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Category: indonesia

  • NZ imported more than a million tonnes of ‘dirty’ coal last year

    By Jordan Bond, RNZ News reporter

    In the same year that the government declared a climate emergency, imports of an especially dirty type of coal from Indonesia topped a million tonnes for the first time since 2006.

    Last year, 235 kilograms of overseas coal was imported for every New Zealander in order to power homes and businesses. This is also only imported coal; the country also produces coal domestically.

    Ninety-two percent of the imported coal was from Indonesia, and the vast majority of that was a low grade, high emissions type – sub-bituminous coal.

    “Not only are we burning more coal, [but] it’s the dirtiest coal. And it comes from Indonesia where the conditions and the mining is appalling,” said Cindy Baxter, an environmental campaigner.

    In recent years, low lake levels meant our biggest electricity generator — hydroelectricity — has produced less energy than normal. Natural gas supply has been inconsistent. Coal has been increasingly used as a fuel of last resort to keep the lights on in our homes and businesses.

    It is also the world’s worst fossil fuel, emitting far more greenhouse gases than any other. It produces carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxides, particulate pollution and heavy metals.

    Coal imports from Indonesia in 2020 totalled 1.084 million tonnes, or just over one billion kilograms. Australia the only other significant exporter of coal here, sending over about 10 percent of Indonesia’s total, 95 million kilograms.

    New Zealand has imported more than a million tonnes from Indonesia only twice in the last 20 years — 2020 and 2006.

    Almost all of it last year — 910 million kilograms — was sub-bituminous coal which must be burned in greater quantities to achieve the same energy output.

    Government not satisfied
    An energy analyst at Enerlytica, John Kidd, said New Zealand’s reliance on this coal has undoubtedly raised greenhouse gas emissions.

    “Yes it does. The fact that we’re importing a carbon-intensive fuel into the country and using it domestically to meet demand is carbon intensive. It will be adding significantly to our footprint here,” Kidd said.

    On top of that, New Zealand measures and budgets for the emissions of burning of the coal. The emissions involved in getting that coal here by ship are not recorded nor fit into any country’s carbon budgets.

    “The carbon miles involved with getting fuel from where it comes from and where it needs to be are generally not part of the equation. But absolutely they would be adding to the footprint involved with a higher coal burn in New Zealand.”

    The government — which wants 100 percent of electricity supply to be renewable by 2030 — admits this is not good enough.

    “Unfortunately fossil fuels continue to play a prominent role in security of electricity supply due to the structure of New Zealand’s electricity system, especially in providing cover for dry hydrological years, such as we have been experiencing,” said Energy and Resources Minister Dr Megan Woods.

    Housing Minister Megan Woods.
    Energy and Resources Minister Dr Megan Woods … government “not satisfied with this reliance on fossil fuels”. Image: Dom Thomas/RNZ

    “This government is not been [sic] satisfied with this reliance on fossil fuels and last year we backed up our goal to have a fully renewable electricity grid with a $30 million investigation into solving the dry year problem.

    “The NZ Battery project is investigating the country’s potential for pumped hydro, as well as comparator technologies, and is progressing well but will take time.”

    Baxter said the government’s aspirational goals on climate ring hollow.

    ‘Sick of hearing words’
    “We’re sick of hearing the words. We need to see it turned into action and the government to stop being driven by industry, the biggest emitters,” Baxter said.

    Even before the coal gets on the ship there is already a global environmental cost, including deforestation and the lack of reforestation once the mines are not used.

    A journalist in Indonesia, Hans Nicholas Jong, said although there is mining regulation, the government doesn’t consistently enforce it.

    “[There are] responsibilities for companies to rehabilitate their mines. Once they have finished operating they’re actually required by law to recover the environment. They’re required to reforest their areas, they’re required to close their mining pits. This is something they haven’t done because basically there is a lack of monitoring by the government, just because of the sheer number of mines.”

    Indonesia is one of the world’s biggest producers of coal.

    Despite public opposition, he said the government recently revised these laws, relaxing restrictions for mining companies which outraged activists.

    “They saw that this new mining law really facilitates the mining industry, at a time when a lot of countries actually want to reduce their coal production and consumption. But here we doubled down on our coal production and consumption.”

    Origin kept confidential
    Precisely where we get our coal from has been masked by the government.

    Since 2012, Stats NZ has kept confidential the type of coal and its origin. The public cannot know where we get our coal from. Importers can request their products be made confidential, which Stats approved in this case. It does release total coal imports.

    RNZ sourced this data from United Nations figures.

    “It’s indicative of the close relationship that the mining industry has had with our government. To be able to get that sort of information that is available internationally blocked in New Zealand arguing commercial sensitivity … the power of industry in this country over civil society is quite extraordinary,” Baxter said.

    Coal makes up a large amount of our electricity. As an example – in the first quarter of this year, 44 percent of Genesis Energy’s total generation was from coal. The company has signed an agreement to receive natural gas from another company Methanex.

    Woods said there has been an unexpected reduction in natural gas supply from at the Pohokura gas field, recently the country’s largest.

    “At full capacity, Pohokura gas field provides approximately 40 percent of New Zealand’s natural gas supply but over the past 12 months, production from the field has almost halved.

    Natural gas production down
    “As a result, overall natural gas production is down approximately 20 percent on last year. While this decline has put pressure on the supply of gas for all users, including electricity generators, this is not something anyone could have foreseen and is not a result of Government decisions.

    “The market responded as it was originally designed to, which included more use of coal at Huntly power station to provide the dry year cover that gas has previously provided to ensure security of supply.”

    She said the energy sector has also committed over $1 billion in new renewable capacity this year alone, including both geothermal and wind energy plants. Another wind farm, Waipipi, opened last month, and the country’s biggest solar farm in Kapuni.

    Woods was asked, if coal is necessary, why New Zealand couldn’t import it from a country with a stronger environmental record. She said these are business decisions made by privately-owned companies.

    The government is a majority shareholder of each of Genesis, Mercury and Meridian energy companies.

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Papuan and human rights defender Carmel Budiardjo dies at 96

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    British and Indonesian human rights defender Carmel Budiardjo, founder of TAPOL watchdog and the movement’s driving force for many decades, has died peacefully aged 96.

    TAPOL said in an announcement that she had died on Saturday and would greatly missed by an extensive network of people whose lives had been “touched — and sometimes transformed — by her passionate and determined campaigning for human rights, justice and democracy in Indonesia, East Timor, Aceh and West Papua”.

    For many, she had been a great mentor as well as a beloved friend, TAPOL said.

    TAPOL stands for “tahanan politik” or “political prisoners” in Indonesian.

    Budiardjo, a British citizen then living in Indonesia, was imprisoned without trial by Indonesian authorities following former President Suharto’s rise to power in 1965.

    An Amnesty International prisoner of conscience, Budiardjo was released after three years’ imprisonment and she returned to the UK.

    In 1973, she founded TAPOL to campaign for the release of the tens of thousands of political prisoners following the 1965 atrocities by the Suharto regime and in support of the relatives of the hundreds of thousands who were killed.

    Raised awareness of atrocities
    Budiardjo was determined to raise international awareness about those atrocities and injustices in which many Western countries, including the UK, were “complicit in their attempts to halt what they saw as the rise of communism”.

    Over the next three decades, TAPOL’s work broadened to encompass wider issues of human rights, peace and democracy in Indonesia, including in Aceh, East Timor and the contested Melanesian territory of West Papua.

    “Wherever possible, and despite the extreme repression of the New Order regime, we built close relationships and collaboration with the very brave human rights defenders and pro-democracy campaigners there,” said TAPOL.

    In 1995, Budiardjo received the Right Livelihood Award, after being nominated by the International Federation for East Timor.

    With awareness growing also of the environmental damage being wrought by the regime on nature and local communities, in 1988 Budiardjo helped set up a sister organisation, Down to Earth, to fight for ecological justice.

    Later, in 2007, Budiardjo and TAPOL were also founder members of the London Mining Network, established to support communities harmed by London-based mining companies.

    “As Indonesia became more democratic during the 2000s, we increasingly turned our attention to the region of West Papua. There, human rights violations have continued, largely out-of-sight and un-discussed within Indonesia as well as internationally,” said TAPOL.

    John Rumbiak Award
    For TAPOL’s international work on West Papua, Budiardjo also received the John Rumbiak Human Rights Defender Award and was honoured as an “Eldest Daughter of Papua” by leaders of West Papuan civil society in 2011.

    TAPOL is still today very much as Budiardjo set it up — a small organisation/network of committed staff, volunteers and collaborators, all aiming for a big impact.

    “We remain committed to her ideals of promoting justice and equality across Indonesia, and are deeply grateful for all that she contributed and taught us,” the TAPOL statement said.

    “Our thoughts and sincere condolences for this huge, sad loss go to Carmel’s family in particular, but also to all those across the globe who knew and loved her.”

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Carmel Budiardjo: human rights defender from Indonesia dies

    A leading human rights advocate and former political prisoner in Indonesia, Carmel Budiardjo, has died, aged 96.

    Carmel Budiardjo played a leading role in reporting human rights violations in Indonesia, including in West Papua, Timor-Leste, and Aceh province. She had herself been jailed without trial in 1968 for three years under the government of General Suharto, while her Indonesian husband was jailed for twelve years. They had been caught up in an anti-communist purge led by Suharto, having been arrested in 1965 on charges of involvement in an attempted coup against his predecessor President Sukarno. See: https://www.trueheroesfilms.org/thedigest/laureates/3BDAA6C3-CFA6-444F-7F15-77D914ACFA8B

    After being released she was deported to England, where in 1973 she founded TAPOL, which stands for ‘tahanan politik’ or ‘political prisoners’ in Bahasa Indonesian.

    For decades, the NGO has campaigned for the release of poilitical prisoners in Indonesia, including many who have been incarcerated in Papua merely for exercising their basic rights such as to freedom of expression or assembly.

    Over the next three decades, TAPOL’s work widened to also address broader wider issues of human and environmental rights, peace and democracy in Indonesia.

    According to prominent journalist John Pilger, Budiardjo’s “tireless work saw the release of political prisoners in Indonesia and gave crucial support to the heroic (independence and human rights) struggles in East Timor and West Papua“.

    Despite the brutal repression of human rights activism by Suharto’s New Order regime, Budiardjo and TAPOL built an extensive network and collaborated with brave human rights defenders and pro-democracy campaigners in Indonesia.

    Budiardjo raised international attention towards the 2004 assasination of Indonesian human rights campaigner, Munir Said Thalib, after whose death a lethal dose of arsenic was identified in his body.

    Around the same time she launched a campaign demanding an international embargo against the British government selling arms to Indonesia when Indonesian militrary forces had launched a major offensive to crush the Free Papua movement.

    She remained an active campaigner well into her 90s, concerned with the plight of political prisoners in Papua and throughout the Indonesian republic

    The author of several books, Carmel Budiardjo is remembered as an inspirational defender of human rights.

    https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/446720/carmel-budiardjo-rights-defender-who-shone-a-light-on-papua

    This post was originally published on Hans Thoolen on Human Rights Defenders and their awards.

  • Activists call for peaceful remembering of 1998 Biak massacre in West Papua

    “We Have Come To Testify” … survivors give evidence about the 1998 Biak massacre at a “citizens’ tribunal” hearing hosted by the Centre for Peace Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney. Video: Wantok Musik

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    Today — July 6 — marks 23 years since the Indonesian security forces massacred scores of people in Biak, West Papua.

    The victims included women and children who had gathered for a peaceful rally.

    They were killed at the base of a water tower flying the Morning Star flag of West Papuan independence. Other Papuans were rounded up and later taken out to sea where they were thrown off naval ships and drowned.

    No Indonesian security force member has been charged or brought to justice for the human rights abuses committed against peaceful demonstrators.

    According to the Papuan Institute for Human Rights Studies and Advocacy (Elsham Papua), eight people died, three went missing, four were severely wounded, 33 mildly injured, and 150 people were arrested and persecuted during the Biak massacre.

    The report also said 32 bodies were found in Biak water at that time (Tabloid Jubi, July 5 2021)

    Joe Collins of the Australia West Papua Association (AWPA) said: “it is tragic that 23 years after the Biak massacre, the West Papuan people continue to be arrested, intimated and killed by the security forces and in fact the situation in West Papua continues to deteriorate with ongoing clashes between the security forces and the OPM.

    “It was also reported that a commemoration will be held on the 6th in West Papua.

    “Hopefully, the security forces will allow the West Papuan people to commemorate the tragedy of Biak peacefully without interference.”

    Komnas HAM Papua head Frits Ramandey said: “I have been contacted by those who will commemorate the Biak massacre [in a rally] on July 6. We demand relevant parties [especially the security forces] to facilitate them.”

    Ramandey appealed to Jubi in a phone call on Sunday: “Let the Papuans remember the Biak Massacre.”

    • On 2 July 1998, the West Papuan Morning Star flag was raised on top of a water tower near the harbour in Biak. Activists and local people gathered beneath it singing songs and holding traditional dances for four days in a demand for a self-determination referendum. As the rally continued, many more people in the area joined in with numbers reaching up to 500 people. On July 6, the Indonesian security forces attacked the demonstrators, massacring scores of people.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Malawi Pride and press freedoms in Palestine: human rights this fortnight – in pictures

    A roundup of the coverage on struggles for human rights and freedoms, from Chile to Cambodia

    Continue reading…

    This post was originally published on Human rights | The Guardian.

  • Frontline women: unrecognised leadership in Indonesia’s COVID-19 response

    Local government and civil society responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia have been widely lauded in academic and popular media since the first Covid-19 case was confirmed in March 2020. Indeed local mitigation and healthcare responses have proven critical in the face of central government failures in many aspects of pandemic responses. What early studies have not shown however, has been the role that women have played in leading these local responses. My new study uncovered a disjuncture between men’s high representation in formal Covid-19 leadership and decision-making bodies, and women’s overwhelming domination of the daily work of pandemic leadership in both infectious disease mitigation and healthcare responses. While I focused on just one city in Central Java, we can assume that this division is mirrored in other parts of Indonesia and, indeed, in many parts of the world.

    The results of research published in my new report sheds light on why women are minimally represented in official Covid-19 taskforce structures while having overwhelming majority representation in the frontlines of emergency and long-term pandemic responses. In January and February 2021 I conducted fieldwork with a masters scholar in the city of Salatiga, Central Java, collecting data on women public servants’ leadership roles in pandemic responses. In this report I extend on previous research on pandemic responses at local level by applying a gender lens to examine why women healthcare workers and officials, who have limited roles and responsibilities on formal Covid-19 taskforces at the city-wide and subdistrict level, have played the critical roles in leading mitigation strategies at both levels.

    Click on the cover image below to download the full policy brief.

