Category: indonesia

  • A West Papuan independence advocate has accused Indonesia of “continuing to murder children” while escalating its military operations across the Melanesian region.

    United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) interim president Benny Wenda says West Papua faces two connected crimes — ecocide and genocide.

    Two schoolchildren were killed by the occupying military in the build up to Indonesian Independence Day this month on August 17, Wenda said in a statement yesterday.

    He said security forces had killed a 14-year-old girl in Puncak Jaya, while 13-year-old Martinus Tebai was slain in Dogiyai a week earlier on August 10 after soldiers opened fire on a group of youngsters.

    “These killings are the inevitable result of the intensified militarisation that has taken place in West Papua since the election of the war criminal Prabowo [Subianto, as President, last year], Wenda said.

    Thousands of additional troops have been deployed to “terrorise West Papua”, while the new administration had also created an independent military command for all five newly created West Papuan provinces, “reinforcing the military infrastucture across our land”, he said.

    More than 100,000 civilians were still displaced, and there had been no justice for the forced disappearance of 12 villagers in Intan Jaya in May.

    Violence linked to forest destruction
    Increased violence and displacement in the cities and villages was inseparable from increased destruction in the forest, Wenda said.

    Soldiers were being sent to Merauke, Dogiyai, and Intan Jaya in order to protect Indonesia’s investment in these regions, he said.

    “We are crying out to the world, over and over again, screaming that Indonesia is ripping apart our ancestral forest, endangering the entire planet in the process,” Wenda said.

    The Merauke sugarcane and rice plantation was the “most destructive deforestation project in history — it will more than double Indonesia’s CO2 emissions”.

    A mother farewells her son in West Papua
    A mother farewells her son in West Papua, alleged to have been slain by Indonesian troops. Image: ULMWP

    Wenda asked what it would take for the global environmental movement to take a stand?

    Indonesia has shown just how fragile its grip on West Papua really is,” he said.

    Forced flag raising
    “After the ULMWP declared that no West Papuan should celebrate Indonesian Independence Day, soldiers went across the country forcing civilians to raise the Indonesian flag.

    “Indonesia is desperate. Even as they increase their violence, they know their occupation will eventually end.

    “We remember what happened in East Timor, where the worst violence took place in the dying days of the occupation.

    “West Papuans have always spoken with one voice in demanding independence. We never accepted Indonesia, we never raised the Red and White flag – we had our own flag, our own anthem, our own Independence Day.”

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • My friend Fausto Belo Ximenes, known as Nino, who has died suddenly aged 43, was one of the first Timorese country directors of a major humanitarian agency (Oxfam) in his home country of Timor-Leste.

    Before Oxfam, Nino worked as a human rights officer with the UN (2001), as a legal researcher with a local NGO monitoring transitional justice (2002), as an adviser to the Timorese ministry of education (2012), as a senior access to justice manager on a USAID project (2013) and as a graduate researcher at Pembroke College, Oxford (2018).

    Continue reading…

    This post was originally published on Human rights | The Guardian.

  • By Alifereti Sakiasi in Suva

    West Papuan journalist Victor Mambor has vowed not to be silenced despite years of threats, harassment and even a bomb attack on his home.

    The 51-year-old founder and editor-in-chief of Jubi, West Papua’s leading media outlet, was in Fiji this week, where he spoke exclusively to The Fiji Times about his fight to expose human rights abuses.

    “Despite them bombing my home and office with molotov bombs, I am still doing journalism today because my people are hurting — and I won’t stop,” Mambor said.

    In January 2023, an improvised explosive device detonated outside his home in Jayapura in what he describes as a “terror” attack.

    Police later closed the case citing “lack of evidence”.

    He was in Suva on Tuesday night as Jubi Media Papua, in collaboration with University of the South Pacific Journalism and PANG, screened its documentary Pepera 1969: A Democratic Integration?

    “I believe good journalism is journalism that makes society better,” he said.

    Republished from The Fiji Times with permission.


    Victor Mambor: ‘I need to do better for my people and my land.’   Video: The Fiji Times

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Two New Zealand Palestinians, Rana Hamida and Youssef Sammour, left Auckland today to join the massive new Global Sumud Flotilla determined to break Israel’s starvation blockade of the besieged enclave. Here, two journalists report on the Asia-Pacific stake in the initiative.

    Ellie Aben in Manila and Sheany Yasuko Lai in Jakarta

    Asia-Pacific activists are preparing to set sail with the Global Sumud Flotilla, an international fleet from 44 countries aiming to reach Gaza by sea to break Israel’s blockade of food and medical aid.

    They have banded together under the Sumud Nusantara initiative, a coalition of activists from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Maldives, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan, to join the global flotilla movement that will begin launching convoys from August 31.

    Sumud Nusantara is part of the GSF, a coordinated, nonviolent fleet comprising mostly small vessels carrying humanitarian aid, which will first leave Spanish ports for the Gaza Strip, followed by more convoys from Tunisia and other countries in early September.

    The international coalition is set to become the largest coordinated civilian maritime mission ever undertaken to Gaza.

    “This movement comes at a very crucial time, as we know how things are in Gaza with the lack of food entering the strip that they are not only suffering from the impacts of war but also from starvation,” Indonesian journalist Nurhadis said ahead of his trip.

    “Israel is using starvation as a weapon to wipe out Palestinians in Gaza. This is why we continue to state that what Israel is doing is genocide.”

    Since October 2023, Israel has killed more than 62,000 Palestinians and injured over 157,000 more.

    Gaza famine declared
    As Tel Aviv continued to systematically obstruct food and aid from entering the enclave, a UN-backed global hunger monitor — the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification — declared famine in Gaza on Friday, estimating that more than 514,000 people are suffering from it.

    Nurhadis is part of a group of activists from across Indonesia joining the GSF, which aims to “break Israel’s illegal blockade and draw attention to international complicity in the face of the ongoing genocide against the Palestinian people.”

    “We continue to try through this Global Sumud Flotilla action, hoping that the entire world, whether it’s governments or the people and other members of society, will pressure Israel to open its blockade in Palestine,” he said.

    “This is just beyond the threshold of humanity. Israel is not treating Palestinians in Gaza as human beings and the world must not keep silent. This is what we are trying to highlight with this global convoy.”

    The GSF is a people-powered movement that aims to help end the genocide in Gaza, said Rifa Berliana Arifin, Indonesia country director for the Sumud Nusantara initiative and executive committee member of the Jakarta-based Aqsa Working Group.

    “Indonesia is participating because this is a huge movement. A movement that aspires to resolve and end the blockade through non-traditional means.

    “We’ve seen how ineffective diplomatic, political approaches have been, because the genocide in Gaza has yet to end.

    ‘People power’ movement
    “This people-power movement is aimed at putting an end to that,” Arifin said.

    “This is a non-violent mission . . .  Even though they are headed to Gaza, they are boarding boats that have no weapons . . .  They are simply bringing themselves . . .  for the world to see.”

    As the Sumud Nusantara initiative is led by Malaysia, activists were gathering this weekend in Kuala Lumpur, where a ceremonial send-off for the regional convoy is scheduled to take place on Sunday, led by Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim.

    One of them is Philippine activist Drieza Lininding, leader of civil society group Moro Consensus Group, who is hoping that the Global Sumud Flotilla will inspire others in the Catholic-majority nation to show their support for Palestine.

    “We are appealing to all our Filipino brothers and sisters, Muslims or Christians, to support the Palestinian cause because this issue is not only about religion, but also about humanity. Gaza has now become the moral compass of the world,” he said.

    “Everybody is seeing the genocide and the starvation happening in Gaza, and you don’t need to be a Muslim to side with the Palestinians.

    “It is very clear: if you want to be on the right side of history, support all programmes and activities to free Palestine . . .  It is very important that as Filipinos we show our solidarity.”

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • By Andrew Mathieson

    Exiled West Papuan media are calling for Fiji — in a reflection of Melanesian solidarity — to hold the greater Pacific region to account and stand against Indonesia’s ongoing media blackout in addition to its human rights abuses.

    The leaders in their field which include two Papuans from Indonesia’s occupied provinces have visited the Pacific country to forge media partnerships, university collaboration and joint advocacy for West Papua self-determination.

    They were speaking after the screening of a new documentary film, Pepera 1969: A Democratic Integration, was screened at The University of the South Pacific in Fiji.

    The documentary is based on the controversial plebiscite 56 years ago when 1025 handpicked Papuan electors, which were directly chosen by the Indonesian military out of its 800,000 citizens, were claimed to have voted unanimously in favour of Indonesian control of Western New Guinea.

    Victor Mambor — a co-founder of Jubi Media Papua — in West Papua; Yuliana Lantipo, one of its senior journalists and editor; and Dandhy Laksono, a Jakarta-based investigative filmmaker; shared their personal experiences of reporting from inside arguably the most heavily militarised and censored region in the Pacific.

    “We are here to build bridges with our brothers and sisters in the Pacific,” Mambor told the USP media audience.

    Their story of the Papuan territory comes after Dutch colonialists who had seized Western New Guinea, handed control of the East Indies back to the Indonesians in 1949 before The Netherlands eventually withdrew from Papuan territory in 1963.

    ‘Fraudulent’ UN vote
    The unrepresentative plebiscite which followed a fraudulent United Nations-supervised “Act of Free Choice” in 1969 allowed the Indonesian Parliament to grant its legitimacy to reign sovereignty over the West Papuans.

    That Indonesian authority has been heavily questioned and criticised over extinguishing independence movements and possible negotiations between both sides.

    Indonesia has silenced Papuan voices in the formerly-named Irian Jaya province through control and restrictions of the media.

    Mambor described the continued targeting of his Jubi Media staff, including attacks on its office and vehicles, as part of an escalating crackdown under Indonesia’s current President Prabowo Subianto, who took office less than 12 months ago.

    “If you report on deforestation [of West Papua] or our culture, maybe it’s allowed,” he said.

    “But if you report on human rights or the [Indonesian] military, there is no tolerance.”

    An Indonesian MP, Oleh Soleh, warned publicly this month that the state would push for a “new wave of repression” targeting West Papuan activists while also calling the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) – the West Papuan territory’s peak independence movement – as a “political criminal group”.

    ‘Don’t just listen to Jakarta’
    “Don’t just listen to what Jakarta says,” Mambor said.

    “Speak to Papuans, listen to our stories, raise our voices.

    “We want to bring West Papua back to the Pacific — not just geographically, but politically, culturally, and emotionally.”

    Press freedom in West Papua has become most dire more over the past 25 years, West Papuan journalists have said.

