Category: indonesia

  • Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    West Papuans will peacefully mark the 60th anniversary of the birth of West Papua next week — on Wednesday, December 1.

    It is also the first anniversary of the formation of the United Liberation Movement of West Papua (ULMWP) provisional government.

    “To my people back home and around the world: this is a very significant and important day for us to remember,” said interim president Benny Wenda in a statement today.

    “When the Morning Star [flag] was raised by the New Guinea Council on December 1, 1961, they formed the embryo of the nation.

    Interim ULMWP president Benny Wenda
    Interim president Benny Wenda during the launch of the Green State Vision policy during COP26. Image: ULMWP

    “I call on everyone to celebrate this day through peaceful prayer meetings. To our international solidarity supporters, please use your freedom to show your support for our struggle, wherever you are.

    “Special flag raising ceremonies coordinated by the provisional government will take place in PNG, Vanuatu, the Netherlands, and the UK. I also invite Indonesian solidarity and all Indonesian citizens to pray for us and respect our national day, as we have respected your independence day.”

    Wenda said that on that day “we will remember people in the bush, particularly the thousands displaced by Indonesian military operations in Intan Jaya, Nduga, Puncak Jaya, Maybrat and Oksibil”.

    “We remember the two year old baby killed at the hands of the Indonesian government last month,” he said.

    Plea for ‘watchful eye’
    Wenda called on the world to keep a watchful eye on any human rights violations  in West Papua on December 1.

    “There is often bloodshed carried out by Indonesian military and police. We do not want this – we will be celebrating in a peaceful way,” he said.

    “There is no need to harass, intimidate or attack those who are peacefully praying. I call on the Indonesian government and President to leave us alone on our national day. Our time is coming, and one day we will stand side-by-side as good neighbours.

    “We will also be celebrating the announcements and progress we have made in the last two years, with our constitution, provisional government, cabinet, and recently our Green State Vision for the nation.

    “The ULMWP provisional government has consistently recognised all proclamations made in the history of our struggle by West Papuan leaders before us.

    “With these important steps we have made, I encourage my people to come together in one spirit to celebrate and move us closer to our goal of independence and self-determination for all.

    “We wish peace on West Papua, on Indonesia, the region and the whole world.”

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Recent events in Afghanistan, where the Taliban have retaken political control, have also triggered political concern in Indonesia. This holds true not only in terms of current support and sympathies for the Taliban but also, as Kathryn Robinson explains well, when it comes to the memories of Indonesia’s own past and traumas of radical Islamic rule under the banner of the Darul Islam movement, which started in 1949 and occupied large areas especially in West Java and southern Sulawesi in the late 1950s until the mid-1960s. Kathryn Robinson stresses the cruelty of the Darul Islam forces, which not only introduced polygamy and the infamous hudut-punishments such as stoning for adulterers and amputation of arms for thieves, but which also evicted non-Muslim populations as they feared that they would support the Indonesian Army, Darul Islam’s enemy. This evoking of memories is important if one wants to understand how non-Muslim minorities at a local level perceive globally mediated events, as events in far-away Afghanistan may have concrete meanings in the local contexts elsewhere.

    In my research on indigeneity among the Duri in the highlands of South Sulawesi I frequently came across narratives and memories of the Darul Islam movement, which had one of its strongholds in the area between the Christian Toraja in the north and the Bugis-dominated lowlands in the south. The rugged landscape, ideal for their guerilla warfare, and the fact that the Duri were already Muslims were the most important preconditions allowing Darul Islam rule there for more than a decade. However, their rule would probably less stable there if they would not have enjoyed support of the local population.

    While indigenous organisations often stress traditions such as animist beliefs and traditional political organisation, I expected to find many stories critical of the Darul Islam movement among indigenous activists and in villages now applying for recognition as indigenous communities. After all, the Darul Islam movement not only banned the pre-Islamic features of the Duri’s worldview (known as Aluk Tojolo in Duri and similar to Torajan traditions of, for instance, ancestor worship) but also aimed to destroy all traditional political hierarchies and political institutions that they saw as being at odds with proper Islam. I was, however, surprised to find that local activists belonging to Indonesia’s largest indigenous organisation, AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusanatara, The Indigenous Alliance of the Archipelago), never criticised Darul Islam. Many even defended Darul Islam and its charismatic leader Kahar Muzakar. A critical stance toward Darul Islam would be in line with official state narratives that describe Darul Islam as gerombolan (gangs) and as anti-nationalist troublemakers, although that did change somewhat in post-authoritarian Indonesia.

    The traumas of the period in which Darul Islam ruled the area are still present. Not only is that time remembered as an era of shortages of essential items such as salt or clothes, but also as an era of violence. “The life of a human being,” a local AMAN activist told me “was worth no more than the life of a chicken.” But in contrast to the narratives collected by Kathryn Robinson in Sorowako, many Duri rather blame the Indonesian Army for destroying their houses every time the army found a village that supported Darul Islam troops. During these years of violence and uncertainty, the Duri adapted to a provisional way of life, only building simple houses that could more easily be rebuilt after a raid.

    Despite these difficulties, many local peasants supported Darul Islam troops with their agricultural products, both food and cash crops. Coffee was given to Darul Islam fighters and brought to the port of Palopo in order to sell them. People told me they did this voluntarily as they believed in the Darul Islam movement. In order to understand their support and their still sympathetic views, it is important to consider local history and the rapid social changes experienced in the area in only 50 years, a change which transformed society from a feudal society with slaves and debt bondage to a kind of Islamic socialism.

    Duri History and Social Change

    In 1906, the Dutch gained direct control over what is now the province of South Sulawesi and introduced profound social change. While they cooperated closely with the high ranks of the traditional elite, they not only outlawed slavery but treated all people outside the upper elite equally. The petty nobility were suddenly equal with former slaves. In the years of the brutal Japanese occupation, even this clear-cut distinction between the ruling nobility and all others was erased; all became equally oppressed by the Japanese military regime and were forced into compulsory labour.

    These changes made it possible for local people to imagine equality in terms of social class. A “positive” equality in which local people were not merely equally oppressed, but in which they could actively build a new society was now, against their traditions, something imaginable. In some parts of the Torajan highlands and in the Bugis lowland, the Communist Party expressed such aspirations. Darul Islam and the communists became competitors for peasant support as they both agitated under the banner of social equality. Among the Duri, the idea of social equality was best articulated in terms of Islam. The Darul Islam movement introduced land reform and banned all traditional noble titles and privileges. This ensured the support of many local peasants and made Duri society much more equal—with the important exception of gender relations. This change had some long-lasting effects. Compared to Torajan societies, for instance, traditional elites are nowadays less important in local politics. Post-Darul Islam Duri societies fit much better into indigenous activists’ images of relatively equal social units. However, it is also striking that indigenous activism is much more often led by women in Toraja than in the Duri highlands.

    Another factor important for local support of Darul Islam was that for the Duri, outside forces had often been a threat. The Dutch and Japanese forces may have set some preconditions for making a more egalitarian society imaginable, but they were also forces of heteronomy. As the Indonesian nationalist movement was quite weak in rural Sulawesi in the 1940s, the Indonesian army in the 1950s and 1960s was often perceived as a Javanese army and therefore as another means of alien domination. By contrast, Darul Islam recruited their troops from the local population.

    The anti-traditional rule of the Darul Islam movement had a tremendous impact on indigeneity and the way that it is constructed today among the Duri. In order to get recognition as an indigenous community, AMAN activists have to collect ethnographic data to prove that the community in question is still indigenous.  In such a document prepared by local AMAN activists, for instance, the death penalty for adulteresses was mentioned as a customary law and it is very likely that this was an impact of the Darul Islam movement. This is, however, just portrayed as customary law with no further references by the AMAN activists. Also, there are no references to traditional worldviews of Aluk Tojolo in the ethnographic data collected and represented by AMAN. Rather, indigeneity is always portrayed as Islamic among the Duri. Where rituals are mentioned, it is always made clear that they are conducted in order to worship Allah. When local AMAN activists told me that Darul Islam troops cut down large trees in order to prevent worship of spirits, the activists did not feel that this affected their indigeneity which retrospectively emerges as a pious Islamic indigeneity.

    Disrupting pathways: What awaits rural youth forced home by COVID-19?

    An influx of new ideas might boost rural and coastal sectors, but unemployment looms large too.

    In 2016, the regency of Enrekang, of which the Duri highlands is a part, adopted one of the first local regulations (peraturan daerah) for the recognition of indigenous communities—a necessary step for all communities who want to apply for customary forest custodianship. Initially, this peraturan dearah was rejected by some Islamic groups in Enrekang, including the Islamic PKS party. But local indigenous activists managed to convince these groups that indigeneity is not at odds with Islam. Eventually, all fractions within the local parliament approved the local regulation on the recognition of indigenous communities.

    Nowadays, some women engaged in the indigenous movement in the Duri area use indigeneity as a tool for achieving gender equality, for instance by organising indigenous women in order to ensure that they participate in economic and social activities. But the very idea that society can be organised in an egalitarian way is without doubt also a legacy of the Darul Islam movement. Thus indigeneity, when it emphasises social equality, is a very modern phenomenon: its progressive qualities are rooted in radical social change which emphasises social equality and therefore in a certain way even in the harsh rule of Islamic fundamentalists.

    On the surface, people often said during the research that they supported the Darul Islam movement because it helped them to become better Muslims. But maybe there is more to it than that: being a good Muslim does not only mean not eating pork or performing regular prayers. In the context of Duri societies it also meant that (male) commoners and nobles had equal rights when they abandoned tradition and embraced what Darul Islam perceived as proper Islam. Stoning is without doubt a cruel practice, but the very idea of applying it equally to former nobles and people in debt bondage was revolutionary.

    Sometimes, when I argue with Indonesian friends about the Taliban, it occurs to me that they have something else in mind than I do. The same holds true for Darul Islam and other radical Islamic movements. Where I see the cruel punishment, discrimination against women and violence, they see a political and legal system that provides at least some egalitarian justice in an otherwise corrupt environment. In my universalist view (to which I still subscribe) I believe that I have a crucial point in denouncing the Darul Islam movement. However, in some dark moments I cannot help but admire their political struggle against traditional hierarchies and for social equality. The ongoing mystique of an Islamic state in Indonesia is perhaps rooted, among others, in these powerful political programs of social equality. If that is true, fighting against radicalisation also means providing alternative ways of articulating social demands.

    The post Rethinking memories of Darul Islam appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Suara Papua in Jayapura

    “Since it was first established on November 19, 2008, the West Papua National Committee (KNPB) has always been confronted by many challenges, including attempts at criminalisation and disbandment by the state through the institutions of the TNI [Indonesian military] and Polri [Indonesian police].”


    The above was written by West Papua National Committee KNPB national spokesperson Ones Suhuniap in his notes in the lead up to the 13th anniversary of the KNPB on Friday.

    “Attempts at criminalisation since 2009 until now in 2021 are still being continued through the TNI and Polri,” wrote Suhuniap.

    The first challenge, he said, was the first coordination post at the grave of assassinated independence leader Theys Hiyo Eluay in Sentani, Jayapura regency, which was forcibly dismantled by Indonesian security forces on the orders of the Jayapura regent at the time.

    “Because the fist coordinating post was dismantled on December 30, 2008, in the end the KNPB established the Papua task force headquarters near Bapak [Mr] Theys Eluay’s grave,” he said.

    Following this in 2009, the KNPB was listed by the government as a “terrorist” and “criminal” organisation.

    “Australian academic Dr Jason MacLeod clarified that the KNPB was a civil movement organisation conducting a peaceful urban struggle. In the end, the KNPB’s status as a terrorist and criminal organisation was removed,” said Suhuniap.

    Activists on ‘wanted’ list
    When it was declared a terrorist and criminal organisation, all of the KNPB’s activists were put on the police wanted persons list (DPO). As a consequence, they all sought refuge in the forests, on Abe Mountain, some even hid in Sabron, Jayapura.

    “In the forests on Abe Mountain, the KNPB held its first mass consultation (Mubes) in the jungle,” he said.

    A year later, in 2019, Suhuniap said that the KNPB began promoting its first congress which was eventually held in Sentani.

    “The congress gave birth to three resolutions, including diplomatic unity, Papuan military unity and civilian unity through representative institutions,” he said.

    Attempts at criminalisation did not, however, end. In 2021 the KNPB was again accused of being an anarchist and criminal organisation.

    “Several criminal actions which were part of a plot were concocted, and then KNPB’s chairperson Mako M Tabuni was shot dead by members of the Special Forces (Kopassus) and the Indonesian police at the State Housing Company (Perumnas) 3 complex in Waena. Then Hubertus Mabel was killed by the Indonesian military in Wamena.”

    Suhuniap revealed: “The state through the security forces pushed through a proposal and proposed to the DPRP [Papua Regional House of Representatives], the DPR [House of Representatives] and the Mendagri [Ministry of Home Affairs] that they hold a plenary session to disband the KNPB after the murder of its chairperson and deputy chairperson.”

    Extraprdinary congress
    In the same year, despite pressure from the military, the KNPB held an extraordinary congress (KLB) in Timika.

    “In 2016 the Papua regional police issued a proclamation prohibiting the KNPB from holding demonstrations and proposed to the central government that the KNPB be immediately disbanded,” said Suhuniap.

    None of these efforts by the state made the KNPB retreat a single step.

    Quite the opposite, said Suhuniap, the KNPB defied the regional police’s proclamation by occupying the Papua Mobile Brigade (Brimob) Command Headquarters in Kotaraja on May 1, 2016.

    Despite ongoing mental terror and repression by the security forces and their accomplices, in 2018 the KNPB aggressively built a consolidation until it succeeded in holding the 2nd Congress at the Vietnam Village in the State Housing Company 3 Complex.

    “The second congress gave birth to a political resolution, namely a national civil strike (MSN),” said Suhuniap.

    In 2021 the KNPB was criminalised by blaming them for attacks committed by the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) and incessant propaganda by buzzers accusing the KNPB of wanting to thwart the 20th National Games in Papua.

    Accusations ‘just nonsense’
    “These accusations were just nonsense, because they were indeed not proven,” he said.

    Finally, he said, last week plain clothes police arrived at the home of a resident in the Expo Waena area after hearing that KNPB activists were eating a meal together.

    In the first incident on November 9, police arrived at the home of KNPB general chairperson Agus Kossay who was eating a meal. In the second, on November 13, police returned to the same location and, according to Suhuniap, raided local residents’ homes.

    “Efforts at criminalisation, propaganda and plots which continue to be played out by the colonialists against the KNPB have made us stronger, more confident and even more mature in confronting the challenges of the struggle for West Papua,” said Suhuniap.

    “None of these efforts have made the KNPB retreat from the struggle, rather what has been done by Indonesia against the KNPB has provided the strength to maintain the struggle for West Papua national liberation.”

    KNPB chairperson Warpo Sampari Wetipo said that the KNPB as a media of the West Papuan ordinary people continued to be consistent in its mission of urban civil struggle.

    Right to self-determination
    “Regardless of the attempts and actions by Indonesian security forces against the KNPB it has never broken our spirit of struggle. The KNPB believes in the agenda of the right to self-determination which has been fought for up until now,” he said.

    Wetipo said: “For as long as the Papuan people are not given the democratic space to determine their own future (self-determination), the KNPB will continue to exist throughout the land of Papua.

    “The KNPB has broadened its roots in Papua, from Sorong to Merauke. together with the oppressed people fighting to regain West Papuan independence.”

