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  • Invoking memories of Darul Islam

    The reports of anxiety and fear as the Taliban marched through to claim rule in Afghanistan and the crescendo of reports of the targeting of women has invoked memories of stories people told me about living under the rule of Kahar Muzakkar’s Darul Islam/Tentara Islam (henceforth DI/TI) in South Sulawesi. This fraction of Indonesia’s post-colonial Islamic state movement, first established by Kartosuwirjo in West Java in the 1950s, held power over much of rural South Sulawesi (including what is now Southeast Sulawesi Province) until the early 1960s. My doctoral research on Sorowako, in the northern mountains of South Sulawesi, concerned the social and economic impacts of a foreign-owned nickel mine that had just been opened by President Suharto. I arrived in 1978, and the local population were still smarting from the forced loss of their land and livelihoods. But when I sat down to yarn with people, they were compelled to tell me also about their suffering under what they termed the ‘gerombolan’ (‘gang’). This area had been close to one of the key centres of Kahar’s movement (Kolaka in Sulawesi Tenggara):  the rebel troops had forcibly moved the people from the western shore of Lake Matano, the end point of the road to Malili on the coast, to a remote location on the wild side of the lake—which the people termed the penyingkiran (evacuation site). They explained to me that the guerrilla fighters wanted to ensure local populations could not be forced to provide sustenance to the guerrillas’ enemy, the Indonesian army (TNI) troops. Local people’s accounts of DI/TI, who lived among them exercising authority and control for over a decade, always feature stories about actions that are harsh, even cruel.

    Islam in Sorowako

    The ‘orang asli Sorowako,‘ as they called themselves, had been Islamised by functionaries from the Kerajaan Luwu deployed as colonial officials by the Dutch after they extended direct control over the interior regions of Sulawesi’s southwestern peninsular around 1906.  From the early 1950s DI/TI forcibly Islamised Christian villagers around Lake Matano who had been relocated there from further up the mountains. Villages and ripening fields on the lake shore were burned as people were forced to flee.

    The text of proclamation of Islamic State of Indonesia on Wikicommons

    Life in the jungle refuge was full of privation, and over the years I learned about the ways the DI/TI impacted on individual lives. The current stories of young Afghani women being forcibly married to Taliban fighters, or people hiding their daughters as the fighters rolled into their towns brought to mind the personal stories of forced marriages to DI/TI fighters recounted by many of my friends in Sorowako. One very independent woman raising her now adult (disabled) son on her own had been forcibly married in this manner. I asked a family member if the marriage lasted after the cease fire with government troops in 1962.  I was told: ‘she pushed the stairs away from the (stilt) house’ i.e. a strong message to the husband ‘don’t come back’. People gossiped about a ‘wrong marriage’ of a friend: wrong according to the rules of the bilateral kinship system which stressess generational relations. Prior to their marriage he had called her ‘aunt’—that is she was the generation above him, not on ‘cousin’ level. Her father, a village leader, married her off quickly to avoid her forcible marriage to a DI/TI soldier. No doubt many of these marriages were polygynous, both within the DI/TI -controlled territory and in their home villages, and this alone would have given parents reason to fear them. Collecting genealogies, I came across quite a few men who had been DI/TI fighters. The charismatic rebel leader Kahar was himself polygynous (practiced poligami) having 9, or some accounts say 12, wives—and this excessive sexuality was an aspect of his hyper-masculinised charisma.

    Photo of Kahar Muzakkar, the leader of the Sulawesi rebellion from 1950-1965. KamielahK on Wikicommons

    There were many stories of kidnapping, especially people from the government-controlled towns who had expertise the rebels desired—such as accountants, teachers and agricultural experts—to set up their alternative administration. Government was in accord with a document establishing shariah law as the basis of the Makalua charter. It contained provisions, similar to that of the Taliban, based on misogynistic readings of Islamic texts, on the fikih (Islamic jurisprudence) that supported a God-ordained male privilege. Women were forced to wear head coverings and live basically domestic lives. The Makalua charter allowed forced polygyny (poligami), indeed people who rejected polygyny could be prosecuted, and no offer of marriage could be refused, save that the man was a juvenile, impotent, diseased or of bad character. It had harsh provisions for regulating relations between the sexes, and a broad interpretation of zina (sexual acts outside marriage): I heard personal accounts from people who witnessed women accused of adultery being buried to the waist and stoned to death (dirajam).  Other people graphically gestured to describe the practice of cutting off hands as punishment for theft.

    Kahar has been described as a Muslim socialist and his rule also expressed a kind of ‘radical egalitarianism’ in that he sought to stamp out the power of Bugis nobility and the cultural trappings of their authority, which were an exercise of power that the pre-Islamic religion deemed ordained by the Gods of the Upper world. The corpus of pre-Islamic beliefs and rituals that validated social hierarchy and noble privilege and power and were divinely ordained and ritual life harkened back to the sacred cycle, La Galigo. DI/TI troops burned the houses of the nobility that symbolically encoded their status, and which housed sacred regalia. They banned syncretic ritual practices, melded with Islamic rituals for birth, death, marriage and activities such as farming and house construction. People of noble birth were targeted. A very confident Bugis noble woman form Malili told me she had been kidnapped as a 10 year- old child and held captive in the jungle ‘sleeping under the trees’ for three years. She recounted that she continuously scolded her captors and refused to bend to their world view. Just a few years ago, a friend who was in a ‘nostalgic’ mode told a story of seeing a DI/TI rebel walk up the stairs of a house and shoot the owner in his doorway, According to her, this was because they were of noble birth.

    What allowed for despotism and misogynistic tyranny?

    What makes this possible? Kahar’s rule over the Islamic state that he proclaimed relied on the Makalua charter, which was ostensibly based on the fikih: their understanding of Islamic law and what they believed to be Syariah. The elevation of a version of Islamic law (understood as God’s law and so not subject to debate) justified cruel summary justice. The Makalua charter and the ideology that it was the direct interpretation of the words of God justified this arbitrary behaviour, including the cruel and arbitrary treatment of women, and notably, control of their sexuality and public movement. This style of textual interpretation that the DI/TI and Taliban share is known in Indonesian as ‘Islam garis keras (hard-line Islam’). Former president and head of NU, Abdurahman Wahid (Gus Dur) reminded us that while the Qu’ran is the word of God it is always known through human interpretation—and scholars of Islam in the many educational institutions throughout Indonesia delight in textual debate

    The people of Sorowako are today very observant Muslims, and acknowledge that the years under DI/TI rule led them to intensify their piety. A common view was that although they professed Islam by the 1950s, they had not been very pious. The threshold for conversion had been very low in South Sulawesi: recite the shahada, renounce eating pork and get circumcised. When I asked whether they supported the rebels, many people responded: yes, because it championed the elevation of Islam. Many are well-educated, working for the mining company or in other middle-class occupations, and their modernist and tolerant mode of Islamic practice is of the kind common to Indonesia’s urban middle classes. The village imam stressed an important point, from their contemporary understanding of piety. He said that the DI/TI compelled women to wear head covering: the women today, including young women, all wear head-covering (jilbab), but now it has more meaning as they do it from their own religious knowledge.

    Memory activism—why not DI/TI?

    The DI/TI came soon after the very traumatic events of the Japanese occupation, which is remembered as very brutal in this area. It also followed the 1947 Westerling massacres of the anti-colonial struggle. Memory activism is a notable political movement in in contemporary Indonesia, much of it focussing on the brutal mass killings of accused communists in 1965-6, associated with the power struggle that resulted in Suharto assuming the presidency. After his fall in 1998, memories of the suffering and lingering claims of injustice rapidly surfaced, especially among local populations (and especially in East Java) with remembrance of unmasked mass graves and slaughter sites serving as mnemonic devices to keep those memories alive. In Sorowako memories of the years of suffering under DI/TI go very deep and have not been supplanted by the more recent traumatic memories of the loss of their land and livelihoods under the Suharto regime’s foreign investment provisions. They do, however, acknowledge that the discourse of the threat of communism that was deployed by the New Order as a form of social and political control constrained their courage to oppose their dispossession to make way for the foreign-owned mine. A group of young people are now exploring the history of their community, including its’ history and culture before the development of the project and its associated suffering.  They reported the same experience that I did when I asked about the past: the old people wish to recount their suffering under DI/TI.

    Related

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    V. Arianti and Muh. Taufiqurrohman 31 August, 2021

    The failure to address the events of the DI/TI years continue to have political consequences today.  A descendant of Kahar Muzakkar has won political office, for example, on platforms that echo some of the tenets of Kahar’s movement and calling on the deceased Kahar’s enduring charisma. In the case of Sorowako the Christian Karongsi’e, who prior to the 1950s lived in a neighbouring village on the shores of Lake Matano, began to return to the mining town that had grown up on the shores of the lake. Their village had been burned at the same time as Sorowako and they had been forcibly Islamised and taken to the refuge site (so as not to provide assistance to government troops). In around 1960 they had been rescued from the penyingkiran (evacuation site) by the TNI (Indonesian army) and taken to Malili. From there they dispersed into Central Sulawesi—and were fearful to return until after Reformasi. They trickled back and established a settlement (considered illegal by the local government and the mining company) and pressed claims for compensation for their lands, forcibly abandoned during the DI/TI period and now incorporated into the mine concession area (used for residences and a golf course). The land ‘compensation’ has been controversial since the 1970s, but the company considers the process complete with the group who self-identify as the orang asli Sorowako, who are Muslim. They have had difficulty gaining formal recognition of their claims to indigeneity and for consequent privileges in the mining community.

    The Karongsi’e who have come back since 1998 argue that they have been dispossessed by the mining development and their claims have been taken up by international and national NGOs who support their status as the indigenous people in East Luwu. These claims are accepted by the current local government. A 2016 report of KOMNASHAM (Indonesian Commission in Human Rights) on’ indigenous people in forest areas’ focused on the Karongsi’e to the exclusion of the orang asli Sorowako (even though the groups are linked through kinship and marriage, language and shared history in the pre-colonial and colonial eras). The erroneous description in that report draws on accounts of the historical experience of the orang asli Sorowako at the hands of the mining company, confusingly attributing this experience to Karongsi’e. Significantly, it fails to account for their fundamental dispossession by the DI/TI. They are represented as dispossessed by the mining development. The KOMNASHAM report follows the ‘script’ set out by the AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, the principle advocacy group for customary rights), which calls for  ‘inventorising’ claims,  including mapping graves. The identity of Karongsi’e as Christian is downplayed as adherence to a world religion does not fit the AMAN script. Meanwhile, the people of Sorowako regularly travel back to the cemetery at the penyingkiran, to clean graves before important Islamic holidays. There are a lot of graves, many of babies and children. Like people in areas of political killings in 1964-5, the act of clearing their loved ones’ graves triggers the memories of the years of suffering under DI/TII rule.

    But the violence of the DI/TI which occurred in South and Southeast Sulawesi (and linked movements in West Java and Aceh), a quotidian occurrence over around 15 years, have not been the subject of contemporary memory activism. Perhaps current political sensitivities around political Islam preclude addressing the trauma of those years. But reports from Afghanistan and contemporary memory activism teach us that memories of trauma run deep, as I and others have found among the Sulawesi survivors of DI/TI.

    The author has published extensively on this topic over many decades. Not all that scholarship has been digitised yet, so we encourage readers to seek out, in particular, her 1983 journal article   “Living in the hutan: jungle village life under the Darul Islam” Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, vol 17. pp. 208-229. Professor Robinson has also recently published Mosques and Imams:  Everyday Islam in Eastern Indonesia (2020) Singapore: NUS press.

    The post Invoking memories of Darul Islam appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Wenda blames nurse’s death on Indonesian military crackdown for Papuan mining, palm oil

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    The United Liberation Movement of West Papua has blamed the Indonesian military over the attack at a hospital in Kiwirok, near the Papua New Guinean border, in which a nurse was killed.

    Interim president Benny Wenda of the ULMWP has issued a statement in response to accusations by the Indonesian authorities against the West Papuan army, saying that the upsurge in violence is because of the militarisation of the region to protect business and a “destroy them” policy directive from Jakarta against West Papuan resistance.

    Indonesia has accused the West Papuan army of attacking the hospital and killing nurse Gabriella Meliani in Kiwirok.

    But Wenda claimed, according to sources he has spoken to, the clash was started by an Indonesian migrant doctor threatening people with a pistol.

    “This triggered a West Papua Army investigation. A nurse fled from the scene and fell down a slope, fatally injuring herself,” said Wenda.

    Indonesia had deployed more than 21,000 new troops since December 2018, displacing tens of thousands of civilians from Nduga, Intan Jaya, Puncak Jaya and Sorong.

    Not keeping Papuans safe
    “These troops are not there to defend Indonesia’s ‘sovereignty’ or keep my people safe; they are there to protect illegal mining operations, to defend the palm oil plantations that are destroying our rainforest, and to help build the Trans-Papua Highway that will be used for Indonesian business – not for the people of West Papua,” Wenda said.

    “The Indonesian government is creating violence and chaos to feed these troops. As the head of the Indonesian Parliament, Bambang Soesatyo, ordered, ‘destroy them first. We will discuss human rights matters later’.

    “He reiterated this statement [on Monday], and was backed by Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Mahfud Md.”

    Benny Wenda
    United Liberation Movement of West Papua leader Benny Wenda on a visit to New Zealand in 2013. Image: Del Abcede/APR

    The killing of Pastor Yeremia Zanambani and his two brothers in April last year was an example of how this policy worked.

