Iran’s parliamentary elections on March 1 witnessed a historically low turnout, in a blow to the legitimacy of the clerical establishment.
The official turnout of 41 percent was the lowest for legislative elections since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Critics claim the real turnout was likely even lower.
Hard-liners dominated the elections for the parliament and the Assembly of Experts, a body that picks the country’s supreme leader, consolidating their grip on power. Many reformists and moderates were barred from contesting the polls.
Experts said the declining turnout signifies the growing chasm between the ruling clerics and Iran’s young population, many of whom are demanding greater social and political freedoms in the Middle Eastern nation of some 88 million.
“These elections proved that the overriding imperative for the Islamic republic is strengthening ideological conformity at the top, even at the cost of losing even more of its legitimacy from below,” said Ali Vaez, the director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group.
‘Widening Divide’
Observers said disillusionment with the state has been building up for years and is reflected in the declining voter turnout in recent elections.
Turnout in presidential and parliamentary elections were consistently above 50 percent for decades. But the numbers have declined since 2020, when around 42 percent of voters cast ballots in the parliamentary elections that year. In the 2021 presidential vote, turnout was below 49 percent.
Ali Ansari, a history professor at the University of St. Andrews, puts that down to growing “despondency” in the country.
This is “the clearest indication of the widening divide between state and society, which has been growing over the years,” said Ansari.
“It is quite clear that the despondency is extending even to those who are generally sympathetic to the regime,” he added, referring to reformist former President Mohammad Khatami choosing not to vote in the March 1 elections.
Voter apathy was particularly evident in the capital, Tehran, which has the most representatives in the 290-seat parliament. In Tehran, only 1.8 million of the 7.7 million eligible voters — or some 24 percent — cast their votes on March 1, according to official figures.
Up to 400,000 invalid ballots — many believed to be blank — were cast in Tehran alone, a sign of voter discontent.
Ahead of the elections, nearly 300 activists in Iran had called on the public to boycott the “engineered” elections.
Beyond Boycott
The March 1 elections were the first since the unprecedented anti-establishment protests that rocked the country in 2022.
The monthslong demonstrations, triggered by the death in custody of a young woman arrested for allegedly violating Iran’s hijab law, snowballed into one of the most sustained demonstrations against Iran’s theocracy. At least 500 protesters were killed and thousands were detained in the state’s brutal crackdown on the protests.
Iran has been the scene of several bursts of deadly anti-establishment protests since the disputed presidential election in 2009. Many of the demonstrations have been over state repression and economic mismanagement.
Iranians protest the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini after she was detained by the morality police in September 2022. Experts say declining voter turnout highlights society’s growing disenchantment with the state.
But experts said that the 2022 protests alone did not result in the record-low turnout in the recent elections.
“This is a reflection of a deeper malaise that extends back to 2009 and traverses through 2017, 2019, and 2022,” Ansari said. “It has been building for some time.”
Despite the historically low turnout, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei praised the “epic” participation of the public. State-run media, meanwhile, spun the elections as a victory over those who called for a boycott.
By claiming victory, the clerical establishment “overlooks the growing absence of support from 60 percent of its population,” said Vaez.
“Such self-approbation [mirrors] the regime’s previous dismissal of the 2022 protests as the result of foreign intrigue rather than reflection of deep discontent,” he said, adding that it represents the Islamic republic’s “continuation of ignoring simmering public discontent.”
Hard-Line Dominance
Around 40 moderates won seats in the new parliament. But the legislature will remain dominated by hard-liners.
The elections were largely seen as a contest between conservatives and ultraconservatives.
“We can say that a more hotheaded and previously marginal wing of the hard-liners scored a victory against more established conservatives,” said Arash Azizi, a senior lecturer in history and political science at Clemson University in South Carolina.
“This is because the former had a more fired-up base and in the absence of popular participation were able to shape the results,” he added.
A more hard-line parliament could have more bark but “certainly” not more bite than its predecessors, according to Vaez.
“The parliament is subservient to the supreme leader and rubber stamps the deep state’s strategic decisions, even if grudgingly,” he added.
Since the ultraconservative Ebrahim Raisi, a close ally of Khamenei, was elected as president in 2021, Iran’s hard-liners have dominated all three branches of the government, including the parliament and judiciary.
Other key institutions like the Assembly of Experts and the powerful Guardians Council, which vets all election candidates, are also dominated by hard-liners.
“There is not much left of the system’s republican features,” Vaez said. “The Islamic republic is now a minority-ruled unconstitutional theocracy.”
Iran’s parliamentary elections on March 1 witnessed a historically low turnout, in a blow to the legitimacy of the clerical establishment.
The official turnout of 41 percent was the lowest for legislative elections since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Critics claim the real turnout was likely even lower.
Hard-liners dominated the elections for the parliament and the Assembly of Experts, a body that picks the country’s supreme leader, consolidating their grip on power. Many reformists and moderates were barred from contesting the polls.
Experts said the declining turnout signifies the growing chasm between the ruling clerics and Iran’s young population, many of whom are demanding greater social and political freedoms in the Middle Eastern nation of some 88 million.
“These elections proved that the overriding imperative for the Islamic republic is strengthening ideological conformity at the top, even at the cost of losing even more of its legitimacy from below,” said Ali Vaez, the director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group.
‘Widening Divide’
Observers said disillusionment with the state has been building up for years and is reflected in the declining voter turnout in recent elections.
Turnout in presidential and parliamentary elections were consistently above 50 percent for decades. But the numbers have declined since 2020, when around 42 percent of voters cast ballots in the parliamentary elections that year. In the 2021 presidential vote, turnout was below 49 percent.
Ali Ansari, a history professor at the University of St. Andrews, puts that down to growing “despondency” in the country.
This is “the clearest indication of the widening divide between state and society, which has been growing over the years,” said Ansari.
“It is quite clear that the despondency is extending even to those who are generally sympathetic to the regime,” he added, referring to reformist former President Mohammad Khatami choosing not to vote in the March 1 elections.
Voter apathy was particularly evident in the capital, Tehran, which has the most representatives in the 290-seat parliament. In Tehran, only 1.8 million of the 7.7 million eligible voters — or some 24 percent — cast their votes on March 1, according to official figures.
Up to 400,000 invalid ballots — many believed to be blank — were cast in Tehran alone, a sign of voter discontent.
Ahead of the elections, nearly 300 activists in Iran had called on the public to boycott the “engineered” elections.
Beyond Boycott
The March 1 elections were the first since the unprecedented anti-establishment protests that rocked the country in 2022.
The monthslong demonstrations, triggered by the death in custody of a young woman arrested for allegedly violating Iran’s hijab law, snowballed into one of the most sustained demonstrations against Iran’s theocracy. At least 500 protesters were killed and thousands were detained in the state’s brutal crackdown on the protests.
Iran has been the scene of several bursts of deadly anti-establishment protests since the disputed presidential election in 2009. Many of the demonstrations have been over state repression and economic mismanagement.
Iranians protest the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini after she was detained by the morality police in September 2022. Experts say declining voter turnout highlights society’s growing disenchantment with the state.
But experts said that the 2022 protests alone did not result in the record-low turnout in the recent elections.
“This is a reflection of a deeper malaise that extends back to 2009 and traverses through 2017, 2019, and 2022,” Ansari said. “It has been building for some time.”
Despite the historically low turnout, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei praised the “epic” participation of the public. State-run media, meanwhile, spun the elections as a victory over those who called for a boycott.
By claiming victory, the clerical establishment “overlooks the growing absence of support from 60 percent of its population,” said Vaez.
“Such self-approbation [mirrors] the regime’s previous dismissal of the 2022 protests as the result of foreign intrigue rather than reflection of deep discontent,” he said, adding that it represents the Islamic republic’s “continuation of ignoring simmering public discontent.”
Hard-Line Dominance
Around 40 moderates won seats in the new parliament. But the legislature will remain dominated by hard-liners.
The elections were largely seen as a contest between conservatives and ultraconservatives.
“We can say that a more hotheaded and previously marginal wing of the hard-liners scored a victory against more established conservatives,” said Arash Azizi, a senior lecturer in history and political science at Clemson University in South Carolina.
“This is because the former had a more fired-up base and in the absence of popular participation were able to shape the results,” he added.
A more hard-line parliament could have more bark but “certainly” not more bite than its predecessors, according to Vaez.
“The parliament is subservient to the supreme leader and rubber stamps the deep state’s strategic decisions, even if grudgingly,” he added.
Since the ultraconservative Ebrahim Raisi, a close ally of Khamenei, was elected as president in 2021, Iran’s hard-liners have dominated all three branches of the government, including the parliament and judiciary.
Other key institutions like the Assembly of Experts and the powerful Guardians Council, which vets all election candidates, are also dominated by hard-liners.
“There is not much left of the system’s republican features,” Vaez said. “The Islamic republic is now a minority-ruled unconstitutional theocracy.”
Israel’s genocide in Gaza has unleashed a low-grade regional war that is gradually escalating towards what could become an all-out conflict. The central players in this simmering showdown are the members of the informal Resistance Axis, which include Hezbollah in Lebanon, a number of armed Palestinian groups including Hamas, the Syrian and Iranian governments, the Houthis or Ansarallah in Yemen, and Iraq’s armed Popular Mobilization Forces. Numerous strikes against Israeli and US military and commercial targets have already been carried out by these groups across the region, from US military bases in Iraq to Israel-linked commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
As the possibility of a regional conflagration looms, corporate media outlets are turning their attention to the Resistance Axis—and often regurgitating stale, Orientalist narratives that have been deployed for decades to justify US and Israeli aggression in the region. Central to this media narrative is the presentation of Iran as a kind of puppet master overseeing and coordinating the activities of the Resistance Axis. What this narrative fails to take into account is that it is not Iran that created the Resistance Axis, but decades of US and Israeli aggression. Journalists Rania Khalek and Nima Shirazi join The Real News for a conversation on the media narratives spun around the Resistance Axis and Iran, and how such portrayals have primed the US public to support forever wars in West Asia for decades.
Rania Khalek is a Middle East-based journalist for Breakthrough News where she hosts the show Dispatches. Her work has also appeared at The Intercept, Truthout, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, Al Jazeera, The Nation, Salon, AlterNet, Vice and more. Nima Shirazi is the cohost of Citations Needed, a podcast on the media, power, and politics.
Studio Production: Maximillian Alvarez Post Production: Alina Nehlich
Transcript
Maximillian Alvarez: Welcome everyone to this special episode of The Real News Network Podcast. My name is Maximillian Alvarez, I’m the editor-in-chief here at The Real News.
Ju-Hyun Park: And I’m Ju-Hyun Park, the engagement editor at The Real News.