    Translated by James Balowski for Indoleft News. The original title of the article was “Jelang HUT ke-13, KNPB Konsisten Berjuang”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Suara Papua in Jayapura

    “Since it was first established on November 19, 2008, the West Papua National Committee (KNPB) has always been confronted by many challenges, including attempts at criminalisation and disbandment by the state through the institutions of the TNI [Indonesian military] and Polri [Indonesian police].”


    The above was written by West Papua National Committee KNPB national spokesperson Ones Suhuniap in his notes in the lead up to the 13th anniversary of the KNPB on Friday.

    “Attempts at criminalisation since 2009 until now in 2021 are still being continued through the TNI and Polri,” wrote Suhuniap.

    The first challenge, he said, was the first coordination post at the grave of assassinated independence leader Theys Hiyo Eluay in Sentani, Jayapura regency, which was forcibly dismantled by Indonesian security forces on the orders of the Jayapura regent at the time.

    “Because the fist coordinating post was dismantled on December 30, 2008, in the end the KNPB established the Papua task force headquarters near Bapak [Mr] Theys Eluay’s grave,” he said.

    Following this in 2009, the KNPB was listed by the government as a “terrorist” and “criminal” organisation.

    “Australian academic Dr Jason MacLeod clarified that the KNPB was a civil movement organisation conducting a peaceful urban struggle. In the end, the KNPB’s status as a terrorist and criminal organisation was removed,” said Suhuniap.

    Activists on ‘wanted’ list
    When it was declared a terrorist and criminal organisation, all of the KNPB’s activists were put on the police wanted persons list (DPO). As a consequence, they all sought refuge in the forests, on Abe Mountain, some even hid in Sabron, Jayapura.

    “In the forests on Abe Mountain, the KNPB held its first mass consultation (Mubes) in the jungle,” he said.

    A year later, in 2019, Suhuniap said that the KNPB began promoting its first congress which was eventually held in Sentani.

    “The congress gave birth to three resolutions, including diplomatic unity, Papuan military unity and civilian unity through representative institutions,” he said.

    Attempts at criminalisation did not, however, end. In 2021 the KNPB was again accused of being an anarchist and criminal organisation.

    “Several criminal actions which were part of a plot were concocted, and then KNPB’s chairperson Mako M Tabuni was shot dead by members of the Special Forces (Kopassus) and the Indonesian police at the State Housing Company (Perumnas) 3 complex in Waena. Then Hubertus Mabel was killed by the Indonesian military in Wamena.”

    Suhuniap revealed: “The state through the security forces pushed through a proposal and proposed to the DPRP [Papua Regional House of Representatives], the DPR [House of Representatives] and the Mendagri [Ministry of Home Affairs] that they hold a plenary session to disband the KNPB after the murder of its chairperson and deputy chairperson.”

    Extraprdinary congress
    In the same year, despite pressure from the military, the KNPB held an extraordinary congress (KLB) in Timika.

    “In 2016 the Papua regional police issued a proclamation prohibiting the KNPB from holding demonstrations and proposed to the central government that the KNPB be immediately disbanded,” said Suhuniap.

    None of these efforts by the state made the KNPB retreat a single step.

    Quite the opposite, said Suhuniap, the KNPB defied the regional police’s proclamation by occupying the Papua Mobile Brigade (Brimob) Command Headquarters in Kotaraja on May 1, 2016.

    Despite ongoing mental terror and repression by the security forces and their accomplices, in 2018 the KNPB aggressively built a consolidation until it succeeded in holding the 2nd Congress at the Vietnam Village in the State Housing Company 3 Complex.

    “The second congress gave birth to a political resolution, namely a national civil strike (MSN),” said Suhuniap.

    In 2021 the KNPB was criminalised by blaming them for attacks committed by the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) and incessant propaganda by buzzers accusing the KNPB of wanting to thwart the 20th National Games in Papua.

    Accusations ‘just nonsense’
    “These accusations were just nonsense, because they were indeed not proven,” he said.

    Finally, he said, last week plain clothes police arrived at the home of a resident in the Expo Waena area after hearing that KNPB activists were eating a meal together.

    In the first incident on November 9, police arrived at the home of KNPB general chairperson Agus Kossay who was eating a meal. In the second, on November 13, police returned to the same location and, according to Suhuniap, raided local residents’ homes.

    “Efforts at criminalisation, propaganda and plots which continue to be played out by the colonialists against the KNPB have made us stronger, more confident and even more mature in confronting the challenges of the struggle for West Papua,” said Suhuniap.

    “None of these efforts have made the KNPB retreat from the struggle, rather what has been done by Indonesia against the KNPB has provided the strength to maintain the struggle for West Papua national liberation.”

    KNPB chairperson Warpo Sampari Wetipo said that the KNPB as a media of the West Papuan ordinary people continued to be consistent in its mission of urban civil struggle.

    Right to self-determination
    “Regardless of the attempts and actions by Indonesian security forces against the KNPB it has never broken our spirit of struggle. The KNPB believes in the agenda of the right to self-determination which has been fought for up until now,” he said.

    Wetipo said: “For as long as the Papuan people are not given the democratic space to determine their own future (self-determination), the KNPB will continue to exist throughout the land of Papua.

    “The KNPB has broadened its roots in Papua, from Sorong to Merauke. together with the oppressed people fighting to regain West Papuan independence.”

    Translated by James Balowski for Indoleft News. The original title of the article was “Jelang HUT ke-13, KNPB Konsisten Berjuang”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • By Yance Wenda in Jayapura

    Deputy chair Debora Mote of the Papuan People’s Assembly (MRP) says the Indonesian state’s security forces should be protecting indigenous Papuan women and children, not killed them.

    Mote told a joint conference of the National Commission for Women and the MRP that members of the Indonesian military (TNI) and police’s task was to protect the people, including indigenous Papuan women and children in and outside conflict areas.

    The TNI and police must respect the guarantees for the protection of Papuan women and children as stipulated in Special Regional Regulation No. 1/2011 on the Restoration of the Rights of Papuan Women Victims of Violence and Human Rights Violations, she said.

    “There is the Special Regional Regulation No. 1/2011 on the Restoration of the Rights of Papuan Women Victims of Violence and Human Rights Violations,” said Mote.

    “We hope that TNI and police are not allergic [to such a regulation]. The regulation gives a warning that instruments of the state are used to protect the people, not the other way around.”

    Mote said that cases of violence inflicted by the security forces against Papuan women and children should push the MRP and the Papuan Legislative Council to further encourage the implementation of the special regional regulation.

    Such an effort was important to ensure that violence against civilians in Papua did not recur, she said.

    Protection key to future generations
    She added that the protection of indigenous Papuan women and children would determine future generations.

    “It is women, not men, who bear and give birth to the next generation. If there are children, then the children will carry on the ancestry, and inherit them,” said Mote.

    A youth representative of the Evangelical Church in Indonesia (GIDI), Eneko Pahabol, regretted the conflicts and violence that continued to occur in Papua and to take a toll on indigenous Papuan women and children.

    Pahabol asked why the conflict was allowed to happen.

    “It’s as if one takes advantage of the armed conflict. I, as the next generation, who inherited the suffering of my parents, ask [the warring parties] to end the violent conflict completely and peacefully,” said Pahabol.

    Republished with permission.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Although religious radicalism potentially could cause many problems in society, the issue has been contentious in Indonesia. Some people believe that radicalism is a myth created by “the West”. For them, the term radicalism has a negative implication to discredit Muslims and to conquer Islam. According to this view, Western governments often apply a double standard when they deal with Muslims (Sihbudi, 2002)

    However, suicide bombings that have occurred in Indonesia in recent decades, such as in Bali (2002 and 2004), the Australian Embassy (2004), the JW Marriot Hotel Jakarta (2009), Cirebon (2010), Surabaya (2018), Mako Brimob Depok (2018) and other places prove that radicalism is not a myth. Testimony from one of the Bali bombers, in which he described the group’s scenario for a suicide bombing, proved this fact.

    Ali Imron explained in detail how his group persuaded and recruited bombers to conduct the suicide bombing using a car, a motorbike and a explosives vest. He surveyed locations to find where foreigners most often gathered. He asserted that the Bali bomb was a counterattack in response to the USA and its allies invading Afghanistan. Imron added that his group is responsible for serial acts of terror in Indonesia. As Sidney Jones asserts, the threat of terrorism and radicalism in Indonesia is a real fact, even if there are  few who are radical and committed to using violence.

    Ideology has contributed to the rise of religious radicalism. Some view it as the responsibility of Indonesian Muslims to join the struggle to Islamise the secular government and system. Radical groups such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI-Islamic Defenders Front), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI-Indonesia Islamic Warrior’s Council), and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI-The Party of Liberation) are active and influential in promoting their ideology to society, under the protection of the right to freedom of expression. Alvara Research Consulting’s survey in 2017 found that one in five students supports the formation of a caliphate to change the system of Indonesian government. This survey of 4,200 Muslims students showed that nearly one in four students was ready to join the struggle to establish such a caliphate.

    There are also social factors in the rise of religious radicalism in Indonesia. People can be radicalised when living as a minority group and frequently received discriminatory treatment from the majority. Muslims living in regions where they are a minority religion were radicalised into violence with their Christian neighbours, which then escalated to the point where some groups called for other Muslims to travel to the Moluccas and Poso to wage jihad on Christians.

    Political factors have also been a source of rising religious radicalism in Indonesia. Even though the founding fathers agreed that Indonesia is a neutrally religious state and must protect all citizens, some politicians deny this and play on their religious identity. Some parties and religious organisations in Indonesia actively campaign against candidates based solely on their religion, demanding voters not elect non-Muslim leaders. The has been a serious problem in Indonesia since the reformation era. In several regions, governors and mayors have agreed to formally implement sharia bylaws in regional law to boost their Islamic credentials ahead of elections. This political strategy can exacerbate religious radicalism because the laws position Muslims as a majority group with special rights. Utilising these laws as justification, fanatical religious groups often discriminate against minority groups. These groups will be increasingly radicalised because they have more room and legitimacy for their violent actions. The experience of Pakistan and Afghanistan, which rigidly implement shariah bylaws resulting in increasing prominence, should be taken into account. In both countries, women and minority groups became second class citizens and were discriminated against by state and radical groups.

    Social media is also often used to broadcast hoax information that contributes to the rise of religious radicalism. For example, during the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, radical groups which supported Anies Baswedan-Sandiaga Uno published a statement that Muslims who supported Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok)-Djarot Saiful Hidayat could be categorised as the enemy of Islam.

    Although radicalism and terrorism cannot be equated, they are closely related. Maarif (2002) and Ghufron (2017) have argued (separately) that radicalism is related to how people understand and express their religion, and terrorism is committed to using violence for political purposes. However, radicalism can turn into terrorism, and people who are followers of radical groups are targeted by terrorist recruiters. As a consequence, if government and society do not pay serious attention to radical groups, they may find they cooperate with terrorist groups instead.

    What happens when Islamists win power locally in Indonesia?

    Does Islamist rule in lower branches of government affect relations between religious groups?

    Furthermore, terrorist groups target recruitment at younger generations. Radical groups often disseminate their ideology in senior high schools and universities. Recently, authorities detained several students in the State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta for allegedly being involved in bombing and other violent actions. Moreover, the phenomena of suicide bombers, in Serpong (2011), the exposure of NII’s network (Negara Islam Indonesia-the Islamic State of Indonesia), and bombers of JW Marriot hotel (2009) and the perpetrators of the Klaten bomb (2011) shows they are often young people from schools and universities.

    In several cases, radical groups have infiltrated universities and schools. Radical groups also recruited young generations from several places such as mosques. The young generation is becoming the main target of radical groups because they are in a transitional period, forming their identity and being easily influenced by others. They are susceptible to the ideologies of radical groups which use the internet as the tool of propaganda.

    Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Perdamaian’s (Research Institute on Islam and Peace, LAKIP) study in 2010 showed this in its survey of 10 areas in Jakarta at the end of 2010. This survey found that more than 50% of high school students agree that the use of violence is justified in Islamic teaching. They believe that Muslims are permitted to use violence to defend Islam. They agree that the use of violence against people who insult Islam is a legitimate action. The survey also showed that 21 % of teachers stated that the state ideology of Pancasila is no longer relevant. MAARIF Institute’s 2011 research mapping the problems of radicalism in the State Senior High Schools in 4 areas (Pandeglang, Cianjur, Yogyakarta, and Solo) also confirmed these findings. The research, conducted in 50 schools, revealed that schools have become the arena in which to disseminate ideology. Because the schools are so open, radical groups have exploited this opportunity to spread their ideas and widen their networks. As a result, many students’ understanding of Islam has become more monolithic, and they easily blame others for social, economic, and political problems that they perceive to jeopardise Muslims.

    The rise of religious radicalism can trigger conflict in society. For radical groups, society is divided into “us” and “them”. Groups that reject radical ideas will be classified as “them”. Because of their demarcation from other groups in society conflicts occurs. The application of the doctrine “us vs. them” also contributes to increasing intolerance of religious minority groups. Ahmadiya and Shi’ah groups often became the target of violent actions by radical groups. A series of attacks against Ahmadiya and Shi’ah followers have occurred in many areas in Indonesia. Christians have also been prevented from  building houses of worship in some areas. Maarif argues that the “us and them” paradigm is contradictory to Islamic values, and based on an archaic historical contexts.

    It is time for the Indonesian government to pay serious attention to the slippage between radicalism and terrorism, and the mechanism that terrorists use to recruit others to their ideologies. Otherwise it risks to the consequences of a rise in religious violence.

    The post Rising religious radicalism in Indonesia: roots and shoots appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Penerjemah: Putri Nurul A’La – postgraduate student at Monash University. Tulisan ini telah diterbitkan disini dalam Bahasa Inggris.

    Dalam waktu dekat, ada kemungkinan bahwa Indonesia akan melarang semua aktivitas seksual di luar pernikahan heteronormatif. Ini akan menjadi langkah radikal bagi sebuah negara yang tidak pernah mengkriminalisasi homoseksualitas, karena hubungan seksual atas keputusan bersama (suka sama suka) selama ini dianggap sebagai urusan individu, bukan urusan negara.

    ‘Krisis LGBT’ pada tahun 2016 dan RUU Ketahanan Keluarga yang diusulkan di tahun 2020 (keduanya akan dibahas di bawah) adalah petunjuk nyata tentang arah yang diambil Indonesia dalam hal penghukuman pengawasan seksual. Tetapi anteseden dari gerakan-gerakan ini—yang secara kolektif dapat kita sebut sebagai perubahan moral Indonesia—jauh lebih dalam dan dapat ditelusuri ke tahun-tahun awal reformasi demokrasi.

    Perjalanan singkat pasca-demokrasi Indonesia memberi harapan bahwa hak-hak seksual dan reproduksi akan dilindungi. Namun, Indonesia justru semakin beralih ke arah pengaturan moral kehidupan masyarakat secara mendalam dan bersifat menghukum.

    Penggunaan istilah “moral turn” atau perubahan moral adalah cara yang tepat untuk mengungkap tren ini. Perubahan moral di Indonesia memiliki banyak kesamaan dengan illeberal turn (perubahan ke arah tidak liberal), “perubahan ke arah konservatif”, dan “perubahan ke arah otoriter”. Hal ini juga dapat dianggap sebagai bagian kecil dari tren yang lebih besar. “Moral turn” adalah cara menyatukan serangkaian perubahan yang terjadi di seluruh nusantara terkait hal-hal yang secara luas dianggap sebagai patokan moral.