    Foreign journalists are barred entry into the territory and internet access for locals is often restricted, especially during periods of civil unrest.

    Indigenous reporters also risk arrest and/or violence for filing politically sensitive stories.

    Most trusted media
    Founded in 2001 by West Papuan civil society, Jubi Media Papua’s English-language publication, the West Papua Daily, has become arguably the most trusted, independent source of news in the territory that has survived over its fearless approach to journalism.

    “Our journalists are constantly intimidated,” Mambor said, “yet we continue to report the truth”.

    The word Jubi in one of the most popular Indigenous Papuan languages means to speak the truth.

    Mambor explained that the West Papua Daily remained a pillar of a vocal media movement to represent the wishes of the West Papuan people.

    The stories published are without journalists’ bylines (names on articles) out of fear against retribution from the Indonesian military.

    “We created a special section just to tell Pacific stories — to remind our people that we are not alone, and to reconnect West Papua with our Pacific identity,” Mambor said.

    Lantipo spoke about the daily trauma faced by the Papuan communities which are caught in between the Indonesian military and the West Papua national liberation army who act on behalf of the ULMWP to defend its ancestral homeland.

    ‘Reports of killings, displacement’
    “Every day, we receive reports: killings, displacement, families fleeing villages, children out of school, no access to healthcare,” Lantipo said.

    “Women and children are the most affected.”

    The journalists attending the seminar urged the Fijian, Melanesian and Pacific people to push for a greater awareness of the West Papuan conflict and its current situation, and to challenge dominant narratives propagated by the Indonesian government.

    Laksono, who is ethnically Indonesian but entrenched in ongoing Papuan independence struggles, has long worked to expose injustices in the region.

    “There is no hope from the Asian side,” Laksono said.

    “That’s why we are here, to reach out to the Pacific.

    “We need new audiences, new support, and new understanding.”

    Arrested over tweets
    Laksono was once arrested in September 2019 for publishing tweets about the violence from government forces against West Papua pro-independence activists.

    Despite the personal risks, the “enemy of the state” remains committed to highlighting the stories of the West Papuan people.

    “Much of Indonesia has been indoctrinated through school textbooks and [its] media into believing a false history,” he said.

    “Our film tries to change that by offering the truth, especially about the so-called Act of Free Choice in 1969, which was neither free nor a genuine act of self-determination.”

    Andrew Mathieson writes for the National Indigenous Times.

    Melanesian supporters for West Papuan self-determination at USP
    Melanesian supporters for West Papuan self-determination at The University of the South Pacific. Image: USP/NIT

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • The Indonesian Army has now fielded the Khan ITBM-600 short-range ballistic missile system that was ordered from Turkish firm Roketsan in 2022. The weapon was observed at the Raipur A base of the 18th Field Artillery Battalion in East Kalimantan on 1 August, with photos posted on Facebook confirming the system’s deployment. This is the […]

    The post Indonesia fields Khan short-range ballistic missile appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • 17 August 2025 marks the 80th anniversary of Indonesia’s independence. Surrounding the commemorations are various discourses on whether Indonesia was colonised by the Netherlands for 350 years, or less than that. Regardless of the answer, traces of colonialism prevail. And the commodification of those traces is perhaps one of the very first steps to understanding the multiple narratives on history in Indonesia today.

    The commodification of colonialism is part of a broader trend across postcolonial countries, where visible relics of empire, often in the form of enduring infrastructure, pose a choice: to erase them through neglect or demolition, or to repurpose them for new uses. In Indonesia, the early decades after independence saw leaders such as Soekarno and Soeharto promote a nationalist vision, favouring modernist designs by Indonesian architects. Yet the risk of erasing the colonial past altogether raised concerns that history itself might be forgotten.

    From the 1980s onwards, heritage conservation initiatives emerged, seeking to preserve colonial-era buildings while embedding them within narratives of nationalism. Restoration projects multiplied, but the challenge remained: static plaques and written histories struggle to compete for public attention in an era when much of social life unfolds on phone screens. Recognising that people value immersive experiences over textual storytelling, governments and private actors began converting colonial clusters into open-air or “living” museums. This model, visible in Indonesia’s Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, Singapore’s Battlebox in Fort Canning, and the Netherlands’ Archeon, promises visitors not just a history lesson, but a sensory encounter and countless souvenirs they can take home: Instagram-ready shots.

    While this approach integrates preservation with the economic demands of tourism, it also risks reducing complex historical narratives to a kind of theme park. The emphasis shifts from engaging with the realities of colonial oppression to offering an aesthetically pleasing, marketable fantasy. In Modernity at Large (1996), Arjun Appadurai refers to a yearning that is not rooted in lived memory as ersatz nostalgia—a longing for a stylised, imagined past where nostalgia and fantasy are reduced to consumption.

    In Surabaya, the ghosts of the Dutch East Indies have not merely lingered; they have been revived through commodification in tourism. Wander through the revitalised “European Zone” of Kota Lama (Old Town) or a long-standing ice cream palace in the city, and one is bound to feel the seduction of a colonial past repackaged for modern consumption. Whether through architecture or cuisine, a certain narrative is quietly whispered: the colonial past was not only orderly and elegant, but perhaps even desirable.

    In Surabaya today, following the revitalisation of the old town quarter that used to be reserved for the European community, colonial aesthetics have become central to city branding and urban placemaking. While such nostalgia can serve as a tool for historical reflection, its unchecked commodification risks perpetuating colonial myths, erasing uncomfortable histories, and displacing local narratives.

    A “digital postcard” of colonialism

    Surabaya’s revitalised old town complex comprises four quarters: the European Zone, Chinatown, Arab, and Malay Quarters. Yet it was the erstwhile hub for the Dutch East Indies’ European population—uncannily dubbed the “European Zone”—that quickly became a hit due to its stark black-and-white colonial façades, restored buildings, and tourism experiences such as period costume rentals, vintage military Jeep tours, and the influencer-endorsed toerwagen car rides.

    After its grand relaunch on 3 July 2024, the European Zone quickly became one of Surabaya’s most photogenic destinations. Here, local and domestic tourists don lace dresses or aristocratic Javanese beskap and velvet kebaya, posing against a backdrop that once marked European privilege and native exclusion. The place has been transformed into a stage for colonial cosplay and a theatre of nostalgia.

    This performative longing reflects the tendency to reduce a historical site into a glossy, consumable aesthetic. The area, once a colonial enclave of Dutch offices and military officers’ houses, has been restored into a site that offers middle-class tourists the fantasy of playing historical elites for a day. For as little as US$2–5, one can rent a costume; for a bit more, a professional photographer guides the experience, somewhat blurring the line between heritage and an accidental state-supported theme park.

    Storefront of the period costume rental (photo: author)

    While this may seem questionable at first, it could also be viewed as a means for people to exercise agency over the legacy of colonialism. The romanticisation of the colonial era here serves multiple agendas. Economically, it fuels tourism revenues and supports local microenterprises. Politically, it aligns with a nationalist desire to reclaim and repurpose colonial spaces. Yet culturally, it risks perpetuating a dangerous myth: that the Dutch East Indies were cosmopolitan, orderly, and benign—egalitarian, even, considering that the space is now accessible to the general public. In short, a time worth being longed for. The cost of such nostalgia is the erasure of the structural violence, exclusion, and exploitation that defined colonial life for the vast majority of Indonesians.

    This transformation is not isolated. Colonial nostalgia has emerged as a potent aesthetic in urban Indonesia, particularly among middle-class members of a generation who never experienced colonisation directly. The new Kota Lama is a vivid example of a manufactured memoryscape that prizes photogenic charm over historical substance.

    Indonesia and North Korea: warm memories of the Cold War

    Friendly ties to Pyongyang have been an emblem of non-alignment for generations of Indonesian foreign policy makers.

    The tourism infrastructure here is telling. While electric becak pedicabs are mostly ignored by tourists for not fitting the European fantasy, the Jeep tours led by drivers in vests emblazoned with “Surabaya Heritage Tour” and the toerwagen are booked solid. The route begins and ends with the historic Red Bridge and a replica of Brigadier A.W.S. Mallaby’s car that was supposedly caught in a grenade explosion during a ceasefire that escalated into skirmishes on 30th October 1945.

    Though the circumstances remain contested, the car is symbolic of the struggle for independence for the people of Surabaya. On 25 October 1945, Allied forces, accompanied by the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA), landed in Surabaya under the pretext of disarming Japanese troops. The events that followed became one of the most decisive confrontations in the Indonesian National Revolution: the Battle of Surabaya, which began on 10 November 1945. Their defiance became a powerful rallying point for the independence movement, cementing 10 November as Indonesia’s Hari Pahlawan (Heroes’ Day). The monument is supposedly intended to provide a counter-narrative of anti-colonial resistance by the people of Surabaya, but is very much overshadowed by the charm of the architecture. Now, the sirens of the Jeep punctuate the ride like theme-park sound effects, reenacting military patrols of the allies rather than nationalist defiance.

    A jeep for tourists (photo: author)

    A “tourwagen” (Photo: author)

    A replica of A.W.S Mallaby’s burnt out car (Photo: author)

    Frozen fantasies: ice cream and class at Zangrandi

    Down in the city centre, another site of colonial memory quietly churns out nostalgia by the scoop: Zangrandi Ice Cream Palace. Established in 1930 by Italian immigrant Roberto Zangrandi and his wife, affectionately dubbed Mevrouw Zangrandi, the parlour has long claimed its place in Surabaya’s culinary imagination. Today, it is celebrated as a heritage destination and “Dutch ice cream” among unknowing people, despite its Italian origins.

    The interior of Zangrandi Ice Cream Palace. Staff are trained to answer questions about the history of the place. Foreign tourists can be spotted, but most of them are Surabaya locals who worked in other cities and came back for family reunion. (Photo: author)

    Aside from being a sweet indulgence, Zangrandi’s appeal carries a myth frozen in its image. The parlour markets itself as a “taste of tempo doeloe” (“olden times”), a culinary relic of the colonial era. Its trademark flavour is the Macedonia, with its rum drizzle, served in delicate glass bowls, evoking a gentler, more “refined” age. As the parlour mostly caters to the locals now, customers could choose between actual rum or a non-alcoholic essence. For Surabaya’s middle-class families, visiting Zangrandi is a symbolic ritual of a nostalgic journey inherited from parents and grandparents who once glimpsed, or aspired to, colonial cosmopolitanism. An escapism from the harsh reality of colonialism, an effort to assert their agency despite borderline cosplaying the coloniser.

    Now we come back to the matter of what is being remembered here—and what is being forgotten.

