes claimants have the right to manage, but not own the land, according to positive law principles. This means the government can claim land that is considered to be “unowned”, even if it belongs to traditional land owners. Furthermore, the name “Nusantara” itself is not accepted by locals who propose indigenous name “Benuaq Etam” (Our City) as the new capital’s name.

    In sum, both the lack of coordination between state actors and a lack of acknowledgment between state and society lead me to suggest the real voice of East Kalimantan should be heard. More specifically, central government should sit with local residents in East Kalimantan. There is an urgent need to ease unresolved issues between Jakarta and East Kalimantan to avoid further exacerbating an already tense situation.

    The post A new capital city for who? Central-local tensions in Indonesia appeared first on New Mandala.

  • ANALYSIS: By Kyle Delbyck of the TrialWatch Initiative

    Journalist Muhammad Asrul is awaiting word from Indonesia’s Supreme Court about whether he will spend further time behind bars for reporting on corruption issues. The decision will have a profound impact not only on his life but also on press freedom in Indonesia.

    The country is at a turning point following its transition at the end of the 20th century from military dictatorship to democracy.

    Many, including civil society and members of the judiciary, have sought to protect journalists — they see a free, functioning press as part of Indonesia’s future.

    Others, however, are waging a battle against independent media and freedom of speech, through prosecutions like Asrul’s and through the impending passage of a criminal code that smacks of authoritarianism. With Indonesia’s two-decade-old democratic path in real jeopardy, the next several months will be decisive.

    In 2019, Asrul penned a series of articles alleging corruption by a local political official. The same official filed a complaint with the police, who subsequently arrested and detained Asrul.

    After spending more than a month in jail as the police conducted investigations, Asrul was prosecuted under the country’s draconian Electronic Information and Transactions Law (ITE Law), which criminalises the electronic transmission of information that defames or affronts.

    At the end of 2021, a court found Asrul guilty and sentenced him to three months in prison.

    Police bypassed Press Council
    While this would be egregious enough on its own, in Asrul’s case the police chose to bypass Indonesia’s Press Council.

    The Press Council is an independent government body tasked with protecting journalists in press-related disputes. The police are supposed to coordinate with the Press Council to determine whether a case should be funnelled into the criminal justice system or resolved through mediation or other solutions outside of the courts.

    But the police did not give the council a chance to settle the complaint against Asrul, sidestepping this critical institution. Equally worrying, the court that convicted Asrul stated that the police have the power to override the Press Council in a range of situations, including where individuals offended by news articles go straight to the police instead of the council.

    The Clooney Foundation for Justice’s TrialWatch initiative, where I work as a senior programme manager, monitored Asrul’s trial through its partner the American Bar Association Center for Human Rights.

    This coming week, we will file an amicus brief requesting that the Supreme Court overturn Asrul’s conviction and ensure that the protections offered by Indonesia’s Press Council remain a reality for journalists throughout Indonesia.

    TrialWatch monitors trials such as Asrul’s in more than 35 countries, seeking to overturn unjust convictions against journalists and marginalised individuals and to reform the laws used to target them.

    The ITE Law is one such example. Since its enactment in 2008, the ITE Law has been a key tool in suppressing freedom of expression and press freedom in Indonesia, with prosecutions spiking in recent years.

    81 people charged
    During the first nine months of 2021, for example, at least 81 people were charged with violating the ITE Law, “most of them accused of defamation” — the provision under which Asrul was prosecuted. Those found guilty of defamation can face up to four years behind bars.

    While the ITE Law has been a darling of government officials seeking to quash legitimate criticism, it has also been deployed by businesses and other powerful actors who simply do not like what someone has posted online.

    TrialWatch recently monitored a trial in which a woman, Stella Monica, was prosecuted for Instagram complaints about acne treatment she received at a dermatology clinic. Monica was acquitted but the clinic aggressively pursued the case, subjecting her to almost two years of legal proceedings.

    This playbook for stifling speech may soon receive a boost with the revision of Indonesia’s colonial-era criminal code. In many countries, the amendment of colonial laws has been a step forward, but Indonesia’s iteration is so regressive that when a draft was published in 2019 it triggered widespread protests.

    Although the government withdrew the legislation following the protests, this year the new code was resurrected, retaining provisions from the 2019 version that endanger press freedom.

    In addition to providing for a potential jail sentence of up to three years for perceived insults to the president and vice-president, the draft code criminalises the dissemination of “incomplete” news and so-called “fake news”.

    In neighbouring countries like Cambodia, we have seen fake news provisions deployed against those who criticise the authorities.

    Attempts to hide developments
    Just how troubling these developments are is clear from the Indonesian government’s attempts to hide them. The Deputy Law and Human Rights Minister in charge of the revision process had previously pledged that the legislature would vote on the code by August 17, Indonesia’s Independence Day.

    He also stated that the authorities would not share the draft text with either civil society or the public because of the risk of disorder. After an outcry, however, the government published the draft in July and promised further consultations, still leaving civil society with scant time to deliberate and engage the government if the vote indeed takes place in the next few months.

    While passage of the code in its current form would be a triumph for government officials and corporate interests seeking to restrict critical speech, it would also be a victory for the increasingly powerful conservative Islamist parties on which President Joko Widodo has relied to maintain power.

    The draft code falls squarely on the side of conservatives in Indonesia’s roiling cultural battles, threatening jail time for sex and co-habitation before marriage, which would also functionally criminalise LGBTQ+ relationships. Another provision swells the already expansive blasphemy law, extending it to criminalise comments made on social media.

    Although the draft code reflects the reality that repressive forces are gaining ground, there is still hope that the authorities will side with those fighting for fundamental freedoms. The government has shown itself to be responsive not only to pressure from hardliners but also to pressure from pro-democracy forces.

    The withdrawal of the code after the 2019 protests and the recent sharing of the draft text are good examples. In another recent example, after enduring intense criticism about overly broad enforcement of the ITE Law, President Widodo commissioned guidelines limiting its application — in particular against journalists.

    The guidelines, which were introduced after Asrul’s case had already begun, explicitly state that in cases where a news outlet has published an article, then press regulations — not the ITE law — should apply. While enforcement has been shaky thus far, the guidelines demonstrate the power of public pressure and are an additional tool in the battle for press freedom.

    Institutional safeguards
    Other institutional safeguards are in place. Indonesia’s Press Council has a mandate that puts it on the same level as other government entities and gives it real power to protect journalists — hence the importance of Asrul’s case and the impending Supreme Court decision on the Council’s role.

    To show how significant the Press Council is we need only hop across the ocean, where press freedom advocates in Malaysia have been fighting to establish a similar mechanism for years, recognising its potential to stop the harassment of independent media.

    The courts are also making positive noises. In the face of campaigns by government officials, religious conservatives and businesses to clamp down on speech, some judges have ruled in favour of human rights protections — from the acquittal of Monica for her dermatological troubles to a recent high-profile acquittal in a blasphemy prosecution.

    What this means is that unlike in countries where the decks are stacked, with the legislature, judiciary and press co-opted by authoritarian powers, all is not lost in Indonesia. Civil society has proven that it can mobilise and that institutional levers can be pulled.

    But this upcoming period will be crucial. Buffeted by competing winds, the Indonesian government will decide whether to move forward with the current version of the new criminal code. Actors at the local level, like police and prosecutors, will decide whether to enforce — or not enforce — rights-positive guidelines and laws.

    The judiciary will consider cases with wide-ranging consequences for press freedom and freedom of speech, like that of Muhammad Asrul. And even if the criminal code is passed, it awaits a barrage of constitutional challenges, putting the judiciary in the spotlight.

    Through its TrialWatch initiative, the Clooney Foundation for Justice will continue to monitor these courtroom battles and advocate for those unjustly targeted in criminal prosecutions. With key decisions forthcoming, the fate of Asrul and many others hang in the balance.

    Kyle Delbyck is senior programme manager at the Clooney Foundation for Justice’s TrialWatch initiative, where she coordinates trial observations and ensuing advocacy.  Grace Hauser, TrialWatch legal fellow at the Clooney Foundation for Justice, contributed to this article. First published by Al Jazeera English, it is republished under a Creative Commons licence.

  • Is the death penalty—judicial or extra-judicial—an effective deterrent of the drug epidemic? Malaysians and policymakers are unable to agree on whether some crimes, such as drug trafficking without violence, should be penalised by death. The Malaysian government has stated that the mandatory death sentence, which is statutory for certain offences, including nonviolent drug trafficking convictions, is likely to be abolished. This would give judges the discretion to impose a different punishment for the 23 crimes that carry the death sentence. Many ASEAN nations are wrestling with the question of whether or not capital punishment is effective.

    In the Philippines the number of civilians killed in the drug war from July 2016 to March 2019 “appears to be between 12,000 and 30,000.” Former President, Rodrigo Duterte named 44 mayors, vice mayors and other officials in May 2019 as being “narco politicians”. But when his son and Davao’s Vice Mayor, Paolo Duterte, was accused of aiding and abetting a seized shipment of $125 million worth of narcotics from China for the Philippines market, Duterte senior was less enthusiastic to carry his extrajudicial killings. On the other hand, also in 2019, the police executed two former governors, both of whom had been designated as “narco politicians” on Duterte’s watch list.

    The Malaysian case is no different. Tan Sris and Datuks (titles conferred to dignitaries by Malaysian heads of state) lead the drug cartels, at least in the case of the RM 2.4 billion (0.55 billion USD) confiscated from the North Butterworth Container Terminal (NBCT) in September 2019. These Malaysian drug lords are able to attain these titles because they too were probably able to hide the fact that they are laundering money by, among other things, running pawn shops, shipping companies, and hotels. The continuous arrests of policemen involved in drug dealing and consumption shows a symbiotic relationship between law enforcement and the drug related crime networks. Malaysia has to play a more important role in going after the drug lords because, as mentioned by the Inspector General of Police (IGP) of the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP), the country is a transit point for drugs being sent to other countries.

    Development and drugs in Myanmar

    How alternative crops can help stop Myanmar’s opium trade.

    The thinning of the grey lines between the executive and drug lords by the likes of Myanmar’s Lo Hsing Han further exacerbates the problem. In the 1960s, he was given permission to traffic opium and heroin in exchange for commanding a local militia formed by then-dictator Ne Win to battle communists on the country’s borders with China. Meanwhile, Lo sided with the insurgents during the next decade, and he was captured in Thailand in 1973 and condemned to death for treason. His sentence was eventually reduced to life in prison, and he was released under a general amnesty in 1980. Thus, started the second half of his career, during which he was reported to continue his heroin business, using poor farmers from Myanmar’s Shan state and northern Thailand to cultivate opium for him. When he turned around and decided to disassociate himself from his life of crime He found receptive partners in Thailand’s business communities, multi-national corporations and governments, notably in Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Singapore. One such example is Asia World Co Ltd, a major infrastructure conglomerate in Myanmar partially owned by Lo’s son, Steven Law, with which the Singapore government had a joint venture. That venture has been blacklisted by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

    Evidently, there is a transnational criminal network that controls an extensive operation involving air cargo and shipping services which send drugs to Indonesia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Australia. The 2017 arrest of Xaysana Keopimpha – a Lao dubbed the “ASEAN drug lord”, exposed a major drug ring that had links to insurgents in Thailand’s Deep South.

    While most ASEAN nations turn a blind eye to drug lords and cartels, they are keener to execute naive teenage drug mules. Nagaenthran Dharmalingam, for example, was a Malaysian with learning disabilities who was convicted of narcotics trafficking in 2010 and whose case drew international attention. He was recently executed at Singapore’s Changi prison.

    The question is, why are countries like Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines are so quick to impose death penalties and extrajudicial killings for drug mules and drug peddlers, but not as effective in taking action against the drug lords?

    In Singapore there is an over-representation of Malays condemned to death. Between 2010 and 2021, 50 of the 77 persons condemned to death were Malays, 15 Indians, 10 Chinese, and two others. Due to a lack of transparency, we may extrapolate from publicly accessible statistics that Indian men are overrepresented in Malaysian prisons and are particularly vulnerable to custodial mortality. In the Philippines, the policy of executing individuals without trial, implemented by Duterte, disproportionately harmed the poor.

    The fact that dirty money needs to be cleaned to make legitimate “real world” purchases, provides opportunities for law enforcement agencies in ASEAN to collectively monitor drug lords and drug traffickers. Despite the fact that drug trafficking syndicates are always inventing new strategies to conceal their operations, the police have been successful in locating and arresting these drug lords. They have been known to operate pawn shops, shipping companies, hotels and even bundle clothing stores. Additionally, the drug trafficking routes and ‘rat lanes’ along the border states such as the Southern Thailand – Malaysia requires joint efforts and efficient patrolling. Drug mule trafficking can only be eliminated if politicians and law enforcement agencies work together to combat the web of organised crime and bring drug lords to justice. While the law says that drug mules must be executed, drug lords dine with legislators and discuss capitalist methods to exploit people and launder money.

    The post “Mandatory” deaths for the poor, get out of jail free card for the rich in Asia appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • To mark International Human Rights Day in 2021, on 9 December 2021 the ANU Indonesia Institute hosted a discussion on women’s rights and gender equality in Indonesia. Speakers examined the extent to which Indonesian women have achieved equality in a broad array of political, economic and social fields, and what Indonesian women are doing today to overcome the obstacles that lie in the path of gender equality. You can watch this important, challenging and inspiring discussion on New Mandala now.