    Pada dasarnya, moralitas adalah sifat moral yang berkenaan dengan penyaringan yang benar dari yang salah, yang baik dari yang buruk. Saat etika dapat dikodifikasikan dalam undang-undang (contohnya, dalam Kode Etik), moralitas seringkali berkaitan dengan aspek yang lebih pribadi. Sebagai contoh, banyak orang mungkin menganggap perzinahan sebagai tindakan tidak bermoral (hal yang buruk), tetapi hanya sedikit negara yang memasukkan orang ke penjara karena hal tersebut. Masalah moral juga sering dianggap tidak pasti—tidak ada yang jelas benar atau salah. Misalnya, penggunaan narkotika yang mungkin menjadi masalah moral karena sebagian orang menganggapnya sebagai sesuatu yang dapat diterima, sedangkan yang lain tidak.

    Fokus kajian ini terletak pada moralitas seksual, khususnya upaya-upaya di Indonesia dalam membingkai seks di luar nikah sebagai hal yang sangat tidak bermoral sehingga harus dikriminalisasi. Apa yang menjadi pendorong pergeseran moral di Indonesia? Meskipun ada banyak, kajian ini hanya membahas 4 hal: agama, pendidikan, politik, dan sosial. Kombinasi hal diatas dan faktor-faktor lainnya telah menciptakan keadaan kritis yang memposisikan moralitas, terutama moralitas seksual, sebagai titik di mana kesejahteraan nasional Indonesia dianggap oleh banyak orang sebagai tempat bergantung.

    Bukti perubahan moral

    Bagi banyak pengamat, tanda pertama yang jelas dari perubahan moral adalah pengesahan UU Pornografi 2008, yang diterbitkan bukan secara kebetulan, namun tepat dua tahun setelah dirilisnya edisi perdana majalah Playboy. Meskipun undang-undang yang berlaku merupakan versi yang lebih lunak dari versi aslinya, undang-undang tersebut masih sangat membatasi ekspresi seksual. Misalnya, Pasal 1 dari 45 menyatakan bahwa pornografi adalah “gambar… percakapan, gerak tubuh… di muka umum yang memuat kecabulan atau eksploitasi seksual yang melanggar norma kesusilaan dalam masyarakat.” Dengan definisi yang seluas ini, tak heran jika hukum tersebut telah digunakan untuk mempersekusi lesbian, gay, biseksual dan transgender (LGBT) di Indonesia.

    Walaupun UU Pornografi menjadi momen penting dalam perubahan moral Indonesia, dasar dari perubahan ini ditetapkan pada awal tahun 2000-an. Terbukti pada tahun 2004, berbagai provinsi di seluruh Indonesia telah memanfaatkan desentralisasi untuk menerapkan hukum keras terhadap seksualitas. Palembang, misalnya, menjadi salah satu dari sekian banyak provinsi yang mengkriminalisasi prostitusi, dan menurut pemahaman penulis, hukum tersebut telah ditafsirkan sebagai pendefinisian homoseksualitas sebagai tindakan prostitusi. Tren ini berlanjut selama sisa dekade tersebut.

    Walaupun contoh nyata dari perubahan moral lebih sulit dideteksi antara tahun 2010 dan 2015, peristiwa yang terjadi secara keseluruhan menunjukkan adanya tekanan moral yang jelas. Pemeriksaan dua peristiwa yang berkaitan dengan Polisi Wanita (polwan) adalah ilustrasi yang akan membantu penjelasan lebih lanjut.

    Perempuan telah menjadi bagian dari kepolisian Indonesia sejak tahun 1948. Namun pada tahun 2005, untuk pertama kalinya, polwan dilarang mengenakan jilbab saat bertugas. Pada tahun 2013, polwan Muslim dan pendukungnya  memenangkan hak berjilbab saat bertugas, dengan memanfaatkan wacana hak asasi manusia.

    Tepat setahun setelah peristiwa ini, Human Rights Watch melaporkan adanya praktik  tes keperawanan yang sedang berlangsung khusus untuk perempuan sebagai bagian dari perekrutan polisi. Beberapa polwan secara terbuka menyuarakan kebencian terhadap praktik yang telah berlangsung setidaknya sejak tahun 1965. Namun, banyak juga yang bangga akan hal tersebut, dengan alasan bahwa tes ini adalah cara untuk membuktikan moralitas seksual. Disertifikasi sebagai seseorang yang memiliki moral seksual, polwan pun kemudian memposisikan diri mereka secara tak terbantahkan sebagai pihak yang mampu mengawasi moralitas seksual di antara warga negara.

    Secara bersamaan, peristiwa-peristiwa ini merupakan indikasi dari perubahan moral yang sedang berlangsung di Indonesia antara tahun 2010 dan 2015. Sebagai contoh, para polwan dan pendukungnya memperjuangkan hak bercadar karena merasa bahwa bercadar adalah cara mereka untuk menunjukkan moral diri. Demikian pula, fakta bahwa tes keperawanan masih dipraktikkan selama perekrutan polisi, dikombinasikan dengan fakta bahwa beberapa polwan mendukungnya (dan hanya sedikit yang secara terbuka menyatakan penentangan terhadap hal ini), menunjukkan bahwa moralitas berperan penting. Polwan wajib menunjukkan bahwa mereka bermoral dan dapat melindungi moralitas mereka.

    Tahun 2016 mungkin menjadi tahun yang paling diingat untuk dua peristiwa yang tidak saling terkait dalam hal perubahan moral Indonesia: ‘krisis LGBT’, dan persidangan penistaan agama oleh  Gubernur Jakarta Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (yang lebih dikenal sebagai Ahok).

    Banyaknya hal yang telah ditulis tentang kedua peristiwa ini, memperjelas terjadinya pertumbuhan eksponensial dalam fokus moralitas Indonesia. Singkatnya, ‘krisis LGBT’  membuat acara radio dan TV dilarang menayangkan program yang menampilkan identitas LGBT sebagai pribadi yang ‘normal’, terjadinya penolakan dana PBB yang dialokasikan untuk mendukung komunitas LGBT, dan banyak protes anti-LGBT yang tidak diganggu oleh polisi. Peristiwa-peristiwa tersebut merupakan intervensi paling sengit selama paruh pertama tahun 2016.

    Protes anti-LGBT kemungkinan tenggelam akibat demo anti-Ahok yang dilaporkan dihadiri oleh sekitar setengah juta orang. Namun demonstrasi ini memperjelas bahwa segala sesuatu yang ditafsirkan bertentangan dengan Islam, baik itu homoseksualitas maupun penistaan agama, kini menjadi sasaran aksi kekerasan yang sah.

    Pada akhir tahun 2016, ilusi pemisahan negara, agama dan seksualitas telah hancur. Pada tahun 2017, Mahkamah Konstitusi Indonesia dengan tegas menolak petisi untuk menjadikan seks di luar nikah ilegal dengan suara 5 banding 4. Pengadilan menolak petisi tersebut dengan catatan bahwa perubahan tersebut berada di luar kewenangan mereka, dan menyarankan agar petisi tersebut diajukan ke parlemen. Kesimpulannya adalah Pengadilan bukan tidak setuju dengan petisi itu sendiri, melainkan memutuskan bahwa hal tersebut di luar yurisdiksi mereka.

    Pada tahun 2019, revisi sebanyak 628 pasal yang terkandung dalam KUHP Indonesia diperdebatkan. Revisi yang diusulkan termasuk mengkriminalisasi seks konsensual di luar nikah, meningkatkan hukuman untuk penghinaan terhadap agama Islam dan Presiden, dan melemahkan kekuasaan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK). Di luar Indonesia, usulan revisi tersebut kemudian dikenal sebagai RUU Bonking Bali. Ketika RUU itu ditunda oleh Presiden Joko Widodo sebagai tanggapan atas ribuan orang yang menentangnya, tampaknya hanya ada sedikit protes terhadap revisi terkait seksualitas. Dengan kata lain, masyarakat melakukan protes terhadap melemahnya tindakan anti-korupsi, bukan menentang potensi kriminalisasi seks di luar nikah. Sampai saat ini, tidak ada informasi tentang apakah atau kapankah revisi tersebut akan disahkan.

    Pada tahun 2020, sebuah proposal lanjutan yang mendorong untuk mengkriminalisasi aktivitas seksual di luar nikah diajukan, yang dikenal dengan RUU Ketahanan KeluargaDiusulkan juga serentetan absurditas lainnya seperti mengamanatkan bahwa seorang istri dan suami harus saling mencintai. Pada saat penulisan, masa depan RUU ini tidak jelas.

    Sementara itu, RUU Progresif Anti Kekerasan Seksual terhenti di parlemen. RUU ini seharusnya dapat  mengkriminalisasi kekerasan seksual tetapi pihak lawan berhasil mematahkan pendapat tersebut dengan mengatakan bahwa pengesahan RUU ini hanya akan menghancurkan keharmonisan pernikahan dan mendorong pergaulan bebas. Bagaimana RUU itu akan mendorong pergaulan bebas masih tidak jelas, tetapi pendapat yang muncul adalah jika kekerasan seksual dibuat ilegal, maka semua kekerasan seksual akan terhenti, sehingga perempuan (dan laki-laki) tidak perlu lagi menahan diri secara seksual.

    Dampak dari perubahan moral tersebut berefek sangat buruk, dan tidak hanya kaum LGBT yang menjadi sasaran utama. Ibu-ibu yang menikah secara heteroseksual, yaitu kelompok yang dianggap sebagai warga negara yang paling bermoral, juga terkena dampak negatif. Contohnya, terjadi peningkatan yang mengkhawatirkan dalam jumlah infeksi HIV di kalangan ibu-ibu menikah yang seharusnya berisiko rendah. Warga negara asing (WNA) pun juga terkena dampaknya, karena guru WNA tampaknya dipaksa untuk melakukan tes untuk mengungkap apakah mereka homoseksual.

    Jelas bahwa Indonesia telah mengalami perubahan moral yang berkepanjangan dan semakin intens. Apa yang mendorongnya?

    Pendorong perubahan moral

    Satu-satunya pendorong paling jelas dari perubahan moral Indonesia adalah meningkatnya kekuatan dan pengaruh Islam konservatif. Namun kehadiran pendorong lainnya juga memungkinkan terjadinya amplifikasi Islam. Karena dalam banyak kasus, pendorong lain ini menggunakan Islam hanya untuk memenuhi tujuan mereka yang tidak liberal. Di bawah ini penulis menyajikan diskusi singkat tentang empat faktor pendorong perubahan moral.

    Agama sebagai faktor pendorong

    Ketika Ma’ruf Amin, mantan ketua Majelis Ulama Islam konservatif, diangkat sebagai Wakil Presiden Indonesia pada tahun 2019, represi lebih lanjut terhadap hak-hak seksual dan reproduksi tampaknya tak terelakkan. Sementara Presiden Joko Widowo perlu meyakinkan bahwa Ma’ruf adalah orang yang tepat untuk kampanye presiden kedua kalinya. Dua dekade reformasi demokrasi ironisnya telah menciptkan kondisi di mana Ma’ruf secara sempurna menyeimbangkan tiket nasionalis-Islamis.

    Meski Islam telah terbebas dari pembatasan yang diterapkan Presiden Suharto (1965-1998), kepresidenan di tahun-tahun awal reformasi tetap mempertahankan pemisahan yang hati-hati antara negara dan agama. Namun, kepresidenan Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014), memberikan peluang bagi pengaruh Islam untuk tumbuh. Pengesahan UU Penistaan Agama oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi pada tahun 2010—dan dukungan dari organisasi Muslim serta partai politik yang sebelumnya dianggap nasionalis, termasuk Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono—memperkecil jurang pemisah antara Islam dan politik nasionalis.

    Pada saat pemilihan presiden 2019, dan setelah persidangan kasus penistaan agama oleh Ahok, kredensial Islam terbukti penting untuk elektabilitas. Ma’ruf merupakan kandidat terunggul.

    Tokoh agama terkemuka yang mendorong perubahan moral dalam ruang politik sudah sejak lama mendapat dukungan dari kelompok-kelompok Islam berpengaruh yang bekerja di luar politik. Sebagian besar dari mereka diuntungkan dengan aliran dana yang besar dari Saudi. Sementara itu kelompok-kelompok militan seperti Front Pembela Islam (FPI) telah mengerahkan kekuatan, terlihat dari bangkitnya Aliansi Cinta Keluarga (AILA) yang bermartabat yang menjadi pendorong utama perubahan moral Indonesia. Narasi AILA untuk membangun keluarga yang kuat melalui kriminalisasi seksualitas non-nikah sebagian telah berhasil karena gerakan tersebut mengkooptasi orang-orang berpengaruh, seperti profesor-profesor di universitas. Pengaruh AILA menunjukkan adanya pertumbuhan intoleransi dan bahwa Muslim konservatif yang berpendidikan menggunakan posisi/kekuasaan untuk mendorong perubahan moral. Sistem pendidikan Indonesia pun ikut berkontribusi dalam hal ini.

    Pendidikan sebagai faktor pendorong

    Pada tahun 2013, Indonesia menerapkan kurikulum baru dengan banyak tujuan yang patut dipuji, termasuk menghasilkan warga negara masa depan yang toleran, peka terhadap permasalahan sosial, demokratis, dan bertanggung jawab. Namun, jika digali lebih dalam, terungkap banyak kontradiksi dan memperjelas bahwa sistem pendidikan Indonesia secara umum tidak banyak menghasilkan warga negara yang toleran. Dalam pelajaran agama, misalnya, tujuan umum dari pembelajaran ini tampaknya untuk meningkatkan ketakwaan, bukan meningkatkan toleransi. Pendidikan di lingkungan pesantren bahkan cenderung menghasilkan lulusan yang kurang toleran, terutama karena para santri memiliki sedikit kesempatan untuk berinteraksi dengan orang non-Muslim.

    Kekhawatiran lebih lanjut adalah fakta bahwa pendukung utama kriminalisasi seksualitas non-nikah ditemukan di eselon tertinggi universitas negeri,  posisi-posisi yang melegitimasi homofobia yang mereka miliki. Tanpa rasa toleransi yang mendalam dan rasa hormat terhadap perbedaan, mahasiswa lulus dengan merasa berhak untuk mendiskriminasi orang-orang yang dianggap tidak bermoral.

    Unravelling gender-Based violence in Southeast Asia

    It is essential for governments, together with grassroots communities and academia, to actively educate society.

    Faktor pendidikan lainnya yang mendorong perubahan moral adalah rendahnya kualitas pendidikan kesehatan reproduksi dan seksual di Indonesia. Tersebarnya informasi yang keliru jelas terlihat pada tahun 2020 ketika sebuah komisi di Indonesia secara terbuka menyatakan bahwa jenis sperma super bisa menghamili wanita yang sedang berenang di kolam renang umum. Informasi yang keliru seperti ini secara tidak sadar mendorong moralitas seksual untuk diawasi di tingkat nasional.

    Politik sebagai faktor pendorong

    Tahun-tahun awal reformasi demokrasi di Indonesia mengisyaratkan harapan akan hak-hak seksual. Komnas HAM diberi kekuasaan yang lebih besar dan Komnas Anti Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan diresmikan. Namun, salah satu ironi dari demokrasi adalah bahwa ketika hak-hak minoritas secara teoritis dilindungi, ada ruang khusus yang dibuat untuk penyebaran kebencian dan kekerasan.