Maximillian Alvarez: It’s so great to have you all with us. We are recording this episode on Thursday, February 29. By the time you hear this, Israel’s genocidal war and full-scale ethnic cleansing of Palestinians in Gaza will have crossed the five-month mark, though the violence of Israel’s occupation of Palestine and the armed resistance to that occupation goes back many, many decades – 75 years to be exact. But since October 7, various actors in the resistance axis outside of historic Palestine, have staged armed attacks against US and Israeli military and commercial assets, from the Houthis’ blockade of Israeli shipping in the Red Sea to the attacks on a US base in Jordan this January that claimed the lives of three US soldiers.
Ju-Hyun Park: Today, in part one of this two-part podcast series, we’re going to talk about the resistance axis and how Western media portrays this alliance of state and non-state actors in the Middle East confronting Israel and the US which includes Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, Ansar Allah or the Houthis, and more.
Maximillian Alvarez: We’ve got two very special guests on the pod today who are going to help us break it all down. We are honored to be joined on The Real News Network Podcast today by journalist Rania Khalek of BreakThrough News, and Nima Shirazi, co-host of the Citations Needed podcast.
Ju-Hyun Park: By and large, corporate media outlets here in the US have been running with the story that all the eclectic groups that make up the resistance axis are nothing more than Iranian proxies at best, or terrorist organizations indistinguishable from ISIS, at worst. Rania and Nima are here with us today to cut through the propaganda and get to the facts. Who exactly are the people and groups comprising the resistance axis? Why are they throwing down so hard for Palestine right now? How is the media portrayal of this axis, its contingent groups, and Iran shaping how we understand the politics of the Middle East, the war in Gaza, and the implications of a broader regional war?
Maximillian Alvarez: Before we get started, I wanted to quickly begin by thanking you, our listeners, for your continued support of The Real News. We take a lot of pride in what we do and we know none of our reporting would be possible without you and your help. So whether you are a longtime supporter or a newcomer to our channel, we’re touched to know that you trust us to keep you informed, expand your worldview, and make your workday a little more bearable.
Ju-Hyun Park: But making independent media costs money. We know times are tough out there, believe me, we’re feeling it too. We’re desperately trying to expand our coverage and improve the quality of stories we can bring you, but we need your help to do it.
Maximillian Alvarez: Listen, we do this because we believe in the power of independent media and because we ultimately believe in you, our listeners, and your power to change the world when you are armed with the right information. So please help us help you. Head over to therealnews.com/donate right now and become a monthly sustainer of our work. If you want to stay in touch and get regular updates about the latest and greatest stories from us, then sign up for our free newsletter by heading over to therealnews.com/sign-up.
Ju-Hyun Park: Now, without further ado, Rania, Nima, welcome to The Real News.
Rania Khalek: It’s great to be on with you.
Nima Shirazi: A pleasure to be with everyone today.
Maximillian Alvarez: Yeah. Man, this is the crossover that the people have been itching for. I am so, so excited to have all of us on the call right now and grateful to you guys for making time for this; I know you’re incredibly busy, but we have a lot to dig into here. We wanted to get your guys’s thoughts specifically for part one of this two-part episode which Ju-Hyun and I laid out in the introduction just now.
To get us rolling, get the blood boiling, and get the analysis going, we want to pull a page from Adam Johnson and Nima’s playbook on the Citations Needed podcast which everyone should go listen to. You also should go support BreakThrough News, check them out, subscribe, and all that good stuff. But we’re going to pull a clip from a Wall Street Journal explainer video that does the work for us of packaging all the propaganda tropes about the resistance axis and the puppet master Iran, into a tight minute and a half. So I’m going to play that for us now, and then Nima and Rania, we want to jump right into your reactions. So let’s go ahead and tee up this clip from the Wall Street Journal which was published on YouTube on January 5 of this year.
[AUDIO CLIP BEGINS]
Iran-backed groups form a land bridge across the Middle East and connect in an alliance that Tehran calls the “Axis of Resistance.” Its focus, to oppose the West. It can both transport equipment and personnel, but can also use these positions to attack US interests or threaten Israel closer to its borders. The alliance has been brought into focus amid the Hamas-Israel War as the groups are mobilizing on multiple fronts at the same time. So here’s how Iran built out the network across the Middle East and what it means for the US and Israel.
So to show you where Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance works in the Middle East, we have Iran over here, and then, of course, Hamas in Gaza over here on the Mediterranean. There’s another group that Iran supports in Gaza called the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which is actually a closer ally of Iran ideologically, but also working out of Gaza here and also in the West Bank. Iran’s most important militia ally is Hezbollah here in Lebanon. Aside from that, they also have Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, here, and various militant groups in Iraq. And then, finally, they also have an alliance with the Houthis in Yemen down here south.
These connections allow Iran to expand its influence in the Middle East and make it easier for the country to transport military equipment, personnel, and weapons through the region. One of Iran’s aims in the Middle East is to always keep the fight, the military fight, as far away from its own borders as possible, and the presence of these military allies and the land bridge kind of helps it do that.
[AUDIO CLIP ENDS]
Okay, let’s go ahead and stop there. Harrowing, harrowing shit, really intense stuff, guys. Thank you to the Wall Street Journal for breaking that all down for us. So, okay, this is what we are working with – And for folks who are listening to this, I want to impress that the video, which we will link to in the show notes for this episode, literally has this Wall Street Journal journalist laying out the puzzle pieces on a map like he’s explaining this grand risk military strategy.
So Rania, and Nima, I want to turn this over to you guys, and let’s unpack this for our viewers. What conclusions are already being made for us in the very framing and presentation of this one piece alone? It is very much representative of the larger narrative coming out of corporate media and Washington DC right now as it pertains to Iran, the “Axis of Resistance,” its contingent groups, and Israel and the US’s role in all of this. So I’m going to ask the very leading question: What is wrong about this framing to you, or what do you think needs to be seriously qualified for people in the West who are hearing this kind of thing?
Rania Khalek: Well, first, I think the Wall Street Journal needs to open up the purse strings a little bit and spend some money on graphics because that was pitiful. The guy had a paper map and little dots that he was moving around. But you know that he does know what he’s talking about because he has a British accent. But in all seriousness, in all seriousness, the first thing that came to mind seeing that is something that’s very typical of the way that mainstream corporate media covers this issue of the resistance axis: The idea that Iran is somehow some foreign player who is inserting itself into a place it doesn’t belong and where there are US interests at risk because of Iran’s presence and Iran’s support for these various militia groups when it’s completely backward.
You notice that map… For those who are listening, there was this map, it was just of the Middle East and North Africa. So you didn’t hear the guy say, oh, and the US is all the way over here. There isn’t even space for the US on that map because the US is on the other side of the world. So it completely glosses over the idea of, wait, what is the US even doing in this region? In reality, Iran is a part of the Middle East. It is supporting actors in the region. It has a partnership with actors across the region that have similar interests to Iran, and that is to fight US imperialism and to protect their own sovereignty in various ways, depending on which part of the region they’re from. Iran has way more reason to be involved and invested in its region, especially against such an aggressive actor like the US, than the US and its settler colony of Israel do. So that’s where I’ll start. Go ahead, Nima. Love to hear your thoughts.
Nima Shirazi: Yeah. It’s hard to add much to that, Rania, thank you. Yeah, there’s this overwhelming Orientalism that pervades all of this propaganda. There’s the assumption that US troops and CIA agents and military contractors are indigenous to the Middle East, and as Rania said, they’re just going about their business besieged from all sides by big bad Iran, the maligned foreign force, and somehow it’s just been there forever.
Maximillian Alvarez: Well, and I don’t want to cut you off, I know it’s more complex than this, but the thing that keeps jumping out to me is when companies like Amazon here will hire outside union-busting consultants to come into the warehouse and tell workers the union is an outside force. So it’s like, motherfucker, what are you?
Nima Shirazi: Yeah. No, exactly. There’s this pathological insistence throughout our politics here in the US and our media that the US and its allies should control the world and that any idea contrary to that is met with incredulity and outright hostility. So the guiding principle here, as we just saw in the Wall Street Journal clip, is that the region of the world is the victim of Iranian aggression and hegemony, rather than, as Rania so rightly said, it is exactly the inverse.
When the video lays out where certain military interests lie in the region, there’s one little chip for the US to have an ally in Israel. One little chip for the US having allies in Saudi Arabia and across the Gulf; Each one of those chips represents thousands, if not tens of thousands of American troops, and dozens of military bases. The overwhelming military support, intelligence support, and diplomatic cover – For impunity, for war crimes exacted upon the people of the world, and certainly in that part of the world, specifically – Are completely glossed over, if not 100% omitted. There are these conflagrations of violence that come from nowhere, except they’re not from nowhere; They’re from the big bad mullahs in Tehran, exacting their devious plan. So much of this can be traced back to the way that Iran is viewed in the American mindset and has been for now for decades at least. But much longer in terms of the orientalist, colonial, and imperial nature of the way that the “West” views that part of the world.
Can I just mention that in August of 1979, the way that the US understands the world was put into a diplomatic cable, a confidential cable, that was leaked only about a decade ago, by WikiLeaks. The confidential cable was from August of 1979, so after the Iranian Revolution, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi – The Shah of Iran and US ally – Has been kicked out. There is a new interim government in place before the new constitution is voted on by the entire population of Iran, and in that time, a confidential cable is sent back to Washington from Bruce Laingen, the chargé d’affaires in Tehran. In this cable, the American diplomat talks about the discussions that he’s been having with his Iranian counterparts. He analyzes in this cable, “The underlying cultural and psychological qualities” of the Iranians, stating in a diplomatic cable “Perhaps the single dominant aspect of the Persian psyche is an overriding egoism” and continues that this is manifested in “An almost total Persian preoccupation with self and leaves little room for understanding points of view other than one’s own.”
He then continues to write that Iranians suffer from extreme paranoia and “A pervasive unease about the nature of the world in which one lives” and the neurotic belief that “Nothing is permanent and that hostile forces abound.” The diplomat ascribes this to what he calls, “The bazaar mentality so common among Persians, a mindset that often ignores longer-term interests in favor of immediately attainable advantages and countenances, practices that are regarded as unethical by other norms.” So the idea is that Iran and Iranians, by virtue of their DNA, are devious, don’t understand the world, are preoccupied with themselves, will do anything as long as it gets them short-term gains, and they don’t care about the world around them. Somewhere else in the cable, it says there’s a “Persian aversion to accepting responsibility for one’s own actions.”
Rania Khalek: Persian aversion [Max laughs].
Nima Shirazi: Indeed.
Rania Khalek: Sounds like a game.
Maximillian Alvarez: Wait, that’s our new band name, Persian Aversion.
Rania Khalek: Game night. We’re going to play Persian Aversion.