    “Indonesian soldiers murdered the two brothers in April last year. Months later troops tortured and killed the pastor,” Wenda said.

    Indonesian soldiers to blame
    “In both cases, the military blamed the West Papua Army for the attacks – but Indonesia’s own human rights commission and military courts found that Indonesian soldiers were to blame. A similar pattern will unfold with the events in Kiwirok.”

    Wenda said Indonesia must allow the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights into West Papua to investigate this violence and produce an independent, fact-based report, in line with the call of 84 international states.

    “Indonesia’s ban on media, human rights groups and aid agencies from entering West Papua must be immediately lifted. If Indonesia is telling the truth about these events, why continue to hide West Papua from the world?,” he said.

    “This war will never end until President Widodo sits down with me to solve this issue. This is not about ‘development’, about how many bridges and roads are built.

    “This is about our sovereignty, our right to self-determination — our survival.”

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Regional countries react to AUKUS and Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine ambition

    Southeast Asian countries have raised concerns that Canberra’s decision to develop and procure eight nuclear-powered submarines under a trilateral security partnership with the United Kingdom and United States, announced on 15 September and collectively known as AUKUS, will spark a regional arms race. The nuclear submarine initiative signals an end to Australia’s contract with French […]

    The post Regional countries react to AUKUS and Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine ambition appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • Indonesia’s sugar scandals

    As with rice, Indonesia experiences high sugar prices. Domestic sugar prices can be three times the average international price. Near the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak last year, sugar prices rose a further 25 percent in some areas. Consumer sugar prices differ substantially between different regions, but even seemingly low prices are still high compared internationally. These inflated prices make for big profit margins, especially for importers. Indonesia imports over two thirds of its sugar. Although there are anti-sugar import protests, they do not produce the same sort of sensationalised outrage associated with rice imports.

    Calls to reform Indonesia’s sugar trade often appear in media. Proponents for lowering prices on behalf of consumers and commercial users blame the government’s opaque import licensing and quota system for creating an uncompetitive sugar market. They claim allowing greater quantities of imported sugar does not lower prices as just a few groups have permission to import. Their efforts to reform the import license and quota system to lower sugar prices for consumers have little influence because those who profit from how things work now have few reasons to accept change.

    Indonesia’s own sugar farmers and millers, represented by assertive and politically connected lobbying associations, want to preserve already high prices. So too do select bureaucrats, politicians, conglomerates, and their oligarchs, as well as state-owned enterprises that make windfalls from the structure of the existing sugar market. But perhaps less obviously, Indonesia’s security institutions benefit from sugar capital. They have profited from sugar since the birth of the Republic. Addressing high sugar prices requires addressing the sensitive issue of reforming security force financing practices that have been institutionalised since decolonisation. If modes of sugar patronage institutionalised in tumultuous periods of Indonesian history remain unaddressed, incremental changes to sugar-related regulations can only have a piecemeal effect on prices.

    The roots of sugar capital

    Enclaves of sugar production and processing fuelled the early colonial state’s capitalist development. Sugar production enabled the emergence of private Chinese and European entrepreneurs on Java, some of whom went onto become the entire region’s wealthiest oligarchs. Given sugar’s high value, the Dutch forced its production among other cash crops in the Culture System (Cultuurstelsel, 1830-1870). Before the Great Depression, Java was consistently the world’s second largest sugarcane producer and exporter after Cuba.

    Sugar produced wealth for some but also cultivated insecurity. Declining sugar prices and sugar permit exceptionalism formed the foundations for ethnic violence that still lingers. Rigid state allocation of land for sugar production enabled conditions for famine. “Sugar lords” invested their profits into opium production. Crime such as theft and holdups increased around the trade of sugar. Thugs became more prominent in villages with elites using them to expand and protect land used for sugar cultivation as well as to discipline labour. Villagers that protested about falling sugar prices as well as forced land conversion could find their crops torched, or alternatively they burnt down plantations’ sugarcane crops in acts of resistance. In response, colonial police became deeply entangled with sugar. Dutch police (Marechaussee) battalions were posted to Java to curb sugarcane theft as well as arson attacks on sugar plantations. After the Japanese occupation began, military police (Kempetai) took over sugar plantations and coercively extracted from wealthy sugar-rich families.

    Stamp from 1960 showing a railway track running through sugarcane fields (public domain)

    Newly independent Indonesia was similarly dependent on sugar. After the Second World War and the National Revolution, Indonesia had less than half of its sugar processing capacity. Early governments needed to generate revenue to engage in trade for necessary machinery and textiles, which they did by reviving the decimated sugar industry. Private smallholder sugarcane farming occurred but its scale remained minor. Revival really meant securing and funding plantations. Revival also meant the sugar industry’s colonial-era sins, such as heinous working conditions and extortion, were largely unaddressed. Many state officials became entangled with private capital to take over Dutch sugar enterprises. Independence leaders and officials’ quick decisions made to support the national economy meant the structure of colonial sugar cultivation and processing was retained during decolonisation (Indonesianisasi).

    While there was structural continuity, political tensions among workers at sugar plantations found new avenues for expression. During the “be prepared” (bersiap) period of the revolution (August 1945 to December 1946), long pent-up resentment felt at some sugar factories erupted in violence and murder. Sugar plantation workers became deeply involved in the new nation’s political change and many later returned to work at plantations as hardened revolutionaries. Sugar plantation unions, which colonisers had crushed, emerged again with connections to ideologically driven political parties and Islamic organisations. During this period, the independent state was often without the means to sustain control for extracting revenue in sugar enclaves. In the years immediately after the National Revolution, the amount of sugarcane plantation destroyed or stolen reached between 15 and 20 percent annually. Like its colonial predecessors, the newly independent government’s attempts to maintain control included assigning soldiers and police to protect sugar plantations.

    Military involvement in sugar became even more entrenched after plantation nationalisation and Sukarno’s authoritarian turn in 1957. As newly formed state sugar plantation companies gained control over formerly Dutch enterprises, soldiers became more heavily involved to supervise financial administration, and deal with land and labour disputes. Military leaders needed to find money for their underfunded units or departments and sugar plantations were a useful source of revenue. The practice of soldiers extracting from the sugar trade occurred beyond plantations, too. A prominent example of military engagement in the sugar trade in this period involved a future president, Suharto.

    From the late 1940s, Suharto—then a Lieutenant Colonel – lent army trucks to businessmen for sugar transport. He also purchased, or even sometimes seized, sugar from mills to sell onto middlemen. Later in 1957, while commanding a deep-water port in the city of Semarang, Suharto collaborated with future oligarchs such as Sudono Salim (Liem Sioe Liong) and Bob Hasan (The Kiang Seng) to smuggle and export sugar to Singapore. According to biographer David Jenkins “extortion and straight-out theft” describes Suharto’s operation at the port in those years. Suharto’s racketeering even meant he was nearly dismissed from his position by army chief of staff General Nasution.

    Suharto with Let. Gen. Leo Lopulisa at a North Sumateran military food project in 1968

    Once Suharto became president, his militarised government further entangled itself with sugar production and processing to generate revenue. The government created state-owned sugar plantation companies out of the nationalised Dutch estates. These companies milled most domestically sourced sugar even as private smallholders became more important to overall sugar production. But really, sugar producing smallholders participated in state directed sugar distribution chains despite a veneer of change. The New Order government initially maintained a long-term system of forcing sugarcane farmers to rent land to mills. A regulation that was introduced to increase production efficiency by ending forced land rental, also had the effect of enabling village elites to dispossess smallholders of land. Those elites then sold sugar into the same state-owned mills. Moreover, soldiers and the police, in conjunction with irrigation officials, determined allocation of smallholder lands for sugarcane production.

    Further up the sugar chain, the National Logistics Agency (Badan Urusan Logistik, Bulog), partly led by former soldiers, absorbed output from mills and became the sole trader of sugar. Bulog licenced sugar import and distribution contracts to Suharto’s cronies, including conglomerates controlled by his children as well as Sudono Salim. These contracts were very lucrative as Indonesia became, in the 1980s, one of the largest sugar importers in the World. This dominance meant Bulog had an enormous influence on prices.

    Post Suharto sugar marketcraft

    After Suharto’s downfall, the longstanding dynamic of prosperity and crime continued to coalesce around sugar. The removal of Bulog’s  monopolies in 1999 meant imported sugar readily flowed into Indonesia and caused a sharp price decline. This new competitiveness caused a shock to sugarcane farmers as well as mills, represented by their associations. The emergence of agricultural commodity farming and trading associations are feature of post Suharto democratisation. There are many such associations for sugar.

    The interests of diverse sugar associations, such as the Association of Indonesian Sugarcane Farmers (APTRI), the Association of Sugar and Flour Entrepreneurs (APEGTI), and the Indonesian Sugar Association (AGI), the latter with its membership comprised mostly of state-owned plantations, aligned in response to the price decline. They aggressively lobbied the government for re-introduction of sugar import restrictions and were successful in 2002. Soon after, just several state-owned plantations were legally able to bring sugar into the country. The government reintroduced these sugar import restrictions just as it was introducing decentralisation reforms that meant local governments gained more power to act in the sugar trade. The subsequent confusing regulatory landscape and the sidelining of private sugar merchants that prospered briefly after Suharto’s downfall led to a re-emergence of sugar smuggling.

    Near the estuary of the Asahan River in North Sumatra is a small port almost opposite Malaysia’s Port Klang, a special trade zone around 180 kilometres away. Many such “veins” for smuggling contraband exist along the coast, but from this small port many thousands of tons of sugar flowed into Indonesia illegally after the re-introduction of import restrictions. The small port lays next to a highway. After unloading, workers quickly transferred contraband sugar onto waiting trucks and whisked it towards metropoles to become mixed into value chains trading legitimate sugar.

    For many smugglers, the possibility of finding fortune in smuggled sugar was worth the minimal risk of jailtime. Making illegally imported sugar legitimate was not particularly problematic. One regular method included smugglers paying officials to create permits to legalise sugar after it was already in Indonesia. A reporter aptly said the restrictive sugar regulations “crumbled like donut dough in the hands of an official wanting an envelope (angpau)”. Moreover, the threat from the state for enforcement was not asymmetrical. A high-ranking customs official near the port claimed there were only 20 officers to deal with a nearby city full of smugglers. One junior leader at the port believed thugs (preman) would react strongly if their livelihoods dependent on sugar trade became disturbed.

    But there were some arrests. One notable sugar-related arrest in the early post-Suharto period was a Golkar politician from South Sulawesi, Nurdin Halid. He held prominent leadership positions. Aside from being one of the Golkar party’s main leaders, he was head of the All-Indonesian Football Association (PSSI) (2003-2011), as well as Indonesia’s Cooperative Council (Dewan Koperasi Indonesia, Dekopin)(1999-2004, 2009-2019)—a representative body for savings and small loan banks. While a member of the parliamentary commission on trade Halid, along with his brother and several cronies, took part in a swindle involving more than 73,000 tonnes of illegally imported sugar. The police, rather than the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) that was then operating at a more limited capacity, were involved in prosecuting Halid’s sugar smuggling case. Eventually the illegal sugar import charges against Halid were dropped, but he was nevertheless jailed for other commodity trading cons.

    Further details about Halid’s links with sugar and the police reveals a more complicated picture. Just after Halid went to prison in September 2007, thieves stole 3,000 tonnes of his sugar from South Sulawesi Customs. In addition to the customs warehouse manager and supervisor, the police investigated one of their own, a midranking officer described as a witness to the theft. After prison Halid was elected head of Dekopin for two more five-year terms over the decade 2009 to 2019 and was only recently ousted trying for another. A prominent member of Dekopin is the police employee cooperative (Induk Koperasi Kepolisian, Inkoppol), which is itself involved in the sugar trade.

    Police and military employee cooperatives invest in raw sugar importation. These investments are partly justified in terms of helping control consumer prices as well as supporting their budgets. Their participation in sugar importation is above board and, despite criticism from national auditing authorities and members of civil society, occurred with ministerial approval. A 2005 review for police finance reform even saw increasing revenue at police cooperatives as a solution to help curb other sources of informal financing while addressing the institution’s budget shortfalls. Police and military cooperatives help import raw sugar from overseas for processing with several members of the Indonesian Refined Sugar Association (AGRI) which formed in 2004 soon after restrictive import controls were introduced.

    Polda Metro Jaya in the Sudirman Central Business District (SCBD). The SCBD is a development of the Artha Graha group. Cropped photo by Dino Adyansyah on Flickr. (CC BY 2.0)

    Conglomerates owned by oligarchs, some of whom have long established links to security forces, fund these sugar-refining enterprises and have significant access to an exclusive domestic sugar market. Membership of sugar markets regulates companies means to trade. Politically connected sugar players themselves sometimes even own commodity trading markets. One such figure is Tomy Winata, a tycoon with links to security forces and political parties. His conglomerate Artha Graha owns the Jakarta Commodities Market (Pasar Komoditas Jakarta, PKJ) designated by the government for large-scale sugar trade auctions. In addition to owning a government-designated market for sugar trading, Artha Graha owns one of the companies that trades there, which is also a member of AGRI, and is a major sugar importer in conjunction with Inkoppol.