    Chair

    Dr Eva Nisa
    Senior Lecturer, School of Culture, History and Languages, and ANU Indonesia Institute
    The Australian National University.

    Topics and speakers

    Sri Budi Eko Wardani: Achieving women’s sexual and reproductive rights and health.
    Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Director of the Center for Political Studies, Universitas Indonesia.

    Dr Marcia Soumokil: Countering gender-based violence and harassment.
    Country Director IPAS Indonesia (Yayasan Inisiatif Perubahan Akses menuju Sehat Indonesia)

    Anindya Restuviani: The gender pay gap and female labour force participation.
    Director of Jakarta Feminist and Co-Director of Hollaback! Jakarta.

    Dr Diana Contreras Suarez: Women in the media and building a feminist voice.
    Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, University of Melbourne.

    Devi Asmarani
    Editor-in-Chief and co-founder of women-focused webmagazine Magdalene (www.magdalene.co)

    Speaker Biographies

    Dr Eva Nisa is a cultural anthropologist and expert in Islamic studies. Her research and publications focus on the intersections between religious, cultural, political, economic, legal, social, and philosophical aspects of peoples’ lives. She is interested in global currents of Islam reshaping the lives of Muslims in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia and Malaysia. Her research has involved international collaborative projects with scholars from the USA, Germany, Australia, the Netherlands, Indonesia, Austria, Malaysia, New Zealand, Thailand and Singapore. Currently, she serves on the editorial board of The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology. 

    Dr Marcia Soumokil is the director of Ipas Indonesia. Prior to joining Ipas, Dr. Soumokil worked for several international organizations within Indonesia in the areas of HIV, adolescent reproductive health, maternal and newborn health, and health governance. Dr. Soumokil is a trained medical doctor and began her career as a general practice physician in a community health clinic. She also holds a Masters of Public Health degree from University of Melbourne, Australia. She currently serves on the boards of the Indonesia AIDS Coalition. 


    Frontline women: unrecognised leadership in Indonesia’s COVID-19 response

    Incorporating women’s experiences and skills would improve pandemic responses.

    Sri Budi Eko Wardani is a lecturer in Department of Political Science Universitas Indonesia. She is also the Director of Center for Political Studies Universitas Indonesia. She is taking her doctoral degree in politics at Department of Political Science Universitas Indonesia. Some of her previous notable research were Indonesian Voting Behavior on 1999 Election (1999-2000, collaboration with Ohio State University, USA), Strengthen and Monitoring of 2004 General Election (2003-2004, collaboration with CETRO),  Women Political Participation and Advocacy for Adoption Affirmative Policy in Political Party Law and Election Law (2007-2009, collaboration with The Asia Foundation), and Representation of Women in National and Local Legislature after 2009 Election (July – December 2010, collaboration with The Asia Foundation & AusAID).  

    Dr Diana Contreras Suarez is a Senior Research Fellow at the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research. Her research is driven by questions on how to improve the lives of vulnerable and disadvantaged populations, and focuses on understanding human capital formation throughout the life cycle as well as how public policy or programs work on achieving improved lives. She uses econometrics techniques to look into those questions, with most of her expertise in developing countries, including Indonesia.  

    Devi Asmarani is the Editor-in-Chief and co-founder of women-focused webmagazine Magdalene (www.magdalene.co). Her 25 years’ experience in journalism began at The Jakarta Post, followed by The Straits Times of Singapore, where she wrote news reports, in-depth articles and analyses on various issues from politics, conflicts, terrorism to natural disasters. She has also written columns, articles, essays as well as works of fiction for various local and international publications. She is also a writing and journalism instructor, and gender and media facilitator, and has worked as a consultant with international organizations. Devi is the recipient of S.K. Trimurti Awards for her work in promoting gender equality in journalism.  

    Anindya Restuviani is Program Director of Jakarta Feminist and Co-Director of Hollaback! Jakarta. She is a feminist activist with expertise in gender equality and a history of working in the development sector on issues of gender, children, and vulnerable youth with strong experience in feminist advocacy and organizing within grassroots communities and at the local, national and global level.

    The post Women’s rights & gender equality in Indonesia: watch now appeared first on New Mandala.

  • Perpetrators of disinformation, a danger to democracy—these have been the choice words to describe Facebook amid the global battle against disinformation. But while the social media giant run by Mark Zuckerberg may have fallen out of grace among digital rights advocates, one Indonesian scholar describes Zuckerberg differently: a “prophet” presenting a gift from the gods.

    This renowned scholar, who has taught at an Indonesian university for over 20 years and has recently gained notoriety as a pro-government social media influencer, frames the existence of social media akin to a religious experience: “It’s like God descended and said, “Here, this is the public sphere that you wanted for so long. I hand it to you through Mark Zuckerberg, through Google. It couldn’t reach you before, but now you have it. So, use it!”

    This sentiment may seem surprising coming from an academic with a background in journalism—a field heavily battered by disinformation running rampant on the very platforms that Arya Susanto (not his real name) hails. Nonetheless his perspective reflects the different ways people perceive and respond to digitisation in society: while some hail digital transformation as a ticket to the future, others fear that the push towards digitisation oversimplifies or even exacerbates social problems.

    EngageMedia recently collaborated with Diani Citra, research consultant from Sintesa Consulting, and the Alan Turing Institute (ATI) to understand how people in different contexts imagine and experience the growing digital landscape through the lens of data justice. This concept looks at the societal implications of datafication, particularly the impact of data-driven processes in people’s lives. To fill the gap in data justice research, the “Advancing Data Justice Research and Practice” project aims to expand existing narratives to include testimonies from unheard voices.

    Exploring data justice

    Every day, massive amounts of data are generated from every click, scroll, tap, filled-out form, and search term entered on digital devices. But how and to what ends this data is collected, analysed, and used is often unclear. While some benefit from access to and representation in digital systems, these same systems can also exclude others; for instance, modern apps are designed for digitally literate users, excluding those with limited digital knowledge and ability.

    Broadly speaking, data justice refers to the fair and just approach in dealing with digital data, particularly in how people are made visible and represented in data collection and analysis processes. Historically marginalised communities have often been overlooked in the collection and use of data, resulting in the reinforcement of repressive and harmful systems. Data justice aims to counter the ways in which underrepresented communities are systematically rendered invisible by including their perspectives.

    As one of ATI’s policy pilot partners, EngageMedia reported on how data justice is perceived and understood by civil society, technology groups, and affected communities in Indonesia and the Philippines. The resulting report,  The Techno-politics of Data Justice in Indonesia and the Philippines focuses on understanding the ways different groups imagine and experience the growing digital landscape.

    A notable finding was the struggle to pin down a definition for data justice. Many respondents were unfamiliar with the term, and most tended to speak about data justice by talking about data injustice—such as barriers to access, lack of data protection, and restrictions on content. Most of the Filipino activists in our research tended to connect the societal impact of datafication to issues of data protection, individual rights, privacy, efficiency, and (digital) security.

    For our respondents, the term “data justice” intersects with the digital rights discourse. They framed the concept in terms of algorithmic transparency, data privacy, security, and ownership. Others emphasised the link to social justice (i.e. data should be used to prevent inequities, ensure equal rights to access and participation in social and political life, help inform policy and improve the lives of marginalised communities). The common theme among the responses was the emphasis on fairness, equity, and transparency during the entire process: from the production and collection of data to its distribution, interpretation, and creation of products and services based on digital data. For respondents, the concept of data justice centres the observance of human rights and social justice in the creation, processing, and use of data.

    Amid warnings about the threats of over-surveillance, privacy breaches, and censorship, many stakeholders in Indonesia and the Philippines see digitisation as not only inevitable, but also readily accept it as beneficial for society. For instance, Philippine activists and civil society organisations see data as the backbone for advocacy, research, and policymaking and lobbying efforts. For Indonesian respondents, digitisation takes on a more spiritual undertone as it is often couched in terms of keniscayaan, which translates as inevitability. In the research team’s interviews with policymakers and in Indonesian media, the term is often used in the discussion on Indonesia’s digitisation efforts. In everyday Bahasa Indonesia its use gives it a sense of something divine or prophetic.

    When illiberal social media takes over democratic Philippines

    Social media has amplified, rather than created, an existing culture of disinformation.

    This relates to Arya Susanto’s view that the internet and social media are gifts from God, imbued with powers that individuals should not resist and should be grateful for. As more government and private services and resources are now available online, being part of the digital realm is essential for full social participation—applying for jobs, accessing health care, conducting business, connecting with friends and family, or expressing and sharing one’s views to a wider audience. Because of the many opportunities digital systems offer, digitisation is seen as a ticket to the future.

    But the reverence for the digital tends to mask underlying issues: how are these technological advances shaped? By whom, and for whose interests? As the report noted: “This rhetoric of inevitability tends to obscure policy choices and conflicting interests that shape the processes of new technology adoption and hide the reality that digital transformation is not only a technological issue, but a social one as well.”

    Privacy and rights trade off

    This idea of inevitability also extends to data security and privacy: since being part of the digital realm is seen as necessary to fully participate in public life, giving away personal data in exchange for these conveniences is inescapable. But while civil society activists in the Philippines are concerned with data collection, Indonesian informants, especially those with limited socio-economic capital, say they have become accustomed to giving away control over their data to meet basic needs (such as better internet connection or access to work opportunities); many seem resigned about the lack of government protection over their data. Still others express some level of trust in the state. In the report, Emir from Indonesia explains: “I wouldn’t be in trouble as long as I don’t do anything negative. That’s what I think. Unless I do something like treason I shouldn’t be nervous”.

    Some are willing to give away their data in exchange for social capital. Susanto feels that social media has given him a platform to express his views in ways he was unable to in the past. This was why, despite numerous media reports on data breaches and security concerns, he is all too willing to trade off data security for the feeling of power on social media.

    “I will just choose to be grateful and thankful to Mark [Zuckerberg], Bill Gates, and friends,” he said. “You could even steal our data, I don’t care, and sell them, I don’t care… I’m already quite happy with what you’ve provided for us.”

    Human dignity in a datafied society

    Data justice also involves questions on whether the experience of being datafied maintains one’s dignity as a human being—enabling them to retain access and control of their data, or to have their identities be accurately reflected in datasets. But in a world where everything is digitised, can people who choose to opt out still live with dignity?

    One interesting case in the report was the story of Ginanjar from Indonesia, a self-proclaimed anarchist who went to great lengths to avoid handing over his personal data. While trying to activate his public health insurance service, Ginanjar chose to travel back to his hometown to avoid having to send digital copies of his identification card. However, the local office still insisted that he send his data online through an app—even when he was already physically present. “They told me that I had to send my data over WhatsApp. For me, this is absurd, you know?”

    Ginanjar’s case highlighted his efforts to minimise the amount of personal data collected in order to protect his privacy. Interestingly, in other cases respondents noted that more complex data collection was needed, particularly when it came to capturing the multiplicity of people’s identities. Dina Anjani (not her real name), host of a popular Indonesian YouTube channel that addresses issues of sexuality, says data justice “has to provide as many truths as possible in data collecting and processing.” But current methods of data collection are inadequate and non-comprehensive, which in turn could feel dehumanising to those whose identities are not fully reflected in these data sets. For Dina, in-person interaction helps bypass these limits and allows for more space to explain and express her identity. The report noted:

    “[Dina] finds that, when appealed to personally, most Indonesians are capable of more understanding than digital technologies can afford them. During her driver’s licence renewal appointment, the officer asked her informally if she wanted her gender entry to be “woman.” He offered to change the digital entry that had been determined by Dina’s birth certificate.”

    Ways forward

    Based on the perspectives of our Indonesian and Filipino respondents, EngageMedia’s research found that digital technologies are accepted as an embodiment of progress in and of themselves, without adequately examining whether these are needed, or even wanted, within the local conditions they are used. Additionally, their negative impact goes largely unexamined. However, even if digitisation is inevitable, understanding how this trend unfolds can make a difference in helping mirror the lived experiences and hopes of people.

    How do we move forward from here? Respondents listed several key recommendations, such as promoting transparency in data collection, processing, sharing, and disposal, and upholding the dignity of data owners in the process. They also highlighted the need to ensure that data accessibility and accountability measures for upholding data privacy are in place, as well as the importance of scrutinising existing mechanisms to avoid an elitist approach to data justice.

    Technological development does not exist in a vacuum and should not be regarded as removed from its social context. Without a nuanced approach and understanding of the power dynamics in societies, inequalities offline will be replicated online. To counter this, it is important to continue discussions on how data justice manifests in daily life. This includes increasing awareness on data literacy and conducting digital security training to empower people to assert their rights over their data and exercise their agency to live a dignified life in a datafied society.

    Digital technologies have become so intertwined with modern life that their use is essential in day-to-day activities. As Susanto exclaims in his exaltation of the internet and social media, these technologies are now regarded as something we simply have. The challenge is finding ways to ensure that in using these technologies, the access to and experience of the digital is more fair and dignified for everyone.

    The post Techno-politics of data justice: perspectives from Indonesia and the Philippines appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • RNZ Pacific

    New Caledonia’s pro-independence FLNKS (Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front) has signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), which wants independence from Indonesia.

    The Kanak-Papuan deal was signed by Roch Wamytan, President of New Caledonia’s Congress, and the visiting ULMWP leader Benny Wenda.

    Wamytan told La Premiere television in Noumea that both territories were involved in a process of decolonisation and emancipation — one with France, the other with Indonesia.