Nima Shirazi: So thank you for giving me the time to lay some of that out because it speaks to the way that the US government – So offended, so humiliated by the Iranian Revolution in 1979 – Changed the dynamic of US hegemony in that part of the world and the vengeance that the US has exacted upon Iran because of that revolution ever since. So much of it does stem from this idea that Iranians are a certain type of people who cannot be trusted, who do not operate by the norms of society – Those norms laid out and followed to a T by noble Americans, always – And so this lays out the framework in which we understand the way that our politics and our media really describes Iran, talks about Iran, thinks about Iran, and how these perceptions then pervade a more public opinion about Iran. Which comes back to projecting American issues with itself and the overriding egoism of American hegemony and exceptionalism onto those that we hope to dominate and are very frustrated when we’re not able to.
Rania Khalek: Okay. I wanted to butt in when you were talking and say, projection for a thousand, Nima, because so much of that sounded like projection. I want to add to what you’re saying because I know that you wanted to have a discussion here also about the rest of this resistance axis beyond Iran. A lot of what Nima described, the blatant racism, this racist framework that’s used to understand Iranian thought, Iranian decision making, those sneaky Persians, it behooves Iran in some ways for the US to view the Iranian government that way. It’s just not understanding your enemy and one of the worst things you can do is misunderstand your enemy when you’re involved in a long war like this. But when we talk about the rest of the region, a lot of that is then projected onto the way the US and DC have come to look at the people they have framed as Iranian agents across the region in the way that they look at Shias.
That’s what you saw happen over the last couple of decades, especially with the rise of a group like Hezbollah, for example. Then getting the Gulf states involved and being the counter to a group like Hezbollah, with the whole war in Syria, and then also with what took place in Iraq post-occupation and especially in the pre-ISIS years, it became this conversation about the big bad Shias. This view was imposed on the region in many ways through Gulf-funded and Western-funded media by portraying Shias in Iraq and Lebanon as being agents of Iran. In Lebanon specifically, that is how Hezbollah is described; Not as what they are, which is a group of Lebanese people who are a product and an outcome of Israel’s invasion and occupation of Lebanon in the ’80s; Fighting that occupation in the south of Lebanon and successfully kicking out the Israelis in 2000, and then defeating them in 2006 when they tried to do a ground invasion and failed in a humiliating, miserable, pathetic way for supposedly one of the most powerful armies in the world.
But that said, that Persian orientalist view has then been projected onto Shias in Lebanon, specifically those affiliated with Hezbollah, and the same goes for groups in Iraq that fought the US occupation and that went on to form certain units in what’s known as the Hashd al-Shaabi or the Popular Mobilization Units when ISIS took over a huge portion of the country. A lot of Shias joined the call to join the Hashd al-Shaabi to fight the Popular Mobilization Forces to fight the threat of ISIS. Then it gets complicated though. You’ve got Hezbollah and Lebanon made up of Lebanese people, not Iranians – But allied indeed with Iran because they have similar interests – You have the Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, and we’re talking about some specific units in the Hashd al-Shaabi, not even the whole thing, that are involved and now fighting.
They fired some rockets at the American bases and near the American embassy in Iraq, post-genocide in Gaza. They’ve been portrayed as agents of Iran because they’re Shia but then you’ve got Hamas which is a Sunni organization. That’s where things get complicated and that’s where that Persian narrative falls apart. It goes back to the same old Islamophobia. Hamas and Gaza, plus Islamic Jihad, and a bunch of other allied forces are a huge part of the resistance axis because they’re in one of the most important locations. They’re fighting the most belligerent, depraved arm of US imperialism in the region – That being the Israeli army.
I won’t say much about Syria because Syria’s been decimated by years of war, but the government’s still intact, and Syria is part of the resistance axis. It’s a means to move material to the organizations it needs to go to, though it’s not so much involved in the fight anymore after a decade of attempted regime change and then horrific sanctions that have decimated the economy. But all of these organizations, are not Iranian organizations. They are simply allied with Iran because they have similar interests in their own countries, and that’s what’s so amazing. Nobody ever talks about the other side. Who is the other side? It’s the US, it’s Israel, it’s the Gulf states, it’s Egypt, it’s Jordan, and it’s these monarchies. It’s these monarchies and dictatorships in police states that are completely beholden to US interests and act as extensions of America in brutal ways like we’re witnessing right now.
Even when we talk about who the maligned actor is here, you don’t have to love Iran, but objectively speaking, there is one side opposing a genocide and another side arming and giving it cover. In my opinion, I don’t care where you stand on any of these issues in a more complicated way, there’s one side we should all be on, and that’s anti-genocide. And by the way, I didn’t mention the Houthis in Yemen. The Houthis in Yemen are also a very important part of the resistance axis. They’re imposing material consequences on the Western world and Israel because of this genocide, and as a result, they’ve been re-designated as terrorists. What upside-down world do we live in when the Houthis and Yemen are terrorists for blockading ships to intervene against a genocide? A genocide. Then the Israelis are considered the humane actors and Iran as evil? It’s completely absurd.
Ju-Hyun Park: Yeah, absolutely. We’re looking at an upside-down, funhouse mirror-style situation when we look at the real situation on the ground and then compare it to this media coverage and this long arc of a historical narrative that’s been implanted into the minds of everyone in the West. It’s not just about this moment; This is decades and decades of propaganda that’s accumulated over time. I appreciate what you’re both bringing to the table because this is how the US operates all around the world. It’s also how the West has operated throughout the entirety of its colonial history. When we look at the narratives that are being espoused about the resistance axis and Iran, we can find parallels going back centuries. This Persian aversion stuff, this is what the Spaniards said about Indigenous people in the Americas in like 1500. All of these people, they’re not responsible. They don’t have morals. They can’t make decisions on their own.
Rania Khalek: The OG Persian aversion.
Ju-Hyun Park: Exactly, yeah. If I were more clever, I would come up with an appropriate rhyme for it. But yeah. Getting back to what I was saying, this is also about naturalizing the US presence. They construct this giant, big, bad, villain out of Iran which is part of the region. Iran will always be a neighbor to the rest of the countries in the Middle East or the Arab region, no matter whether anyone likes it or not. And yet they talk about it as if Iraq is Ohio and the US is trying to protect Cincinnati from Iran-backed militias. So it only takes a second to think about the basic facts of the situation to understand that we are being duped here. I appreciate both of you for spelling out so clearly the racism, the assumptions, and the arrogance that go into the projection that goes into this media narrative. I want us to also start to fill the space with facts because it’s one thing to point out the propaganda, to dispel the illogical basis that it’s always rising from, but then we have to fill in that vacuum too.
Rania, I appreciate you getting into some of the basics and the fundamentals of the resistance access. I’m thinking let’s dive a little bit deeper, and let’s think particularly about the case of Iran because so much of the way this media narrative works is around the dominant images of Iran that we’ve been bombarded with since 1979. Once we tear down this idea that’s been constructed of Iran as this inherently evil entity, let’s fill in that space a little bit more and talk about what is the political character of Iran at this point and its political project. What are the interests that it’s seeking to defend? How does that intersect with the interests of other actors in the regions – As Rania was getting at earlier – When we think about the strivings of people in these other countries to be free from US imperialism?
Maximillian Alvarez: Also, like you were saying, Nima, how does the constant projection and depiction of Iran decades over, what political ends does that serve both in the minds of the population here and the broader foreign policy of the US?
Nima Shirazi: Yeah. Iran is a large country with 80-plus million people. It has its own interests as a nation-state. Its government has its own interests domestically and internationally. There are all manner of different political persuasions and different perspectives on things within the country and within its people. To say that Iran has one thing that it wants to do is a way to flatten reality so that we can somehow after the Cold War ended, have a new, big, bad puppet master enemy. You don’t have the Soviet Union anymore, you don’t have communism in that way anymore, therefore, the political narrative switches to worrying about Iran and worrying about Islamism.
But so much of what this does is self-perpetuating because by casting Iran, its government, and also its people – And let’s be clear about this – The US and its allies and affiliated media arms love to do this thing where there’s the government and then the people. No, we’re not talking about the people; We love the people, we’re just talking about the government. But then everything we do is attacking the people. Every sanction, every missile strike, every drone attack attacks people. So that is a way to disassociate and dismiss out of hand, this idea that our interests, US interests, and Western interests are not fully bent on domination. They care about the freedom, love, and peace of people around the world. Okay. But with that in mind, this constant drumbeat of Iran can’t be trusted, Iran is our enemy, Iran is in charge, Iran is in control. One of my favorite terms herein that Wall Street Journal piece is the “land bridge.” You mean like, earth? [Max laughs] Okay. Cool.
Maximillian Alvarez: Also known as land [all laugh].
Nima Shirazi: Yeah. Like, okay. The land bridge between New York and Los Angeles is ripe with Americans [Max laughs]. Whoa, it’s fucked up. They built a land bridge. So all of this serves the purpose of not only refusing to change the perception of an enemy state to keep that threat ever present. So that American interests, American actions, Israeli interests and actions, and Saudi interests and actions can be perennially justified. Anything they do can be justified. It is reasonable to act in this way because of big, bad Iran. But also what that does, much in the way that we see the US political machines and media talk about Latin and South America, when there are socialist governments challenging American hegemony, those countries have been under threat. Their governments and their people have been under threat and under attack for so long and never allowed to fully realize the nation-states that they could have, with the popular representation that they could have, with the aspirations of the people enacted in the way that the people get to decide because they are constantly under threat.
Being constantly under threat serves a real political purpose not only for the US threatening those countries but also within those countries. Because the people and governments of those countries are always under siege, and therefore, what you see is this idea that what Iran could be is not allowed to be realized on purpose because it is constantly under sanction and under threat. The fact that Iran still maintains this terrifying persona in the American political power structure psyche is a real testament to how much resistance Iran has been able to maintain, that it has not been regime changed, it has not been occupied. So it’s important to realize that this threat narrative not only threatens people within those countries and whatever spectrum of political interests they have for aspirations of stronger democratic representation, of different relations with other countries in the world, that is done on purpose; Exacted from the outside onto those countries to stifle the natural course of the way that nation-states evolve.
Maximillian Alvarez: Rania, I want to get your thoughts on this as well. But really quick for people listening to this who have been stewing in that Western propaganda for decades, as I have; I’ve admitted many times I grew up very conservative. I told Chris Hedges in this studio that my family was one of the ones who thought you were a nutjob 20 years ago. I’ve come a long way and I know all the people listening to us have as well. What I beseech you all listening to consider is, is what Nima’s describing here any less plausible or ridiculous than the thought that there’s some deeply genetically encoded, politically distinct evil in Iran that’s leading to all the narratives that the US presents about Iran to be true? I would ask you to consider that this is what the US as an imperial power is doing around the world, including a hundred miles away from our own border.