    AGRI members’ appear likely to benefit further from regulation stemming from the controversial Omnibus Job Creation Law (Undang Undang Cipta Kerja No.11/2020). Sugar related regulation in the law and Ministry of Trade regulations could mean only state plantations and large industrial-scale sugar traders, nicknamed “samurai”, are able access sugar import licenses. Many of the eleven “samurai” businesses are members of AGRI. Powerful Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, and former General, Luhut Panjaitan said, “Sugar will be imported only by the food industry that needs it. So it’s not from other people so it doesn’t become a game”. Some industrial users of refined sugar, along with Indonesian Entrepreneur’s Association, worry that this new regulation goes against previous attempts to enable more competition, and will lead to further entrenchment of AGRI members’ dominance in the sugar trade. But before accepting the two differing positions as opposite sides in a hypothetical debate, it is worth asking who is actually willing to compete with entrenched players in Indonesia’s sugar markets?

    ‘A fuss about sugar’, the cover of Tempo magazine, No 39, 22 Nov 1980

    At the subnational level, newer sugar traders have links to coercive power, sometimes including security institutions beyond the police and military. For example, according to some research, former members of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) connected to former two-time Governor (2007-2012 and 2017-2018) Irwandi Yusuf, were awarded many of the province’s sugar quota licenses between 2007 and 2012. Importers more removed from the former Governor’s immediate patronage network then purchased these licenses with agreements that allowed the original holders cuts, without having to involve themselves in sugar distribution. These relations of sugar patronage are part of a broader “combatants to contractors” transition also found in Aceh’s construction sector.

    Other new sugar players use existing political connections that competitors lack. For example, former Minister of Agriculture Amran Sulaiman allegedly sped up the approval process for the construction of what is now now the largest sugar plantation and processing factory in Indonesia. From 2016, the government requested tender submissions for an enormous new sugar plantation and factory located in Bombana, Southeast Sulawesi. The government promoted this new plantation and factory as necessary in terms of reducing dependency on foreign sugar. Of the 300 submissions to acquire the rights for sugar the plantation, Sulaiman’s cousin and former deputy treasurer for the Jokowi-Maruf Amin presidential campaign, Andi Syamsuddin Arsyad (also known as ‘Crazy Rich’ Haji Isam), a coal magnate, gained the license.

    In October 2020, President Jokowi opened the sugar factory in Bombana declaring, with Sulaiman and Haji Isam present: “This is courage. Courage to open an investment and business in this place. This is what we must appreciate and value.” His remarks sounded as though he had arrived at a Wild West frontier with land of little value. Wealth from small-scale gold mining on the land converted for sugar plantation actually flowed into the area’s off-budget economy. But the conversion of thousands of hectares for sugar production and the factory dispossessed farmers who valued the land.

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    “Can Indonesia have food security without security?” Colum Graham looks at who really benefits from the government’s recent measures to address Indonesia’s food crisis.

    Colum Graham 04 June, 2020

    Available coverage of the sugar plantation development at Bombana suggests there was an absence of protest from the dispossessed. But elsewhere recently, land conflict at sugar plantations has been intense. One recent case of land conflict in Tulang Bawang regency in the province of Lampung illustrates the power of plantations backed by security forces with stakes in sugar capital. For a long time, the land now used by the Bangun Nusa Indah Lampung (BNIL) company has been a site of conflict. In the early 1990s, security forces allegedly used gunfire to herd elephants from a national park through nearby transmigrant villages to make residents flee and assist BNIL to claim the land. Reports from human rights organisations say villagers had to sign miserly compensation agreements, which they only later discovered were for land, or face torture.

    Tensions between BNIL and surrounding communities, many comprised of transmigrant villagers, were fraught for two decades before boiling over in 2015. Given sugar’s high price and its national prioritisation, some companies use it to replace other cash crops. BNIL even wanted to replace palm oil in its plantation with sugarcane. But then-Regent of Tulang Bawang Hanan Rozak, now a member of national parliament, refused BNIL’s request to convert palm oil land for sugar production because their application did not include an environmental impact assessment.

    The Regent’s refusal became entangled with broader longstanding communal grievance about the legitimacy of BNIL’s land claim and threats to employment. Emboldened, thousands of aggrieved members of the “Farmers Union of BNIL Eviction Victims” attempted to occupy the plantation. Protests about BNIL even reached the presidential palace in Jakarta. In October 2016, conflict between members of the farmer union occupying the plantation and ‘Self-Sufficient Community Security Forces’ (Pam Swakarsa) protecting it erupted. Dozens of motorbikes and security posts were torched. With the clashes serving as additional justification, the actual police moved in, disbursed the occupiers, and arrested the accused ringleaders of the occupation including a charismatic priest Sugianto, who reportedly attempted to ensure occupation was nonviolent.

    While we might look at this case in isolation as reported, we should see it as part of a broader pattern of sugar politics. Much about this disbursal of Farmers Union of BNIL Victims by the police reproduces the long-term relations between security forces and plantations that we have seen earlier in this brief chronology of the political economy of sugar in Indonesia.


    Nowadays, BNIL cultivates sugarcane.

    What is new?

    Aside from the emergence of representative sugar business associations in the post Suharto democratic landscape, then Regent Hanan Rozak’s rejection of BNIL’s land conversion request in 2015 might indicate potential separation between the power of sugar capital and political decisions in one regency of Lampung province. But further analysis of the province’s elections indicate sugar capital actually saturates its politics.

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    Indonesia’s agro nationalism in the pandemic

    “Can Indonesia have food security without security?” Colum Graham looks at who really benefits from the government’s recent measures to address Indonesia’s food crisis.

    Colum Graham 04 June, 2020

    Just one hundred kilometres southeast of the BNIL sugar plantation by road is another owned by the Sugar Group. Ridho Ficardo, the son of one of Sugar Group’s directors, became the youngest ever Governor of Lampung in 2014 at 33 years of age. The company, famous for its popular Gulaku shelf-product found in Indomaret and most grocery stores, funded Ridho’s costly campaign to have someone in power to regulate on its behalf. In the most recent 2018 Lampung gubernatorial election, despite their man Ridho running as incumbent, the company backed the eventual winner, Arinal Djunaidi, too.

    But that news of sugar scandals even appears at least allows for recognition of what is problematic. Corruption within Indonesia’s state-owned sugar plantations in the last decade, such as sugar distribution contracts and tender process bribery involving plantation bureaucrats, has frequently appeared in the news. Beyond the case of Nurdin Halid, other prominent politicians’ careers have recently ended because of underhanded dealings in the sugar trade. For instance, Irman Gusman, former speaker (2009-2016) of the Regional Representative Council (DPD), received a four-and-a-half-year sentence in prison (later reduced to three) in 2017 for accepting bribes for sugar purchasing licenses in West Sumatera.

    More prominently, former Minister for Trade Enggartiasto Lukita (2016-2019) was linked to bribery for sugar auction permits in a recent corruption case. In the trial of former Golkar parliamentarian Bowo Sidik Pangarso—prominent for planned “dawn attack” vote buying in the 2019 elections and now himself in prison for fertilizer bribery—a witness accused the former Trade Minister of offering a bribe to Pangarso for securing PKJ as the designated government sugar auctioning market. When questioned about the accusation Lukita denied involvement, but just a few months later he lost his position in Jokowi’s second term cabinet without clear public explanation.

    Rather than see such sugar scandals—be they land conflicts, instances of corruption, collusion, or high prices—in isolation, recognising the context that enabled them is useful for understanding possibilities for moving forward. The effects of decisions about sugar made during tumultuous periods in Indonesian history linger into the contemporary era. Progress may mean political leaders’ revise decisions made long ago in totally different economic contexts and disrupt entrenched sugar patronage networks. Unwinding relations of sugar patronage is all the more difficult without also reforming security force financing. Further, lowering high sugar prices may not be a useful goal in terms of public health. Diabetes and other sugar related illnesses are increasingly prevalent in Indonesia. Leaders and officials will want to make quick decisions about these difficult issues as they have done in the past. But sidestepping sugar’s actual political economy and its roots as too difficult may render any future reforms toothless.

    The post Indonesia’s sugar scandals appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • The Right to Clean Air in Jakarta

    It seems utterly beyond debate but acknowledging legal rights to clean air has assumed the makings of a slow march over the years.  The 1956 Clean Air Act in Britain arose from the lethal effects of London’s 1952 killer smog, which is said to have taken some 12,000 lives.  The Act granted powers to establish smoke-free zones and subsidise householders to shift to the use of cleaner fuels (gas, electricity, smokeless solid fuel).

    There is certainly no shortage of advocates for the self-evident point that clean air is vital.  Some of this has been reduced – at least historically – to an issue about the non-smoker’s wish not to have the air clouded by the selfish actions of a smoker.  But this is small beer when compared to the general levels of global pollution that keeps the Grim Reaper busy on an annual basis. According to the World Health Organization, air pollution kills 7 million or so people each year, with 9 out of 10 people breathing air “that exceeds WHO guideline limits containing high levels of pollutants, with low- and middle-income countries suffering from the highest exposures.”

    In 2019, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment David R. Boyd noted approvingly that a majority of States had, be it through their constitutions, statutes and regional treaties, recognised the right to a healthy environment.  But recognition for such a right on a global level remained an unfulfilled object.  The UN General Assembly, for instance, may have adopted a range of resolutions on the right to clean water, but never on the right to clean air.  This is despite such a right being, according to Boyd, “implicit in a number of international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration to Human Rights (right to adequate standard of living), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (right to life) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (right to health).”

    This month, a flutter of interest was caused by a ruling in the Central Jakarta District Court on a lawsuit lodged two years before accusing the Indonesian government of unlawfully permitting air pollution in the capital to exceed permissible, healthy limits.  Citizens such as Istu Prayogi, who had never so much as touched a cigarette in their lives, joined the suit after his lungs revealed the sort of lung damage that would arise from being a heroic, persistent smoker.

    The unanimous decision by the three-judge panel found that the seven officials concerned, including President Joko Widodo, three cabinet ministers and the governors of Jakarta, Banten and West Java were negligent in not upholding environmental standards.  As Duta Baskara, one of the panel members observed, “They have been negligent in fulfilling the rights of citizens to a good and healthy environment.”  The judges, however, dismissed the applicants’ submission claiming that the president had violated human rights.

    The court directed that the seven officials take serious action to guarantee the rights of Jakarta’s residents by improving air-quality regulations and implementing measures to protect human health, the environment and ecosystems informed by science and technology.  Environmental laws would also have to be policed more rigorously, along with the imposition of sanctions for offenders.

    The scale of this effort is hard to exaggerate.  On June 4, 2019, Jakarta registered the worst air quality in the world, if one takes the readings of the air quality monitoring app AirVisual as accurate.  At 210 on the Air Quality Index (AQI), the city keeps ahead of the pack of other polluters such as New Delhi, Beijing and Dubai.

    Rapporteur Boyd also offered his services to the 32 applicants, writing in his supporting brief that, “Protecting human rights from the harmful effects of air pollution is a constitutional and legislative obligation for governments in Indonesia, not an option.”  The director of the Indonesian Forum for the Environment, Nur Hidayati, affirmed this view to The Jakarta Post in early June that breathing “clean air is our right that the government has to fulfil.”

    These are not positions plucked out of some speculative realm of legal reasoning.  The right to clean air in Indonesia is guaranteed by such legal documents as the country’s 1945 Constitution and the 1999 Law on Environmental Protection and Management.  But the writ of law is not always a guarantee of its policing.

    Before the September decision, Jakarta’s governor, Anies Baswedan, did not feel that a ruling against the authorities would cause much fuss.  As the governor’s climate change envoy Irvan Pulunga explained, “The governor doesn’t see this lawsuit as a disturbance to the government’s work but a vehicle for collaboration.”  Pulungan also insisted that improvements had been made to the city’s air quality over the course of two years.

    This tune coming from the office of president has been somewhat different, more a case of fleeing rather than addressing a problem.  In part, this is understandable, given that Jakarta has become a city of nightmares for policy makers, urban planners and the authorities.  Few such concentrations of humanity on the planet are as plagued by environmental concerns.  To debilitating air pollution can be added flooding, regular seismic activity and gradual subsidence.

    Only a month after the lawsuit was filed, the president proposed relocating the capital to another spot to be built in East Kalimantan on the island of Borneo.  “The burden Jakarta is holding right now,” he claimed at the time, “is too heavy as the centre of governance, business, finance, trade and services.” Such moves promise to abandon one problem by creating another, given the risks posed to the environment of East Kalimantan.

    Showing a spirit not exactly collaborative in nature, an appeal against the ruling is expected by the government.  Jakarta’s governor, in particular, finds himself facing a range of orders from the court, including designing environmental “strategies” and policies to mitigate the air pollution” under the direction of the supervision of the Home Affairs Minister.

    Modest as it is, the victory for the applicants in the Central Jakarta District Court shows, at the very least, that courts remain an increasingly important forum to force the hand of legislatures in ensuring that something so elementarily vital is not just seen as a right but enforced as one.

    The post The Right to Clean Air in Jakarta first appeared on Dissident Voice.

    This post was originally published on Dissident Voice.

  • Covid-19 crisis a pretext for West Papua online, offline repression, says Tapol

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    The Indonesian government has used the covid-19 pandemic as a pretext to crack down on West Papuan street protests and to impose online censorship, according to new research published by the human rights watchdog TAPOL.

    Covid-19 protocols have given more power to the police and military to crush protests but they are not fairly implemented across Indonesia in general.