    “We have signed this accord because each of us are confronted by a process of decolonisation and emancipation. The people of Papua with Indonesia and us with the French state,” he said.

    “This process of decolonisation has not ended for us, it has been ruptured over time, to say the least.”

    The memorandum aims to support each other internationally and to develop a list of common goals.

    Indonesia took over the western half of New Guinea island after a controversial 1969 UN-backed referendum that is rejected as a sham by Papuans, with West Papuan activists now seeking inscription on the UN decolonisation list.

    New Caledonia has been on the UN decolonisation list since 1986, and between 2018 and 2021 has held three referendums on independence from France.

    Wenda visited Vanuatu on the first leg of his Pacific trip from his exiled base in London.

    He was a guest of the Vanuatu West Papua Independence Committee.

    FLNKS will boycott Paris talks
    New Caledonia’s pro-independence FLNKS movement said it would not attend talks in September of the signatories to the 1998 Noumea Accord in Paris.

    West Papuan independence leader Benny Wenda
    West Papuan independence leader Benny Wenda … supporting each other internationally. Image: Koroi Hawkins/RNZ Pacific

    A special meeting of the movement’s leadership decided at the weekend that legitimate talks would now have to be bilateral ones, involving the FLNKS and France as the colonising state.

    Newly-elected FLNKS Congress member Laura Humunie said bilateral talks were the only formal way to get their message to the French state.

    “We repeat, that to obtain bilateral talks we will not go to Paris because for us this is the legitimate way of talking to the French colonial state,” she said.

    “Our loyalist partners who have signed the ‘no’ referendum, means that they align with the French state’s ideals.”

    Last December, more than 96 percent voted against independence from France in a referendum boycotted by the pro-independence parties, which refuse to recognise the result as the legitimate outcome of the decolonisation process.

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

    West Papuan leader Benny Wenda
    West Papuan leader Benny Wenda (red shirt) signing the memorandum of understanding with the FLNKS. Image: FLNKS

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • By Victor Mambor and Alvin Prasetyo in Jayapura

    The US Holocaust Memorial Museum is warning in a new report that mass killings of civilians could occur in Indonesia’s troubled West Papua region in the next year to 18 months if current conditions deteriorate to a worst-case scenario.

    Although large-scale violence against civilians is not occurring yet in Papua, early warning signs are visible and warrant attention, says the report, titled “Don’t Abandon Us: Preventing Mass Atrocities in Papua.”

    The museum’s Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide published the 45-page report this week authored by an Indonesian, Made Supriatma, who conducted field research in the region.

    “Indonesia ranks 27th on the list of countries with risks of mass atrocities. This report should be considered as an early warning,” Supriatma said.

    A combination of factors — increasing rebel attacks, better coordination and organisation of pro-independence civilian groups, and the ease of communication — makes it plausible that the unrest could reach a new level in the next 12-18 months, the report said.

    “If political and social unrest persist, and if it were to spread across the region, it is possible that the Indonesian government could determine that the scale or persistence of the protests would justify a more severe response, which could lead to large-scale killing of civilians,” it said.

    The risks are rooted in factors such as past mass atrocities in Indonesia, the exclusion of indigenous Papuans from political decision-making, Jakarta’s failure to address their grievances and conflicts over the exploitation of the region’s resources, according to the report.

    Human rights abuses
    Other factors include Papuans’ resentment over Jakarta’s failure to hold accountable security personnel implicated in human rights abuses and conflict between indigenous Papuans and migrants from other parts of Indonesia over economic, political, religious, and ideological issues, it said.

    Under one scenario that the report envisions, pro-Jakarta Papuan militia, backed by the military and police, commit mass atrocities against pro-independence Papuans.

    But such a scenario depends on indigenous Papuan groups remaining divided into pro-Jakarta and pro-independence groups, it said. The other scenario involves Indonesian migrants and Indonesian security forces committing atrocities against indigenous Papuans, the study said.

    "Don't Abandon Us"
    Don’t Abandon Us”: Preventing mass atrocities in Papua, Indonesia. Image: EWP cover

    The report recommends that the government improve freedom of information and monitoring atrocity risks, manage conflicts through nonviolent means, and address local grievances and drivers of conflict.

    Supriatma said indigenous Papuans he spoke to as part of his research confirmed that real and perceived discrimination had fueled an “us-against-them” mentality between indigenous Papuans and Indonesians.

    Papua, on the western side of New Guinea Island, has been the scene of a low-level pro-independence insurgency since the mainly Melanesian region was incorporated into Indonesia in a United Nations-administered ballot in the late 1960s.

    In 1963, Indonesian forces invaded Papua — like Indonesia, a former Dutch colony — and annexed the region.

    Only 1025 people voted in the UN-sponsored referendum in 1969 that locals and activists said was a sham, but the United Nations accepted the result, essentially endorsing Jakarta’s rule.

    ‘Not based on facts’
    An expert at the Indonesian presidential staff office, Theofransus Litaay, questioned the study’s validity.

    “There’s something wrong in the identification of research questions. The author extrapolated events in East Timor to his research,” he said, referring to violence by pro-Jakarta militias before and after East Timor’s vote for independence from Indonesia in 1999.

    “It’s not based on the facts on the ground,” he said, without elaborating.

    Gabriel Lele, a senior researcher with the Papuan Task Force at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, said the report was based on limited data.

    “It is true that there has been an escalation of violence, but the main perpetrators are the OPM [Free Papua Movement] and the victims have been civilians, soldiers and police,” lele said.

    He said rebels had also attacked indigenous Papuans who did not support the pro-independence movement.

    Violence has intensified in Papua since 2018, when pro-independence rebels attacked workers who were building roads and bridges in Nduga regency, killing 20 people, including an Indonesian soldier.

    Suspected rebels killed civilians
    In the latest violence, suspected rebels gunned down 10 civilians, mostly non-indigenous Papuans, and wounded two others on July 16.

    A local rebel commander from the OPM’s armed wing, Egianus Kogoya, claimed responsibility.

    “We suspect they were spies, so we shot them dead on the spot,” the Media Indonesia newspaper quoted him as saying on Monday.

    The attack in Nduga regency came a little more than two weeks after legislators voted to create three new provinces in Papua amid opposition from indigenous people and rebel groups.

    In March this year, insurgents killed eight workers who were repairing a telecommunications tower in Beoga, a district of Puncak regency.

    No desire to address racism
    Reverend Dr Benny Giay, a member of the Papua Church Council, said Jakarta had not shown a desire to address racism against Papuans, who are ethnically Melanesian, and instead branded pro-independence groups terrorists.

    “Authorities allow arms trade between armed groups and members of the TNI [military] and police, which perpetuates the violence and in the end can have fatal consequences for the indigenous people,” Dr Giay said.

    The influx of migrants from other parts of Indonesia has created inter-communal tensions and conflicts over regional governance, analysts said.

    Indigenous people are concerned that a massive project to build a trans-Papua highway, as part of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s drive to boost infrastructure, could lead to economic domination by outsiders and the presence of more troops, said Cahyo Pamungkas, a researcher from the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN).

    “The road will mainly benefit non-Papuans, and indigenous people will benefit little economically because they are not ready to be involved in the economic system that the government wants to build,” Cahyo said.

    Republished from Benar News. Co-author Victor Mambor is editor-in-chief of the indigenous Papuan newspaper and website Jubi.

  • By Asia Pacific Report editor David Robie

    A lively 43sec video clip surfaced during last week’s Pacific Islands Forum in the Fiji capital of Suva — the first live leaders’ forum in three years since Tuvalu, due to the covid pandemic.

    Posted on Twitter by Guardian Australia’s Pacific Project editor Kate Lyons it showed the doorstopping of Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare by a melee of mainly Australian journalists.

    The aloof Sogavare was being tracked over questions about security and China’s possible military designs for the Melanesian nation.

    A doorstop on security and China greets Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare
    A doorstop on security and China greets Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare (in blue short) at the Pacific islands Forum in Suva last week. Image: Twitter screenshot

    But Lyons made a comment directed more at questioning journalists themselves about their newsgathering style:

    “Australian media attempt to get a response from PM Sogavare, who has refused to answer questions from international media since the signing of the China security deal, on his way to a bilateral with PM Albanese. He stayed smilingly silent.”

    Prominent Samoan journalist, columnist and member of the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) gender council Lagipoiva Cherelle Jackson picked up the thread, saying: “Let’s talk western journalism vs Pacific doorstop approaches.”

    Lagipoiva highlighted for her followers the fact that “the journos engaged in this approach are all white”. She continued:

    ‘A respect thing’
    “We don’t really do this in the Pacific to PI leaders. it’s a respect thing. However there is merit to this approach.”

    A “confrontational” approach isn’t generally practised in the Pacific – “in Samoa, doorstops are still respectful.”

    But she admitted that Pacific journalists sometimes “leaned” on western journalists to ask the hard questions when PI leaders would “disregard local journalists”.

    “Even though this approach is very jarring”, she added, “it is also a necessary tactic to hold Pacific island leaders accountable.”

    So here is the rub. Where were the hard questions in Suva — whether “western or Pacific-style” — about West Papua and Indonesian human rights abuses against a Melanesian neighbour? Surely here was a prime case in favour of doorstopping with a fresh outbreak of violations by Indonesian security forces – an estimated 21,000 troops are now deployed in Papua and West Papua provinces — in the news coinciding with the Forum unfolding on July 11-14.

    In her wrap about the Forum in The Guardian, Lyons wrote about how smiles and unity in Suva – “with the notable exception of Kiribati” – were masking the tough questions being shelved for another day.

    “Take coal. This will inevitably be a sticking point between Pacific countries and Australia, but apparently did not come up at all in discussions,” she wrote.

    “The other conversation that has been put off is China.

    “Pacific leaders have demonstrated in recent months how important the Pacific Islands Forum bloc is when negotiating with the superpower.”

    Forum ‘failed moral obligation’
    In a column in DevPolicy Blog this week, Fiji opposition National Federation Party (NFP) leader and former University of the South Pacific economics professor Dr Biman Prasad criticised forum leaders — and particularly Australia and New Zealand — over the “deafening silence” about declining standards of democracy and governance.

    While acknowledging that an emphasis on the climate crisis was necessary and welcome, he said: “Human rights – including freedom of speech – underpin all other rights, and it is unfortunate that that this Forum failed in its moral obligation to send out a strong message of its commitment to upholding these rights.”

    Back to West Papua, arguably the most explosive security issue confronting the Pacific and yet inexplicably virtually ignored by the Australian and New Zealand governments and news media.

    Fiji Women's Crisis Centre coordinator Shamima Ali and fellow activists at the Morning Star flag raising in solidarity with West Papua
    Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre coordinator Shamima Ali and fellow activists at the Morning Star flag raising in solidarity with West Papua in Suva last week. Image: APR screenshot FV

    In Suva, it was left to non-government organisations and advocacy groups such as the Australia West Papua Association (AWPA) and the Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre (FWCC) to carry the Morning Star of resistance — as West Papua’s banned flag is named.

    The Fiji women’s advocacy group condemned their government and host Prime Minister Bainimarama for remaining silent over the human rights violations in West Papua, saying that women and girls were “suffering twofold” due to the increased militarisation of the two provinces of Papua and West Papuan by the “cruel Indonesian government”.

    Spokesperson Joe Collins of the Sydney-based AWPA said the Fiji Forum was a “missed opportunity” to help people who were suffering at the hands of Jakarta actions.

    “It’s very important that West Papua appears to be making progress,” he said, particularly in this Melanesian region which had the support of Pacific people.

    Intensified violence in Papua
    The day after the Forum ended, Pacific Conference of Churches (PCC) general secretary Reverend James Bhagwan highlighted in an interview with FijiVillage how 100,000 people had been displaced due to intensified violence in the “land of Papua”.

    Pacific Conference of Churches general secretary Reverend James Bhagwan … “significant displacement of the indigenous Papuans has been noted by United Nations experts.” Image: FijiVillage

    He said the increasing number of casualties of West Papuans was hard to determine because no humanitarian agencies, NGOs or journalists were allowed to enter the region and report on the humanitarian crisis.

    Reverend Bhagwan also stressed that covid-19 and climate change reminded Pacific people that there needed to be an “expanded concept of security” that included human security and humanitarian assistance.

    In London, the Indonesian human rights advocacy group Tapol expressed “deep sorrow” over the recent events coinciding with the Forum, and condemned the escalating violence by Jakarta’s security forces and the retaliation by resistance groups.

    Tapol cited “the destruction and repressive actions of the security forces at the Paniai Regent’s Office (Kantor Bupati Paniai) that caused the death of one person and the injury of others on July 5″.

    It also condemned the “shootings and unlawful killings’ of at least 11 civilians reportedly carried out by armed groups in Nduga on July 16.

    “Acts of violence against civilians, when they lead to deaths — whoever is responsible — should be condemned,” Tapol said.

    “We call on these two incidents to be investigated in an impartial, independent, appropriate and comprehensive manner by those who have the authority and competency to do so.”

  • In The Candidate’s Dilemma: Anticorruptionism and Money Politics in Indonesian Election Campaigns (Cornell UP, 2022), Elisabeth Kramer tells the story of how three political candidates in Indonesia made decisions to resist, engage in, or otherwise incorporate money politics into their electioneering strategies over the course of their campaigns.