The continued blockade on Cuba is expressly designed to punish the people of Cuba so that, as government officials here in the US have said, they eventually rebel against the socialist government and overthrow it. That is the expressed point of the blockade. Much like the ways that Nima describes, the US does, can, and continues to apply these pressures, these sanctions, and these supporting coups in Latin America and around the world to get its way, thus creating an internal situation that the US media likes to pretend the US has no role in. Sorry, Rania, I wanted to throw that out there. Hop back in here.
Rania Khalek: Yeah. This applies to the entire region. I want people to recognize too, I’m talking to you from Beirut right now, a place that is a part of a country, a part of a region that has endured so much violence because of US imperialism. And why? Why does the US want the Middle East so bad? Why does it need to control it? It has a huge amount of oil. It’s about controlling resources. It’s very simple. In Iran specifically, before the Iranian Revolution in 1979, why was there a revolution? Because there was a horrific dictatorship that the US and the UK imposed on Iran after overthrowing a democratically-elected leader in 1953 to extract Iranian oil for almost free. That is what imperialism is; It is about the US and its imperial allies going around the world – Particularly the ruling elites in these countries – Stealing resources from the Global South and putting in place local leadership that will allow them to steal the resources so that the people in these countries remain poor.
There are a few countries that are able to develop and do well. Everybody has their place in the imperial hierarchy. But imperialism is the way capitalism is organized on a global scale, and the US is at the top. Right now, what we’re seeing, we’re in a historic moment. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 came at a time when the Soviet Union started to fall and there was an ideological vacuum around the world where it was a huge… The fall of the Soviet Union was a huge defeat for communism and for the left on a global scale, whether you liked it or hated it. The Islamic Revolution in Iran gave a lot of new motivation ideologically across the region for revolution with an Islamic flavor.
There are a lot of groups across the region you wouldn’t have, had it not been for the Islamic Revolution in Iran. That’s not to say that Hezbollah is an Iranian group, but the people of South Lebanon were inspired by the revolution in Iran because whether it had a religious flavor or not, it did have a religious flavor and it was a revolution against imperialism. It kicked out the imperialists and took back Iranian resources for Iranians, and then those resources were used to develop Iran and go back into the pockets of the people of Iran. This is about sovereignty and this is about allowing people or giving people a chance in their countries to use their land and their resources for themselves. That’s what pushing out imperialism means. Hezbollah is all about liberating Lebanese land and protecting the territorial integrity of Lebanon. And that is what they did; They liberated Lebanese land on more than one occasion. It was a huge defeat for the US.
What I’m getting at here is that as we come into the 21st century, 2003 was a very different time for the Middle East. The US was able to invade and occupy Iraq with no obstacles really, no obstacles. It is now 2024 and there is a resistance axis, there are groups across the region that fight back, and they’re allied with Iran. This is why the US hates Iran. The US hates Iran because it partners with, funds, trains, and arms groups that stand in the way of the US looting resources from the Middle East. It’s as simple as that. The Palestinian resistance groups want to liberate their land. That’s what they want. The Yemenis, the Houthis, and Ansar Allah want sovereignty and liberation from imperialism. That’s why they fought an almost decade-long war against a Saudi-led, US-backed genocide in Yemen. And you know what? They won.
What I’m getting at here is that the US is increasingly losing. Am I saying that what’s happening in Gaza is some big win for the resistance? No, it’s horrific. It’s a loss for all of humanity, but people are fighting back. What happened on October 7, should not be dismissed as anything other than people from the Global South firing back at their oppressors. That’s the most basic way to look at it. That terrifies the US, it terrifies Europe, and the only way to undo it is with genocide. This is a big deal, and you’re going to see the rhetoric amp up hard against Iran and all the actors that are currently involved and hitting back at Israel and Western interests over this genocide. It is the biggest fear of the Global North, especially as we begin to move into this increasingly multipolar world where all of the biggest anxieties of the US have to do with the rise of China, the rise of the Global South, and loss of control over the world.
Very soon we’re going to look back at this moment as a historical turning point. It’s pretty epic in terms of the downfall of Western imperialism. There’s a long way to go before it falls but right now we see the ideological apparatus behind it: The human rights, democracy, and liberalism. All these things, people see through them right now because the US is backing a genocide in Gaza.
Nima Shirazi: Yeah. If you’re able to redefine popular movements for liberation as the brainchild of a few people in Tehran, then it is not an actual threat to the current world order. It becomes a political issue, a military issue, not a popular resistance issue that is supported by the vast majority of human beings living on this planet. Therefore, if it’s this axis of resistance led by Iran, you don’t have to grapple with the fact that these are anti-colonial, anti-oppression, and anti-genocide movements for freedom.
Maximillian Alvarez: I appreciate this conversation and wish it could go for another hour, but I know we only have about 10 minutes with y’all. I wanted to hop in on that point and say that this is why we at The Real News – Along with other media-makers like yourselves who are trying to correct the decades of imbalance that we’ve been trying to unpack here in the way the media presents this to Western audiences – We’ve been working hard to give people more of a human sense of, who are the flesh and blood human beings we’re talking about here? Not just the masses of Brown people living in slums with that 24-color tint to everything, making everything look a little more like it’s a desert planet in Star Wars with a humanoid-type species that isn’t quite as human as us, but they look a little like us. It takes a lot of work to try to deprogram people who have been trained to see their fellow human beings as so much less human than they are to try to correct that.
I’m not going to say that any one of us is going to be able to do that, but I will say something is happening. We published a piece that is one of the pieces I’m most proud of since I got here at The Real News in 2020, which was a beautiful on-the-ground and harrowing documentary report by Ross Domoney, Nadia Peridot, and Ahmad Al-Bazz from Janin Refugee Camp, looking at the faces of the resistance and talking to the people in their homes who have been called terrorists for so long. This one quote that we used for the subhead for that piece sticks out, and I will encourage folks to watch this piece because it gives a picture of what we’re talking about here, but the quote from one of the people interviewing this piece is “They call us terrorists. Who planted terrorism? Wasn’t it they? As long as there is occupation, there is no future for the people. There will be no future unless they let us live.”
Not only is that important for people to hear but what struck me was that so many people here in the States were finally willing to hear it in a way that we have not been for the past 20 years, and so that is significant. I feel like the ideological armature of the post-911 era is, like you said, Rania, starting to break and people are pissed at the ways they’ve been misled. We are going to, in part two of this conversation, do a deeper dive into these resistance groups, the flesh and blood human beings that comprise them, the different local and regional and intersecting reasons that people are resisting, and so on and so forth.
But with the last 10 minutes we’ve got, Rania, you’re over there in Lebanon; Let’s start that conversation here. Let’s try to emphasize and end that we are talking about flesh and blood human beings here. We’re not saying you’ve got to like everybody here, we’re asking you to understand that we are talking about people, and the situation as it always is with people is more complicated than what the media is currently telling us. So I wanted to toss that to you guys with the last few minutes that we’ve got. What do you want to impress upon people listening about the human beings behind this “Iran-backed resistance axis” and what do you think that textured human understanding adds to the “conversation” that we are currently having here in the West?
Rania Khalek: People in Lebanon, people in Syria, and people in Iraq are moms, dads, children, teachers, lawyers, and cooks; All of the things that exist in the US, those same things exist here. All the same, aspirations exist. People just want to live their lives. They want to be safe. They want to be happy. They want to love their families. They want to enjoy their moments. They want to raise their kids. They want to go to school. They want to have jobs that pay so they can put food on the table. They want to advance in life. They want all the same things that anybody anywhere else wants. They want to live in their countries. They want to live on their land. They want to have the freedom to do that without being bombed. A lot of people have been exposed to that because of all of this stuff on social media where they get an insider view of the raw emotion and lives of the people who are being decimated in Gaza.
On a personal level, I think that Israel has done a very big service to the world in showing the world what their society is. They are convulsing in fascism right now and it is on full display. They’re like egomaniacally celebrating denying food to children and murdering them and they’re saying it openly like that. They’re not even sugarcoating it because there’s no accountability or consequences. This is a society that is consumed by murderous hatred. It’s very disturbing to watch and it’s being livestreamed which is disturbing the world right now. That’s why you see a lot of people around the world traumatized by what they’re witnessing in Gaza and why you saw someone like Aaron Bushnell light himself on fire.
What I’ll say about the way I feel and the conversations I have with people here is, that I grew up with a family that had no nice feelings for Israel because they were always bombing them. I’ve grown up very much despising Zionism and despising settler colonialism in this region and all around the world and what it’s done. I’ve never heard anybody or felt myself that I want the children who live in Israel to die, I have never. I still don’t want good things to happen to the Israelis committing genocide right now but I would never wish death upon their children ever. Nothing could make me feel that way about babies anywhere. I have this conversation with people here all the time. We’re all completely struck by confusion and horror that this is how they feel about us, and they’re the aggressors. No one I know feels that way about their children. I don’t know if that helps humanize people here in any way but I wanted to share that.
Nima Shirazi: Yeah. Fear and loathing are very, very powerful and those have been deliberately instilled in consumers of media, pop culture, and in anyone who pays attention to politics or not. These feelings pervade and saturate every aspect of how Americans and people living in the ” West” are led to think about, as you put it, Max, the sepia-toned savage. So to Rania’s point, the images that people are seeing… Tragically, we’ve all been doing this long enough that we know that decade after decade there are new horrors, new genocidal acts, new war crimes, new crimes against humanity, and we always think this time it’s going to change. This time people are going to wake the fuck up. This time the images are so horrific that this will not be allowed to go on anymore, and time and time again, they do.
Power, whether economic, pop-cultural, military, or diplomatic, is a hell of a thing. What we are seeing now is the breakdown of some of that narrative power. Yes, some of that real-life power but also some of that narrative power through the images that are being able to be shared across the world in real-time. And this is not to boost social media platforms that are also incredibly toxic and horrible but there’s a reason why a lot of corporate media is terrified that they are not controlling this narrative in the way that they would want to. It’s the reason why the Wall Street Journal is going to put that video together because they need to try and maintain the fear and loathing, the othering of the human beings who are on the slaughter-end of the bullets, of the missiles, and white phosphorus.
What we’re seeing right now is amid genocide, hopefully, a way for this to never happen again. We will see what happens but that’s what the people of this world should be coming together to do and what a lot of them are; Despite the incredible barriers, the incredible pushback, and the incredible oppression that they are facing in doing so. I’ll leave us with this: I do media criticism as a part of the way that I spend my day, and I am consistently struck by the fact that people far smarter than myself have already laid out everything that is already happening. If you read James Baldwin or Edward Said, you don’t need to listen to Citations Needed. That said, please listen to Citations Needed.
Rania Khalek: [Laughs] You’re terrible at marketing, Nima.