    Setelah dua dekade demokrasi berlalu, Indonesia menyaksikan stagnasi demokrasi  bahkan kemunduran demokrasi yang didorong oleh elit politik dan anti-reformis, di mana banyak di antaranya telah muncul kembali dari struktur kekuasaan sebelumnya. Dua pendorong perubahan moral yang relevan dalam hal ini: populisme dan inovasi otoriter.

    Populisme tampaknya mendominasi lanskap politik kontemporer Indonesia. Dengan menggunakan karakteristiknya, mereka yang memiliki kekuasaan, pengaruh, dan  mereka yang berusaha mencapainya, telah memposisikan orang yang melakukan hubungan seks di luar nikah sebagai musuh yang tidak bermoral. Orang-orang yang tidak bermoral adalah yang anti-Pancasila dan mereka membentuk “faceless movement” (sebuah gerakan tanpa identitas jelas) yang berbahaya hingga mengobarkan proxy war (perang proksi) yang melawan keluarga dan maskunlinitas dalam upaya memecah belah keutuhan bangsa. Nostalgia akan stabilitas pra-demokrasi dimanfaatkan untuk mengarahkan kecemasan yang mendalam terhadap orang-orang yang “tidak bermoral”.

    Penggunaan retorika populis untuk membingkai dan memfitnah “orang yang tidak bermoral” telah mencapai daya tarik yang luar biasa, sebagian karena inovasi otoriter, di mana nilai-nilai demokrasi di Indonesia terkooptasi untuk membantu tujuan yang tidak liberal. Melalui cara yang serupa dengan kooptasi feminisme oleh neoliberalisme, mereka yang berkuasa telah mengubah praktik otoriter untuk dijual kepada warga negara yang masih mendukung demokrasi.

    Perubahan moral ini penuh dengan inovasi otoriter. Sebagai contoh, diskusi tentang komunitas LGBT sebagian telah beralih dari retorika penganiayaan ke diskusi yang mengalir dengan kepedulian, rehabilitasi, dan belas kasihan yang demokratis. Usulan untuk melarang seks di luar nikah dibingkai lewat keprihatinan terhadap anak-anak, terutama melindungi anak-anak dari pedofil. Pembingkaian keprihatinan ini diposisikan berdasarkan hak-hak demokrasi anak. Pembingkaian yang tampaknya progresif seperti ini telah dikendalikan oleh media sosial, salah satu pendorong utama lainnya dari perubahan moral Indonesia.

    Sosial sebagai faktor pendorong

    Faktor sosial, termasuk media sosial, memainkan peran utama sebagai pendorong perubahan moral Indonesia. Dengan 40 persen dari 270 juta penduduk Indonesia yang menjadi pengguna aktif media sosial, faktor pendorong ini sangatlah signifikan, termasuk di kalangan wanita yang taat beragama. Walaupun media sosial memiliki potensi untuk mempromosikan tujuan progresif, penggunaan media sosial di Indonesia sering kali bertentangan dengan kesetaraan dan keadilan sosial.

    Tagar Twitter yang trending pada tahun 2016 #TolakLGBT menunjukkan betapa berbahayanya hal ini. Terbukti sepanjang tahun 2016 lanskap media sosial dipenuhi dengan ujaran kebencian terhadap kaum LGBT. Platform media sosial yang pernah memberikan ruang bagi kaum LGBT untuk menjadi dirinya sendiri diblokir oleh pemerintah, demikian juga dengan kata-kata seperti pelakor, serta surat kabar mahasiswa yang mengarang kisah cinta lesbian. Sekali dipermalukan di media sosial, maka tak ada cara untuk menghapus catatan permanen tersebut.

    Faktor sosial lebih lanjut yang mendorong perubahan moral di Indonesia berkaitan dengan pembingkaian pribadi yang bermoral—baik dari cara orang menampilkan diri sebagai orang yang bermoral maupun apa yang membuat orang lain menilai orang tersebut sebagai pribadi yang bermoral (atau tidak). Penanda moralitas terukir jelas di tubuh wanita, Jilbab merupakan salah satu penanda yang paling diperdebatkan.

    Terkadang seorang wanita yang bercadar secara otomatis dianggap sebagai orang yang bermoral, tetapi di lain waktu jilbab menandai seseorang sebagai tidak bermoral. Misalnya, di Prancis di mana beberapa jenis cadar dilarang, seorang wanita bercadar dapat dilihat bertentangan dengan norma nasional atau dianggap sebagai korban dari keinginan suaminya untuk mengendalikannya.

    Di Indonesia, jilbab menjadi penanda moral seorang wanita. Pada tahun 2014, sebuah survei menunjukkan bahwa 64 persen wanita Indonesia mengenakan jilbab; jika dilihat dari pengamatan sederhana saja sekarang, pasti persentasenya lebih tinggi. Ada banyak cara lain yang juga harus dilakukan orang Indonesia agar dianggap bermoral. Contohnya, kelompok swadaya yang mengajari masyarakat, terutama wanita, tentang bagaimana cara menampilkan diri mereka sebagai warga negara yang bermoral. Lebih jauh lagi, penceramah kondang juga mendorong bagaimana caranya berpenampilan dan berperilaku sesuai moral. Kebiasan baru dalam mengkonsumsi hal yang mencolok seperti jenis pakaian Islami, mendorong tampilan moralitas publik. Pesan yang selalu digemakan: orang yang bermoral adalah orang yang saleh dan tidak pernah melakukan hubungan seks di luar nikah.

    Perubahan moral

    Sejak awal reformasi demokrasi, sudah terdapat bukti yang jelas tentang perubahan moral di Indonesia yang kemudian berkembang pesat dan menuai berbagai kritik pedas. Hantaman dari berbagai sisi memaksa terjadinya perubahan ini. Faktor agama, pendidikan, politik, dan sosial sama pentingnya dengan faktor lainnya, seperti hukum, kesenjangan, dan globalisasi. Saat Islam konservatif disebut-sebut sebagai penyebab perubahan moral, pada kenyataannya, semua faktor yang disebutkan di atas telah ikut serta dalam memotivasi dan memungkinkan terjadinya perubahan moral.

    Perubahan ini berujung pada kriminalisasi seks di luar nikah; seks di luar nikah telah menjadi penanda utama tindakan asusila. Tentu masyarakat telah menemukan cara untuk menciptakan ruang aman, tetapi hal ini semakin dibatasi dan hukuman-hukuman pun diterbitkan. Pada awal reformasi demokrasi di Indonesia tahun 1998, satu pertanyaan yang benar adalah, “Apakah moralitas akan menjadi masalah pribadi atau masalah negara/kriminal?” Dua dekade telah berlalu, dan jawaban atas pertanyaan ini tampaknya adalah yang kedua.

    The post Apa yang mendorong perubahan moral Indonesia? appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • The family of Australian-based Indonesian human rights lawyer Veronica Koman.have been the target of two recent attacks in Indonesia, reports Susan Price.

    This post was originally published on Green Left.

  • Pacific Media Watch newsdesk

    The Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) has appealed to news media that reported on intimidation against the parents and relatives of human rights lawyer Veronica Koman to immediately make corrections.

    Some media have revealed the identity and addresses exposing them to further violence, reports Tabloid Jubi in Jayapura.

    The plea comes amid many protests among civil society groups about the harassment and the London-based Indonesian human rights organisation TAPOL condemned the increasing threats and attacks against Koman’s family in Jakarta.

    Koman, a prominent advocate for West Papuan human rights, lives in Australia in self-imposed exile.

    AJI chairman Sasminto Madrim said that mentioning the identity, names, and addresses of Koman’s family members in the news would lead to further “terrorism” acts.

    “Regarding the news that reveals the identity of Veronica Koman’s family, we want to convey that there is no news worth a life,” Madrim said during an online media conference.

    “The safety of the informants is paramount.”

    Journalism code of ethics
    Article 2 of Indonesia’s Journalism Code of Ethics (KEJ) reads: “Indonesian journalists use professional methods in carrying out journalistic duties.”

    Madrim said that “being professional’ meant respecting the privacy of the source in certain cases, such as victims of terrorism, violence, or sexual violence.

    Madrim further mentioned Article 10, which says: “Indonesian journalists immediately retract, rectify, and correct false and inaccurate news accompanied by apologies to readers, listeners, or viewers.”

    In London, TAPOL issued a statement saying that is was “deeply concerned” about a series of escalating threats and attacks made against Koman’s family in Jakarta.

    “These threats and attacks indicate a worsening situation for human rights lawyers and defenders in Indonesia, with other prominent human rights defenders being subjected to police investigations,” TAPOL said.

    “The incidents against Koman’s family have in recent weeks involved an arson attack outside the house of her parents on October 24.

    Explosive device
    “Two weeks later, on Sunday, November 7, assailants left an explosive device outside her parents’ house. A package containing a dead chicken was also sent to a different relative, with a note stating that ‘anyone who helps to hide Veronica Koman will end up like this’.

    “TAPOL is concerned that, particularly in Koman’s case, the police are responsible for conducting an investigation into the attacks on the family but had also previously paid unsolicited visits to the same family residence in Jakarta.”

    Koman was put on a so-called “police search list” (Daftar Pencarian Orang, DPO) following social media posts she had made in support of West Papuan students who were subjected to racial abuse in 2019.

    “Other human rights defenders are now being subjected to police investigations with complaints having been initiated by government ministers,” said TAPOL.

    “Furthermore, in October 2020, prominent environmental activist Golfrid Siregar died [in] suspicious circumstances in North Sumatra.

    One conclusion to be drawn about at least some of these incidents is that the police, due to their previous record in relation to Koman and others, and willingness to pursue dubious investigations at the behest of politicians, may require careful independent scrutiny to ensure that its investigations are carried out objectively.”

    TAPOL added that human rights defenders and activists in Indonesia were facing increasing risks to their own personal safety and the safety of their family members.

    The human rights agency called for a “thorough investigation” of the attacks against Koman and her family, and to stop criminalising human rights defenders.

    Joe Collins of the Australia West Papua Association (AWPA) has appealed to the Australian government to press Indonesia to “conduct an investigation into the attacks against Veronica’s family and that the police investigation must be impartial and subject to independent oversight”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • RNZ Pacific

    Advocacy groups in Indonesia have condemned an attack on the parents of human rights lawyer Veronica Yoman, who speaks out for West Papuan justice issues.

    A number of packages were delivered to the couple’s house in Jakarta on Sunday morning.

    According to Amnesty International Indonesia, two of the packages exploded, scattering bits of paper and red paint in the garage.

    Another package contained a message threatening to attack Koman and her supporters.

    Amnesty International Indonesia’s executive director Usman Hamid described it as “an unconscionable attack that has frightened and traumatised two older people”.

    “The authorities must immediately carry out a thorough, transparent, impartial and independent investigation of the incident and ensure the safety of Veronica Koman’s parents,” he said.

    Koman, who has became a prominent voice in advocating for Papuan human rights since 2015, has been based in Australia since 2019.

    UN plea for protection
    That year, UN human rights experts issued a statement calling on the Indonesian government to protect the rights of Koman and other activists after she was subjected to online harassment, threats and abuse following her reporting on alleged human rights violations in Papua province.

    The latest incident comes only weeks after two unidentified men on a motorcycle left an explosive package on the fence of Koman’s parents’ house.

    Andreas Harsono of Human Rights Watch said the incident marked “a serious escalation in the threats and intimidation that Koman and her family have faced for years due to her peaceful activism on Papua”.

    “Indonesian human rights defenders should be able to express themselves even on sensitive subjects without having a target painted on their backs.”

    As well as a police investigation, Harsono said Indonesia’s Witness and Victim Protection Agency should also assist Koman’s parents with protection and psychosocial support.

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    West Papua indigenous independence leaders today launched  “Green State Vision” at the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow, pledging to take decisive action to address the climate emergency and the impact of natural resource extraction in an independent West Papua.

    The Green State Vision was drafted with the assistance of international lawyers, including UK-based barrister Jennifer Robinson of Doughty Street Chambers, reports the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP).

    It sets out commitments from West Papua’s “government-in-waiting”, including:

    • Making ecocide a serious criminal offence;
    • Restoring guardianship of natural resources to indigenous authorities, combining Western democratic norms with local Papuan systems; and
    • ‘Serving notice’ on all extraction companies, including oil, gas, mining, logging and palm oil, requiring them to adhere to international environmental standards or cease operations.
    • READ MORE: The Green State Vision document
    • Other West Papua articles

    In June 2021, a panel of international legal experts, co-chaired by Professor Philippe Sands QC, drafted a definition of ecocide intended for adoption by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

    West Papua is half of the island of New Guinea, home to the world’s third largest rainforest after the Amazon and the Congo. West Papua is rich in natural resources, including one of the world’s largest gold and copper mines — the Freeport Indonesia mine at Grasberg —  and extensive sources of natural gas, minerals, timber and palm oil.

    West Papua was a Dutch colony until 1961. The Indonesian military seized control in 1963.

    The people indigenous to the provinces are Melanesian, ethnically distinct from the people of Indonesia. West Papua continues to be unlawfully occupied by Indonesia. Indonesia is currently the world’s largest exporter of palm oil.

    West Papuans have contested Indonesia’s occupation for more than half a century, with Indonesian forces repeatedly accused of human rights violations and violent suppression of the independence movement.

    According to recent reports, thousands of Indonesian soldiers have been deployed to West Papua in a crackdown, with civilians forced to flee and journalists and activists targeted.

    In 2020, the ULMWP announced the formation of its Temporary Constitution and Provisional Government, with exiled leader Benny Wenda as interim president.

    He will be a keynote speaker at the COP26 Coalition’s Global Day for Climate Justice rally tomorrow.

    A “March Against Climate Colonialism” will be held on Sunday, November 7, starting at 1:30pm at 83 Argyle Street, Glasgow.

    Benny Wenda, interim president of the ULMWP and provisional government, said: ‘We are fighting for stewardship of one of the planet’s largest rainforests, a lung of the world.

    “The international climate movement and all governments serious about stopping climate change must help end Indonesia’s genocide of the first defenders in West Papua. If you want to save the world, you must save West Papua.”

    Joe Corré, founder of Agent Provocateur, said: “This is a critical step towards protecting one of the world’s largest rainforests from catastrophic destruction caused by the illegal Indonesian occupation.

    “The Indonesian government and military, supported by BP, are using violence, intimidation and murder to silence the indigenous inhabitants.”

    Jennifer Robinson of Doughty Street Chambers said: “The unlawful occupation of West Papua by Indonesia is facilitating the destruction of one of the world’s most important rainforests.

    “Ensuring West Papua’s right to self-determination will also ensure the protection of the environment and the climate by allowing the Indigenous custodians of the land to take back control, protection and management of their resources.’

    A Papuan Green State rally.
    A Papuan Green State Vision rally. Image: ULMWP


    This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by APR editor.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • 3 Mins Read Green Rebel Foods, the Indonesian startup that pioneered plant-based foods in the country, has just added vegan cheese to its range.

    The post Vegan Cheese Is Indonesian Plant-Based Pioneer Green Rebel’s Latest Drop appeared first on Green Queen.

    This post was originally published on Green Queen.

  • By Antonio Sampaio in Dili

    Former Timor-Leste President Xanana Gusmão today lamented the death of journalist and filmmaker Max Stahl, recalling that his work had “changed the fate of the nation”.

    In a letter sent to his widow Dr Ingrid Brucens, Gusmão, chief negotiator over East Timor’s maritime borders, said Stahl’s footage of the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre “exposed the repression and brutality of the Indonesian occupation” for 24 years.

    His work was an archival history the country — a legacy for the Timorese nation.

