The “communist” label, inherited from Suharto’s era, has become a traditional part of the Indonesian “political repertoire”. The great irony is that the more the authoritarian regime establishes a categorical interconnection with latent threats and the definition of an Indonesian communist, the more unclear they become. The 2014 and 2019 presidential elections confirmed this worrying trend. The myth of a dangerous communist resurgence was invoked during both elections, gained considerable traction, and was accepted by millions. In both presidential contests, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was accused of being a PKI adherent, and the false narrative that he was a “communist candidate” persisted throughout the two campaigns. An entire disinformation industry sprang up promoting the idea that the long-banned and defunct PKI continues to pose a threat to national security, and that communist ideas are supported by many key figures among Jokowi’s allies and sympathisers. Prominent figures from, but not limited to, military backgrounds and vigilante groups, have often promoted this spectral idea and crafted emotive narratives.
The naivete and vulnerability of Indonesian society to these narratives has been precisely yet sadly demonstrated by none other than the elected President Joko Widodo. In the wake of massive political disinformation against him, Mr President desperately countered the allegation that he is a communist adherent by transforming himself into a vehement anti-communist. While the Prabowo and Jokowi factions are very different in terms of their political orientation, they share one thing in common: politically, they agree that choosing to be anti-communist is best. This of course disallows any effort to reconcile the victims and perpetrators of the 1965–1967 wrongdoings: the very reconciliation that may represent notable progress in a democratic state is totally rejected, not only because of its complex process and the position of the military as the leading actor but also because anti-communist sentiment has proven many times to be an effective political resource in the electoral contest.
Most importantly, it proves that Indonesia has an extremely fragile position with regard to communism as scare tactic: there is no ideological formula against this except to be anti-communist itself. All anti-communist rhetoric thereby appears as an established status quo of the state ideology.
The vague and ridiculous spectre of communism shows that being anti-communist offers certain benefits. In my research I have mapped numerous rare insights from the inner circle of the presidential campaign teams from 2014 and 2019, who mostly admit to using communist imaginary as an opportunistic political tool. The function of the communist imaginary is not to open and revisit past wrongdoings such as the 1965-67 mass killings. Instead, all attacks are founded on a trauma that has been effectively reproduced by anti-communist forces in the political arena.
The very fact that people already live in a prolonged but fabricated understanding of communist presence, and that the meaning of elites’ role is still veiled in darkness proves that a radical shift should be proposed.
What should be the role of academia to demystify the communist spectre as one persistent routine and effective political formula?
The most important mission now is to radically shift the concern of research from an examination of history to an investigation of the contemporary networked elite that capitalises on the communist spectre. This mission has for many years fallen behind in the study of communism in Indonesia. Previous research has focused on the coup actors and their motives, especially the military and internal conflict between its factions; justice and reconciliation through ordinary courts, tribunals, activism and so on; analysis of 1965 violence in local contexts; the political-economic impact and New Order policy; other actors such as religious elites and Islamic organisations; persistent anti-communist sentiment in cultural realms; surveys and polls providing a limited measurement of public perceptions and finally, communist and/or leftist representation in popular media.
Assessment of the PKI as the main feature of electoral disinformation is very rare. Rather than diving into elite networks and the mechanics of orchestrated disinformation and its direct benefits for the political purposes, many observers seem trapped in debates about the true perpetrators. Those questions remain important in clearing away the darkness of past wrongdoings, but it is now or never for academia to focus on elite reinvention of the communist imaginary in the front of our very eyes.
The post-Suharto context should provide political reform, strengthen law enforcement, and resolve the past human rights abuses. The re-emergence of the communist imaginary distracts from the reform Indonesia requires, and from appropriate analysis to understand the complete picture.
It is clear that political actors are a significant factor in manufacturing communist theme in Indonesia’s electoral campaigns. Contemporary disinformation studies should pay further attention to political actors as orchestrators of falsehoods. This will unveil the broader system operating behind the curtain and enable researchers to investigate the cultural scripts actors use, their political considerations and material benefits. It will also expose both collaboration and contestation between the actors and/or elites, revealing their networks and or hierarchies in the process.
These actors have been gifted authoritative roles as mythmakers and manipulators, and without attention to their work the clarity needed to relieve people from prolonged propaganda trap will never be achieved.
Alleged corruption involving Governor Lukas Enembe has dominated both Papuan and Indonesian media outlets and social media groups over the past two weeks.
The Indonesian media is rife with allegations and accusations against the governor who is suspected of spending of billions in rupiahs.
These media storms are sparked by allegations against him of receiving gratification worth Rp 1 million (NZ$112,000).
Governor Enembe was named a suspect by the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) last week and summoned on Monday, September 19, by Police Mobile Brigade Corps (BRIMOB) headquarters in Kota Raja, Jayapura Papua.
Due to illness, the governor was unable to attend the summons. Only his lawyers and Papuan protesters attended, who then condemned KPK of being unprofessional in handling the case.
Papuans (governor’s supporters) take this case as another attempt by the state to “criminalise” their leader motivated by other political agendas, while Jakarta continues to push the narrative of the case, being a serious crime with legal implications.
According to Dr Roy Rening, a member of governor’s legal team, the governor’s designation as a suspect was prematurely determined. This is due to the lack of two crucial pieces of evidence necessary to establish the legitimacy of the charge within the existing framework of Indonesia’s legal procedural code.
Unaware he was a suspect
Dr Rening also argued that the KPK’s behaviour in executing their warrant turned on a dime. The Governor was unaware that he was a suspect, and he was already under investigation by the KPK when he was summoned to appear.
In his letter, Dr Rening explained that Governor Enembe had never been invited to clarify and/or appear as a witness pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code. The KPK instead declared the Governor a suspect based on the warrant letters, which had also changed dates and intent.
The manner in which the KPK and the state are handling the case involving Papua’s number one man in Indonesia’s settler colonial province has sparked a mass demonstration with the slogan “Save Lukas Enembe” from criminalisation.
The Governor’s case has generated a flurry of news stories with all kinds of new allegations by the nation’s most prominent figures.
Mohammad Mahfud Mahmodin, commonly known as Mahfud MD, Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, accused Governor Enembe of corruption, amounting to billions of rupiahs during a public media conference held at the Coordinating Ministry Office, Jakarta, on Monday.
His allegations have sparked a backlash from the Governor and his lawyers, as well as from the Papuan people.
Governor’s lawyer Dr Rening said Mahfud MD should not be included in the technical part of the investigation, particularly when in relation to those financial figures. Dr Rening said any confidential information was already protected by the constitution and it was inappropriate for Mahfud MD to make such announcement.
He asked which case the minister Mahfud MD was referring to in his allegation because the actual case involving the KPK investigation only related to a gratuity of 1 billion Rp.
‘Massive campaign to undermine Governor Enembe’
Dr Rening asked how Mahfud MD could explain the other charges that were not included in the dispute of this case, adding that “we are still of the opinion, as I have mentioned in my articles, that ‘This is what we call a systematic, structured, and massive campaign to undermine the honour and reputation of Papuan leader Lukas Enembe’.
“Governor Enembe himself has also rejected the allegations involving the spending of billions of rupiah, accusing Mahfud MD of making false allegations against him.”
Reverend Dr Socratez Sofyan Yoman … the KPK has lost its integrity and legitimacy as an independent institution. Image: Tabloid Jubi
Reverend Dr Sofyan Yoman, president of the Papuan Baptist Church Alliance, stated on the same day as Mahfud MD’s press conference that it would be remembered as the day the KPK lost its integrity and legitimacy as an independent institution for the protection of the nation’s morale.
He said it would be recorded that 19 September 2022 was the day of the “death” of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK).
“Therefore, I express my condolences for the passing of the KPK. So, the history of the KPK is over,” reported Tabloid Jubi.
At the press conference, Mahfud MD was accompanied by Alexander Marwata (KPK), Ivan Yustiavandana, director of the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (PPATK), and other representatives from the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), National Police, and the Armed Forces were also present.
By engaging in this collaboration, the KPK lacked an independent voice, and its integrity and legitimacy were shattered by state intervention.
Jakarta’s ‘state of panic’
Reverend Yoman’s “condolence” statement about the KPK was the result of the state intervention in suffocating KPK’s ability to stand independently.
Reverend Yoman added: “Jakarta is in a state of panic right now because gross human rights violations in the land of Papua are already being recognised by international institutions such as the UN, European Union, Pacific Island forums (PIF) and Africa Caribbean Pacific nation states (ACP).
“Governor Lukas Enembe’s case is not the real issue,” he said.
In reality, this was “merely a façade designed by Jakarta” to distract the public from paying attention to the real issue, which was the state’s crimes against West Papuans, reported Papua.tribunnews.com.
Natalius Pigai, a prominent Indigenous Papuan figure in Indonesia and former human rights commissioner, wrote on Twitter: “There is no single law that authorises Mahfud MD to lead a state auxiliary body. The coordinating minister can only lead police and prosecutors as part of the cabinet, he cannot act as Head of State. It was a silly intervention that weakened the KPK, and strengthened accusations of political motivations toward Lukas Enembe.”
Despite this condemnation and rejection from the governor’s camp, Governor Lukas Enembe remains a suspect waiting to be investigated by the KPK. The KPK’s Deputy Chair, Alexander Marwata said KPK examined a number of witnesses before establishing Enembe as a suspect.
“Several witnesses have clarified, and documents have been obtained that give us reason to believe there is enough evidence to establish a suspect” reported Kompas.com.
Papuans protect residence
Meanwhile, the Governor’s private residence in Papua is being protected by Papuans, triggering more security personnel being deployed in a region that is already one of the most highly militarised in the Asia Pacific.
Papua’s people have been shaken by the news of this corruption allegation against their Governor.
According to Paskalis Kosay, Papua is worried about the loss of Lukas Enembe, a unifying figure among the Papuan people.
He added: “Papua’s political situation has become increasingly unhealthy since Mahfud MD’s statement. The internet — particularly social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp — are full of both positive and false information. Also, its contents may be used to slander, humiliate, or discredit the good name, honour, or dignity of a certain person, figure, or group.
“We should be vigilant when paying attention to the different information spread on social media and other mass lines. It is imperative that Papuans filter all news content very carefully. You must then respond wisely, intelligently, and proportionally so as not to be accused of being a member of a group of disseminators of misleading information”.
Meanwhile, as Governor Enembe awaits the outcome of the case against him, he has already missed his medical appointments in Singapore. This could unleash unprecedented protests throughout West Papua if or when his health fails him due to him being blocked by Jakarta from leaving the country.
A failure to protect the Governor while he is caught up in the limbo of the Indonesian legal system, would have catastrophic consequences for Jakarta. Papuans have already warned Jakarta “don’t try [to detain him] during the protests.”
As of today, the Governor’s and his family’s bank accounts remain blocked, a decision made by the state without their knowledge a few months ago, that has led to the current crisis.
Who is Governor Lukas Enembe?
Governor Lukas Enembe is a symbol of pride and an icon for the sons and daughters of the Koteka people of the highlands of Papua. He is often referred to as “Anak Koteka” (son of Koteka).
Governor Lukas Enembe … a bold style of leadership and deeds indicate a deep longing in his heart for justice for Papuans. Image: West Papua Today
Koteka as a horim, or penis gourd or sheath, traditionally worn by males in Papua’s Highlands, where Governor Enembe comes from.
When he is called “Anak Koteka” it means that he is a son of cultural groups that wear this traditional attire. Knowing this is critical to understanding how and why this man became such a central figure in West Papua.
Before he became Governor of Papua in 2013, the Koteka people of the Highlands faced many kinds of racial prejudice and discrimination. Wearing the koteka was seen as a symbol of primitiveness, backwardness, and stupidity.
Lukas Enembe turned the symbol of the koteka into hope, pride, courage, leadership, and power when he became governor for two consecutive terms. He broke barriers no one else had crossed, exposed cultural taboos, and used his ancestral wisdom to unite people from every walk of life.
As the Highland’s first Papua Governor (2013 -2023), he upended stereotypes associated with his cultural heritage.
Governor Enembe was born in Timo Ramo Village, Kembu District, Tolikara Regency of Papua’s Highlands on 27 July 1967. His biography A Statesman from Honai, by Sendius Wonda, states that Lukas grew up in a simple family.
He attended elementary school in Mamit (1974-1980) and junior high school in Sentani (1980-1983). He then attended senior high school in Sentani from 1983-86.
Sacred building for sharing wisdom
In Highlands Papua, honai is a traditional hut, but it is more than just a hut; it is a sacred building where ancient teachings and wisdoms are discussed and preserved.
Honai shaped him into the person he is today. In the 1980s, he was one of only a handful of Papuan Highlands village children to study in urbanised coastal regions.
His determination to continue his studies was already noted by his peers. In 1986, he took the selection examination for admission to Indonesia’s State Universities and was accepted as a student at Sam Ratulangi University (Unsrat) Manado Indonesia.
As a fourth-semester student at the FKIP Campus, Enembe majored in political science at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences in Manado. After completing his studies in Manado in 1995, Lukas returned to Papua.
As he waited for acceptance of his Civil Service Candidates (CPNS) he lived in Doyo Sabron, Jayapura Regency with his wife, Yulce Wenda, and his family. The following year, he was accepted as a civil servant (PNS).
He aspired to become a lecturer at Cenderawasih University, Jayapura, where he earned 22 citations for local government lectures. The promise of being a lecturer ran aground during the pre-service announcement, and Enembe was assigned a position as a civil servant at the Merauke Regency Socio-Political Affair’s Office instead.
During 1998-2001, Enembe was sent by a missionary agency to continue his studies for two years at the Cornerstone Christian college in Australia (Dubbo, NSW). Upon returning from Australia in 2001, he participated in the Puncak Jaya regional election, but his dream of becoming a regent was dashed.
‘Papua rising’
From 2001-2006, he served as Deputy Regent of Puncak Jaya alongside Elieser Renmaur. In 2006, Enembe was elected chair of the DPD of the Papua Province Democratic Party. In that year he also attempted to run for Governor of Papua by collaborating with a Muslim couple, Ahmad Arobi Aituarauw.
He lost the vote, however, and Bas Suebu-Alex Hasegem won. Last but not least, he participated in the 2007 Puncak Jaya regional election and was elected Regent of Puncak Jaya along with Henock Ibo.
In 2013, Enembe and Klemen Tinal ran as candidates for Governor of Papua in the 2013 Papuan Gubernatorial Election.
The General Elections Commission (KPU) appointed Lukas Enembe and Klemen Tinal to lead Papua between 2013 and 2018. In 2018, he was re-elected along with Klemen Tinal to serve as Governor of Papua for the period 2018-2023.
“Papua rising, independent, and prosperous” was Lukas’s vision for leading Papua through the landslide victory.
As Governor he gave 80 percent of the special autonomy funds to regional and city areas, and 20 percent to the provinces. In his view, 80 percent of the special autonomy funds are managed by districts or cities which is where most people in Papua live.
Papua has undergone a lot of development during Enembe’s governorship, including the construction of a world-class sports stadium that has been named after him, as well as other major projects like the iconic Youtefa Bridge in Jayapura city.
Papua has undergone a lot of development during Enembe’s governorship, including the construction of a world-class sports stadium that has been named after him, as well as other major projects like the iconic Youtefa Bridge in Jayapura city. Image: APR
Papuans ‘need to live’
Many Papuans opposing Jakarta’s activities in West Papua consider him to be a father figure. When asked about the conditions his people face on national television, Governor Enembe responded by saying “Papuans do not need development, they need to live.”