    Colonial cuisine in Indonesia has always been a marker of class and cultural hegemony. In the Dutch East Indies, milk products and ice cream were expensive and exclusive, inaccessible to the pribumi or locals except for the elite middle-upper class or those working in colonial institutions. Zangrandi thus represents not only nostalgia for a colonial aesthetic, but also for a colonial class structure that is still asserted until now. Only, it is not reserved on the division between the coloniser and the colonised, but rather between the local lower and middle-upper class itself, considering its prestige and price marks. Its survival and success are due in part to the myth that it offers an “authentic” experience of that imagined, upper-class past.

    Meanwhile, local alternatives like es puter, a coconut milk-based adaptation developed as a substitute for expensive dairy ice cream in the past, are relegated to street stalls and plastic cups. While es puter evokes a modest nostalgia of postcolonial decades and class struggle following independence (c. 1960s–1990s), Zangrandi invites customers into a fantasy of leisure once reserved for colonial elites. The stark contrast is not just culinary but symbolic: one is a reminder of makeshift resilience, the other a sanitised simulation of European indulgence.

    Nostalgia a commodity; history a casualty

    In both Kota Lama and Zangrandi, the same logic unfolds: history is aestheticised, class boundaries are blurred, and colonial oppression is rebranded as elegance. Tourists pose before Dutch-era façades or sip milkshakes in rattan chairs beneath sepia-toned murals. The cityscape becomes a stage for a longing that is shaped not by memory but by media, beautiful architecture, and consumer rituals.

    Popular films like Bumi Manusia (2019) have reinforced this fantasy. In Hanung Bramantyo’s adaptation of Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s seminal novel, the emphasis on the interracial romance between Minke and Annelies through warm colour grading, courteous gestures, and lace dresses in the film distorts the book’s political and anticolonial message. Mass media, including Instagram reels promoting Kota Lama’s “new face,” similarly reproduce these colonial myths, making the past feel desirable rather than interrogated.

    This phenomenon is not inherently insidious, however. Observing these matters firsthand, I would argue that colonial nostalgia can be educational if framed critically. Zangrandi, for instance, could serve as a site to unpack culinary hierarchies, race, and class in the Indies. The Red Bridge and Mallaby’s car could be framed not as quirky backdrops, but more highlighted as symbols of Indonesian defiance. But in the rush to capitalise on nostalgia, the towering black and white buildings around it, these sites risk becoming hollow shells, monuments without memory.

    The problem is not that Indonesians are remembering the colonial past, but that they are remembering it selectively. In the case of Surabaya, the interaction between the site and its visitors allows citizens to identify with the former colonisers, rather than with those who resisted. Media outlets endorsing “Instagrammable spots a la Europe” further put the spotlight on the wrong angle.

    Indonesia and North Korea: warm memories of the Cold War

    Friendly ties to Pyongyang have been an emblem of non-alignment for generations of Indonesian foreign policy makers.

    This myth of “order and prosperity” under Dutch rule is not new. Such narratives have always been carefully curated to project stability and progress. Today, that legacy continues, albeit with new packaging: European and priyayi (aristocratic Javanese) dress-up games, Instagram-friendly façades, and pricey ice cream.

    The city government’s efforts to revitalise Kota Lama and the ongoing business of colonial cuisine like Zangrandi are not without merit. Cultural heritage deserves conservation. But heritage is not the same as history, and though the two overlap and complete each other, without critical engagement, heritage can become a dangerous mask.

    Surabaya’s colonial past includes defiance, adaptation, mimicry, and survival. There is nothing inherently wrong with photographing an old building or enjoying a scoop of ice cream. But the stories we tell about these pleasures matter. When nostalgia becomes a commodity, and heritage a gimmick, we risk flattening a complex struggle of the past into a digital postcard posted on the ‘gram.

    If Zangrandi and Kota Lama are to serve the city’s collective memory, then restorative narratives must accompany their romantic façades. Perhaps tour guides could highlight and put emphasis on class segregation during the Indies period; menu books could mention the economic exclusion that made such desserts inaccessible to most locals, to celebrate what the local people had endured and are allowed to consume now. Doing so would not diminish their charm; it would deepen it, shedding light on something else that should be appreciated rather than admiring their appeal on a surface level.

    Only by holding beauty and brutality in the same frame can Surabaya truly honour its past. Colonial nostalgia, then, should not be a detour from history but a gateway into its darker aspects that let people learn from the past and reflect on what they have endured and reclaimed now. Let the tourists flock in, take pretty pictures; let them eat ice cream, but to be fair enough, let them also leave with questions and ponder each time they scroll through their photos.

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  • Authorities overseeing the development of AI in Indonesia have proposed a “sovereign AI fund” to finance the archipelago’s ambitions to become a regional hub for the fast-growing technology, a government document showed. Last month, Reuters reported that Southeast Asia’s largest economy would release its first national roadmap on AI in a bid to attract foreign…

    The post Indonesia eyes ‘sovereign AI fund’ to drive development appeared first on InnovationAus.com.

    This post was originally published on InnovationAus.com.

  • Turkey’s naval shipbuilding industry is steadily expanding its footprint in Southeast Asia as defence ties strengthen, particularly with Muslim-majority nations within the region. At the recently concluded IDEF 2025 defence exhibition in Istanbul, the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) signed a contract to acquire two Istif-class frigates from TAIS Shipyards, the platform having been developed under the […]

    The post Turkey’s naval exports make waves in Southeast Asia appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • Turkey’s naval shipbuilding industry is steadily expanding its footprint in Southeast Asia as defence ties strengthen, particularly with Muslim-majority nations within the region. At the recently concluded IDEF 2025 defence exhibition in Istanbul, the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) signed a contract to acquire two Istif-class frigates from TAIS Shipyards, the platform having been developed under the […]

    The post Turkey’s naval exports make waves in Southeast Asia appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • By Julian Isaac

    The Indonesian Military (TNI) is committed to supporting the completion of the Trans-Papua Highway during President Prabowo Subianto’s term in office.

    While the military is not involved in construction, it plays a critical role in securing the project from threats posed by pro-independence Papuan resistance groups in “high-risk” regions.

    Spanning a total length of 4330 km, the Trans-Papua road project has been under development since 2014.

    However, only 3446 km of the national road network has been connected after more than a decade of construction.

    “Don’t compare Papua with Jakarta, where there are no armed groups. Papua is five times the size of Java, and not all areas are secure,” TNI spokesman Major-General Kristomei Sianturi told a media conference at the Ministry of Public Works on Monday.

    One of the currently active segments is the Jayapura–Wamena route — specifically the Mamberamo–Elim section, which stretches 50 km.

    The project is being carried out through a public-private partnership and was awarded to PT Hutama Karya, with an investment of Rp3.3 trillion (about US$202 million) and a 15-year concession. The segment is expected to be completed within two years, targeting finalisation next year.

    Security an obstacle
    General Kristomei said that one of the main obstacles was security in the vicinity of construction sites.

    Out of 50 regencies/cities in Papua, at least seven are considered high-risk zones. Since its inception, the Trans-Papua road project has claimed 17 lives, due to clashes in the region.

    In addition to security challenges, the delivery of construction materials remains difficult due to limited infrastructure.

    “Transporting goods from one point to another in Papua is extremely difficult because there are no connecting roads. We’re essentially building from scratch,” General Kristomei said.

    In May 2024, President Joko Widodo convened a limited cabinet meeting at the Merdeka Palace to discuss accelerating development in Papua. The government agreed on the urgent need to improve education, healthcare, and security in the region.

    The Minister of National Development Planning, Suharso Monoarfa, announced that the government would ramp up social welfare programmes in Papua in coordination with then Vice-President Ma’ruf Amin, who chairs the Agency for the Acceleration of Special Autonomy in Papua (BP3OKP).

    ‘Welfare based approaches’
    “We are gradually implementing welfare-based approaches, including improvements in education and health, with budgets already allocated to the relevant ministries and agencies,” Suharso said in May last year.

    As of March 2023, the Indonesian government has disbursed Rp 1,036 trillion for Papua’s development.

    This funding has supported major infrastructure initiatives such as the 3462 km Trans-Papua Highway, 1098 km of border roads, the construction of the 1.3 km Youtefa Bridge in Jayapura, and the renovation of Domine Eduard Osok Airport in Sorong.

    Republished from the Indonesia Business Post.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Jakarta, Indonesia – Forget the pastel farmhouses of your grandma’s Pinterest board. Indonesia’s ambitious “Red and White Village Cooperatives” (KDMP) program – named after the nation’s flag – is a surprisingly complex and potentially game-changing initiative aimed at revitalizing rural economies. Officially launching next week with a nationwide rollout, the program’s initial success hinges on a handful of pilot villages, most notably Namang in Bangka Belitung, and it’s already sparking debate about whether it’s a genuine solution or just another government buzzword.

    The post Indonesia Red And White Villages Cooperatives appeared first on PopularResistance.Org.

    This post was originally published on PopularResistance.Org.

  • In the lead up to Japan’s Upper House elections, scheduled for 20 July, “foreign nationals” have unexpectedly become a topic of discussion during the campaign. Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru’s assertion that Japan needs to determine “who to permit entry into the country” and his Liberal Democracy Party’s demand for “zero illegal foreign nationals” indicate a resurgence of the security-focused rhetoric that has long been a part of Japan’s immigration debate.

    Migration remains a contentious issue across the Global North, often leveraged by right-wing political factions to garner votes and deflect blame for economic uncertainties. Migration is regularly scapegoated and portrayed as the source of social tensions and government shortcomings in addressing economic challenges.

    This has become increasingly the case in Japan. Its national migration policy has reflected a hesitancy to accept a role as a destination for immigrants, even its then- thriving economy began facing a shortage of labour. As of the end of 2024, Japan’s foreign population grown to almost 3.8 million people, according to the Immigration Services Agency. This marks an increase of 10.5% year-on-year, and represents the third consecutive record annual high.

    The populist party Sanseitō has launched a campaign centred around migration issues, advocating for “Japanese First” policies similar to the “America First” approach promoted by Donald Trump. Recently, Sanseitō secured its first two seats in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly at elections held on June 22, and polls suggest it will significantly increase its representation in the national Diet after Sunday’s upper house election.

    Fears among Indonesians

    Indonesia is one important source of migrant workers living in Japan. A netnography analysis I employed for this article, which involves observing and analysing online communities, cultures, and behaviours on social media platforms, reveals various reactions to Sanseitō’s mobilisation of “Japanese First” sentiment from Indonesians living in Japan.