    “Few people have managed to make such a significant contribution to the nation,” Gusmão said.

    He said Stahl was “loved by the Timorese” and that the country was “in mourning”.

    Max Stahl died in Brisbane hospital early yesterday after a long illness.

    The journalist was decorated by the state with the Order of Timor-Leste and the National Parliament awarded him Timorese nationality in 2019.

    Born Christopher Wenner, but better known as Max Stahl, he began his commitment to East Timor on 30 August 1991 when he entered the country disguised as a tourist to film a documentary for ITV in Britain, In Cold Blood: The Massacre of East Timor.

    He interviewed several resistance leaders and left because of his visa. However, he returned and secretly filmed the Santa Cruz graveyard massacre on November 12 that year.

    The Portuguese government also highlighted Stahl’s “key role” in the “East Timor fight for self-determination”.

    “Max Stahl played a key role in East Timor’s struggle for self-determination. Our condolences to the family, friends, and also to the Timorese people, who today lose a person who made an invaluable contribution to their history,” said the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Shortly after his re-election in May 2019, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) delivered his Vision of Indonesia speech, in which he pledged “zero tolerance against those who undermine Pancasila”, the pluralist state ideology. The President then instructed the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security, Mahfud MD, to initiate more “serious efforts” at curbing the spread of radical ideologies. A range of polices has been systematically implemented since, from weeding out radicalism in public service—including through online surveillance mechanism—to the proscription and prosecution of certain Islamist organisations.

    One Islamist group that has borne the brunt of the growing state repression is the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), an infamous organisation that has graduated from morality racketeering to becoming the country’s most formidable opposition movement. The Jokowi government officially banned FPI on 31 December 2020, citing as reasons its past involvement in vigilantism and hate campaigns against minorities, but also its purported link to terrorism and the more procedural reason of lapsed registration. The banning was immediately followed by more arrests of FPI’s prominent leaders and the freezing of its assets. This is qualitatively different from the disbandment of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in 2017: thus far no HTI leaders have been prosecuted and most of its assets and activities have remained intact, sans the flag and symbol.

    What are the consequences of the hard clampdown on Islamist groups? Has it achieved its stated goal of defending pluralism? I argue that the costs of repression far outweigh its benefits. While the crackdown seems effective in undercutting the capacity of Islamists to mobilise, it can lead to damaging outcomes. First, the policy is buttressed by excessive use of force against Islamist and other opposition activists. Second, the cost of repression directly impacts public health as disillusioned Islamist groups contribute to conspiracy theories rejecting COVID-19 vaccines. Third, dissolving one or two hardline groups does not necessarily address—and may in fact divert attention from—the complex causes of discrimination against minority groups.

    FPI: from the fringe to centre stage and back again?

    Born on the fringes of Islamic activism in 1998, FPI later gained prominence among Indonesian Muslims, especially after playing a leading role in the unprecedented 2016 mobilisation which toppled the Chinese-Cristian governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), who was accused of blasphemy. After the anti-Ahok rallies (also known as “212” movement after the date of the mammoth protest), FPI and its partners used their newfound clout to assist Jokowi’s rival, Prabowo Subianto, in the highly polarised 2019 presidential campaign.

    The alarming rise of Islamist influence in national politics prompted the government to contain their power, for instance by investigating and arresting leaders of the 212 Movement. FPI supreme leader Habib Rizieq Shihab, who was under investigation for his alleged involvement in a porn scandal and also facing defamation charges, decided to flee the country in April 2017 and remained in for Saudi Arabia for three years.

    His homecoming celebration perfectly captured his new status as a beloved spiritual leader of the opposition. Upon his return on 10 November 2020, he received a hero’s welcome with tens of thousands of supporters coming to greet him at the airport. Prominent politicians like the Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan also went to visit him; other politicians seeking to curry favour with Islamist constituencies attended his daughter’s wedding shortly after his return. On 1 December, the police summoned Rizieq for breaching public health protocols, but he refused to comply. On 7 December, a police intelligence team tasked with tailing Rizieq shot dead six of his body guards in a dramatic car chase. Four of those have been classified as extrajudicial killing by a National Human Rights Commission investigation.

    The incident was swiftly followed by the prosecution of Rizieq and at least seven other FPI figures. In April 2021, FPI secretary general Munarman was arrested on dubious accusations that link FPI to the terrorist group Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Munarman retorted that the “terrorisation” of FPI is a ploy to legitimise the killing of FPI guards. His statement harks back to pent-up grievances related to police abuse of Muslim terror suspects. In June 2021, Rizieq was sentenced to 4 years and 8 months jail for violating public health restrictions and spreading false news by lying about his positive Covid test.

    The sweeping crackdown on FPI indicated the government’s concerns over Rizieq’s skyrocketing political stature. Many pluralist and liberal groups are similarly worried about Islamist encroachment into the mainstream political arena, which explains their muted response even as the crackdown turned violent.

    Public opinion polls indicate high approval for Jokowi’s anti-FPI policy. Fealy and White argue that the limited criticism of FPI’s banning means the government has “effectively removed its most potent Islamist opponent and won public plaudits for doing so”, suggesting that FPI might have slid back to the fringes of Muslim society. The authors also note that such an outcome has made other Islamist groups “wary of crossing the government”. While the clampdown seems effective in the short term, I question its broader implications not only in terms of democracy and pluralism promotion but also its adverse consequences for public health.

    Effective but at what cost?

    On the one hand, the repression is largely effective in weakening FPI’s mobilising capacity. With Rizieq locked up, FPI’s re-incarnation, called the Islamic Brotherhood Front (also FPI), is struggling to revive its organisational structures. FPI has also failed to draw large crowds to rallies, to the extent that it publicly rebuked its own supporters for failing to show up en masse during Rizieq’s trials. FPI-affiliated channels on Telegram circulated online memes reprimanding his supporters. One poster entitled Fake Love asked his supporters: “how could you just sit and watch all the abuse being inflicted by the regime upon the Prophet’s grandson” (i.e. Habib Rizieq). Another meme labels those who abandoned the struggle as “losers”.

    When FPI called on its supporters to swarm in front of Jakarta’s High Court for Rizieq’s verdict announcement on 24 June, some followers responded on FPI’s social media platform by frivolously apologising for their absence as they lived outside Jakarta—something that hadn’t prevented them from attending anti-Ahok rallies in 2016. Others said that they had to lay low after being chased by the police cyber-patrol squad for posting anti-government contents. Still others feared imprisonment—over 400 protesters at Rizieq’s first trial on 18 December 2020 were arrested for infringing health quarantine. Hence, the crackdown seems effective in deterring many Islamist sympathisers from going to the streets.

    At the same time, the anti-radicalism campaign’s reliance on excessive force is concerning . The police are increasingly willing  to use violent methods in response to demonstrations. We have seen this inclination since 2019, during the post-election riots in which hundreds of police officers were injured and a police dormitory building was burned (while several civilians were killed). Since then, the police have used force more frequently as a pre-emptive strategy to handle anti-government demonstrations.  And, particularly in recent mobilisations that accompanied Rizieq’s trials, the police have consistently deployed large forces and brazenly shot teargas at protestors who were unarmed and in relatively small numbers.

    The excessive use of force in turn makes Islamist opposition more combative, claiming self-defence. Online propaganda by FPI supporters increasingly displays violent imagery. For example, one  poster reads: “when the call for jihad comes and the mujahidin are being blocked, the solution is attack and war! Come from all directions, don’t be afraid of getting imprisoned or killed. Let’s storm the Jakarta High Court and free our Grand Imam! Write a will for your family [i.e. prepare to die]”. Such posters are certainly a far cry from the imagery of ‘super peaceful rallies’ that Islamists propagated—and indeed observed—in 2016 and 2017.

    Islamists and Anti-Vaccine Narratives

    The repression also has public health costs as some Islamist groups agitate against the government’s COVID vaccination program. It is important to note that Islamist groups are not unanimous on the vaccine issue. On the one hand, many conservative clerics, including Salafis and HTI recommended vaccination. Felix Siauw, a celebrity preacher affiliated with HTI, says that Islam does not prohibit vaccination and in fact, he claims, the Ottoman Caliphate invented and applied smallpox immunisation long before the Europeans. On the other hand, FPI-affiliated media and 212 alumni groups have spearheaded anti-vax campaigns.

    FPI’s attitude is particularly interesting. At the beginning of the pandemic, FPI was relatively supportive of the public health campaign especially the Jakarta governor’s initiative. In April 2020, Rizieq called on his supporters to stop speculating about the origins of COVID-19 because the virus is real and that everyone must set aside their political differences to fight it together. FPI also ridiculed as irrational the government’s initial denial of COVID and supported Anies Baswedan’s lockdown policy in Jakarta. But now that the central government has become more serious in implementing social restriction and vaccination, FPI has shifted positions.

    It is worth noting that Rizieq has not issued an official statement regarding the vaccine. However, FPI-affiliated media and various 212 alumni groups have recently contributed to spreading anti-vaccine propaganda.  They are quite inclusive in their conspiracy repertoires, borrowing and modifying western right-wing narratives. For instance they told online followers that Bill Gates is using vaccines to mass-implant microchips and take control of the human race, especially resource-rich Muslim countries, and that Jokowi is helping him to create a New World Order.

    What explains Islamist reversion to dissent? If we look at pro-FPI Telegram channels, most narratives on COVID vaccine are not about whether it is halal or haram. This is in part because the government has, from the outset, engaged the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) and major Islamic organisations to verify the halal status of the state’s preferred vaccines, Sinovac and Astrazeneca. MUI’s seal of approval makes it hard for Islamists to attack the vaccine on religious ground. So, in addition to the political conspiracy behind the vaccine, Islamist anti-vaxers focused on its supposedly dangerous side effects, such as disgusting skin diseases, heart inflammation and death. The vaccine rejection is not as closely connected to anti-China sentiment as assumed by some observers. Many of the pro-Rizieq Islamists and 212 Alumni groups do not just reject Sinovac and Sinofarm, but also all other brands including Pfizer and Moderna.

    If religion and anti-China sentiment are not the primary reasons, why did some Islamists suddenly go from being health conscious to vaccine sceptical? There is no particularly coherent reason other than pure spite and animosity towards Jokowi. Some Islamist supporters with whom I spoke confirmed that they were aware of MUI’s religious endorsement of the vaccine and of similar fatwa issued by Middle Eastern ulama. However, they chose not to be vaccinated because Jokowi is “forcing” people by making vaccine mandatory. Some also said that they do not trust the government’s reassurances about vaccine side effects. The fact that the government exploited public health regulations to punish Islamist activists does little to gain trust. That said, my interviewees were quick to add that they still contribute to pandemic eradication in “their own ways” such as praying, wearing masks and taking herbal supplements. This anecdotal evidence suggests that at least one segment of the Islamist community opposes public health regulations due to deepening disillusionment with the government.

    In defence of pluralism?

    Illiberal suppression has been framed in terms of defending pluralism and religious freedom. However, there are compelling reasons to believe that it has not been worthwhile for the protection of minorities. Wahid Foundation’s 2020 data comparing violations of religious freedom during President Yudhono and Jokowi presidencies shows that the overall trends have barely changed (from 1,110 incidents under Yudhoyono to 1,101 cases in Jokowi era). Surprisingly, state-perpetrated violations have increased under Jokowi (from 419 to 524 cases). The Setara Institute recorded 422 violations of religious freedom in 2020 alone, 56 percent of which were conducted by state actors. In addition, rights advocacy groups have reported growing persecution of LGBT citizens, including through police raids on so-called gay massage parlors and private parties.

    The attack on an Ahmadiyah mosque in Sintang, West Kalimantan on 3 September is but one indication that the existing anti-radicalism campaign has merely served as a political weapon to target government enemies, rather than defending minorities. The crackdown simply masks the complex problems underlying religious and sexual discriminations in Indonesia, in particular the frequent involvement of state actors and the impunity afforded to them. In November 2020, the East Java government reportedly facilitated the conversion of a long-persecuted Shi’a minority as a prerequisite for returning to their predominantly-Sunni hometown of Sampang. Even after the conversion, the internally displaced Shi’a families have not been able to go home due to objections from the Sampang ulama and community elders. Last June, the mayor of Bogor, West Java unilaterally relocated the GKI Yasmin Church following a 15 year-long sectarian agitation to deny it building permit. The mayor stated that his government gifted the land to the church as compensation, and that it was a win-win solution to create religious harmony without upsetting the majority.

    The above examples remind us that the perpetrators of anti-minority violence are not limited to organised groups like FPI. It often involves state apparatuses, community leaders and ordinary citizens. For instance in the latest case of anti-Ahmadi violence in West Kalimantan, the district head with the support of the local police chief and military commander closed off the mosque, citing the 2008 Joint Ministerial Decree on Ahmadiyah which effectively restricts the rights of Ahmadis to practice their beliefs. Such official endorsement in turn emboldened a local mob—backed by community leaders—who had been agitating against the Ahmadis. Video footage online shows attending police officers standing in silence as the attackers burned the mosque to the ground.

    The banning of FPI or any other “anti-Pancasila” group is not a shortcut to ending deep-seated discrimination against minorities. For this, the government will need to address problematic regulations which formalise discrimination against certain minorities and end the impunity afforded to perpetrators under the guise of respecting the majority will or preserving religious harmony.

    The post The Costs of Repressing Islamists appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • In this video — one of several made while he was guest speaker at the Pacific Journalism Review’s 20th anniversary conference in Auckland — Max Stahl talks about the betrayal of West Papua. Video: Pacific Media Centre

    By Antonio Sampaio in Dili

    Max Stahl has died, almost 30 years after capturing images of the Indonesian massacre at Santa Cruz cemetery in the Timor-Leste capital Dili, which helped change forever the course of the country’s struggle for independence.

    By coincidence, he passed away on the same day as the death in 1991 of Sebastião Gomes, the young man who was buried in Santa Cruz and whose death led to the protest that would eventually end in the Santa Cruz Massacre.

    More than 2000 people had headed to Santa Cruz to pay tribute to Gomes, killed by militia connected to Indonesian forces in the Motael neighborhood.

    Filmmaker Max Stahl
    Filmmaker Max Stahl speaking to the 20th anniversary of Pacific Journalism Review in Auckland in 2014. Image: Del Abcede/APR

    The action of the Indonesian military was secretly filmed by Max Stahl and international attention on East Timor dramatically changed.

    At the graveyard, the Indonesian military opened fire on the crowd and caused the deaths of 74 people at the scene. Over the next few days, more than 120 young people died in hospital or as a result of persecution of occupying forces.

    Most bodies were never recovered.

    Born on 6 December 1954 in the United Kingdom and a Timorese citizen since 2019, journalist and documentary maker Christopher Wenner, better known as Max Stahl, began his connection to the country in 1991 when he managed to enter East Timor for the first time.

    Hiding among the graves
    On November 12, hiding among the graves of Santa Cruz cemetery, he filmed one of many massacres during the Indonesian occupation of the country, with images being circulated  around the world and changing the country’s history.

    Filmmaker and digital historian Max Stahl
    Filmmaker and digital historian Max Stahl at CAMSTL with an image from his 1991 Santa Cruz massacre footage in Timor-Leste. Image: David Robie/APR

    Decorated with the Order of Timor-Leste, the highest award given to foreign citizens in the country, with the Rory Peck Prize for filmmakers and several other rewards, Max Stahl leaves as a legacy one of the main archives of images from the last years of the Indonesian occupation of the country and the period immediately before and after the independence referendum.