Such bold statements, along with others he made directly challenge Indonesia’s mainstream narrative, since Jakarta and Indonesians at large regard “development” as a panacea for West Papua’s problem.
Jakarta is also suspicious about the hundreds of Papuan students sent abroad under the scholarship scheme he designed using Special Autonomy Funds.
His boldness, style of leadership and deeds indicate that there is a deep longing in his heart for justice and for better treatment of his fellow humans. His accomplishments distinguish him as a pioneer, a dreamer, a fighter, a survivor, and a practical man with deep compassion for others.
It is this spirit that keeps him alive and strong despite the physical and psychological intimidation, threats, as well as clinical sickness he has endured for years.
The rest of his term (2022-2023) is one of the most critical times for him. After more than 20 years as Indonesia’s top public servant, the strong man of the people is facing his greatest challenge as he enters his final year in his career.
How that final chapter of his career ends will be determined by the outcome of this corruption allegations case, which could have significant consequences for Papua and Indonesia as well as for Governor Enembe.
Jakarta must think carefully in how they handle the governor, son of Koteka.
Yamin Kogoya is a West Papuan academic who has a Master of Applied Anthropology and Participatory Development from the Australian National University and who contributes to Asia Pacific Report. From the Lani tribe in the Papuan Highlands, he is currently living in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia.
How did OATSIDE become one of Asia’s fastest growing oat milk companies? CEO & creator Benedict Lim talks to Green Queen’s Sonalie Figueiras about why malty milk matters and more.
In less than two years, self-described ‘full-stack’ oat milk brand OATSIDE has become a force to be reckoned with on supermarket shelves in over 8 Asian markets including Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. As of earlier this month, they have launched in Hong Kong. The company’s strength is down to its uber creamy and malty product, a robust regional supply chain (oats from Australia, coconut sugar and cacao from Indonesia) and full control over their oat extraction (the company owns its production facility). We met with CEO and creator Benedict Lim during his Hong Kong visit. Below he tells us more about their unique branding, how the company scaled so fast and why Asia needs another oat milk.
Q: What are the key markets for OATSIDE? Do you want to focus on APAC or also eventually go to the US and EU?
Benedict Lim: We feel we have a better understanding of the palates and culture in Asia and it’s where we’re currently focused! That said, we wouldn’t close off the possibility of expanding outside of Asia in the future.
Q: What has enabled you to scale so fast?
Benedict Lim: The strongest factor has to be the taste of our product – there’s something about the creamy maltiness of OATSIDE that is very familiar to people growing up in this region and that builds a connection and joy that people want to share with others.
Q: Can you share more about your unique branding?
Benedict Lim: OATSIDE as a brand is optimistic, adult and as-is. The artwork was a way to convey our brand world – the OATSIDE of life; the bright side of life told in all its unfiltered, modern glory. The packs’ artwork are cartoons and yet have a feel and tone that speaks to adults, which is our intention.
Courtesy OATSIDE
Q: Why do we need another oat milk brand? What’s the real mission here?
Benedict Lim: We want to be the plant milk for people who don’t care for plant milks – to lead the movement to sustainable milk through incredible taste. Within plant milks – and oat milks in particular – there is a wide variance in textures, tastes and there has to be a varied offering across brands to achieve this shared mission globally.
Q: Why do most Asian consumers buy oat milk, in your view? What’s their motivation?
Benedict Lim: Oat milk is still a very new category in Asia, but oats are a familiar ingredient in most parts. It’s ultimately about taste/texture familiarity!
Q: Where is OATSIDE produced? Can you share more about your supply chain?
Benedict Lim: OATSIDE is produced in Bandung, a beautiful mountainous region of West Java, Indonesia, where we get access to clean mountain spring water for our production.
Q: How do you achieve the sweetness in the ‘no added sugar’ Barista blend?
Benedict Lim: Indeed there is no added sugar in OATSIDE’s Barista Blend – there are some natural sugars from oats that are created through the enzymatic process of oat extraction.
Q: OATSIDE ingredients include canola oil? Do you feel this is a healthy choice given it is linked to certain issues?
Benedict Lim: When thinking about a source of vegetable fat, canola was particularly appealing given it is an unsaturated fat and has a neutral taste profile. We use non-GMO canola with sourced in Australia.
Q: Are you being affected by existing supply chain difficulties?
Benedict Lim: Over the past months, we’ve had to face some port congestion in various countries and limited vessel availability but our supply chain team has managed to mitigate these issues with good planning.
Q: Are you raising capital at the moment?
Benedict Lim: No, we are not raising capital at this moment.
Lead image by Green Queen with photos courtesy OATSIDE.
The notion that Papua is the “Land of Peace” has no substance.
Many feel that this phrase “Papua Tanah Damai” or “Papua Land of Peace” only conceals the reality of Papua. In recognition of that, we would like to convey our observations about the current crisis in Papua.
Besides reading media news reports about today’s planned rally supporting Papua Governor Lukas Enembe, I also read a letter from the People of Indonesia’s Archipelago urging its followers living in Papua to arm themselves, guard the mosque, and give their children a holiday on Monday.
It is important to note that these developments can be viewed from two perspectives — the “criminalised” Enembe became a symbol of resistance by Indigenous Papuans who have been treated like second-class citizens for 59 years; and the Nusantara militias backed by “bigwigs” (as seen in the Racism Protests of 29 August 2019).
Who are the bigwigs? And how do they operate?
Papua was managed by Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) — the Indonesian National Armed Forces — during the Suharto era.
President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, however, is more concerned with the role of the Indonesian National Police.
‘Criminalising’ Enembe
According to the Papuan Council of Churches, in 2021 the Indonesian National Police took over in Papua and it was led by Tito Karnavians, the Head of the State Intelligence Agency (Budi Gunawan), and Paulus Waterpauw, the Papua Police Chief.
Taking into account the current crisis in Papua, from the perspective of the state actors, and in particular the alarming letter of Nusantara, an armed group that was part of the August 29 anti-racism protest, we ask: Is tomorrow any better?
Perhaps the political party opposing the Democratic Party, is criminalising Governor Enembe (as its chairman) in order to gain votes in the 2024 elections for its party?
A candidate for governor, an ambitious successor looking to depose Enembe prematurely before the 2024 elections? Another instance of the central government interfering in Papua’s affairs.
The victims behind Enembe
Who is behind Enembe? Recently activists (and their relatives) who have been protesting against racism — which has now been branded as “treason” — are the victims of state violence (by officials).
Reverend Dr Benny Giay’s West Papua Council of Churches open pastoral letter in Bahasa yesterday – a plea for genuine peace. Image: APR
These headaches for the Papuan victims have occurred since early December 2018 in Nduga regency, Intan Jaya, Puncak, Pegunungan Bintang, Maybrat Sorong, and Surua Yahukimo; families and relatives of four mutilated residents of Nduga who were only cremated two days ago; and families and relatives of Mapi residents who were murdered on 30 August 2022 among others.
The victims of these episodes of violence ask: How can KPK criminalise governor Enembe when they failed to arrest [current regent] Romanus Baraka in Merauke, who alleged in the name of Jesus that (Representative) Jan Mandenas and he were involved in corruption?
Why hasn’t the KPK arrested PDIP [Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle] official Komarudin Watubun? Why?
It is common for the parties we mentioned above, particularly the strong ones, to play together. Parties like these enjoy destroying weaker opponents. The actions of Ferdy Sambo in Jakarta illustrate this.
Promote peace, dialogue
Therefore, we invite all members of the congregation and the community here to promote peace, dialogue, and communication.
It is only natural that we demand our dignity and respect. However, do not demand sharp tools and weapons — not with anarchy and savagery. Whenever possible, keep the area free of turmoil and bloodshed.
In Jayapura, Abepura, Sentani and throughout the Land of Papua, we ask security forces to grant the victims a voice today and tomorrow. We want to see the security forces escorting the masses on September 20, 2022, to be more humanist to ensure the safety and well-being of the masses.
Reverend Dr Benny Giay is a West Papuan theologian, social anthropologist, and an activist. He is ordained as a pastor in the Kemah Injil Church (KINGMI) (Gospel Tabernacle Church) and in 2010 assumed leadership of the Kingmi Synod of the Evangelical Christian Church of West Papua. This open letter was written yesterday as an appeal for peace ahead of today’s planned rally in Jayapura and has been translated by Yamin Kogoya, a contributor to Asia Pacific Report.
ANU is world renowned as a centre for excellence in Indonesia-focused research and engagement. Through short study tours, the extensive ‘Year in Asia’ program, and extended postgraduate degrees, ANU students gain first-hand understanding of Indonesian language, culture, politics and economics and go on to apply this expertise in careers in government, academia, the media and many other diverse fields. As numbers of Indonesian language graduates decline across the country, Indonesian expertise and specialised skills are becoming increasingly sought after. This webinar examines four stories of success from ANU alumni who have been engaged in strengthening the Australia-Indonesia relationship. It highlights the course options available to current ANU students for exchange programs, intensive study tours in-country/ virtually, and research opportunities for postgraduate students from both Australia and Indonesia.
Panellists
Cameron Allan, Regional Policy and EAS Section, Southeast Asia Regional Division, Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade Bachelor of Laws (Honours) and International Security Studies (ANU 2020)
Claudina Milawati, Deputy Director, Department of Education and Training, Australian Embassy, Jakarta. Master of Science (Science Communication) (ANU 2005)
Kirrilly McKenzie, Head of Languages, Haileybury Rendall School, NT BA Asia-Pacific Security (ANU 2014) and Grad Dip of Asia-Pacific Studies (ANU 2014)
Dr Gatra Priyandita, Australian Strategic Policy Institute and non-resident WSD-Handa Fellow at the Pacific Forum PhD Political Science, ANU Coral Bell School (ANU 2021) and BA Asia-Pacific Security (Honours) (ANU 2014)
Moderator:
Elena Williams, Board Member, ANU Indonesia Institute. Current PhD candidate in the School of Culture, History and Languages at ANU, examining Australia-Indonesia relationship building. MA Applied Anthropology & Participatory Development (ANU 2012)
Governor Lukas Enembe of Indonesia’s Melanesian province of Papua has been banned from travelling abroad by the state Directorate General of Immigration, Ministry of Law and Human Rights, preventing him undergoing vital medical treatment in the Philippines.
Governor Enembe, 55, was due to go to Manila this month. However, his hope of getting treatment there has been dashed by the ban from the Directorate General of Immigration.
The order preventing any overseas trip to Governor Lukas Enembe is in force until 7 March 2023.
It was issued in response to a Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) request to ban the governor from any overseas trip.
“Directorate of Immigration Supervision and Enforcement of the Directorate General of Immigration accepts the submission for prevention to subject an. Lukas Enembe from the Corruption Eradication Commission on Wednesday, September 7, 2022. Prevention is valid for six months,” said the Director of Immigration Supervision and Enforcement, I Nyoman Gede Surya Mataram in Jakarta.
Tabloid Jubi reports that during spontaneous demonstrations in protest by Enembe’s supporters in Jayapura last Monday over the steps taken by the KPK, Enembe’s lawyer, Stevanus Roy Rening, said governor was due to leave for his medical treatment that day.
“Last night, the Governor [explained] that it was actually Monday that he is supposed to leave [for treatment]. I repeat again, let the people know.
‘Roy, I’m sick’
“Governor said, ‘Roy, I’m sick. I have got permission from the Minister of Home Affairs. I said, ‘Sir, not yet, please delay! There is a letter from the KPK for you to attend on Monday’,” Rening.
Rening was worried that if Enembe left for treatment abroad on Monday, public opinion would form that Lukas Enembe had run away. However, Governor Enembe said he had never stolen the public’s money, so he would never be afraid.
“[I said], ‘later when you left, it will be said that Lukas Enembe is afraid, running away’. [He replied], ‘Roy, I am the leader of the Papuans. I’ve never been afraid, I’ve never corrupted’,” Rening said, reiterating Enembe’s explanation.
Governor Enembe’s personal medical physician, Dr Antonius Mote, said Governor Lukas Enembe was still ill.
The heavy pressure had caused health reactions such as swollen feet that make it difficult Governor Enembe.
According to Dr Mote as the Pacific Pos reports, in the last 6 months the governor began to experience several illnesses such as stroke, diabetes, heart disease, hypertension and kidney complications.
He has routinely undergone check-ups in hospitals in Singapore and Manila, Philippines.
Papuan Governor Lukas Enembe undergoing medical treatment … believed to be the target of an Indonesian power struggle over Indigenous administrations in the Melanesian region. Image: Pacific Pos
Return needed for medical
Dr Mote said that the governor should have returned to the doctor in Singapore for a medical appointment but this was cancelled because of a summons for an interview by the KPK.
“We really ask for his right to get medical treatment, in this case, he can go to a hospital abroad. Because he was very worried, the pressure he experienced could worsen his health condition,” said Dr Mote.
In response to the request from the Governor Enembe’s lawyer Rening over the treatment overseas, the Deputy Chair of the KPK, Alexander Marwata, said this would be facilitated — with certain conditions, reports Tempo.
Marwata gave the Governor an option to seek treatment at the Army Central Hospital or Cipto Mangunkusumo Hospital in Jakarta.
“If the disease can be treated in Indonesia, why do you have to go abroad?,” said Marwata.
Marwata said a doctor would decide whether Enembe could be treated in Indonesia or must go abroad for treatment.
If doctors in Indonesia “raised their hands”, he said, the KPK would grant Enembe permission to go abroad for treatment.
Chasing alleged ‘corruption’
Lawyer Rening said the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) seemed to be trying to find a case of alleged corruption involving Governor Enembe.
“It [has been] proven [by Luke Enembe]. During his [leadership] period, all audit results of [Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget by] have been vetted by the Supreme Audit Agency [gained opinion]. There was no element of corruption found,” said Rening.
The Papuan Governor’s spokesperson, Rifai Darus, said the Governor’s home was still being closely guarded by thousands of people and close relatives of Enembe.
“He [Governor Enembe] asked not to have too many people there and asked them to return to their homes. These people came alone, without being asked, after seeing the information circulating on social media regarding the ‘criminalisation’ of the Governor,” said Darus.
He added that the Governor had also said the ongoing legal process was a “political struggle” and asked not to “politicise the situation”.
“He knows very well that the current situation is a process of ‘criminalising’ him by making the KPK the ‘front’ to deal with this case. The Governor has the right as stated in the 1945 Constitution Article 48a that everyone has the right to live and defend his life,” said Darus.
The president of the Communion of Baptist Churches in West Papua, Dr Socratez Yoman, has revealed to news media that the KPK had three times tried to criminalise Governor Enembe.
‘Purely political goal’
“The effort to ‘criminalise’ Papuan Governor Lukas Enembe is purely a political goal or agenda for [the elections in] 2024, not a legal issue,” he said.
Reverend Yoman believes that other political parties in Indonesia felt “uncomfortable and insecure” about entering the political process in 2024 in Papua Province.
“So far, there have been people who have seen, observed and felt that the presence of Governor Enembe is a threat and obstacle for other political parties to become ‘number one’ in Papua province.
Reverend Yoman said there was no other way to “destroy the strong fortress” of the Governor Enembe, who is chair of the Democratic DPD of Papua province. So the KPK was being used by certain political parties to ‘criminalise’ Enembe.
“On Wednesday, September 14, 2022, I met Governor Enembe at his residence in Koya Timur and he told me, Mr Yoman, the problem is now clear. It’s not a legal issue, it’s a political issue.