    Failure of Covid-19 pandemic taskforces at local level

    While national government regulations state that gender mainstreaming policies must be integrated into emergency and disaster response plans at the national and sub-national levels, women comprise only 7% of the national Covid-19 taskforce and 12% of, for example, the Central Java provincial taskforce. In the municipality of Salatiga in Central Java, gender representation in government is higher than the national average, however women still occupy a minority of positions in the highest echelons of the local government public service. This disparity had direct implications for the composition of Salatiga’s COVID pandemic taskforce where positions in it were allocated on the basis of structural positions within government without specific reference to gender. In the Salatiga city taskforce appointed in October 2020, women’s participation was 17% in a body of 12 members. The heads of strategic government departments, such as the heads of the regional police (Polres), the local military command base (Korem), the municipal police (Satpol PP), the Regional Planning, Research and Development Agency (Bappeda) and the National Unity and Political Department amongst others (Kesbangpol), are all headed by men and were automatically appointed to the taskforce. Despite violating gender mainstreaming principles, this local picture is typical of the situation across Indonesia both in elected government and amongst career public servants, with men holding a majority of higher echelon positions.

    Rapid Test facility at Pasar Senen Station. Image credit: Gaudi Renanda in Wikimedia Commons (CC BY 4.0)

    The Salatiga municipal taskforce is responsible for strategic pandemic mitigation policy and planning, cross-agency coordination, monitoring and enforcement of mitigation measures, budgeting and other resource allocations. Despite the assumed leading role of this male-dominated body, in practice it has been women that have principally led mitigation and healthcare responses, stepping up to fill gaps in formal leadership of pandemic mitigation measures.

    Women’s leadership in the pandemic

    In contrast to the city-wide COVID-19 taskforce, the Salatiga health department has a far higher proportion of women both in leadership roles as well as comprising the majority of healthcare workers. Overall women comprise 80% of the city’s health department workforce. At the community level, Salatiga’s healthcare response to COVID-19 was even more female-dominated. The directors of the city’s six community health centres (PUSKESMAS)  are all women, with women comprising up to 90% of the health centres’ workforce.

    In practice, pandemic responses not only in healthcare, but also in the critical area of infectious disease mitigation, were largely led by women from the health department, women staff of community health centres, and some acute care staff in the district and other local hospitals. The main weakness in pandemic responses identified by all those interviewed was the failure of the city-wide taskforce to provide leadership and direction. A health department official said that while government agencies have specific taskforce responsibilities in practice they run to the health department to find solutions. Women leaders working in healthcare at citywide and sub-district level argued that the citywide taskforce should be strengthened, to effectively monitor and evaluate the implementation of policies in the field, to supervise effective public communications including mitigation policies to the public, so that health services could prioritise deepening their knowledge of COVID-19 related health science and pandemic handling which is very dynamic and fast-developing.

    Banners communicate strategies for mitigiating COVID-19 spread. Image credit: Rebecca Meckelburg.

    The report shows that there were four institutions that were critical in frontline health care—the health department, community health centres, the district hospital and a special isolation facility; while the first two of these institutions were also critical in mitigation responses. Indeed community health centres (puskesmas) have been the backbone of Salatiga’s pandemic healthcare and disease mitigation strategy as the frontline for testing, tracing and supporting people infected with COVID-19.

    The strategic response of the health centre examined here was innovative, rapidly reorganising health centre workers into dedicated teams that manage COVID-19 patient work specifically and the remainder who continue to manage and provide general health services. At the community level, the community health centre head initiated cross-sectoral communication with sub-district stakeholders (with subdistrict government, police, military and local ward officials) and coordinated cooperation with community stakeholders, civil associations, religious groups and subdistrict government agencies.

    Women’s pandemic workloads

    National pandemic policy failures in Indonesia and many other countries have increased women healthcare workers’ paid and unpaid work burden. Much of the labour of women healthcare workers is not even visible let alone important in public policy– either in terms of the costs it imposes on a highly feminized workforce and society more generally, or the benefits it provides in terms of care work and social reproduction. The result is that the pandemic produced more complex work practices with higher workloads for women working at the frontline of the response, without additional human resources, while these women also had to deal more intensively with everything related to the pandemic in their domestic roles.

    Lab workers in the Bandung BioFarma facility in Indonesia examine vials that have vaccine vial monitor technology incorporated into their labels. BioFarma, Bandung, Indonesia. Image credit: Ümit Kartoğlu for VOA on Wikimedia Commons

    Most concerning is that these women hold significant knowledge through experience of managing this pandemic crisis. They know the shape of the COVID-19 pandemic and understand what practices work best—and what does not work—in mitigating the crisis. Yet their limited inclusion in formal structures with decision-making authority, continue to restrict women’s power to critique and shape political decision-making about priorities in COVID-19 pandemic responses.

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    COVID-19, food insecurity and the resilience of indigenous women in Indonesia

    Protecting rural indigenous people’s control over food resources is linked to the wellbeing of migrant workers in the cities.

    Muntaza and Rizki Amalia Affiat 20 April, 2021

    What women contribute to pandemic leadership

    Scholars and advocates have argued for women’s participation in the design, implementation and monitoring of COVID-19 related laws and policies at all levels of government decision-making. My study shows that this participation is indeed necessary, not only to address the specific needs of women and girls in the pandemic, but, further, in order to draw upon the growing knowledge and experience of these women in developing timely pandemic strategies.

    Healthcare managers and frontline workers identified several areas that required serious and immediate action. First, there needs to be better coordination, leadership and implementation of official duties in the city-wide taskforce. Second, improved monitoring and enforcement of health protocols in workplaces, public spaces and approved events including weddings, public ceremonies and venues that facilitated public gatherings are required. Third, there must be monitoring and enforcement of movement restrictions and local regulations on work from home quotas, limits on numbers in restaurants, hotels and other venues and home isolation. Fourth, there needs to be more extensive trace and test capacity by expanding physical facilities to support expanded testing as the lynch pin of sound epidemiological monitoring of disease prevalence. This epidemiological monitoring would support the development of a road map to successful disease suppression.

    Local health departments and community health centres in Indonesia, run largely by women, have been a critical piece of infrastructure for Indonesia’s pandemic response. Both health department officials and health centre workers’ intensive community engagements have generated greater understanding of what COVID-19 is in local communities, driven coordination of cross-sectoral stakeholders where possible, provided active support for positive patients, and reduced community stigmatisation. Sadly, this critical role, as well as the knowledge and experience gained by these women, has not been acknowledged formally nor drawn upon as a critical resource in longer term pandemic planning and leadership. Ultimately, this failure to include these leaders undermines the capacity to provide well-coordinated wholistic responses to the COVID-19 pandemic at the local level, resulting in ongoing high levels of virus transmission and effectively extending the timeframe of the multiple crises resulting from the pandemic.

    The post Frontline women: unrecognised leadership in Indonesia’s COVID-19 response appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Java, Bali brace for covid emergency lockdown as Indonesia’s cases surge

    The World Health Organisation says the delta variant of covid-19 has been identified in 85 countries and is spreading rapidly in unvaccinated populations around the world. Indonesia registered a record 21,807 cases on Wednesday. Video: Al Jazeera

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    Indonesia’s most populated and popular islands are bracing for emergency lockdown measures from this weekend, with President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo touting the inevitability of shifting policy amid soaring covid-19 cases, reports The Jakarta Post.

    The country recorded another record-breaking day with 21,807 new covid-19 cases and 467 deaths in a day, according to official figures published on Wednesday.

    That brings the country’s overall caseload to 2,178,272 and deaths to 58,491 – a toll among the highest in Asia.

    The numbers are widely regarded as conservative estimates because of severely inadequate testing outside Jakarta.

    The Health Ministry also reported alarming bed occupancy rates (BORs) in Jakarta, Banten and West Java – all of which have surpassed 90 percent – followed by Yogyakarta and Central Java at 89 and 87 percent, respectively.

    President Widodo said the restrictions would begin tomorrow — Saturday — and last until July 20 on the most populous island of Java and the tourist island of Bali, reports Al Jazeera.

    In a televised address yesterday, Widodo said: “This situation requires us to take more decisive steps so that we can together stem the spread of covid-19.”

    Worst-hit nation
    The details of the measures were being announced later, he added.

    Indonesia is Southeast Asia’s worst-hit nation with new cases topping 21,000 every day. The surge has overwhelmed hospitals and resulted in a shortage of oxygen in the capital, Jakarta.

    A government document said the new restrictions aim to cut daily cases to below 10,000, and will include work-at-home orders for all non-essential sectors and the continued closure of schools and universities.

    The document also said public amenities like beaches, parks, tourist attractions and places of worship must close, while restaurants can offer only take away or delivery services.

    Constructions sites can continue operating as normal, however.

    Udayana University Professor Gusti Ngurah Mahardika, a virologist on the island of Bali where the number of daily confirmed cases have more than quadrupled in two weeks, said the proposed restrictions were not enough.

    “I have seen the new emergency measure but I am sceptical. We need a lockdown but the problem is there is just no money to keep people at home,” he said.

    Infection rate far higher
    Infectious disease experts say modelling suggested Indonesia’s true daily infection rate was at least 10 times higher than the official count.

    “The problem in Indonesia is that testing rates are very low because only people who present themselves at hospitals with symptoms receive free tests. Everyone else has to pay,” said Dr Dicky Budiman, an epidemiologist who has helped formulate the Indonesian Ministry of Health’s pandemic management strategy for 20 years.

    “Based on the current reproduction rate in Indonesia that has climbed from 1.19 in January to 1.4 in June, I estimated there at least 200,000 new cases in the country today.

    “But if I compare that with modelling by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation in Seattle, it is much higher, about 350,000 new infections per day. That’s as high as India before the peak.”

    A virologist in Java advising the Ministry of Health, who spoke to reporters on condition of anonymity because they were not authorised to speak to the media, said the virus spread so quickly because many Indonesians exhibiting symptoms of covid-19 prefer to stay home.

    “When we see the hospitals full with patients it’s only the tip of the iceberg because only 10 to 15 percent of sick people in Indonesia go to hospitals,” the virologist said.

    “The rest will stay at home and self-remedy because they prefer to stay with their family.

    “This has happened since the start of the pandemic but with the delta variant now becoming dominant it’s a much more serious problem because the secondary infection rate in households for the delta variant is 100 percent.

    “That means if one member of a household is infected, they all get infected. But as their symptoms become worse and people experience trouble breathing, we expect many more people will come to hospitals, like what we saw in India.”

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Uneven accountability reform: insights from parliament and bureaucracy in Indonesia

    After Indonesia transitioned to democracy in 1999, accountability reforms in parliament and bureaucracy were on the agenda. In 2002, Law 31/1999 on Criminal Acts of Corruption and Law 30/2002 established the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) as an effort to solve the legacy of corruption from Suharto’s authoritarian era. Indonesia also reformed overlapping tasks of existing audit bodies, which were the state audit board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, BPK), the financial and development audit agency (Badan Pengawas Keuangan dan Pembangunan, BPKP, and the internal audit body of local government and ministry (Inspektorat) through the Constitution Amendment 1999-2002. This accountability reform was intended to ensure that the three audit bodies could cooperate well in investigating the use of state budget by the parliament and the bureaucracy. But it has made uneven progress.

    The BPK is the only state institution which has the authority to audit financial reports, performance, and conduct further investigations of suspected corruption in public and private organisations which receive funds from the state. The BPK’s investigation results are the only official indicator to assess whether a state institution performs well in its use of state funds. When conducting investigations, the BPK classifies its findings into four categories. First, if there is administrative error, the BPK will only recommend fixing the error. Second, if there are issues on budget planning, such as too many work trips, the BPK will recommend efficiency measures. Third, if there are irregular costs in infrastructure procurement, the BPK will order to funds be returned. Fourth, if there are fictitious programs or unreasonable mark-ups on state budgets, the BPK will classify it as corruption.

    However, the accountability reform does not seem to be working. In 2014-2018 parliament consistently received higher scores than the bureaucracy in BPK’s financial audits. Meanwhile, Transparency International’s data shows that Indonesian corruption cases were higher in the parliament than in the bureaucracy. In 2014 the parliament contributed 89 percent of total corruption cases in Indonesia, while the bureaucracy contributed 79 percent. During 2014-2019, the KPK arrested 254 members of parliament due to corruption in use of state funds.

    The accountability reform in 1999 only shifted the BPK’s vulnerability to the president, to vulnerability to parliament. Indonesia’s Constitution stipulates that members of BPK are chosen by parliament. The BPK is required to submit its investigation reports to the parliament in order to receive recommendation as to whether the report will be followed up by the judiciary. Meanwhile, the reform in 1999 shifted authority and power to conduct investigations toward the bureaucracy from the corrupt BPKP, which received many political interventions from Suharto’s administration, to BPK which was established as an independent body.

    The arrangement creates a dysfunctional accountability mechanism. According to Bovens and Mulgan, accountability as a mechanism is an institutional arrangement or relation in which “actors are held to account by forums,” whereby the forum’s power and hierarchical status are higher than the actor. This assumes that a principal-agent relationship exists, in which “the forum is the principal and the actor is the agent who is held to account for his performance in office.” This type of accountability aims to ensure that state institutions stay on a virtuous path to accountable governance. In the Indonesian context, the arrangement places the BPK’s power and status (as the forum) lower than the parliament (as the actor). Meanwhile, the status and power of BPK (as the forum) is higher than the bureaucracy (as the actor).

    The parliament controls BPK through the selection of the nine members. The term of office of each member is five years. The selection processes of BPK’s members in 2009, 2014 and 2019 have continuously been in the spotlight because the processes were not transparent in parliament and were subject to political interventions. Members of the BPK consist of former parliament members and non-politicians, but its composition is dominated by former politicians. Both former politicians and non-politicians need to have political accesses if they want to be the member of BPK. This political access leads to clientelism, which is a dominant practice in Indonesia. Scholars have shown that to occupy a public official position in Indonesia, people need to offer something, like funds and/or mass support, to a political party’s campaign in an election.

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    Paying bribes in Indonesia

    A new survey looks beyond aggregated corruption indexes at how experiences of bribery and extortion in Indonesia differ from sector to sector.

    Paul Kenny and Eve Warburton 20 January, 2021

    This dysfunctional accountability mechanism really undermines accountability quality between BPK and the parliament. In 2013 the Hambalang project, a mega corruption case in Indonesia, exemplified this problem. The Hambalang project was supposed to build sport infrastructure for Indonesian athletes. This project was implemented from 2003 to 2012 and costed Rp 2.5 trillion (US$ 1 = Rp 14,278) and never finished. BPK investigated this case and found that corruption in this project reached Rp 463.67 billion and involved 15 parliamentarians. But, later due to the parliament’s control over the BPK, the names of the 15 politicians were lost from the BPK’s investigation report. Both the BPK and the parliament claimed that there was no mention of the 15 politicians in the report, even though the report with the names of 15 politicians had been published in the media. Many NGOs protested and challenged the disappearance of the 15 names from the BPK’s report but were ignored. This illustrates that the BPK can change its investigation report categories from a corruption category to non-violation category simply by erasing the suspects’ names.