    The Max Stahl Audiovisual Center in Timor-Lete (CAMSTL) contains thousands of hours of video, including extended interviews with key actors in the Timorese struggle for independence.

    The archive was adopted by UNESCO for the World Memory Register and has been used for teaching and research purposes on Timor’s history under the framework of the cooperation protocol established between the University of Coimbra, the National University of East Timor and the CAMSTL

    The descendant of a family of diplomats, he was wounded as a war correspondent in the Balkans.

    Stahl studied literature at the University of Oxford and was a fluent speaker of several languages, including the two official languages of East Timor — Portuguese and Tetum.

    He began his career writing for theatre and children’s television shows and found his calling as a war reporter when he lived with his family — his father was ambassador — in El Salvador where he sent reports about the civil war between 1979 and 1992.

    Among other conflicts he covered were those of Georgia, former Yugoslavia and — from 30 August 1991 — East Timor, where he arrived as a “tourist” at the invitation of resistance groups.

    “The king is dead. With great sadness, I write to inform you that Max passed away this morning around 04 am.”

    — Max Stahl’s wife Dr Ingrid Brucens

    Historic resistance leaders
    Throughout his long ties to East Timor, where he lived until recently when he had to travel to Australia for medical treatment, he interviewed some of the historic resistance leaders like Nino Konis Santa, David Alex and others.

    It would be Santa Cruz, and the 12 November 1991 massacre that would make the name Max Stahl known internationally with the images exposing the barbarism of the Indonesian occupation.

    In Portugal, the images eventually made a special impact, both through the brutality of the violence and with the fact that survivors gathered in the small chapel of Santa Cruz praying in Portuguese while listening to the bullets from the Indonesian military and police.

    The 1999 referendum prompted Max Stahl to return to East Timor where he covered the violence before the referendum and after the announcement of independence victory and accompanied families on the flight to the mountains.

    News of Max Stahl’s death on Wednesday at a Brisbane hospital quickly became the most commented subject on social media in East Timor, raising condolences from several responsible and personalities linked to the cause of the struggle for independence.

    In statements to Lusa, former President José Ramos-Horta described Max Stahl’s death a “great loss” to Timor-Leste and the world, and which will cause “deep consternation and pain” to the Timorese people.

    “What a great loss for all of us to East Timor, to the world. Someone like Max, with a big heart, with a great dedication and love for East Timor … being taken to another world,” he told Lusa.

    Dr Ingrid Brucens, Max Stahl’s wife, and who was with the children in Brisbane, announced his death to his friends.

    “The king is dead. With great sadness, I write to inform you that Max passed away this morning around 04 am,” she wrote in messages to friends.

    Antonio Sampaio is the Lusa correspondent in Dili

    Photos of Max Stahl
    Photos of Max Stahl … top left he is wearing the Order of Timor-Leste, the highest honour for foreigners. Images: CAMSTL

    CAMSTL video tribute
    This video below is the  CAMSTL team’s tribute to the memory of Stahl, who had dedicated 30 years of his life to the people of Timor-Leste. CAMSTL colleagues said on their Facebook page:

    “The images and testimonies recorded by the journalist in the 1990s alerted the world to the serious human rights violations taking place in Timorese territory.

    “From then on, the country’s independence restoration process gained momentum.

    “Today, the journalist’s heroic trajectory ends on the earthly plane, but his legacy will continue to live on in the large archive created and directed by him, the Centro Audiovisual Max Stahl Timor-Leste.

    “Dear Max. We will always be together with you in preserving the memory of the resistance struggle and the construction of the Timorese nation.

    “We would like to thank Max’s friend José Ramos-Horta — Nobel Peace Prize and Former President of the Republic– for participating in this video.”


    This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by APR editor.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • SPECIAL REPORT: By Johnny Blades, RNZ Pacific journalist

    Armed conflict in West Papua has caused an exodus of displaced people into one of the most remote parts of neighbouring Papua New Guinea.

    The latest flashpoint in the conflict is in the Indonesian-administered Bintang Mountains regency, where state forces are pursuing West Papua Liberation Army fighters who they blame for recent attacks on health workers in Kiwirok district.

    Since violence surged in Kiriwok last month, Indonesian security forces have targetted suspected village strongholds of the OPM-Free Papua Movement’s military wing.

    At least 2000 people are recorded by local groups to have fled from the conflict either to other parts of Bintang Mountains (Pegunungan Bintang) or crossed illegally into the adjacent region over the international border.

    Hundreds of people have fled across to Tumolbil, in Yapsie sub-district of the PNG province of West Sepik, situated right on the border.

    A spokesman for the OPM, Jeffrey Bomanak, said that those fleeing were running from Indonesian military operations, including helicopter assaults, which he claimed had caused significant destruction in around 14 villages.

    “Our people, they cannot stay with that situation, so they are crossing to the Papua New Guinea side.

    “I already contacted my network, our soldiers from OPM, TPN (Liberation Army). They already confirmed 47 families in Tumolbil.”

    Evidence of the influx
    A teacher in Yapsie, Paul Alp, said he saw evidence of the influx in Tumolbil last week.

    “It is easy to get into Papua New Guinea from Indonesia. There are mountains but they know how to get around to climb those mountains into Papua New Guinea.

    “There are foot tracks,” he explained, adding that Papua New Guineans sometimes went across to the Indonesian side, usually to access a better level of basic services.

    A village destroyed in Pengunungan Bintang regency, Papua province.
    A village destroyed in Pengunungan Bintang regency, Papua province. Image: ULMWP/RNZ

    Alp said West Papuans who had come to Tumolbil were not necessarily staying for more than a week or so before returning to the other side.

    He and others in the remote district confirmed that illegal border crossings have occurred for years, but that it had increased sharply since last month.

    For decades, the PNG government’s policy on refugees from West Papua has been to place them in border camps, the main one being at East Awin in Western Province, with support from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

    Thousands of displaced Papuan have ended up at East Awin, but many others who come across simply melt into the general populace among various remote villages along the porous border region.

    Threadbare security
    Sergeant Terry Dap is one of a handful of policemen in the entire Telefomin district covering 16,333 sq km and with a population of around 50,000.

    He said a lot of people had come across to Tumolbil in recent weeks, including OPM fighters.

    “There’s a fight going on, on the other side, between the Indonesians and the West Papuan freedom fighters.

    “So there’s a lot of disruption there [in Tumolbil]. So I went there, and I talked to the ward development officer of Yapsie LLG [Local Level Government area], and he said he needed immediate assistance from the authorities in Vanimo [capital of West Sepik].”

    “They want military and police, to protect the sovereignty of Papua New Guinea, and to protect properties to make sure the fight doesn’t come into PNG.”

    Sergeant Dap said he had emailed the provincial authorities with this request, and was awaiting feedback.

    Papua New Guinea police
    Papua New Guinea police … “There’s a fight going on, on the other side, between the Indonesians and the West Papuan freedom fighters.” Image: Johnny Blades/RNZ

    More civilians crossing over
    According to Bomanak, the impacts of displacement from recent attacks in Kiwirok district are ongoing.

    “This problem now is as we have damage in village, more civilians will cross over in Papua New Guinea side.

    “Five to six hundred villagers, civillians, mothers and children, they’re still in three locations, out in jungle in Kiwirok, and they’re still on their way to Papua New Guinea,” he warned.

    On the PNG side, Sergeant Dap said some of the people coming across from West Papua have traditional or family links to the community of Tulmolbil

    But their presence on PNG soil creates risk for locals who are fearful their communities could get caught in the crossfire of Indonesian military pursuing the Papuan fighters.

    Dap said he spoke with the OPM fighters who had come to Tumolbil, and encouraged them not to stay long.

    “I’ve talked to their commander. They said there’s another group of people coming – about one thousand-plus coming in,” he said.

    “I told them, just stay for some days and then you go back, because this is another country, so you don’t need to come in. You go back to your own country and then stay there.”

    Violence in mountainous Pengunungan Bintang regency, near the border with PNG, October 2021.
    Clashes in the mountainous Pengunungan Bintang regency, near the border with PNG, in October 2021. Image: RNZ

    The policeman has also been involved in efforts by PNG authorities to encourage vaccination against covid-19.

    Mistrust of covid vaccines is deep in PNG, where only around 2 or 3 percent of the population has been inoculated, while a delta-fuelled third wave of the pandemic is causing daily casualties.

    Sergeant Dap said convincing people to get vaccinated was difficult enough without illegal border crossings adding to the spread of the virus and the sense of fear.

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    Two small babies were shot by the Indonesian military in Intan Jaya two days ago, claims the United Liberation Movement of West Papua (ULMWP).

    One of them has died, and the other is in critical condition. Thousands more West Papuans have been displaced in Intan Jaya and Maybrat as Indonesia bombs villages.

    Hundreds of internal refugees are fleeing into PNG.

    Baby Nopelinus Sondegau
    Two-year-old Nopelinus Sondegau, a Papuan baby alleged to have been killed by the Indonesian military. Image: ULMWP

    One two-year-old, Nopelinus Sondegau, was killed by the Indonesian forces, ULMWP interim president Benny Wenda said in a statement.

    A five-year old, Yoakim Majau, was also shot. The bullet was still in the baby’s shoulder.

    “These killings are happening under the eye of the world while the Indonesian President [Joko Widodo] and ministers pretend that nothing is happening during talks with Pacific and Melanesian leaders,” said Wenda.

    “These killings are happening as Indonesia tries to turn West Papua’s killing fields into a tourist destination.”

    Wenda called for urgent United Nations intervention.

    “Indonesia cannot use coronavirus as an excuse to delay the visit of the UN High Commissioner, recently called for by the Basque Parliament, any longer,” he said.

    “Indonesia has hosted national games in West Papua during coronavirus, Indonesia has sent thousands of troops to West Papua during coronavirus, now Indonesia is killing small children during coronavirus.

    “There can be no more excuses. Amnesty International, Red Cross, all international journalists, must be allowed in to monitor this urgent situation.

    “My people are screaming for help. Where is the world?”

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • ANALYSIS: By Kalinga Seneviratne in Sydney

    Indonesia’s popular tourism islands of Bali opened for tourism last week, while Thailand announced that from November 1 vaccinated travellers from 19 countries will be allowed to visit the kingdom including its tourism island of Phuket.

    Both those countries’ tourism industry, which is a major revenue earner, has been devastated by more than 18 months of inactivity that have impacted on the livelihood of hundreds of thousands of people.

    India and Vietnam also announced plans to open the country to vaccinated foreign tourists in November, and Australia will be opening its borders for foreign travel from mid-November for the first time since March 2020.

    Countries in the Asia-Pacific region — except for China — are now beginning to grapple with balancing the damage to their economies from covid-19 pandemic by beginning to treat the virus as another flu.

    The media may have to play a less adversarial role if this gamble is going to succeed.

    October 11 was “Freedom Day” for Australia’s most populous city Sydney when it came out of almost four months of a tough lockdown.

    Ironically this is happening while the daily covid-19 infection rates are higher than the figure that triggered the lockdowns in June.

    ‘It’s not going away’
    Yet, New South Wales Premier Dominic Perrottet told Sky News on October 11: “we’ve got to live alongside the virus, it’s not going away, the best thing that we can do is protect our people (by better health services)”.

    Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, addressing the nation on October 9, said: “Singapore cannot stay locked down and closed off indefinitely. It would not work, and it would be very costly”.

    He added, “each time we tighten up, businesses are further disrupted, workers lose jobs, children are deprived of a proper childhood and school life”.

    Singapore is coming out of lockdown when it is facing the highest rates of daily infections since the covid-19 outbreak.

    Both Singapore and Australia adopted a “zero-covid” policy when the first wave of the pandemic hit, quickly closing the borders, and going into lockdown.

    Both were exceptionally successful in controlling the virus and lifting the lockdowns late last year with almost zero covid-19 cases. But, when the more contagious delta virus hit both countries, fear came back forcing them back into lockdowns.

    However, PM Lee told Singaporeans that lockdowns had “caused psychological and emotional strain, and mental fatigue for Singaporeans and for everyone else. Therefore, we concluded a few months ago that a “Zero covid” strategy was no longer feasible”.

    ‘Living with covid-19’
    Thus, Singapore has changed its policy to “Living with covid-19”.

    In a Facebook posting on October 10, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison said: “The phenomenal response from Australians to go and get vaccinated as we’ve seen those vaccination rates rise right across the country, means it’s now time that Australians are able to reclaim their lives. We’re beating covid, and we’re taking our lives back.”

    On October 8, Australia’s Federal Health Minister Greg Hunt said that though infection rates might still be a bit high, yet less than 1 percent of those infected were in intensive care units (ICUs).

    Why didn’t political leaders take this attitude right from the beginning and continue with it? After all the fatality rate of covid-19 has not been that much higher than the seasonal flu in most countries.

    True, it was perhaps more contagious according to medical opinion, but fatality rates were not that large in percentage figures.

    According to the Worldometer of health statistics, there have been 237.5 million covid-19 infections up to October this year and 214.6 million have recovered fully (90.4 percent) while 4.8 million have died (just over 2 percent).

    According to the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates, there have been between 39-56 million flu cases, about 700,000 flu hospitalisations recorded in the US during the 2019-2020 flu season up to April 2020.

    They also estimate between 24,000 to 62,000 flu deaths during the season. But did the media give these figures on a daily or even a weekly basis?

    New global influenza strategy
    In March 2019, WHO launched a new global influenza strategy pointing out that each year there is an estimated 1 billion flu cases of which 3-5 million are severe cases, resulting in 290,000 to 650,000 influenza-related respiratory deaths.

    This has been happening for many years, but, yet the global media did not create the panic scenario that accompanied covid-19.

    Unfortunately, the media’s adversarial reporting culture has helped to create a fear psychosis from the very beginning of the outbreak in early 2020, which may have contributed to millions of deaths by creating anxiety among those diagnosed with covid-19.

    During the peak of the delta pandemic in India, many patients died from heart attacks triggered by anxiety. Would they have died if covid-19 were treated as another flu?

    In the US out of the 44 million infected with covid-19 only 1.6 percent died. In Brazil from 21.5 million infected, 2.8 percent of them died, while in India out of 34 million infected only 1.3 percent died.

    But what did we see in media reports? Piles of dead bodies being burnt in India, from Brazil bodies buried in mass graves by health workers wrapped in safety gear and in the US, people being rushed into ICUs.

    They are just a small fraction of those infected.

    Bleak picture of sensationalism
    I was the co-editor of a book just released by a British publisher that looked at how the media across the world reported the covid-19 outbreak during 2020. It paints a bleak picture of sensationalism and adversarial reporting blended with racism and politicisation.

    It all started with the outbreak in Wuhan in January 2020 when the global media transmitted unverified video clips of people dropping dead in the streets and dead bodies lying in pavements. Along with the focus on “unhygienic” wet markets in China this helped to project an image of China as a threat to the world.

    It contributed to the fear psychosis that was built up by the media tinged with racism and politicisation.

    If we are to live with covid and other flu viruses, greater investments need to be made in public health.

    In Australia, health experts are talking about boosting hospital bed and ICU capacities to deal with the new policy of living with covid, and they have also warned of a shortage of health professionals, especially to staff ICUs.

    What about if the media focus on these as national security priorities? Rather than giving daily death rates and sensational stories of people dying from covid — do we give daily death rates from heart attacks or suicide?

    We should start discussing more about how to create sustainable safe communities as we recover from the pandemic, and that includes better investments in public health.

    We need a journalism culture that is less adversarial and more tuned into promoting cooperation and community harmony.