“Pak Budi Gunawan, the head of BIN (State Intelligence Agency) and PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) used the KPK to criminalise me. Mr Yoman, you should write an article so that everyone would know about this crime.
“How come state institutions can become tools for certain political parties,” Reverend Yoman quoted Governor Enembe as saying.
Money left for medical expenses
On that occasion, the Governor of Papua also conveyed about Rp 1 billion [NZ$112,000] to Socratez Yoman, where in March 2019, the Governor left for Jakarta at night because his health was getting worse.
This was during the covid-19 lockdown.
“When Enembe left, he kept Rp. 1 billion in the room. After three months in Jakarta, in May 2019, the Governor called Tono, who used to look after and organise Enembe’s house and yard.
“I asked Tono to go to my room and take the money in the room with a value of 1 billion. I asked Tono to send it through a BCA account. That’s my money, not money from corruption. This KPK is just claiming anything,” said Reverend Yoman quoting Governor Enembe.
Reverend Yoman appealed for support and prayers for Governor Enembe and his family.
Laurens Ikinia is a Papuan Masters in Communication Studies student at Auckland University of Technology who has been studying journalism. He contributes to Asia Pacific Report.
In Vienna, China’s permanent mission to the United Nations has been rather exercised of late. Members of the mission have been particularly irate with the International Atomic Energy Agency and its Director General, Rafael Grossi, who addressed the IAEA’s Board of Governors on September 12.
Grossi was building on a confidential report by the IAEA which had been circulated the previous week concerning the role of nuclear propulsion technology for submarines to be supplied to Australia under the AUKUS security pact.
When the AUKUS announcement was made in September last year, its significance shook security establishments in the Indo-Pacific. It was also no less remarkable, and troubling, for signalling the transfer of otherwise rationed nuclear technology to a third country. As was rightly observed at the time by Ian Stewart, executive director of the James Martin Center in Washington, such “cooperation may be used by non-nuclear states as more ammunition in support of a narrative that the weapons states lack good faith in their commitments to disarmament.”
Having made that sound point, Stewart, revealing his strategic bias, suggested that, as such cooperation would not involve nuclear weapons by Australia, and would be accompanied by safeguards, few had reason to worry. This was all merely “a relatively straightforward strategic step.”
James M. Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was far less sanguine. “[T]he nonproliferation implications of the AUKUS submarine deal are both negative and serious.” Australia’s operation of nuclear-powered submarines would make it the first non-nuclear weapon state to manipulate a loophole in the inspection system of the IAEA.
In setting this “damaging precedent”, aspirational “proliferators could use naval reactor programs as cover for the development of nuclear weapons – with the reasonable expectation that, because of the Australia precedent, they would not face intolerable costs for doing so.” It did not matter, in this sense, what the AUKUS members intended; a terrible example that would undermine IAEA safeguards was being set.
A few countries in the region have been quietly riled by the march of this technology sharing triumvirate in the Indo-Pacific. In a leaked draft of its submission to the United Nations tenth review conference of the Parties to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT RevCon), Indonesia opined that the transfer of nuclear technology for military purposes was at odds with the spirit and objective of the NPT.
In the sharp words of the draft, “Indonesia views any cooperation involving the transfer of nuclear materials and technology for military purposes from nuclear-weapon states to any non-nuclear weapon states as increasing the associated risks [of] catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences.”
At the nuclear non-proliferation review conference, Indonesian diplomats pushed the line that nuclear material in submarines should be monitored with greater stringency. The foreign ministry argued that it had achieved some success in proposing for more transparency and tighter scrutiny on the distribution of such technology, claiming to have received support from AUKUS members and China. “After two weeks of discussion in New York, in the end all parties agreed to look at the proposal as the middle path,” announced Tri Tharyat, director-general for multilateral cooperation in Indonesia’s foreign ministry.
While serving to upend the apple cart of security in the region, AUKUS, in Jakarta’s view, also served to foster a potential, destabilising arms race, placing countries in a position to keep pace with an ever increasingly expensive pursuit of armaments. (Things were not pretty to start with even before AUKUS was announced, with China and the United States already eyeing each other’s military build-up in Asia.)
The concern over an increasingly voracious pursuit of arms is a view that Beijing has encouraged, with Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian having remarked that, “the US, the UK and Australia’s cooperation in nuclear submarines severely damages regional peace and stability [and] intensifies the arms race.”
Wang Qun, China’s Permanent Representative, told Grossi on September 13 that he should avoid drawing “chestnuts from the fire” in endorsing the nuclear proliferation exercise of Australia, the United States and the UK. Rossi, for his part, told the IAEA Board of Governors that four “technical meetings” had been held with the AUKUS parties, which had pleased the organisation. “I welcome the AUKUS parties’ engagement with the Agency to date and expect this to continue in order that they deliver their shared commitment to ensuring the highest non-proliferation and safeguard standards are met.”
The IAEA report also gave a nod to Canberra’s claim that proliferation risks posed by the AUKUS deal were minimal given that it would only receive “complete, welded” nuclear power units, making the removal of nuclear material “extremely difficult.” In any case, such material used in the units, were it to be used for nuclear weapons, needed to be chemically processed using facilities Australia did not have nor would seek.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning was less than impressed. “This report lopsidedly cited the account given by the US, the UK and Australia to explain away what they have done, but made no mention of the international community’s major concerns over the risk of nuclear proliferation that may arise from the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation.” It turned “a blind eye to many countries’ solemn position that the AUKUS cooperation violates the purpose and object of the NPT.”
Beijing’s concerns are hard to dismiss as those of a paranoid, addled mind. Despite China’s own unhelpful military build-up, attempts by the AUKUS partners to dismiss the transfer of nuclear technology to Australia as technically benign and compliant with the NPT is dangerous nonsense. Despite strides towards some middle way advocated by Jakarta, the precedent for nuclear proliferation via the backdoor is being set.
Papuan protesters from seven customary regions this week stormed the Mako Brimob police headquarters in Kota Raja, Jayapura, accusing the KPK and police of “criminalising” local Governor Lukas Enembe.
The protest on Monday was organised in response to the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) Corruption Eradication Commission’s attempt to investigate corruption allegations against Governor Lukas Enembe.
This time, Enembe is suspected of receiving gratification of Rp 1 miliar (NZ$112,000).
These accusations are not the first time that the KPK has attempted to criminalise Lukas Enembe, the Governor of Papua. The KPK has tried this before.
KPK had attempted to implicate the governor in their corruption scam in February 2017, but the attempt failed.
On 2 February 2018, KPK attempted another attack against Governor Enembe at the Borobudur Hotel, Jakarta, but [this] failed miserably. Instead, two KPK members were arrested by the Metro Jaya Regional Police. The KPK announced a suspect without checking with the governor first.
The representative of the Papuan people at the rally stated that KPK failed to follow the correct legal procedures in executing this investigation.
KPK should avoid inflaming the Papuan conflict, as the Papuan people have so far followed Jakarta’s controversial decisions — decisions that are contrary to the wishes of the Papuan people, a representative stated at the rally.
For instance, Jakarta’s insistence on the creation of new provinces from the existing two (Papua and West Papua) has been strongly rejected by most Papuans.
Remained silent
The spokespeople for the protesters warned KPK that they had remained silent because Governor Enembe was able to maintain a calm among the community. However, if the governor continues to be criminalised, Papuans from all seven customary regions will revolt.
Papuan protesters hold “save him” banners in support of accused Governor Lukas Enembe. Image: APR
The KPK has named Governor Enembe as a suspect in the corruption of his personal funds.
“This is ‘funny’,” protesters said. “One billion rupiahs [NZ$112,000] of his own money used for medical treatment were alleged to be corrupt. This is strange. We will raise that amount, from the streets and give it to KPK.
“Remember that,” speakers said.
Stefanus Roy Renning, the coordinator of Governor Enembe’s Legal Council Team, said the case the governor was accused of (1 billion Rupiah) is actually, the governor’s personal funds sent to his account for medical treatment in May 2020.
Governor Lukas Enembe … seen as a threat and an obstacle for other political parties seeking the position of number one in Papua. Image: West Papua Today
Therefore, if you refer to this [KPK’s behaviour] as criminalisation, then yes, it is criminalisation.
This is due to the fact that the suspect’s status was premature and not in line with the criminal code, and that the governor himself has not been questioned as a witness in the alleged case.
Questioned as witness
Renning said that for a suspect to be determined, there must be two pieces of evidence and he or she must be questioned as a witness.
Benyamin Gurik, chair of the Indonesian Youth National Committee (KNPI), expressed apprehension about the allegations, saying it amounted to the criminalisation of Papuan public figures, which may contribute to conflict and division in the region.
“Jakarta should reward him for all of the good things he’s done for the province and country, not criminalise him,” said Gurik.
Supporters of Governor Lukas Enembe guard his home. Image: APN
Otniel Deda, chair of the Tabi Indigenous group, urged the KPK to act more professionally.
He suspects that the KPK’s actions were sponsored by “certain parties” intent on shattering the reputation of the Papuan leader.
The governor himself has his own suspicions as to who is behind the corruption accusations against him.
He suspects KPK and the police force are among the highest institutions in the country being used to serve political games that are being played behind his back.
Purely a political move
According to Dr Sofyan Yoman, president of the Fellowship of West Papuan Baptist Churches (PGBWP), the attempted criminalisation of Governor Enembe is a purely political move geared toward dictating the 2024 election outcome, not a matter of law.
An angry group of Governor Lukas Enembe supporters performing a war dance armed with traditional bows and arrows outside his home in an effort to thwart police plans. Image: APR
Dr Yoman explained that other parties in Indonesia are uncomfortable and lack confidence in entering the Papua provincial political process in 2024.
There have been those who have seen, observed, and felt that the existence of Lukas Enembe is a threat and an obstacle for other political parties seeking the position of number one in Papua.
To break the stronghold of Governor Enembe, who is also the chair of the Democratic Party of the Papuan province, there is no other way than to use KPK to criminalise him.
In a statement to Dr Yoman on Wednesday, Governor Enembe said:
Mr Yoman, the matter is now clear. This is not a legal issue, but a political one. The Indonesian State Intelligence, known as Badan Intelligence Negara (BIN), and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, known as Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP), used KPK to criminalise me.
Mr Yoman, you must write an article about the crime so that everyone is aware of it. State institutions are being used by political parties to promote their agenda.
Account blocked
Dr Yoman met the governor and his wife at Governor Enembe’s Koya residence, where he was informed of the following by Yulce W. Enembe:
In the last three months, our account has been blocked without any notification to us as the account owner. We have no idea why it was blocked. We could not move. We can’t do anything about it. Our family has been criminalised without showing any evidence of what we did wrong. Now we’re just living this way because our credit numbers are blocked.
The governor himself gave an account of how he used the Rp 1 billion:
As my health was getting worse, we left for Jakarta at night in March 2019. We were in lockdown due to COVID-19 at the time. When I left, I saved 1 billion in my room. In May 2019, I called Tono (the governor’s housekeeper). I asked Tono to go to my room and take the money in the room worth 1 billion. I asked Tono to transfer it to my BCA account. That’s my money, not corruption money.
“The KPK is just anybody,” the governor stated. “The KPK’s actions were purely political, not legal. KPK has become a medium for PDIP political parties. Considering that the Head of BIN, the Minister of Home Affairs, and the KPK descend from one institution — the police — these kinds of actions are not surprising to me.
“I am being politically criminalised”, said the governor. “Part of a pattern of psychological and physical threats and intimidation I have faced for some time”
“I am not a criminal or a thief,” the governor said.
Singapore health travel
The governor’s overseas travels for medical treatment in Singapore have been halted [barred] by the Directorate General of Immigration based on a prevention request from the KPK.
This appears to be a punitive measure taken by the country’s highest office to further punish the governor, preventing him from receiving regular medical care in Singapore.
Media outlets in Indonesia and Papua have been dominated by stories about the governor’s name linked to the word “corruption”, creating a space for hidden forces to assert their narratives to determine the fate of not only the governor, but West Papua, and Indonesia.
West Papua is a region in which whoever controls the information distributed to the rest of the world, controls the narrative. It is a region where the Indonesian government and the Papuan people have fought for years over the flawed manner in which West Papua was incorporated into Indonesia in the 1960s.
When news of a criminalised Papuan public figure such as Governor Enembe comes to the surface, it is often conveniently used as a means of demoralising popular Papuan leaders who are trusted and loved by their people.
It has been proven again and again over the past decade that Jakarta would have to deal with the revolt of hundreds of thousands of Papuans if they sought to disturb or displace Governor Enembe.
Ultimately, these kinds of nuanced incidents are often created and used to distract Papuans from focusing on the real issue. The issue of Papuan sovereignty is what matters most — the state of Papua, as Jakarta is forcing Papuans to surrender to Indonesian powers that seek to transform Papua and West Papua into Indonesia’s dream.
Papuan dream turned nightmare
Tragically, the Indonesian dream for West Papua have turned into nightmares for the people of Papua, recently claiming the lives of four Indigenous Papuans from the Mimika region, whose bodies were mutilated by Indonesian soldiers.
In recent weeks, this tragic story has been featured in international headlines, something that Jakarta wishes to keep out of the global spotlight.
The UN acting High Commissioner for Human Rights Nada Al-Nashif raised West Papua in her statement during the 51st session of the Human Rights Council on Monday — the day that Governor Enembe was summoned to police in Kota Raja.
Despite Jakarta’s attempts to spin news about West Papua as domestic Indonesian sovereignty issues, the West Papua story will persist as an unresolved international issue.
Governor Enembe (known as Chief Nataka) his family, and many Papuan figures like them have fallen victim to this protracted war between two sovereign states — Papua and Indonesia.
Some of the prominent figures in the past were not only caught in Jakarta’s traps but lost their lives too. In the period between 2020 and 2021, 16 Papuan leaders who served the Indonesian government are estimated to have died, ranging in their 40s through to their 60s.
Papuans have lost the following leaders in 2021 alone:
Klemen Tinal, Vice-Governor of Papua province under Governor Enembe, who died on May 21.
Pieter Kalakmabin, Vice-Regent of the Star Mountain regency, died on October 28.
Abock Busup, Regent of Yahukimo regency (age 44), was found dead in his hotel room in Jakarta on October 3.
Demianus Ijie, a member of Indonesia’s House of Representatives, died on July 23.
Alex Hesegem, who served as Vice-Governor of Papua from 2006-2011, died on June 20.
Demas P. Mandacan, a 45-year-old Regent from the Manokwari regency, died on April 20.
The Timika regency (home of the famous Freeport mine) lost a member of local Parliament Robby Omaleng, on April 22.
In 2020, Papuans lost the following prominent figures: Herman Hasaribab; Letnan Jendral, a high-ranking Indigenous Papuan serving in the Indonesian Armed Forces, who died on December 14; Arkelaus Asso, a member of Parliament from Papua, died on October 15; another young Regent from Boven Digoel regency, Benediktus Tambonop (age 44), died on January 13; Habel Melkias Suwae, who served twice as Regent of Jayapura, the capital of Papua, died on September 3; Paskalis Kocu, Regent of Maybrat, died on August 25; on February 10, Sendius Wonda, the head of the Biro of the secretary of the Papua provincial government, died; on September 9, Demas Tokoro, a member of the Papuan People’s Assembly for the protection of Papuan customary rights, died; and on November 15, Yairus Gwijangge, the brave and courageous Regent of the Nduga regency (the area where most locals were displaced by the ongoing war between the West National Liberation Army and Indonesian security forces), died in Jakarta.