    On 9 July an Indonesian influencer residing in Japan revealed in an Instagram post that he had been contacted by an “important Japanese figure” who urged him to encourage Indonesian migrant workers in Japan to maintain proper conduct to avoid potential rejection in the future. The revelations followed media coverage of “problematic” behaviours of Indonesians in Japan, ranging from visa overstaying to pretty crime to more serious crimes. Within the Indonesian community, concerns were heightened about Indonesian migrants potentially being “blacklisted” by Japan in 2026.

    A concern with defending the good name of the Indonesian migrant community has marked many of the responses to the rise of anti-foreigner political rhetoric. Many comments have centred on the supposedly problematic behaviour of certain Indonesian migrant workers, which has been perceived as drawing increased scrutiny on migration issues during the upper house election campaign.

    For example, the Indonesian Community of Japan (ICJ), one of the largest social media groups of Indonesians in Japan, has also addressed this migration concern. A member, referred to as A (pseudonym), shared his thoughts in a status update on the ICJ platform, highlighting the importance of preserving a positive image within the community:

    “I felt sad when I first read this thread, especially during the campaign season like now, and so many people are agreeing. I hope that those of you who are currently in this position will be kind when picking up and dropping off your children. There may be some people around you who are a little less pleased, even though they don’t really understand the rights regulated by law, but they want to change the law, which seems impossible.” (ICJ, FB, July, 2025)

    A’s post was a response to a Japanese thread that expressed concerns about childcare fees, which the author believes do not serve the interests of Japanese society. The thread questioned why some foreigners can leave their children in daycare while studying, highlighting that newcomers to Japan often have very low childcare fees due to not having a reportable income from the previous year, while Japanese citizens typically pay around ¥50,000– 60,000 (A$500–600). The post also raised questions about how someone can be a student with small children—and expressed confusion about why a particular individual was attending a Japanese university despite not speaking the language.

    The social media group Japan Guide Indonesia, a platform that shares everything about Japan for Indonesians on Instagram has also been a space for similar discussions. One member posted news regarding Prime Minister Ishiba’s plan to create a special unit to monitor foreigners and his plans to review regulations that tighten the entry of foreigners. The post was widely responded to by various comments, most of which blamed “irresponsible” Indonesian people and communities in Japan who they considered unable to maintain the good name of the nation while living there.

    Among the posts expressing concern, some also attempted inject balance by presenting rebuttals written by Japanese NGOs rejecting negative narratives that marginalise foreigners, including an 8 July statement by 274 NGOs voicing their rejection of xenophobia in the election campaign. Eight Japanese NGOs, including the Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (Ijuren) and the Anti-Poverty Campaign, led the organisation of this joint statement, which opposed the baseless xenophobic comments made by several legislative candidates in the Upper House election campaign.

    More recently the ICJ issued an official statement aimed at the Japanese people, addressing concerns and issues regarding misunderstandings about foreigners. Following this, an official statement was issued by the Indonesian Embassy in Tokyo to clarify the chaos surrounding the rumour on social media that Indonesia will be blacklisted in 2026.

    Subsequently, Indonesia’s Minister of Protection for Indonesian Migrant Workers, Abdul Kadir Karding, addressed influencers with an important message: “Please understand the impact of your posts before sharing them. It’s not just about your image; it can influence Japan’s willingness to employ Indonesians. We must not let the actions of a few individuals jeopardise the opportunities for hundreds of thousands of prospective migrant workers, especially when inaccurate information is spread through social media.” He then stressed the importance of upholding the nation’s good reputation in response to several Indonesian individuals facing issues in Japan that could potentially harm Indonesia’s image.

    Japanese dreams and unrequited love

    Amid the prevalent “Japanese first” narrative and chaotic reactions on social media, Indonesia stands out as one of the countries actively sending migrant workers to Japan. For more than 30 years, the pathway for cooperation on labour migration has been kept open through the Technical Intern Training Program (TITP). During this time, Indonesian migrant workers have played a vital role in addressing gaps in key Japanese industrial sectors, including construction, agriculture, fisheries, food processing, and nursing and aged care.

    But the Japanese government’s policy of openness in accepting workers in these fields has been criticised as sluggish, often leading to the exploitation of migrant workers as if they were disposable. The “temporary” policies, crafted under the guise of preserving the integrity of “Japaneseness,” illustrate Japan’s lack of genuine commitment to facilitating the integration of foreigners into society. Meanwhile, Indonesia, as a sending country, remains entranced by this type of cooperation, which offers a temporary solution to the high unemployment rates at home. The mutual interests of both nations have transformed the migration issue into a bartering transaction.

    Indonesia’s new economy of speed

    Why are millions of Indonesian workers taking up methamphetamine?

    It is therefore not surprising that the hashtag “just run away first (#kaburajadulu)” has gained traction on Indonesian social media, as a reflection of disappointment and despair regarding domestic conditions. This sentiment was met with a promotional response from the Ministry of Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (KemenP2MI), which aimed to turn dreams of working abroad into reality. , “Go as migrant, go home as a boss” was the slogan endorsed by government-aligned celebrities such as Rafi Ahmad in support of the scheme.

    In reality, not everyone has the privilege to migrate safely. Many Indonesian migrant workers who choose to migrate to Japan to fulfill their dreams face numerous challenges. They often encounter difficulties such as accumulating debts before departure, having their documents withheld (such as diplomas and land certificates), and being coerced into signing agreements that violate their human rights. Not to mention the inhumane departure training system, such as asking prospective workers to sign agreements not to marry, get pregnant, or leave the house, and more. All of these obstacles must be navigated in the hope of escaping uncertainty in their home country and improving their lives in Japan. Upon arriving in the destination country, sometimes they have to accept the painful reality that their love is unrequited.

    Who really needs to maintain their “good name”?

    Overall, framing the issue of migration as a security challenge instead of a humanitarian matter frequently results in policies that violate migrants’ human rights. Moreover, migration is often commodified by irresponsible parties—like labour brokers and so-called “black companies”—by selling the dreams of a better life by exploiting prospective migrants’ vulnerable conditions.

    In the end, the phrase “Japanese first” is being leveraged by certain individuals or groups from the sending country as a means to position themselves as a “gatekeeper’’ (in that they control and regulate movement), instilling anxiety and fear among migrants about the potential loss of opportunities for those unable to meet the “compliance” standards they have set for entering the migrant worker market in Japan. This approach encourages discourages migrants from speaking out, questioning their rights, seeking protection, or simply finding solace amidst the fatigue of the often inhumane working conditions.

    The political climate in Japan as the election approaches has indeed been strategically exaggerated to create fear among potential migrant workers. This approach could potentially normalise, legitimise, and perpetuate inhumane practices in the pre-departure process, purportedly for the sake of ensuring discipline and compliance once workers arrive in Japan. Such a scenario potentially undermines the urgent need for reform in the pre-departure mechanism.

    Indeed, it is essential to maintain the good reputation of your nation wherever you are. Upholding the values and following the rules of the country you reside in is equally important. However, in the end, who should be on blacklists, and be at the centre of politicians’ attention, are the corrupt systems, agencies, brokers who exploit the vulnerabilities of migrant workers, restrict their rights, weaken their solidarity, and prevent their advocacy in the name of gratitude, patience, and obedience.

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    The post “Japanese First” politics creates fears for Indonesians appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Dismantling the ideological architecture of the U.S. empire by exposing how atrocity becomes infrastructure and propaganda becomes profession. From the Ford Foundation’s role in Indonesia’s Cold War genocide to the rise of figures like Orville Schell and Johnny Harris, KJ unpacks how soft power functions as a weapon: manufacturing consent, laundering imperial violence, and shaping global narratives. How US think tanks, journalism schools, and digital platforms are not just media ecosystems, but actually, ideological battlegrounds built atop bloodshed.

    The post Mass Killings, Media Control, and the Machinery of US Soft Power first appeared on Dissident Voice.

    This post was originally published on Dissident Voice.

  • If the Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU) could have its way, it would be operating fighters galore from aerospace companies emanating from Asia, across Europe and all the way to the USA. However, fiscal realities mean such ambitions remain a pipe dream. In recent times, Indonesia has been linked to the following proposed purchases: American F-15EXs, […]

    The post Indonesia keeps options open with bewildering fighter smorgasbord appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • From the 1960s to the early 1990s, Indonesia’s development strategy was famously shaped by the influence of the “Berkeley Mafia”, a group of US-educated technocrats—including Widjojo Nitisastro, Mohammad Sadli, Emil Salim, J. B. Sumarlin, and Ali Wardhana—so named for their association with the University of California, Berkeley.

    These men held key roles in the finance ministry, the central bank, and other economic institutions, where under the protection of Suharto’s autocratic regime they emphasised pragmatic economic policies, fiscal management, and risk-sensitive governance. After Suharto’s fall, a new generation of PhD economists, such as Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Chatib Basri, Bambang Brodjonegoro, and Suahasil Nazara, inherited the Berkeley Mafia’s dominant influence over Indonesia’s fiscal policies.

    However, following the presidency of Joko Widodo (Jokowi), the technocratic landscape began to shift, with bankers and professional investors gaining greater influence. Like academic technocrats, these bankers and investors are neither elected officials nor formal party members. However, their credentials stem from careers in the private sector—particularly in banking and investment firms—where their expertise in asset pricing, risk assessment, and corporate finance contrasts with the policy-oriented, analytical focus of PhD-trained economists such as the Berkeley Mafia technocrats.

    In this article, I define a “technocrat” as a government official, policymaker, or leader appointed based on technical expertise and professional skills rather than through election.

    Indonesia’s democracy is becoming reactive. Is that good?

    Social media offers an ersatz form of accountability

    The emergence of banker technocrats began with figures such as Agus Martowardojo, who served as Minister of Finance (2010–2013) and later as central bank governor (2013–2018). As CEO of the state-owned Bank Mandiri (2005–2010), Agus played a key role in deepening Mandiri’s integration into capital markets following its stock exchange listing in 2003.

    This trend gained momentum during Jokowi’s first term (2014–2019), particularly with the rise of Budi Gunadi Sadikin, who served as Minister of Health under Jokowi and now under President Prabowo Subianto. As Bank Mandiri’s CEO (2013–16), Budi played a central role in facilitating the 2018 acquisition of a majority stake in the US-owned Freeport McMoRan by Indonesia’s state-owned mining firm Inalum.

    A distinction needs to be drawn between banker technocrats and professional investor technocrats, despite the often-blurred boundaries between the two. While bankers are by their nature professional investment advisors, not all professional investors come from banking. But does this distinction carry real significance? More importantly, how do their differing professional backgrounds shape their approach to governance?