    As they campaign, candidates encounter pressure from the institutional rules that guide elections, political parties, and voters, and must also negotiate complex social relationships to remain competitive. For anticorruption candidates, this context presents additional challenges for building and maintaining their identities. Some of these candidates establish their campaign parameters early and are able to stay their course. For others, the campaign trail results in an avalanche of compromises, each one eating away at their sense of what constitutes “moral” and “acceptable” behavior. The Candidate’s Dilemma delves into the lived experiences of candidates to offer a nuanced study of how the political and personal intersect when it comes to money politics, anticorruptionism, and electoral campaigning in Indonesia.

    Like this interview? If so, you might also be interested in:

    Professor Michele Ford is the Director of the Sydney Southeast Asia Centre, a university-wide multidisciplinary center at the University of Sydney, Australia.

    The post New Books on SEAsia: Elisabeth Kramer on “The Candidate’s Dilemma” appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    The Australia West Papua Association (AWPA) has condemned the absence of West Papua in last week’s Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) official communique, saying it was “greatly disappointed” that the human rights situation in the Indonesian-ruled Melanesian region had not been mentioned.

    “it is understandable that the PIF has huge challenges in the region and in particular climate change. But for all the talk about inclusiveness it would appear West Papua is not a major concern for the Forum,” spokesperson Joe Collins said in a statement.

    “The PIF could have shown solidarity with the Papuan people by a simple statement of concern about the human rights situation in West Papua (particularly as the situation continues to deteriorate).”

    Collins called on the forum to continue to urge Jakarta to allow a fact-finding mission to the region.

    “The leaders would have had the support of the people of the Pacific region in doing so,” he added.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • By Reiner Brabar in Jayapura

    Papua People’s Petition (PRP) protesters have braved brutal police blockades, forced dispersals and assaults while staging simultaneous mass actions across Papua.

    The actions were held on Thursday to demonstrate the people’s opposition to revisions of the Special Autonomy Law on Papua (Otsus), the creation of new autonomous regions (DOB) and reaffirming demands for a referendum on independence.

    Reports by Suara Papua have covered the following rallies:

    Jayapura
    A PRP action in Jayapura was held under tight security by police who subsequently broke up the rally, resulting in several people being hit and punched by police.

    Four students — Welinus Walianggen, Ebenius Tabuni, Nias Aso and Habel Fauk — were assaulted by police near the PT Gapura Angkasa warehouse at the Cenderawasih University (Uncen) in Waena, Jayapura when police forcibly broke up the student protest.

    According to Walianggen, one of the action coordinators, scores of police officers used batons and rattan sticks to disperse them.

    Meanwhile, PRP protesters arriving from different places conveyed their demands at the Papua Regional House of Representatives (DPRP) office. Although they were blocked by police, negotiations were held at the main entrance to the Parliament building.

    Several DPRP members then met with the demonstrators who handed over a document stating their opposition to the creation of the three new provinces (South Papua, Central Papua and the Papua Highlands) — ratified by the House of Representatives (DPR) during a plenary meeting in Senayan, Jakarta, on Thursday, June 31 — and and demanding that revisions to the Special Autonomy law be revoked.

    Timika
    In Timika, a PRP action was held in front of the Mimika Indonesian Builders Association (Gapensi) offices but this was broken up by police.

    Despite not having permission from police, several speakers expressed the Papuan people’s opposition to Otsus, the DOBs and demands for a referendum. The speakers also called for the closure of the PT Freeport gold and copper mine and the cancellation of planned mining activities in the Wabu Block.

    Nabire
    In Nabire, PRP protesters held their ground against the police but many people who had gathered at Karang Tumaritis, SP 1 and Siriwini were arrested and taken away by the Nabire district police.

    A short time later, demonstrators from several places headed towards the Nabire Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) office where they packed into the Parliament grounds.

    While they were giving speeches, the demonstrators who had been arrested rejoined the action after being dropped off by several Nabire district police vehicles.

    Meepago
    Speakers representing various different organisations and elements of Papuan society in the Meepago region took turns in expressing their views.

    PRP liaison officer for the Meepago region Agus Tebai said that the Papuan people, including those from Meepago, rejected Otsus and the DOBs in the land of Papua. Speakers also said that Otsus and the recently enacted laws on the creation of three new provinces in Papua must be annulled.

    Tebai said that the Papuan people were calling for an immediate referendum to determine the future of West Papua. These demands were handed over to the people’s representatives and accepted by three members of the Nabire DPRD.

    Manokwari
    In Manokwari, PRP protesters gathered on the Amban main road and gave speeches.

    The hundreds of demonstrators were blocked by police and prevented from holding a long march to the West Papua DPRD offices. Negotiations between police and the action coordinator achieved nothing and the demonstrators then disbanded in an orderly fashion.

    Similar mass actions were also held in Yahukimo, Boven Digoel, Sorong and Kaimana in West Papua province.

    Wamena
    In Wamena, meanwhile, the Lapago regional PRP conveyed its support for protesters who took to the streets via video. According to PRP Lapago Secretary Namene Elopere there was no action in Wamena for the Lapago region in accordance with the initial schedule because they were still coordinating with the Jayawijaya district police.

    Aside from protest in Papua, simultaneous actions were also held in Bali, Ambon (Maluku), Surabaya (East Java), Yogyakarta (Central Java), Bandung (West Java) and Jakarta.

    Translated by James Balowski for Indoleft. The original title of the article was Begini Situasi Aksi PRP Hari Ini di Berbagai Daerah.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • By Rusiate Baleilevuka in Suva

    A Fiji women’s advocacy group has condemned their government for remaining silent over the human rights violations in West Papua amid the Pacific Islands Forum being hosted by Prime Minister Voreqe Bainmarama this week.

    Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre (FWCC) coordinator Shamima Ali with other staff members and activists made the criticisms at a ceremony raising the independence flag Morning Star, banned in Indonesia.

    The women raised the flag of West Papua on Wednesday to show their solidarity.

    West Papua's Morning Star flag-raising in Suva
    West Papua’s Morning Star flag-raising in Suva this week. Image: Fijivillage

    Ali said this ceremony was done every Wednesday to remember the people of West Papua, particularly women and girls who were “suffering twofold” due to the increased militarisation of the two provinces of Papua and West Papuan by the “cruel Indonesian government”.

    She said this was a perfect time since all the Pacific leaders were in Fiji for the forum but the Fiji government stayed silent on the issue.

    Ali added that with Fiji as the chair of the forum, Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama should have negotiated for West Papua to be on the agenda.

    Wenda appeals to Pacific Islands Forum
    Meanwhile, United Liberation Movement of West Papua interim president Benny Wenda has appealed to Pacific leaders to show “timely and effective leadership” on the great issues facing the Pacific — “the human rights crisis in West Papua and the existential threat of climate change”.

    “West Papua is a green land in a blue ocean. Our blue Pacific has always united our peoples, rather than dividing them,” he said in a statement.


    Shamima Ali speaking out on West Papua in Suva. Video: Fijivillage

    “In this spirit of Pacific solidarity, we are grateful for the support our Pacific family showed for our struggle in 2019 by calling for Indonesia to allow the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, to visit West Papua.”

    However, Indonesia continued to undermine the forum by refusing to allow a UN visit to take place.

    “For decades, we have been crying that Indonesia is bombing our villages and killing our people, but we have been ignored,” Wenda said.

    “Now, the world is taking notice of our struggle. The United Nations has shown that up to 100,000 West Papuan civilians have been internally displaced by Indonesian military operations in the past three years alone.

    “They have fled into the bush, where they lack access to shelter, food, water, and proper medical facilities. This is a rapidly worsening human rights disaster, requiring immediate attention and intervention by the United Nations.

    “Indonesia hears the increasing calls for a UN visit, but is employing delaying tactics to avoid exposing their crimes against my people to the world.”

    Rusiate Baleilevuka is a Fijivillage reporter.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • The arrest in 2021 of a young Singaporean for planning attacks outside a synagogue raises the question of why a conflict in the Middle East would lead a Muslim in Southeast Asia to want to attack Jews. It is a story of contested beginnings, imperial power, and global conflict.

    Some may think that antisemitism is just a Western hatred with no resonance in Asia, including Singapore. However, the case of a 20-year-old national serviceman detained by the Internal Security Department (ISD) after planning attacks on a synagogue there in 2021 shows otherwise. Moreover, there is well-documented antisemitism in both Malaysia and Indonesia.

    Southeast Asian antisemitism has, however, often bemused scholars and researchers, because it has been described as an antisemitism without Jews. Historically, Jewish communities have been at best marginal, or often non-existent, within what is now the Muslim-dominated archipelago around modern day Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei.

    While centuries-old communities exist in India and China, records indicate Jews arriving in Southeast Asia in the wake of European colonisation from the seventeenth century. Most were traders, and communities across Southeast Asia probably never exceeded a few tens of thousands. The last community that existed in Penang, Malaysia, died out in the mid-twentieth century. In Indonesia, the only synagogue for many years was in Surabaya, but it became inactive due to tensions and declining numbers in 2009 and was demolished in 2013. Only two synagogues currently exist, one in Jakarta, serving a small community, while in 2022 the region’s first Holocaust museum was opened in Sulawesi, which is significant as Holocaust denial is often tied into modern antisemitism.

    Sha’ar Hashayamim Synagoge inauguration by local government, in Minahasa in 2019. Image by Yaakov Baruch on Wikimedia Commons.

    Singapore has the oldest active synagogue in the region, and many Jewish figures, such as David Marshall, were influential in the city’s history. Only a small local community still exists, but in the wider expatriate community there exists a good number of Jews as part of the nation’s sizable temporary workforce. Brunei has never had a synagogue.

    It is useful to define some terms and context for antisemitism, because Southeast Asian antisemitism only exists within a wider global and colonial context. Antisemitism is a form of prejudice which affects Jews and those perceived as Jews, and has been around for over two thousand years. Any distinctive community that exists as a minority is likely to be the subject of prejudice, and Jews have been no exception. In the Jewish case, the intertwined history with Christianity has made it a widely prevalent and genocidal hatred.

    What we now think of as the Christian religion began as a branch of Judaism; Jesus, his disciples, and Paul were all Jews and thought as Jews; Paul’s letters are effectively midrash, or traditional rabbinic commentary. The advocates of the early Jesus movement represented a new interpretation of Judaism that became focused on conversion outside the Jewish community. However, over a few centuries, Christians came to find their Jewish roots obscure, and when Emperor Constantine adopted Christianity as an official part of the state apparatus a seismic rupture essentially severed connections.

    Moreover, over these centuries and in those that followed, Christians developed a whole literature and ideological frame that saw “the Jew” as abominable and even demonic. Virulent antisemitic tracts emanated from Christian bishops and teachers, reading antisemitic messages into the New Testament texts. Today, all mainstream Christian churches have acknowledged their complicity in the prejudicial hatred and environment that made the Shoah (Holocaust) possible.

    We need to talk! Art, offence and politics in Documenta 15

    Human-rights oriented Indonesian art collectives have been accused of anti-Semitism at one of Europe’s largest art exhibitions, Documenta, in Kassel, Germany.

    To understand the connection to Southeast Asia, however, requires understanding how European colonialism spread antisemitism, particularly around Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This led first to Arab Christians adopting antisemitic ideas, which seeped into secular Arab nationalism then into Islamic Arab nationalisms, and into a full-blown Islamic antisemitism. This latter move came during the 1930s, and two key figures were the mufti of Jerusalem Hajji Amin Al-Husseini and Syed Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb wrote a tract called Our Struggle With the Jews in in 1950 which still circulates in Southeast Asia today and defined an eternal enmity between Jews and Muslims, but drew on Western antisemitic tropes.

    Alongside this, the importance of the current Palestine-Israel conflicts cannot be underestimated for how Muslims globally view Jews. Hence, in Southeast Asia, as elsewhere, the narratives on this shape discourses, with many Muslims perceiving what is often termed the “settler colonialism” and “apartheid” of Israeli state policy, and a certain form of Zionism, as driving a wedge between the communities.

    Before proceeding, several caveats need noting. Firstly, accusations of Israel as a “settler colonial” state and engaged in “apartheid” are hotly contested, so I am only noting here a perception of this without arguing either way. Secondly, Zionism names a range of attitudes of Jewish people towards a homeland that may or may not be Israel (some early Zionists suggested South America may make a good homeland). As such, the excesses of militant Zionist settlers is far from definitive of all Zionisms. Thirdly, opposition to Israeli policies vis-à-vis Muslims is not itself antisemitic, nor does it entail hatred of Jews, and many local Muslims recognise this, especially in relation to their tradition, a matter we can unpack further.

    In the Quran, hadith, and Islamic tradition, Jews—like Christians—were regarded as People of the Book (ahl al-kitab) and Protected People (ahl al-dhimma), and had resultantly lived peaceably in Muslim-dominated lands. Indeed, when persecuted or exiled by Christian rulers, many Jews had found congenial homes amongst Muslims who often welcomed them warmly. The Jewish golden age of philosophy, literature, and learning of the medieval period happened in Muslim-dominated Spain, as well as in such cities as Cairo, and Baghdad. Antisemitism can therefore be seen as something alien to the Islamic tradition, despite its adoption today by many Muslims under Western influence.