These Indigenous Papuan leaders’ deaths cannot be determined, due to the fact that the institutions responsible for investigating these tragic deaths, such as the legal and justice systems and the police forces, are either perpetrators or accomplices in these tragedies themselves.
Dwindling survival for Papuans
This does not mean Jakarta is to blame for every single death, but its rule provides an overarching framework where the chances of Papuans surviving are dwindling.
This is a modern-day settler colonial project being undertaken under the watchful eye of international community and institutions like the UN. This type of colonisation is considered the worst of all types by scholars.
It is only their grieving families and the unknown forces behind their deaths that know what really happened to them.
The region for the past 60 years has been a crime scene, yet hardly any of these crimes have been investigated and/or prosecuted.
Given the threats, intimidation, and illness Governor Enembe has endured, it is indeed a miracle he has survived.
A big part of that miracle can be attributed to his people, the Papuans who put their lives on the line to protect him whenever Jakarta has tried to harass him.
This week, KPK tried to criminalise the governor and Papuans warned Jakarta – “don’t you try it”.
Yamin Kogoya is a West Papuan academic who has a Master of Applied Anthropology and Participatory Development from the Australian National University and who contributes to Asia Pacific Report. From the Lani tribe in the Papuan Highlands, he is currently living in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia.
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) announced in early September that it had secured an export contract for its CH-4 (Cai Hong-4, or CH-4) medium altitude long endurance unmanned aerial vehicle (MALE UAV) worth over US$100 million from an undisclosed customer. It is understood that the order is from an existing customer for an […]
A country consisting of over 17,000 islands the capability to project land forces across the water is a critical concern for Indonesia’s military. Yet, its amphibious assault capabilities have been largely limited to Soviet era BTR-50s. The Republic of Korea donated some LPTP-7s to Indonesia’s Korps Marinir in 2009 (hoping to spur a larger order). […]
The works in this exhibition by Indonesian artists, Bulan Fi Sabilliah and Fitri DK, comment on the Indonesian New Order’s legacy of the primacy of prescribed beauty ideals and women’s domestic and reproductive roles over public and political roles. The artists’ playful images expose societal norms and offer alternatives to understanding women’s position in society that defy the restrictions of domesticity and beauty ideals and highlight the empowering and agentic potential of women’s solidarity and organising against patriarchal norms. The artists use print-making techniques as a reference to the medium’s role in the dissemination of information against the New Order regime and into Reformasi to advocate for social justice.
Fitri DK
Fitri DK, uses graphic art techniques such as woodcut and etching to critique and initiate dialogue on social and environmental issues. Fitri is committed to raising women’s issues through art and music. Fitri is lives and works in the South of Yogyakarta, Indonesia and is an active member of the SURVIVE!Garage community, Taring Padi art collective. Fitri is also lead vocalist of the band Dendang Kampungan. Over the past decade, Fitri has exhibited in Australia, Europe and the United States, as well as throughout the Indonesian archipelago. Instagram: fitridk
Artist Statement
My works record many memorable or important events in my life. This body of work is inspired by the Women’s March, a political action that I participated in 2019 in Yogyakarta. The Women’s March was organised to celebrate International Women’s Day. This worldwide movement of solidarity, held in cities all across the world, draws on global challenges and encourages social, cultural, legal, and economic changes at the local levels so that women’s rights are recognized, fulfilled, and protected.
The Women’s March in Yogyakarta in 2019 highlighted the ongoing local issues of violence against LGBTQI groups, protection of domestic workers and migrant workers, child marriage, dating violence, and protection of sex workers. I hope that through my artworks, I can spread the message to the world that gender rights are an essential part of human rights.
Bulan Fi Sabilillah is a visual artist living in the South of Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Bulan works with the medium of print and etching to discuss social issues. Her concerns are predominately about challenging beauty ideals imposed by a patriarchal society and imposed on young women by social media. Her messages are of body positivity and acceptance. Bulan is a recent graduate of ISI, the Indonesian Institute of the Arts, Yogyakarta. Instagram: Bulalalan
Artist’s Statement
Commentary on people’s bodies – particularly women’s bodies – is part of everyday life in Indonesia. For example, when you meet a friend in the street, often the first thing they will comment is your physical appearance; your weight and the colour of your skin. Digital media often reinforces this everyday practice to comment and make comparisons on people’s appearances. Often people don’t understand the impact this seemingly meaningless ‘banter’ has on people’s self-esteem.
My religion teaches women that they must cover their aurat – their bodies. However, men are not required to change at all. This leads to unjust outcomes. In cases of sexual violence, often society and the media consider the woman to be responsible because she wasn’t covering her body and becomes re-victimised, as a victim of stigma.
All of these experiences, both personal and from society at large, form the basis of this series. As a young woman living in Indonesia, I want to share my interpretation of what positive body image means, and provide a perspective on why women should feel body confident without being forced to cover it or compare to others, or be discriminated against.
The lawyer of the families of the victims of the Mimika murder case has criticised the military reconstruction of the killings and mutilation of the four Nduga residents, describing it as “odd” and calling for an independent investigation.
“The reconstruction of the murder by the security forces is very odd,” lawyer Gustaf R Kawer said in Jayapura yesterday.
“It is mostly the version of the perpetrators and less from the witnesses.”
According to Kawer, the reconstruction that took place last Saturday demonstrated 40 scenes. Of these, only 10 showed the role of the Raider/20 Ima Jaya Keramo Infantry Brigade soldiers accused over the murder and mutilation.
Kawer questioned how the reenactment of the crime emphasised the role of Roy or RMH — a fugitive still at large who did not participate in the reconstruction.
“The story that was built in the reenactment from the beginning to the end revolved around Roy. But the person was not even there.
“It was as if Roy was made the sole perpetrator even though there were Indonesian military [TNI] members named as suspects,” Kawer said.
‘Finding it strange’
The murder and mutilation of four civilians from Nduga Regency occurred at Settlement Unit 1, Mimika Baru District, Mimika Regency on August 22, 2022.
The four victims were Arnold Lokbere, Leman Nirigi, Irian Nirigi and Atis Tini.
Kawer said the reenactment showed one of the victims, Arnold Lokbere, in front of a mosque at 10pm local time.
“We find it strange that people around the location who are mentioned in the reenactment do not know about the murder,” he said.
Kawer called for an independent team to fully investigate the chronology and reconstruction of the Mimika murder and mutilation.
“The case has now been handed over to the military police and the police, and will be tried in the general court and military court as a general criminal case,” Kawer said.
Meanwhile, Papua Legislative Council member Namantus Gwijangge said the victims’ families considered the reenactment of the murder scene as “rushed”.
Call for ‘death sentence’
“The family asked the Papua Legislative Council to have the case investigated by an independent team, and the perpetrators be sentenced to death,” Gwijangge said.
On Monday, the Papua Office of the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM Papua) said the reconstruction had not fully revealed the murder and mutilation.
Komnas HAM Papua head Frits Ramandey noted that several accused refused to act out certain scenes so some roles were replaced by other people.
Komnas HAM Papua also said that the reconstruction raised suspicion that there were two more soldiers of the Raider/20 Ima Jaya Keramo Infantry Brigade involved in the murder and mutilation but they had not been named as suspects.
However, Komnas HAM Papua did not mention the names or ranks of the two other soldiers allegedly involved.
Republished from Tabloid Jubi/West Papua Daily with permission.
Recently, New Mandala intern Timothy Barham caught up with Patrick Anderson, a policy advisor with the Forest Peoples Programme, a human rights group that supports forest peoples’ struggles throughout the wet tropics. Patrick has lived in Canberra for the last ten years. During the previous decade, he was based in Jakarta and was campaigns advisor at WALHI, the Indonesian Forum for Environment. Patrick is Chair of the Executive Committee of the High Carbon Stock Approach. The HCSA is a multi-stakeholder standard that assists groups wishing to apply commitments to zero deforestation.
Despite choosing not to study at university, Patrick has a close relationship with the Australian National University where he has held positions as a guest lecturer, visiting fellow, and research associate. Patrick’s dedication to supporting environmental justice has spanned his life and led him to work in forest areas the world over.
To begin our discussion today, I would love to hear how you first become interested in issues of environmental justice and land rights?
Growing up my parents were politically active on many issues so social justice was part of my upbringing. After high school I moved to Northern New South Wales where I became engaged with environmental justice movements. I participated in protests which succeeded in getting a moratorium on a contract to log Terania creek, an area which is ecologically important and of significance to the Bundjalung peoples. Subsequently, myself and some others who had been involved in the protest started a group called Rainforest Information Centre.
One day we received a letter from a community leader in the Solomon Islands informing us that the same Australian companies were now on his island and, without community consent, were logging their forests. This demonstrated the need to work in solidarity globally and at the intersection of environmental protection and human rights.
In the 1990s I took a job as director of Greenpeace International’s rainforest protection campaign, which generated international pressure to support local struggles against destructive logging and deforestation and, where possible, worked closely with forest peoples to support their interests.
What did you learn from your early volunteer and professional experiences?
One of the biggest lessons I learnt was the value of market pressure. Cooperating with Government is of course ultimately essential, however, in many cases governments follow industry. One of the big levers for incentivising industry change is to go after their markets.
In most cases, when a forestry industry is expanding it is to sell to export markets and will be aided by foreign capital. These international links can be the industry’s Achilles heel. When you try to transform an industry such as logging you often encounter local resistance from industry and government, raising arguments about loss of revenue, jobs and taxes. For foreign corporate purchasers and investors the decision matrix is importantly different. They are not concerned about job losses in a distant forestry company, but about their reputation to their customers, and being branded as supporting environmental destruction. Thus, their concern for the environment and forest peoples being displaced isn’t weakened by arguments about jobs and revenue.
When did you become primarily focused on environmental justice in Indonesia and what projects are you currently working on?
After ten years working for Greenpeace International in Amsterdam, in 2000 I moved to Indonesia. I initially worked as an advisor to WALHI the National Forum for Environment. Then in 2005 I joined the Forest Peoples Program, where I still work. I primarily work on international policy relating to voluntary standards for palm oil, pulp paper, timber, and a standard that’s been recently developed for companies committed to zero deforestation.
None of these standards are government initiatives. Rather, non-government organisations have worked with progressive industry to develop standards, based on international environmental and human rights norms. International market campaigns put pressure on companies to abandon destructive practices and products. Voluntary industry standards help companies to implement their commitments to sustainability and justice. Once these standards become widely adopted by industry, governments, which are often initially resistant, can become interested in adopting them into law, so that they apply to all players in that sector in their jurisdiction. For example, there are now several district governments in Indonesia that have committed to applying a standard for oil palm production called the Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil.
Once a standard is adopted by a company or a government, its effective implementation depends on regular independent assessments, and an effective and responsive complaints mechanism accessible to all interested parties. Work on developing and implementing such standards has been taken up by many environmental organisations and a few human rights organisations; creating standards and then assisting communities and civil society to use them effectively.
Palm oil is Indonesia’s biggest export and has played a major role in its economic growth over the last two decades. Consequently, palm oil has been credited with contributing to poverty reduction, increased employment, and by extension improving food and health security. With this in mind, why is establishing such voluntary palm oil standards so important?
Indonesia is approaching 20 million hectares of palm oil, which is about 10% of the land area of the nation. As you can imagine this has had massive impacts. About half of that area was established by clearing rainforests and many of the plantations displaced local communities and their agroforestry systems. In most cases, communities and farmers were effectively forced to give up their farms and forests to large-scale agribusiness, while receiving very little compensation (typically less than $100 per hectare).
So, both the environmental and human impacts have been monumental and projections show the palm industry may expand to 30 million hectares. The voluntary sustainability standard for palm oil is designed to stop environmental damage such as deforestation and human rights abuses such as forced land acquisition, and so is one mechanism to limit the damage from further palm oil expansion in Indonesia.
In the past ten years, in response to international concern about carbon emissions and forest loss, the Indonesian government had enacted a moratorium on further clearance of forest and on granting new palm oil licences. Following the COVID-19 pandemic and associated economic contraction, the government has been promoting economic recovery through agribusiness expansion, and in particular by stripping away social and environmental safeguards that protected forests and community rights. This creates alarming risks for human exploitation and environmental degradation, but given that the major industry players in the oil palm sector are members of the RSPO, it is expected that they will not revert to deforestation and land theft.
Do you think that there are risks associated with the limited diversity of Indonesia’s agricultural sector?
Yes, traditionally much of Indonesia’s farming at the local level was based on a mosaic of crops and forest products. Close to a village, farmers would grow annual crops, including wet or dry rice, then further out there would be tree crops, and further still there would typically be a forest area that was managed for products including timber, resins, water and honey. The expansion of industries like palm oil has led to literally millions of people transitioning from this kind of model to becoming palm oil farmers or day workers on company plantations for cash payments.
Now this is not inherently negative. There are plenty of issues associated with those kinds of farming models, primarily relating to the fact that it provides only a very limited cash income. What it did provide, however, was a basic level of food security and nutritional diversity, within structures of local culture and tradition. Once communities lose their lands and their members become exclusively palm oil farmers or plantation workers, their economic security is in the hands of the industry. If there are not satisfactory standards in place this can expose farmers and workers to low wages and poor working conditions.
In some cases this has led to what is effectively slavery, where people are brought from one island to another to work on plantations and kept in camps where their mobility is restricted and they are forced to spend their small wages within company stores. Farmers who gave up their lands to palm oil plantations were often persuaded to do so based on the promise of obtaining title to two hectares of land planted with palm oil trees established by the company. These schemes come with a debt for all the company’s development costs, and some farmers have found themselves unable to service the debt, becoming permanently trapped in debt bondage.
Additionally, there are serious ecological risks where you have an agricultural sector that is dominated by a limited range of crops. For example, the palm oil industry in Indonesia is currently being threatened by a range of pathogens, funguses, viruses, and insects. So, I think that Indonesia’s dependence on the palm oil industry, while obviously very profitable for big industry and a major revenue source for government, is also risky from environmental, social, and ecological perspectives and these risks will only grow as the industry expands.
What are your thoughts on relocating the capital to Kalimantan?
The government listed two or three primary reasons in its rationale for relocating the capital: Jakarta is congested, sustainability concerns, and a desire to diversify the distribution of government. In my personal opinion I don’t believe that any of these factors justify building a new capital in the middle of a jungle in Kalimantan.
Jakarta is a city of 10 million people and without a doubt it needs more infrastructure. That said, it is possible to build your way out of congestion. In the early 2000s Bangkok had a comparable population and geographical characteristics to Jakarta, and similarly faced major problems with congestion, poor air quality, limited infrastructure, and a deteriorating urban environment. Over two decades it invested significantly in infrastructure and initiatives to improve air quality. This investment improved the functionality of the city. A similar approach could be applied to Jakarta, but would require roughly five times the level of investment that the city is currently able to organise. By moving the capital the government has removed national revenue that could have fuelled such an initiative.
If the government’s concern is to diversify the concentration of the government then spending $30-40 billion on a new capital is a perplexing approach. This funding could instead be channelled to the existing constellation of provincial and local governments to support initiatives to decentralise government systems and services.
Finally, the location of the new capital in Kalimantan will lead to quite a lot of deforestation. This raises environmental concerns, but there are also dozens of Indigenous communities from at least 12 ethnicities who occupy that area. So, it will almost certainly create a multitude of human rights abuses, forced displacements, impoverishment, and environmental degradation.