    Similarly, in 2016 the BPK conducted an annual investigation of all state institutions and found that the parliament had conducted fictitious work trips which reached Rp 945 billion. This case attracted a great deal of attention and protest from the public. But, because of the parliament’s intervention on the BPK, it moved its investigation report from the fictitious category to an administrative issue. BPK claimed that the parliamentary members who conducted the work trips had only failed to correctly report work trips. This shows that the BPK is able to move investigation results from the corruption category into the ordinary error category.

    Conversely, accountability mechanisms which function between the BPK and the bureaucracy lead to audit processes which work well. In 2017 BPK conducted annual investigations into performance and financial reporting in Jambi Province. This investigation found fictitious work trips by the bureaucracy of up to Rp 100 million. The BPK ordered the bureaucracy to return Rp 100 million to the treasury.

    Similarly, in 2020, a BKP audit found a corruption category breach in the bureaucracy of Seram Bagian Barat Regency, Maluku Province. This abuse reached Rp 70 billion of financing for the regency programs. This case was referred by the BPK to the Attorney to be processed.

    In 2020 the BPK found violations of state budget for COVID-19 handling in South Sulawesi Province. The bureaucracy conducted unreasonable mark-up in the tenders for social assistance provision. The BPK has handed its investigation report to the judiciary to adjudicate this case. These cases show that BPK is consistent with its category findings.

    These empirical cases show that the accountability mechanism which functions between BPK and the bureaucracy prevent illegal behaviour, and it can produce an objective finding category. Meanwhile, the dysfunctional accountability mechanism triggers illegal behaviour in BPK in order to secure the interests of the parliament. It is not surprising, then, that the parliament’s financial audit score from BPK is as high as the bureaucracy’s.

    The future of Indonesia’s accountability performance much depends on how well the accountability mechanism works. The next accountability reform should fix this problem. If not, the reform will not lead to any meaningful improvements.

    The post Uneven accountability reform: insights from parliament and bureaucracy in Indonesia appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Starbucks Indonesia Debuts Its First Vegan Sandwich At More Than 460 Locations

    3 Mins Read Starbucks Indonesia has added a vegan sandwich as part of its partnership with Rebel Food’s meatless offerings.

    The post Starbucks Indonesia Debuts Its First Vegan Sandwich At More Than 460 Locations appeared first on Green Queen.

    This post was originally published on Green Queen.

  • Papuans protest over draconian bid by Jakarta to replace Governor Enembe

    SPECIAL REPORT: By Yamin Kogoya

    Indonesia’s most troubled province of Papua is become embroiled in another mass demonstration with protesters barricading provincial government buildings and offices over a draconian and undemocratic appointment.

    The latest unrest is in response to last week’s controversial appointment of Papua’s Provincial Government Secretary, Dance Yulian Flassy, as Acting Governor of Papuan province by Indonesia’s Home Affairs Minister Tito Karnavian.

    It has been alleged that Flassy sent a letter to the Ministry of Home Affairs requesting to be appointed as Acting Governor of Papua.

    The letter no T.121.91/4124/OTDA dated June 24, 2021, was signed by the Ministry of Home Affairs General Director of Regional Autonomy, Akmal Malik.

    This sudden appointment shocked Governor Enembe, who has been in Singapore receiving medical treatment since May. The governor said that he had not been informed nor made aware of the appointment.

    He said that this was “maladministration” and an attempt to cause more trouble in Papua.

    Four points
    Governor Enembe wrote a letter to President Jokowi, which outlined four points:

    1. Governor Enembe will return to Papua to perform his duty as governor as soon as he is fully recovered;
    2. As an active governor, Governor Enembe has not been consulted, informed about, or agreed to Flassy’s appointment as Acting Governor;
    3. Governor Enembe was elected by his people in accordance with Indonesia’s constitution to administer the province and lead his people. He stated that when he took office, he took an oath to protect the unitary state of Indonesia. He is disappointed by this kind of unlawful and unconstitutional behaviour coming from the high office; and
    4. Governor Enembe requested President Jokowi to dismiss Flassy from office as he had misused his public portfolio in trying to take office without consulting Governor Enembe.

    “In addition to these [points], Mr Flassy has already done many things that contradict my policies as Governor,” said Governor Enembe (Fajar Papua.com, June 25).

    Governor Lukas Enembe
    Governor Lukas Enembe … receiving medical treatment in Singapore. Image: West Papua Today

    The Governor said he was surprised by the fact that Home Affairs Minister Tito Karnavian was the one who granted permission for him to go to Singapore for medical treatment in April. Governor Enembe asked: “Why, then, is Mr. Tinto trying to replace me, knowing that I am still alive and recovering?”

    Muhammad Rifai Darus, Governor Enembe’s spokesperson, said Enembe was still active as the head of Papua’s regional, provincial government and criticised the appointment in its breach of proper procedure and mechanism (as reported by Papua Today online news, June 25).

    Discriminatory move
    Ricky Ham Pagawak, the vice-chairman of the Democrat party in Papua, said that this appointment was discriminatory and a civil coup d’état against Governor Lukas’ office (Papua Post, June 26).

    Dance Yulian Flassy name board
    Papuan provincial office name board for the official named to “replace” Governor Enembe as “Acting Governor”. Image: APR

    Pagawak continues to criticise the appointment by saying the letter was issued in the morning and in the afternoon on the same day Flassy was appointed.

    “Is this fair?” he asked.

    In response, Papuans have already blocked several government buildings, including the office of the Democrat Party.

    “If there is no withdrawal of this appointment from the central government, Papuan people will continue to galvanize mass rallies and occupy provincial office until the matter is fully resolved,” said Pagawak (Suara Papua, June 26).

    Papuan provincial office barrier
    A barrier erected by protesters on the Papuan provincial office. Image: APR

    A member of the Papuan Provincial Parliament, Nason Utty, also expressed his disappointment at Flassy’s move, sending a letter to the Ministry of Home Affairs, requesting to be appointed as Acting Governor of Papua.

    “It is inappropriate for the provincial secretary to do this. Mr. Enembe remains the legitimate Governor of the Papuan Province, so this is an important decision that should be consulted first with him,” said Nason Utty (SindoNews.com, June 26).

    Severe criticism
    Despite the severe criticism by Governor Enembe and Papuans, Luqman Hakim, Vice-Chairman of Commission II of the House of Representatives in Jakarta, said that this appointment was appropriate and proper procedures and mechanisms had been followed.

    “The decision of the Minister of Home Affairs to appoint Papua Provincial Secretary, Dance Yulian Flassy, as acting Governor was needed and legitimate. In the principles of constitutional law, it is not permissible for a government to have a power vacuum,” Hakim told DetikNews reporters (June 26).

    There is an element of common sense in Hakim’s statement –- such high office should not be left as a power vacuum infinitely. Especially in Papua, one of the most conflict-ravaged regions of Indonesia and the world.

    But even simple rules that govern such as common sense differ significantly between Jakarta and Papua.

    In Papua, strong local leadership is needed to respond to never ending impending crises.

    However, Jakarta is also notoriously known for introducing harmful policies, opposite to the wishes of Papuan people, which aggravate these conflicts and crises.

    One such failed policy is the infamous Papuan Special Autonomy Law No. 21 of 2001, introduced 20 years ago to deflect the ever-growing demand for Papuan independence, following the fall of Suharto’s 32-year iron fist rule in 1998.

    Autonomy law opposed
    This law will expire in November 2021. Jakarta’s insistence to extend what Papuans regard as a “failed and dead special autonomy” policy have already been met with severe criticism and massive rejection by Papuan society.

    Exacerbating these situations further, controversial labelling of any Papuans who opposed Jakarta as “terrorists” in recent months, following the killing of a senior Indonesian intelligence officer, General I Gusti Putu Danny Karya Nugraha, also sparked outrage among Papuans and Indonesians alike.

    Papuan civil society groups and churches strongly rejected this “terrorist” label and asked Jakarta to revoke the decision. This harmful label will give the green light for security forces to shoot any Papuan regarded as a West Papua National Liberation Army member.

    Local media Suara Papua (Papua Voice) has recorded rare shocking footage on the current devastating humanitarian crisis in Papua’s highlands, as security forces continue to terrorise the locals in their pursuit for Papua’s liberation army.

    WATCH THE VIDEO ON FACEBOOK

    Jakarta’s unsympathetic approach in not respecting Papuan’s customary practice of 40 days of national mourning for the May 21 passing of their Vice-Governor, Klemen Tinal, rubs salt in Papua’s deep wounds.

    These are among many of Jakarta’s top-down, draconian policies that fan the burning flames in the hearts of Papuans in this decade-old-conflict-stricken region of the world.

    Because the central government doesn’t even have the courtesy of asking their own elected Governor about the appointment of another Indigenous Papuan as acting Governor, indicates that Jakarta is creating and nurturing conflicts among Papuan Indigenous people.

    Governors not consulted
    Jakarta also did not ask the governors of both provinces (Papua and West Papua) about the impact that the recent “terrorist” labelling of Papuans might have on the psychology of the Papuan people.

    It seems that Indonesia, a country that prides itself as the world’s fourth-largest democracy with an ambition to play a role in global affairs, struggles to decide what it stands for –- democracy and freedom? Or something else?

    This indecisiveness was demonstrated further when Indonesia decided to join 14 other countries (including North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela, Russia and China) in rejecting a resolution on “The Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) and the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity during the vote in the UN Assembly in May this year.

    This ambivalence reflects in almost every policy Jakarta has introduced for Papua. We have the ruling elites in Jakarta making statements of removing all Indigenous Papuans from their ancestral homeland.

    On the other hand, President Jokowi wants to approach Papua through welfare.

    Unfortunately, the same president that talks about welfare also gives orders to his troops for a manhunt looking for “terrorists” in West Papua.

    The appointment of Flassy as Acting Governor without consulting Governor Lukas Enembe and Papuan people reflects Jakarta’s tragic mishandling of West Papua.

    Practising what is preached
    Jakarta should pick what principles and values it wants to live by and handle its affairs with Papuans accordingly.

    Otherwise, any meaningful and permanent peace cannot be installed in the land of Papua if Jakarta continues to approach Papua with self-contradictory policies. It’s a case of practising what you preach.

    Both Enembe and Flassy are Papuans and should be united in resolving the many challenges that their people face, not fighting over the top jobs. But unfortunately, elites in Jakarta continue to introduce policies that encourage Papuans to be at odds with one another for all sorts of things.

    That is the true colour of the old colonial strategy of “divide and conquer” at work. We learned what happened over the past 500 years of European colonisation –- they used this strategy in decimate local indigenous populations.

    Because of these unfortunate tragedies, Governor Lukas Enembe has stated that people in Papua remain calm and united to protect Papua and not be easily provoked by what is happening.

    He has asked if Papuan people want to express their frustrations over the appointment of Dance Yulian Flassy, to do it peacefully without causing harm to all life in the land of Papua.

    Muhammad Rifai Darus, Governor Enembe’s spokesperson, said Governor Enembe was alive and recovering.

    When he comes home, he will deal with Jakarta and appoint his Vice-Governor in accordance with proper procedure and mechanism.

    In the meantime, he asks the people in Papua to remain calm and not to provide any unnecessary opportunity for the enemy of Papua to use this moment to create more conflict and devastation.

    • Yamin Kogoya is a West Papuan academic who has a Master of Applied Anthropology and Participatory Development from the Australian National University who contributes to Asia Pacific Report. From the Lani tribe in the Papuan Highlands, he is currently living in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia.
    • Other Yamin Kogoya articles


    This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by APR editor.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Indonesia vs covid – ‘it’s like fighting a war without a commander’

    By Tsarina Maharani in Jakarta

    The initiator of the citizen-based reporting coalition Lapor Covid-19 (Report Covid-19), Ahmad Arif, says the Indonesian public is facing the covid-19 pandemic without any clear direction.

    There was no data transparency and inadequate information and education on the pandemic, Arif told a media conference.

    There was also no clear leadership in confronting the crisis.

    “Data transparency and information should be the main key for people’s understanding and response to the epidemic,” Arif said.

    “In our view there is no firm or clear leadership in the midst of this multi-disciplinary crisis”, he told the conference titled “Urging an Emergency Response: Prioritising the People’s Safety in the Midst of the Pandemic”, which was organised online last Sunday.

    “Moreover when hospitals are almost in a state of collapse like now, we don’t see any sense of crisis being shown by our leaders. It’s like we’re in a war without a commander-in-chief”, he added.

    According to Arif, the covid-19 situation in Indonesia was becoming increasingly worrying because of inconsistent government policies over the last 15 months.

    Ministry narratives vary
    He said that the policy narrative being conveyed by one ministry and the next could vary and often be the complete opposite.

    “This situation is a reflection of policy inconsistency on the pandemic by the government. For example, one ministry promotes [social] restrictions and health protocols, but another ministry promotes mobility,” he said.

    Arif also said that the government had failed to provide a social security net for people.

    “Like it or not, people who do not have the choice to work from home have to keep working outside the home with all of the associated risks,” he said.

    Arif said that many people did not believe in covid-19 and did not want to comply with heath protocols. This was also because of the government’s failure to convey a consistent narrative in the face of the covid-19 pandemic.

    “The national failure of providing a social security net has forced some people to continue working outside [the home] with all its risks.

    “The other factor, which of course exists, is many don’t believe in covid-10 and don’t comply with health protocols, but this is also related to a failure to communicate the risks we face,” he said.

    Translated by James Balowski. The original title of the article was “Lapor Covid-19: Tak Ada “Sense of Crisis” Pemimpin, Kita seperti Perang Tanpa Panglima”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Hungary’s LGBT protests and Juneteenth Day: human rights this fortnight – in pictures

    A roundup of the coverage on struggles for human rights and freedoms from China to Colombia

    Continue reading…

    This post was originally published on Human rights | The Guardian.

  • West Papua unhappy over never-ending MSG membership tragedies

    ANALYSIS: By Yamin Kogoya in Port Moresby

    When I ring home to West Papua, my village people often ask me about the rumours that they have heard, of an upcoming Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) meeting. They ask, “When is the MSG meeting?” and if West Papua will be accepted as a full member.

    I tell them that I don’t know, and then, with a dispirited voice, they say to me that they will continue to pray for our membership.

    I respond the way I do because of two things: I truly don’t know of any proposed dates for the meeting, and I also don’t want to give false hope to the West Papuan people.

    The MSG often changes the date of their scheduled meetings at the last second, which unfortunately is becoming the norm for it.

    The foreign ministerial meetings and Leaders’ Summit of this regional body was scheduled for June 15 to June 17, 2021, but, unfortunately, it has been postponed again.

    It is now being rescheduled for June 22 to June 25, with no guarantee that this new date won’t be postponed further.

    Past Leader Summits were held in 2018 and February 2019, just before covid-19 hit in Suva, Fiji, where the ULMWP leaders addressed the meeting.

    Another significant year
    In 2016 it was another significant year for both MSG and West Papua. The Leaders’ Summit was held in July that year in Honiara, the capital of the Solomon Islands, and was supposed to be the moment that everyone thought West Papua would be finally accepted as a full member.