    Bankers largely emerged from the post-reform era of Indonesia’s banking system—particularly within state-owned banks—which tend to adopt a conservative stance on risk. In contrast, professional investors arose from coalitions of conglomerates, creating investment vehicles such as private equity and asset management firms. These conglomerates turned to non-bank financial institutions in response to post-reform regulations that made it difficult for them to establish their own banks.

    These divergent professional paths have shaped not only these two new groups of technocrats’ career trajectories, but also their political networks and technocratic styles once they enter government.

    Pandu Sjahrir takes a selfie with Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati, June 2023 (Photo: Pandu Sjahrir on Facebook)

    The emergence of bankers and professional investors

    In the early 1990s, conglomerate-owned banks lent freely to their affiliated companies without oversight, effectively transferring money between entities. This corrupt practice significantly weakened Indonesia’s banking sector, contributing to the 1998 financial crisis.

    As a result of this experience, a key priority of Indonesia’s post-crisis banking reform was to strengthen oversight mechanisms. The reformed regulatory institutions—including the central bank (Bank Indonesia, reformed in 1999), the Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan, established in 1998), and the Financial Services Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, established in 2011)—have closely monitored bank operations and loan disbursements to ensure financial stability and debt repayment capacity. These efforts have been crucial in maintaining capital circulation between banks and corporations.

    The upshot for Indonesia’s state-owned banks of being subject to this regulatory regime was that they have remained relatively independent from political influence compared to other state-owned enterprises (SOEs) like Pertamina, which are often plagued by corruption and vested interests. As a result, Indonesian SOE banks have remained largely free from scandals, have adopted a conservative approach to risk, and have maintained sound financial performance, as reflected in the capital markets.

    At the same, it became increasingly difficult for Indonesian conglomerates to establish banks due to tighter regulations, many shifted toward more flexible investment vehicles. This shift gave rise to a new wave of domestic investment firms in the early 2000s, including Recapital, Saratoga Capital, Principia, and Northstar Group. These firms fund various domestic projects, often linked to specific businesses groups or conglomerates. For conglomerates, investment vehicles offer greater flexibility than conventional banks. They enable stock buybacks when prices are low, allow investments in high-risk projects that banks might reject, facilitate direct funding from other business groups, and help avoid high bank interest rates and maximise profits.

    Then defence minister Prabowo Subianto with Minsiter for State Owned Enterprises Erick Thohir, June 2023 (Photo: Erick Thohir on Facebook)

    Their rise to power

    The banking sectors and investment vehicles have created two cultures of financial experts in Indonesia—one  often risk-tolerant, and the other risk-averse. But who are these professionals, and how did they get into the government?

    Banker technocrats are represented by figures such as Budi Gunadi Sadikin (Minister of Health, former CEO of Mandiri), Pahala Mansury (former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and SOEs, former C-level at Mandiri), Ridha D. M. Wirakusumah (CEO of Indonesia Investment Authority) and Kartiko Wiratmojo (Vice Minister of SOEs, former CEO of Mandiri). Professional-investor technocrats include figures such as Rosan Roeslani (Minister of Investment, CEO of Danantara), Pandu Sjahrir (CIO of Danantara, AC Ventures), Thomas Lembong (former Minister of Investment, Principia Group), and Patrick Walujo (CEO of Gojek, North Star Group). Walujo is the only one who has not held a government position, but he remains politically well connected.

    In terms of how they operate, there are two key differences. The first is managerial depth: bankers tend to focus on financial management and operational efficiency. These skills are shaped by a regulatory environment where reputation is defined by the ability to minimise non-performing loans (NPLs) in the conventional banking sector. In contrast, professional investors emphasise valuation and deal-making. Their investment approach typically avoids long-term relationships with assets. Instead, they prioritise gains from selling assets in the capital markets or direct selling, where quick returns are often preferred over long-term holdings.

    The second difference relates to political connections—professional investors often leverage their high-level networks, while bankers rely on institutional relationships. Most leaders in the investment sector come from privileged, well-connected backgrounds. Pandu Sjahrir earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Chicago and an MBA from Stanford; he is also the nephew of Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, one of Indonesia’s key political figures. Rosan Roeslani, a US-educated investor, is a close friend of Sandiaga Uno (former Minister of Tourism) and Erick Thohir (Minister of State-Owned Eterprises). He also maintains strong ties with the Bakrie family, one of Indonesia’s most influential conglomerates. For these figures, connections are crucial in securing investment opportunities.

    Dony Oskaria, Rosan Roeslani and Pandu Sjahrir at the official launch of Danantara, February 2025 (Photo: Pandu Sjahrir on Facebook)

    Many bankers also come from privileged backgrounds, though not to the same extent as professional investors when compared to the current elite among banker technocrats. For example, Budi Gunadi Sadikin earned his undergraduate degree from Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), while Kartiko Wirjoatmodjo and Pahala Mansury graduated from the University of Indonesia. They later pursued master’s degrees at overseas universities, but only after establishing themselves as bankers.

    For banker technocrats, their institutional careers in SOE banks serve as a direct pathway into government, making the banking sector their primary political ladder. In contrast, professional investors have relied much more heavily on high-level social networks to gain access to government circles. Because of that, professional investor technocrats face greater risks from changes of administration and other political shifts among elites. If Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, for example, were to have a political dispute with President Prabowo or his inner circle, it would immediately affect Pandu Sjahrir’s political capital. High-level connections are effective but vulnerable to elite competition. Banker technocrats, on the other hand, are less exposed to these risks since their credentials were built through careers in the SOE banks. In this sense their careers resemble those of academic technocrats, who also maintained a degree of insulation from elite political conflicts, allowing them greater stability in navigating government transitions.

    Health Minister and former CEO of Bank Mandiri, Budi Gunadi Sadikin, speaks with State Secretary Teddy Indra Wijaya ahead of their meeting with President Prabowo, June 2024 (Photo: Kementerian Kesehatan RI on Facebook)

    What this means for Indonesia

    The idea that technocrats are free from political interests has always been misleading—none are truly politically independent. However, the degree and layers of political influence on technocrats are vary.

    While academic technocrats will continue to play a key role, particularly in the Ministry of Finance, the growing influence of bankers and professional investors in strategic economic positions will create competition between different sets of technocratic groups over state economic policies and asset management. This shift gives Indonesian president alternatives in shaping technocratic policies. They can choose from academic technocrats, bankers, professional investors, combination of these backgrounds, or technocrats from other backgrounds.

    Indonesia’s democracy is becoming reactive. Is that good?

    Social media offers an ersatz form of accountability

    President Prabowo has so far appeared to favour loyalty and political connections in his technocratic appointments. A clear example is Danantara, Indonesia’s largest sovereign wealth fund, which directly controls up to US$900 billion in SOE assets and is charged with managing US$20 billion in cash for new investments. Its leadership—Rosan Roeslani, Pandu Sjahrir, and Donny Oskaria—are all professional investors with strong political ties. This stands in stark contrast to Jokowi’s approach. In 2021 he appointed bankers to lead the Indonesia Investment Authority (INA), prioritising conventional bankers over professional investors.

    Rosan, Pandu, and Donny are undeniably successful investors and capable technocrats, well-versed in effective policy execution. However, what distinguishes them is the dominant role of political connections in securing their appointments—a defining trait of professional-investor technocrats. This raises concerns about the lack of diversity in technocratic approaches within Danantara and other presidential economic agendas, where well-connected investors increasingly occupy strategic economic positions.

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    The post Beyond the “Berkeley Mafia” appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Pacific Media Watch

    West Papuan independence advocate Octovianus Mote was in Aotearoa New Zealand late last year seeking support for independence for West Papua, which has been ruled by Indonesia for more than six decades.

    Mote is vice-president of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) and was hosted in New Zealand by the Green Party, which Mote said had always been a “hero” for West Papua.

    He spoke at a West Papua seminar at the Māngere Mountain Education Centre and in this Talanoa TV segment he offers prayers for the West Papuan solidarity movement.

    In a “blessing for peace and justice”, Octo Mote spoke of his hopes for the West Papuan struggle for independence at lunch at the Mount Albert home of New Zealand activist Maire Leadbeater in September 2024.

    He gave a tribute to Leadbeater and the Whānau Community Centre and Hub’s Nik Naidu, saying:

    “We remember those who cannot eat like us, especially those who oppressed . . . The 80,000 people in Papua who have had to flee their homes because of the Indonesian military operations.”

    Video: Nik Naidu, Talanoa TV


    Blessings by Octo Mote.               Video: Talanoa TV

    On Saturday, 12 July 2025 Te Atatu MP Phil Twyford will open the week-long Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) exhibition at the Ellen Melville Centre Women’s Pioneer Hall at 3pm.

    https://www.facebook.com/events/1856900961820487/

    Poster for the Legends of the Pacific: Stories of a Nuclear-Free Moana 1975-1995 exhibition
    Poster for the Legends of the Pacific: Stories of a Nuclear-Free Moana 1975-1995 exhibition, July 13-18.


    This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by Pacific Media Watch.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) is receiving a boost to its upper-end capabilities as it inducts two new classes of frigates. Beginning the charge, the first of four frigates, KRI Brawijaya, was commissioned in Mugiano, Italy on 2 July. KRI Brawijaya (pennant number ‘320’) is the first of two PPA warships manufactured by Fincantieri, originally destined […]

    The post Indonesian Navy cranks up its frigate inventory appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • The Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) is receiving a boost to its upper-end capabilities as it inducts two new classes of frigates. Beginning the charge, the first of four frigates, KRI Brawijaya, was commissioned in Mugiano, Italy on 2 July. KRI Brawijaya (pennant number ‘320’) is the first of two PPA warships manufactured by Fincantieri, originally destined […]

    The post Indonesian Navy cranks up its frigate inventory appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • French technology company Exail has been awarded a contract to deliver uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) and mine identification and disposal systems to the Indonesian Navy. The company announced on 24 June that it will supply four Inspector 90 USVs, and the Seascan and K-Ster mine identification and disposal systems (MIDS). The systems will be deployed […]

    The post Exail to supply uncrewed mine countermeasures systems to Indonesian Navy appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • Asia Pacific Report

    The NGO Coalition on Human Rights in Fiji (NGOCHR) has called on Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka as the new chair of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) to “uphold justice, stability and security” for Kanaky New Caledonia and West Papua.

    In a statement today after last week’s MSG leaders’ summit in Suva, the coalition also warned over Indonesia’s “chequebook diplomacy” as an obstacle for the self-determination aspirations of Melanesian peoples not yet independent.

    Indonesia is a controversial associate member of the MSG in what is widely seen in the region as a “complication” for the regional Melanesian body.