I think to some people your career path would sound unconventional. Based on this experience, what advice would you give to young people interested in environmental justice?
Well, as mentioned I never went to university and so most of my learning has been grounded in practical on the job experiences. My dad, Don Anderson who was a sociologist at the ANU, always used to tease me “when are you going to get a proper education?” Since I moved back to Australia in 2013, I’ve had the pleasure of giving guest lectures, and holding positions as a visiting fellow and research associate at the ANU.
I’m quite proud of the fact that my life experience allows me to bring unique perspectives and insights to these roles. And my dad has come to appreciate how I continue to educate myself through extensive reading, field research, and by being open to learn from every person and situation I encounter. I don’t intend this to in any way discredit the crucial work of academics, which I use in my work all the time, but rather to stress that there are many avenues for learning.
Something I would recommend to absolutely anyone is volunteering. I personally have volunteered all my life. Even when working full-time I make sure to make time to volunteer somewhere. I think this is important because it is a great way to stay connected to the movement. Environmental justice causes aren’t the exclusive realm of professionals. It is crucial that everyone is able to act on their feelings of concern for the environment and social justice, and it is a challenge to groups working in these sectors to make space for volunteers to be involved, so that together we can change our world in the direction of sustainability and justice.
ANALYSIS:By David Engel, Albert Zhang and Jake Wallis
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has analysed thousands of suspicious tweets posted in 2021 relating to the Indonesian region of West Papua and assessed that they are inauthentic and were crafted to promote the policies and activities of the Indonesian government while condemning opponents such as Papuan pro-independence activists.
This work continues ASPI’s research collaboration with Twitter focusing on information manipulation in the Indo-Pacific to encourage transparency around these activities and norms of behaviour that are conducive to open democracies in the region.
It follows our August 24 analysis of a dataset made up of thousands of tweets relating to developments in Indonesia in late 2020, which Twitter had removed for breaching its platform manipulation and spam policies.
This report on Papua focuses on similar Twitter activity from late February to late July 2021 that relates to developments in and about Indonesia’s easternmost region.
This four-month period was noteworthy for several serious security incidents as well as an array of state-supported activities and events in the Papua region, then made up of the provinces of West Papua and Papua.
These incidents were among many related to the long-running pro-independence conflict in the region.
A report from Indonesia’s Human Rights Commission detailed 53 violent incidents in 2021 across the Papua region in which 24 people were killed at the hands of both security forces and the armed wing of the Free Papua Organisation (OPM) separatist movement, the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB).
‘Armed criminal group’
Jakarta normally referred to this group by the acronym “KKB”, which stands for “armed criminal group”.
This upsurge in violence followed earlier cases involving multiple deaths. The most notorious took place in December 2018, when TPNPB insurgents reportedly murdered a soldier and at least 16 construction workers working on a part of the Trans-Papua Highway in the Nduga regency of Papua province (official Indonesian sources have put the death toll as high as 31).
The Indonesian government responded by conducting Operation Nemangkawi, a major national police (POLRI) security operation by a taskforce comprising police and military units, including additional troops brought in from outside the province.
The security operation led to bloody clashes, allegations of human rights abuses and extrajudicial killings, and the internal displacement of many thousands of Papuans, hundreds of whom, according to Amnesty International Indonesia, later died of hunger or illness.
Besides anti-insurgency actions, an important component of the operation was the establishment of Binmas Noken Polri, a community policing initiative designed to conduct “humanitarian police missions or operations” and assist “community empowerment” through programmes covering education, agriculture and tourism development.
“Noken” refers to a traditional Papuan bag that indigenous Papuans regard as a symbol of “dignity, civilisation and life”. Binmas Noken Polri was initiated by the then national police chief, Tito Karnavian, the same person who created the recently disbanded, shadowy Red and White Special Task Force highlighted in our August 24 report.
A key development occurred in April 2021 when pro-independence militants killed the regional chief of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) in an ambush. Coming on the back of other murders by independence fighters (including of two teachers alleged to be police spies earlier that month), this prompted the government to declare the KKB in Papua—that is, the TPNPB “and its affiliated organisations”—”terrorists” and President Joko Widodo to order a crackdown on the group.
9 insurgents killed
Nine alleged insurgents were killed shortly afterwards.
In May 2021, hundreds of additional troops from outside Papua deployed to the province, some of which were part of an elite battalion nicknamed “Satan’s forces” that had earned notoriety in earlier conflicts in Indonesia’s Aceh province and Timir-Leste.
During the same month, there were large-scale protests in Papua and elsewhere over the government’s moves to renew and revise the special autonomy law, under which the region had enjoyed particular rights and benefits since 2001.
The protests included demonstrations staged by Papuan activists and students in Jakarta and the Javanese cities of Bandung and Yogyakarta from May 21-24. The revised law was ushered in by Karnavian, who was then (and is still) Indonesia’s Home Affairs Minister.
The period also saw ongoing preparations for the staging of the National Sports Week (PON) in Papua. Delayed by one year because of the covid-19 pandemic, the event eventually was held in October at several specially built venues across the province.
The dataset we analysed represents a diverse collection of thousands of tweets put out under such hashtags as #BinmasNokenPolri, #MenolakLupa (Refuse to forget), #TumpasKKBPapua (Annihilate the Papuan armed criminal group), #PapuaNKRI (Papua unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia), #Papua and #BongkarBiangRusuh (Take apart the culprits of the riots).
Most were overtly political, either associating the Indonesian state with success and public benefits for Papuans or condemning the state’s opponents as criminals, and sometimes doing both in the same tweet.
Papuan Games tweets Among several tweets under #Papua proclaiming that the province was ready to host the forthcoming PON thanks to Jakarta’s investment in facilities and security, 18 dispatched on June 25 proclaimed: “PAPUA IS READY TO IMPLEMENT PON 2020!!! Papua is safe, peaceful and already prepared to implement PON 2020. So there’s no need to be afraid. Shootings by the KKB … are far from the PON cluster [the various sports facilities] … Therefore everyone #ponpapua #papua”.
Many tweets were clearly aimed at shaping public perceptions of the pro-independence militia and others challenging the state.
Under #MenolakLupa in particular, numerous tweets related to past and contemporary acts of violence by the pro-independence militants. Two sets of tweets from March 22 and 24 that recall the 2018 attack at Nduga are especially noteworthy, in that both injected the term “terrorist” into the armed criminal group moniker that the state had been using hitherto, making it “KKTB”. This was a month before the formal designation of the OPM as a “terrorist” organisation.
As if to stress the OPM’s terrorist nature, subsequent tweets under #MenolakLupa carried through with this loaded terminology. For example, tweets on June 15 stated that in 2017 “KKTB committed sexual violence” against as many as 12 women in two villages in Papua.
A fortnight later, another set of tweets said that in 2018 the “armed terrorist criminal group” had held 14 teachers hostage and had taken turns in raping one of them, causing her “trauma”. Others claimed former pro-independence militants had converted to the cause of the Indonesian unitary state and therefore recognised its sovereignty over Papua.
Some tweets relate directly to specific contemporary events. Examples are flurries of tweets posted on July 24-25 in response to the protests against the special autonomy law’s renewal that highlight the alleged irresponsibility of demonstrations during the pandemic, such as: “Let’s reject the invitation to demo and don’t be easily provoked by irresponsible [malign] people. Stay home and stay healthy always.”
Others are tweets put out under #TumpasKKBPapua after the shooting of the two teachers, such as: “Any religion in the world surely opposes murder or any other such offence, let alone of this teacher. Secure the land of the Bird of Paradise.”
Warning over ‘hoax’ allegations
Other tweets warn Papuans not to succumb to “hoax” allegations about the security forces’ behaviour or other claims by overseas-based spokespeople such as United Liberation Movement of West Papua’s Benny Wenda and Amnesty International human rights lawyer Veronica Koman.
Tweets on April 1 under #PapuaNKRI, for example, warned recipients not to “believe the KKB’s Media Propaganda, let’s be smart and wise in using the media lest we be swayed by fake news.”
Many of the tweets in the dataset are strikingly mundane, with content that state agencies already were, or would have been, publicising openly. A tweet on February 27 under #Papua, for example, announced that the Transport Minister would prioritise the construction of transport infrastructure in the two provinces.
Those under #BinmasNokenPolri often echoed advice that receivers of the tweet could just as easily see on other media, such as POLRI’s official Binmas Noken website.
Some were public announcements about market conditions and community policing events where, for example, people could receive government assistance such as rice, basic items and other support.
Most reflected Binmas Noken’s community engagement purpose, ranging from a series on May 20 promoting a child’s “trauma healing” session with Binmas Noken personnel to another tweeted out on June 20 advising of a badminton contest involving villages and police arranged under the Nemangkawi Task Force.
‘Healthy body, strong spirit’
A further 34 tweets on June 20 advised that “inside a healthy body is a strong spirit”, of which the first nine began with the same broad sentiment expressed in the Latin motto derived from the Roman poet Juvenal, “Mens sana in corpore sano.” (Presumably, after this first group of tweets it dawned on the sender that his or her classical erudition was likely to be lost on indigenous Papuan residents.)
As with the tweets analysed in our August 24 report, based on behavioural patterns within the data, we judge that these tweets are likely to be inauthentic—that is, they were the result of coordinated and covert activity intended to influence public opinion rather than organic expressions by genuine users on the platform.
Without conclusively identifying the actors responsible, we assess that the tweets mirror the Widodo government’s general position on the Papuan region as being an inalienable part of the Indonesian state, as well as the government’s security policies and development agenda in the region.
The vast majority are purposive: by promoting the government’s policies and activities and condemning opponents of those policies (whether pro-independence militia or protesters), the tweets are clearly designed to persuade recipients that the state is providing vital public goods such as security, development and basic support in the face of malignant, hostile forces, and hence that being Indonesian is in their interests.
Dr David Engel is senior analyst on Indonesia in ASPI’s Defence and Strategy Programme. Albert Zhang is an analyst with ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre. His research interests include information and influence operations, and disinformation. Dr Jake Wallis is the Head of Programme, Information Operations and Disinformation with ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre. This article is republished from The Strategist with permission.
Indonesia remains a rural country. With 45% of the population living in the countryside (approx. 123 million), Indonesia has the fourth-largest rural population in the global south. Agriculture is the lead sector in 20 of 34 provinces. Rural Indonesia is changing fast, with land reform and village government reforms, rapid migration to the city and overseas, and COVID-19 impacting rural life. While many people have moved above the poverty line over recent decades, rural people face the imminent threats of vulnerability, food security, stunting and climate change, with a large proportion still living below $2/day. Despite the importance of rural life to Indonesia and its region, scholarship has tended to overlook rural Indonesia. In August 2022 the Indonesia Institute held a panel discussion to commemorate Hari Tani and Indonesian Independence day and consider the need to rejuvenate research on rural Indonesia. We asked critical Indonesian thinkers to reflect on a simple question: What are the most important policy problems facing rural Indonesia, and what can researchers do about them? The panellists presentations were followed by an open discussion.
Panel speakers:
Land Reform: Noer Fauzi Rachman
Food security in rural Indonesia: Sirojuddin Arif, SMERU
The group, one aged 19 and the others in their 20s, had raised the flag at the Cenderawasih Sports Centre, and although they were not carrying weapons they were convicted of treason.
The Jubi website reported the judge said raising the Morning Star flag and marching while shouting “Free Papua” and “We are not Red and White, we are the Morning Star“, amounted to treason.
And the act of unfurling banners with the words “Self Determination For West Papua, Stop West Papua Militarism” and “Indonesia Immediately Open Access for the UN Human Rights Commission Investigation Team to West Papua” was also considered treason.
‘Intention of separating’
The verdict read “the defendants already have the intention of separating Papua and West Papua from the territory of Indonesia. The defendants have committed the beginning of treason as stipulated in Article 87 of the Criminal Code”.
After the trial, the defendant’s lawyer Emanuel Gobay told Jubi “we firmly reject” the court’s verdict of treason.
During the trial Gobay said no expert witnesses had been presented to explain their perspectives on the charges.
According to Gobay, the conclusions drawn by the panel of judges seemed subjective because there was no information from expert witnesses.
“We question the basis on which the panel of judges concluded the treason. It is as if the panel of judges acted as experts, interpreting and concluding themselves without relying on expert testimony,” Gobay said.
This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.
Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) is looking to ride on the momentum of recent successes to further expand the global footprint of its T-50/FA-50 Golden Eagle advanced jet trainer/light attack aircraft. The company’s latest order comes from Poland, with Warsaw committing to acquiring 48 FA-50PL light attack aircraft worth up to $3 billion under a broader […]
Floods have struck the West Papuan city of Sorong following heavy rains early this week.
There are reports of 1.5 metre-high flooding and landslides with two people killed.
Roads and thousands of houses in the city were inundated by floodwater.
Two people died when their house was engulfed by a landslide. They were a 35-year-old mother and her eight-year-old son.
The father survived.
The city’s disaster mitigation agency head, Herlin Sasabone, said emergency authorities were continuing to monitor the flood situation.
Herlin said the Sorong Regional Disaster Management Agency (BPBD), in collaboration with the National Search and Rescue Agency, the Indonesian Military, and the National Police continued to monitor the flood situation in the city.
“People who need help and see their homes damaged by landslides can report to the Sorong BPBD office,” Herlin said.
This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.
While travelling with colleagues to East Kalimantan to do fieldwork in the Indonesian capital city (IKN) in mid-July 2022, we collected 180 responses from people affected by the new capital site. In Java, the relocation of the Indonesian capital from Jakarta to purpose-built Nusantara in Kalimantan raises new hopes for both ruling elites and the Jakarta people. It is expected to eradicate severe congestion, unsustainable land use, and overpopulation in Jakarta, and the knock-on effects of these problems. These problems have haunted not only Jakarta, but also Java, for many decades. When we discussed these issues with our local respondents during informal and formal conversations, the first impression we encountered was scepticism. This came not only from local academics, activists, and local people, but even local bureaucrats from regency and provincial levels in East Kalimantan.
These sceptical responses demonstrate a gap in knowledge and poor communication between ruling elites of Jakarta and those in East Kalimantan. While the former problem relates to a lack of aspiration to create bridges between national and local actors, the latter problem is misinformation on both the capital relocation and development of supporting facilities such as housing for civil servant and servicemen and governmental offices.
These two factors inevitably lead to unwelcoming responses from most East Kalimantan locals towards the new capital. Their sombre responses reflect attitudes informed by past and existing problems in East Kalimantan, such as natural disasters, like unrehabilitated mine sites and inequitable funding allocations from all levels of government. Both problems remain unresolved as the capital city issues loom. The capital relocation promises to be another thorn in the side of East Kalimantan if prior problems are left unresolved.
Most respondents agreed that there is no mutual dialogue between Jakarta and East Kalimantan or inclusive participation offered to residents of East Kalimantan. For example, local representatives who were originally invited to Jakarta were actually members of a small local elite who were unfamiliar with the local situation. More specifically they have no idea of the impact that the project will have on local populations.
This meant that information about relocation of people in East Kalimantan and the development of the new capital has not spread widely among the people of East Kalimantan. It resulted in the sudden increase in land prices in several sub districts, like Sepaku, Samboja and Bumi Harapan which lie between Nusantara and East Kalimantan’s two supporting cities, Balikpapan and Samarinda to be used for housing and other industries supporting the new capital. A so-called “land mafia” has emerged, which unilaterally decides the price of land and keeps this information from locals. Unfortunately, these current and upcoming booms do not benefit the small group of indigenous people, such as the Paser and Balik peoples, who have been forced to give up their customary land as a result of government decisions to acquire it. By contrast, those who have freehold title / SHM (sertifikat hak milik) can sell their land.