    Melanesian Spearhead Group headquarters in Port Vila, Vanuatu
    The Melanesian Spearhead Group headquarters in Port Vila, Vanuatu … membership rejected in 2016 due to some criteria issue that West Papua did not meet. Image: Jamie Tahana /RNZ

    But, again, it was rejected due to some criteria issue that West Papua did not meet.

    The semantic rhetoric in the media surrounding this momentous point of West Papua national liberation – advocated by the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) back then – gave a lot of false hope and disappointment to the Papuan people.

    The climate at that time was forecast with anxiety and anticipation, like expecting your team to score a goal in the final of the FIFA World Cup. Hundreds of Papuans were fasting and praying in West Papua, supported by grassroot solidarities across Oceania.

    But tragically, the MSG leaders failed to score the goal everyone had cheered for.

    This tragedy was captured in the words of Melanesian leaders at that time. Joe Natuman, then Vanuatu’s deputy prime minister, said that “West Papua was sold out for 30 pieces of silver”, as reported by Asia-Pacific Report on July 20.

    West Papuans 'sold out' 200716
    “West Papuans sold out for ’30 pieces of silver’, says Natuman” – Asia Pacific Report, 20 July 2016. Image: APR

    At that time, the MSG’s Director-General Amena Yauvoli said: “I believe the MSG Secretariat has been working hard to formalise membership criteria from observer to full member.” Unfortunately, this hard work, never bore any fruit.

    Other forces at work
    Even though it was justifiable to grant ULMWP’s full membership in MSG, as expressed by Prime Minister Manasseh Sogovare when he hosted four Melanesian prime ministers of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji during the 23rd MSG Special Leader’s Summit in Honiara in 2016, there were other forces at work behind the scenes: sorting out the criteria of what constitutes “Melanesia”.

    Given these unfolding events regarding the fate of Melanesia, the late Grand Chief Michael Somare, one of the key founding fathers of the independent state of Papua New Guinea and MSG, also said on 14 July 2016: “We must make the right choice on West Papua.”

    In the same week, the Vanuatu Ambassador to Brussels at that time, Roy Mickey Joy, said, “The Melanesian Spearhead Group is too politicised; it has lost its Melanesian integrity and what it stood for.”

    For the Melanesian leaders, changing and postponing dates and sorting criteria for MSG’s membership seems inconsequential, but it is a matter of life and death for Papuans.

    Unfortunately, this tragic drama is playing out like a horror movie wherein innocent people are being chased by a monster, desperate to seek and enter a safe family home, but refused entry.

    Many Melanesian prominent leaders are passing away

    Deaths of leaders
    These tragedies have also been marked by the recent loss of many of the Melanesian leaders. For decades, they dedicated their lives to open the MSG’s door for the abandoned Melanesian family – Papuans.

    On 4 September 2014, Dr John Ondawame, one of the exiled Free Papua Movement (OPM) leaders who tirelessly lobbied the MSG leaders and countries, died in Port Vila. Another prominent Vanuatu-based West Papuan independent leader, Andy Ayamiseba, died in Canberra in February 2020.

    Tongan Prime minister ‘Akilisi Pohiva, an outspoken proponent of West Papua’s cause, also died in 2019. We have recently lost Grand Chief Michael Somare, the founder of MSG and the state of Papua New Guinea, in 2021.

    In West Papua, Klemen Tinal, the Vice-Governor of Papua’s province, from the Damal tribe of Papua’s central highlands, died in Jakarta on 21 May 2021. Papuans can only lament these tragic losses with endless grief as many prominent churches and tribal and independent leaders continue to die in this war.

    Adding to these heartaches, the people of West Papua and Vanuatu also lost another great leader. Pastor Allen Nafuki, a prominent social justice campaigner, died on Sunday, 13 June 2021 — just two days before another proposed MSG meeting, which has now been rescheduled again, for June 22.

    Pastor Nafuki was responsible for bringing warring factions of Papuan resistance groups together in Port Vila in 2014, which helped precipitate much of the ULMWP’s international success. Vanuatu, West Papua, and communities across Oceania mourn the loss of this great beacon of hope for our region.

    Shared the Papuan burden
    Saturday, June 19, was announced as the day of mourning for Pastor Nafuki in West Papua. His picture and words of condolences have been printed and displayed across West Papua as they mourn for the great loss of their great father and friend who shared their burden for four decades.

    The ULMWP leadership paid their tributes to the late Pastor Nafuki through ULMWP’s executive director Markus Haluk’s words: “Reverend Nafuki is a father, shepherd and figure of truth for both Vanuatu and West Papua.”

    In another statement, ULMWP interim President Benny Wenda, said: “This is a great loss – but we also celebrate his legacy. He helped combine the destiny of the people of West Papua with the Republic of Vanuatu and helped bring about Papuan unity in 2014.”

    Papuans and their solidarity groups continue to put pressure on MSG

    Despite these tragedies and losses, Papuans and their solidary groups still fix their eyes on MSG.

    Matthew C Wale, the Solomon Islands opposition leader, tweeted:

    “MSG Leaders cannot continue to postpone the admission of West Papua into the group. It’s time the word ‘Spearhead’ in the title is given meaningful use. 30 pieces of silver & a mercenary approach cannot be the way decide the application for full membership.”

    Free West Papua Campaign Facebook page has also been inundated with photos of Papuans holding banners supporting West Papua admission into MSG.
    Image: Free West Papua campaign

    Bring West Papua back to the Melanesian family
    Bring West Papua back to the Melanesian family is the main message Papuans are trying to convey to the Melanesian leaders across the social media world. Although Melanesia itself is a colonial invention, Papuans take their identity as part of Melanesia seriously. They feel threatened by the large influx of Indonesian migrants into their ancestral land.

    In response to these growing demands, the MSG leaders granted observer status to ULMWP in 2015. However, Papuans insist that elevating it to full membership status will boost their confidence as they carry their cause to the wider world.

    This will legitimise the home-based regional support before asking anyone else for help. It also means someone out there recognises the 60 years of tragedy, as the world kicked West Papua around as they saw fit for their own selfish interests.

    The beginning of Papuan tragedies
    The modern history of West Papua since 1963 has been tainted with tragic stories of betrayal. It started when the Dutch prepared Papuans for independence on December 1, 1961, but then withdrew without saying anything.

    The controversial New York Agreement followed this betrayal in 1962, which gave the green light to Indonesia to re-colonise West Papua, sealing its fate with a sham Act of Free Choice in 1969.

    Ever since, Papuans have been trying to share these stories with the world, unfortunately, their fate was ultimately decided during that agreement. Two prominent Papuan leaders, Willem Zonggonau and Clemens Runawery, fled West Papua to Papua New Guinea to fly to New York to inform the United Nations that the Act of Free Choice was corrupt, but were stopped by the Australian government.

    The cover-ups of these betrayals and prohibition of international media and the UN to visit West Papua persist. Unlike the Palestinians, Papuan stories hardly make global headline news, remaining a secret war of the 21st century somewhere between Asia and the Pacific.

    The Greeks and MSG’s tragedies
    Today, West Papuans and their solidarity groups around the world continue to knock on the MSG’s doors. But the fact that the MSG leaders are reluctant to open their arms and embrace Papuans as part of their larger Melanesian nation-states, only adds another episode of tragedy in their liberation stories.

    The MSG’s decisions on ULMWP’s application for full membership are not in the hands of some celestial beings beyond human comprehension. These decisions that affect human lives are in the hands of individuals just like you and I, with family and conscience.

    This is true to what’s been happening in MSG and true to what had happened in the New York Agreement in 1962 or any other meetings held between the Netherlands, Indonesia, and Western governments about Papua’s fate.

    Mortal human beings, titled leaders, ministers, kings, and queens continue to make decisions that bring calamities to human lives, driven by self-deluded, egotistical importance, righteousness, greed, and power.

    We make wrong decisions for the right reasons and make right decisions for the wrong reasons, or sometimes are unable to make any decision at all, with all sorts of reasons, influenced by misleading information, misjudgement, and misunderstanding. Ancient Greeks wrote about these tragedies in the fifth century BC, but these tragedies are still unfolding in front of our eyes.

    Although the famous Greek Tragedy was set in a distant past in different cultural contexts, the basic theme is still relevant today because it tells us about the decisions we make about our relationship with other people, the consequences, and the unfairness of life itself.

    What happened and what is still happening to West Papuan people reflect these tragedies – being cheated, mistreated for decades, and forgotten by nations around the world as they turn their back on their fellow humans. MSG’s indecisiveness about West Papua’s full membership adds to this prolonged history of mistreatment of the Papuan people.

    MSG is at a crossroads
    These are uncertain times as humankind is slowly but surely being re-programmed to think and feel specific ways under the cursed covid-19 pandemic. It seems that the old world is dying, and a new one is being born, and we are in the middle of it – at a crossroads, gazing at some cataclysmic collapse looming all around.

    In this kind of climactic moment, a hero is needed to make bold decisions and set a precedent for future generations. These pressures compel us to reflect on these tragedies and ask why the Melanesian Spearhead Group was formed in the first place over 40 years ago.

    Was it to save Melanesia? Or destroy it?

    Overdue smile
    In Port Vila, October 2016, when Sogovare met and told Pastor Nafuki and West Papuan leaders Jacob Rumbiak, Benny Wenda, and Andy Ayamiseba about granting West Papua full membership, according to the Vanuatu Daily Post, the pastor “smiled a long overdue smile and breathed a sigh of relief, saying, ‘Now I can go to my home island of Erromango and have a peaceful sleep with my grandchildren, with no disturbance whatsoever’.”

    The beloved Pastor Nafuki, the chairman of Vanuatu Free West Papua Association, died on Sunday, 13 June 2021, just two days before when the MSG meeting was due, which has been postponed for another week.

    He is now certainly at peace on his island with his family, but the thing that thrilled him to utter these words, West Papua membership in MSG, is still unresolved.

    How long will the MSG leaders drag out these overdue smiles, tragedies, and betrayals? What should I tell Papuan villages who fast and pray every day for your decision?

    Should I tell them I don’t know? Or say, “yes, your prayers have been answered”, that the rest of the Melanesian family has now welcomed West Papua?

    West Papuans have been waiting a painfully long time for recognition, for salvation, for independence.

    • Yamin Kogoya is a West Papuan academic who has a Master of Applied Anthropology and Participatory Development from the Australian National University who contributes to Asia Pacific Report. From the Lani tribe in the Papuan Highlands, he is currently living in the Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia.
    • Other Yamin Kogoya articles

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • This Indonesian Palm Grower Is Reforesting Land Half the Size of Singapore

    3 Mins Read Indonesian palm grower KPN Plantation is reforesting 38,000 hectares of forests, an area half the size of Singapore.

    The post This Indonesian Palm Grower Is Reforesting Land Half the Size of Singapore appeared first on Green Queen.

    This post was originally published on Green Queen.

  • The politics of banning FPI

    For almost four years, the government of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) has been steadily ramping up its efforts to roll back Islamist influence within Indonesia’s political system and society.  Although the anti-Islamist campaign has not been formally declared or been given a name, it has nonetheless been systematic and concerted.  It has included the investigation and prosecution of leading Islamist leaders, restrictions upon Islamists within the public service, closure of websites and social media pages, and the proscription of Islamist organisations.

    The boldest move in this campaign took place in the last days of 2020, when the Jokowi government announced the banning of the Islamic Defenders’ Front (Front Pembela Islam or FPI).  FPI was by far the largest and best-known Islamist organisation to be so targeted – it claimed a membership of seven million, had branches in every province and broad networks across the Muslim community.  The ban was the culmination of two months of sharpening confrontation between the government and FPI and its fiery spiritual leader, Habib Rizieq Syihab, who had returned to Indonesia in November 2020 from three years’ virtual exile in Saudi Arabia. He drew large crowds wherever he spoke.  Six FPI guards were shot by police in early November in a clash between Rizieq’s security detail and a police surveillance team, and a week later Rizieq was arrested and put on trial – he was found guilty in late May on one charge of breaching public health protocols and jailed for eight months. Six other senior FPI leaders were also jailed for the same offence.  (All are likely to be released in the next month or so due to time already served in detention.)

    This showdown between the government and Islamist groups is not without political and security risk. Jokowi has been vulnerable to Islamist criticism and mobilisation in the past and he and his governing coalition appear determined to drive organisations and movements such as FPI to the margins of national life.  If the Muslim community comes to see the FPI ban as anti-Islam (rather than just anti-Islamist), the government could suffer a backlash.  There is also the possibility of former FPI members and sympathisers becoming further radicalised and more violent as a result of the state’s action.

    In this article, we examine the public’s reaction to the crackdown using data from a Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI) survey from mid-April commissioned by ANU as part of a research project into religious polarisation in Indonesia, but other data from the Saiful Mujani Research Consultancy (SMRC) will also be used.

    A clear majority of the public approves of the government’s actions in banning FPI.  Moreover, community dislike of FPI and of several other Islamist groups has strengthened over the past year, suggesting that the government is winning the politics of its battle with Islamism, at least in the short term.  More broadly, we will argue that the limited opposition to FPI’s proscription is indicative of shrinking political support for Islamism over the past five years and an endorsement of government efforts to sideline Islamists. We will explore where FPI’s basis of support lies and the reasons for the apparent ebb in public sympathy.

    FPI’s Vigilante Islamism

    Since its formation in 1998, FPI’s central feature was its ability to mobilise on the streets and take direct action against those who it saw as acting contrary to Islamic principles.  Vigilante attacks on nightclubs, brothels, gambling dens and so-called ‘deviant’ Islamic groups such as Ahmadiyah or the Shia were common, as also was the intimidation of and sometimes serious assaults upon liberal-minded Muslims, non-Muslims and even social-media critics of FPI. Scores of FPI members have been arrested and jailed for violence and Rizieq himself was twice jailed in the 2000s.  Despite its thuggish behaviour, FPI has often been courted by prominent political and business figures, and even used on occasions by the police and security agencies to ‘maintain’ law and order.

    FPI’s influence reached its highpoint in 2016-2017 when it played a pivotal role in mobilising 100,000s of Muslims in Jakarta against the Christian Chinese governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (‘Ahok’), ultimately resulting in his defeat in the ensuing gubernatorial election. The massive protests shook the Jokowi government, giving rise to fears that Islamists, after many decades of fragmentation and peripheral activism, were now in a position to shape national politics.  Soon after the Jakarta elections, the government began moving against its Islamist opponents.  Many Islamists came under investigation: some were jailed while others quietly removed themselves from public view.  Rizieq himself went off to Saudi Arabia in April 2017 to escape prosecution on multiple charges.  The Islamist organisation, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, was banned by the government in July 2017.