    When we address Islamic antisemitism in Southeast Asia today, we therefore need to return to our earlier discussion about the growth of this tradition in MENA. As noted, many Muslims learnt antisemitism via Christian and secular Arabs, from Western colonial, secular, and Christian sources. But, in figures such as Syed Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood, it became internalised as what we may term an Islamic religious ideological stance. Qutb’s role in the Muslim Brotherhood meant that antisemitism became embedded in Egypt and beyond, most notably in Saudi Arabia. It was really from this source, through what has been termed the Arabisation of Southeast Asian Islam, that antisemitism spread as a part of the Wahhabi-Salafism as taught from the 1980s onwards.

    This is not, though, to deny colonial and other sources of antisemitism, and in Indonesia antisemitism was institutional in the colonial period, came with Nazi influence under Japanese occupation, and was spread by notable Christian nationalists such as Ratu Langie.

    The global spread of modern Saudi Arabian and MENA Islam, including in the Southeast Asian region, means that antisemitism exists in many Muslim communities. The Israel-Palestine conflict has led many Muslims to see their fellows repressed by Jews, and news reporting has reinforced an antisemitic narrative that is essentially alien to traditional Islamic tenets.

    The prominence of antisemitism in recent times, particularly in Malaysia, where we have noted the endogenous Jewish community has disappeared, may seem puzzling. But attention to the discursive function of the trope of “the Jew” and how antisemitism operates makes it clear.

    Firstly, it was arguably under Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir that antisemitism gained a major public profile there, a discourse he has repeated in recent years. He was instrumental in turning towards a Muslim identity in the political sphere and away from a secular framing. As such, given Wahhabi-Salafi infiltration and the prominence of Palestine-Israel as a point of identity for a global Muslim ummah (community), it was a natural discursive trope to help found arguments for a beleaguered and oppressed Muslim identity that would bind group identity and garner support.

    Secondly, within Malaysia’s context, as Mary Ainslee has argued, antisemitism without Jews has been a cipher for a different group: the Chinese. In other words, antisemitic discourse about Jews as a minority but yet a prosperous and controlling group (playing on old antisemitic tropes noted below), has acted as a code to criticise and stir up resentment against local Chinese, perceived as a successful business community which prospers at the expense of Malays. A similar pattern has also been observed in Indonesia.

    It has been noted that copies of Henry Ford’s deeply antisemitic text The Universal Jew were handed out at Mahathir’s political rallies in the 2000s. This points to the ongoing Western influence. Moreover, the conception of controlling and prosperous Jews plays upon tropes developed through European history, but very particularly on a nineteenth century forgery, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which allegedly records a secret meeting of Jewish leaders discussing their plot for world domination. Originally a scene from a novel, it has taken on a life of its own and has the passage we have discussed: from Europe (both France and Russia were posited origins), to MENA where it influenced Qutb’s writings, and now to Southeast Asia in the Islamic ideological framing of antisemitism.

    The porte-cochère of Maghain Aboth Synagogue, Singapore. Image by Smuconlaw on Wikimedia Commons.

    All this brings us back to the context of the detained 20-year-old Singaporean youth. While actual violence, or planned violence against Jews is rare in Southeast Asia—though a planned (Jemaah Islamiyah) JI attack in 2001 on Singapore targeted not just the US but also the Israeli embassy—antisemitic sentiment clearly festers regionally.

    This is particularly tied to anti-Israeli sentiment. Amongst the countries surveyed here, only Singapore has close ties with Israel, and Malaysia in particular has had sometimes tense relations. But anti-Israeli sentiment can be separated from antisemitism (many Israeli and non-Israeli Jews criticise the government’s harsh policies towards the Palestinians). Therefore, while many Muslims regionally may criticise Israel, certainly not all are antisemitic. Muslims and Jews sit side-by-side in the Interreligious Organisation of Singapore and other platforms. In Indonesia, for example, some have stressed kinship. Respect for Jews, as People of the Book, is integral to Muslim identity for many.

    As such, it was no surprise that Singapore’s Mufti and others expressed their outrage at the planned crime. Indeed, Jewish and Muslim leaders united together to condemn it. It may be said that it was not Islam that gave this young man these ideas, but a politicised hatred learnt via colonial imposition and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

    Nevertheless, like synagogues globally, those across Southeast Asia have security in place, and the need for reviewing security across places of worship in Singapore has been noted. Although Singapore’s Chief Rabbi has contrasted the safety felt here compared to Europe, there is no room for complacency given regional discourses on antisemitism. Indeed, Singapore is something of an outlier amongst the countries surveyed in that peaceful rather than hostile discourse marks the Jewish-Muslim encounter. This is perhaps related to Singapore’s carefully curated interreligious landscape.

    The response from, and amicable relationship between, Singapore’s Muslim and Jewish leaders and wider community is a sign of hope, but it is not the norm and is something that needs more regional support. It may be useful to stress the traditional amity of Muslims and Jews in the teachings of community leaders, in madrassahs, and the Malay language literature. ​ Yet, it cannot be ignored that, in the region, antisemitism remains rife amongst many Muslims.

    The post Antisemitism in Southeast Asia: Stories from Jerusalem to Jakarta appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • By Melisha Yafoi in Port Moresby

    The Indonesian government has filed a K105.6 million (US$30 million) writ against Papua New Guinea, naming two senior officials as persons of interest toward the illegal shipments of hazardous materials.

    The two officials named are acting managing director for Conservation and Environment Protection Authority (CEPA) Gunther Joku and State Solicitor Daniel Rolpagarea.

    Republic of Indonesia’s Ministry of Environment and Forestry-Basel Protocol’s Department’s Chief Compliance Officer Siti Muhammad told the Post-Courier they had been given the cold shoulder by the PNG government over the issue.

    Last week the Indonesian government, in a letter addressed to the CEPA’s’s acting managing director Gunther Joku demanded that the PNG government pay a fine of K105.6 million (US$30 million) in 14 days for the management and storage of six illegal oil shipments.

    Muhammad said that by 1 August 2022 PNG would be required to seek written approval from Indonesia Environment prior to the loading of any oil-related products, including but not limited to HS 1511 – Palm Oil HS 2710 – Crude Oil.

    “We have advised Sime Darby (Malaysia) of the new process required effective August 1 2022 toward any oil palm shipments which transit through our waters and Indonesia Customs is advising PNG customs as such,” she said.

    “It is my intent to ensure that any shipments coming from Papua New Guinea are monitored and checked for correct information due to the ongoing mislabeling issues.

    Filed a writ
    “We have filed a writ against the State of Papua New Guinea, naming Mr Gunther Joku and Mr Daniel Rolpagarea as persons of interest toward the illegal shipments of Hazardous Materials from Papua New Guinea and they will be advised in due course and requested to attend the hearing in Jakarta.”

    Muhammad said they were currently planning a ban on any oil shipments through Indonesian waters either to or from PNG until such a time they had assurance that the products which were being claimed, were indeed what were being shipped.

    This includes oil palm and crude oil.

    “The waters of Indonesia are critical to the Asia-Pacific region and we acknowledge that on the previous instance of PNG causing a spill from an illegal shipment, no recognition or rectification was provided,” Muhammad said.

    “Our waters provide transit for fuel to Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific. Closing our waters due to an issue from Papua New Guinea will see the entire Indo-Pacific shut down and provide an unthinkable security risk to the region.

    “Many countries will suffer if our waterways are blocked due to this occurrence. Indonesia will not take such risks purely because Papua New Guinea lacks the interest to implement programs which she has signed to.”

    Melisha Yafoi is a PNG Post-Courier reporter. Republished with permission.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Hanwha Defense will manufacture a batch of 25 Barracuda vehicles for local police forces under a contract between Hanwha Corporation and the Indonesian National Police. The 4×4 Barracuda features excellent manoeuvrability and protection for multiple missions such as reconnaissance and internal security Hanwha Defense offers a wide range of advanced wheeled/tracked armored vehicles to global […]

    The post Hanwha signs contract to deliver 25 Barracuda armored vehicles to Indonesian Police appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    The Papua People’s Council (MRP) says that a Coordinating Ministry for Security, Politics and Legal Affairs (Kemenko Polhukam) deputy has told them that the creation of new autonomous regions (DOB) in Papua is to narrow the space for the West Papua National Liberation Army-Free Papua Movement (TNPB-OPM) to move.

    MRP Chair Timotius Murib said that the Coordinating Minister for Security, Politics and Legal Affairs Mahfud MD also made the statement during a meeting between the Kemenko Polhukam and the MRP.

    Murib said that during the meeting, the MPR had received a great deal of input from the Kemenko Polhukam.

    “One of the deputies told the MRP that the MPR should know that the DOB is an activity by the state to narrow the space for the TNPB-OPM or KKBs [armed criminal groups] to move,” said Murib during a virtual press conference on June 30.

    Murib said the deputy also said that the government would build large numbers of regional police (Polda) headquarters and regional military commands (Kodam),

    Because of this, the MRP believed that the creation of new autonomous regions in Papua was aimed at bringing more military into Papua and encircling the TPNPB.

    According to Murib, the government was not prioritising the interests of ordinary people but rather the desire to exploit natural resources in Papua.

    “And they want to build [more] Polda, Kodam, in the near future,” said Murib.

    Murib revealed that there were many people who had heard the statement by the deputy.

    The MRP believes that it is no longer a secret that the government is pursuing natural resources in Papua and ignoring the interests of local people.

    According to Murib, the government also wants to exploit natural resources without being disturbed by other parties by bringing in large numbers of military personnel.

    “But brought in so that when natural resources [are managed] in Papua no one disrupts this. Because the country’s debt is indeed very big at the moment,” the deputies said.

    Earlier on June 30, the House of Representatives (DPR) enacted three laws on the establishment of new provinces in Papua — Central Papua, the Papua Highlands and South Papua.

    Note
    The original text of the second paragraph in which Murib said that Minister Mahfud MD made the statement, rather than the unnamed deputy, read: “Ketua Majelis Rakyat Papua (MRP), Timotius Murib mengatakan, bawahan Menko Polhukam, Mahfud MD menyampaikan pernyataan itu dalam salah satu pertemuan Kemenko Polhukam dengan MRP”.

    Translated by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. The original title of the article was Majelis Rakyat Papua: Bawahan Mahfud Sebut DOB Papua Tuk Persempit OPM.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • RNZ Pacific

    The president of the United Liberation Movement of West Papua, Benny Wenda, has arrived to a warm welcome in Port Vila from London where he is based.

    Representatives of the Vanuatu West Papua Independence Committee, who are organising his trip, made sure the media was present only during a welcome ceremony at the Shefa provincial government headquarters.

    Shefa province has adopted the people of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) as “brothers and sisters of Vanuatu”.

    The movement’s Morning Star flag is flown alongside the Shefa provincial flag at its Headquarters in Port Vila.

    It is not clear if Wenda will meet government leaders.

    He will be in Port Vila for two weeks.

    Vanuatu has donated a plot of land along with office facilities for use by ULMWP as its international office in Port Vila.

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Pressured to solve the ongoing cooking oil crisis in Indonesia, President Joko Widodo reshuffled his cabinet and appointed Zulkifli Hasan to replace the previous Minister of Trade, Muhammad Lutfi.

    Many view this appointment as merely strategic political consolidation by Widodo instead of as a means to seriously handle the crisis. Zulkifli is a prominent party leader of the National Mandate Party (PAN), one of the large political parties that recently joined Widodo’s big government coalition.

    Whatever the original intention, Zulkifli is undoubtedly far from the right person for the job. Just a couple of days after being appointed, he claimed that there was no “mafia” behind the cooking oil crisis. He deliberately ignored the fact that in April the Attorney General named four suspects in a corruption case regarding the approval for exporting crude palm oil. A high-ranking official from the Ministry of Trade allegedly received bribes from separate individuals from Wilmar Nabati Indonesia, Permata Hijau Group, and Musim Mas to grant export licenses without them having to adhere to domestic market obligations beforehand. According to Ministry of Trade Regulation No. 33/2022, to obtain an export permit, palm oil companies are required to deposit 30% of their total crude palm oil production for the needs of the Indonesian domestic market. Wilmar Nabati Indonesia, Permata Hijau Group, and Musim Mas are among Indonesia’s major palm oil producers and have repeatedly received special treatment from the government, notably in the form of massive incentives or subsidies.

    It is also important to note that as Minister of Forestry in 2009-2014, Zulkifli had a track record,  converting up to 1,64 million hectares of forests for oil palm plantations, benefitting the interests of palm oil giants in doing so. It is especially concerning to see that the current Ministry of Trade won’t publicly acknowledge that the roots of the cooking oil crisis stem from how the palm oil industry operates in Indonesia. The ministry also has a track record of appeasing the interests of said industry.

    The mismanagement of the palm oil industry in Indonesia has a long history, coloured by corruption and government collusion with palm oil oligarchs. Tania Li and Pujo Semedi observed that the prevalence of palm oil plantations was not due to agronomic superiority or productive efficiency but by political support: through the political economy, political technology, and a regime of impunity that is characteristic of Indonesia’s political environment.

    Food availability, Indonesia’s commodity balance and the trap of Malthusian Optimism

    A recent research paper casts doubt on the government’s ability to accurately determine available supplies.

    In that regard, we can’t trust the government to adequately solve the cooking oil crisis since it was mainly their own creation. The nationwide scarcity of cooking oil that sparked the crisis was not a bug but a feature of Indonesia’s palm oil oligopoly. The oligopoly, in part, is maintained through Widodo’s “new developmentalism” ideology which puts deregulated capitalism at the forefront of governing every public sector, including palm oil management.