The Capital Authority / BO (Badan Otorita) itself does not have a branch office in East Kalimantan yet. Ideally, it should it should establish an office from which to engage with the people of East Kalimantan. According to local bureaucrats the BO made few visits to hold talks with local governments and/or communities. Certainly, these conditions create a gap between national and local governments in finding common ground regarding power sharing.
The main gap is the lack of coordination between government levels especially the central government, provincial government, and regency/municipal government. The issue of territorial expansion and spatial planning is causing major problems between BO and its local government counterparts. Although the new capital city bill already defines the capital territory in regulation, there is still the possibility of acquiring other land from the Kutai Kartanegara and North Penajam Paser regencies, and Balikpapan city. This would surely disrupt the existing spatial planning of the three regencies’ governments. One bureaucrat from the Local Development Agency (Bappeda) told me that there is no joint agreement to merge spatial planning between the new capital and regencies. Bappeda will run its own spatial planning programs independently from the Capital Authority. More specifically, there is budget inequality between the BO and its neighbouring governments.
Indonesian officials are raising Brasilia as a model for relocating the capital city to East Kalimantan. But Brazil’s experience with Brasilia is not a positive lesson from history, but a warning.
The regencies are envious of large BO’s budget. In fact, East Kalimantan Province is the biggest fundraiser for the Indonesian national budget (APBN), contributing almost 500 trillion rupiah per year. But the special allocation fund (DAK) that transfers back to East Kalimantan from Jakarta is not always adequate for local infrastructure and public services. The BO, as the central government institution, will not be welcomed by surrounding local governments due to its institutional superiority and huge funding.
On a social level the new capital city is colloquially known as the Second Betawi (Betawi Kedua) in East Kalimantan. This terminology refers to the Betawi people, the original inhabitants of Jakarta, who have been forced out by rapid development and modernisation. On the new capital site approximately 150-200 households in Paser, Balik, and Basap people will be removed from their ancestral land due to disputed legal standing. The government does not acknowledge ancestral land claims because it believes claimants have the right to manage, but not own the land, according to positive law principles. This means the government can claim land that is considered to be “unowned”, even if it belongs to traditional land owners. Furthermore, the name “Nusantara” itself is not accepted by locals who propose indigenous name “Benuaq Etam” (Our City) as the new capital’s name.
In sum, both the lack of coordination between state actors and a lack of acknowledgment between state and society lead me to suggest the real voice of East Kalimantan should be heard. More specifically, central government should sit with local residents in East Kalimantan. There is an urgent need to ease unresolved issues between Jakarta and East Kalimantan to avoid further exacerbating an already tense situation.
Journalist Muhammad Asrul is awaiting word from Indonesia’s Supreme Court about whether he will spend further time behind bars for reporting on corruption issues. The decision will have a profound impact not only on his life but also on press freedom in Indonesia.
The country is at a turning point following its transition at the end of the 20th century from military dictatorship to democracy.
Many, including civil society and members of the judiciary, have sought to protect journalists — they see a free, functioning press as part of Indonesia’s future.
Others, however, are waging a battle against independent media and freedom of speech, through prosecutions like Asrul’s and through the impending passage of a criminal code that smacks of authoritarianism. With Indonesia’s two-decade-old democratic path in real jeopardy, the next several months will be decisive.
In 2019, Asrul penned a series of articles alleging corruption by a local political official. The same official filed a complaint with the police, who subsequently arrested and detained Asrul.
After spending more than a month in jail as the police conducted investigations, Asrul was prosecuted under the country’s draconian Electronic Information and Transactions Law (ITE Law), which criminalises the electronic transmission of information that defames or affronts.
At the end of 2021, a court found Asrul guilty and sentenced him to three months in prison.
Police bypassed Press Council
While this would be egregious enough on its own, in Asrul’s case the police chose to bypass Indonesia’s Press Council.
The Press Council is an independent government body tasked with protecting journalists in press-related disputes. The police are supposed to coordinate with the Press Council to determine whether a case should be funnelled into the criminal justice system or resolved through mediation or other solutions outside of the courts.
But the police did not give the council a chance to settle the complaint against Asrul, sidestepping this critical institution. Equally worrying, the court that convicted Asrul stated that the police have the power to override the Press Council in a range of situations, including where individuals offended by news articles go straight to the police instead of the council.
The Clooney Foundation for Justice’s TrialWatch initiative, where I work as a senior programme manager, monitored Asrul’s trial through its partner the American Bar Association Center for Human Rights.
This coming week, we will file an amicus brief requesting that the Supreme Court overturn Asrul’s conviction and ensure that the protections offered by Indonesia’s Press Council remain a reality for journalists throughout Indonesia.
TrialWatch monitors trials such as Asrul’s in more than 35 countries, seeking to overturn unjust convictions against journalists and marginalised individuals and to reform the laws used to target them.
The ITE Law is one such example. Since its enactment in 2008, the ITE Law has been a key tool in suppressing freedom of expression and press freedom in Indonesia, with prosecutions spiking in recent years.
81 people charged
During the first nine months of 2021, for example, at least 81 people were charged with violating the ITE Law, “most of them accused of defamation” — the provision under which Asrul was prosecuted. Those found guilty of defamation can face up to four years behind bars.
While the ITE Law has been a darling of government officials seeking to quash legitimate criticism, it has also been deployed by businesses and other powerful actors who simply do not like what someone has posted online.
TrialWatch recently monitored a trial in which a woman, Stella Monica, was prosecuted for Instagram complaints about acne treatment she received at a dermatology clinic. Monica was acquitted but the clinic aggressively pursued the case, subjecting her to almost two years of legal proceedings.
This playbook for stifling speech may soon receive a boost with the revision of Indonesia’s colonial-era criminal code. In many countries, the amendment of colonial laws has been a step forward, but Indonesia’s iteration is so regressive that when a draft was published in 2019 it triggered widespread protests.
Although the government withdrew the legislation following the protests, this year the new code was resurrected, retaining provisions from the 2019 version that endanger press freedom.
In addition to providing for a potential jail sentence of up to three years for perceived insults to the president and vice-president, the draft code criminalises the dissemination of “incomplete” news and so-called “fake news”.
Attempts to hide developments
Just how troubling these developments are is clear from the Indonesian government’s attempts to hide them. The Deputy Law and Human Rights Minister in charge of the revision process had previously pledged that the legislature would vote on the code by August 17, Indonesia’s Independence Day.
He also stated that the authorities would not share the draft text with either civil society or the public because of the risk of disorder. After an outcry, however, the government published the draft in July and promised further consultations, still leaving civil society with scant time to deliberate and engage the government if the vote indeed takes place in the next few months.
While passage of the code in its current form would be a triumph for government officials and corporate interests seeking to restrict critical speech, it would also be a victory for the increasingly powerful conservative Islamist parties on which President Joko Widodo has relied to maintain power.
The draft code falls squarely on the side of conservatives in Indonesia’s roiling cultural battles, threatening jail time for sex and co-habitation before marriage, which would also functionally criminalise LGBTQ+ relationships. Another provision swells the already expansive blasphemy law, extending it to criminalise comments made on social media.
Although the draft code reflects the reality that repressive forces are gaining ground, there is still hope that the authorities will side with those fighting for fundamental freedoms. The government has shown itself to be responsive not only to pressure from hardliners but also to pressure from pro-democracy forces.
The withdrawal of the code after the 2019 protests and the recent sharing of the draft text are good examples. In another recent example, after enduring intense criticism about overly broad enforcement of the ITE Law, President Widodo commissioned guidelines limiting its application — in particular against journalists.
The guidelines, which were introduced after Asrul’s case had already begun, explicitly state that in cases where a news outlet has published an article, then press regulations — not the ITE law — should apply. While enforcement has been shaky thus far, the guidelines demonstrate the power of public pressure and are an additional tool in the battle for press freedom.
Institutional safeguards
Other institutional safeguards are in place. Indonesia’s Press Council has a mandate that puts it on the same level as other government entities and gives it real power to protect journalists — hence the importance of Asrul’s case and the impending Supreme Court decision on the Council’s role.
To show how significant the Press Council is we need only hop across the ocean, where press freedom advocates in Malaysia have been fighting to establish a similar mechanism for years, recognising its potential to stop the harassment of independent media.
The courts are also making positive noises. In the face of campaigns by government officials, religious conservatives and businesses to clamp down on speech, some judges have ruled in favour of human rights protections — from the acquittal of Monica for her dermatological troubles to a recent high-profile acquittal in a blasphemy prosecution.
What this means is that unlike in countries where the decks are stacked, with the legislature, judiciary and press co-opted by authoritarian powers, all is not lost in Indonesia. Civil society has proven that it can mobilise and that institutional levers can be pulled.
But this upcoming period will be crucial. Buffeted by competing winds, the Indonesian government will decide whether to move forward with the current version of the new criminal code. Actors at the local level, like police and prosecutors, will decide whether to enforce — or not enforce — rights-positive guidelines and laws.
The judiciary will consider cases with wide-ranging consequences for press freedom and freedom of speech, like that of Muhammad Asrul. And even if the criminal code is passed, it awaits a barrage of constitutional challenges, putting the judiciary in the spotlight.
Through its TrialWatch initiative, the Clooney Foundation for Justice will continue to monitor these courtroom battles and advocate for those unjustly targeted in criminal prosecutions. With key decisions forthcoming, the fate of Asrul and many others hang in the balance.
Kyle Delbyck is senior programme manager at the Clooney Foundation for Justice’s TrialWatch initiative, where she coordinates trial observations and ensuing advocacy. Grace Hauser, TrialWatch legal fellow at the Clooney Foundation for Justice, contributed to this article. First published by Al Jazeera English, it is republished under a Creative Commons licence.
Is the death penalty—judicial or extra-judicial—an effective deterrent of the drug epidemic? Malaysians and policymakers are unable to agree on whether some crimes, such as drug trafficking without violence, should be penalised by death. The Malaysian government has stated that the mandatory death sentence, which is statutory for certain offences, including nonviolent drug trafficking convictions, is likely to be abolished. This would give judges the discretion to impose a different punishment for the 23 crimes that carry the death sentence. Many ASEAN nations are wrestling with the question of whether or not capital punishment is effective.
In the Philippines the number of civilians killed in the drug war from July 2016 to March 2019 “appears to be between 12,000 and 30,000.” Former President, Rodrigo Duterte named 44 mayors, vice mayors and other officials in May 2019 as being “narco politicians”. But when his son and Davao’s Vice Mayor, Paolo Duterte, was accused of aiding and abetting a seized shipment of $125 million worth of narcotics from China for the Philippines market, Duterte senior was less enthusiastic to carry his extrajudicial killings. On the other hand, also in 2019, the police executed two former governors, both of whom had been designated as “narco politicians” on Duterte’s watch list.
The Malaysian case is no different. Tan Sris and Datuks (titles conferred to dignitaries by Malaysian heads of state) lead the drug cartels, at least in the case of the RM 2.4 billion (0.55 billion USD) confiscated from the North Butterworth Container Terminal (NBCT) in September 2019. These Malaysian drug lords are able to attain these titles because they too were probably able to hide the fact that they are laundering money by, among other things, running pawn shops, shipping companies, and hotels. The continuous arrests of policemen involved in drug dealing and consumption shows a symbiotic relationship between law enforcement and the drug related crime networks. Malaysia has to play a more important role in going after the drug lords because, as mentioned by the Inspector General of Police (IGP) of the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP), the country is a transit point for drugs being sent to other countries.
The thinning of the grey lines between the executive and drug lords by the likes of Myanmar’s Lo Hsing Han further exacerbates the problem. In the 1960s, he was given permission to traffic opium and heroin in exchange for commanding a local militia formed by then-dictator Ne Win to battle communists on the country’s borders with China. Meanwhile, Lo sided with the insurgents during the next decade, and he was captured in Thailand in 1973 and condemned to death for treason. His sentence was eventually reduced to life in prison, and he was released under a general amnesty in 1980. Thus, started the second half of his career, during which he was reported to continue his heroin business, using poor farmers from Myanmar’s Shan state and northern Thailand to cultivate opium for him. When he turned around and decided to disassociate himself from his life of crime He found receptive partners in Thailand’s business communities, multi-national corporations and governments, notably in Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Singapore. One such example is Asia World Co Ltd, a major infrastructure conglomerate in Myanmar partially owned by Lo’s son, Steven Law, with which the Singapore government had a joint venture. That venture has been blacklisted by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
Evidently, there is a transnational criminal network that controls an extensive operation involving air cargo and shipping services which send drugs to Indonesia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Australia. The 2017 arrest of Xaysana Keopimpha – a Lao dubbed the “ASEAN drug lord”, exposed a major drug ring that had links to insurgents in Thailand’s Deep South.
While most ASEAN nations turn a blind eye to drug lords and cartels, they are keener to execute naive teenage drug mules. Nagaenthran Dharmalingam, for example, was a Malaysian with learning disabilities who was convicted of narcotics trafficking in 2010 and whose case drew international attention. He was recently executed at Singapore’s Changi prison.
The question is, why are countries like Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines are so quick to impose death penalties and extrajudicial killings for drug mules and drug peddlers, but not as effective in taking action against the drug lords?
In Singapore there is an over-representation of Malays condemned to death. Between 2010 and 2021, 50 of the 77 persons condemned to death were Malays, 15 Indians, 10 Chinese, and two others. Due to a lack of transparency, we may extrapolate from publicly accessible statistics that Indian men are overrepresented in Malaysian prisons and are particularly vulnerable to custodial mortality. In the Philippines, the policy of executing individuals without trial, implemented by Duterte, disproportionately harmed the poor.
The fact that dirty money needs to be cleaned to make legitimate “real world” purchases, provides opportunities for law enforcement agencies in ASEAN to collectively monitor drug lords and drug traffickers. Despite the fact that drug trafficking syndicates are always inventing new strategies to conceal their operations, the police have been successful in locating and arresting these drug lords. They have been known to operate pawn shops, shipping companies, hotels and even bundle clothing stores. Additionally, the drug trafficking routes and ‘rat lanes’ along the border states such as the Southern Thailand – Malaysia requires joint efforts and efficient patrolling. Drug mule trafficking can only be eliminated if politicians and law enforcement agencies work together to combat the web of organised crime and bring drug lords to justice. While the law says that drug mules must be executed, drug lords dine with legislators and discuss capitalist methods to exploit people and launder money.
To mark International Human Rights Day in 2021, on 9 December 2021 the ANU Indonesia Institute hosted a discussion on women’s rights and gender equality in Indonesia. Speakers examined the extent to which Indonesian women have achieved equality in a broad array of political, economic and social fields, and what Indonesian women are doing today to overcome the obstacles that lie in the path of gender equality. You can watch this important, challenging and inspiring discussion on New Mandala now.
Chair
Dr Eva Nisa
Senior Lecturer, School of Culture, History and Languages, and ANU Indonesia Institute
The Australian National University.
Topics and speakers
Sri Budi Eko Wardani: Achieving women’s sexual and reproductive rights and health.
Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Director of the Center for Political Studies, Universitas Indonesia.
Dr Marcia Soumokil: Countering gender-based violence and harassment.
Country Director IPAS Indonesia (Yayasan Inisiatif Perubahan Akses menuju Sehat Indonesia)
Anindya Restuviani: The gender pay gap and female labour force participation.