    The government gave four reasons for outlawing FPI on 31 December last year: it had forfeited its legal status after its registration as a community organisation had lapsed; some of its members had been involved in terrorism and other criminal activity; it had often committed acts of communal vigilantism; and it had violated the principles of the 1945 Constitution, the state ideology Pancasila and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The government followed up with a range of other measures, including freezing all FPI’s bank accounts, closing its social media sites, and warning the media not to publish any information from FPI sources.  The public’s reaction to the banning and the government’s explanations is worth exploring further

    Public Responses

    The April 2021 LSI survey involved 1620 respondents across all provinces of Indonesia.  When asked if they were aware of FPI’s banning, a surprisingly high 48% said they did not know, even though news of this and related matters had dominated the media for months.  Of the 52% who were aware of the ban, 63% approved and 28% were against [see figure one].  By comparison, a February 2021 national survey by SMRC found that 77% of respondents were aware of the ban. Of those, 59% agreed with the ban and 35% disagreed.  This suggests that roughly twice as many people approve of the ban as disapprove of it, and that over the past few months, opinion in favour of the government’s actions has strengthened.

    Figure One: Attitude to the banning of FPI (April 2021 LSI Survey)

    A breakdown of the figures gives a clearer picture of where FPI’s support lies.  Of Indonesia’s ethnic groups, the Buginese, based mainly in South Sulawesi, and the Sundanese concentrated in West Java were the most disapproving of the ban (66% and 43% respectively).  The Betawi community in the Greater Jakarta region, which has been a major source of FPI recruitment, was unexpectedly evenly divided on the ban, with 45% agreeing with it and 41% disagreeing.  Those with higher education levels were most likely to know about the ban (75%) as well as disapprove of it (32%).  Also surprising was that some 75% of under-25-year-old respondents favoured the ban.

    The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) was the only Islamic party that had a majority of its supporters opposing the ban (55%), with 29% endorsing it.  This reflects the close ties that developed between PKS and FPI during the anti-Ahok demonstrations and the 2019 election campaigns.  Opinion among supporters of the three other Islamic parties was pro-banning: the National Mandate Party (PAN) supporters were 42% in favour, 37% against; the United Development Party (PPP) was 59% in favour, 18% against; and the National Awakening Party (PKB) was 77% in agreement and only 19% against [see figure two]. More broadly, 59% of Muslim respondents backed the ban (31% were opposed), whereas 97% of non-Muslims favoured it – a predictable outcome given FPI’s long sectarian agitation against religious minorities.

    Figure Two: Attitude to the banning of FPI ban by party, with party affiliation on basis of voting in 2019 legislative election (April 2021 LSI Survey)

    Perhaps even more revealing of the equivocation felt in the Muslim community towards FPI was the results of “thermometer” questions in which respondents were asked how warmly or coolly they feel towards an array of religious and political organisations. [see figure three] Whereas the major Islamic organisations rated highly—Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 77% and Muhammadiyah 64%—FPI was ranked in the “cool” lower half of the thermometer on 44%.  Notably, respondents felt more warmly towards the Chinese (46%) than to FPI, which was ironic given FPI’s frequent disparagement of the Chinese community.  A related question about which groups respondents objected to having as neighbours found FPI the sixth most unpopular at 24%, comparing unfavourably with supposedly ‘disliked’ minorities such as the Chinese and Christians (both 18%).

    Figure Three: Feeling thermometer asking respondents how warmly they feel towards a range of religious groups (April 2021 LSI Survey)

    A glance at historical survey data shows that FPI’s profile and public approval has fluctuated widely since its formation in 1998.  An LSI survey for The Asia Foundation in 2010 found that approval of FPI was 15% in 2005, 20% in 2006, 13% in 2007 and 16% in 2010.

    Respondents in the April 2021 LSI survey were asked retrospectively what they thought of FPI’s actions in 2016 when it was the vanguard of the 212 movement: 46% said they agreed with its attitude towards Ahok; 36% disagreed. Support was strongest among young people, with highest levels of support coming in the 22-25-year bracket (54.4%), and then the under-21s (53.1%). The April 2021 figures show under-21s continue to be the strongest supporters of FPI, with 37.1% disapproving of the ban, but 22-25-year-olds were now those most in favour of the ban, with a massive 75% approval rating for the measure, compared to the average of 28% across all age groups.  So, by far the biggest drop in support for FPI has been among young adults.

    Interestingly, those with a university education were most likely to say that they disapproved of the FPI’s actions in 2016 (48% of respondents compared to 34% overall). But this same group were also most likely to disagree with the ban on FPI (32.5%). Given that this is a reversal of the general trend of decline in support for FPI, it is likely that this opposition to the banning of FPI is driven not by greater support for FPI, but by disapproval of the government’s actions. There are certainly some high-profile Muslim and civil society leaders who have spoken out strongly against the ban, arguing either that it is legally questionable or is an excessively repressive way to deal with militant Islamists.

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    The dramatic shift in public opinion, and especially Muslim attitudes, towards FPI over the past five years appears due to a number of factors.  In 2016, FPI successfully exploited community anger towards Ahok, particularly relating to his supposed blasphemy against Islam, and portrayed itself as protecting the dignity of the faith against denigration by a prominent non-Muslim. But with Ahok’s 2017 defeat and subsequent jailing, much of the emotion dissipated from this issue, and along with it, approbation for FPI.  Rizieq’s relocation to Saudi Arabia in 2017 left a vacuum in FPI’s leadership and a drop in its activities.

    The fall in support for FPI this year appears heavily influenced by the organisation’s flouting of public health protocols in connection with Rizieq’s return to Indonesia in November 2020.  Despite strict provisions regarding social distancing, hand sanitation and mask wearing, massive crowds greeted Rizieq when he arrived in Jakarta, paralysing the airport and causing traffic chaos in the city for much of the day. A few days later, thousands thronged to witness his daughter’s wedding ceremony and hear his sermon marking the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday.  An SMRC survey in late November 2020 found that almost half their respondents knew of the airport and wedding crowds and, of those, 77% felt that law enforcement and the Jakarta government should halt such events and disperse attendees.  The April 2021 LSI survey asked those who agreed with the ban why they did so: 25% said it was because FPI caused social disturbance; 24% mentioned its violent behaviour; 19% said it was an illegal organisation; and 15% said it had breached public health codes. (see figure four)  Interestingly, only 10% regarded FPI as a radical organisation and a meagre 2% felt it was terrorist.  These latter two points are significant because the government has used FPI’s alleged radicalisation as grounds for proscription, suggesting that the public is sceptical.

    Figure Four: Reasons for agreeing with the banning of FPI among respondents aware of the ban (April 2021 LSI Survey)

    All of this survey data points to a certain fragility in FPI’s support.  FPI does have a solid constituency of at least around 15%, based on historical survey data. On occasions when FPI is able to capture and amplify anger or anxiety in the broader community on an issue, such as that of blasphemy during the 2016-2017 Jakarta election, its approval can spike.  But at other times, its propensity for virulent rhetoric, intimidation and violence leads to public disapproval and censure.  Over the past six months, its flouting of public health restrictions has further shrunk goodwill towards it.

    The Jokowi government was undoubtedly aware of survey results on FPI prior to outlawing it—Coordinating Minister for Politics, Security and Law, Mahfud MD, cited polling as indicating public support when the ban was announced.  The April LSI survey data presented here will no doubt further convince the government that its strike against FPI has been a resounding political success.  It has effectively removed its most potent Islamist opponent and won public plaudits for doing so.  Other Islamist groups are now wary of crossing the government, lest they also become targets.  Rizieq, one of the government’s most vexatious critics, is in jail with a tarnished reputation.  Many advocates of religious tolerance and pluralism will, perhaps paradoxically given their usual concern with democratic rights, also welcome the demise of such a provocative and militant group.

    But the longer-term consequences of banning of FPI may be a greater cause for concern.  Many millions of Islamists remain convinced of the correctness of FPI’s actions, as is evident from roughly 30% of survey respondents who think it was unjustly dealt with.  Many in this group are likely to see the Jokowi government and indeed the Indonesian state as increasingly hostile towards them.  The risk of growing resentment and extremism is high, as also is the possibility of political retribution should a more Islamically inclined president come to office in a future election with Islamist support.

    The post The politics of banning FPI appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Indonesia signs for new and refurbished Italian frigates

    Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri announced on 10 June that it will supply six new multirole frigates based on its Bergamini (Fregata Europea Multi-Missione – FREMM)-class design to the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL). The new frigates have been selected under a programme to acquire follow-on vessels to the TNI-AL’s two Martadinata (SIGMA 10514)-class frigates. Fincantieri added that Jakarta […]

    The post Indonesia signs for new and refurbished Italian frigates appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • Politics of Halal certification: the collapse of the MUI’s long-held monopoly

    In Indonesia Halal certification emerges as a contentious issue time and time again. For example, in March 2021, the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) made a controversial fatwa that ruled the AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine as “haram” but permissible for urgency, despite the company’s insistence that it does not contain pork ingredients. On another occasion, Halal certification on unconventional products such as refrigerators and other home electronics has invited public scrutiny.

    The issue revolves around the MUI’s effective monopoly on Halal certification in Indonesia. Since the inception of the Halal industry in the late-80s, the MUI has been the sole authority to issue certification for food and cosmetics manufacturers in the Indonesian market. The monopoly has been repeatedly criticised by media and civil society as the cause of corruption.

    However, the MUI’s monopoly on Halal certification is collapsing. The second Joko Widodo administration, with the former MUI-chairman Ma’ruf Amin as vice-president, seems eager to tackle the issue with state power. The stance is in line with the administration’s approach to religious affairs, which is characterised by increasing central government oversight. However, it is important to take into account the political context of pluralist-Islamist rivalry. From this perspective, it remains to be seen whether the administration will address the primary concern, which is the accountability of the MUI.

    The Halal Product Assurance Law and the accountability of the MUI

    The dismantling of the MUI’s monopoly on Halal certification is a result of the inauguration of the Halal Product Assurance Body (BPJPH). The BPJPH is a statutory board under the Ministry of Religious Affairs, tasked to oversee domestic transactions on Halal certification. In October 2019, the Halal Product Assurance Law (UU JPH) No.30/2014 took effect, and the BPJPH has officially commenced operation.

    The establishment of the BPJPH is monumental from a financial perspective. While there is no accurate figure available, in Indonesia, a state official stated the government would be able to raise Rp. 22.5 trillion (US$1.6 billion) in revenue once the UU JPH is in full effect. The calculation is, accordingly, based on the number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME)—almost 60 million, according to the Indonesian Body of Statistics (BPS)—and large companies operating in Indonesia. Halal certification covers not only food and beverages but also drugs, cosmetics, and ingredients for these products, meaning a large number of manufacturers and factories, domestic and foreign, are under the scope of this accreditation.

    Behind the legislation has been a concern over the unchecked monopoly enjoyed by the MUI. The UU JPH was introduced during the Yudhoyono presidency, with the intention to bring order to the Halal certification industry. The system is highly unregulated, and the MUI has been prone to corruption with no regulatory measures to hold the council accountable.

    The most controversial issue has been the MUI’s financial disclosure. Despite being obliged by government regulation No.14/2008 on information disclosure by the public bodies, the MUI does not report its financial status to the Indonesian public. Multiple observers have speculated that the MUI has generated a significant portion of its income from Halal certification, aside from subsidies from national and regional governments. The MUI has repeatedly argued that they are audited by external bodies such as the National Accreditation Committee (KAN) and no issues have arisen.

    The MUI escapes the purview of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), even though the government partially funds the council. This is because it nominally designates itself as a non-governmental organisation aimed to serve the Muslim community through various means, including the Halal certification. Halal certification has been a domain of Islamic clerics (ulama) in the majority of countries, and only a handful of countries such as Malaysia have established a comprehensive state-sanctioned Halal management system.

    On top of this is a political sensitivity. Adnan Topan Husod, a coordinator of Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), stated to Salaam Gateway that “[there] is no institution or law enforcement that can deal with the MUI. Sometimes when they start to investigate the MUI ulama, [officials] can easily say the government is criminalising them. They can say the government doesn’t support Islam and the ulama, so it becomes politically tricky.” The MUI’s visibility through Halal certification, with their logo attached to every package of food and beverage, certainly lends legitimacy toward the organisation as a champion of Muslim interests in the eyes of the public.

    The Indonesian government has attempted to take over the Halal authority multiple times dating back to the Megawati presidency. Observers hope the new system under the UU JPH will finally be able to hold the MUI accountable. However, at the time of the legislation of the UU JPH, the role of the MUI within the new system was not clearly defined. The law introduced a division of labor within the scheme but also assigned the MUI as the final decision maker of all processes of certification.

    Specifically, the law formed a new category of an entity, known as the Halal Inspection Agency (LPH). In short, LPH is an agency tasked to audit clients who request certification of their products. Previously, the Institute for the Study of Food, Medicines and Cosmetics (LPPOM MUI), the Halal-certifying subdivision of the MUI, handled all parts of the certification process. In the new system, the BPJPH can assign auditing to qualified third-party organisations. LPPOM MUI will then be confined to the function of final decision-making.

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    However, the LPPOM MUI was likely confident that the BPJPH will assign them as an LPH, considering their large resources of auditors and expertise on Halal certification. One observer was concerned the bill could elevate the legal status of the MUI’s fatwa to an unprecedented level. Others predicted the MUI would dramatically increase the income from Halal certification in the new system as the new law makes it compulsory for the companies to apply for Halal certification.

    History of intimate state-MUI relations

    The MUI’s optimism was not wholly unfounded, considering the history of intimate relations between the state and MUI. Founded in 1975, the MUI was formed by the Suharto regime to assist their policy on regulating the Muslim community. Later the Yudhoyono administration reinvigorated the council by providing political and financial patronage to the organisation, expecting to seize the social capital of the burgeoning middle-class conservative Muslim constituency. From there, the MUI managed to redefine itself as an organisation that serves umat (Muslim community) and endeavoured to Islamise the Indonesian society in accordance with the conservative interpretation of the Sunni orthodoxy.

    The membership of the MUI executive committee is a testament to this development. The central board of the MUI is an amalgamation of religious intellectuals as well as leaders who represent various Islamic mass organisations (ormas) in Indonesia. As such, there is always an internal contestation between the competing Islamic religious strands within the board. During the Yudhoyono presidency, an increasing number of conservative ulamas joined the executive committee at the expense of pluralist ulamas, establishing the ascendance of conservatism within the council.

    This has allowed the MUI to become the chief orchestrator of the “conservative turn” of Islam in Indonesia. Its status as a semi-official clerical body has yielded strong legitimacy to its fatwas, which have aimed at the “purification” of the Indonesian society. Notably, the MUI has had a history of issuing controversial fatwas targeting religious pluralism, liberalism and secularism, as well as the Ahmadiyya community. Many Islamist vigilante organisations took such fatwas into their own hands, resulting in religious violence in some cases.

    The Joko Widodo administration attempted to reduce the amount of government support, however, backed by the proponents of pluralist Islam who raised concern over the MUI fatwas. Widodo initially slashed informal financial patronage toward members of the organisation from the Yudhoyono era. Coincidentally, puritanical clerics took over MUI’s national congress in 2015, which determined the management board of the 2015-2020 period. Islamist activists and Salafi Islamic leaders such as Bachtiar Nasir, Zaytun Rasmin, Yusuf Martak and late Tengku Zulkarnain were elected as executives, further propelling the conservative turn of the MUI. In the wake of the national congress, the MUI played a critical role during the infamous Aksi Bela Islam rally which targeted Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama, which resulted in then-Jakarta governor being convicted and jailed for blasphemy.