    Peaceful demonstrators, student activists, West Papuan and Indonesian political activist groups, human rights lawyers and defenders and individual civilians experienced extreme repression during 2020 in West Papua and outside West Papua.

    The West Papua 2020 Report
    The West Papua 2020 Report. Image: Tapol screenshot APR

    The findings are in a new study, the West Papua 2020: Freedom Of Expression And Freedom Of Assembly Report, in which TAPOL has collated and analysed incidents recorded by West Papuan and Indonesian civil society organisations.

    The report includes specific recommendations for the Indonesian government and the international community.

    “Online and offline repression in 2020 left almost no space in which West Papuans, or West Papua-related issues, or protest in general, could be freely conducted,” said Pelagio Doutel of TAPOL.

    Doutel called on the Indonesian government to desist from using its own covid-19 protocols to stop free expression, especially treason charges which were in almost all cases “disproportionate” to alleged offences.

    Call to uphold human rights
    He also called on international groups to ensure that the Indonesian government fulfilled its legal obligations by upholding human rights and not arbitrarily criminalising West Papuans.

    The report details repression, consisting of arbitrary dispersals, arbitrary arrests, terror and intimidation, internet shutdowns or cyber attacks against those speaking out in support of West Papua’s self-determination and against the Indonesian government’s treatment of West Papuans.

    The Indonesian police and military were responsible for most of the repression but some actions were carried out by Indonesian right-wing reactionary militias, academic institutions and civilian administrative authorities.

    Regions such as West Papua have seen increasing numbers of the security forces deployed on the streets.

    Security forces arrested as many as 443 people. Of this number, 297 were arrested in West Papua, with 146 people arrested outside West Papua.

    The authorities charged 18 people with treason, all of whom were West Papuans.

    Various arbitrary dispersals took place during protests about West Papua, with dozens of intimidation and harassment incidents taking place before and during protest dispersals.

    Intimidation and harassment
    Intimidation and harassment also took place online.

    Many West Papua-related public discussions that were held online were attacked by unknown individuals with the intention of disrupting them, and event speakers received intimidating phone calls and threatening messages.

    Protests in West Papua continued in 2020 due to ongoing issues of political prisoners, arrested during 2019, and the renewal of the special autonomy law (otsus, otonomi khusus) in West Papua.

    Protests against the Omnibus Law were also held in Indonesia in general, including in West Papua.

    Trials of several high profile Papuan political prisoners from the 2019 West Papua Uprising took place at the beginning of 2020.

    As a result, many street protests and public discussions were held to support and demand the release of political prisoners.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Inquiry needed into Australia’s silence on West Papuan massacre, human rights groups say

    Revelations that Australia knew about atrocities by Indonesian military but did nothing are ‘deeply disturbing’, Human Rights Watch says

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    Human rights groups say revelations that Australia sat on its hands after learning of Indonesian military atrocities against West Papuan demonstrators are “deeply disturbing” and should prompt an independent investigation.

    A newly released unredacted intelligence report, shared with the Guardian, shows the Australian government had compelling evidence that the Indonesian military fired live rounds indiscriminately into a group of unarmed West Papuan demonstrators on the island of Biak on 6 July 1998.

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    This post was originally published on Human rights | The Guardian.

  • Criminalisation of activists blamed for Indonesia’s declining democracy

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    The criminalisation of activists — including those in West Papua — in 2019 and 2020 has been cited as one of the factors for the decline in the quality of democracy in Indonesia.

    Based on a report by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), democracy in Indonesia scored its worst figure ever with a score of 6.3 and was placed 64th out of 167 countries.

    Advocacy Team for Democracy (TAUD) member Teo Reffelsen said that the criminalisation of activists contributed to Indonesia’s poor record on civil freedoms.

    “It has been marked by the criminalisation of expression and public opinion, through to repressive actions ridden with violence,” said Reffelsen in a media release, reports CNN Indonesia.

    Between 2019 and 2020, said Reffelsen, TAUD recorded at last 10 incidents of the criminalisation of activists in Indonesia.

    This included six Papuan activists — Watchdoc founder and senor journalist Dandhy Dwi Laksono, Jakarta State University (UNJ) sociologist Robertus Robet, musician Ananda Badudu, Papua Student Alliance (AMP) lawyer and human rights activist Veronica Koman and public policy activist Ravio Patra.

    Also, 5198 demonstrators were arrested during the protests against the Omnibus Law on Job Creation in September and October 2019, Save Indonesia Action Coalition (KAMI) activists Syahganda Nainggolan and Jumhur Hidayat along with Banda Aceh Syiah Kuala University lecturer Saiful Mahdi.

    12 cases in 2021
    In 2021, TAUD recorded at last 12 cases of criminalisation of activists. Two of these cases were related to senior state officials, namely Presidential Chief of Staff Moeldoko and Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan.

    “The criminalisation of two Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) researchers, Egi [Primayogha] and Miftah, threats of criminalisation against [rights activist] Haris Azhar from the Lokataru [Foundation] and Fatia Maulidiyanti from Kontras [Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence],” wrote Reffelsen.

    Reffelsen also said they found several cases of attacks on civil freedoms in the form of doxing or attacks in digital space against people who were critical of the government such as those suffered by Ravio Patra and critical online media Tempo.co and Tirto.id.

    “The [police] cyber patrols which were legitimised by an instruction by the Indonesian police chief is another example,” said Reffelsen.

    Apart from civil freedoms, another factor was that it appeared as if the government lacked the involvement of public participation in policy formulation.

    The enactment to revisions to the Corruption Eradication Commission Law, the Omnibus Law and other legislation were examples.

    Another aspect was actions by law enforcement agencies such as the judiciary which were seen as corrupt and the lack of seriousness on the part of the government to resolve human rights violations.

    “The decline in Indonesia’s democratic index is in keeping with TAUD’s findings on the ground, primarily in relation to civil freedoms which have shrunk,” said Reffelsen.

    Translated by James Balowski for Indoleft News. The original title of the article was “Kriminalisasi Aktivis Disebut Buat Indeks Demokrasi Menurun”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Papua’s KNPB accuses Jakarta of using military post attack to criminalise them

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    The West Papua National Committee (KNPB) claims that an attack on a military post in Maybrat regency earlier this month is being used as a pretext to “force the KNPB into a corner” and to criminalise them, reports Suara Papua.

    The September 2 attack on Kisor sub-district military post in Maybrat regency, West Papua province, killed four soldiers.

    “There are vested interests and a plot by certain parties behind the killing for four TNI [Indonesian military] members at Kisor, Maybrat,” claimed KNPB spokesperson Ones Suhuniap in a statement sent to Suara Papua newspaper.

    “First multinational palm oil companies, which are currently challenging [the cancellation of] permits in the western Birds Head region,” he said.

    “Second, the construction of [new] Koramil [sub-district military commands] in several districts in South Sorong and Maybrat regencies.

    “Third, the additional deployment of troops on the grounds of securing the PON XX Papua [20th Papua National Games].”

    Suhuniap said the incident was a plot and a trap which had been arranged to distract public attention from a challenge by four palm oil companies with the Jayapura State Administrative Court (PTUN) against Sorong Regent Jhony Kamuru’s decision to revoke their permits.

    Legalising Trans-Papua Highway posts
    The “plot” was also to legalise and accelerate the construction of sub-district military posts and TNI and Indonesian police posts on the Trans-Papua highway connecting Manokwari and Sorong.

    Suhuniap said that for the KNPB such a plot was nothing new and these methods were often used in Papua, especially against the KNPB.

    As has been reported, the police claimed that a member of the civil society KNPB was involved in the attack, namely the movement’s chairperson in the Kisor sector.

    However, what their alleged motive was and why they were involved, along with who the mastermind was behind the 19 people declared responsible for the attack had not been cited by the police.

    Suhuniap said that if there were KNPB Maybrat members involved then there was a third party which provoked or trapped them into it and so it was necessary to discover the mastermind and what their interests were.

    The KNPB did not kill or act in a hostile way towards other people, including the TNI and police, Suhuniap said.

    “There is no agenda of murder directed against the authorities or special organisational instruction to attack members of the TNI and Indonesian police,” he said.

    Investigation needed
    “So the police must delve into and investigate this case further. Who was the mastermind behind the attack? Don’t criminalise the KNPB.” he said.

    If the investigation found that KNPB members were proven to have been involved in the attack then their actions were taken as individuals, not the organisation.

    “We as an organisation [the KNPB] have never carried out sabotage or urban guerrilla actions,” he said.

    Suhuniap also said the attack was part of an Indonesian effort to counter public demands from within Papua and internationally for the release of KNPB international spokesperson Victor Yeimo.

    “The state is shaping public opinion to distract the Papuan people’s attention from Victor Yeimo’s release and creating a sense of fear,” he said.

    “Indonesian colonialism through its intelligence [services] are shaping public opinion and distracting the Papuan people’s attention by accusing the KNPB of being involved in the attack on the soldiers in Kisor.

    “We believe that this effort to distract public attention is a cheap sort of intelligence propaganda to destroy and criminalise the KNPB.”

    Suhuniap called on colleagues from West Papua’s 112 resistance movement organisations and all Papuan people to remain solid and not be influenced by the manipulation of public opinion.

    “The Papuan people must be consistent in rejecting the extension of special autonomy, the unconditional release of Victor Yeimo and demanding the right to self-determination,” he said.

    Translated by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. The original title of the article was “KNPB Sebut Empat Skenario Pembunuhan Empat Anggota TNI di Kisor”.


    This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by APR editor.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Domino’s Indonesia Just Dropped 2 New Asian-Inspired ‘Beefless’ Pizzas

    3 Mins Read Domino’s Indonesia has just added two new meatless items to its menu, developed in partnership with homegrown startup Green Rebel Foods. The two new Asian-inspired pies will be topped with Green Rebel’s vegan-friendly beefless shreds, and are now available across all Domino’s 162 outlets in the country.  World-famous pizza chain Domino’s has expanded its plant-based […]

    The post Domino’s Indonesia Just Dropped 2 New Asian-Inspired ‘Beefless’ Pizzas appeared first on Green Queen.

    This post was originally published on Green Queen.

  • Colonial border between PNG and West Papua ‘will fall like Berlin Wall’

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    A West Papuan group seeking self-determination has greeted Papua New Guinea on its 46th anniversary of independence, predicting that one day the artificial colonial border separating the two would “fall like the Berlin Wall”.

    “Happy 46th independence anniversary to Papua New Guinea. We send a message of solidarity from your brothers on the other half of New Guinea,” said interim president Benny Wenda of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP).

    “We are there with you in spirit for this great celebration.

    “I know that one day all of New Guinea, from Sorong to Samarai, will celebrate true independence and enjoy God’s creation on our green island. This is our long-term dream.

    “With one half unfree, our island is not complete.

    “We are one island, with one ancestor. Just because a colonial border separates us, does not mean we are destined to be apart forever.

    “One day this artificial line will fall like the Berlin Wall, bringing our people together once more.”

    Wenda said in a statement it was in “my heart’s dream to see elders from each half of the island meet and watch their grandchildren dance together in peace like the Bird of Paradise”.

    He said Papuans continued to dream of liberating the people of West Papua from tyranny, 21st colonialism imposed by the Indonesian government.

    “You have reached your 46th year of sovereignty – we have been fighting for the last 58 years for independence and freedom,” said Wenda.

    Benny Wenda Sky
    Exiled Papuan leader Benny Wenda … “the new generation, in West Papua and PNG, must fight to liberate the rest of New Guinea”. Image: Office of Benny Wenda

    “We will pray for your celebrations and thank the forefathers who liberated PNG.”

    On the other side of the island, said Wenda, Papuans still struggled for their freedom, but their forefathers had already set their destiny.

    “Now the new generation, in West Papua and PNG, must fight to liberate the rest of New Guinea,” he said.

    “One day we will join these independence celebrations hand-in-hand, with the Morning Star [banned in Indonesia] raised alongside the PNG flag. We will stand together and celebrate together.”

    While Papua New Guinea gained its independence from Australia in 1975, West Papuans declared independence in 1961 but this was overturned in a non-democratic referendum in 1969 — the so-called Act of Free Choice — after Indonesian paratroopers had invaded Papua, then a colony of The Netherlands.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Traumatic Pasts in Asia: The editors’ account

    Mark Micale and Hans Pols, eds. Traumatic Pasts in Asia: History, Psychiatry, and Trauma, 1930 to the Present. New York: Berghahn, 2021.

    How did this book come about? Both of us are historians of psychiatry, and we frequently met at conferences when Hans was living in North America. One of most fascinating topics in the history of psychiatry is the appearance, increasing popularity, and disappearance of psychiatric diagnoses over time. Mark has written about the history of hysteria —once commonly diagnosed, now rarely identified. After moving to Sydney, Australia, some 20 years ago, Hans became interested in [link] psychiatry and mental health care in Indonesia—its past, present state, and future. In Indonesia, not surprisingly, psychiatry looks somewhat different. It is not possible to transplant North American theories and treatments to clinical presentations in other parts of the world without modification and adaptation.

    Today, one of the most widely used diagnostic categories in psychiatry is Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). It was officially recognised by the American Psychiatric Association in 1980, when it was included in the third edition of its authoritative Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III), nicknamed the “Bible of Psychiatry.” PTSD captures the psychological after-effects experienced by individuals who have been exposed to extreme violence or catastrophic events “outside the realm of normal human experience.” These include bombing, torture, death camps, military combat, physical or sexual assault, and natural disasters. Initially, the PTSD diagnosis was primarily applied to Vietnam veterans, Holocaust survivors, and women who had suffered domestic and sexual abuse.