    In 2010, the Indonesian Business Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU) determined that 20 cooking oil producers were involved in cartel practices and export more than 90% of their products due to weak supervision by the government. However, the Indonesian ”political technology” succeeded in defeating the KPPU at the Supreme Court, resulting in a failure to improve control and management of the cooking oil supply chain in Indonesia.

    Through a subsidy scheme by the government, the palm oil company that allocates their crude palm oil for biodiesel, will be compensated heavily. The same scheme is unavailable if crude palm oil is allocated for cooking oil purposes. This, in turn, decreases the allocation of crude palm oil for cooking oil and lowers available stock, hence triggering the crisis.

    Technically speaking, this subsidy scheme—which started in 2016, didn’t have a proper legal basis when it was implemented. The relevant Law (No. 39/2014) doesn’t specify whether the government can allocate the palm oil funds for biodiesel incentives. However, subsequent implementing regulations (Government Regulation No. 24/2015 & Presidential Decree No. 61/2015) allowed it to. This contradicts the legal systems hierarchy of laws in which implementing regulations cannot regulate things that are not explicitly mentioned by the higher laws. Recently, this legally dubious provision was entrenched in the controversial Law No. 11/2020 on Job Creation—which was created behind closed doors without any semblance of meaningful participation from the public. This law-making process was later deemed to violate the Indonesian constitution by the Constitutional Court.

    To face the cooking oil crisis seriously means untangling the complex web that maintains the hegemony of palm oil oligarchy. This web encompasses minimal supply chain oversight, rampant corruption by the government and the palm oil industry, and the haphazard adoption of a neoliberal ideology that sacrifices anything for the sake of profit—including public welfare and environmental sustainability. We need to remodel Indonesia’s political and economic system so it can accommodate justice and equity for all.

    The post The price for maintaining Indonesia’s palm oil industry hegemony appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • COMMENTARY: By Benny Wenda

    Today we celebrate the 51st anniversary of the independence declaration of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) at Markas Victoria on July 1, 1971.

    The declaration, signed by Seth Rumkoren and Jacob Prai — who sadly passed away last month — was a direct rejection of Indonesian colonialism.

    It sent a powerful message to Jakarta: “We, the people of West Papua, are sovereign in our own land, and we do not recognise your illegal occupation or the 1969 ‘Act of No Choice’.”

    West Papua's Benny Wenda
    West Papua’s Benny Wenda (left) with PNG journalist Henry Yamo at the Pacific Media Centre on his visit to New Zealand in 2013. Image: Del Abcede/APR

    From that moment on, we have been struggling for the independence of West Papua. Through guerilla warfare, the OPM has helped keep the flame of liberation alive. They are our home guard, defending our land and fighting for the sovereignty that was stolen from us by Jakarta.

    This day is an opportunity for all West Papuans to reflect on our struggle and unite with determination to complete our mission. Whether you are exiled abroad, in a refugee camp, a member of the West Papua Army, or internally displaced by colonial forces, we are all united in one spirit and determined to liberate West Papua from Indonesian oppression.

    The OPM laid the foundations for the political struggle [that] the Provisional Government is now fighting. As expressed in our constitution, the provisional government recognises all declarations as vital and historic moments in our struggle.

    Having declared our provisional government, our cabinet, our military wing, and our seven regional executives, we are ready to take charge of our own affairs.

    Two new announcements
    I also want to use this moment to make two new announcements about our provisional government.

    First, I am announcing the formation of a new government department, the Department of Intelligence Services. As with our existing departments, it will operate on the ground in occupied West Papua, and reinforce our challenge to Indonesian colonialism.

    In addition, I am announcing that we have appointed an executive member for each of the seven regional bodies we established in December 2021. With every step forward, we are building our capacity and infrastructure as a provisonal government.

    Over 50 years on from the 1971 proklamasi, our people’s mission is the same.

    We refuse Indonesian presence in WP, which is illegal under international law. We do not recognise “Special Autonomy”, five new provinces, or any other colonial law; we have our own constitution.

    I again reiterate my call for President Joko Widodo to sit down with me and discuss an independence referendum. This remains the only pathway to a peaceful solution.

    Benny Wenda, Interim President, United liberation Movement of West Papua (ULMWP) Provisional Government.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • In March 2022, Muhammad Qodari, the high profile executive director of Indo Barometer survey institute grabbed headlines by proposing that President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and his former presidential rival and now Minister of Defence Prabowo Subianto run on a joint ticket for the 2024 presidential election.  He argued that this would unify the nation and “polarisation would disappear”.

    Politicians and scholars have repeatedly warned of the dangers that polarisation, especially of a religious nature, poses to Indonesian democracy.  Deepening cleavages between religious communities that were once on civil terms are seen as contributing to a political culture of intolerance and democratic illiberalism.

    But in the past three years, a new trend has emerged which might best be labelled “counter-polarisation”.  In this development, politicians and their parties undertake initiatives or manoeuvres in the name of reducing polarisation and easing intra-communal tensions.  This usually involves parties that were once on opposing sides of the political divide agreeing to cooperate or coalesce.  Not uncommonly, this is hailed as a move to restore national cohesion and strengthen democracy.

    The first and most striking example of this was the decision of Prabowo Subianto, the losing candidate in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, to join Joko Widodo’s new cabinet in October 2019 as Defence Minister, despite having campaigned sometimes rancorously against his rival.  One of Prabowo’s justifications for this abrupt about-face was the need to heal divisions between his and Jokowi’s supporters.

    Since then, similar arguments have been used to broker deals that bring together seemingly disparate electoral candidates or parties.  One such case is Qodari’s proposed Jokowi-Prabowo joint ticket, which proved especially controversial because it would require a constitutional amendment to allow Jokowi to stand for a third term. Critics said changing the constitution for this purpose would be democratically regressive. Qodari argued that so great was the threat of polarisation that extending the presidential term limit was justified.  Another proposal called for Prabowo, who previously drew strong Islamist support, to run with Puan Maharani, from the nationalist Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). In the same spirit, the chairman of the NasDem party suggested that Ganjar Pranowo, the Central Java governor who represents the nationalist camp, take as his running mate Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan, who attracts strong Islamist support.

    Jokowi-Prabowo political reconciliation as Javanese strategy

    The underpinning politics between Jokowi and Prabowo reveals a deeper complexity within the Indonesian election.

    Parties also used “bridge building” arguments to support a flurry of new alliances and proposed coalitions.  Two Islamic parties—the United Development Party (PPP) and the National Mandate Party (PAN)—coalesced with the nationalist Golkar in May 2022, and more recently the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), launched alliance talks with the religiously neutral NasDem and the moderate Islamic National Awakening Party (PKB), both of which were previously staunch PKS rivals. Even debate over the length of the 2024 election campaign saw parties arguing about whether a shorter period was more likely to reduce polarisation than a longer one.

    Two questions arise from these developments. Is polarisation as serious a problem as many contend, particularly following the 2019 elections? And is the use of counter-polarisation justifications for political realignments credible or just a cover for other motivations?  We will argue that a recent survey shows a decline in the high levels of polarisation of the 2014-2019 period and that much of the counter-polarisation trend is driven by parties’ attempts to maximise their opportunities in the run-up to the 2024 elections.

    How Polarised is Indonesia?

    This article draws from two data sets, both from Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI). The first is the “National Survey on Polarization” conducted in April 2021, which involved 1620 respondents across all provinces of Indonesia.  The margin of error was +/-2.5 at a confidence level of 95%.  The second is “Polarization among Indonesian Muslim Elites”, an analysis of social media content between 2016 to 2021.  More than 2000 excerpts and quotes from a wide range of Muslim organisations and leaders were analysed to discern whether the postings represented conservative, progressive or neutral viewpoints on controversial current issues.

    The survey found that 11% of respondents felt Indonesia was highly polarised and 27% thought it was quite polarised, compared to 33% who believed there was only slight polarisation and 16% who saw no polarisation. This suggests that for a majority of the public, polarisation was not a significant national problem. Those who thought that polarisation was of concern belonged primarily to the elite in urban areas: professionals, and those with higher levels of education and income. Thus while over 56% of those with tertiary education thought that polarisation was of concern, less than 20% of those with only elementary education believed it was a problem. This indicates that existing polarisation is more an elite than a grassroots concern.

    In addition, 46% of respondents who use the Internet (64% of the total number of voters) also tended to see the country as highly or quite polarised, compared to only 24% of respondents who have no Internet access. Thus, although in general the respondents feel that Indonesia is not polarised, exposure to the Internet, such as social media or news sites, increases this perceived sense of division.

    A recurring theme of the “reducing polarisation” proposals is that there is a deep cleavage between those holding pluralist views and those with Islamist views. Pluralism in this case refers to those who favour a polity based on inclusivity, in keeping with the principle of religious neutrality set out in the state ideology of Pancasila. Pluralists resist special privileges being accorded to the nation’s large Muslim majority and also object to political mobilisation based on what they see as “transnational” Islam, or an expression of Islam perceived as inspired by movements or trends from the Middle East.  Islamists are those who seek a political and social system in which Islamic law and principles feature prominently. They believe that the majority status of Muslims combined with Islam’s important role in Indonesia’s history should be formally reflected in the structure and laws of the state.

    The LSI survey, however, showed that the cleavage between pluralist and Islamist groups is less deep than widely supposed. Indeed, the results suggest that high public antipathy is mainly directed to specific religious minority groups rather than major ideological blocs.  The survey used the “feeling thermometer” method for measuring polarisation.  Respondents were shown a list of organisations and parties and asked to rank these according to how warmly or coolly they regarded them, with 100 being hot and zero cold.  (see Chart One)

    Chart One: Feeling Thermometer for persons and groups

    Of the numerous Islamist organisations included in the list, perhaps the most significant for measuring polarisation is PKS.  This largest of Islamist parties that has garnered roughly 7-8% of the national vote in the four general elections since 2004 and is often singled out by pluralists as an example of “transnational Islam” due to its historical links to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. PKS was a key Prabowo supporter in the 2014 and 2019 elections, spear-heading damaging social media and mosque-based attacks on Jokowi’s religious credibility.

    Despite its reputation, PKS received an unexpectedly warm 56 “degrees” on the thermometer, placing it above the median. By way of comparison, the groups which were most warmly regarded were, not surprisingly, Indonesia’s two largest mainstream organisations, Nahdlatul Ulama (74) and Muhammadiyah (64).  PKS was more warmly regarded than various non-Muslim groups, such as Christians (50), Hindus (46), Buddhists (43), all of whom might also have been expected to have cooler responses judging by earlier thermometer surveys.

    So, if PKS drew mildly warm “feelings”, which groups evinced the coolest responses?  The five lowest-ranked groups were: local faith sects (38 degrees), usually a reference to heterodox Muslims groups (sometimes referred to Kepercayaan or Kebatinan); the banned Islamist movement Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (33); the Muslim minority sects Ahmadiyah and the Shia (both 32); and, at the very bottom, the progressive Liberal Islamic Network (JIL) (30), which has been inactive for many years.

    In addition to the thermometer questions, respondents were asked how they felt about having neighbours (Chart Two), sons- or daughters-in-law (Chart Three), or local leaders (Chart Four) from the same list of groups. This is a more specific measure of “affective polarisation’ that gauges the strength of positive or negative emotions. Once again, PKS drew less hostile responses than pluralist discourses might suggest. Sixty-nine percent of respondents didn’t mind having PKS members as neighbours and only 9% objected; 51% could accept them as local leaders and 14% were opposed. 47% of respondents would not object to PKS in-laws, though 26% were resistant. By contrast, more than 30% of respondents were opposed to Ahmadi, Shia or JIL members living near them, and HTI and the banned Islamist vigilante Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) attracted objections from 28% and 24% respectively. Forty-seven percent of respondents would not vote for candidates from local sects; 45% felt the same about Ahmadi candidates, 44% for Shia and 43% for JIL. Objections to having these same groups marrying into respondents’ families were especially high: 55% for Shia, 54% for Ahmadis, 53% for JIL, 49% for HTI and 40% for FPI.

    Chart Two: Feeling Objection for being neighbours with…

    Also notable was the fact that 81% had no objection to supporters of a rival presidential candidate or party for whom they voted living in their neighbourhood, which points to tolerance of political differences in contrast to strong dislike for religious outliers.

    Chart Three: Feeling objection to marrying your child to…

    Chart Four: Feeling objection to voting for a local leader who is…

    These results reveal that the strongest feelings of dislike are directed not towards rival mainstream groups but rather at those on or near the margins who are seen as religiously “deviant” or “excessively” Islamist or liberal. Intolerance of Muslim groups that deviate from Sunni orthodoxy, as defined by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the state-sanctioned National Ulama Council (MUI) or pre-eminent Islamic organisations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, has been growing since the Yudhoyono presidency in the late 2000s.  Local sects are frowned upon for their heterodoxy, particularly in blending Islamic and non-Islamic practices.  Ahmadis and Shia, while regarding themselves as Muslim, albeit not part of the Sunni majority, are seen by many conservative Sunnis as theologically problematic and have faced repeated calls for their banning.  HTI is disliked because it espouses the creation of a transnational Islamic government under the leadership of a caliph, which is seen as subverting Indonesia’s foundational principles.  FPI has a public reputation of violence and contempt for law and order. Last of all, JIL, though long moribund, is still seen as emblematic of disruptively progressive ideas that undermine established Islamic norms and practices.  In effect, by objecting to groups such as these, respondents are marking the boundaries of what they regard as acceptable mainstream behaviour.  One might call this a centrist orthodoxy which seeks to exclude ideas and practices that do not conform to an increasingly rigid set of middle-ground norms.