    Backlash against the MUI and increasing central government oversight

    It seems the role of the MUI within the conservative turn of Indonesian Islam has invited backlash from the Widodo administration in the form of an increasing government oversight over the council. The development of the issue of Halal certification supports this theory.

    The administration initiated a “preemptive strike” during the selection of the BPJPH head in August 2017. Lukmanul Hakim, the director of LPPOM MUI and one of the leading candidates of the chair, was removed from the shortlist by the Ministry of Religious Affairs three days before the official announcement. Instead the Ministry appointed Sukoso, a university professor with a modest background as the director of the BPJPH.

    From there, a cold war between LPPOM MUI and the BPJPH intensified. In August 2019, headed by Ikhsan Abdullah, the director of the MUI’s Law Commission and an attorney representing Lukmanul Hakim, LPPOM MUI’s 31 regional branches filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court to assert their legal credentials and demanded the revocation of several articles of the UU JPH, to prevent the complete transfer of the mandate. Among the reasons for the lawsuit, LPPOM MUI emphasised Halal as the realm of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and reasserted the “normativity” of the ulama  handling Halal certification instead of the government. The court immediately dismissed the lawsuit and LPPOM MUI was barred from reapplying for the revision of the contested articles.

    The conflict reached its peak in 2020 with the introduction of the Job Creation Law (UU Cipta Kerja) or the Omnibus Law. The dispute revolved around the previously mentioned LPH. The BPJPH urged the parliamentary committee on the bill to put Halal certification into consideration and revise the UU JPH. The BPJPH complained there are not enough auditors to sustain its operation, as LPPOM MUI monopolised Halal auditors. The MUI has been the only body in Indonesia that can train and certify Halal auditors.

    Reflecting on this issue, the parliamentary committee on the bill decided to open the gate for other entities, such as the universities and Islamic ormas (e.g. Nahdlatul Ulama), to establish their own LPH, and to revoke the requirement of Halal auditors to obtain certifications from the MUI. As a result, LPH will be able to form partnerships with the BPJPH to process audits without the involvement of the MUI. The decision infuriated the MUI.

    In the end, the recent Omnibus Law included a significant revision of the UU JPH, mainly concerning fees, duration of certification and the regulations surrounding LPH. Based on the Omnibus Law, in February 2021 the parliament passed the Halal Product Assurance Law (UU JPH) No.39/2021, which stipulated that LPH can be formed not only by universities and Islamic ormas but also by the state-owned enterprises and government at all levels. Under this regulation, not only did the MUI lose authority over Halal auditors but the state also increased its prerogative to influence the outcome of the Halal certification process.

    Concurrently, the MUI was reorganised. After the 2020 national congress held in November to decide the MUI executive committee of the 2020-2025 period, the MUI removed Islamist leaders from the central board and replaced them with pluralist ulamas mainly hailing from Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The MUI’s new executive committees will likely follow the direction of the government and smooth relations with the BPJPH.

    With the reorganization of the MUI executives, the conflict between LPPOM MUI and the BPJPH effectively made a “soft landing.” In March 2021, the secretary-general of the MUI Amirsyah Tambunan and the new head of BPJPH Mastuki agreed the two organisations will foster cooperation to accelerate Halal certification for the benefit of the economy. The “soft landing” has likely urged LPPOM MUI to accept its position within the new Halal certification regime and respond to the long-standing accusation of corruption. In April, the institution announced it has been implementing an anti-bribery management system in a bid to improve governance standards.

    However, the critical issue regarding the accountability of the MUI remains unaddressed. The politics of Halal certification can be interpreted as a win for Widodo, pluralist ulamas and business interests, and a defeat for Islamist agenda. But the ambiguous legal basis and unregulated system that created the MUI’s lack of transparency remains. LPPOM MUI still maintains its position on the question of financial disclosure and denies its responsibility to report to the public. This demonstrates that increasing central government oversight over religious affairs is an issue of power struggles, rather than democratic integrity.

    The post Politics of Halal certification: the collapse of the MUI’s long-held monopoly appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Indonesian Startup Green Rebel Foods Unveils Asia’s First Plant-Based Whole Cut Steak To Meet Growing Demand For Meat

    5 Mins Read Indonesian plant-based meat startup Green Rebel has debuted two new products, a Beefless Steak and a Chick’n Steak, in what it calls the “first plant-based whole cut steak in Asia” at two of the leading steakhouse dining chains in the country in order to help bridge the growing demand for beef and chicken in the […]

    The post Indonesian Startup Green Rebel Foods Unveils Asia’s First Plant-Based Whole Cut Steak To Meet Growing Demand For Meat appeared first on Green Queen.

    This post was originally published on Green Queen.

  • Nine reasons why Jakarta has branded Papuan armed rebels as ‘terrorists’

    By Benny Mawel in Jayapura

    The United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) believes that the Indonesian government has nine motives behind the branding of National Liberation Army of West Papua as terrorists.

    Executive director Markus Haluk of ULMWP said this during a seminar and book discussion “Demanding Dignity, Papuans Are Punished” in Jayapura on Friday.

    He said it was believed that one of the reasons the Indonesian government labels armed groups as terrorists was to stem and limit ULMWP diplomacy in various Melanesian countries, the Pacific, and in other countries worldwide.

    “We’ve been reading that since a few months ago,” said Haluk.

    He said the Indonesian the government continued to strive to increase its influence in a number of international forums attended by the ULMWP delegation.

    In these various forums, the Indonesian delegation strived to minimise the role of the Papuan delegation.

    “They started with the issue [that] Papua could not afford to pay the dues (For the Melanesian Spearhead Group). Papua has already handled [the various efforts].

    ‘Terrorism’ issue raised again
    “[Then] Indonesia raised the issue of terrorism again,” said Haluk, who delivered a presentation entitled “Revealing the government’s motivation with the terrorist label to Papua”.

    According to him, the terrorist brand was also an attempt to silence and isolate the movement of indigenous Papuans.

    As a result, whatever the activities of the indigenous Papuans are they would come to the attention of the Indonesian government because they were associated with the terrorist label.

    “The terrorist label is a way of isolating the Papuan issue and silencing Papuans’ freedom of expression,” Haluk said.

    Haluk said that the effort to silence the expressions of indigenous Papuans was part of the Indonesian government’s efforts to pass a revision of Law No. 21/2001 on Papua’s Special Autonomy.

    This happened because the Papuan people continued to reject the Indonesian government’s efforts to extend the Special Autonomy Law, including by holding demonstrations and collecting the signatures of the Papuan People’s Petition (PRP).

    “Clearly, there was the arrest of Victor Yeimo, spokesman for the [international West Papua National Committee] and the PRP. There have been expulsions of students from Cenderawasih University student dormitories and flats, internet access has been cut off,” Haluk said.

    Easier for Indonesian weapons
    “Haluk suspects that the terrorist label for armed groups (West Papua National Liberation Army) is an effort to smooth the way for procurement of weapons and combat equipment for the TNI/POLRI (Indonesia National Army/Indonesia National Police).

    The designation of armed groups in Papua as terrorists would also increase the opportunity for members of the TNI/POLRI to participate in various cooperation exercises in dealing with terrorists with other countries and increase the opportunity to obtain funds for handling terrorists from the European Union, United States, Australia and New Zealand.

    Haluk said that the terrorist label would also be a means of intimidation against executive and legislative officials in Papua.

    In addition, the terrorist label would facilitate the state’s efforts to secure investment and the interests of national and international investors.

    “Indonesian political elites play a big role in investment interests, for example in forest concession rights, selling alcoholic beverages, and mining,” he said.

    The labeling of terrorists could even be used as a stage for politicians to contest the general election in Indonesia.

    “[It could be] a political stage for the sake of the legislative and presidential elections in 2024, as well as for the interests of the local Papuan political stage, for example, seizing the leadership of the Democratic Party in Papua, or the 2023 Papuan gubernatorial election,” Haluk said.

    ‘Branding’ not new
    The president of the Fellowship of West Papua Baptist Churches, Reverend Dr Socratez Sofyan Yoman, who is also a member of the Papuan Church Council, said that the label of terrorists was not new.

    “The label appeared in the 1960s. [There is a label] Free Papua Organisation, separatist, KKB, KKBS, GPK, [then now] we are facing the terrorist label. It’s a repetition of all those [labels],” he said.

    According to Yoman, the various labels were created to smooth over or legalise the actions of the state apparatus to commit violence against Papuans.

    “Papuans continue to be tortured and killed in their own country,” said Reverend Yoman.

    This article from Tabloid Jubi has been translated by a Pacific Media Centre correspondent and is republished with permission.

     

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Wenda accuses Jakarta’s military of ‘massacre’ after killing of 3 Papuans

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    The United Liberation Movement of West Papua has accused Indonesian “colonial forces” of a new massacre with the killing of three civilians, “adding to the hundreds of thousands of West Papuans killed during six decades of occupation”.

    Interim president Benny Wenda of the ULMWP has also claimed that Jakarta has put the entire population of 4.4 million “at risk of being swiped out” by Indonesian security forces by being labelled “terrorist”.

    In a statement, Wenda said a husband and wife, Patianus Kogoya, 45, and Paitena Murib, 43, had been killed at Nipuralome village, along with another Papuan man, Erialek Kogoya, 55.

    “They were shot dead by joint security services on June 4 in Ilaga, Puncak regency. Three others, including a five year old child, were wounded during the massacre,” he said.

    “Local churches have confirmed the incident, even as the colonial Indonesian police have spread hoaxes to hide their murders.”

    Wenda said cold blooded murder was becoming the culture for the security forces.

    “West Papua is the site of massacre on top of massacre, from Paniai to Nduga to Intan Jaya to Puncak. This is heart-breaking news following the killing of our religious leaders like Pastor Zanambani,” he said.

    ‘Count more of our dead’
    “We now have to count more of our dead. How much longer will this continue?”

    Wenda said Indonesia had labelled the OPM (Free Papua Moivement) “terrorist”.

    “The OPM is all West Papuans who have hopes for freedom and self-determination, all organisations that fight for justice and liberation in West Papua,” he said.

    “I am OPM, the ULMWP is OPM. If you label the OPM ‘terrorist’, you are labelling the entire population of West Papua ‘terrorist’.

    “The Indonesian state is targeting all West Papuans for elimination – the evidence is there in Ilaga last week, with unarmed civilians being gunned down.

    “How do they justify this killing? With the ‘terrorist’ label.”

    Wenda claimed these “stigmatising labels” were part of Jakarta’s systematic plan to justify its presence in West Papua and the “deployment of 21,000 troops to our land”.

    He said that the ULMWP continued its urgent call for Indonesia to allow the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights into West Papua.

    “Intervention is needed now. What is happening in Palestine is happening in West Papua,” he said.

    Wenda appealed to solidarity groups in the Pacific and internationally to speak up for “freedom and justice”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Indonesian activists protest against plan to dump Fukushima nuclear waste in Pacific

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    Activists from the Fukushima Anti-Nuclear Indonesia (IANFU) movement in Indonesia have held an action commemorating International Ocean Day demanding that the Japanese government not dispose of nuclear reactor coolant waste into the Pacific Ocean, reports Liputan6.

    The protesters also staged street theatre outside the Japanese Embassy on Jalan MH Thamrin and in front of the Ministry for Fishing and Maritime Affairs office in Central Jakarta.

    “We from Fukushima Anti-Nuclear Indonesia are holding an action against the Japanese government in relation to the disposal of waste, because the disposal of this waste into the sea will damage the Pacific Ocean’s ecosystem,” said IANFU action coordinator Zaki.

    Zaki said the Japanese once dumped dangerous nuclear waste in Minimata in Kumamoto, a case which resulted in birth defects and the death of local people exposed to mercury in the Japan sea in 1956.

    As many as 2000 people out of 10,000 suffered damage as a result of the pollution of the Minimata sea.

    Because of this, the planned disposal of coolant waste from the Fukushima nuclear reactor into the Pacific Ocean must be halted because it would be highly dangerous to human health and the Pacific Ocean ecosystem, including biological diversity in the oceans, said Zaki.

    Zaki hopes that the Indonesian government as a maritime country will take a firm position by lodging its objections and opposition to the Japanese government’s plan.

    “Our country is a maritime country whose seas are very extensive. The distance between Japan and Indonesia is indeed far, but waste dumped in the sea will impact on the livelihoods of Indonesian fisherpeople,” said Zaki.

    Zaki said protests against nuclear waste dumping would continue if the Indonesian government failed to take firm measures.

    Translated by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. The original title of the article was “Aktivis Dorong Indonesia Tolak Rencana Jepang Buang Limbah Nuklir ke Laut”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • FairFlavor Foods: Italian Scientists Ferment Indonesia’s Kenari Nuts Into Vegan Dairy

    4 Mins Read There’s a growing variety of plant-based dairy products on the market today, from coconut yoghurts to oat milk and cashew cheese. But one startup believes that there’s an untapped opportunity when it comes to the little-known Kenari nut, a nutrient powerhouse found in the Indonesian rainforest, grown on trees that help to sequester carbon and […]

    The post FairFlavor Foods: Italian Scientists Ferment Indonesia’s Kenari Nuts Into Vegan Dairy appeared first on Green Queen.

    This post was originally published on Green Queen.

  • West Papua and other critical issues – why is NZ media glossing over them?

    COMMENT: By David Robie in Auckland

    International reporting has hardly been a strong feature of New Zealand journalism. No New Zealand print news organisation has serious international news departments or foreign correspondents with the calibre of such overseas media as The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age.

    It has traditionally been that way for decades. And it became much worse after the demise in 2011 of the New Zealand Press Association news agency, which helped shape the identity of the country for 132 years and at least provided news media with foreign reporting with an Aotearoa perspective fig leaf.

    It is not even much of an aspirational objective with none of the 66 Voyager Media Awards categories recognising international reportage, unlike the Walkley Awards in Australia that have just 34 categories but with a strong recognition of global stories (last year’s Gold Walkley winner Mark Willacy reported “Killing Field” about Australian war crimes in Afghanistan).

    Aspiring New Zealand international reporters head off abroad and gain postings with news agencies and broadcasters or work with media with a global mission such as Al Jazeera.

    Consequently our lack of tradition for international news coverage means that New Zealand media tend to have many media blind spots on critical issues, or misjudge the importance of some topics. Examples include the Samoan elections in April when the result was the most momentous game changer in more than four decades with the de facto election of the country’s first woman prime minister, unseating the incumbent who had been in power for 23 years.

    The recent Israel-Palestine conflict in May was another case of where reporting was very unbalanced in favour of the oppressor for 73 years, Israel. Indonesian’s five decades of repression in the Melanesian provinces of West Papua is also virtually ignored by the mainstream media apart from the diligent, persistent and laudable coverage by RNZ Pacific.