    The concept of PTSD has various uses within psychiatry. But trauma and PTSD often appear in discussions of non-psychiatrists and non-physicians as well. As historians, we view debates about trauma as ways to cast light on violence and horrific experiences—how they come about, their nature, and what can be done about them. These debates are socially, culturally, and politically highly significant.

    Before the publication of DSM-III, psychiatrists and others used a range of terms to describe the psychological effects of war and severe accidents. These included shellshock, war neurosis, railway spine, combat fatigue, and combat stress. In 2001, Mark co-edited an influential volume on this topic with Paul Lerner and noted that many of these diagnostic categories fell in and out of favour over time. In contrast, PTSD’s popularity in the Western world has steadily increased. According to some critics, PTSD is now ubiquitous in Western society. According to these critics, the condition is increasingly diagnosed in individuals who have experienced less severe traumas, thereby potentially trivialising the diagnosis.

    Hans and Mark met again in 2017, when Mark was invited by the University of Newcastle, Australia, for a 2-month visit. Over several beers, Hans convinced Mark that Traumatic Pasts deserved a sequel focusing on the non-Western world. Because of Hans’ work in Indonesia and his familiarity with the history of psychiatry and mental health in Asia, he suggested co-editing a volume focusing on Asia. Traumatic Pasts in Asia is the outcome.

    Traumatising events are not unique to the West. People in Asia have been repeatedly exposed to deeply traumatic events including military violence and occupation, civil war, torture, terrorism, and acts of genocide, as well as natural disasters such as volcanic eruptions, tropical storms, floods (including the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami), earthquakes, and prolonged droughts. Critics of Western and global psychiatry have argued that Western diagnostic categories, in particular PTSD, do not adequately capture the way people in the rest of the world react to severe trauma.

    The contributors to Traumatic Pasts in Asia investigate how people in Asia have reacted to traumatising events by rebuilding their communities and by developing individual and collective repertoires to overcome trauma, regain a sense of equilibrium, and foster resilience. They focus on how they found ways of rebuilding their communities and their sense of self. Some contributors have focused on the extent to which Western diagnostic categories have influenced the ideas and approaches of local health personnel. Others analyse the way people in Asia have dealt with traumatic events without resorting to medical theories and approaches.

    The chapters in the book are written by historians and anthropologists—a fruitful combination, because combining approaches from both disciplines leads to unusually good insights. The volume’s historians have analysed trauma-related diagnostic categories over time, while its anthropologists have investigated the unique features of how people in various Asian contexts react to traumatic events.

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    Traumatic Pasts in Asia contains historical chapters on Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Vietnam. Eri Nakamura analyses how German ideas on trauma influenced Japanese military psychiatry during World War II. Even though psychiatrists publicly denied that soldiers of the Imperial Army could succumb to trauma, they still identified soldiers who had broken down. Before World War II, as Harry Wu describes, Japanese physicians investigated the psychological after-effects of a volcanic eruption in Taiwan—long before natural disasters became of interest of psychiatrists elsewhere. Ran Zwigenberg investigates the complete absence of research on the trauma among atomic bomb survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in post-war Japan. Even though these individuals were obvious candidates for this kind of research, it was never conducted, for various political reasons.

    Jennifer Yum-Park analyses the enthusiastic reception of American approaches to war neurosis and combat stress (“Yankee-style trauma”) among Korean physicians during the Korean war. In a path-breaking essay, Narquis Barak investigates the reactions of Vietnamese psychiatrists and physicians during the Vietnamese War (called the American war in Vietnam). Up to this day, Vietnamese psychiatrists argue that there is no PTSD in Vietnam. Neither the Korean nor the Vietnamese story have been told before.

    Vannessa Hearman focuses on the exchange of letters between a female political prisoner in Suharto’s Indonesia and a British woman Quaker. These letters provided the only source of contact with the outside world for this prisoner and helped her to survive. Dyah Pitaloka and Mohan J. Dutta investigate the performances of the Indonesian Dialita choir. Its members are women who survived the horrors of the aftermath of Suharto’s coup in 1965. In their performances, they sing songs of hope and resilience, and thereby connect to younger audiences. Neither chapter focuses on medical or psychiatric conceptions of trauma. Instead, it focuses on rituals and practices people use to deal with traumatic pasts and presents.

    Jakub Hałun, Skulls at the stupa on the Choeung Ek Killing Field in Phnom Penh. Source: Wikimedia Commons

    Anthropologist Hua Wu reports on the experiences of a group visiting the rural farm to which they were banished during China’s cultural revolution. Revisiting this site evoked various reactions in the participants. Caroline Bennett analyses haunting in Cambodia after the defeat of the Khmer Rouge by investigating how people re-established relationships with the death. The death remained a social presence, to which their surviving relatives reacted through funerary rituals and building shrines. It is exceedingly difficult to interpret these rituals as culturally specific expressions of psychological trauma.

    Saiba Varma focuses on conditions in Kashmir, which is still occupied by the Indian army. Because the occupation is ongoing, Kashmiris are currently not post-trauma. Their trauma continues in the present; it is not relegated to the past. Seinenu Lemelson-Thein analyses the remarkable resilience of Myanmar’s freedom fighters, which is based on a cultural system of rites, rituals, and moral beliefs based on the concept of sacrifice (anitnah). Sadly, the situation in Myanmar has deteriorated dramatically over the past year.

    In the final chapter, Maki Kimura describes how sculptures are used in the ongoing political battle of the so-called “comfort women,” women who were forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese Imperial forces during World War II. Japan still refuses to acknowledge the experiences of these women. By placing sculptures in strategic places, activists around the world highlight their plight.

    We see discussions about trauma and PTSD as ways of dealing with violence and horror—or, at times, to obfuscate both. The case studies in this volume analyse both the psychological and communal effects of violence and natural disasters and how communities attempt to overcome their effects. At times, people in Asia incorporate and transform Western medicalised ideas, at other times transcend them and rely on local spiritual healing traditions, or even creatively combine both.

    This volume transcends the traditional Western focus of trauma studies by highlighting Asia. We hope that this volume will inspire a shift in perspective for other scholars in this field.

    The post Traumatic Pasts in Asia: The editors’ account appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • New Green Queen APAC Alternative Protein Industry Report Showcases Explosive Regional Growth

    Alt Protein Report 2021 Green Queen Media

    4 Mins Read Green Queen Media publishes “APAC Alternative Protein Industry Report – APAC Acceleration”, the 2nd edition of its award-winning Asia Alternative Protein Industry Report 2021.

    The post New Green Queen APAC Alternative Protein Industry Report Showcases Explosive Regional Growth appeared first on Green Queen.

    This post was originally published on Green Queen.

  • Jakarta Opens World’s First Brick-and-Mortar Vegan Dining and Cloud Kitchen Collaborative Space

    4 Mins Read Jakarta has just welcomed a new dedicated plant-based collaborative space with vegan cloud kitchens. Opened by local startup Mad Grass, the new space in the Indonesian capital claims to be the first-of-its-kind in the world, featuring a wide range of homegrown plant-based brands and curating their offerings under one roof.  Mad Grass, Jakarta’s first vegan […]

    The post Jakarta Opens World’s First Brick-and-Mortar Vegan Dining and Cloud Kitchen Collaborative Space appeared first on Green Queen.

    This post was originally published on Green Queen.

  • Yogyakarta officials ‘black out’ critical street art before Jokowi’s visit

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    A mural on the eastern side of the Wirobrajan intersection in Central Java city of Yogyakarta was covered over with black paint before President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s weekend visit.

    But officials have denied that it was censorship, reports CNN Indonesia.

    It was known that President Widodo would be passing through this stretch of road during a working visit to Yogyakarta on Saturday. The mural was painted over in Friday.

    The mural was critical of Indonesian censorship under the Widodo administration.

    Yogyakarta Mayor Haryadi Suyuti asked people not to pre-judge the removal of the mural, saying it was done as part of a routine weekly cleanup — not just because of the mural.

    “We were doing a routine cleanup right, not [just] cleaning off the mural,” he told journalists.

    Quoting from the Gejayan Calling (Gejayan Memanggil) Instagram account, which immortalised the mural before it was painted over, the picture was of a figure whose eyes were covered with the internet tab “404 Not Found” with the message “The regime is afraid of pictures”.

    During his working visit to Yogyakarta on Friday, Widodo asked Yogyakarta Governor Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono X to accelerate the covid-19 vaccination programme for the region.

    The request was made during an internal meeting with the provincial and regency regional leadership coordinating forum at the Pracimasono Building at the Kepatihan complex in Danurejan.

    “[We are] accelerating vaccinations in concert with the gradual reopening (of public places)”, said the Sultan following the meeting, although he said that Widodo did not give any specific vaccine targets for Yogyakarta.

    “Vaccinations must be done as widely as possible even if it’s only the first dose”, he added.

    Abridged translation by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. The second part of the article which was not translated detailed the covid-19 situation in Yogyakarta, vaccination rates and comments by Widodo. The original title of the article was “Jokowi Mau Lewat, Coretan Kritikan di Yogya Dihapus”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Letter: Carmel Budiardjo obituary

    As a campaigner, Carmel Budiardjo (obituary, 27 August) was a pioneer in using film to publicise the abuse of human rights. In London she produced Amnesty International’s first documentary film, More Than a Million Years, highlighting the ill-treatment of political prisoners in Indonesia. In the cutting room, with the editor Jane Wood, she was a stickler for clarity and accuracy.

    In 1976, with Albert Finney as its narrator, the film won the jury prize at the Nyon documentary film festival in Switzerland. The jury’s citation praised the film “for exposing the conspiracy of silence which masks the drama of the Indonesian people”.

    Continue reading…

    This post was originally published on Human rights | The Guardian.

  • Indonesian military, police continue Papua crackdown over soldier deaths

    By Rahmad Nasution in Jayapura

    More than a week after four Indonesian soldiers were killed by pro-independence fighters in an attack on a military post in Kisor village, South Aifat sub-district, Maybrat district, West Papua, police have arrested two suspects and launched a manhunt for 17 others.

    Also, a joint team of personnel from the Indonesian Military (TNI) has continued to crack down on Papuan rebels operating in the area.

    The XVIII/Kasuari Regional Military Command’s spokesperson, Colonel Hendra Pesireron, said that TNI soldiers had “secured” several villages.

    The troops’ presence in villages had “restored the security situation” in Maybrat district, and guaranteed public safety, he claimed in a statement.

    On 5 September 2021, TNI personnel engaged in a gunfight with several members of a pro-independence group in the neighborhood areas of East Aifat sub-district.

    The rebels retreated into a thick forest to escape, Colonel Pesireron said.

    Before the gunfight, the rebels destroyed a bridge, he said.

    Kisor military post attacked
    On Thursday, pro-independence rebels had ambushed several soldiers while they were sleeping at the Kisor military post.

    Four soldiers—2nd Sergeant Amrosius, Chief Private Dirham, First Private Zul Ansari, and First Lieutenant Dirman—died in the attack, while two others suffered serious wounds.

    The bodies of three soldiers had been found at the post, while the body of another soldier had been discovered in bush not far from the post.

    Several local residents had fled their homes fearing for their safety.

    On Friday, Indonesian police investigators named 19 alleged suspects in connection with the attack on the military post.

    Rahmad Nasution is a journalist for the Indonesian news agency Antara.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Activists call on Canberra to protest over human rights abuses in Papua

    By Susan Price in Sydney

    West Papua activists have called on the Australian government to raise concerns about the Indonesian military’s ongoing human rights abuses in West Papua, when they met with their Indonesian counterparts this week.

    Foreign Minister Marise Payne and Defence Minister Peter Dutton are attending the seventh Indonesia-Australia Foreign and Defence Ministers 2+2 dialogue in Jakarta, which started yesterday, before continuing on to visit New Delhi, Seoul, Washington and New York.

    Australia-West Papua Association spokesperson Joe Collins said: “We can expect all the usual statements about regional stability, peace, economic prosperity, terrorism and defence cooperation, but highly unlikely anything about human rights — unless it is criticism of China’s record.”

    In a reply to correspondence from AWPA, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) indicated that because of Australia’s close relationship with Indonesia it had allowed DFAT to discuss a range of issues, including sensitive topics like the situation in Papua.

    Given this close relationship, Collins said activists were hoping the human rights situation in West Papua would be raised, including: the ongoing concerns for arrested West Papuan activist Victor Yeimo; the security force operation taking place in the Maybrat Regency; and the death of Kristian Yandun from a beating in a police cell in Merauke.

    Yeimo faces a number of charges, including treason with conspiracy. There is concern for his mental and physical health, which is deteriorating.

    According to AWPA, after an attack on a military post in Kisor village in the Maybrat regency, security forces have retaliated, causing residents from five districts to flee their villages in fear of the Indonesian military.

    AWPA is concerned that Merauke local police chief Untung Sangaji was trained by Australian Federal Police and trainers from the United States and Britain in anti-people smuggling and surveillance techniques at the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC).

    AWPA is calling on Payne and Dutton to urge Jakarta to release Yeimo and all political prisoners, and to raise the human rights abuses committed by the Indonesian security forces.

    Susan Price reports for Green-Left.

    Stronger Australian-Indonesian military ties
    Indonesian troops could join regular training exercises on Australian soil, as part of a deepening of defence ties with Australia, reports The Guardian.