    Kalinga Seneviratne is co-editor of COVID-19, Racism and Politicization: Media in the Midst of a Pandemic published in August 2021 by Cambridge Scholars Publishers. IDN is the flagship agency of the Non-profit International Press Syndicate. This article is republished in partnership with IDN.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • The National Commission on Violence Against Women with a network of Indonesian civil society organisations has directed its peacebuilding effort towards the proposition of an Elimination of Sexual Violence Bill through advocacy. It was initiated in 2012. In 2016, the commission and Service Provider Forum had the opportunity to submit a background paper for  the bill to the parliament.

    This bill embodies the critical value of peacebuilding, that is, meeting the needs and rights of security by managing sexual violence. The proposal addresses material, social, and cultural needs and rights built upon women’s experiences. A wide range of categorizations of sexual violence – sexual harassment, forced marriage, forced contraception, forced abortion, rape, sexual exploitation, forced prostitution, sexual slavery, and sexual torture– in the bill proposed by the commission and civil society demonstrates consideration of these needs and rights. Sexual violence has many faces, and these categories accommodate more forms of sexual violence to be processed legally. As a peacebuilding instrument, this bill’s content seeks an opportunity to prevent and reduce any form of sexual violence.

    The work of peacebuilding is multi-dimensional. According to Lisa Schirch, peacebuilding covers any form of prevention of violence, reduction, transformation, and/or recovery. This wide range of work aims at sustainability. It also shows that there is no single path toward peace. The proposal was initiated against a background of increasing violence against women and children in Indonesia. Yet, several recent cases show the significance of this bill for all sexualities and genders, for instance, a recent case heard by Commission, in relation sexual violence committed against a male staff member at the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission.

    The damage survivors sustain from sexual violence is massive. Superficially it may seem that sexual violence is merely a matter of direct physical assault. In fact, the damage is also inflicted through cultural and structural violence, in which women are positioned as inferior, stigmatised and blamed for sexual violence. Meanwhile, perpetrators are often treated with impunity and there are few legal protections for survivors, who must endure traumatic legal process to resolve charges.

    The war on homosexuality in Indonesia

    How hetero- and homo-nationalisms are colliding in debates about LGBT rights.

    This bill aspires to be a foundation of transformation and recovery. The clauses on the assurance of survivor’s rights, recovery, and protection reflect this aspiration. Vigorous law enforcement with a survivor-centred perspective can transform the safety of women in society by pivoting on principles of justice and fairness. The law’s capacity to enable this transformation can be enhanced by legally binding mechanisms to enforce compliance. It can be the foundation of derived legal product or regulation, including fill the gap of anti-sexual violence regulation in education institution.  On the other hand, survivor’s well-being should remain the focus. Survivors’ recoveries positively impact their personal development and social transformation by breaking the chain of violence.

    In other words, the initial draft bill developed from background study for the legislation by the commission and Service Provider Forum is intended to abolish direct, cultural, and structural violence. The primary domain of this bill, if it is passed, is in mitigating structural violence where current regulations fail to accommodate women’s experiences. As a proposed law, it can help to construct an ‘infrastructure of peace’ in Indonesia by creating structural mechanisms to abolish sexual violence, even if there are shortcomings in Indonesian law enforcement.

    The change of substance and nomenclature of the Elimination of Sexual Violence Bill to the term Sexual Violence Criminal Offence hampers the attainment of peace, particularly for women in Indonesia. The new bill cuts sexual violence to only four categories. It also abandons survivor’s rights, recovery, and protection clauses that matter in serving security. The parliament’s act in curtailing the bill’s substance has also curtailed its power to eliminate sexual violence.

    Realising peace through peacebuilding requires cooperation from all parties. The National Commission on Violence Against Women and Indonesian civil society organisations, especially the Service Provider Forum, has built the path. The parliament and the government, who hold the authority to legislate regulation should support rather than diminish the survivor-centred version of the bill.

    In my life and in my identity, my position as a woman has exposed me to many forms of violence, making me question what peace is. As a survivor of sexual violence, this bill gives me hope to find every-day peace. Any reduction to it keeps a peaceful life away from me, and other women in Indonesia exposed to sexual violence every day.

    The post A survivor-centered Sexual Violence Bill in Indonesia? appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    Protesting students have held demonstrations in several cities around Indonesia to mark seven years of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s administration, reports CNN Indonesia.

    The protests came as President Widodo left Jakarta to officiate at the opening of a palm oil processing factory owned by the PT Jhonlin Group in South Kalimantan.

    The largest demonstration was held in Jakarta on Thursday where protesters led by the National Association of University Student Executive Bodies (BEM SI) marched from the National Library to the State Palace in Central Jakarta.

    The protesters were stopped at the Horse Statue because of a police blockade. However, there was no physical confrontation and the student took turns in giving speeches in front of the police blockade.

    “Today, we are not here for existence, but to bring a clear substance,” said Boy, a representative from the Tanjung Karang Polytechnic during the action near the Horse Statue.

    The demonstrators read out 12 demands after being prevented from approaching the State Palace.

    One of the demands was that a regulation in lieu of law (Perppu) be issued to annul the revisions to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) Law.

    A similar action was also held in the South Sulawesi provincial capital of Makassar.

    The difference was that the students in Makassar blockaded Jalan Sultan Alauddin street, detained two trucks and set fire to used tyres.

    The field coordinator of the student action in Makassar, Razak Usman, criticised the government’s alleged bias in development and demanded that President Widodo make pro-people policies.

    “We demand the upholding of legal supremacy, reject amendments to the constitution, reject the Omnibus Law, want Law Number 19/2019 revoked, reject simultaneous regional elections, reject the removal of fuel subsidies and urge Jokowi to resolve the handling of Covid-19,” said Usman.

    Students in the Central Java provincial capital of Semarang held a long-march from the Old City area to the office of the Central Java Governor, Ganjar Pranowo.

    Upon arriving at the governor’s office they took turns in giving speeches. A number of different issues were taken up, including resolving past human rights violations, the Omnibus Law on Job Creation and the weakening of the KPK.

    “What has resulted from Jokowi so far? Where are his promises?,” asked action coordinator Fajar Sodiq.

    “Resolving past human rights violations are not heard, the Omnibus Law oppresses the ordinary people, and now we are witnessing efforts to weaken the KPK. Where [are the results of] Jokowi’s work?”

    As the students were protesting, President Widodo was visiting South Kalimantan where he officiated at the opening of a biodiesel factory, a bridge and monitored covid-19 vaccinations.

    The biodiesel factory, which is located in Tanah Bumbu, is managed by the PT Jhonlin Group owned by Samsudin Andi Arsyad alias Haji Isam.

    President Widodo said he appreciated the processing of palm oil into biodiesel and said he hoped that other countries would follow Jhonlin’s example in processing palm oil into biofuel.

    “Downstreaming, industrialisation, must be done and we must force ourselves to do it. Because of this, I greatly respect what is being done by the PT Jhonlin Group in building a biodiesel factory”, said Widodo.

    Meanwhile, Greenpeace Indonesia has published a damning new report about Indonesia’s palm oil industry and the devastation of rainforests.

    Translated by James Balowski for Indoleft News. The original title of the article was “Demo di Sejumlah Kota, Jokowi Resmikan Pabrik di Kalsel”.

  • Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    Illegal palm oil plantations are destroying protected Indonesian rainforests and other habitats — and New Zealand’s industrial dairy sector is a major beneficiary, says a new environmental report.

    The daming report, released yesterday by Greenpeace Indonesia, “Deceased Estate: Illegal palm oil wiping out Indonesia’s national forest”, finds palm oil plantation expansion in national parks, wildlife sanctuaries, and even UNESCO sites, across Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua.

    Palm oil expansion is the largest single cause of destruction of critical Indonesian rainforests over the past two decades.

    Deceased Estate
    The Deceased Estate report on rainforest destruction in Indonesia and West Papua. Image: Greenpeace Indonesia

    The Deceased Estate has report found that there are four palm oil producers with at least 50,000ha of oil palm plantations illegally established inside the protected forest estate.

    These producers include Wilmar International which imports palm kernel expeller (PKE) to New Zealand.

    PKE is a product of the palm oil industry used as supplementary feed in New Zealand’s industrial dairying.

    “Back in 2020, when Fonterra handed control of its PKE imports to Wilmar International, Greenpeace warned of trouble to come,” Greenpeace Aotearoa agriculture campaigner Christine Rose said last night.

    ‘Illegal deforestation’
    “Sadly we’re now seeing evidence of New Zealand agriculture benefiting from illegal deforestation for palm oil and PKE.”

    New Zealand is the world’s largest importer of PKE, importing an estimated two million tonnes a year which is used to feed the dairy herd because there are too many cows for grass growth alone to sustain.

    “New Zealand’s industrial dairying is cashing in on the destruction of endangered species, critical rainforest habitat and indigenous livelihoods in Indonesia,” said Rose.

    “New Zealand’s intensive dairying benefits from ecological destruction in Indonesia while polluting rivers, the climate and drinking water at home.

    “The New Zealand dairy sector’s use of PKE to support herd intensification and expansion, effectively outsources environmental costs onto some of the most diverse remaining forests and species in the world, and it has to stop.

    “It’s unconscionable that New Zealand is complicit in the illegal expansion of palm oil plantations that undermine indigenous community land use and destroy the habitat of rare and endangered species such as Sumatran orangutans, tigers and elephants.”

    ‘Highly polluting’
    Greenpeace Aotearoa is calling for an end to the importation of supplementary feed like PKE, “because it drives highly polluting dairy intensification in Aotearoa, contributes to rainforest destruction and increases climate emissions both here and in Indonesia.”

    Clearance of Indonesian rainforest for palm oil released an estimated 104 Tg (million metric tons) of primary forest carbon from Indonesia’s forest estate between 2001-2019. This is equal to 60 percent of the annual emissions of international aviation.

    Greenhouse gas emissions from NZ’s intensive dairy sector, supported by this illegal PKE, are 48 percent of this country’s total.

    “With industrial agriculture being New Zealand’s biggest climate polluter, we need an urgent shift away from this high-input, industrial agribusiness model towards regenerative organic farming that works within the limits of nature,” said Rose.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    The International Coalition for Papua (ICP) says there has been an increase in the number of arbitrary arrests in its latest report on human rights violations in Papua between July and September 2021.

    The ICP found that mass arrests took place during military security operations in response to attacks by the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB), reports Suara Papua.

    The increase in arrests was also related to the spread of protests opposing the extension of Special Autonomy for Papua and calling for the release of Papua activist and human rights defender Victor Yeimo.

    “The mass arrests were reported to have been accompanied by violence by security forces which resulted in a significant rise in cases of torture and abuse,” the ICP report said.

    “In unison with this the number of extra-judicial killings declined to only two, which were related to excessive use of force during law enforcement operations.

    “This decline, however, does not mean that the armed conflict in West Papua lessened over the last three years.”

    According to the ICP, violence related to the armed conflict has now spread to the regencies of Yahukimo and Star Highlands.

    Armed clashes
    Prior to this, the two regencies were largely unaffected by the impact of the armed conflict.

    In August 22, 2021, TPNPB members killed and set fire to the bodies of two construction workers near the Kribu village in Yahukimo regency.

    On September 2, 2021, TPNPB members killed four people and injured two TNI (Indonesian military) officers at the Kisor village in Maybrat regency.

    On September 13, 2021, the TPNPB also attacked a sub-district military command (Koramil) post in Kiwirok sub-district in Star Highlands regency.

    It was reported that a healthcare worker fell into a ravine and died during this attack and several public facilities were burnt to the ground. A joint security force responded by conducting raids in the three regencies which resulted in arbitrary arrests and torture.

    The statistical figures show that the number of armed clashes that were reported increased threefold in late 2021 compared with 2017, increasing from 24 in 2017 to 44 in 2018 and 64 in 2020.

    As of September 30, 2021, the ICP documented at least 63 armed clashes in West Papua since the start of the year.

    Papuan pleas rejected
    On July 15, the House of Representatives (DPR) revised the Special Autonomy Law. In doing so, the government ignored calls by the Papua Regional House of Representatives (DPRD), the Papua People’s Council (MRP), the West Papua People’s Council (MRPB) and thousands of West Papuans who rejected and protested against these unilateral revisions.

    The revisions made 19 amendments to the existing Special Autonomy Law related to articles which regulate the allocation of Special Autonomy funds and the establishment of new autonomous regions.

    Meanwhile, the establishment of a Papua Human Rights Court and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (KKR) were sidelined.

    During the time that the Special Autonomy Law was being revised, security forces forcibly broke up protests by West Papuans in various parts of Indonesia on the grounds that they violated covid-19 health protocols.

    A new report on freedom of expression and assembly in West Papua published by the UK based human rights group TAPOL describes how these protests were violently repressed by Indonesian security forces using the regulations on controlling the spread of covid-19.

    During the period of the report, many countries declared their support for a fact-finding mission led by the United Nations to investigate allegations of human rights violations in West Papua.

    Call for urgent mission
    In September, the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS or ACP) sent a letter to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) calling for, “an urgent mission to West Papua to provide an evidence based information report on the human rights situation”.

    Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu also declared their support for a similar mission during the 76th session of the UN General Assembly.

    On September 17 the UN published a new report on cooperation with representatives and its mechanisms in the field of human rights.

    The report was drafted by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres and referred to five cases of criminalisation and intimidation against West Papua human rights activists.

    Translated by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. The original title of the article was “ICP Melaporkan Terjadi Peningkatan Penangkapan Sewenang-Wenang di Papua”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Here a bit of wrap up on recent developments in Indonesia. First two disclaimers:

    (1) I have a long-standing interest in this country [see: Indonesia and the Rule of Law, 20 Years of “New Order” Government, a Study prepared for the ICJ, published by Frances Pinter Publishers, London, 1987, pp 208 (ISBN: 0 86187 919 8) and previous posts: https://humanrightsdefenders.blog/tag/indonesia/]

    (2) the human rights situation has generally improved since that book in 1987 and is a lot better compared to other countries in Asia such as China and Myanmar.

    Still, there is no case for complacency as many of the hopes raised with the election of President Jokowi were dashed (see e.g.: https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/08/19/indonesias-president-promised-reform-yet-it-is-he-who-has-changed)

    Over the past two years, human rights defenders (HRDs) have faced unprecedented challenges in Asia, where existing risks were exacerbated, while new threats have emerged. Governments enacted and used repressive laws, online harassment became widespread, and Asian HRDs have seen their families and loved ones increasingly subjected to harassment and threats. The COVID-19 pandemic has also significantly increased violations against defenders, and created new challenges for them to safely conduct their work.

    Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) and the Commission for Disappeared Persons and Victims of Violence (KontraS) presented a joint analysis, “Refusing Silence: A joint analysis on the situation of Human Rights Defenders”, as part of a collaboration in documenting cases of violations against human rights defenders in Asia, and particularly in Indonesia since 2020. [For the full PDF version of this analysis in English, click here]

    The Indonesian government should put an end to the judicial harassment against human rights defenders Fatia Maulidiyanti and Haris Azhar, and uphold the right to freedom of expression, the human rights organisations said.

    ‘The Government of Indonesia must uphold its international human rights obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as its own national constitution which protects the right to freedom of expression,’ said the groups.

    The groups urged the Indonesian government to ensure that all persons can express their opinions without fear of reprisals, and to ensure its actions are compliant with Indonesia’s Constitutional protections for human rights and the ICCPR, of which Indonesia is a State Party. The National Human Rights Institution, Komnas HAM, must also work towards ensuring the protection of defenders facing judicial harassment, the groups said.