Nima Shirazi: Yeah, I’m the worst.
Rania Khalek: Wow.
Nima Shirazi: I’m the worst. It’s the anti-capitalist in me. But I will leave us with this, describing media coverage of Iran at the time of the hostage crisis – Late ’79 and throughout 1980 – Edward Said wrote this about the way that the media was covering things. He wrote, “Cliches, caricatures, ignorance, unqualified ethnocentrism, and inaccuracy were inordinately evident” in the media that he was seeing about Iran. He called out one of our favorite topics and targets on Citations Needed: The New York Times. The “Gray Lady” paper of record for the Western world. He called out the New York Times and their reporting saying that what they were doing formed “A collection of attitudes displayed for the benefit of suspicious and frightened readers.”
We are seeing that time and time again, whether it’s the Wall Street Journal‘s little six-minute video, Joe Biden doing Rose Garden speeches, and everything in between. Maybe those aren’t that far apart, maybe there’s not much in between, but what we are seeing is the constant promotion of suspicion and fear. Because those motivate so much dehumanization, xenophobia, and racism that allow the bombs to keep falling and allow politicians to sometimes hand-wring, oh, well, we wish that Israel would do nicer war crimes. Not that we need to immediately stop this but if they could be a little nicer, we could sleep a little more soundly.
Rest assured, those people are already sleeping soundly every single night funding and arming a genocide and then saying that the real threat is not their own bombs – To the flesh of babies and their parents and doctors and journalists – But rather that the threat somehow emanates from big, bad Iran, and so let’s keep our vision there. Let’s keep our Sauron eye on Tehran while this other stuff is going on, but don’t worry about that because it’s all done in service of maintaining freedom and democracy for the world. That if there’s an axis of resistance, it’s us, not the Iranians. Casting that perspective is very deliberate. It needs to be meticulously and constantly maintained and we’ve seen that for decades now. And the consequence is more invasion, occupation, apartheid, and genocide.
Ju-Hyun Park: Couldn’t have put it any better. As we close out, it’s important to emphasize that this is an ongoing process; This narrative, these images are being actively constructed every single day as we’re going through this. But we’re also at an important inflection point. As the military power, the political power, and the supremacy that the US has enjoyed for a number of decades are being contested, so is its power to define. The US, for so long, has had a monopoly over how we define the actors in the region and how we define the people in the region, overall, as well. A lot of that is coming to a head at this moment. What we’re seeing is that in response, they’re only becoming more nakedly brutal and inhumane in everything that they’re doing.
I want to bring in what’s going on at the New York Times at this moment. For listeners who may be a little bit out of the loop, there was a big story that was published about the claims of mass rape on the part of Hamas on October 7 a few months ago. It’s now coming out that the two authors of this story, Anat Schwartz and Adam Sella, not only did not have any serious writing or reporting experience before they published this huge flagship story for the paper of record of the US, but on top of that, one of them, Anat Schwartz, was a former Israeli intelligence officer, and these are the people who are being permitted to construct the narrative.
I want to bring in this tweet that Anat Schwartz liked. There was the one calling to make Gaza a slaughterhouse but there’s another one. This is a translation from Hebrew – I don’t speak Hebrew so this may not be an exact one – The translation of this other tweet that was liked by this author is, “Our goal is to establish a narrative according to which Hamas is ISIS Daesh (this is a familiar contemporary sentiment that scares Westerners) and not an organization of freedom fighters and it has no contribution to Free Palestine.” They are spelling out what they’re attempting to do here which is to take one of the most brutal, violent actors in the region in recent history and equate it with the popular forces that are fighting back against Zionism, and over 20 years of US war. They know that all they need to do to string it together is to point out that they’re both Muslim or that political Islam is playing a role here, barring the fact that Islam has 2 billion adherents across the world, so political Islam can never be one thing.
They’re counting on the ignorance of people like us, people in the West who only know about these countries as a scary place over there, maybe know like one or two trivia-style facts about the place, and they’re counting on that because that’s to their advantage. That then gives them the freedom of action to say whatever they want, create whatever associations they want, and construct whatever images they wish. This then justifies their freedom of military action in the real world which is now resulting in the deaths of over 13,000 children, over 30,000 Palestinians in total. I wanted to bring that in as a final point to drive this all home, tie it all together for our listeners, and thank you both so much for taking the time, sharing your knowledge, and for your accumulated experience for however many years you have both been at this. As we say goodbye, I wanted to give you the chance to close out for our listeners, plug yourselves, and let us know how we can keep up with you. Maybe some of our listeners already listen to you a lot, maybe they’re being introduced to you for the first time, so let them get that sweet, sweet BreakThrough News, Citations Needed nectar. Where can they find that?
Rania Khalek: Well, since Nima is not good at marketing his podcast, I’ll start. No. So I have a show called Dispatches on BreakThrough News. I’ve had you on, Ju-Hyun. We did a good episode on North Korea 101, it was fantastic. But I feel very privileged that I get to have this platform where I can host people to talk about a lot of these topics that we’re covering and more from an anti-imperialist perspective, one that you certainly don’t see in the mainstream. So I do encourage people to go check that out and to follow BreakThrough News on all platforms. My colleagues have been doing amazing work even before October 7, but certainly after. You can find us @btnewsroom on Instagram, Twitter, and TikTok, and BreakThrough News on YouTube. Thank you guys for hosting us. This was a fantastic discussion. I appreciate getting to participate in it.
Nima Shirazi: Yeah, I appreciate this as well. It’s great to be with you, Rania. It’s been a while.
Rania Khalek: It has.
Nima Shirazi: Good to see you. And yeah, The Real News is doing incredible work. It’s a real honor and pleasure to have been asked to join you all. I co-host a podcast called Citations Needed with the brilliant media critic, Adam Johnson, and the team that puts that show together is fantastic. I mention that because it’s not just the two voices you hear on the show, it’s not just the host, it’s the whole team; Florence, Julianne, Trendel, Marco, and Mahnoor who help us put together every episode. So if media criticism is your jam, please check out Citations Needed. You can find that on Twitter @CitationsPod and Facebook @Citations Needed.
If you are so inclined to want to support the show, we are 100% listener-funded. We don’t run ads for snack packs and mattresses like a lot of podcasts do, and that is on purpose. It’s so that we can say what we want to say and not be beholden. And the way that we are able to keep doing that is because we are totally listener-funded which we absolutely do not take for granted. We are so, so grateful. We’re now into our seventh season. We started back in July 2017, and the fact that we’re able to keep doing this is a joy and continues to be a real privilege.
So thanks to anyone who has previously listened to the show, supported the show, or shared the show with folks that they love and trust or maybe that they hate and want to bring over to our side here. Endless gratitude for all the listeners, and for anyone who checks out Citations Needed. As always, to you all at The Real News, we’ve had the honor of hosting brother Max on the show a couple of times. It’s always a fantastic time.
Maximillian Alvarez: Hell yeah. Well, Rania Khalek and Nima Shirazi, thank you both so much for joining us today on The Real News Network. It was a pleasure. Everyone out there, go check out BreakThrough News, go check out Citations Needed, and follow Rania and Nima; They are always doing great and important work. And please, before you go, head on over to therealnews.com/support and throw us some love too so we can keep bringing y’all more important coverage and conversations like this every week. My name is Maximillian Alvarez.
Ju-Hyun Park: I’m Ju-Hyun Park.
Maximillian Alvarez: And for The Real News Network, we wanted to thank you all so much for listening, thank you for caring, and please let us know what you think about this conversation. Stay tuned for part two where we’re going to be diving deeper into the Iran-backed resistance axis. We’re going to be looking closer at the local level about the history and humanity of these people and groups so that you can be better armed to navigate the propaganda that we’re all being bombarded with every single day. So for The Real News Network, this is Maximillian Alvarez signing off. Take care of yourselves. Take care of each other. Solidarity forever.
Iran’s so-called axis of resistance is a loose network of proxies, Tehran-backed militant groups, and an allied state actor.
The network is a key element of Tehran’s strategy of deterrence against perceived threats from the United States, regional rivals, and primarily Israel.
Active in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, the axis gives Iran the ability to hit its enemies outside its own borders while allowing it to maintain a position of plausible deniability, experts say.
Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has played a key role in establishing some of the groups in the axis. Other members have been co-opted by Tehran over the years.
Iran has maintained that around dozen separate groups that comprise the axis act independently.
Tehran’s level of influence over each member varies. But the goals pursued by each group broadly align with Iran’s own strategic aims, which makes direct control unnecessary, according to experts.
Lebanon’s Hizballah
Hizballah was established in 1982 in response to Israel’s invasion that year of Lebanon, which was embroiled in a devastating civil war.
The Shi’ite political and military organization was created by the Quds Force, the overseas arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the elite branch of the country’s armed forces.
Danny Citrinowicz, a research fellow at the Iran Program at the Israel-based Institute for National Security Studies, said Tehran’s aim was to unite Lebanon’s various Shi’ite political organizations and militias under one organization.
Since it was formed, Hizballah has received significant financial and political assistance from Iran, a Shi’a-majority country. That backing has made the group a major political and military force in Lebanon.
A Hizballah supporter holds up portraits of Hizballah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Beirut in 2018.
“Iran sees the organization as the main factor that will deter Israel or the U.S. from going to war against Iran and works tirelessly to build the organization’s power,” Citrinowicz said.
Hizballah has around 40,000 fighters, according to the office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence. The State Department said Iran has armed and trained Hizballah fighters and injected hundreds of millions of dollars in the group.
The State Department in 2010 described Hizballah as “the most technically capable terrorist group in the world.”
Citrinowicz said Iran may not dictate orders to the organization but Tehran “profoundly influences” its decision-making process.
He described Hizballah, which is considered a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, not as a proxy but “an Iranian partner managing Tehran’s Middle East strategy.”
Led by Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah has developed close ties with other Iranian proxies and Tehran-backed militant groups, helping to train and arm their fighters.
Citrinowicz said Tehran “almost depends” on the Lebanese group to oversee its relations with other groups in the axis of resistance.
Hamas
Hamas, designated a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, has had a complex relationship with Iran.
Founded in 1987 during the first Palestinian Intifada, or uprising, Hamas is an offshoot of the Palestinian arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist political organization established in Egypt in the 1920s.
Hamas’s political chief is Ismail Haniyeh, who lives in Qatar. Its military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, is commanded by Yahya Sinwar, who is believed to be based in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is estimated to have around 20,000 fighters.
For years, Iran provided limited material support to Hamas, a Sunni militant group. Tehran ramped up its financial and military support to the Palestinian group after it gained power in the Gaza Strip in 2007.
Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi (right) greets the leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran on June 20, 2023.