    While Indonesia regularly joins naval exercises with Australia, and has participated in occasional joint military exercises on Australian land, the two countries have flagged plans to “step up” their joint training in the coming years, writes Daniel Hurst.

    Australia’s defence minister, Peter Dutton, and foreign minister, Marise Payne, met their Indonesian counterparts in Jakarta yesterday, on the first leg of a four-country trip.

    Indonesia’s Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto said he and Dutton had discussed “the possibility of Australia opening their training areas for the participation of Indonesian units to be training together with Australia”.

    “I think this is a historical first,” Prabowo said.

    Indonesian troops arrive at Sinak 100921
    Indonesian security forces troops being flown in to Sinak, Puncak region, in the Papuan highlands for operations against independence fighters. Image: Screenshot APR

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Indonesia accused of forcing mass flights of Papuans ‘for business’

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    Indonesian authorities have been accused of adopting a strategy of deploying military force to drive thousands of Papuans from their homes to make way for powerful business interests.

    The accusation comes from the United Liberation Movement of West Papua (ULMWP) in a statement responding to news that about 2400 internal refugees have been displaced from 19 villages after renewed Indonesian military operations in the Maybrat regency.

    The humanitarian crisis there is being compared to Nduga and Intan Jaya, where more than 50,000 West Papuans have been displaced by military operations in recent years.

    “Maybrat is a peaceful place. The violence we are seeing now is a result of Indonesian state attempts to clear the local people and grab the gold and minerals that lie under the earth,” said ULMWP interim president Benny Wenda.

    “I have been stating for a long time that Indonesia’s military operations are not about ‘sovereignty’, but business.

    “Now, Indonesia’s own NGOs have confirmed this. New reports from WALHI Papua, LBH Papua, KontraS, Greenpeace Indonesia and several other groups have noted the deep links Indonesia’s retired generals, Kopassus officers and intelligence chiefs have with resource extraction projects in West Papua.

    “Powerful Indonesian leaders like Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, Maritime Affairs Minister, hold direct interests in the Wabu Block gold concession in Intan Jaya, where huge military operations have forced thousands of people from their homes.”

    ‘Wiping our entire villages’
    Wenda claimed the military operations were attempts to “wipe out entire villages and clear the way for illegal mines”.

    “They are killing us because we are Black, because we are different. This is state-sponsored terrorism,” he said.

    Wenda said that given these economic interests, the Papuan people could not “trust the reports of the Indonesian police and military whenever one of their own is killed”.

    “The military men’s presence in the region is illegal. Their presence is part of Indonesia’s business interests, part of their illegal colonial occupation of my land.

    “The 1969 Act of No Choice was illegal, it was not done by one man one vote as required by the 1962 New York Agreement. The UN did not endorse what happened, it only ‘took note’ following fierce opposition led by Ghana in the UN General Assembly.

    “Indonesia cannot claim that its invasion of West Papua is a done deal – it is not. It is the root cause of all the issues we see today.

    “Indonesia has no right to send any more military to West Papua, to build the Trans-Papua Highway, or to construct any more military posts.”

    Negotiated solution
    Wenda said the issue would never end until Indonesian President Joko Widodo negotiated a “solution for the good of West Papua and Indonesia to hold a referendum on independence”.

    He said Indonesia must listen to the will of 84 countries and allow the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit West Papua immediately.

    “If the international community wants to help end the bloodshed in my homeland, it must act to ensure this visit happens,” Wenda said.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Indonesian military say two Papuan rebels arrested over Kisor post attack

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    Indonesian police have arrested two suspects in connection with an attack on the Kisor military post which killed four soldiers late last week, reports Antara news agency from Sorong.

    “The suspects have admitted their involvement,” claimed the commander of the XVIII/Kasuari Regional Military Command, Major General I Nyoman Castiasa, after paying his respects for the dead soldiers on Friday.

    Castiasa led a military procession to honour the soldiers before their caskets were transported to their hometowns for their funeral.

    The two alleged West Papuan independence fighters have been placed under police custody for further investigation, he said.

    The commander added that he did not yet know the exact number of the attackers.

    Castiasa appealed to members of the community in West Papua who were still independence to end the conflict and “work together to develop” the province.

    “If they are stubborn and continue their campaign of insurgency, they will be crushed,” he said.

    Military post ambush
    In the early hours of Thursday, the pro-independence fighters ambushed several soldiers while they were sleeping at the Kisor military post.

    2nd Sergeant Amrosius, Chief Private Dirham, First Private Zul Ansari, and First Lieutenant Dirman died in the attack, according to spokesperson for the XVIII/Kasuari Regional Military Command, Lt Col Hendra Pesireron.

    The bodies of three soldiers were found at the post, while another was discovered in the bush not far from the post.

    Pesireron added that another soldier, First Private Ikbal, could not be found.

    Police chief Inspector General Tornagogo Sihombing in West Papua province said two suspects have been apprehended, but police investigators were continuing their probe into the Kisor military post attack.

    “The suspects are under police custody at South Sorong police precinct,” he said.

    The assault on the Kisor military post was the latest incident in the armed uprising by Papuan nationalists.

    Covid-19 pandemic
    In the midst of the government’s handling of the covid-19 pandemic in Papua and West Papua, the two Melanesian provinces have been gripped with the armed independence struggle over the past few months of 2021.

    In April, two teachers in Julukoma village, Beoga sub-district, Puncak district, were allegedly killed by independence fighters.

    On August 22, 2021, a rebel group operating in Yahukimo district attacked several construction workers of PT Indo Mulia Baru who were involved in building a bridge on Brazza River, killing two.

    Independence fighters also attacked the Indonesian Police’s Mobile Brigade (Brimob) unit when they went to the shooting site to recover the bodies, Pesireron said.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Medical treatment for Victor Yeimo after police break up Papua protest

    By Hengky Yeimo in Jayapura

    Papuan activist Victor Yeimo has been receiving medical treatment in hospital following a police crackdown on a protest in the provincial capital Jayapura demanding that he be released from detention to be treated for illness.

    Hundreds of protesters had gathered at the Papua chief public prosecutor’s office on Monday to demand that West Papua National Committee (KNPB) spokesperson Yeimo be released from detention to be given hospital treatment.

    Yeimo’s detention was finally deferred on Monday afternoon and he was taken to Jayapura public hospital for treatment.

    The protesters arrived from the direction of Abepura, Jayapura city. They arrived at the chief public prosecutor’s office and began giving speeches on the street leading into the office.

    In speeches, the demonstrators demanded that chief public prosecutor Nikolaus Kondomo immediately defer Yeimo’s detention.

    Yeimo is currently being tried at the Jayapura District Court in a criminal case related to anti-racist demonstrations in Papua in 2019.

    On Friday, August 27, the panel of judges, presided over by Eddy Soeprayitno S Putra, with judges Mathius and Andi Asmuruf, ruled that Yeimo’s detention be deferred and that he receive medical treatment because he was ill.

    Demand for treatment
    The rally at the prosecutor’s office on Monday was because Yeimo had still not been released from detention. They demanded that the prosecutor release Yeimo immediately and allow him to be treated.

    The police had already closed the main gate to the office and prohibited the protests from entering the grounds. About 1 pm police forcibly broke up the rally which was coordinated by the KNPB.

    A number of protesters were injured, including Gad Holanue, Varra iyaba, Hengki Giban, Leti Soll, Egenius Tebay and Jufri Dogomo. Three protesters — Soleng Soll, Beni Orsa and Bayage — were arrested by police.

    Papua Regional House of Representatives (DPRP) member John NR Gobai said he deplored the police actions. Gobai, along with DPRP member Laurenzus Kadepa, had been accepted by the court as guarantors for Yeimo to be released and treated in hospital.

    “I was blocked by police, then I was pulled away by the demonstrators. I wasn’t able to get in and convey my wishes,” Gobai said.

    A Regional Representatives Council (DPD) member from Papua, Herlina Murib, was also barred from entering the office.

    “We hope that the police will not repeat this inhuman attitude which was shown by blocking us and removing people who wanted to convey their aspirations. This violates the law”, Murib said.

    Second demonstration
    The demonstration at the prosecutor’s office on Monday was the second one held by activists demanding that Yeimo be allowed to receive hospital treatment.

    Protesters had also gathered at the prosecutor’s office on Saturday, August 28, because the prosecutor was seen as ignoring the court’s ruling that Yeimo receive treatment.

    Because the prosecutor’s office was empty on Saturday, the protesters went to the prosecutor’s private residence where they again called on Kondomo to immediately postpone Yeimo’s detention.

    However, Kondomo refused the request, saying Yeimo could only be released on Tuesday, August 31.

    About 3.20pm on Monday, Yeimo was finally allowed to leave the Papua regional Mobile Brigade command headquarters detention centre and was taken to Jayapura public hospital. The ambulance transporting Yeimo was escorted by two police patrol cars and three black minivans.

    Around 20 police officers escorted Yeimo to the hospital. Public prosecutors Adrianus Tomana and Valerianus Dedi Sawaki were also present at the hospital.

    Advocate and lawyers
    Yeimo was accompanied to the hospital by advocate Emanuel Gobay and a number of other lawyers, Laurenzus Kadepa and John NR Gobai along with Yeimo’s wife and mother.

    Speaking to Tabloid JUBI at Jayapura hospital, Tomana said the medical examination was in accordance with the court’s ruling. Tomana stated that how long Yeimo’s detention will be deferred would depend on the examination and the doctor’s diagnosis.

    “How long the deferment will be depends on the results of the doctor’s examination. If the doctor declares that he is well, then we will revoke the deferment, and Yeimo will be returned to his detention cell,” he said.

    Translated by James Balowski for Indoleft News. The original title of the article was “Minta Victor Yeimo dikeluarkan dari tahanan, massa di Kejati Papua dibubarkan polisi”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Indonesia holds fire on Afghanistan relations – awaits Taliban government

    By Marcheilla Ariesta in Jakarta

    Indonesia, the world’s fourth largest country by population with 270 million, has not yet determined its stance towards the Taliban leadership after seizing power in Afghanistan.

    It is also the most populous Muslim country.

    The Director-General for Asia Pacific and Africa at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abdul Kadir Jailani, said the same attitude was also being shown by other countries.

    Abdul Kadir Jailani Indonesia
    Indonesia’s Director-General for Asia Pacific and Africa at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abdul Kadir Jailani … “quite warm” response in Indonesia to Taliban takeover. Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    “Why haven’t many countries taken a definitive stance, because the situation is still fluid and (the Taliban) have not yet formed a legitimate government,” said Abdul Kadir in the webinar ‘Post-Conflict Afghanistan: Fall or Rise?’ this week.

    According to Jailani, Taliban officials are negotiating with a number of figures in Afghanistan in a bid to form a new government.

    In addition to the formation of government, Indonesia is also still waiting for the status of the Taliban in the international community.

    Jailani said a common view was needed about the status of the Taliban.

    “This understanding is very important, so we can get faster information to determine our attitude towards the Taliban and its government later,” he added.

    He said the Indonesian government was also careful in determining its stance because the Taliban’s seizure of power in Afghanistan received a “quite warm” and mixed reaction from within Indonesia.

    Jailani stressed that Indonesia’s definitive stance would only be conveyed when the situation in Afghanistan became clearer.

    The Taliban seized control of the civilian government in Afghanistan on August 15 without any resistance. A few days ago, the Taliban claimed to have pocketed a number of names of figures who would later fill the new government.

    Unlike in the 1996-2001 era, the Taliban claimed to be forming an inclusive government that involved all elements and ethnicities in Afghanistan.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Ex-tapol Filep Karma shocked over prosecutor’s ‘racist’ treatment of Yeimo

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    Former Papuan political prisoner Filep Karma has also joined activists and Victor Yeimo’s family along with Yeimo’s lawyer who protested at the private residence of the Papua chief public prosecutor in the Doc 5 area of Jayapura city at the weekend, reports Suara Papua.

    Karma revealed that he was shocked at the attitude of the public prosecutor who was still “showing his racism” towards Yeimo during their visit on Saturday.

    The panel of judges at the Jayapura District Court hearing last Thursday, August 26, ordered the prosecutor to facilitate the defendant, who is accused of “treason”, being given healthcare — an up examination and inpatient care at a hospital.

    Just like before and despite being urged by several parties over the last two days following the court’s ruling, the chief public prosecutor has not demonstrated good faith, say critics.

    When Yeimo was being examined by a medical team at the Jayapura pubic hospital on the evening of Friday, August 27, the prosecutor accompanied by security personnel put pressure on Yeimo not to be treated overnight.

    He was then returned to the Papua regional police Mobile Brigade command headquarters detention centre where he has been detained since his arrest in May.

    Yeimo’s lawyer, who is part of the Papua Law Enforcement and Human Rights Coalition (KPHHP), has already met all of the administrative requirements for Yeimo’s hospital treatment, including providing guarantors from the Papuan Regional House of Representatives (DPRP) — legislators John NR Gobai and Laurenzus Kadepa, as well as an advocate.

    ‘Long-winded lawsuits’
    “Legal affairs in Indonesia are indeed like this, excessively long-winded,” he said.

    “Indonesia does not regard life as important — procedures are more important than people’s lives.”

    Karma said the prosecutor’s actions were “strange”, especially because ipso facto it was an an indigenous Papuan who had not heeded the order by the judges.