    There is a deafening silence about the current brutal and draconian attack on West Papuan dissidents in remote areas with internet unplugged.

    No threat to status quo
    As national award-winning cartoonist Malcom Evans wrote in a Daily Blog column on the eve of last week’s Voyager Media Awards that whoever won prizes, “it’s a sure bet that, he or she, won’t be someone whose work threatens the machinery that manufactures our consent to a perpetuation of the status quo”.

    He continued:

    “There will be no awards for anyone like Julian Assange or Edward Snowden, but none either for our own Nicky Hager or Jon Stephenson, who exposed war crimes committed in Afghanistan by New Zealanders, and none for Chris Trotter, Bryan Bruce or Susan St John whose writings have consistently exposed the criminal outcomes wrought on New Zealanders by neo-liberalism.”

    Evans also cited “Indonesia’s rape of West Papua and East Timor” and the “damning Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians” as examples of lack of media exposure of “New Zealand duplicity and connivance”.

    Palestinian protesters target NZ media "bias"
    Palestinian protesters target NZ media “bias” at the first Nakba Rally in Auckland last month. Image: David Robie/APR

    Hanan Ashrawi, the first woman member of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), told Middle East Eye in the wake of the conflict that left 256 Palestinians — including 66 children — and 13 Israelis dead that it was illogical to expect Israel to be both the “gatekeeper and to have the veto”.

    “Israel has never implemented a single UN resolution at all, since its creation [in 1948]. And Israel has always existed outside the law. So why do you expect Israel suddenly to become a state that will respect others, human rights, international law and the multilateral system.

    “Israel is the country, the only country that legislated a basic law that says only Jews have the right to self-determination in this land which is all of historical Palestine.

    “Israel has destroyed the two-state solution.

    When Israel opens up …
    “Only when Israel opens up, when this system of discrimination, repression, apartheid is dismantled, only then will you begin to see that there are opportunities of equalities and so on.”

    However, Ashrawi was complimentary about the new wave of youth leadership and support for the Palestinian cause sweeping across the globe. She was optimistic that a new political language, new initiatives for a solution would emerge.

    New Zealand media did little to reflect this shifting global mood of support for Palestine – apart from Stuff and its publication of Marilyn Garson’s articles from Sh’ma Kolienu – and it ignored the massive second week of protests for a lasting peace.

    RNZ Mediawatch’s Hayden Donnell was highly critical over the lack of news coverage of the “newsworthy and historic” Samoan elections on April 9, commenting: “For nearly two days, RNZ was the only major New Zealand news website carrying information about the election results, and analysis of the outcome.”

    As he pointed out, since 1982, the Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP) had been in power and the current prime minister, Tuila’epa Sa’ilele Malielegaoi (now caretaker), had been prime minister since 1998.

    “It’s very monumental that we’ve had a political party [opposition FAST Party led by Fiame Naomi Mata’afa] come through so quickly within 12 months to challenge the status quo in many different ways.”

    Fiame has a slender one seat majority, 26 to 25, in the 51-seat Parliament, and was sworn in as government in still-disputed circumstances. But the New Zealand media coverage has still been patchy in spite of the drama of the deadlock.

    Tension high in Samoa stand-off
    “Tension high in Samoa stand-off” – New Zealand Herald on 26 May 2021. Image: APR screenshot

    Woke up to Samoa crisis
    The New Zealand Herald    , for example, finally woke up to the crisis and splashed the story across its front page on May 24, but then for the next three days only published snippets on the crisis, all drawn from the RNZ Pacific coverage. For the actual election result, the Herald only published a single paragraph buried on its foreign news pages.

    "Democracy in crisis" - New Zealand Herald
    “Democracy in crisis” – New Zealand Herald on 25 May 2021. Image: APR screenshot

    As for West Papua, the silence continues. Not a single major New Zealand newspaper has given any significant treatment to the current crisis there described by The Sydney Morning Herald as a “manhunt for 170 ‘terrorists’ slammed as a ‘licence’ to shoot anyone”.

    Singapore-based Chris Barrett and Karuni Rompies reported that “Indonesian forces are chasing 170 members of the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB), the armed wing of the Free Papua Movement [OPM]. The crackdown has reportedly displaced several thousand people.

    “Tensions have been high since the separatists’ shooting in April of two teachers suspected of being Indonesian spies and the burning of three schools in Beoga, Puncak.”

    This is the worst crisis in West Papua since the so-called Papuan Spring uprising and rioting in protest against Indonesian racism and repression in August 2019.

    The Jakarta government was reported to have deployed some 21,000 troops in the Melanesian region, ruled since the fiercely disputed “Act of Free Choice” when 1025 people handpicked by the Indonesian military in 1969 voted to be part of Indonesia. The latest crackdown followed the killing in an ambush of a general who was head of Indonesian intelligence on April 25.

    Indonesian police carry a body in the current crackdown near Timika, Papua.
    Indonesian police carry a body in the current crackdown near Timika, Papua. Image: seputarpapua.com

    Discrimination against Papuans
    This latest round of strife marks widespread opposition to Indonesia’s 20-year autonomy status for the region which is due to expire in November and is regarded by critics as a failure.

    Interim president Benny Wenda of the United Liberation Movement of West Papua (ULMWP) denounces Indonesian authorities who have variously tried to label Papuan pro-independence groups “separatists”, “armed criminal groups”, and “monkeys” (this sparked the 2019 uprising).

    “Now they are labelling us ‘terrorists’. This is nothing but more discrimination against the entire people of West Papua and our struggle to uphold our basic right to self-determination,” he says.

    Wenda has a message for the United Nations and Pacific leaders: “Indonesia is misusing the issue of terrorism to crush our fundamental struggle for the liberation of our land from illegal occupation and colonisation.”

    The West Papua issue is a critical one for the Pacific, just like East Timor was two decades ago in the lead-up to its independence. Why is our press failing to report this?

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Papuan resistance slams Indonesian internet gag amid leader crackdown

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    Indonesia has cut off the internet in West Papua to conceal its crackdown on the peaceful liberation movement, says a leading Papuan campaigner.

    Benny Wenda, interim president of the United Liberation Movement of West Papua (ULMWP), has condemned the internet gag while Indonesia’s leading English-language daily newspaper, The Jakarta Post, has also criticised Jakarta’s actions.

    In an editorial last Friday, the Post said that many people “suspect that the disruption to the [Papua] internet service in April was actually a deliberate move to silence anti-government critics and activists”.

    “The government has been cutting off Papua from the outside world for decades by measures that included restricting foreign visitors, especially foreign journalists,” the newspaper said.

    Jakarta remained “stubbornly insistent on maintaining its isolation policy for Papua”.

    Erik Walela, secretary of the ULMWP’s “Department of Political Affairs”, is now in hiding, and two of his relatives — Abi, 32, and Anno, 31 — were arrested by the Indonesian colonial police on June 1.

    Victor Yeimo, spokesperson of the KNPB, had already been arrested.

    Stigmatised as ‘terrorists’
    “I am concerned that all the ULMWP leaders and departments inside West Papua are now at risk after Indonesia has tried to stigmatise us as ‘terrorists’,” said Wenda.

    “The head of Indonesia’s National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) has stated that it considers the entire liberation movement, including anyone associated with me, to be terrorists.

    “Anyone who stands up to injustice in West Papua is now in danger. Indonesia is cutting off the internet to conceal its crackdown and military operations, continuing its long tradition of concealing information from the world by banning international journalists and spreading propaganda.

    “The only way anyone can currently access the internet inside is by standing near a military, police, or government building.”

    Wenda said Indonesian authorities had tried to label Papuan pro-independence groups “separatists”, “armed criminal groups”, and in 2019, “monkeys’”.

    “Now they are labelling us ‘terrorists’. This is nothing but more discrimination against the entire people of West Papua and our struggle to uphold our basic right to self-determination,” he said.

    “I want to remind the United Nations and the Pacific and Melanesian leaders that Indonesia is misusing the issue of terrorism to crush our fundamental struggle for the liberation of our land from illegal occupation and colonisation.”

    21,000 troops deployed
    More than 21,000 troops had been deployed in less than three years, including last month ‘Satan’s forces’ implicated in genocide in East Timor, said Wenda.

    Densus 88, trained by the West, were also using their skills “against my people”.

    These operations were being carried out on the direct order of the President and the head of the Parliament.

    “My people are traumatised, scared to go to their gardens, to hunt or fish. Everywhere they turn there are military posts and bases,” said Wenda.

    “How long will the world ignore my call? How long can the world watch what is happening to my people and stand by?”

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Papuan armed resistance insists talks with Jakarta must be mediated by UN

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    West Papua National Liberation Army-Free Papua Organisation (TPNPB-OPM) spokesperson Sebby Sambom says the armed resistance force is not prepared to hold a dialogue with or pursue diplomacy with the Indonesian government unless it is mediated by the United Nations.

    “We, the TPNPB under the leadership of General Goliath Tabuni reject [a bipartite] dialogue with Jakarta,” said Sambom, reports CNN Indonesia.

    However, the armed resistance is urging the Indonesian government to hold tripartite negotiations with the TPNPB-OPM Tabuni leadership and all components of the Papuan liberation movement who have been resisting Jakarta rule.

    This dialogue, he said, must be mediated by a third party, and the third party must come from the United Nations.

    “We don’t have an agenda for a dialogue, but our agenda is tripartite negotiations, namely negotiations mediated by a UN organisational body,” he said.

    “So a Jakarta-Papua dialogue will not be realised, if the main actor is not involved,” he explained.

    Earlier, the TPNPB-OPM designated Puncak Ilaga, Papua, as a battleground against joint forces from the TNI (Indonesian military) and Polri (Indonesian police). It designated this region because it was far away from civilian settlements and would not endanger Papuan civilians.

    Negotiations rather than war
    On the other hand, the TNI was not concerned about the designation of Puncak Ilaga as a battleground to fight the OPM.

    However, Regional Representatives Council (DPD) member from Papua, Filep Wamafma, is asking that the Indonesian government endeavour to open diplomatic communications with the TPNPB-OPM rather than conducting an open war in Ilaga.

    “I hope that there will be political diplomacy between the TNI, Polri and the OPM in order to reach the best solution, to safeguard civilians,” Wamafma told CNN Indonesian.

    CNN Indonesia has attempted to contact Join Regional Defence Command III spokesperson Colonel Czi IGN Suriastawa and Coordinating Minister for Security, Politics and Legal Affairs Mahfud MD by text message and telephone about the offer to mediate with the involvement of the UN.

    Neither Suriastawa nor Mahfud had responded when this article was published.

    Translated by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. The original title of the article was “Jubir OPM Mau Ambil Jalur Diplomasi dengan RI Asal Ada PBB”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Indonesian police crack down on ‘free Yeimo’ West Papuan protests

    RNZ Pacific

    Indonesian police have forcefully dispersed a number of West Papuan protests around the region.

    The protesters were yesterday calling for the release of pro-independence activist Victor Yeimo who was taken into police custody more than two weeks ago.

    They were also calling for the release of other Papuan political prisoners, and rejecting Jakarta’s plans for special autonomy in Papua.

    Reports from the capital of West Papua province, Manokwari, indicate that as many as 130 protesters were arrested.

    Dozens of armed police converged on the mobilisations by Papuan students and civil society members to disperse their attempts to hold protests on several occasions around Manokwari.

    Reports from Papua region say authorities ensured those being arrested underwent covid-19 rapid anti-gen testing before being processed by police.

    Several deaths linked to the coronavirus have been reported in the province over the last few days.

    Protests in Sorong, Jayapura
    Protests were also held in the cities of Sorong and Jayapura, the latter of which has entered a fourth week of internet outage.

    Yeimo, the foreign spokesman for the West Papua National Committee, had been on a police wanted list for treason suspects related to his alleged role in the widespread “Papua Rising” anti-racism protests in August and September 2019.

    Those protests in a number of cities and towns in the region followed highly publicised racist attacks on Papuan students in Java.

    They were met with a crackdown by Indonesian security forces, and interference by militia groups, and spiralled into unrest which caused dozens of deaths.

    Protesters in today’s mobilisations in Manokwari were also demonstrating against the Indonesian government’s recent decision to brand the West Papuan National Liberation Army as terrorists.

    Guerilla fighters with the Liberation Army, which is a small and fractured force, have been locked in an ongoing armed conflict with Indonesian military forces in the rugged central highlands of West Papua for months.

    The conflict escalated in recent weeks after the Papuan force killed an Indonesian intelligence chief and – according to authorities – two teachers last month.

    West Papuan protesters held in custody in Manokwari.
    West Papuan protesters held in custody outside a Brimob police station in Manokwari. Image: RNZ Pacific

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.


    This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by APR editor.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • What’s behind COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy in Indonesia?

    As Indonesia pushes forward with its COVID-19 vaccine rollout, the nation faces substantial obstacles. Trying to administer vaccines to an archipelagic population of 260 million people spread over 6000 islands is no small task. But logistics and resources aside, Indonesia is facing a further hurdle: vaccine hesitancy.

    In January 2021 polls suggested that 27 percent of Indonesians were hesitant to receive the vaccine; this hesitancy rate has risen to around 30-40 percent (https://saifulmujani.com/kepercayaan-publik-nasional-pada-vaksin-dan-vaksinasi-COVID-19/)

    What is behind this vaccine hesitancy? To uncover the reasons, we conducted on-the-ground research in Sumatra, interviewing 50 women in the first few months of 2021 who had key vulnerabilities: 20 of these women were living with HIV; 20 were pregnant during the last 12 months; and 10 were front line health workers.

    Our interviews revealed four key factors behind vaccine hesitancy: concern that the vaccine is not halal (permissible in Islam); fears over Sinovac as it comes from China (and has imagined links with Communist contagion); vaccine coercion; and belief in alternative ways of safely and effectively guarding against COVID-19 such as good hygiene practices.

    The vaccine is not halal

    I do not want to be vaccinated because the vaccine is from China, and there are pig parts in the ingredients. It is haram (forbidden) to put pig parts into my body. We will go to hell if we do it. (Yaya, a 50-year-old housewife) (all names are pseudonyms)

    Indonesia has a relatively high acceptance rate of regular immunisation regimes. Indeed, around 80 to 90 percent of all babies under the age of one receive immunisations. Mothers we talked to noted that prior to COVID they would travel some distance and stand in long lines at public health centres to ensure their babies were fully immunised. This account suggests that Indonesia is a vaccine-accepting country. Furthermore, the current MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella) vaccine is made in India and is widely suspected to contain pig products. Yet there has been no large-scale refusal of this vaccine in Indonesia, despite it not being certified halal.

    But there is heated debate in Indonesia currently around the Sinovac vaccination, which is the main vaccine administered in Indonesia at the moment for COVID-19. Sinovac was developed by Chinese biopharmaceutical company Sinovac and is now made in partnership with Indonesian state-owned pharmaceutical firm PT Bio Farma. While AstraZeneca, Novavax and Pfizer have publicly stated that there are no pork products in their vaccines, Sinovac has refused to reveal whether its vaccine contains any pork products.