Director of Jakarta Feminist and Co-Director of Hollaback! Jakarta.
Dr Diana Contreras Suarez: Women in the media and building a feminist voice.
Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, University of Melbourne.
Devi Asmarani
Editor-in-Chief and co-founder of women-focused webmagazine Magdalene (www.magdalene.co)
Speaker Biographies
Dr Eva Nisa is a cultural anthropologist and expert in Islamic studies. Her research and publications focus on the intersections between religious, cultural, political, economic, legal, social, and philosophical aspects of peoples’ lives. She is interested in global currents of Islam reshaping the lives of Muslims in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia and Malaysia. Her research has involved international collaborative projects with scholars from the USA, Germany, Australia, the Netherlands, Indonesia, Austria, Malaysia, New Zealand, Thailand and Singapore. Currently, she serves on the editorial board of The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology.
Dr Marcia Soumokil is the director of Ipas Indonesia. Prior to joining Ipas, Dr. Soumokil worked for several international organizations within Indonesia in the areas of HIV, adolescent reproductive health, maternal and newborn health, and health governance. Dr. Soumokil is a trained medical doctor and began her career as a general practice physician in a community health clinic. She also holds a Masters of Public Health degree from University of Melbourne, Australia. She currently serves on the boards of the Indonesia AIDS Coalition.
Sri Budi Eko Wardani is a lecturer in Department of Political Science Universitas Indonesia. She is also the Director of Center for Political Studies Universitas Indonesia. She is taking her doctoral degree in politics at Department of Political Science Universitas Indonesia. Some of her previous notable research were Indonesian Voting Behavior on 1999 Election (1999-2000, collaboration with Ohio State University, USA), Strengthen and Monitoring of 2004 General Election (2003-2004, collaboration with CETRO), Women Political Participation and Advocacy for Adoption Affirmative Policy in Political Party Law and Election Law (2007-2009, collaboration with The Asia Foundation), and Representation of Women in National and Local Legislature after 2009 Election (July – December 2010, collaboration with The Asia Foundation & AusAID).
Dr Diana Contreras Suarez is a Senior Research Fellow at the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research. Her research is driven by questions on how to improve the lives of vulnerable and disadvantaged populations, and focuses on understanding human capital formation throughout the life cycle as well as how public policy or programs work on achieving improved lives. She uses econometrics techniques to look into those questions, with most of her expertise in developing countries, including Indonesia.
Devi Asmarani is the Editor-in-Chief and co-founder of women-focused webmagazine Magdalene (www.magdalene.co). Her 25 years’ experience in journalism began at The Jakarta Post, followed by The Straits Times of Singapore, where she wrote news reports, in-depth articles and analyses on various issues from politics, conflicts, terrorism to natural disasters. She has also written columns, articles, essays as well as works of fiction for various local and international publications. She is also a writing and journalism instructor, and gender and media facilitator, and has worked as a consultant with international organizations. Devi is the recipient of S.K. Trimurti Awards for her work in promoting gender equality in journalism.
Anindya Restuviani is Program Director of Jakarta Feminist and Co-Director of Hollaback! Jakarta. She is a feminist activist with expertise in gender equality and a history of working in the development sector on issues of gender, children, and vulnerable youth with strong experience in feminist advocacy and organizing within grassroots communities and at the local, national and global level.
Perpetrators of disinformation, a danger to democracy—these have been the choice words to describe Facebook amid the global battle against disinformation. But while the social media giant run by Mark Zuckerberg may have fallen out of grace among digital rights advocates, one Indonesian scholar describes Zuckerberg differently: a “prophet” presenting a gift from the gods.
This renowned scholar, who has taught at an Indonesian university for over 20 years and has recently gained notoriety as a pro-government social media influencer, frames the existence of social media akin to a religious experience: “It’s like God descended and said, “Here, this is the public sphere that you wanted for so long. I hand it to you through Mark Zuckerberg, through Google. It couldn’t reach you before, but now you have it. So, use it!”
This sentiment may seem surprising coming from an academic with a background in journalism—a field heavily battered by disinformation running rampant on the very platforms that Arya Susanto (not his real name) hails. Nonetheless his perspective reflects the different ways people perceive and respond to digitisation in society: while some hail digital transformation as a ticket to the future, others fear that the push towards digitisation oversimplifies or even exacerbates social problems.
EngageMedia recently collaborated with Diani Citra, research consultant from Sintesa Consulting, and the Alan Turing Institute (ATI) to understand how people in different contexts imagine and experience the growing digital landscape through the lens of data justice. This concept looks at the societal implications of datafication, particularly the impact of data-driven processes in people’s lives. To fill the gap in data justice research, the “Advancing Data Justice Research and Practice” project aims to expand existing narratives to include testimonies from unheard voices.
Exploring data justice
Every day, massive amounts of data are generated from every click, scroll, tap, filled-out form, and search term entered on digital devices. But how and to what ends this data is collected, analysed, and used is often unclear. While some benefit from access to and representation in digital systems, these same systems can also exclude others; for instance, modern apps are designed for digitally literate users, excluding those with limited digital knowledge and ability.
Broadly speaking, data justice refers to the fair and just approach in dealing with digital data, particularly in how people are made visible and represented in data collection and analysis processes. Historically marginalised communities have often been overlooked in the collection and use of data, resulting in the reinforcement of repressive and harmful systems. Data justice aims to counter the ways in which underrepresented communities are systematically rendered invisible by including their perspectives.
As one of ATI’s policy pilot partners, EngageMedia reported on how data justice is perceived and understood by civil society, technology groups, and affected communities in Indonesia and the Philippines. The resulting report, The Techno-politics of Data Justice in Indonesia and the Philippines focuses on understanding the ways different groups imagine and experience the growing digital landscape.
A notable finding was the struggle to pin down a definition for data justice. Many respondents were unfamiliar with the term, and most tended to speak about data justice by talking about data injustice—such as barriers to access, lack of data protection, and restrictions on content. Most of the Filipino activists in our research tended to connect the societal impact of datafication to issues of data protection, individual rights, privacy, efficiency, and (digital) security.
For our respondents, the term “data justice” intersects with the digital rights discourse. They framed the concept in terms of algorithmic transparency, data privacy, security, and ownership. Others emphasised the link to social justice (i.e. data should be used to prevent inequities, ensure equal rights to access and participation in social and political life, help inform policy and improve the lives of marginalised communities). The common theme among the responses was the emphasis on fairness, equity, and transparency during the entire process: from the production and collection of data to its distribution, interpretation, and creation of products and services based on digital data. For respondents, the concept of data justice centres the observance of human rights and social justice in the creation, processing, and use of data.
Amid warnings about the threats of over-surveillance, privacy breaches, and censorship, many stakeholders in Indonesia and the Philippines see digitisation as not only inevitable, but also readily accept it as beneficial for society. For instance, Philippine activists and civil society organisations see data as the backbone for advocacy, research, and policymaking and lobbying efforts. For Indonesian respondents, digitisation takes on a more spiritual undertone as it is often couched in terms of keniscayaan, which translates as inevitability. In the research team’s interviews with policymakers and in Indonesian media, the term is often used in the discussion on Indonesia’s digitisation efforts. In everyday Bahasa Indonesia its use gives it a sense of something divine or prophetic.
This relates to Arya Susanto’s view that the internet and social media are gifts from God, imbued with powers that individuals should not resist and should be grateful for. As more government and private services and resources are now available online, being part of the digital realm is essential for full social participation—applying for jobs, accessing health care, conducting business, connecting with friends and family, or expressing and sharing one’s views to a wider audience. Because of the many opportunities digital systems offer, digitisation is seen as a ticket to the future.
But the reverence for the digital tends to mask underlying issues: how are these technological advances shaped? By whom, and for whose interests? As the report noted: “This rhetoric of inevitability tends to obscure policy choices and conflicting interests that shape the processes of new technology adoption and hide the reality that digital transformation is not only a technological issue, but a social one as well.”
Privacy and rights trade off
This idea of inevitability also extends to data security and privacy: since being part of the digital realm is seen as necessary to fully participate in public life, giving away personal data in exchange for these conveniences is inescapable. But while civil society activists in the Philippines are concerned with data collection, Indonesian informants, especially those with limited socio-economic capital, say they have become accustomed to giving away control over their data to meet basic needs (such as better internet connection or access to work opportunities); many seem resigned about the lack of government protection over their data. Still others express some level of trust in the state. In the report, Emir from Indonesia explains: “I wouldn’t be in trouble as long as I don’t do anything negative. That’s what I think. Unless I do something like treason I shouldn’t be nervous”.
Some are willing to give away their data in exchange for social capital. Susanto feels that social media has given him a platform to express his views in ways he was unable to in the past. This was why, despite numerous media reports on data breaches and security concerns, he is all too willing to trade off data security for the feeling of power on social media.
“I will just choose to be grateful and thankful to Mark [Zuckerberg], Bill Gates, and friends,” he said. “You could even steal our data, I don’t care, and sell them, I don’t care… I’m already quite happy with what you’ve provided for us.”
Human dignity in a datafied society
Data justice also involves questions on whether the experience of being datafied maintains one’s dignity as a human being—enabling them to retain access and control of their data, or to have their identities be accurately reflected in datasets. But in a world where everything is digitised, can people who choose to opt out still live with dignity?
One interesting case in the report was the story of Ginanjar from Indonesia, a self-proclaimed anarchist who went to great lengths to avoid handing over his personal data. While trying to activate his public health insurance service, Ginanjar chose to travel back to his hometown to avoid having to send digital copies of his identification card. However, the local office still insisted that he send his data online through an app—even when he was already physically present. “They told me that I had to send my data over WhatsApp. For me, this is absurd, you know?”
Ginanjar’s case highlighted his efforts to minimise the amount of personal data collected in order to protect his privacy. Interestingly, in other cases respondents noted that more complex data collection was needed, particularly when it came to capturing the multiplicity of people’s identities. Dina Anjani (not her real name), host of a popular Indonesian YouTube channel that addresses issues of sexuality, says data justice “has to provide as many truths as possible in data collecting and processing.” But current methods of data collection are inadequate and non-comprehensive, which in turn could feel dehumanising to those whose identities are not fully reflected in these data sets. For Dina, in-person interaction helps bypass these limits and allows for more space to explain and express her identity. The report noted:
“[Dina] finds that, when appealed to personally, most Indonesians are capable of more understanding than digital technologies can afford them. During her driver’s licence renewal appointment, the officer asked her informally if she wanted her gender entry to be “woman.” He offered to change the digital entry that had been determined by Dina’s birth certificate.”
Ways forward
Based on the perspectives of our Indonesian and Filipino respondents, EngageMedia’s research found that digital technologies are accepted as an embodiment of progress in and of themselves, without adequately examining whether these are needed, or even wanted, within the local conditions they are used. Additionally, their negative impact goes largely unexamined. However, even if digitisation is inevitable, understanding how this trend unfolds can make a difference in helping mirror the lived experiences and hopes of people.
How do we move forward from here? Respondents listed several key recommendations, such as promoting transparency in data collection, processing, sharing, and disposal, and upholding the dignity of data owners in the process. They also highlighted the need to ensure that data accessibility and accountability measures for upholding data privacy are in place, as well as the importance of scrutinising existing mechanisms to avoid an elitist approach to data justice.
Technological development does not exist in a vacuum and should not be regarded as removed from its social context. Without a nuanced approach and understanding of the power dynamics in societies, inequalities offline will be replicated online. To counter this, it is important to continue discussions on how data justice manifests in daily life. This includes increasing awareness on data literacy and conducting digital security training to empower people to assert their rights over their data and exercise their agency to live a dignified life in a datafied society.
Digital technologies have become so intertwined with modern life that their use is essential in day-to-day activities. As Susanto exclaims in his exaltation of the internet and social media, these technologies are now regarded as something we simply have. The challenge is finding ways to ensure that in using these technologies, the access to and experience of the digital is more fair and dignified for everyone.
New Caledonia’s pro-independence FLNKS (Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front) has signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), which wants independence from Indonesia.
The Kanak-Papuan deal was signed by Roch Wamytan, President of New Caledonia’s Congress, and the visiting ULMWP leader Benny Wenda.
Wamytan told La Premiere television in Noumea that both territories were involved in a process of decolonisation and emancipation — one with France, the other with Indonesia.
“We have signed this accord because each of us are confronted by a process of decolonisation and emancipation. The people of Papua with Indonesia and us with the French state,” he said.
“This process of decolonisation has not ended for us, it has been ruptured over time, to say the least.”
The memorandum aims to support each other internationally and to develop a list of common goals.
Indonesia took over the western half of New Guinea island after a controversial 1969 UN-backed referendum that is rejected as a sham by Papuans, with West Papuan activists now seeking inscription on the UN decolonisation list.
New Caledonia has been on the UN decolonisation list since 1986, and between 2018 and 2021 has held three referendums on independence from France.
Wenda visited Vanuatu on the first leg of his Pacific trip from his exiled base in London.
He was a guest of the Vanuatu West Papua Independence Committee.
FLNKS will boycott Paris talks New Caledonia’s pro-independence FLNKS movement said it would not attend talks in September of the signatories to the 1998 Noumea Accord in Paris.
West Papuan independence leader Benny Wenda … supporting each other internationally. Image: Koroi Hawkins/RNZ Pacific
A special meeting of the movement’s leadership decided at the weekend that legitimate talks would now have to be bilateral ones, involving the FLNKS and France as the colonising state.
Newly-elected FLNKS Congress member Laura Humunie said bilateral talks were the only formal way to get their message to the French state.
“We repeat, that to obtain bilateral talks we will not go to Paris because for us this is the legitimate way of talking to the French colonial state,” she said.
“Our loyalist partners who have signed the ‘no’ referendum, means that they align with the French state’s ideals.”
Last December, more than 96 percent voted against independence from France in a referendum boycotted by the pro-independence parties, which refuse to recognise the result as the legitimate outcome of the decolonisation process.
This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.
West Papuan leader Benny Wenda (red shirt) signing the memorandum of understanding with the FLNKS. Image: FLNKS
The US Holocaust Memorial Museum is warning in a new report that mass killings of civilians could occur in Indonesia’s troubled West Papua region in the next year to 18 months if current conditions deteriorate to a worst-case scenario.
The museum’s Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide published the 45-page report this week authored by an Indonesian, Made Supriatma, who conducted field research in the region.
“Indonesia ranks 27th on the list of countries with risks of mass atrocities. This report should be considered as an early warning,” Supriatma said.
A combination of factors — increasing rebel attacks, better coordination and organisation of pro-independence civilian groups, and the ease of communication — makes it plausible that the unrest could reach a new level in the next 12-18 months, the report said.
“If political and social unrest persist, and if it were to spread across the region, it is possible that the Indonesian government could determine that the scale or persistence of the protests would justify a more severe response, which could lead to large-scale killing of civilians,” it said.
The risks are rooted in factors such as past mass atrocities in Indonesia, the exclusion of indigenous Papuans from political decision-making, Jakarta’s failure to address their grievances and conflicts over the exploitation of the region’s resources, according to the report.
Human rights abuses
Other factors include Papuans’ resentment over Jakarta’s failure to hold accountable security personnel implicated in human rights abuses and conflict between indigenous Papuans and migrants from other parts of Indonesia over economic, political, religious, and ideological issues, it said.
Under one scenario that the report envisions, pro-Jakarta Papuan militia, backed by the military and police, commit mass atrocities against pro-independence Papuans.