    “Because the prosecutor is a Papuan, he’s afraid of being labeled as biased towards Papuan independence. So, he will try to show that he is more nationalist than the Javanese,” said Karma.

    “Yet in the eyes of the Javanese, he’s ‘just a monkey’. I lived in Java for a long time, so I have felt this.”

    Yeimo must be treated first because, according to Karma, a suspect and a defendant was guaranteed by law to receive treatment if they were ill.

    “What we want this evening is for brother Victor Yeimo to be allowed to be treated in hospital. But this has not happened because of other considerations and they say they are following legal procedures,” he said.

    ‘Surrender to God’
    Because of efforts to get Yeimo treated in hospital have not been carried out, Karma is calling on all Papuans to “surrender to God”.

    “We will cool our passionate hearts, let us rise in hymn and prayer. Myself and all of us exist not just because of power, but rather because Jesus who lived before us, today and forever,” Karma said.

    KPHHP litigation coordinator and Yeimo’s lawyer Emanuel Gobay believes that the Papua chief public prosecutor’s response to Gobai and Kadepa when he met with them at his private residence was different from the court’s ruling that his client receive inpatient treatment because his state of health had deteriorated while being detained at the Mobile Brigade detention centre.

    “We have heard the chief public prosecutor’s response. If seen from the court’s ruling, there is difference in how it is seen,” he said.

    “What the chief public prosecutor has conveyed proves that he does not respect the judges’ ruling at the Abepura Class IIA District Court.

    “The public prosecutor has gone against the court’s order.”

    Speaking in front of Yeimo’s family and activists gathered in front of the prosecutor’s home at 8am, Gobay said Yeimo’s lawyers would accompany him at the next hearing on Tuesday. His guarantors, Gobai and Kadepa would also attend the hearing.

    Translated by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. Slightly abridged due to repetition. The original title of the article was “Filep Karma Heran Jaksa Masih Hambat Victor Yeimo Dirawat”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Taliban rule restored in Afghanistan: security implications for Indonesia

    In the Indonesian Islamist extremist landscape, support for the Taliban—as it seeks to restore the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan following the US’ withdrawal from the country—has mainly accrued from groups and individuals that have followed Al-Qaeda’s (AQ) stance in rejecting the legitimacy of the now defunct “caliphate” declared by the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq in 2014.  Moreover, support for the Taliban in the Indonesian context has traditionally been closely associated with the support for AQ, given the former has provided sanctuaries for AQ for several decades. As such, how will the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan be interpreted by Al-Qaeda supporters in Indonesia? By extension, what are the security implications for the country?

    Support for Taliban

    The Indonesian pro-AQ camp consists of, among others, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Jama’ah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), all groups which have aspired to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. Their loyalty to AQ, and by extension, the Taliban, is evident from the content posted on their respective affiliated websites and publications. In 2007, Arrahmah Media, linked to MMI, published a translated book titled The Giant Man: Biography of Mullah Umar. The book, an ode to the Taliban leader who founded the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, is currently still sold on several e-commerce platforms in Indonesia. Based on our observations, the groups’ affiliated websites have also regularly provided updates on the progress of the Taliban over the decades.

    Following its recent takeover, JAS was the first pro-AQ local extremist group to officially congratulate the Taliban. In fact, JAS’ public lauding on its official website of the Taliban’s territorial successes stretches back to March 2020, when it congratulated the Taliban on its “victory” in the high-level peace talks held in Doha in February 2020, that led to the US’ commitment to a military withdrawal from Afghanistan. JAS also congratulated the people of Afghanistan, who it claimed would soon enjoy the liberty and freedom of living under Islamic law (Sharia).  Following the Taliban’s takeover of the capital Kabul, JAS again lauded the group, encouraging Muslims around the world, including in Indonesia, to celebrate its victory.

    Research by PAKAR, an Indonesian NGO that studies terrorism, has also revealed that some pro-AQ former terrorist inmates have been staunch supporters of the Taliban in recent years.  They have kept themselves updated on the progress of the Taliban’s military operations and recently re-circulated congratulatory messages from AQ affiliated groups—Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) of Syria and Al-Qaeda in the Arabia Peninsula (AQAP), based in Yemen—heralding the Taliban’s success in retaking Afghanistan.

    Euphoria over the Taliban’s “victory” is also apparent in the online discourse of pro-AQ groups in Indonesia, which has suggested the Taliban should unite Muslims around the world and establish a global caliphate, including conquering the capital cities London and Washington. In the Indonesian context, there were some online suggestions to unite the jihadists under Daulah Islam Sumatra (an Islamic State of Sumatra).  There were also suggestions the Taliban should open a “branch” in Indonesia, and assist in the establishment of an Islamic state in the country.  Meanwhile on the ground, some Islamist elements in Poso, Central Sulawesi, such as supporters of the banned Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front/FPI), and ex-combatants from the Poso communal conflict in the early 2000s, have called on Muslims to pledge their allegiance (bai’at) to the Taliban.

    In contrast to the exuberance of the pro-AQ Indonesian elements, the International Centre of Political Violence Research (ICPVTR) data suggests the pro-IS camp in Indonesia has repudiated the Taliban takeover as a “victory”. It has labelled the Taliban as murtad (apostates) and being pro-Shia and pro-US, in addition to being antagonistic towards IS Khorasan, an IS affiliate based in Afghanistan. PAKAR’s research shows some supporters of pro-IS groups, the Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) and Jamaah Ansharul Khilafah (JAK), assert that the Taliban is a thaghut (tyrant Muslim state that does not enforce Sharia) as its emirate is premised on the concept of a nation-state (nationalism), and thus has deviated from the teachings of AQ founder Osama bin Laden.  Such reactions are to be expected, as IS supporters still long for the restoration of the group’s now defunct “Caliphate”.

    Security Implications

    The support from Indonesian extremist networks for the Taliban has several security implications.  First, the success of the Taliban may re-energise the Indonesian pro-AQ groups in pursuing their long-held strategy, which combines non-military (social and political) and military (armed jihad) elements.  In the past decade, the aforementioned Indonesian groups have conformed to a long-term strategy that seeks the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia.  The non-military element primarily entails winning the hearts and minds of local communities through social activities (dakwah/religious outreach, charities, education) and active involvement in the political realm. The latter aims to introduce sharia into the Indonesian political and legal system (by participating in elections, rallies, as well as lobbying the government and parliament on Islamic issues).

    The military element is manifested in abstaining from plotting attacks within the country (for JI, this was especially the case when Para Wijayanto led the group from 2009 to 2019), while at the same time discreetly sending their members to gain military experience in Syria as part of their i’dad programme (military training).  JI, the group with the most serious military preparation, believes that jihad should be waged when it is militarily ready and has the support of the community; all of which requires patience. In a critical difference, patience has been a source of contention between the Indonesian AQ and IS elements.  Those who are not patient are typically associated with the latter whose networks have preferred random attacks in Indonesia with little preparations.

    Second, some pro-AQ individuals have emerged to express their intention for hijrah (migration) to Afghanistan so as to receive training from the Taliban and to use such skills to establish an Islamic state back in Indonesia.  If this materialises, it will pose a serious security threat to Indonesia in the long term as returning jihadists will be more emboldened by their Afghan training, in a similar way that the old JI Afghan alumni network in the 1980s and 1990s.

    Third, the Indonesian jihadists may copy and implement Taliban’s strategy and tactics—as described in the latter’s tradecraft manuals (such as guerrilla tactics) circulated in the Indonesian online domain—although such prospects remain remote.  Almost a decade ago, the Taliban’s 12-page manual titled “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: The Prison Break: How to Turn Fantasy to Reality” was translated into Indonesian and posted in several Indonesian extremist websites in 2012. This manual might have inspired Fadli Sadama, the commander of Kumpulan Mujahidin Indonesia (KMI) – a branch of JI in North Sumatra led by Toni Togar – to mastermind a jail break in Medan in July 2013. A total of 218 inmates, including 15 terrorists, fled from prison then.  Fifteen prison officers were also briefly taken hostage.  The incident resulted in five casualties including two prison wardens.

    Related

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    Indonesia should not be lulled by Neo-JI’s seemingly peaceful development.

    Alif Satria 16 August, 2019

    Currently, it does not appear that the Taliban’s latest tradecraft manuals have been translated into Indonesian.  The lack of such translated manuals may be a sign of current weak enthusiasm to implement the manual in the Indonesian context, but it may be a matter of time before such translations appear. How these translated manuals are eventually utilised may impact on the future strategy and tactics which the pro-AQ camp would adopt in Indonesia.

    Concluding Remarks

    The pro-AQ elements’ general celebration of the Taliban takeover is not unqualified. As the Taliban transforms itself into a governing authority and seeks international recognition, Indonesian pro-AQ groups could possibly reject some of the potential political compromises that the Taliban will have to make along the way. Our online observation shows that individuals in this camp have questioned the Taliban’s efforts in seeking alliances with China, Russia, and Iran, all of which the pro-AQ camp also deem as enemies of Islam, along with the US and its allies. Furthermore, they have also dismissed reports on various concessions the Taliban has apparently made with these countries.

    Overall, however, the pro-AQ groups in Indonesia will likely continue to be inspired by the Taliban’s “success” and remain committed to their own long-term goal of setting up an Islamic state in Indonesia.  This means they may not be inclined to conduct attacks in Indonesia for the time being, with the exception of some rogue elements within JI who lack patience and have plotted attacks in parts of the country recently.

    The post Taliban rule restored in Afghanistan: security implications for Indonesia appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Protest call at prosecutor’s home to demand hospital care for Yeimo

    By Dwi Bowo Raharjo and Ria Rizki Nirmala Sari in Jayapura

    West Papua National Committee (KNPB) diplomacy commission head Kobabe Wanimbo has appealed to the Papuan people to picket the private residence of the chief public prosecutor in the controversial treason trial of an activist who is seriously ill.

    The appeal was made to support a demand that KNPB international spokesperson Victor Yeimo be transferred from the Mobile Brigade command headquarters (Mako Brimob) detention centre to a hospital because his health has further deteriorated.

    Yeimo was arrested by security forces because of his alleged link to riots in Papua in 2019.

    Since he has been detained, however, his state of health has become critical.

    “[His illness] is because of a consequence of his lungs and a chronic [ailment]. Moreover, the doctor has advised that Victor Yeimo must be treated in hospital,” said Wanimbo in a media release received by Suara.com at the weekend.

    Although his state of health has worsened, the prosecutor handling his case is said not to care.

    Yeimo was forcibly taken back to the Papua regional police Mako Brimob detention centre after earlier being treated at the Jayapura public hospital in defiance of a court ruling.

    Hospital treatment ruling
    The court ruling on August 26 in Yeimo’s case instructed the prosecutor to postpone Yeimo’s detention and prosecution so that he could be treated at a public hospital in Jayapura.

    Moreover, the chief public prosecutor was also ordered to place Yeimo in detention only after his health had improved.

    KNPB members and other activists went to the chief public prosecutor’s private residence in the Doc 2 area of Jayapura city to demand that permission be immediately granted for Yeimo to receive medical treatment.

    The KNPB also appealed to all Papuan people to gather at the prosecutor’s residence to support the demand.

    “We will remain here making this demand of the prosecutor — immediately transfer Victor Yeimo to hospital to obtain treatment for him,” said Wanimbo.

    Translated by James Balowski for Indoleft News. The original title of the article was “KNPB Datangi Rumah Kepala Kejati Papua, Tuntut Izinkan Victor Yeimo Dibawa ke RS”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Indonesian court orders hospital treatment for accused Papuan activist Victor Yeimo

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    The panel of judges hearing the case against a West Papuan activist accused of treason have ordered the prosecution to prioritise the defendant’s health, reports Suara Papua.

    At the second hearing on Thursday when the charges were supposed to be read out against West Papua National Committee (KNPB) international spokesperson Victor Yeimo, the judges ordered the prosecution to take him to a hospital for intensive treatment because of his deteriorating health.

    The first and second court hearings this week were postponed because of Yeimo’s worrying state of health and because he was unable to attend the hearing.

    On Friday, Yeimo was taken to the Jayapura public hospital in Dok II for an examination and treatment.

    John NR Gobay and Laurenzus Kadepan — two members of the Papua Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) — have declared that they are ready to stand as guarantors for Yeimo while he is being treated.

    Papua Legal Aid Foundation (LBH) director Emanuel Gobay has also declared that he is ready to become a guarantor.

    This was conveyed to the panel of judges at the Jayapura District Court on Thursday who subsequently granted the request.

    Pressure from prosecutor
    When contacted by Suara Papua on Friday, Gustaf Kawer, one of the members of Yeimo’s team of defence lawyers, revealed that after Yeimo had been taken to hospital there was pressure from the prosecutor who said Yeimo was not allowed to receive inpatient care.

    “It is correct that Victor was taken to hospital earlier. But on the matter of inpatient care this is still being debated with the prosecutor because he doesn’t want Victor Yeimo to be treated at the Doc II hospital,” he told Suara Papua.

    According to Kawer, there was a debate between Yeimo’s lawyers and the prosecutor at the hospital.

    Yeimo and his lawyers wanted him to be treated at the hospital while the prosecutor did not.

    Kawer said that the administrative requirements could be completed and would be handed over on Monday.

    “What we are asking and urging is that Victor Yeimo’s health [be prioritised]. His state of health is not good,” Kawer aid.