    Given Indonesia is home to the largest population of Muslims in the world, not being able to confirm the halal status of the vaccine worries many. This worry persists despite Vice President Ma’ruf Amin, an influential Muslim leader, declaring that in emergencies such as a global pandemic, the vaccine does not need to be certified as halal to be permissible. But fear continues, and it continues despite other widely accepted vaccines (e.g. MMR) not being declared halal. We suggest, therefore, that it is not halal status on its own that is provoking vaccine hesitancy. Hesitancy is also due to the fact that there is suspicion of China.

    Fear of Sinovac and China (and imagined links with Communism)

    As far as I know, China bought vaccines from Europe, and Indonesia bought vaccines from China. Think about it! (Nay, 33-year-old working mother)

    Part of the reason for vaccine hesitancy is that people are not convinced that the Sinovac vaccine is effective. As Nay suggests above, consumers are suspicious of why China  would import a vaccine from Europe if their domestically produced one was effective.

    But hesitancy also comes from a general distrust of China, including health products made by Chinese companies. This distrust extends from Indonesia’s long standing tension with Communism, which continues to be banned in Indonesia. Rumours thus circulate that China might be waging a proxy war against Indonesia by delivering a vaccine that might have fatal consequences.

    Further, women told us they felt China was pushing a vaccine (of dubious efficacy and with potentially deleterious side effects) just to make money. This again taps into harmful stereotypes in Indonesia that Chinese businesses want to make a profit at any cost. Added to this profit discourse is the widespread belief that people from mainland China are coming to Indonesia to take away local jobs. There is thus a kind of grass-roots collective resistance against China and Chinese products, including vaccines, as Nika, a 29-year-old mother summarises:

    The efficacy of the vaccines has not been proven with evidence. It could turn out to be medical malpractice. We hesitate then to take the vaccine and wonder if it is a vaccine or if it’s just vitamins. And where did the virus come from? And where is the vaccine made? Both in China! So maybe COVID-19 vaccines are just made for economic reasons to benefit China. China, you know, they are Communists. We have become experimental subjects, yes, guinea pigs (kelinci percobaan, literally test rabbits). For me, it is better to maintain our health, trust our body, and if we can maintain our health, then what is the COVID-19 vaccine for?

    Vaccine hesitancy also stems from public distrust of the Indonesian government, which many people see as being too close with China. For instance, women noted that the government has not raised the issue of Sinovac needing to pass clinical trials and have its efficacy proven. Women mentioned that the Sinovac vaccine had not (according to their understanding) passed the Stage III Clinical Trial and they noted that the government had not transparently explained this. Women thus worried that the vaccine was not safe because it was only approved through an emergency permit granted by Indonesia’s Drug and Beverage Regulatory Agency. There is thus palpable suspicion of the vaccine in Indonesia and when this suspicion is met with a coercive vaccination program, you have a recipe for vaccine hesitancy.

    Vaccine coercion

    From early January 2021, there was rampant social media messaging saying “I am ready to be vaccinated.” ] Such posts were shared by community health centres, hospitals and public health departments, healthcare organisations, and health workers themselves. There was hope that people would get vaccinated in good faith.

    Figure 1: Social media message saying: “I am ready to be vaccinated” (Source: Ministry of Health Indonesia)

    But shortly thereafter the government imposed the threat of fines of up to Rp 5 million (AUD$450) for people who refused the vaccine or who spread anti-vaccine messages (https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-02-19/indonesia-warns-fines-for-refusing-COVID-19-vaccine-world-first/13170826). These fines were particularly aimed as health care workers and teachers, who were first in line for mandatory COVID-19 vaccines. Presidential Decree Number 14 of 2021, verse 13A, point 4, states:

    Anyone designated as a core target for the vaccine, and who refuses the vaccine, will face an administrative sanction, including postponing or stopping social aid, postponing, or stopping administrative government services; and/or a fine (https://jdih.setkab.go.id/PUUdoc/176339/Salinan_Perpres_Nomor_14_Tahun_2021.pdf)

    The coercive nature of the vaccine rollout has put many Indonesians offside, as Ati, a 30-year-old nutritionist, revealed: “We cannot reject the vaccination for COVID-19. Thirty of my friends refused the vaccine on health grounds and they were interviewed by staff from the Ministry of Health and the Public Health Office. After the interview, 28 were compelled to be vaccinated; only two had their wishes not to be vaccinated upheld.”

    Related

    Gendering Indonesia’s responses to COVID-19: Preliminary thoughts

    The approach used in the creation of these policies ignores that women may face more difficulty in accessing the promised benefits.

    Fadhilah Primandari 19 October, 2020

    The coercion to be vaccinated has concrete implications, as Hana, a 35-year-old woman who works in a public hospital noted: “From the bottom of my heart, I did not want to get the COVID-19 vaccine. However, we would lose our job if we did not get the COVID-19 vaccination.”

    Lala, a 30-year-old nurse, also mentioned that as a health worker she was obliged to get vaccinated and that her only choice was to agree to the vaccine or to lose her job. Lala also noted: “We are also afraid of accessing the COVID-19 vaccination. We are ordinary humans, we are afraid of taking the COVID-19 vaccine, but we need to take care of our own health.”

    Part of the reason that people do not trust the Indonesian government in terms of the COVID-19 response, is that health messages have been unclear and caused confusion. One of the impacts of a lack of trust in the government is that women are now deciding not to bring their children in for regular immunisations, such as for measles. Yana, a 24-year-old mother said: “I decided not to immunise my second baby, who was born during this pandemic. I am afraid that the baby will not be given the regular immunisation, and I thought my child might be given the COVID-19 vaccine. For my older children who are school age, I will ask whether they will be vaccinated for COVID-19. If they tell me the children will be vaccinated for COVID-19, I will reject it for my children.”

    Belief in harmful side-effects and alternative ways of guarding against COVID-19

    Some women noted that they did not want the vaccine because they were worried about adverse side effects, which were heightened among women who had comorbidities. Kanya, an HIV-positive mother told us: “I do not want to get vaccinated as I do not want to take any risks. I have asthma and HIV. I am afraid of disclosing my HIV status.” Others mentioned feared an allergic reaction. Some of the women noted disbelief that COVID-19 is real, or at least belief that COVID-19 poses no real health risk. For instance, Diah, a 29-year-old small shop owner noted: “People surrounding me did not believe in COVID-19, how come they want to access COVID-19 vaccines” (see also http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue45/najmah2.html).

    Worry and disbelief play into the promotion of alternative ways of guarding against COVID-19. Some women talked about alternative ways of protecting themselves. For instance, Anti, a 49-year-old housewife said: “I do not want to take any risk [by having the vaccine]. I feel healthy and I am in a good condition. I just need to perform the health protocols [e.g. hand-washing] and maintain my immunity by taking vitamins. I also need to maintain my health by eating nutritional food. If I feel sick and suffer from COVID-19 symptoms, I just need to take vitamins and have a rest at home, it is easier [than getting vaccinated].”

    Figure 2: Mapping reasons women reject COVID-19. Source: Najmah (supplied by author)

    Indonesia has a long way to go to gain public trust in its handling of COVID-19. There is little evidence that the government has implemented a national health solution, instead stoking public distrust through inconsistency and lack of transparency. To mitigate this doubt, the government should look to scientific evidence and effective communication, rather than coercive power and religious doctrine.

    The post What’s behind COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy in Indonesia? appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Wenda condemns Indonesia’s UN genocide vote for Papua ‘hypocrisy’

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    An exiled West Papuan leader has condemned Indonesian for “hypocrisy” in speaking out about Myanmar and Palestine while voting at the United Nations to ignore genocide and ethnic cleansing.

    The leading English-language daily newspaper, The Jakarta Post, has also criticised Jakarta’s UN vote.

    “We are thankful that Indonesian leaders show solidarity with the suffering of the Palestinians and Myanmarese, but Indonesia is desperately trying to cover up its own crimes against humanity in West Papua,” said interim president Benny Wenda of the United Liberation Movement of West Papua (ULMWP).

    Benny Wenda
    West Papuan leader Benny Wenda … Indonesia claims to “fight for humanity”, but the truth is the opposite. Image: Del Abcede/APR

    At the UN General Assembly last week, Indonesia defied the overwhelming majority of the international community and joined North Korea, Russia and China in rejecting a resolution on “the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”.

    Voting in favour of the RP2 resolution were 115 states while 28 abstained and 15 voted against.

    The Jakarta Post said in an editorial that to find Indonesia on the “no” list was “perplexing”.

    “The country that had at one time championed for the inclusion of human rights and democratic principles in the ASEAN Charter is now seen as voting against attempts to uphold those very principles internationally,” the newspaper said.

    “Recent events in Myanmar and in the occupied Palestinian territory raise questions about the failure of the international community to intervene and stop bloodshed in these two countries.”

    ‘Real reason’ for vote
    The Jakarta Post     said there was speculation about the “real reason” behind the no vote.

    “One is the spectre of R2P being invoked against Indonesia over the Papuan question. In spite of the recent escalation of violence in Papua, the situation on the ground is still too far to merit international intervention,” the newspaper claimed.

    However, while the Indonesian Foreign Minister claimed to “fight for humanity”, the truth was the opposite, said Wenda in a statement.

    “They are committing crimes against humanity in West Papua and trying to ensure their perpetual impunity at the UN,” he said.

    Indonesian leaders often talked about the right to self-determination and human rights, and the Indonesian constitution’s preamble called for “any form of alien occupation” to be “erased from the earth”, noted Wenda.

    “But in West Papua, the Indonesian government is carrying out the very abuses it claims to oppose. Their refusal to accept the UN resolution is clearly the consequence of ‘the Papuan question’,” he said.

    “The evidence is now overwhelming that Indonesia has committed crimes against humanity, colonialism, ethnic cleansing and genocide in West Papua.

    Women, children killed
    “The same week as the UN vote, the Indonesian military – including ‘Satan’s troops’ implicated in genocide in East Timor – were attacking Papuan villages, killing unarmed women and children and adding to the over 50,000 people displaced since December 2018.

    “The stated aim of the operations is to ‘wipe out’ all resistance to Indonesian colonialism,” Wenda said.

    “When you displace villagers, they lose their hunting ground, their home, their entire way of life.

    “This is systematic ethnic cleansing, part of a long-running strategy of Jakarta’s occupation to take over our lands and populate it with Indonesian settlers and multi-national corporations. This is the intent, and we need action before it is too late.”

    Wenda said that after Papuans declaring resistance to the illegal occupation “terrorism”, Indonesia had launched a massive crack down.

    “Victor Yeimo, one of our most popular peaceful resistance leaders, has already been arrested. Frans Wasini, a member of the ULMWP’s Department of Political Affairs, was also arrested,” he said.

    “In the city [Jayapura], students at the University of Cenderawasih are being dragged out of their dorms by the police and military and made homeless. Anyone who speaks out about West Papua, human rights abuses and genocide, is now at risk of being arrested, tortured or killed.

    Arrested ‘must be released’
    “Victor Yeimo, Frans Wasini, and all those arrested by the Indonesian colonial regime must be released immediately.”

    Wenda described the deployment of more than  21,000 troops, killing religious leaders, occupying schools, shooting children dead as “state terrorism, crimes against the people of West Papua”.

    Such developments had shown more clearly than ever the need for Indonesia to stop blocking the visit by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Eight-four countries have already called for the visit.

    “There can be no more delays. The troops must be withdrawn, and the UN allowed in before more catastrophe strikes.”

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

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    The post Shipbuilding – A Numbers Game appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • Protest in Bandung rejects Papuan Otsus, militarism, war on Palestine

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    Activists from the Papua People’s Solidarity (Sorak) have protested against Indonesia’s policies in the Papuan region, militarism and Israel’s war on Palestine, likening it to the West Papuan struggle against colonialism.

    The protest against Special Autonomy (Otsus) was held in front of the Merdeka building in the West Java provincial capital of Bandung on Friday, reports CNN Indonesia.

    The action by Papuan activists was staged to respond to the crisis in Indonesia’s eastern-most provinces Papua and West Papua which has become tense over a military crackdown.

    Based on CNN Indonesia’s observations at the rally, scores of people brought banners and gave speeches in front of the Merdeka building.

    In addition to this, there were several banners with messages such as “We reject Special Autonomy Chapter II, the creation of new autonomous regions and the terrorist label”, “Immediately release all Papuan political prisoners” and “Withdraw all organic and non-organic troops from West Papua”.

    Throughout the action, the demonstrators wore masks and maintained social distancing.

    Action coordinator Pilamo said there were a number of demands being articulated during the action. First, rejecting the planned extension of Special Autonomy status in Papua, and then rejecting militarism and the deployment of troops which would further harm the Papuan people.

    ‘Forced on’ Papuan people
    According to Pilamo, the Special Autonomy given to Papua by the government was just a policy which had been forced on the Papuan people by the central government.

    Yet, he said, since July 2020 the Papua People’s Petition (PRP) had declared opposition to continuation of Special Autonomy and it has offered as a solution for the Papuan people the right to self-determination.

    He claimed that as of May 2021 as many as 110 Papuan people’s organisations had joined the PRP and that some 714,066 people had declared their opposition to and the continuation of the Special Autonomy political package in Papua.

    “Because of this, we, representing the Papua people, are conveying this aspiration to Indonesia and the state that today in Papua things are not okay,” Pilamo told journalists.

    According to Pilamo, almost all components and layers of society had said that Special Autonomy had failed to side with, empower or protect the land and people of Papua.

    In addition to this, over the 20 years of implementing Special Autonomy it had impacted badly on the Papuan people, including causing environmental damage, Pilamo said.

    The education and healthcare system had worsened and the construction of roads were not in the interest of the people, but rather, in the interests of investors.

    Pacific Islanders for Palestine and West Papua
    Pacific Islanders for Palestine and West Papua at a rally in Auckland, New Zealand, yesterday. Growing numbers of Pacific islanders are linking up the West Papuan and Palestinians struggles as a common one – against colonialism. Image: David Robie /APR

    Palestine issue raised
    Aside from highlighting issues in Papua, the demonstrators also took up the issue of Palestine. In a written call to action, it demanded an end to the war in Palestine – a ceasefire was declared by Israel and Hamas the same day.

    They also highlighted a number of recent cases including the government’s branding of the Free Papua Organisation (OPM) as terrorists, a label which they reject.

    Pilamo believes that the label will only give authority to security forces to commit violence, including against civilians. He claimed that civilians often fall victim as a consequence of violence committed by the TNI (Indonesian military) and Polri (Indonesian police).

    “We call on the state and Pak Jokowi [Joko Widodo] as the president, we demand an immediate end to military operations and to stop [using] the terrorist label against the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB). The TPNPB are not terrorists, they are part of the movement fighting for Papua national liberation,” said Pilamo.

    Similar protests were also held on Friday in Jakarta and the Central Java city of Yogyakarta.

    Translated by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. The original title of the article was “Warga Papua Demo Tolak Otsus dan Militerisme di Bandung”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.