But such a scenario depends on indigenous Papuan groups remaining divided into pro-Jakarta and pro-independence groups, it said. The other scenario involves Indonesian migrants and Indonesian security forces committing atrocities against indigenous Papuans, the study said.
The report recommends that the government improve freedom of information and monitoring atrocity risks, manage conflicts through nonviolent means, and address local grievances and drivers of conflict.
Supriatma said indigenous Papuans he spoke to as part of his research confirmed that real and perceived discrimination had fueled an “us-against-them” mentality between indigenous Papuans and Indonesians.
Papua, on the western side of New Guinea Island, has been the scene of a low-level pro-independence insurgency since the mainly Melanesian region was incorporated into Indonesia in a United Nations-administered ballot in the late 1960s.
In 1963, Indonesian forces invaded Papua — like Indonesia, a former Dutch colony — and annexed the region.
Only 1025 people voted in the UN-sponsored referendum in 1969 that locals and activists said was a sham, but the United Nations accepted the result, essentially endorsing Jakarta’s rule.
‘Not based on facts’ An expert at the Indonesian presidential staff office, Theofransus Litaay, questioned the study’s validity.
“There’s something wrong in the identification of research questions. The author extrapolated events in East Timor to his research,” he said, referring to violence by pro-Jakarta militias before and after East Timor’s vote for independence from Indonesia in 1999.
“It’s not based on the facts on the ground,” he said, without elaborating.
Gabriel Lele, a senior researcher with the Papuan Task Force at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, said the report was based on limited data.
“It is true that there has been an escalation of violence, but the main perpetrators are the OPM [Free Papua Movement] and the victims have been civilians, soldiers and police,” lele said.
He said rebels had also attacked indigenous Papuans who did not support the pro-independence movement.
Violence has intensified in Papua since 2018, when pro-independence rebels attacked workers who were building roads and bridges in Nduga regency, killing 20 people, including an Indonesian soldier.
Suspected rebels killed civilians
In the latest violence, suspected rebels gunned down 10 civilians, mostly non-indigenous Papuans, and wounded two others on July 16.
A local rebel commander from the OPM’s armed wing, Egianus Kogoya, claimed responsibility.
“We suspect they were spies, so we shot them dead on the spot,” the Media Indonesia newspaper quoted him as saying on Monday.
The attack in Nduga regency came a little more than two weeks after legislators voted to create three new provinces in Papua amid opposition from indigenous people and rebel groups.
In March this year, insurgents killed eight workers who were repairing a telecommunications tower in Beoga, a district of Puncak regency.
No desire to address racism Reverend Dr Benny Giay, a member of the Papua Church Council, said Jakarta had not shown a desire to address racism against Papuans, who are ethnically Melanesian, and instead branded pro-independence groups terrorists.
“Authorities allow arms trade between armed groups and members of the TNI [military] and police, which perpetuates the violence and in the end can have fatal consequences for the indigenous people,” Dr Giay said.
The influx of migrants from other parts of Indonesia has created inter-communal tensions and conflicts over regional governance, analysts said.
Indigenous people are concerned that a massive project to build a trans-Papua highway, as part of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s drive to boost infrastructure, could lead to economic domination by outsiders and the presence of more troops, said Cahyo Pamungkas, a researcher from the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN).
“The road will mainly benefit non-Papuans, and indigenous people will benefit little economically because they are not ready to be involved in the economic system that the government wants to build,” Cahyo said.
Republished from Benar News. Co-author Victor Mambor is editor-in-chief of the indigenous Papuan newspaper and website Jubi.
A lively 43sec video clip surfaced during last week’s Pacific Islands Forum in the Fiji capital of Suva — the first live leaders’ forum in three years since Tuvalu, due to the covid pandemic.
Posted on Twitter by Guardian Australia’s Pacific Project editor Kate Lyons it showed the doorstopping of Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare by a melee of mainly Australian journalists.
A doorstop on security and China greets Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare (in blue short) at the Pacific islands Forum in Suva last week. Image: Twitter screenshot
But Lyons made a comment directed more at questioning journalists themselves about their newsgathering style:
“Australian media attempt to get a response from PM Sogavare, who has refused to answer questions from international media since the signing of the China security deal, on his way to a bilateral with PM Albanese. He stayed smilingly silent.”
Prominent Samoan journalist, columnist and member of the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) gender council Lagipoiva Cherelle Jackson picked up the thread, saying: “Let’s talk western journalism vs Pacific doorstop approaches.”
Lagipoiva highlighted for her followers the fact that “the journos engaged in this approach are all white”. She continued:
‘A respect thing’
“We don’t really do this in the Pacific to PI leaders. it’s a respect thing. However there is merit to this approach.”
A “confrontational” approach isn’t generally practised in the Pacific – “in Samoa, doorstops are still respectful.”
A thread
Let’s talk western journalism vs. Pacific journalism doorstop approaches. You will see in this, that the journos engaged in this approach are all white. We don’t really do this in the Pacific to PI leaders. It’s a respect thing. However there is merit to this approach. https://t.co/GcsJVDICFb
But she admitted that Pacific journalists sometimes “leaned” on western journalists to ask the hard questions when PI leaders would “disregard local journalists”.
“Even though this approach is very jarring”, she added, “it is also a necessary tactic to hold Pacific island leaders accountable.”
So here is the rub. Where were the hard questions in Suva — whether “western or Pacific-style” — about West Papua and Indonesian human rights abuses against a Melanesian neighbour? Surely here was a prime case in favour of doorstopping with a fresh outbreak of violations by Indonesian security forces – an estimated 21,000 troops are now deployed in Papua and West Papua provinces — in the news coinciding with the Forum unfolding on July 11-14.
In her wrap about the Forum in The Guardian, Lyons wrote about how smiles and unity in Suva – “with the notable exception of Kiribati” – were masking the tough questions being shelved for another day.
“Take coal. This will inevitably be a sticking point between Pacific countries and Australia, but apparently did not come up at all in discussions,” she wrote.
“The other conversation that has been put off is China.
“Pacific leaders have demonstrated in recent months how important the Pacific Islands Forum bloc is when negotiating with the superpower.”
Forum ‘failed moral obligation’
In a column in DevPolicy Blog this week, Fiji opposition National Federation Party (NFP) leader and former University of the South Pacific economics professor Dr Biman Prasad criticised forum leaders — and particularly Australia and New Zealand — over the “deafening silence” about declining standards of democracy and governance.
While acknowledging that an emphasis on the climate crisis was necessary and welcome, he said: “Human rights – including freedom of speech – underpin all other rights, and it is unfortunate that that this Forum failed in its moral obligation to send out a strong message of its commitment to upholding these rights.”
Back to West Papua, arguably the most explosive security issue confronting the Pacific and yet inexplicably virtually ignored by the Australian and New Zealand governments and news media.
Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre coordinator Shamima Ali and fellow activists at the Morning Star flag raising in solidarity with West Papua in Suva last week. Image: APR screenshot FV
In Suva, it was left to non-government organisations and advocacy groups such as the Australia West Papua Association (AWPA) and the Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre (FWCC) to carry the Morning Star of resistance — as West Papua’s banned flag is named.
The Fiji women’s advocacy group condemned their government and host Prime Minister Bainimarama for remaining silent over the human rights violations in West Papua, saying that women and girls were “suffering twofold” due to the increased militarisation of the two provinces of Papua and West Papuan by the “cruel Indonesian government”.
Spokesperson Joe Collins of the Sydney-based AWPA said the Fiji Forum was a “missed opportunity” to help people who were suffering at the hands of Jakarta actions.
“It’s very important that West Papua appears to be making progress,” he said, particularly in this Melanesian region which had the support of Pacific people.
Intensified violence in Papua
The day after the Forum ended, Pacific Conference of Churches (PCC) general secretary Reverend James Bhagwan highlighted in an interview with FijiVillage how 100,000 people had been displaced due to intensified violence in the “land of Papua”.
Pacific Conference of Churches general secretary Reverend James Bhagwan … “significant displacement of the indigenous Papuans has been noted by United Nations experts.” Image: FijiVillage
He said the increasing number of casualties of West Papuans was hard to determine because no humanitarian agencies, NGOs or journalists were allowed to enter the region and report on the humanitarian crisis.
Reverend Bhagwan also stressed that covid-19 and climate change reminded Pacific people that there needed to be an “expanded concept of security” that included human security and humanitarian assistance.
In London, the Indonesian human rights advocacy group Tapol expressed “deep sorrow” over the recent events coinciding with the Forum, and condemned the escalating violence by Jakarta’s security forces and the retaliation by resistance groups.
Tapol cited “the destruction and repressive actions of the security forces at the Paniai Regent’s Office (Kantor Bupati Paniai) that caused the death of one person and the injury of others on July 5″.
“Acts of violence against civilians, when they lead to deaths — whoever is responsible — should be condemned,” Tapol said.
“We call on these two incidents to be investigated in an impartial, independent, appropriate and comprehensive manner by those who have the authority and competency to do so.”
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The Australia West Papua Association (AWPA) has condemned the absence of West Papua in last week’s Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) official communique, saying it was “greatly disappointed” that the human rights situation in the Indonesian-ruled Melanesian region had not been mentioned.
“it is understandable that the PIF has huge challenges in the region and in particular climate change. But for all the talk about inclusiveness it would appear West Papua is not a major concern for the Forum,” spokesperson Joe Collins said in a statement.
“The PIF could have shown solidarity with the Papuan people by a simple statement of concern about the human rights situation in West Papua (particularly as the situation continues to deteriorate).”
Collins called on the forum to continue to urge Jakarta to allow a fact-finding mission to the region.
“The leaders would have had the support of the people of the Pacific region in doing so,” he added.
It’s a wrap- From the Suva Agreement to the 2050 Strategy, get the last word on what’s next for regionalism in the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Communique 2022 at https://t.co/VwQslLSmXkpic.twitter.com/MHTNd6rh9O
Papua People’s Petition (PRP) protesters have braved brutal police blockades, forced dispersals and assaults while staging simultaneous mass actions across Papua.
The actions were held on Thursday to demonstrate the people’s opposition to revisions of the Special Autonomy Law on Papua (Otsus), the creation of new autonomous regions (DOB) and reaffirming demands for a referendum on independence.
Reports by Suara Papua have covered the following rallies:
Jayapura A PRP action in Jayapura was held under tight security by police who subsequently broke up the rally, resulting in several people being hit and punched by police.
Four students — Welinus Walianggen, Ebenius Tabuni, Nias Aso and Habel Fauk — were assaulted by police near the PT Gapura Angkasa warehouse at the Cenderawasih University (Uncen) in Waena, Jayapura when police forcibly broke up the student protest.
According to Walianggen, one of the action coordinators, scores of police officers used batons and rattan sticks to disperse them.
Meanwhile, PRP protesters arriving from different places conveyed their demands at the Papua Regional House of Representatives (DPRP) office. Although they were blocked by police, negotiations were held at the main entrance to the Parliament building.
Several DPRP members then met with the demonstrators who handed over a document stating their opposition to the creation of the three new provinces (South Papua, Central Papua and the Papua Highlands) — ratified by the House of Representatives (DPR) during a plenary meeting in Senayan, Jakarta, on Thursday, June 31 — and and demanding that revisions to the Special Autonomy law be revoked.
Timika In Timika, a PRP action was held in front of the Mimika Indonesian Builders Association (Gapensi) offices but this was broken up by police.
Despite not having permission from police, several speakers expressed the Papuan people’s opposition to Otsus, the DOBs and demands for a referendum. The speakers also called for the closure of the PT Freeport gold and copper mine and the cancellation of planned mining activities in the Wabu Block.
Nabire In Nabire, PRP protesters held their ground against the police but many people who had gathered at Karang Tumaritis, SP 1 and Siriwini were arrested and taken away by the Nabire district police.
A short time later, demonstrators from several places headed towards the Nabire Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) office where they packed into the Parliament grounds.
While they were giving speeches, the demonstrators who had been arrested rejoined the action after being dropped off by several Nabire district police vehicles.
Meepago Speakers representing various different organisations and elements of Papuan society in the Meepago region took turns in expressing their views.
PRP liaison officer for the Meepago region Agus Tebai said that the Papuan people, including those from Meepago, rejected Otsus and the DOBs in the land of Papua. Speakers also said that Otsus and the recently enacted laws on the creation of three new provinces in Papua must be annulled.
Tebai said that the Papuan people were calling for an immediate referendum to determine the future of West Papua. These demands were handed over to the people’s representatives and accepted by three members of the Nabire DPRD.
Manokwari In Manokwari, PRP protesters gathered on the Amban main road and gave speeches.
The hundreds of demonstrators were blocked by police and prevented from holding a long march to the West Papua DPRD offices. Negotiations between police and the action coordinator achieved nothing and the demonstrators then disbanded in an orderly fashion.
Similar mass actions were also held in Yahukimo, Boven Digoel, Sorong and Kaimana in West Papua province.
Wamena In Wamena, meanwhile, the Lapago regional PRP conveyed its support for protesters who took to the streets via video. According to PRP Lapago Secretary Namene Elopere there was no action in Wamena for the Lapago region in accordance with the initial schedule because they were still coordinating with the Jayawijaya district police.
Aside from protest in Papua, simultaneous actions were also held in Bali, Ambon (Maluku), Surabaya (East Java), Yogyakarta (Central Java), Bandung (West Java) and Jakarta.
A Fiji women’s advocacy group has condemned their government for remaining silent over the human rights violations in West Papua amid the Pacific Islands Forum being hosted by Prime Minister Voreqe Bainmarama this week.
Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre (FWCC) coordinator Shamima Ali with other staff members and activists made the criticisms at a ceremony raising the independence flag Morning Star, banned in Indonesia.
The women raised the flag of West Papua on Wednesday to show their solidarity.
West Papua’s Morning Star flag-raising in Suva this week. Image: Fijivillage
Ali said this ceremony was done every Wednesday to remember the people of West Papua, particularly women and girls who were “suffering twofold” due to the increased militarisation of the two provinces of Papua and West Papuan by the “cruel Indonesian government”.
She said this was a perfect time since all the Pacific leaders were in Fiji for the forum but the Fiji government stayed silent on the issue.
Ali added that with Fiji as the chair of the forum, Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama should have negotiated for West Papua to be on the agenda.
Wenda appeals to Pacific Islands Forum
Meanwhile, United Liberation Movement of West Papua interim president Benny Wenda has appealed to Pacific leaders to show “timely and effective leadership” on the great issues facing the Pacific — “the human rights crisis in West Papua and the existential threat of climate change”.
“West Papua is a green land in a blue ocean. Our blue Pacific has always united our peoples, rather than dividing them,” he said in a statement.
Shamima Ali speaking out on West Papua in Suva. Video: Fijivillage
“In this spirit of Pacific solidarity, we are grateful for the support our Pacific family showed for our struggle in 2019 by calling for Indonesia to allow the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, to visit West Papua.”
However, Indonesia continued to undermine the forum by refusing to allow a UN visit to take place.
“For decades, we have been crying that Indonesia is bombing our villages and killing our people, but we have been ignored,” Wenda said.
“Now, the world is taking notice of our struggle. The United Nations has shown that up to 100,000 West Papuan civilians have been internally displaced by Indonesian military operations in the past three years alone.
“They have fled into the bush, where they lack access to shelter, food, water, and proper medical facilities. This is a rapidly worsening human rights disaster, requiring immediate attention and intervention by the United Nations.
“Indonesia hears the increasing calls for a UN visit, but is employing delaying tactics to avoid exposing their crimes against my people to the world.”