But Tehran reduced its support to Hamas after a major disagreement over the civil war in Syria. When the conflict broke out in 2011, Iran backed the government of President Bashar al-Assad. Hamas, however, supported the rebels seeking to oust Assad.
Nevertheless, experts said the sides overcame their differences because, ultimately, they seek the same goal: Israel’s destruction.
“[But] this does not mean that Iran is deeply aware of all the actions of Hamas,” Citrinowicz said.
After Hamas militants launched a multipronged attack on Israel in October that killed around 1,200 people, mostly civilians, Iran denied it was involved in planning the assault. U.S. intelligence has indicated that Iranian leaders were surprised by Hamas’s attack.
Seyed Ali Alavi, a lecturer in Middle Eastern and Iranian Studies at SOAS University of London, said Iran’s support to Hamas is largely “confined to rhetorical and moral support and limited financial aid.” He said Qatar and Turkey, Hamas’s “organic” allies, have provided significantly more financial help to the Palestinian group.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad
With around 1,000 members, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is the smaller of the two main militant groups based in the Gaza Strip and the closest to Iran.
Founded in 1981, the Sunni militant group’s creation was inspired by Iran’s Islamic Revolution two years earlier. Given Tehran’s ambition of establishing a foothold in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, Iran has provided the group with substantial financial backing and arms, experts say.
The PIJ, led by Ziyad al-Nakhalah, is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union.
“Today, there is no Palestinian terrorist organization that is closer to Iran than this organization,” Citrinowicz said. “In fact, it relies mainly on Iran.”
Citrinowicz said there is no doubt that Tehran’s “ability to influence [the PIJ] is very significant.”
Iraqi Shi’ite Militias
Iran supports a host of Shi’ite militias in neighboring Iraq, some of which were founded by the IRGC and “defer to Iranian instructions,” said Gregory Brew, a U.S.-based Iran analyst with the Eurasia Group.
But Tehran’s influence over the militias has waned since the U.S. assassination in 2020 of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who was seen as the architect of the axis of resistance and held great influence over its members.
“The dynamic within these militias, particularly regarding their relationship with Iran, underwent a notable shift following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani,” said Hamidreza Azizi, a fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
The U.S. drone strike that targeted Soleimani also killed Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy head of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization of mostly Shi’ite Iran-backed armed groups that has been a part of the Iraqi Army since 2016.
Muhandis was also the leader of Kata’ib Hizballah, which was established in 2007 and is one of the most powerful members of the PMF. Other prominent groups in the umbrella include Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Seyyed al-Shuhada, and the Badr Organization. Kata’ib Hizballah has been designated as a terrorist entity by the United States.
Following the deaths of Soleimani and al-Muhandis, Kata’ib Hizballah and other militias “began to assert more autonomy, at times acting in ways that could potentially compromise Iran’s interests,” said Azizi.
Many of the Iran-backed groups that form the PMF are also part of the so-called Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which rose to prominence in November 2023. The group has been responsible for launching scores of attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria since Israel launched its war against Hamas in Gaza.
“It’s important to note that while several militias within the PMF operate as Iran’s proxies, this is not a universal trait across the board,” Azizi said.
Azizi said the extent of Iran’s control over the PMF can fluctuate based on the political conditions in Iraq and the individual dynamics within each militia.
The strength of each group within the PMF varies widely, with some containing as few as 100 members and others, such as Kata’ib Hizballah, boasting around 10,000 fighters.
Syrian State And Pro-Government Militias
Besides Iran, Syria is the only state that is a member of the axis of resistance.
“The relationship between Iran and the Assad regime in Syria is a strategic alliance where Iran’s influence is substantial but not absolute, indicating a balance between dependency and partnership,” said Azizi.
The decades-long alliance stems from Damascus’s support for Tehran during the devastating 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.
When Assad’s rule was challenged during the Syrian civil war, the IRGC entered the fray in 2013 to ensure he held on to power.
Khamenei greets Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Tehran in 2019.
Hundreds of IRGC commander and officers, who Iran refers to as “military advisers,” are believed to be present in Syria. Tehran has also built up a large network of militias, consisting mostly of Afghans and Pakistanis, in Syria.
Azizi said these militias have given Iran “a profound influence on the country’s affairs,” although not outright control over Syria.
“The Assad regime maintains its strategic independence, making decisions that serve its national interests and those of its allies,” he said.
The Fatemiyun Brigade, comprised of Afghan fighters, and the Zainabiyun Brigade, which is made up of Pakistani fighters, make up the bulk of Iran’s proxies in Syria.
“They are essentially units in the IRGC, under direct control,” said Brew.
The Afghan and Pakistani militias played a key role in fighting rebel groups opposed to Assad during the civil war. There have been reports that Iran has not only granted citizenship to Afghan fighters and their families but also facilitated Syrian citizenship for them.
The Fatemiyun Brigade, the larger of the two, is believed to have several thousand fighters in Syria. The Zainabiyun Brigade is estimated to have less than 1,000 fighters.
Yemen’s Huthi Rebels
The Huthis first emerged as a movement in the 1980s in response to the growing religious influence of neighboring Saudi Arabia, a Sunni kingdom.
In 2015, the Shi’ite militia toppled the internationally recognized, Saudi-backed government of Yemen. That triggered a brutal, yearslong Saudi-led war against the rebels.
With an estimated 200,000 fighters, the Huthis control most of the northwest of the country, including the capital, Sanaa, and are in charge of much of the Red Sea coast.
A Huthi militant stands by a poster of Iraqi militia commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and Iranian military commander Qassem Soleimani during a rally by Huthi supporters to denounce the U.S. killing of both commanders, in Sanaa, Yemen, in 2020.
The Huthis’ disdain for Saudi Arabia, Iran’s regional foe, and Israel made it a natural ally of Tehran, experts say. But it was only around 2015 that Iran began providing the group with training through the Quds Force and Hizballah. Tehran has also supplied weapons to the group, though shipments are regularly intercepted by the United States.
“The Huthis…appear to have considerable autonomy and Tehran exercises only limited control, though there does appear to be [a] clear alignment of interests,” said Brew.
Since Israel launched its war in Gaza, the Huthis have attacked international commercial vessels in the Red Sea and fired ballistic missiles at several U.S. warships.
In response, the United States and its allies have launched air strikes against the Huthis’ military infrastructure. Washington has also re-designated the Huthis as a terrorist organization.
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg says NATO allies are committed to doing more to ensure that Ukraine “prevails” in its battle to repel invading Russian forces, with the alliance having “significantly changed” its stance on providing more advanced weapons to Kyiv.
Speaking in an interview with RFE/RL to mark the second anniversary of Russia launching its full-scale invasion of its neighbor, the NATO chief said solidarity with Ukraine was not only correct, it’s also “in our own security interests.”
“We can expect that the NATO allies will do more to ensure that Ukraine prevails, because this has been so clearly stated by NATO allies,” Stoltenberg said.
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“I always stress that this is not charity. This is an investment in our own security and and that our support makes a difference on the battlefield every day,” he added.
Ukraine is in desperate need of financial and military assistance amid signs of political fatigue in the West as the war kicked off by Russia’s unprovoked invasion nears the two-year mark on February 24.
In excerpts from the interview released earlier in the week, Stoltenberg said the death of Russian opposition leader Aleksei Navalny and the first Russian gains on the battlefield in months should help focus the attention of NATO and its allies on the urgent need to support Ukraine.
The death of Navalny in an Arctic prison on February 16 under suspicious circumstances — authorities say it will be another two weeks before the body may be released to the family — adds to the need to ensure Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian rule does not go unchecked.
“I strongly believe that the best way to honor the memory of Aleksei Navalny is to ensure that President Putin doesn’t win on the battlefield, but that Ukraine prevails,” Stoltenberg said.
Stoltenberg said the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the city of Avdiyivka last week after months of intense fighting demonstrated the need for more military aid, “to ensure that Russia doesn’t make further gains.”
“We don’t believe that the fact that the Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from Avdiyivka in in itself will significantly change the strategic situation,” he said.
“But it reminds us of that Russia is willing to sacrifice a lot of soldiers. It also just makes minor territorial gains and also that Russia has received significant military support supplies from Iran, from North Korea and have been able to ramp up their own production.”
Ukraine’s allies have been focused on a $61 billion U.S. military aid package, but while that remains stalled in the House of Representatives, other countries, including Sweden, Canada, and Japan, have stepped up their aid.
“Of course, we are focused on the United States, but we also see how other allies are really stepping up and delivering significant support to Ukraine,” Stoltenberg said in the interview.
On the question of when Ukraine will be able to deploy F-16 fighter jets, Stoltenberg said it was not possible to say. He reiterated that Ukraine’s allies all want them to be there as early as possible but said the effect of the F-16s will be stronger if pilots are well trained and maintenance crews and other support personnel are well-prepared.
“So, I think we have to listen to the military experts exactly when we will be ready to or when allies will be ready to start sending and to delivering the F-16s,” he said. “The sooner the better.”
Ukraine has actively sought U.S.-made F-16 fighter jets to help it counter Russian air superiority. The United States in August approved sending F-16s to Ukraine from Denmark and the Netherlands as soon as pilot training is completed.
It will be up to each ally to decide whether to deliver F-16s to Ukraine, and allies have different policies, Stoltenberg said. But at the same time the war in Ukraine is a war of aggression, and Ukraine has the right to self-defense, including striking legitimate Russian military targets outside Ukraine.
Asked about the prospect of former President Donald Trump returning to the White House, Stoltenberg said that regardless of the outcome of the U.S. elections this year, the United States will remain a committed NATO ally because it is in the security interest of the United States.
Trump, the current front-runner in the race to become the Republican Party’s presidential nominee, drew sharp rebukes from President Joe Biden, European leaders, and NATO after suggesting at a campaign rally on February 10 that the United States might not defend alliance members from a potential Russian invasion if they don’t pay enough toward their own defense.
Stoltenberg said the United States was safer and stronger together with more than 30 allies — something that neither China nor Russia has.
The criticism of NATO has been aimed at allies underspending on defense, he said.
But Stoltenberg said new data shows that more and more NATO allies are meeting the target of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense, and this demonstrates that the alliance has come a long way since it pledged in 2014 to meet the target.
At that time three members of NATO spent 2 percent of GDP on defense. Now it’s 18, he said.
“If you add together what all European allies do and compare that to the GDP in total in Europe, it’s actually 2 percent today,” he said. “That’s good, but it’s not enough because we want [each NATO member] to spend 2 percent. And we also make sure that 2 percent is a minimum.”
Like two heavyweight boxers, the United States and Iran circle the ring — flexing their muscles without stepping close enough to actually trade blows. It is clear that neither wants to fight, but they also have no interest in settling their stark differences.