    ‘He must be treated in hospital’
    “He must be treated in a hospital. We already have the guarantors. The administrative requirements can be handed over on Monday. What we want is for Victor to be treated. Victor’s health is most important.”

    A video received by Suara Papua on Friday evening shows Yeimo at the Dok II Jayapura hospital emergency unit. Several photographs received also show Yeimo being examined by a team of medics at the hospital.

    Meanwhile, another video received by Suara Papua shows Yeimo debating with the authorities and the prosecutor who are insisting that Yeimo not be treated at the hospital.

    Translated by James Balowski of IndoLeft News. Abridged slightly due to repetition. The original title of the article was “Victor Yeimo Dipaksa untuk Tidak Dirawat di Rumah Sakit”.


    This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by APR editor.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • PT Lundin launches replacement stealth trimaran for TNI-AL

    Indonesian shipbuilder PT Lundin has launched a new trimaran-hull fast missile attack craft for the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL), the future KRI Golok (688), at a ceremony at its facility in Banyuwangi, East Java, on 21 August. The first-of-class vessel of the type, KRI Klewang (625) was gutted by an onboard fire on 29 September 2012 […]

    The post PT Lundin launches replacement stealth trimaran for TNI-AL appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • Treason trial of West Papua’s Victor Yeimo begins amid calls for his release

    By Johnny Blades, RNZ Pacific journalist

    The trial of West Papuan political prisoner Victor Yeimo has begun in an Indonesian court in Jayapura.

    Yeimo, who is a spokesman for the pro-independence West Papua National Committee (KNPB), is charged with treason and incitement over his alleged role in anti-racism protests that turned into riots in 2019.

    Amnesty International Indonesia’s Usman Hamid said Yeimo was a peaceful pro-independence activist who had not committed a crime.

    He said Indonesian authorities were using criminal code provisions to prosecute several peaceful pro-independence political activists in Papua simply for peacefully exercising their human rights, including the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly.

    Riots and unrest arose from some of the 2019 protests, resulting in buildings being destroyed and dozens of people killed, although the role of militia groups in inflaming the situation has yet to be brought to account.

    However, Yeimo has denied he was involved in the protests in question.

    Hamid said it appeared that authorities targetted Yeimo because he had significant influence as a spokesman for the KNPB which had persistently called for an independence referendum for West Papua.

    Failure to recognise ‘peaceful expression’
    According to him, Indonesia’s government had failed to differentiate between peaceful expression and violent expression.

    “As long as it’s related to a political call for independence, self-determination or referendum, the government had never tolerated this. Although it is actually allowed by Indonesian special autonomy law,” Hamid said.

    “So I see no reason to lock him up in prison, especially in what we call solitary confinement in the prison of the Mobile Brigade of the special force of the police.”

    If convicted, Victor Yeimo faces a maximum range of sentences from 20 years to life in prison.

    Protesters march against racism in Jayapura, August 2019.
    Protesters march against racism in Jayapura, August 2019. Image: Whens Tebay/RNZ

    The 39-year-old was the latest Papuan detained for treason allegations following widespread protests in August and September 2019, including the so-called “Balikpapan Seven”.

    The Seven, who include KNPB members, received jail terms of between 10 and 11 months in a trial carried out in East Kalimantan province.

    The protests two years ago began in response to racist harassment of Papuan university students in Java, and spread across several cities and towns in Papua, including a smaller number of protests which spilled into deadly rioting in Jayapura, Manokwari and Wamena.

    Concerns for Yeimo’s health
    Amnesty and others including the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders Mary Lawlor have voiced concern about Yeimo’s health after more than three months in custody.

    “He has been held in solitary confinement in a cramped and poorly ventilated cell which has further worsened his pre-existing medical condition,” Amnesty noted.

    “With a record of lung and gastric diseases and having recently suffered from hemoptysis (coughing up blood) and heightened risk of COVID-19, we are concerned about his deteriorating health.”

    Lack of faith in system
    In the provinces of West Papua and Papua, Indonesian security forces routinely clamp down on Papuan protests, while military forces are also engaged in ongoing armed conflict with guerilla fighters of the West Papua Papua Liberation Army in the highlands region.

    Hamid described the rule of law in Papua as weak, and said grassroots Papuans had increasingly lost faith in the ability of the Indonesian justice system to address the many abuses their communities have experienced.

    “If Indonesia wants them to be part of Indonesia, stop the natural resources exploitation, over-exploitation, stop the over-presence of the military, stop the killing, and bring those responsible for the killings, for the torture, for any crimes against Papuans to justice.”

    In recent weeks, peaceful protests by Papuans calling for Yeimo’s release have been forcibly stopped by Indonesian police who say the risk of covid-19 means such public events aren’t allowed.

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Extricating Indonesian children from ISIS influence abroad

    “Rocket attacks happened, and I don’t know… I ran away and didn’t see anyone from my family”, said Faruq, an Indonesian boy in al-Hol camp, Syria in a BBC report, February 2020. He and two other boys, Yusuf and Nasa, aged around 10 to 12 years old, were separated from their parents and family when ISIS’s last stronghold, Baghouz, fell in March 2019. They have lived in al-Hol camp ever since, without guardians.  Until this day, we do not know what the future holds for these children.

    In February 2020, the Indonesian government announced it will not repatriate citizens who joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The government, however, opened the possibility for repatriation of unaccompanied children under ten years of age on a case-by-case basis. It has been more than a year since the announcement and no significant progress has been made, partly due to the worsening COVID-19 situation in Indonesia. Meanwhile, Indonesian children continue to live under squalid conditions amidst health and safety crises inside the camps.

    Indonesian pro-ISIS groups also exist in other ISIS-claimed territories, including in the Philippines, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The latter case is timely to discuss. A small number of Indonesians have arrived in the ISIS ‘Khorasan’ since 2017, some bringing their family along with them. As of early August 2021, there are eleven Indonesian pro-ISIS detainees in Kabul, Afghanistan, at least three of them are children under ten years of age. There has been discussion about their transfer from Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS) prison to the custody of the Indonesian embassy, but this was cancelled after the Taliban takeover on 15 August 2021. The Taliban reportedly freed some pro-ISIS and pro-al-Qaeda prisoners, including the eleven Indonesians. No one knows what happened to the children or what kind of life they must face in the midst of the ensuing chaos.

    Dire conditions in Syrian camps

    A recent IPAC report shows there were 555 Indonesians in al-Hol, al-Roj, and some Kurdish prisons, according to a census that took place in June 2019. Children were a large part of that population. There were 367 Indonesian children under eighteen, 75 per cent of whom were under ten. ISIS was active in recruiting and mobilising families, including women and children, after its establishment in mid-2014. Hundreds of Indonesian families were sold on the high hopes of living under the true, prosperous, and just Islamic state. The reality turned out to be far from it. The capital city, Raqqa, fell in 2017 and Baghouz was taken over in March 2019. Thousands of their supporters were displaced to camps and prisons managed by US-backed militia, the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF).

    The living conditions were already poor, but became even more dire as COVID-19 hit. Access to nutritious meals, water, hygiene, and medical facilities is scarce. The restriction of mobility during the pandemic further delayed distribution of aid and basic necessities, and forced some health clinics to shut down due to limited medical personnel. Consequently, eight children died within a week in August 2020 due to malnutrition and limited health facilities. It was reportedly three times higher the death toll rate for children since the beginning of 2020.

    Confinement in camps is also affecting the children’s psychological well-being, partly due to post-war trauma, but also because of the constant threats of violence inside the camps. Pro-ISIS women have been reported to burn tents or beat to death those accused of  violating ISIS law, as seen in the case of Sudarmini, a pregnant Indonesian  woman who was found beaten to death in July 2019. ISIS sleeper cells are smuggled inside, conducting killings and even a public beheading in early 2021, escalating the tension inside the camp. Sexual violence is also prevalent, despite limited documentation.

    The future is gloomy for these children. They receive no education but only indoctrination from pro-ISIS women. The UN and other humanitarian organisations have repeatedly call on governments to repatriate their nationals, especially children, but efforts so far remain insufficient. In March 2021, the National Anti-Terror Agency, BNPT, said it will conduct on-site identification and verification processes once the travel ban is lifted, but the chance is slim today amidst the worsening COVID-19 situation worldwide. The data verification is one thing, but there is a lot of work that needs to be done before repatriation takes place, and it should start immediately.

    Government’s challenges

    Repatriation of the children is not an easy process. Challenges include the definition of children eligible for repatriation, citizenship and data verification, risk assessments, diplomatic issues, and competing bureaucratic interests.

    The Indonesian government has hinted at the possibility of repatriation for unaccompanied children under ten years of age. But such a requirement can be problematic on the ground. For instance, in the case of Faruk, Yusuf and Nasa, who were already close to or older than the ten-year-old threshold when the interview took place: have their rights to get a better life and future already vanished? Faruq, Yusuf, and Nasa are not isolated cases. The IPAC report shows there are 34 unaccompanied children under eighteen; nineteen were under ten years of age as of June 2019.

    There were also 22 child brides, some with babies and toddlers, who possibly will not be regarded as “children” anymore, according to the citizenship law. Their children, however, will be granted Indonesian citizenship. The child protection law mandates the state protect every citizen under eighteen, regardless of their marital status, and thus the child brides, along with their babies, should be accorded full rights as children. But again, with the narrow eligibility for child repatriation, will they have a chance to come home?

    Related

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    Indonesia’s ban of ISIS was motivated by more than fear of returning fighters, writes Dominic Berger.

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    Data verification can be a real challenge as many camp residents lost their legal documents due to war or had them confiscated when they first arrived in IS territory. Those who decided to stay may use false identities or have deliberately destroyed their legal documents. The Indonesian government could use other methods of data verification, for instance by working with the Kurdish government who has done census and collected biometric data for some nationals in 2020 and 2021.

    Another obstacle is diplomatic. Indonesia maintains ties with the Syrian government under Bashar al-Assad, which does not recognise the Kurdish-led territory where the camps are located. Building communication and cooperation with the Kurdish government is seen as potentially harmful to Jakarta’s relationship with Damascus. Nevertheless, in August 2017, Indonesia successfully worked with the Kurdish government in Rojava in repatriating its 18 nationals, without affecting the relationship with Assad’s government. Humanitarian organisations in al-Hol also pointed out that working through proxies is possible, even repatriation through Damascus, as done by Albania, Kosovo, Russia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan.

    Repatriation increasing the security risk?

    The most complex challenges in repatriation are institutional differences in their approach and interests. Security agencies such as the police, BIN, and BNPT, continue to weigh the risk of child repatriation. Other institutions, especially those with a greater focus on child protection, are more concerned with the methods of repatriation, not whether it should be done.

    The perception of a risk to the state increases with age. Infants and toddlers may pose little risk to Indonesia’s security, but older children are assumed to have greater risk as they may receive indoctrination and military training from ISIS. ISIS indoctrination is ongoing and targets young children inside the camp. The government needs to move fast because the longer it delays, the fewer children will be under ten years of age. A thorough risk assessment therefore needed, as well as good work with the children’s family and community, and a well-planned and sustainable rehabilitation and reintegration programs.

    Indonesia has experience in handling child deportees and returnees in 2017, as well as the domestic cases of children exposed to extremism, as seen in the case of seven children of the 2018 Surabaya bombing. Lessons learned from post-conflict intervention projects in Aceh, Ambon, and Poso can be an important reference for future work. Children from Syrian camps might face entirely different situations, with different degrees of trauma. But prior-hands-on experience is a good starting point.

    The rehabilitation and reintegration programs also need to be supported with a good policy framework. The Ministry of Women Empowerment and Child Protection tried to fill the gap by issuing a 2019 ministerial regulation on guidelines for protecting children from radicalism and terrorism, which includes steps for prevention, reeducation, and provisions for social, psychosocial, and psychological rehabilitation for children within extremist networks. However, implementation remains uncertain. On the other hand, The National Action Plan on P/CVE, signed by President Joko Widodo in January 2021, claimed to have incorporated child protection principles, despite no provisions on child deportees, returnees, or those stranded abroad.

    All and all, the Indonesian government needs to have a real plan on the repatriation of Indonesian children in Syrian camps, with a clear roadmap and timeline. It can start with a small number of children to ease the monitoring process and develop better rehabilitation and reintegration programs ahead. Unaccompanied children under ten will number less than ten in 2021, and it is a good number to start with. These children cannot wait any longer as they grow up with grievances and disappointment with society and their government under ISIS indoctrination. Bringing them home is the only option that addresses both the humanitarian and security aim of weakening Indonesian links to terrorist networks abroad.

    This article derives from IPAC report No. 72 with the same title “Extricating Indonesian Children from ISIS Influence Abroad”, full report can be accessed here.

    The post Extricating Indonesian children from ISIS influence abroad appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Carmel Budiardjo obituary

    Campaigner for human rights in Indonesia from soon after independence and for freedom in regions it controlled

    Carmel Budiardjo, who has died aged 96, campaigned for human rights and justice in Indonesia, and contributed significantly to the cause of freedom and self-determination in regions it controlled – East Timor (now Timor-Leste), Aceh and West Papua.

    In the 1950s Carmel, a Londoner, and her Indonesian husband, Suwondo Budiardjo (known as Bud), began working in Indonesia, helping to build a new independent nation after the long period of Dutch colonial rule. Carmel was an economics researcher for the foreign ministry and Bud was deputy minister at the sea communications department.

    Continue reading…

    This post was originally published on Human rights | The Guardian.