    The extent to which PKS is widely accepted as a mainstream party and its Islamism as part of the tapestry of Indonesian Islam rather than an ideological or religious “other” is also reflected in respondents’ answers to a question asking them to place themselves along a continuum of proximity to PDIP at one end or PKS at the other. While, as expected, feelings of closeness to PDIP are much higher than those towards PKS (18% vs 5%), nonetheless, 38% of those who answered the question placed themselves in the middle of the continuum.

    Whereas the survey provides a snapshot of general community attitudes, social media content analysis offers insights into elite opinion because most of the material studied in this process comes from official websites of Islamic organisations or directly from individual Muslim leaders.  One conclusion from this material bears out the findings of the “National Survey on Polarization” survey finding noted earlier, that elites are more polarised than the rest of society. For example, we can almost directly compare the survey results and the content analysis on the issue of the banning of FPI. With the former, 63% of survey respondents who were aware of the ban supported it and only 29% were opposed, but in social media, 50% of postings opposed the ban and only 34% were in favour. So, opinions were roughly reversed, with almost two-thirds of the general populace favouring the ban but only one-third of elite opinion supporting it.

    Elite disapproval on deviancy issues also appears much stronger than the public’s disapproval. 62% of commentary in social media was hostile to local beliefs, 57% was critical of Ahmadiyah and 39% critical of Shia beliefs.

    One reason for elite susceptibility to polarisation is that they are directly involved in competition for political and economic resources, which requires them to mobilise their support bases.  Exploiting religious identity issues is often an effective means of generating emotion and commitment to their cause.  By contrast, ordinary voters are not usually direct beneficiaries of contestation for political power and rewards.

    The data presented above shows that polarisation, particularly on religious issues, remains significant, though not as serious as many politicians and observers have contended. If we place the 2021 survey results beside data from other credible surveys over the past decade, it is possible to conclude that the high point of polarisation occurred during and between the 2014 and 2019 elections, but has since declined.

    While it is welcome that politicians have expressed concern about religious cleavages and shown a willingness to ease divisions in the name of national cohesion and protecting democracy, there are grounds for doubting that counter-polarisation is the real reason for many recent political manoeuvres. Prabowo readily used divisive appeals as a major part of his presidential campaign strategy in 2014 and 2019, and his main reason for now joining his former opponents is that he wants to rebrand himself as a unifying and statesman-like public figure for the 2024 election. The efforts to extend Widodo’s presidential term are driven by the desire of parts of the ruling coalition to remain in power as long as possible. Any extension beyond 2024 would be a further blow to the quality of Indonesia’s democracy. Finally, those parties that now find virtue in collaboration or coalition with former foes are motivated by a desire to maximise their negotiating positions in the run up to the next parliamentary and presidential elections. Putting together alternative tickets for the presidency reduces their risk of becoming peripheral players who have to accept what the largest parties dictate, rather than being able to protect their own interests.

    The salience of polarisation may increase again in the led up to the 2024 elections. But we need also to be mindful of the fact that a certain degree of polarisation is normal in a democracy, a reflection of ideological difference and engagement with the political process. As Robert B Talisse reminded us recently, “The response to polarisation cannot involve calls for unanimity or abandoning partisan rivalries. A democracy without political divides is no democracy at all.”

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    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • The English version of the post can be read here.

    Konflik, kekecewaan, dan rasa takut membayangi pembukaan pameran seni lima tahunan yang dikenal dengan Documenta 15 di Kassel, Jerman pada tanggal 18 Juni yang lalu, ketika tuduhan anti-Semitisme dilontarkan pada kolektif seni Taring Padi yang berpartisipasi dan, bukan untuk pertama kalinya, pada artistik direktur, kolektif seni ruangrupa (dengan huruf r kecil) dari Indonesia. Kedua kolektif tersebut menolak tuduhan anti-Semitisme dan telah meminta maaf karena sebelum pameran dibuka gagal mendeteksi sifat ofensif dari gambar di dalam banner besar yang berjudul The People’s Justice. Setelah awalnya diselimuti kain hitam, kini karya tersebut telah dibongkar .

    Peristiwa ini berdampak besar dan reaksi yang muncul sangat keras dan emosional, baik di Jerman maupun di Israel. Di Twitter, kedutaan Israel mencemooh karya seni itu sebagai “propaganda lama gaya Goebbels” sementara Menteri Kebudayaan Jerman menyatakan bahwa dia telah “dikhianati” oleh manajemen dan kurator Documenta, yang sebelumnya telah memastikan bahwa anti-Semitisme tidak mendapatkan tempat di dalam pameran besar ini. Di Indonesia dan di tempat lain, insiden tersebut, dan lebih khusus lagi tanggapan dari pihak berwenang, telah menyalakan kembali paranoia tentang konspirasi Zionis dan memicu tumbuhnya perasaan bahwa penyelenggara terikat pada kekuatan xenofobia konservatif yang tidak tertarik untuk, dan secara aktif merepresi, dialog konstruktif.

    Ketika pemilihan mereka sebagai direktur artistik Documenta diumumkan pada tahun 2019, ruangrupa menggarisbawahi asal usul festival: “Jika documenta diluncurkan pada tahun 1955 untuk menyembuhkan luka perang, mengapa kita tidak memfokuskan documenta 15 pada cedera hari ini, terutama yang berakar pada kolonialisme, kapitalisme, atau struktur patriarki, dan mengkontraskannya dengan model berbasis kemitraan yang memungkinkan orang memiliki pandangan berbeda tentang dunia.” Dengan mengundang kolektif seni dari seluruh dunia, dan terutama masyarakat yang terkena dampak kolonialisme, ruangrupa mengusulkan kerangka kuratorial yang mereka sebut dengan “lumbung,” istilah yang dipinjam dari kata Indonesia untuk gudang hasil pertanian komunal.

    Pendekatan kurasi mereka adalah horizontal, kooperatif, berorientasi pada komunitas, inklusif dan eksperimental. Tetapi sejak awal 2022, diundangnya kolektif seniman Palestina The Question of Funding dan Khalil Sakakini Cultural Center menarik perhatian sebuah blog yang menuduh direktur artistik melakukan tindakan anti-Semitisme, karena telah mengundang kolektif yang dilabeli sebagai “aktivis anti-Israel” . Tuduhan ini telah didiskreditkan tetapi tetap berulang di media arus utama. Ruangrupa menolak apa yang mereka gambarkan sebagai “fitnah rasis” dan menegaskan bahwa “prinsip-prinsip kebebasan berekspresi dan juga penolakan tegas terhadap antisemitisme, rasisme, ekstremisme, Islamofobia, serta segala bentuk kekerasan fundamentalis adalah dasar pekerjaan kami.”

    Karya dari seri poster Kemanusiaan , cetakan balok kayu di atas kertas, masing-masing 40cm x 53cm, 1999.

    Tidak ada keraguan bahwa bagian dari karya The People’s Justice yang dipermasalahkan mengacu pada citra anti-Semit. Di antara gambar kerangka, persenjataan, tentara, dan mata-mata dari para pemain geopolitik utama Perang Dingin dan korbannya— penggambaran dalam karya ini dimaksudkan untuk mengkritik mesin militer global yang memang secara konspirasi mendukung pembantaian setengah juta orang Indonesia dalam kekerasan massal dan genosida “anti-komunis” di tahun 1965-66 — ada sosok berjas dengan cambang yang memakai topi khas Yahudi ortodoks. Bersamaan dengan atribut-atribut stereotip ini, sosok itu juga menampilkan mata merah dan gigi runcing dan lebih buruk lagi lambang SS di topinya. Penggabungan simbol-simbol ini terlihat anakronistik yang mungkin menunjukkan kurangnya pemahaman terhadap makna simbol-simbol tersebut.

    Bagaimana gambar di atas luput dari perhatian penyelenggara, yang secara terbuka telah berkomitmen untuk memastikan tidak ada unsur anti-Semitisme, patut diteliti lebih lanjut. Pertanyaan penting lainnya adalah bagaimana Taring Padi, sebuah kolektif seni yang menolak tegas rasisme, diskriminasi dan ketidakadilan kemudian memasukkan citra kontroversial tersebut dalam karyanya. Secara lebih luas,  jalur peristiwa ini juga menjadi pertanyaan tentang proses kreatif seniman, kerangka kuratorial yang diadopsi oleh direktur artistik, dan reaksi lembaga penyelenggara terhadap tekanan eksternal yang diberikan melalui media, pemerintah dan perwakilan diplomatik. Dalam artikel ini kami sebagai sejarawan seni akan mengedepankan konteks munculnya karya tersebut dan kerangka kuratorial, serta peluang dan tantangan apa yang muncul dalam transposisinya di Jerman.

    Lumbung sebagai praktek kuratorial

    “Sebagai praktik nyata,” tulis ruangrupa di situs web Documenta 15, “lumbung adalah titik awal documenta lima belas: prinsip kolektivitas, pembangunan sumber daya, dan distribusi yang adil sangat penting bagi pekerjaan kuratorial dan berdampak pada keseluruhan proses — baik struktur, kemandirian citra dan tampilan documenta lima belas.”

    Seniman dikelompokkan ke dalam “mini majelis”, dewan kolaboratif yang terdiri dari sekitar setengah lusin seniman dan kolektif seni, yang bertemu secara teratur (daring) di bulan-bulan sebelum pameran untuk membahas karya masing-masing dan bagaimana mendistribusikan “pot” dana yang dialokasikan untuk mereka. Majelis Akbar atau rapat pleno yang lebih besar diadakan setiap beberapa bulan sekali dan bertindak sebagai forum di mana setiap majelis mini melaporkan kembali diskusi mereka. Menurut Christina Schott  di dalam majelis mini Taring Padi, para seniman tiba-tiba ditantang oleh ekspektasi untuk membuat keputusan tentang hal-hal yang tidak pernah mereka alami. Schott mengutip Setu Legi dari Taring Padi yang berkomentar: “… kebutuhannya sangat berbeda. Tapi yang saya suka dari sistem ini adalah tidak ada yang tertinggal, sementara yang lain menjadi sorotan hanya karena mereka memiliki sumber daya yang lebih baik.”

    Karya dari seri poster Kemanusiaan , cetakan balok kayu di atas kertas, masing-masing 40cm x 53cm, 1999.

    Pendekatan komunitarian ini adalah tipikal masyarakat agraris dan bahkan masyarakat perkotaan di Indonesia, di mana kolektif adalah bentuk umum dari organisasi sosial dan seringkali, pengawasan sosial. Pendekatan ini lantas membentuk gelembung pelindung yang kadang-kadang dapat mengarah pada perspektif sempit dan kenaifan terhadap konteks yang lebih luas—baik pengalaman orang-orang di luar gelembung atau lingkungan sosial di mana ia berada. Dalam percakapan kami dengan Taring Padi beberapa hari setelah banner tersebut diturunkan, mereka tidak ingat akan adanya diskusi tentang sensitivitas politik representasi di Jerman atau konteks sejarah tertentu yang mengarah ke sana, baik dalam majelis mini mereka atau dalam pertemuan yang lebih besar. Hal ini tampaknya bertentangan dengan komitmen direktur artistik yang memastikan tidak ada sentimen seperti itu yang akan muncul; kepekaan antarbudaya yang mendasar seharusnya menjadi titik diskusi, terutama mengingat ancaman mendalam dari kekerasan rasis yang muncul ketika ruang The Question of Funding dirusak pada bulan Mei.

    Kerangka eksperimental lumbung menyebarluaskan nilai-nilai egaliter horizontal yang patut dikagumi dan bertujuan untuk meruntuhkan hierarki institusional yang telah memungkinkan peristiwa seni rupa di seluruh dunia dibajak oleh banalitas, kepentingan elit, dan tontonan kosong. Kerangka ini memungkinkan seniman untuk menghubungkan karya mereka langsung ke penonton dan untuk terhubung satu sama lain. Karya seni tidak lagi disaring melalui lensa tematik kuratorial dan silo selektivitas, dan bentuk relasional tidak didikte oleh program publik profesional.

    Akan tetapi imbalan besar ini tentunya datang dengan risiko besar. Lembaga budaya terkenal alergi terhadap resiko, dengan motivasi utamanya untuk menghindari kerusakan reputasi. Efek samping dari penghindaran resiko rusaknya reputasi ini adalah biasanya institusi mengelola kepekaan kontekstual dan budaya dan memprioritaskan menciptakan lingkungan yang aman bagi penonton, seniman, dan karya seni. Semua ini dicapai melalui hierarki tanggung jawab yang pada akhirnya berarti lembaga memiliki kewajiban untuk peduli (duty of care) kepada semua pemangku kepentingannya. Seniman biasanya tidak terlibat dalam aspek ini karena biasanya berada di bagian bawah hierarki institusional, tetapi sekaligus sebagai bagian yang paling terlihat. Ini adalah paradoks yang juga patut dicermati, dan metode eksperimental seperti lumbung menyoroti hal ini.