That is how experts say Washington and Tehran have dealt with each other for more than four decades, only changing their stance when it is mutually beneficial.
Tensions have soared between the two foes, who have no formal diplomatic ties, amid the fallout from Israel’s devastating war in the Gaza Strip. But despite calls for de-escalation, observers say there is little room for détente.
“I’ve rarely seen a situation in which the tensions have been so high and the exit ramps are nearly nonexistent and there were no real channels of communication between the two sides,” said Ali Vaez, director of the Iran project at the International Crisis Group.
“And that makes the current situation even more dangerous, because there’s plenty of space for miscommunication and misunderstanding,” Vaez added.
Current tensions in the Middle East have had deadly consequences even as each side tries to avoid getting drawn into a direct military confrontation.
The United States has hit Iran-backed militants in response to attacks against U.S. forces and interests in the region, including the deaths of three U.S. soldiers in Jordan last month, while underscoring that its aim is de-escalation.
Iran, which like the United States has said that it does not want war, has continued to back militant groups that make up its so-called “axis of resistance” against Israel and the West, while calling for diplomacy to resolve the crisis.
Tehran and Washington have carefully avoided direct conflict, but are in no position to work out their differences even if they wanted to, experts say.
Washington and Tehran have not had formal diplomatic ties since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, leaving them to negotiate through back-channels or third states when needed.
But political and ideological pressures at home — amplified ahead of a parliamentary vote in Iran in March and a presidential election in the United States in November — has meant that neither side is looking to back away any time soon from the stark red lines the two have drawn.
Avenues For Diplomacy
“There are ways that communication can be had between the two countries, and they do so,” said Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the U.S.-based Middle East Institute. “But they tend to do it on select files, or moments of crisis.”
Vatanka said those lines of communication include Iran’s envoy to the United Nations who resides in New York and the Swiss Embassy in Tehran which handles American interests in the Islamic republic. There are also third-party mediators, including Qatar, Oman, and Iraq, he said.
The U.S.-Iran prisoner swap worked out in September, which followed years of secret negotiations involving Gulf states and Switzerland, is the most recent example.
Under that deal, four Americans held hostage in Iran were released in exchange for Washington unfreezing $6 billion in Iranian oil revenue held up in South Korea.
As part of the agreement, according to Vaez, “Iran committed to rein in groups that were targeting U.S. interests in Iraq and Syria” and Washington received a commitment that Tehran would not supply ballistic missiles to Russia for use in Moscow’s war against Ukraine.
Shortly after Iran-backed Hamas, which is considered a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, carried out its deadly assault on Israel on October 7, the unfrozen Iranian funds came under intense scrutiny. Republicans in the United States who are gearing up for the presidential election in November have been particularly vocal in criticizing the deal worked out by the administration of Democratic President Joe Biden.
In response, Washington worked out an agreement with Qatar, where the unfrozen Iranian funds were moved and to be released only for humanitarian purposes, to prevent Tehran from accessing them at all. But the deal has remained a hot-button issue.
The Gaza war and the ensuing resumption of attacks on U.S. forces and interests by Iran-backed groups have attracted even more political discord.
After Israel’s large-scale offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip that has killed more than 27,000 Palestinians, Iran-backed militant groups have carried out attacks in solidarity with Hamas. The Iran-backed Huthi rebels in Yemen have targeted maritime shipping and U.S. naval forces in the Red Sea. Meanwhile, Iran-backed militias in Iraq killed three U.S. soldiers in Jordan in a drone attack.
That, in turn, has led to U.S. and U.K. attacks on Huthi targets in Yemen, and by the United States against Iran-backed militias and Iranian-linked sites in Syria and Iraq.
U.S. forces launch strikes against Huthi targets in Yemen earlier this month.
Iran, for its part, has said that the axis of resistance, which it denies directing, would continue to carry out strikes until a permanent cease-fire is worked out to stop what it calls a genocide in Gaza. And in what was widely seen as a show of its capability to strike back in the event Iran itself is attacked, it has launched ballistic missile strikes against “enemy” targets in Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria, the latter of which showcased that Israel was within striking distance.
The recent spike in violence came after the United States had experienced “the longest period of quiet in the Middle East” from March until the Hamas assault on October 7, Vaez said.
That relative peace came about not because of displays of power, but because Iran and the United States were negotiating, Vaez said.
“It wasn’t because the U.S. had flexed its military muscle and deterred Iran, it was because it was engaged in diplomatic understandings with Iran that came to fruition and culminated in a detainee deal,” Vaez said.
Tehran and the United States, currently trading threats of ever-stronger responses, “are seeking to pressure each other into greater flexibility,” said Trita Parsi, co-founder of the Washington-based Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
“Both would like to get back to the truce they enjoyed prior to the October 7 attacks” by Hamas against Israel, Parsi said in written comments. “But whether the political will is available for real de-escalation remains unclear.”
“President Biden has been unmovable in his opposition to a cease-fire in Gaza thus far,” Parsi said, referring to mounting calls for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hamas. “And without such a cease-fire, real de-escalation remains very unlikely.”
Military Message
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on February 6, halfway through his latest trip to the Middle East to reduce regional tensions, that a proposal for a temporary cease-fire put together with the help of Qatar and Egypt and presented to Hamas and Israel, was “possible and, indeed, essential.”
While details of the proposal have not been made public, Blinken said that the goal is to use any pause in fighting to address humanitarian and reconstruction needs in Gaza and “to continue to pave a diplomatic path forward to a just and lasting peace and security for the region.”
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken waves as he boards his plane at an airport near Tel Aviv on February 8, during his trip to the Middle East
Asked by RFE/RL whether Washington is employing any diplomatic means, either directly or indirectly, to decrease tensions with Iran, a U.S. State Department spokesperson pointed to recent strikes carried out against Iranian-backed groups in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.
“Our military response to the killing of three U.S. service members by Iran-aligned militia groups and our continued action to degrade the Huthis’ ability to threaten international shipping sends the clearest message of all: the United States will defend our personnel and our interests,” a U.S. State Department spokesman said in written comments on February 7.
“When we are attacked, we will respond strongly, and we will respond at a time and place of our choosing,” the spokesman said.
Prior to the deadly attack on the U.S. base in Jordan, there had been reports of Washington using third states to send a nonmilitary notice to Iran.
Shortly after the Hamas assault on Israel in October, the U.S. Senate majority leader, Chuck Schumer, said that a congressional delegation to China had asked Beijing to exert its influence with Tehran to prevent the Israel-Hamas conflict from spreading.
In early January, the Lebanese news publication Al-Ahed News quoted Iran’s ambassador to Syria as saying that a delegation from an unidentified Gulf state had carried a message from the United States seeking to reduce the risk of an expanded regional conflict.
The U.S. State Department spokesperson said that beyond the recent U.S. strikes, “our message to Iran, in public and in private, has been a singular one: cease your support for terrorist groups and militant proxies and partners.”
Washington welcomes “any efforts by other countries to play a constructive role in trying to prevent these Iran-enabled attacks from taking place,” the spokesperson added, but referred to White House national-security spokesman John Kirby’s February 6 comment that “I know of no private messaging to Iran since the death of our soldiers in Jordan over a week ago.”
Lack Of Vision
The limits of diplomacy between the United States and Iran, according to Vatanka, “is not a lack of the ability to communicate, the problem is a lack of vision” to repair relations.
For political reasons and for a long time, Vantanka added, neither side has been interested in mending the bad blood that has existed between the two countries going back to 1979.
“Right now, the White House cannot afford to talk to Iran at a time when so many of Biden’s critics are saying he’s too soft on the Iranian regime,” Vatanka said. “On the other hand, you’ve got an Iranian supreme leader who is 84 years old. He’s really keen on two things: not to have a war with the Americans, because he doesn’t think that’s going to go well for Iran or his regime. But at the same time, he doesn’t want to see the Americans return to Tehran anytime soon. Certainly not when he’s alive.”
This, Vatanka explained, is because Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini “does not think the Americans want anything other than the fundamental objective of bringing about the end of the Islamic republic.”
The other major voice in Iranian foreign policy — the leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps — also see anti-Americanism as a worthwhile instrument to further their ideological and political aims at home and abroad, according to Vatanka.
“They think anti-Americanism is the ticket to mobilize the Islamic world around their flag and around their leadership,” Vatanka said.
More moderate voices when it comes to Iran’s foreign policy, Vatanka said, are labeled as traitors and weak and “are today essentially marginalized.”
Like two heavyweight boxers, the United States and Iran circle the ring — flexing their muscles without stepping close enough to actually trade blows. It is clear that neither wants to fight, but they also have no interest in settling their stark differences.
That is how experts say Washington and Tehran have dealt with each other for more than four decades, only changing their stance when it is mutually beneficial.
Tensions have soared between the two foes, who have no formal diplomatic ties, amid the fallout from Israel’s devastating war in the Gaza Strip. But despite calls for de-escalation, observers say there is little room for détente.
“I’ve rarely seen a situation in which the tensions have been so high and the exit ramps are nearly nonexistent and there were no real channels of communication between the two sides,” said Ali Vaez, director of the Iran project at the International Crisis Group.
“And that makes the current situation even more dangerous, because there’s plenty of space for miscommunication and misunderstanding,” Vaez added.
Current tensions in the Middle East have had deadly consequences even as each side tries to avoid getting drawn into a direct military confrontation.
The United States has hit Iran-backed militants in response to attacks against U.S. forces and interests in the region, including the deaths of three U.S. soldiers in Jordan last month, while underscoring that its aim is de-escalation.
Iran, which like the United States has said that it does not want war, has continued to back militant groups that make up its so-called “axis of resistance” against Israel and the West, while calling for diplomacy to resolve the crisis.
Tehran and Washington have carefully avoided direct conflict, but are in no position to work out their differences even if they wanted to, experts say.
Washington and Tehran have not had formal diplomatic ties since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, leaving them to negotiate through back-channels or third states when needed.
But political and ideological pressures at home — amplified ahead of a parliamentary vote in Iran in March and a presidential election in the United States in November — has meant that neither side is looking to back away any time soon from the stark red lines the two have drawn.
Avenues For Diplomacy
“There are ways that communication can be had between the two countries, and they do so,” said Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the U.S.-based Middle East Institute. “But they tend to do it on select files, or moments of crisis.”
Vatanka said those lines of communication include Iran’s envoy to the United Nations who resides in New York and the Swiss Embassy in Tehran which handles American interests in the Islamic republic. There are also third-party mediators, including Qatar, Oman, and Iraq, he said.
The U.S.-Iran prisoner swap worked out in September, which followed years of secret negotiations involving Gulf states and Switzerland, is the most recent example.
Under that deal, four Americans held hostage in Iran were released in exchange for Washington unfreezing $6 billion in Iranian oil revenue held up in South Korea.