    The statement said that with Rabuka’s “extensive experience as a seasoned statesman in the Pacific, we hope that this second chapter will chart a different course, one rooted in genuine commitment to uphold justice, stability and security for all our Melanesian brothers and sisters in Kanaky New Caledonia and West Papua”.

    The coalition said the summit’s theme, “A peaceful and prosperous Melanesia”, served as a reminder that even after several decades of regional bilaterals, “our Melanesian leaders have made little to no progress in fulfilling its purpose in the region — to support the independence and sovereignty of all Melanesians”.

    “Fiji, as incoming chair, inherits the unfinished work of the MSG. As rightly stated by the late great Father Walter Lini, ‘We will not be free until all of Melanesia is free”, the statement said.

    “The challenges for Fiji’s chair to meet the goals of the MSG are complex and made more complicated by the inclusion of Indonesia as an associate member in 2015.

    ‘Indonesia active repression’
    “Indonesia plays an active role in the ongoing repression of West Papuans in their desire for independence. Their associate member status provides a particular obstacle for Fiji as chair in furthering the self-determination goals of the MSG.”

    Complicating matters further was the asymmetry in the relationship between Indonesia and the rest of the MSG members, the statement said.

    “As a donor government and emerging economic power, Indonesia’s ‘chequebook and cultural diplomacy’ continues to wield significant influence across the region.

    “Its status as an associate member of the MSG raises serious concerns about whether it is appropriate, as this pathway risks further marginalising the voices of our West Papuan sisters and brothers.”

    This defeated the “whole purpose of the MSG: ‘Excelling together towards a progressive and prosperous Melanesia’.”

    The coalition acknowledged Rabuka’s longstanding commitment to the people of Kanaky New Caledonia. A relationship and shared journey that had been forged since 1989.

    ‘Stark reminder’
    The pro-independence riots of May 2024 served as a “stark reminder that much work remains to be done to realise the full aspirations of the Kanak people”.

    As the Pacific awaited a “hopeful and favourable outcome” from the Troika Plus mission to Kanaky New Caledonia, the coalition said that it trusted Rabuka to “carry forward the voices, struggles, dreams and enduring aspirations of the people of Kanaky New Caledonia”.

    The statement called on Rabuka as the new chair of MSG to:

    • Ensure the core founding values, and mission of the MSG are upheld;
    • Re-evaluate Indonesia’s appropriateness as an associate member of the MSG; and
    • Elevate discussions on West Papua and Kanaky New Caledonia at the MSG level and through discussions at the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders.

    The Fiji NGO Coalition on Human Rights (NGOCHR) represents the Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre (chair), Fiji Women’s Rights Movement, Citizens’ Constitutional Forum, femLINKpacific, Social Empowerment and Education Program, and Diverse Voices and Action (DIVA) for Equality Fiji. Pacific Network on Globalisation (PANG) is an observer.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Asia Pacific Report

    A West Papuan independence movement leader has warned the Melanesian Spearhead Group after its 23rd leaders summit in Suva, Fiji, to not give in to a “neocolonial trade in betrayal and abandonment” over West Papua.

    While endorsing and acknowledging the “unconditional support” of Melanesian people to the West Papuan cause for decolonisation, OPM chair and commander Jeffrey P Bomanak
    spoke against “surrendering” to Indonesia which was carrying out a policy of “bank cheque diplomacy” in a bid to destroy solidarity.

    Fiji Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka took over the chairmanship of the MSG this week from his Vanuatu counterpart Jotham Napat and vowed to build on the hard work and success that had been laid before it.

    He said he would not take the responsibility of chairmanship lightly, especially as they were confronted with an increasingly fragmented global landscape that demanded more from them.

    PNG Prime Minister James Marape called on MSG member states to put West Papua and Kanaky New Caledonia back on the agenda for full MSG membership.

    Marape said that while high-level dialogue with Indonesia over West Papua and France about New Caledonia must continue, it was culturally “un-Melanesian” not to give them a seat at the table.

    West Papua currently holds observer status in the MSG, which includes Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Fiji — and Indonesia as an associate member.

    PNG ‘subtle shift’
    PNG recognises the West Papuan region as five provinces of Indonesia, making Marape’s remarks in Suva a “subtle shift that may unsettle Jakarta”, reports Gorethy Kenneth in the PNG Post-Courier.

    West Papuans have waged a long-standing Melanesian struggle for independence from Indonesia since 1969.

    The MSG resolved to send separate letters of concern to the French and Indonesian presidents.

    The OPM letter warning the MSG
    The OPM letter warning the MSG. Image: Screenshot APR

    In a statement, Bomanak thanked the Melanesians of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS) of Kanaky New Caledonia for “unconditionally support[ing] your West Papuan brothers and sisters, subjected to dispossession, enslavement, genocide, ethnocide, infanticide, and ethnic cleansing, [as] the noblest of acts.”

    “We will never forget these Melanesian brothers and sisters who remain faithfully loyal to our cultural identity no matter how many decades is our war of liberation and no matter how many bags of gold and silver Indonesia offers for the betrayal of ancestral kinship.

    “When the late [Vanuatu Prime Minister] Father Walter Lini declared, ‘Melanesia is not free unless West Papua is free,”’ he was setting the benchmark for leadership and loyalty across the entire group of Melanesian nations.

    “Father Lini was not talking about a timeframe of five months, or five years, or five decades.

    “Father Lini was talking about an illegal invasion and military occupation of West Papua by a barbaric nation wanting West Papua’s gold and forests and willing to exterminate all of us for this wealth.

    ‘Noble declaration’
    “That this noble declaration of kinship and loyalty now has a commercial value that can be bought and sold like a commodity by those without Father Lini’s courage and leadership, and betrayed for cheap materialism, is an act of historic infamy that will be recorded by Melanesian historians and taught in all our nations’ universities long after West Papua is liberated.”

    OPM leader Jeffrey Bomanak
    OPM leader Jeffrey Bomanak . . . his letter warns against surrendering to Indonesian control. Image: OPM

    Bomanak was condemning the decision of the MSG to regard the “West Papua problem” as an internal issue for Indonesia.

    “The illegal occupation of West Papua and the genocide of West Papuans is not an internal issue to be solved by the barbaric occupier.

    “Indonesia’s position as an associate member of MSG is a form of colonial corruption of the Melanesian people.

    “We will continue to fight without MSG because the struggle for independence and sovereignty is our fundamental right of the Papuan people’s granted by God.

    “Every member of MSG can recommend to the United Nations that West Papua deserves the same right of liberation and nation-state sovereignty that was achieved without compromise by Timor-Leste — the other nation illegally invaded by Indonesia and also subjected to genocide.”

    Bomanak said the MSG’s remarks stood in stark contrast to Father Lini’s solidarity with West Papua and were “tantamount to sharing in the destruction of West Papua”.

    ‘Blood money’
    It was also collaborating in the “extermination of West Papuans for economic benefit, for Batik Largesse. Blood money!”

    The Papua ‘problem’ was not a human rights problem but a problem of the Papuan people’s political right for independence and sovereignty based on international law and the right to self-determination.

    It was an international problem that had not been resolved.

    “In fact, to say it is simply a ‘problem’ ignores the fate of the genocide of 500,000 victims.”

    Bomanak said MSG leaders should make clear recommendations to the Indonesian government to resolve the “Papua problem” at the international level based on UN procedures and involving the demilitarisation of West Papua with all Indonesian defence and security forces “leaving the land they invaded and unlawfully occupied.”

    Indonesia’s position as an associate member in the MSG was a systematic new colonialisation by Indonesia in the home of the Melanesian people.

    Indonesia well understood the weaknesses of each Melanesian leader and “carries out bank cheque diplomacy accordingly to destroy the solidarity so profoundly declared by the late Father Walter Lini.”

    “No surrender!”

    MSG members in Suva
    MSG leaders in Suva . . . Jeremy Manele (Solomon Islands, from left), James Marape (PNG), Sitiveni Rabuka (Fiji), Jotham Napat (Vanuatu), and Roch Wamytan (FLNKS spokesperson). Image: PNG Post-Courier

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Asia Pacific Report

    A Fiji-based advocacy group has condemned the participation of Indonesia in the Melanesian Spearhead Group which is meeting in Suva this week, saying it is a “profound disgrace” that the Indonesian Embassy continues to “operate freely” within the the MSG Secretariat.

    “This presence blatantly undermines the core principles of justice and solidarity we claim to uphold as Melanesians,” said We Bleed Black and Red in a social media post.

    The group said that as the new MSG chair, the Fiji government could not speak cannot credibly about equity, peace, regional unity, or the Melanesian family “while the very agent of prolonged Melanesian oppression sits at the decision-making table”.

    The statement said that for more than six decades, the people of West Papua had endured “systemic atrocities from mass killings to environmental devastation — acts that clearly constitute ecocide and gross human rights violations”.

    “Indonesia’s track record is not only morally indefensible but also a flagrant breach of numerous international agreements and conventions,” the group said.

    “It is time for all Melanesian nations to confront the reality behind the diplomatic facades and development aid.

    “No amount of financial incentives or diplomatic charm can erase the undeniable suffering of the West Papuan people.

    “We must rise above political appeasement and fulfill our moral and regional duty as one Melanesian family.

    “The Pacific cannot claim moral leadership while turning a blind eye and deaf ear to colonial violence on our own shores. Justice delayed is justice denied.”

    ‘Peaceful, prosperous Melanesia’
    Meanwhile, The Fiji Times reports that the 23rd MSG Leaders’ Summit got underway on Monday in Suva, drawing heads of state from Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and representatives from New Caledonia’s FLNKS.

    Hosted under the theme “A Peaceful and Prosperous Melanesia,” the summit ended yesterday.

    This year’s meeting also marked Fiji’s first time chairing the regional bloc since 1997.

    Fiji officially assumed the MSG chairmanship from Vanuatu following a traditional handover ceremony attended by senior officials, observers, and dignitaries at Draiba.

    Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister James Marape arrived in Suva on Sunday and reaffirmed Papua New Guinea’s commitment to MSG cooperation during today’s plenary session.

    He will also take part in high-level talanoa discussions with the Pacific Islands Forum’s Eminent Persons Group, aimed at deepening institutional reform and regional solidarity.

    Observers from the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) and Indonesia were also present, reflecting ongoing efforts to expand the bloc’s influence on issues like self-determination, regional trade, security, and climate resilience in the Pacific.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Indonesia has long stood as a democratic paradox: a country with vibrant electoral participation and open civic engagement, yet persistent institutional fragility. Over the last decade, another paradox has emerged—one that reshapes the relationship between public opinion and policymaking. As more citizens engage through digital platforms, political decisions have become increasingly reactive, emotionally charged, and performative.