    On 22 September, Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, the Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment filed a police report against human rights defenders Fatia Maulidiyanti, Coordinator of the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (Kontras), and Haris Azhar, Founder of Lokataru Foundation. The police report alleges that the two individuals violated criminal defamation provisions (Article 310 (1) of the Penal Code), and the controversial Electronic Information and Transaction Law (EIT Law). Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan has reportedly demanded IDR 300 billion, approximately USD 21 million, in compensation.

    The report was filed after subpoenas were earlier sent to the two human rights defenders following a talk show on Haris Azhar’s YouTube channel, titled ‘Ada Lord Luhut di balik Relasi Ekonomi-Ops Militer Intan Jaya!! Jenderal BIN Juga Ada!!’, (There is Lord Luhut behind the relation of Economy-Military Operation Intan Jaya!! General of State Intelligence Agency is also there!!) in which Haris Azhar and Fatia Maulidiyanti discussed the findings of a multi-stakeholder report revealing the alleged involvement of active and retired Indonesian army officials in the business operations of the gold mining sector…

    The report also recorded the escalation of violent and armed conflict triggered by military operations, one of which occurred in the Intan Jaya Regency. The conflict resulted in the loss of civilian lives and the displacement of thousands of people, including children and women.

    The legal actions by the Coordinating Minister constitute judicial harassment and abuse of power. It criminalises the rights of these two human rights defenders to express their opinions on public affairs and creates a chilling environment for individuals who criticise the government,’ the groups said.

    We call on the Indonesian government to amend all repressive laws and legal provisions that hinder the protection of freedom of expression, and ensure the laws align with international human rights standards. The criminalisation of defamation is an inherently disproportionate and unnecessary restriction to the right to freedom of opinion and expression, under international human rights law.[4] Indonesia must immediately drop the charges against Fatia and Haris and take steps towards preventing the misuse of litigation against human rights defenders and civil society that erode the exercise of their rights,’ they concluded.

    And then there is the situation of Papua:

    Indonesia regularly receives criticism for its strategy in relation to separatist groups in Papua, a strategy that relies heavily on a security-based approach and which has raised questions about the government’s commitment to human rights. Most recently, the nation found itself included on a list of 45 countries cited as being culpable of intimidation and reprisals against human rights defenders seeking to cooperate with the UN, according to an annual report from the UN Secretary General’s Office distributed on September 17.

    Between May 2020 and April this year, five individuals seeking to cooperate with UN human rights agencies – Wensislaus Fatubun, Yones Douw, Victor Mambor, Veronica Koman [see also: https://humanrightsdefenders.blog/2019/10/24/indonesian-human-rights-defender-veronica-koman-receives-sir-ronald-wilson-human-rights-award/]and Victor Yeimo – were “subject to threats, harassment and surveillance by government, non-state and private actors, including business enterprises and local political actors”, the report said.

    On 21 September 2021 A U.N. expert has urged Indonesia to provide an independence activist in its Papua province with proper medical care to “keep him from dying in prison”, after reports that his health had deteriorated.

    Victor Yeimo, 39, who is the international spokesman of the West Papua National Committee, was arrested in the provincial capital of Jayapura in May. He has been charged with treason and inciting violence and social unrest in relation to pro-independence protests that swept the remote, resource-rich region for several weeks in 2019. Yeimo has denied the charges.

    His trial went ahead in August despite repeated requests from his lawyer for a delay on medical grounds, Mary Lawlor, U.N. special rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, said in a statement on Monday. “I’ve seen it before: States deny medical care to ailing, imprisoned human rights defenders, which results in serious illness or death,” said Lawlor. “Indonesia must take urgent steps to ensure the fate does not await Mr Yeimo,” she said, adding that his access to medical care had been restricted and his prison conditions “may have amounted to torture”. Yeimo is being treated at a Jayapura hospital after a court ordered he receive medical attention. Papuan activist Rosa Javiera told a news conference organised by the rights group Amnesty International on Tuesday that Yeimo was suffering from chronic tuberculosis that required continuous medical treatmentt.

    The Indonesian government has used the covid-19 pandemic as a pretext to crack down on West Papuan street protests and to impose online censorship, according to new research published by the human rights watchdog TAPOL. Covid-19 protocols have given more power to the police and military to crush protests but they are not fairly implemented across Indonesia in general. The findings are in a new study, the West Papua 2020: Freedom Of Expression And Freedom Of Assembly Report, in which TAPOL has collated and analysed incidents recorded by West Papuan and Indonesian civil society organisations.

    The West Papua 2020 Report
    The West Papua 2020 Report. Image: Tapol screenshot APR

    https://www.phnompenhpost.com/international/indonesia-faces-scrutiny-over-papua

    This post was originally published on Hans Thoolen on Human Rights Defenders and their awards.

  • By Arjuna Pademme in Jayapura

    Advocates warn that the the involvement of the Indonesian military (TNI) in a food estate programme initiated by the government last year may enable potential human rights violations.

    “Military deployment will be followed by the act of securing land grabbing, for example,” said rights NGO Imparsial director Gufron Mabruri in an online discussion this week.

    “There is the potential for human rights violations to occur, especially if the community resists and confronts the security forces.”

    Such potential for human rights violations, Mabruri said, was confirmed by the absence of any accountable mechanism, Mabruri said.

    The TNI has its own military court to prosecute members suspected of committing crimes.

    However, the military court is closed to the public and is seen as a shield for impunity in many cases.

    ‘Separatist’ stigma a problem
    Mabruri also warned that the stigma of Papuans as alleged “separatists” should be taken into consideration when putting the national soldiers on civil programmes.

    “Moreover, armed groups in Papua are now labeled as terrorist organisations. This will make things escalate quickly when there is a conflict between the TNI and the community,” he said.

    He suggested President Joko Widodo and the House of Representatives evaluate all military engagement practices in various sectors because it would weaken civil institutions.

    Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) researcher M. Haripin also said that the involvement of the military in the food estate project was very problematic, as seen in past involvement.

    “Some might think that this is too presumptuous because the military situation has changed. However, for me even now, the military is still very problematic and we cannot put aside our past history and our present concerns,” Haripin said.

    Indeed, ever since it was launched last year until now, the food estate programme has been under heavy criticism, especially with the involvement of the military in its implementation.

    “There is the risk of creating ‘khaki capital’, or the political economy of the military, in the TNI-supported food estate,” he said.

    “Corporations earn profits while soldiers ensure that everything goes according to plan,” he said.

    Arjuna Pademme is a Tabloid Jubi reporter. Republished with permission.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • By Lenny Tristia Tambun and Novy Lumanauw in Gresik, East Java

    President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has laid the foundation stone for a giant smelter belonging to copper and gold mining firm Freeport Indonesia in the East Java town of Gresik.

    The smelter is built on 103-hectare land at the Manyar Special Economic Zone at a cost of US$3 billion, according to government data.

    Jokowi said the smelter would be able to extract 1.7 tonnes of copper from ores and 6000 tonnes of gold annually.

    “The single-line smelter we are going to build will be the biggest in the world because it has a capacity of extracting 1.7 tonnes of copper a year,” the president said in a ceremony to mark the start of the construction.

    Freeport Indonesia operates the giant copper and gold mine at Grasberg in Papua.

    He added Indonesia had the seventh biggest copper reserves in the world after Chile, Australia, Peru, Russia, Mexico, and the United States.

    “Only a few of us have knowledge about this,” he said.

    Lack of processing facilities
    Jokowi said that despite having mines and mineral reserves, Indonesia could not reap the fullest benefit in the metal industry due to a lack of processing facilities, in comparison to countries like Japan and Spain which have higher value-added components in their manufacturing process.

    “That’s why we built the Freeport smelter here in Gresik,” the president said.

    The Indonesian government has a 51 percent stake in the local unit of US mining giant Freeport McMoRan.

    The construction stage alone is expected to create 40,000 jobs for locals, Jokowi said.

    State-Owned Enterprises Minister Erick Thohir said Freeport Indonesia had been performing well since the government secured a commanding stake on December 21, 2018.

    Freeport’s revenues were estimated to more than double from Rp 50 trillion last year, Thohir said.

    Soaring global copper prices and increased output in Indonesia would add to the pace of the company’s growth, he added.

    “The company booked a net profit of approximately Rp 10 trillion last year and we expect the figures to reach Rp 40 trillion by the end of this year,” Thohir said.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Ministers from Muslim-majority nations to travel to Kabul to discuss women and girls schooling ban

    Foreign ministers from several Muslim-majority countries are planning to go to Kabul in part to urge the Taliban to recognise that the exclusion of women and girls from education is a distortion of the Islamic faith.

    The proposal has the support of western diplomats who recognise that calls from them concerning universal values are going to have less traction with the Taliban than if the call comes from leaders of largely Islamic states.

    Continue reading…

    This post was originally published on Human rights | The Guardian.

  • By Yance Wenda in Jayapura

    A Papuan woman politician has warned Indonesian security forces against restricting women from selling noken — traditional string bags — and other accessories displaying the banned Morning Star flag design at the Papuan National Games (PON XX) venue in Jayapura.

    Orpa Nari, a Papuan People’s Assembly (MRP) member of the Women Workgroup, said the police should not be afraid of “a pattern”.

    “It’s just a pattern,” she said. “None of these mamas [Papuan women] weave the pattern as a way to go against the state.

    “If anything, it’s our identity as Papuans,” Nari told the Papuan newspaper Tabloid Jubi.

    Previously, the security forces reportedly forbade Papuan women from selling any Morning Star-patterned accessories during the Games as they were considered a resistance symbol against the Indonesian state.

    Nari said that Papuan women had been making noken with various patterns — including the Morning Star — for a long time, even before the National Games.

    “It has nothing to do with the Games event. It’s common to find accessories with the Morning Star design made by Papuan women.

    “It’s simply a part of their identity that cannot be forgotten and let go,” she said.

    Supported their families
    Nari added that these women had supported their families through knitting and making accessories.

    “It’s their livelihood. We Papuans know it by heart,” she said.

    MRP chair Timotius Murib said he had received information that residents and supporters wearing clothes and accessories with the Morning Star pattern were not allowed to enter the National Games venue

    “Some people who wore bracelets or clothes with the Morning Star pattern were forbidden from watching the Games.

    “These accessories are common and not just worn by native Papuans,” said Murib.

    Murib hoped that the security forces would not overreact to the phenomenon.

    “Don’t overdo it, it’s just an accessory. Let’s create a good atmosphere during the PON XX and make it a successful event,” he said.

    The two-week-long Games end on Friday.

    Yance Wenda is a Tabloid Jubi reporter. Republished with permission.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • By Desi Purnamawati and Uyu Liman in Jakarta

    Eighty-three covid-19 cases have been reported during the Indonesian National Games (PON-XX) being held in Papua as of yesterday afternoon, says Health Minister Budi Gunadi Sadikin.

    He said evaluation of the Games would improve public health protocols in future.

    “The 83 cases are concentrated among the participants competing in several sports — judo, archery, roller skating, cricket and motocross — as well as originating from a number of provinces (Jakarta, East Java, Central Java and Bali)” Sadikin told an online media conference on community activity restrictions (PPKM).

    According to the ministry’s observation, virus transmission occurred in the lodging as each room was occupied by four people and the PON participants often ate together, the minister said.

    “It will be our evaluation to improve the implementation of health protocols in future events,” he said.

    The implementation of the health protocols could still be improved by giving greater authority to the regional covid-19 handling task forces, he added.

    Furthermore, he said that his ministry had noticed that seven infected athletes had returned to their provinces before the end of their five-day quarantine period.

    One athlete returned to Tarakan City, North Kalimantan Province, two returned to Jambi Province, three to Sidoarjo District, East Java Province, and one to the Special Region of Yogyakarta Province, he said.

    “The President [Joko Widodo] has urged the athletes to be quarantined at their hometowns,” Sadikin said.

    Several standards had been set regarding the implementation of health protocols at the XX PON, including giving adequate authority to the task forces and maintaining distancing among participants at the hotels and hostels both while resting and eating, the minister said.

    Other standards included conducting routine covid-19 PCR tests to identify infected participants faster and keeping isolation centers ready to quarantine patients immediately, he added.

    • Asia Pacific Report notes that the Games were controversial because of repeated calls to postpone them given the public health risks from the covid-19 pandemic.

    Desi Purnamawati and Uyu Liman are reporters with Antara News.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • By Agus Pabika in Jayapura

    President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s visit to Papua last weekend to officially open Indonesia’s National Games (PON XX) and officiate a number of infrastructure projects are ceremonial and will not provide any benefits to the ordinary Papuan people when cases of human rights violations are left unresolved.

    This assessment was made by former political prisoner and Papuan activist Ambrosius Mulait in response to Widodo’s visit which he sees as nothing more than “image building” in the eyes of the ordinary people and the international community.

    “Jokowi came simply to bolster his image, he didn’t come with the genuine intention of resolving human rights,” Mulait told Suara Papua.

    Mulait said that the Indonesian government appeared inconsistent in dealing with the covid-19 pandemic because it wasallowing crowds to gather at National Games events.

    “We are questioning the Jokowi administration’s inconsistency, why given the state of the pandemic in Papua are they continuing with PON activities involving thousands of people?” he asked.

    “It’s surprising, covid-19 cases are already rising, but all of a sudden the figures are deemed to be falling and the PON can be held.”

    The secretary-general of the Papuan Central Highlands Indonesian Student Association (AMPTPI) also criticised the repression and violence by police against Papuan students demonstrating peacefully in front of the United States Embassy in Jakarta on September 30.

    “The police are also racist in their handling of Papua mass actions. Meanwhile they weren’t repressive towards a demonstration at the KPK [Corruption Eradication Commission office] several days ago, and instead gave them space [to demonstrate],” he said.

    Mulait said the state was truly unfair in its treatment of Papuans.

    “The Papuan people continue to be silenced by repressive means, peaceful actions are broken up, protesters are arrested, labeled ‘separatists’, jailed. The way they are handled is very discriminative and racist,” said Mulait.

    Papua student activist Semi Gobay also expressed disappointment. He said that President Widodo had already visited Papua nine times but not one case of human rights violations had been addressed let alone resolved.

    “At the height of the PON XX, he came down to look at noken [traditional woven baskets and bags] made by mama-mama [traditional Papuan women traders]. But the internally displaced people in Nduga and Maybrat, the shooting cases in Puncak, Intan Jaya and the Star Highlands are not dealt with by the Indonesian government under the authority of President Joko Widodo” he said.

    Gobay said this further demonstrated the real face of the government.

    “The president comes and visits and buys lots of noken, but the many conflicts in Papua are not resolved. What’s behind all of this?” he asked.

    “The Indonesian government has no good intentions towards us. All the best in celebrating the PON on the sorrows of the West Papuan nation.”

    Translated by James Balowski of IndoLeft News. The original title of the article was “Tidak Selesaikan Kasus Pelanggaran HAM, Jokowi ke Papua Hanya Cari Muka”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • 3 Mins Read IKEA Indonesia just dropped four new meatless dishes to its menu. Collaborating with homegrown food tech Green Rebel Foods for the new offerings, the move is part of the Swedish furnishing giant’s global push to turn 50% of its restaurants around the world plant-based by 2025.  IKEA has launched new plant-based dishes in the restaurant […]

    The post IKEA Indonesia Adds 4 New Plant-Based Dishes with Local Startup Green Rebel appeared first on Green Queen.

    This post was originally published on Green Queen.