    Meskipun pendekatan kuratorial ini tidak aneh bagi praktik kreatif dan kuratorial di Indonesia, kerangka lumbung tampaknya tidak menemukan mekanisme memadai yang dapat diterima untuk mendistribusikan risiko dan tanggung jawab dalam ketegangan yang meningkat dari masalah di dalam Jerman dengan Islamofobia pada saat ini dan tentunya beban sejarah Holocaust. Meskipun konteks ini menggarisbawahi kepekaan tertentu, konteks apa pun yang tidak dikenal oleh seniman dan kurator akan menemukan hal yang sama; politik representasi dan tabu yang menyertainya ada di mana-mana dalam berbagai bentuk. Lantas tanggung jawab siapakah untuk memastikan sensitivitas ini dipahami dan dijalin ke dalam model berbagi pengetahuan alternatif, terutama ketika mereka diimpor ke dalam konteks baru?

    Ada pertanyaan penting lain yang harus dilontarkan tentang bagaimana aspek visual diperhitungkan dalam kerangka kerja ini. Perhatian kepada proses, konsep dan dialog sangat penting untuk membuka peristiwa seni kepada suara yang beragam dan pluralistik, yang dapat mengungkapkan pengalaman mereka yang tidak diperhitungkan dalam wacana sosial hegemonik. Namun sebagian besar seni rupa yang melibatkan representasi dan pengalaman ketubuhan akan diterima pemirsa secara subjektif. Sehingga diskusi kritis tentang citra, representasi dan kekuasaan harus selalu menjadi bagian dari persiapan untuk pameran, baik untuk mengelola risiko maupun untuk memastikan karya telah diuji terhadap berbagai kemungkinan interpretasi. Seniman berhak memiliki kesempatan untuk memastikan karya seni mereka tidak salah menggambarkan posisi mereka secara tidak sengaja.

    Taring Padi: praktek kolektif dan konteks sosial politik

    Dalam wawancara kami dengan Taring Padi, mereka sangat menekankan bahwa mereka tidak menganggap ruangrupa atau kerangka lumbung bertanggung jawab atas rantai peristiwa yang memungkinkan banner dipamerkan, meskipun citraannya memicu protes. Mereka tetap meminta maaf atas pelanggaran yang terjadi tetapi bersikeras bahwa itu tidak disengaja, baik dalam pembuatan banner tersebut untuk Adelaide Art Festival 2002, yang juga kontroversial, dan kegagalan untuk mengidentifikasi penerimaan yang berpotensi menghasut di Jerman 20 tahun kemudian.

    Apapun kelemahannya, platform terbuka yang disediakan lumbung telah memungkinkan mereka untuk menerima gelombang dukungan dari pengunjung Documenta 15 dan warga Kassel, yang telah membawa hadiah, makanan, cinta dan solidaritas. Anggota Taring Padi memberi tahu kami bahwa seorang pengunjung bersama mereka melihat semua karya yang dipamerkan, ia mencari gambar-gambar lain yang mungkin ofensif dan secara terbuka mendengarkan penjelasan mereka setiap kali ada pertanyaan yang ia ajukan. Dengan cara ini, lumbung juga memungkinkan dialog berlanjut di luar kerangka institusional dan media yang tampaknya bersikeras untuk menghambat diskusi bernuansa tentang apa yang telah terjadi. Setidaknya keramahan ini adalah wilayah yang akrab bagi Taring Padi, baik di Jerman, Indonesia, atau di tempat lain.

    Metodologi kolektif dan keakraban dalam Taring Padi sendiri sangat penting untuk memahami tanggapan yang terkadang tidak memuaskan terhadap pertanyaan tentang bagaimana gambar yang menyinggung itu bisa muncul dalam karya tersebut. Proses produksi mereka tertanam dalam konteks sosialnya, dan ada beberapa cara untuk menjelaskan mengapa tidak ada “satu” orang yang bertanggung jawab untuk gambar tersebut. Taring Padi memiliki banyak anggota, dan juga seringkali non-anggota seperti peserta workshop, yang diundang dalam proses berkarya. Pekerjaan dalam skala besar direncanakan melalui diskusi, catatan dan sketsa dan pembagian kerja dikoordinasi oleh anggota kolektif (walaupun tidak dijaga dengan ketat). Ini adalah proses yang dengan sengaja menghindari authorship —karya tidak ditandatangani oleh individu melainkan dicap dengan logo khas Taring Padi. Seperti yang ditulis Bambang Agung dalam Taring Padi: Seni Membongkar Tirani , “Karya kolektif, dengan kata lain, adalah kritik terhadap reifikasi seni dan komodifikasi senimannya.”

    Karya dari seri poster Kemanusiaan , cetakan balok kayu di atas kertas, masing-masing 40cm x 53cm, 1999.

    Citra yang muncul melalui proses ini mau tidak mau berasal dari beragam sumber dan terkait dengan ideologi kiri yang dianut oleh kolektif yang organik. Mereka menggambarkan karikatur dan humor dan berbagi strategi visual ini dengan seniman Indonesia lainnya, termasuk Apotik Komik, Heri Dono dan Eddie Hara, akan tetapi pendekatan mereka secara keseluruhan adalah ‘tembak langsung’ dan terfokus pada penyampaian pesan politik. Estetika cukil kayu mereka yang dibuat di atas kertas cokelat murahan dan sering ditempel di dinding atau didistribusikan melalui jejaring sosial, sering kali menampilkan citraan yang mirip dengan realisme sosial Kathe Kollwitz. Mural mereka juga memiliki kemiripan dengan strategi komposisi seniman muralist Meksiko seperti Diego Riviera; dengan kata lain, pengaruh visual mereka juga bersifat politis. Adalah hal yang biasa dalam strategi visualnya, Taring Padi juga mereduksi figur menjadi sebuah (stereo)“tipe” yang representatif (petani, wanita, politisi, pengkhotbah). Antropomorfisasi babi dan anjing yang menjadi figur ejekan menggemakan sikap budaya dan bahasa terhadap hewan-hewan ini di Jawa dan juga dalam bahasa global (babi kapitalis, anjing pengawas dll). Dalam konteks sosial inilah figur Yahudi dengan taring dan mata merahdi dalam karya The People’s Justice  kemungkinan berasal. Di Indonesia yang berpenduduk mayoritas Muslim, di mana sikap pro-Palestina bersifat normatif, citra semacam itu bisa jadi tidak akan menarik perhatian. Namun seperti yang diperlihatkan Documenta 15, lain cerita ketika karya tersebut dipajang di negara yang bertanggung jawab atas Holocaust.

    Konteks sosial dalam peristiwa di documenta ini lebih kompleks dan memerlukan  penjabaran. Tentang karya yang dibongkar, Taring Padi mengatakan: “’The People’s Justice’ dilukis hampir dua puluh tahun yang lalu, dan mengungkapkan kekecewaan, frustrasi, dan kemarahan kami sebagai mahasiswa seni yang dipolitisasi yang juga kehilangan banyak teman kami dalam pertempuran di jalanan pada tahun 1998 yang akhirnya berujung pada pembubaran sang diktator.” Isi karya ini mengacu pada pengetahuan yang mulai muncul pada saat itu yang mengungkapkan keterlibatan negara- negara demokrasi Barat dalam memperburuk ketidakstabilan politik dan sosial di Indonesia secara sistematis – yang dirancang untuk menjatuhkan partai Komunis Indonesia dan presiden petahana yang bersimpati dengan agenda mereka—yang akhirnya mengarah pada kekerasan massal dan genosida 1965-66 terhadap setidaknya setengah juta warga, penahanan lebih banyak lagi tanpa pengadilan, dan mengukuhkan rezim militer Orde Baru. Karya tersebut secara eksplisit menyiratkan Mossad sebagai pendukung Orde Baru, sebuah fakta yang ditegaskan oleh dokumen- dokumen luar negeri Israel yang sudah dibuka di dalam arsip negara.

    Referensi terhadap badan intelijen modern Israel mungkin cukup valid untuk mengkritik peran Israel dalam politik Perang Dingin, akan tetapi penjabaran gambar yang bermasalah tersebut lebih rumit. Sosok yang berjambang dan berjas dengan jelas mengacu pada jenis propaganda anti-Semit yang beredar luas di Eropa. Bagi mereka yang pendidikan dan konteks sosialnya mengajari untuk secara kritis mengevaluasi gambar ekspresi kebencian yang spesifik ini, referensi anti-Semitisme sangat jelas. Untuk seniman yang berada dalam konteks sosial yang berbeda, mungkin tidak begitu jelas. Taring Padi telah lama dikenal menjunjung nilai-nilai toleransi beragama dan kemanusiaan, jadi penting untuk ditanyakan bagaimana citra tersebut muncul dalam karyanya?

    Religious minorities in Indonesia face discriminiation

    “Spineless politicians, feckless government bureaucrats, and narrow-minded ulama officials” stand in the way of religious freedom in Indonesia.

    Anti-Semitisme di Indonesia

    Sebagai salah satu negara berpenduduk Muslim terbesar di dunia, Indonesia tidak memiliki hubungan diplomatik dengan Israel. Sentimen anti-Semit dapat ditelusuri kembali ke pejabat kolonial dan pelancong Eropa pada abad ke-19 yang secara sistematis menerapkan stereotip Eropa tentang Yahudi pada populasi Tionghoa lokal di seluruh Asia Tenggara. Diperparah dengan peninggalan-peninggalan aturan kolonial yang meniadakan pendidikan berpikir kritis bagi banyak orang Indonesia, tidak heran sentimen anti-Semit cukup meluas . Pada tahun 2002, dunia dibanjiri dengan Islamofobia, menyebar dengan rasa kaget dari serangan teroris 9/11 di gedung-gedung sipil dan pemerintah AS. Di Indonesia, responnya berbeda. Perasaan simpati kepada para korban segera berubah menjadi kemarahan dan ketakutan bahwa Islam secara keseluruhan telah dijadikan kambing hitam. Itu adalah titik balik yang memberanikan kelompok teroris yang sudah aktif dan mengilhami bom Bali pada bulan Oktober 2002.

    Peristiwa 9/11 kemudian menguatkan dikotomi yang menakutkan antara imperialis Barat dan seluruh dunia lainnya, sehingga citra stereotip kapitalis, imperialis, dan Zionis disebarkan tanpa kritik dalam kalangan tertentu. Sehingga tidak mustahil bahwa di dalam lingkungan pemikiran ini gambar seorang pria yang tampak menakutkan dalam setelan jas menjadi figur yang tepat untuk mewakili negara Israel, di samping babi raksasa yang mengenakan topi Paman Sam dan babi lain yang memakai peci. Dipasangnya simbol SS menjadi sangat kontras dan membingungkan, ia tidak hanya menambah shock value gambar tersebut tetapi juga menimbulkan lebih banyak pertanyaan: apakah maksud gambar itu dan apakah pembuatnya menyadari makna gambar tersebut? Apakah ada pemahaman yang mendalam dari simbol-simbol tersebut atau apakah itu diambil secara tidak kritis dari berbagai gambar dalam media populer yang beredar dalam wacana publik yang menggabungkan anti-Semitisme dengan anti-imperialisme dan anti-kapitalisme?

    Ada banyak hal yang harus dipertanyakan dalam karya ini dan sangat mengherankan bahwa gambar tersebut dalam The People’s Justice ini tidak memicu reaksi negatif dari audiens lain di masa lalu. Taring Padi mengakui bahwa pendekatan mereka mungkin “ceroboh dan tidak berhati-hati”. Pengalaman ini, kata mereka kepada kami, akan mengarah pada pendekatan yang lebih hati-hati terhadap dampak citra dalam karya. Sayangnya, Documenta tampaknya tidak bisa memberikan platform kepada para senimannya untuk menjelaskan bagaimana penjelasan yang berhati-hati itu. Tuduhan bahwa karya seni tersebut mencerminkan sentimen Nazi gaya Goebbels adalah tanggapan yang hiperbolik dan ekstremis, bahkan reaksioner; tuduhan ini menciptakan suasana berbahaya di mana keselamatan seniman terancam. Reaksi institusi dan pemerintah telah mencegah diskusi yang konstruktif supaya bisa mengkontekstualisasi politik representasi dari perspektif yang beragam.

    Perlu kita akui bahwa sistem pengetahuan dan praksisnya yang luas telah ditindas dan diselewengkan dengan kejam oleh kolonialisme, dan pekerjaan untuk memperbaiki kerusakan itu baru saja dimulai. Documenta 15, dengan strategi horizontal dan platform terbuka, betapapun rapuhnya, menawarkan kesempatan kepada kita untuk terlibat dalam percakapan nyata tentang kebijaksanaan, bias kognitif, kepentingan pribadi, dan posisi hak istimewa kita; percakapan ini kadang-kadang tidak nyaman, menyakitkan, dan juga menyinggung. Disinilah di mana kita membutuhkan demokrasi deliberatif: sebuah perjuangan yang tertatih-tatih, sulit bahkan mungkin mustahil untuk mencapai konsensus. Di berbagai penjuru dunia saat ini, seniman dan kurator sedang bereksperimen dengan peran seni dan distribusi kekuasaan, meskipun ia tidak sempurna, membuat perjuangan tersebut menjadi mengagumkan dan aspiratif. Documenta 15 telah menghadirkan beberapa eksperimen tersebut kepada audiensnya. Ini adalah kesempatan untuk berdialog tentang berbagai tantangan sosial, politik dan hak asasi manusia yang paling penting di zaman kita.

    Para penulis ingin mengucapkan terima kasih kepada Taring Padi atas ketersediaan untuk diwawancarai, dan kepada Dirk Tomsa atas komentar pada draf awal.

    The post Kita perlu bicara! Seni, pelanggaran, dan politik di Documenta 15 appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.