    What we are witnessing is a shift toward what might be called reactive democracy—a form of governance in which legitimacy, through still rooted in elections or institutional authority, is sustained in between elections by the performance of responsiveness to  the social media reactions that determining which issues gain visibility and urgency—and which have increasingly become seen as proxies for the popular will.

    This logic stands in sharp contrast to the model of deliberative democracy, where legitimacy arises not from the volume or velocity of expression, but from its quality. As envisioned by thinkers like Habermas, deliberative democracy depends on inclusive, rational-critical debate—spaces where citizens justify their claims, consider opposing views, and seek mutual understanding. It imagines the public sphere as a space for thoughtful negotiation and the slow formation of reasoned consensus.

    Social media once seemed to promise this very vision: a digitally enabled deliberative space where citizens could bypass traditional gatekeepers and engage directly in democratic discourse. Few techno-utopian thinkers envisioned a future where the interactive features of digital platforms would foster a deeper, more participatory democracy—a kind of virtual town square grounded in openness, reciprocity, and reflective dialogue

    But in practice, platforms are not designed for deliberation—they are designed to capture attention. Reactions—emoji clicks, retweets, algorithmically sorted comments—are designed for speed and simplicity, not for reasoned exchange.

    Though individually fleeting, these digital signals become powerful when taken together, shaping the collective mood as interpreted and amplified by platform algorithms. The result is a connected mass democracy that often feels more reactive than reflective. It is, in many of its manifestations, shallower, more performative, and more susceptible to the distortions of spectacle than the idealist advocates of digital democracy had originally envisioned.

    Governance by trend

    In this environment, policymaking increasingly follows what goes viral, not what is effective. It becomes more performative than deliberative—driven by what trends, rather than what works. The democratic potential of this shift is real, but so are its dangers.

    In early 2025, several high-profile policy U-turns under President Prabowo Subianto’s administration illustrated this dynamic in real time. However, the phenomenon of viral-driven policymaking did not begin with the Prabowo administration. During Joko Widodo’s presidency, there was already a growing pattern of state responsiveness to viral criticism and digital outrage. A long list of Jokowi-era policies—ranging from controversial labour and education regulations to public health mandates and infrastructure plans—were revised, delayed, or scrapped entirely after facing intense online backlash. What started as occasional policy reversals under Jokowi has now become a more consistent and embedded mode of governance under Prabowo.

    One of the first involved an attempt to restrict the sale of 3-kilogram LPG canisters—widely known as tabung gas melon—to licensed distributors. The move disrupted informal retail networks relied on by millions. Within days, social media platforms were flooded with videos of distressed citizens, particularly women and elderly residents, struggling to find affordable gas. As public frustration intensified online, the government quickly reversed course. The canisters returned to warung shelves, and public anger subsided.

    Earlier, backlash also erupted over a proposed increase in the Value Added Tax (VAT) to 12 percent. Fears of rising prices for basic goods spread rapidly across social media. In response, the government hastily clarified that the hike would apply only to luxury items—a move widely interpreted as a reaction to mounting digital outrage.

    A third episode involved a controversial customs regulation limiting the quantity of goods Indonesian citizens could bring home from abroad. The policy was seen as excessive and burdensome. Online, the term “Becuk”—a mocking abbreviation of Bea Cukai (customs office)—went viral, symbolising widespread dissatisfaction. In a rare move, the spokesperson for the ministry of finance, Prastowo Yustinus, took to Twitter/X to crowdsource feedback from netizens. Days later, following intense online criticism and input, the government scrapped the regulation altogether.

    More recently, the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (Menpan RB) issued a circular announcing delays in the appointment of new civil servants (Calon Pegawati Negeri Sipil or CPNS) and contract-based government employees (Pegawai Pemerintah dengan Perjanjian Kerka or PPPK). The decision sparked public disappointment. Within days, an online petition demanding the fast-tracking of CPNS recruitment began circulating widely, while the hashtag #saveCASN2024 trended across platforms as citizens protested the delay. Following the viral backlash, the government once again revised its position, announcing that CPNS appointments would be accelerated in response to public demand.

    These cases may seem minor, but they reflect a deeper trend. In today’s Indonesia, policy decisions increasingly unfold under the pressure of algorithmically-enabled mobilisation. No longer confined to deliberative forums, data and evidence, or expert panels, policymaking must now survive the court of public virality.

    Then trade minister Zulkifli Hasan acommpanies former president Joko Widodo on a market visit, May 2024 (Photo: Zulkifli Hasan on Facebook)

    From deliberation to digitally amplified emotion

    Indonesia’s digital landscape has expanded rapidly. With over 78 percent internet penetration, the public sphere now includes voices historically excluded from formal politics—housewives, rural youth, street vendors, and informal workers. This democratisation of access has, in many ways, created new spaces for accountability and participatory engagement.

    But social media platforms operate on emotional and algorithmic logic. Viral outrage—not careful deliberation—drives visibility. Research has consistently shown that emotionally charged content is far more likely to be shared and amplified. In this environment, complex and long-term policy issues—such as tax reform, climate adaptation, or education equity—often struggle to gain traction.

    Reactions may appear trivial, but they play a crucial role in digital politics. They not only gauge the popularity of content but also directly affect its algorithmic visibility—and therefore, its influence. The more reactions a piece of content garners, the more prominently social media platforms display it. The “clickers,” “likers,” and “sharers” may be dismissed as mere clicktivists, but they’ve become micro-opinion leaders and amplifiers of political messages.

    In turn, political leaders now obsessively track and optimise for these metrics, treating them as proxies for public approval. This carries a plebiscitary logic, where mass participation comes at the cost of shallow interaction. Only a small subset of activists engage in sustained political discourse, while the majority contribute through simplified acts—clicking “like,” sharing a post, or reacting with an emoji. These actions are individually minor but collectively powerful, accumulating into visible indicators of public sentiment.  It is not always populist leaders driving this shift, but the performative pressures of a digitally mediated public—namely, the growing expectation, amplified by social media, that politicians respond swiftly and visibly to online sentiment, often through symbolic gestures rather than through deliberative policymaking.

    In Indonesia, this logic is becoming institutionalised. Ministries now allocate specific budgets for social media governance—not merely to disseminate policy updates, but to monitor, respond to, and occasionally manipulate public sentiment online. These operations consist of coordinated networks of influencers, content creators, account coordinators, and paid buzzers who work together to steer online opinion in favour of the government and corporate interests. Beyond simply promoting state or corporate agendas, buzzers often engage in targeted attacks against dissenting voices, discrediting and intimidating journalists, activists, and environmental defenders.

    In effect, what Indonesia is witnessing is not merely the digitisation of its democracy. Rather, the rise of buzzers under the umbrella of reactive democracy shows how digital platforms, far from democratising public life, have been adapted to entrench existing hierarchies of power and shield them from accountability.

    As a result, policy decisions are not only swayed by viral public moods but are actively shaped and defended by orchestrated buzzer campaigns, making policymaking increasingly reactive, short-term, and hostile to critical scrutiny.

    Democracy without deliberation?

    To be clear, reactive democracy is not inherently exclusionary. In fact, it often expands participation and strengthens what some scholars call “vertical accountability” from below. It allows citizens—particularly those outside Jakarta or beyond elite circles—to shape national conversations. The ability to film, upload, and amplify grievances in real-time has fostered a new form of political participation—less tied to formal institutions, more rooted in emotional resonance and performative outrage.

    This visibility raises the reputational cost for policymakers who ignore public sentiment. Civil society actors, too, can leverage online momentum to elevate grassroots concerns to national prominence. In many ways, this dynamic has democratised voice. But it has also introduced significant risks.

    The rise of performance politics in Indonesia?

    What does it mean for Indonesia’s political development when elites and voters view democracy in instrumental terms?

    First, reactive governance undermines the predictability and stability that democratic institutions are designed to provide. When policy is shaped by viral outrage, long-term planning becomes difficult. Technocratic expertise may shift from evaluating outcomes to managing narratives. Evidence-based policymaking risks being sidelined by the imperative to act quickly—and visibly.

    Second, not all voices carry equal weight online. Although digital participation is expanding, algorithmic hierarchies still favour particular demographics. Urban, tech-savvy, middle-class users dominate much of the digital space, while rural communities, the elderly, and others on the margins remain underrepresented. What trends online may not reflect a democratic majority—but rather, an emotionally charged, algorithmically curated subset of the public.

    Third, the emotional tone of online discourse can erode the foundation of democratic reasoning. Policies that tackle complex challenges—such as climate change, education reform, or fiscal restructuring—require sustained, inclusive deliberation. These issues rarely go viral. A democracy governed by trending sentiment risks becoming one allergic to difficult truths.

    Fourth, digital discourse is easily manipulated. Political influencers, buzzers, and bots are frequently deployed to manufacture outrage or simulate grassroots support. In such cases, what appears to be “public opinion” may in fact be engineered by vested interests. Reactive governance, then, may end up responding not to the people—but to those who are most skilled at gaming the system.

    Conclusion: toward a more reflective digital democracy

    The rise of reactive democracy in Indonesia reveals a troubling paradox at the heart of its political transformation. On the surface, the digital public sphere appears to have invigorated political participation and enhanced a form of vertical accountability—citizens speaking back to power in real time, holding policymakers to account through viral outrage. Yet beneath this performative responsiveness lies a deeper erosion of institutional strength.

    What appears to be democratic responsiveness is often merely symbolic. Indonesia’s political landscape has become dominated by performance—gestures of attentiveness rather than substantive reform. Policy is increasingly shaped not by careful deliberation or long-term vision, but by what trends online. Public approval is measured in likes and hashtags, not in deliberative consensus. This is accountability in appearance, not in structure.

    Meanwhile, the horizontal and diagonal dimensions of accountability—checks by the judiciary, legislatures, civil society, and investigative media—have weakened significantly in recent years. Formal institutions have been hollowed out or co-opted, and public watchdogs struggle to compete with the speed and spectacle of social media outrage. In this context, digital participation risks distracting from deeper institutional decay, replacing enduring accountability mechanisms with a more volatile and superficial kind.

    Indonesia is not alone in confronting the promises and perils of digital democracy. But the stakes are uniquely high here, where the democratic project has long been shaped by a tension between mass legitimacy and institutional fragility. The challenge is not simply to regulate platforms or improve digital literacy—though these are important steps. It is to fundamentally rethink how democratic accountability is practiced and sustained in the digital age.

    Left unchecked, reactive democracy may lead Indonesia further into a plebiscitary model of governance: one where public input is immediate but shallow, emotionally resonant but policy-thin—ultimately undermining the very institutions needed to support democratic resilience. But if redirected, these new digital dynamics could also be harnessed to strengthen democracy by opening new spaces for deliberation, responsiveness, and inclusion.

    Meeting that challenge requires more than reactive governance. It demands a renewed commitment to building a reflective digital democracy—one that links digital expression to institutional power, and emotional energy to collective reasoning. The task ahead is to ensure that democracy in Indonesia is not only reactive, but also resilient, inclusive, and ultimately, reflective.

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  • Anthony John Stanhope Reid—known to friends, students, and colleagues simply as Tony—passed away on Sunday, 8 June 2025, in Canberra. It was a quiet Sunday, typically devoted to church and reflection with his wife, Helen, his lifelong partner in both scholarship and life. A month earlier, I had an unexpected encounter with Tony in the coffee queue at Canberra Hospital after his oncology consultation. Sitting under the crisp late spring sun, we spoke not about illness but about Helen. “I just want to make sure Helen is taken care of,” he said quietly, deeply concerned she might outlive him.

    Tony Reid’s academic journey began at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, where he was actively involved in the Student Christian Movement. From this early context emerged a progressive intellectual orientation grounded in ideals of social justice and egalitarianism. Unlike many of his contemporaries who focused on Europe or North America, Reid turned decisively toward Southeast Asia—then a marginal region in global scholarship. His aim was not merely to study Southeast Asia but to rewrite its history from within, challenging Eurocentric paradigms and colonial epistemologies. He consistently treated the region not as an object of Western theory but as a generator of knowledge in its own right.

    This epistemological reorientation found its fullest expression in his 1990 magnum opus, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680. In this two-volume work, Reid reconceptualised Southeast Asia as a dynamic and interconnected maritime world, linked by monsoon winds, port cities, commercial exchanges, and religious movements. Rejecting nationalist and colonial historiographies that fragmented the region, he demonstrated that long before European imperialism, Southeast Asia was part of a cosmopolitan and global historical continuum. Through the use of travel accounts, commercial records, and ethnographic detail, Reid uncovered a richly textured world of cultural and economic interdependence.

    Methodologically, Reid was committed to writing history from below. He foregrounded everyday life, material culture, environment, and popular religious practices. His use of early European travel writings and colonial documents was both critical and ethnographic: rather than taking these as objective records, he treated them as refracted lenses through which indigenous societies could be glimpsed—biases and all. In addition, Reid employed economic data such as commodity prices and export statistics to delineate historical turning points, most notably the 17th-century crisis that marked the decline of Southeast Asia’s “Age of Commerce”. His scepticism toward grand, imported theories led him to build grounded historical periodisations based on regional dynamics.

    Although trained within European historiographical traditions, Reid’s ethical and intellectual allegiances were with the marginalized: women, laborers, peasants, diasporic Chinese communities, and adherents of local spiritual traditions. From his doctoral work on anti-colonial resistance in Aceh, completed at Cambridge, to his later studies on Indonesia’s revolution, Reid consistently approached history as a field shaped by the struggles and aspirations of ordinary people. A pivotal moment in this orientation came during his 1966 research trip to Sumatra, where he encountered firsthand the revolutionary fervor and suffering of the local populace. This encounter deeply influenced his 1979 book The Blood of the People, where Reid argued that the 1945–46 Indonesian revolution in Aceh and East Sumatra was a mass social uprising, not merely a political transition orchestrated by elites.

    For Reid, revolution was not just a national event but a profound social rupture with transformative potential. In 2009, he provocatively argued in his book Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia that “Indonesia’s unification as a centralized nation-state (not to mention China’s) would have been impossible without it.” Reid framed revolution as the crucible in which new national legitimacies were forged, particularly in the decolonising world of the mid-20th century. Yet he also acknowledged its paradoxes. As he observed in 2011 in To Nation by Revolution: Indonesia in the 20th Century, post-revolutionary states often invoked revolutionary rhetoric to suppress pluralism and dissent: “Revolution did not deliver all it promised, but it opened up possibilities that were once unthinkable.” For Reid, revolution was both emancipatory and wounding, and its unfinished legacies demanded ongoing critical reflection.

    Fragile paradise: Bali and volcanic threats to our region

    The destruction of centuries past should focus the region on preparing for Indonesia’s next mega-eruption.

    Equally significant was Reid’s institutional legacy. He was not only a prolific scholar but a builder of scholarly communities. At UCLA, he founded the Southeast Asia Center, and later became the founding director of the Asia Research Institute (ARI) at the National University of Singapore. ARI was envisioned as an inclusive intellectual space, deliberately interdisciplinary and intergenerational, designed to encourage critical dialogue across national and theoretical boundaries. For Reid, it was also a site of epistemic experimentation: “ARI is a place where you can see whether your theories make sense from an Asian perspective. But not ruling somebody out just because they don’t know enough about Asia,” he once said. In a field often marked by intellectual gatekeeping, ARI under Reid’s leadership became a rare space of openness and intellectual hospitality.

    Hundreds of young scholars benefitted from Reid’s mentorship. He was never a didactic supervisor but rather an empathetic and generous intellectual interlocutor. He would read long drafts by emerging researchers and offer incisive yet encouraging feedback. He always had time for a thoughtful conversation, whether between academic panels or after a spirited game of tennis. He listened carefully, not to interrogate, but to understand. Above all, Reid remained committed to nurturing a new generation of Southeast Asian scholars—those who would write with intellectual freedom, grounded empathy, and regional insight.

    With his passing, Southeast Asian studies has lost one of its most compelling voices. But Reid’s legacy—his commitment to bottom-up history, to intellectual integrity, and to the dignity of marginalised voices—will continue to shape the field for decades to come. His work reminds us that history is not a tool of power but a space for questioning, understanding, and healing. For Anthony Reid, truth-telling about the past was not a threat to the nation but the foundation of its maturity. In this spirit, he remains a guiding light for scholars committed to writing Southeast Asia from within.

    Farewell, Tony.

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    The post Remembering Anthony Reid (1939–2025) appeared first on New Mandala.

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  • By Scott Waide, RNZ Pacific PNG correspondent

    Two international organisations are leading a call for the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) to elevate the membership status of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) at their upcoming summit in Honiara in September.

    The collective, led by International Parliamentarians for West Papua (IPWP) and International Lawyers for West Papua (ILWP), has again highlighted the urgent need for greater international oversight and diplomatic engagement in the West Papua region.

    This influential group includes PNG’s National Capital District governor Powes Parkop, UK’s former Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn, and New Zealand’s former Green Party MP Catherine Delahunty.

    The ULMWP currently holds observer status within the MSG, a regional body comprising Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS) of New Caledonia.

    A statement by the organisations said upgrading the ULMWP’s membership is “within the remit of the MSG” and requires a consensus among member states.

    They appeal to the Agreement Establishing the MSG, which undertakes to “promote, coordinate and strengthen…exchange of Melanesian cultures, traditions and values, sovereign equality . . . to further MSG members’ shared goals of economic growth, sustainable development, good governance, peace, and security,” considering that all these ambitions would be advanced by upgrading ULMWP membership.

    However, Indonesia’s associate membership in the MSG, granted in 2015, has become a significant point of contention, particularly for West Papuan self-determination advocates.

    Strategic move by Jakarta
    This inclusion is widely seen as a strategic manoeuvre by Jakarta to counter growing regional support for West Papuan independence.

    The ULMWP and its supporters consistently question why Indonesia, as the administering power over West Papua, should hold any status within a forum intended to champion Melanesian interests, arguing that Indonesia’s presence effectively stifles critical discussions about West Papua’s self-determination, creating a diplomatic barrier to genuine dialogue and accountability within the very body meant to serve Melanesian peoples.

    Given Papua New Guinea’s historical record within the MSG, its likely response at the upcoming summit in Honiara will be characterised by a delicate balancing act.

    While Papua New Guinea has expressed concerns regarding human rights in West Papua and supported calls for a UN Human Rights mission, it has consistently maintained respect for Indonesia’s sovereignty over the region.

    Past statements from PNG leaders, including Prime Minister James Marape, have emphasised Indonesia’s responsibility for addressing internal issues in West Papua and have noted that the ULMWP has not met the MSG’s criteria for full membership.

    Further complicating the situation, the IPWP and ILWP report that West Papua remains largely cut off from international scrutiny.

    Strict journalist ban
    A strict ban on journalists entering the region means accounts of severe and ongoing human rights abuses often go unreported.

    The joint statement highlights a critical lack of transparency, noting that “very little international oversight” exists.

    A key point of contention is Indonesia’s failure to honour its commitments; despite the 2023 MSG leaders’ summit urging the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to conduct a human rights mission to West Papua before the 2024 summit, Indonesia has yet to facilitate this visit.

    The IPWP/ILWP statement says the continued refusal is a violation of its obligations as a UN member state.

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • “A lot of people think we’re building unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) to replace the infantry, but that’s just not true.” On the contrary, “Everything we’re doing is about enhancing the combat effectiveness of these people and their jobs.” That was a key message Milrem Robotics delivered when Patrick Shepherd, the company’s Chief Sales Officer, briefed […]

    The post Interview – Patrick Shepherd, Chief Sales Officer, Milrem Robotics appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • Indo Defence 2025, held in Indonesia from 11-14 June, was a busy time for ASELSAN. On 13 June, the Turkish company opened an office in Jakarta, its fourth such office in Asia after previously establishing ones in Malaysia, Pakistan and the Philippines. Meanwhile, ASELSAN signed various accords at Indo Defence 2025, including with PT Len […]

    The post Interview – Ahmet Akyol, President & CEO of Aselsan appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • During the Indo Defence exhibition in Jakarta, South Africa’s Milkor and Indonesia’s PT Dirgantara Indonesia (PTDI) took an important step in strengthening regional defence collaboration by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This new partnership marks a key milestone in advancing Indonesia’s aerospace capabilities, with a strong focus on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It reflects […]

    The post Milkor Announces New Partnership with PT Dirgantara appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • One product that US firm L3Harris was promoting at the Indo Defence 2025 exhibition, held in Jakarta from 11-14 June, was the ALQ-254 Viper Shield, an electronic warfare (EW) suite designed specifically for the F-16 fighter. Speaking to Asian Military Review, Travis Ruhl, Director, International Business Development, Viper Shield Lead & EW SME at L3 […]

    The post L3Harris promotes Viper Shield for Asian F-16 fighter fleets appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.