As part of the agreement, according to Vaez, “Iran committed to rein in groups that were targeting U.S. interests in Iraq and Syria” and Washington received a commitment that Tehran would not supply ballistic missiles to Russia for use in Moscow’s war against Ukraine.
Shortly after Iran-backed Hamas, which is considered a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, carried out its deadly assault on Israel on October 7, the unfrozen Iranian funds came under intense scrutiny. Republicans in the United States who are gearing up for the presidential election in November have been particularly vocal in criticizing the deal worked out by the administration of Democratic President Joe Biden.
In response, Washington worked out an agreement with Qatar, where the unfrozen Iranian funds were moved and to be released only for humanitarian purposes, to prevent Tehran from accessing them at all. But the deal has remained a hot-button issue.
The Gaza war and the ensuing resumption of attacks on U.S. forces and interests by Iran-backed groups have attracted even more political discord.
After Israel’s large-scale offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip that has killed more than 27,000 Palestinians, Iran-backed militant groups have carried out attacks in solidarity with Hamas. The Iran-backed Huthi rebels in Yemen have targeted maritime shipping and U.S. naval forces in the Red Sea. Meanwhile, Iran-backed militias in Iraq killed three U.S. soldiers in Jordan in a drone attack.
That, in turn, has led to U.S. and U.K. attacks on Huthi targets in Yemen, and by the United States against Iran-backed militias and Iranian-linked sites in Syria and Iraq.
U.S. forces launch strikes against Huthi targets in Yemen earlier this month.
Iran, for its part, has said that the axis of resistance, which it denies directing, would continue to carry out strikes until a permanent cease-fire is worked out to stop what it calls a genocide in Gaza. And in what was widely seen as a show of its capability to strike back in the event Iran itself is attacked, it has launched ballistic missile strikes against “enemy” targets in Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria, the latter of which showcased that Israel was within striking distance.
The recent spike in violence came after the United States had experienced “the longest period of quiet in the Middle East” from March until the Hamas assault on October 7, Vaez said.
That relative peace came about not because of displays of power, but because Iran and the United States were negotiating, Vaez said.
“It wasn’t because the U.S. had flexed its military muscle and deterred Iran, it was because it was engaged in diplomatic understandings with Iran that came to fruition and culminated in a detainee deal,” Vaez said.
Tehran and the United States, currently trading threats of ever-stronger responses, “are seeking to pressure each other into greater flexibility,” said Trita Parsi, co-founder of the Washington-based Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
“Both would like to get back to the truce they enjoyed prior to the October 7 attacks” by Hamas against Israel, Parsi said in written comments. “But whether the political will is available for real de-escalation remains unclear.”
“President Biden has been unmovable in his opposition to a cease-fire in Gaza thus far,” Parsi said, referring to mounting calls for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hamas. “And without such a cease-fire, real de-escalation remains very unlikely.”
Military Message
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on February 6, halfway through his latest trip to the Middle East to reduce regional tensions, that a proposal for a temporary cease-fire put together with the help of Qatar and Egypt and presented to Hamas and Israel, was “possible and, indeed, essential.”
While details of the proposal have not been made public, Blinken said that the goal is to use any pause in fighting to address humanitarian and reconstruction needs in Gaza and “to continue to pave a diplomatic path forward to a just and lasting peace and security for the region.”
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken waves as he boards his plane at an airport near Tel Aviv on February 8, during his trip to the Middle East
Asked by RFE/RL whether Washington is employing any diplomatic means, either directly or indirectly, to decrease tensions with Iran, a U.S. State Department spokesperson pointed to recent strikes carried out against Iranian-backed groups in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.
“Our military response to the killing of three U.S. service members by Iran-aligned militia groups and our continued action to degrade the Huthis’ ability to threaten international shipping sends the clearest message of all: the United States will defend our personnel and our interests,” a U.S. State Department spokesman said in written comments on February 7.
“When we are attacked, we will respond strongly, and we will respond at a time and place of our choosing,” the spokesman said.
Prior to the deadly attack on the U.S. base in Jordan, there had been reports of Washington using third states to send a nonmilitary notice to Iran.
Shortly after the Hamas assault on Israel in October, the U.S. Senate majority leader, Chuck Schumer, said that a congressional delegation to China had asked Beijing to exert its influence with Tehran to prevent the Israel-Hamas conflict from spreading.
In early January, the Lebanese news publication Al-Ahed News quoted Iran’s ambassador to Syria as saying that a delegation from an unidentified Gulf state had carried a message from the United States seeking to reduce the risk of an expanded regional conflict.
The U.S. State Department spokesperson said that beyond the recent U.S. strikes, “our message to Iran, in public and in private, has been a singular one: cease your support for terrorist groups and militant proxies and partners.”
Washington welcomes “any efforts by other countries to play a constructive role in trying to prevent these Iran-enabled attacks from taking place,” the spokesperson added, but referred to White House national-security spokesman John Kirby’s February 6 comment that “I know of no private messaging to Iran since the death of our soldiers in Jordan over a week ago.”
Lack Of Vision
The limits of diplomacy between the United States and Iran, according to Vatanka, “is not a lack of the ability to communicate, the problem is a lack of vision” to repair relations.
For political reasons and for a long time, Vantanka added, neither side has been interested in mending the bad blood that has existed between the two countries going back to 1979.
“Right now, the White House cannot afford to talk to Iran at a time when so many of Biden’s critics are saying he’s too soft on the Iranian regime,” Vatanka said. “On the other hand, you’ve got an Iranian supreme leader who is 84 years old. He’s really keen on two things: not to have a war with the Americans, because he doesn’t think that’s going to go well for Iran or his regime. But at the same time, he doesn’t want to see the Americans return to Tehran anytime soon. Certainly not when he’s alive.”
This, Vatanka explained, is because Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini “does not think the Americans want anything other than the fundamental objective of bringing about the end of the Islamic republic.”
The other major voice in Iranian foreign policy — the leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps — also see anti-Americanism as a worthwhile instrument to further their ideological and political aims at home and abroad, according to Vatanka.
“They think anti-Americanism is the ticket to mobilize the Islamic world around their flag and around their leadership,” Vatanka said.
More moderate voices when it comes to Iran’s foreign policy, Vatanka said, are labeled as traitors and weak and “are today essentially marginalized.”
Like two heavyweight boxers, the United States and Iran circle the ring — flexing their muscles without stepping close enough to actually trade blows. It is clear that neither wants to fight, but they also have no interest in settling their stark differences.
That is how experts say Washington and Tehran have dealt with each other for more than four decades, only changing their stance when it is mutually beneficial.
Tensions have soared between the two foes, who have no formal diplomatic ties, amid the fallout from Israel’s devastating war in the Gaza Strip. But despite calls for de-escalation, observers say there is little room for détente.
“I’ve rarely seen a situation in which the tensions have been so high and the exit ramps are nearly nonexistent and there were no real channels of communication between the two sides,” said Ali Vaez, director of the Iran project at the International Crisis Group.
“And that makes the current situation even more dangerous, because there’s plenty of space for miscommunication and misunderstanding,” Vaez added.
Current tensions in the Middle East have had deadly consequences even as each side tries to avoid getting drawn into a direct military confrontation.
The United States has hit Iran-backed militants in response to attacks against U.S. forces and interests in the region, including the deaths of three U.S. soldiers in Jordan last month, while underscoring that its aim is de-escalation.
Iran, which like the United States has said that it does not want war, has continued to back militant groups that make up its so-called “axis of resistance” against Israel and the West, while calling for diplomacy to resolve the crisis.
Tehran and Washington have carefully avoided direct conflict, but are in no position to work out their differences even if they wanted to, experts say.
Washington and Tehran have not had formal diplomatic ties since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, leaving them to negotiate through back-channels or third states when needed.
But political and ideological pressures at home — amplified ahead of a parliamentary vote in Iran in March and a presidential election in the United States in November — has meant that neither side is looking to back away any time soon from the stark red lines the two have drawn.
Avenues For Diplomacy
“There are ways that communication can be had between the two countries, and they do so,” said Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the U.S.-based Middle East Institute. “But they tend to do it on select files, or moments of crisis.”
Vatanka said those lines of communication include Iran’s envoy to the United Nations who resides in New York and the Swiss Embassy in Tehran which handles American interests in the Islamic republic. There are also third-party mediators, including Qatar, Oman, and Iraq, he said.
The U.S.-Iran prisoner swap worked out in September, which followed years of secret negotiations involving Gulf states and Switzerland, is the most recent example.
Under that deal, four Americans held hostage in Iran were released in exchange for Washington unfreezing $6 billion in Iranian oil revenue held up in South Korea.
As part of the agreement, according to Vaez, “Iran committed to rein in groups that were targeting U.S. interests in Iraq and Syria” and Washington received a commitment that Tehran would not supply ballistic missiles to Russia for use in Moscow’s war against Ukraine.
Shortly after Iran-backed Hamas, which is considered a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, carried out its deadly assault on Israel on October 7, the unfrozen Iranian funds came under intense scrutiny. Republicans in the United States who are gearing up for the presidential election in November have been particularly vocal in criticizing the deal worked out by the administration of Democratic President Joe Biden.
In response, Washington worked out an agreement with Qatar, where the unfrozen Iranian funds were moved and to be released only for humanitarian purposes, to prevent Tehran from accessing them at all. But the deal has remained a hot-button issue.
The Gaza war and the ensuing resumption of attacks on U.S. forces and interests by Iran-backed groups have attracted even more political discord.
After Israel’s large-scale offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip that has killed more than 27,000 Palestinians, Iran-backed militant groups have carried out attacks in solidarity with Hamas. The Iran-backed Huthi rebels in Yemen have targeted maritime shipping and U.S. naval forces in the Red Sea. Meanwhile, Iran-backed militias in Iraq killed three U.S. soldiers in Jordan in a drone attack.
That, in turn, has led to U.S. and U.K. attacks on Huthi targets in Yemen, and by the United States against Iran-backed militias and Iranian-linked sites in Syria and Iraq.
U.S. forces launch strikes against Huthi targets in Yemen earlier this month.
Iran, for its part, has said that the axis of resistance, which it denies directing, would continue to carry out strikes until a permanent cease-fire is worked out to stop what it calls a genocide in Gaza. And in what was widely seen as a show of its capability to strike back in the event Iran itself is attacked, it has launched ballistic missile strikes against “enemy” targets in Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria, the latter of which showcased that Israel was within striking distance.
The recent spike in violence came after the United States had experienced “the longest period of quiet in the Middle East” from March until the Hamas assault on October 7, Vaez said.
That relative peace came about not because of displays of power, but because Iran and the United States were negotiating, Vaez said.
“It wasn’t because the U.S. had flexed its military muscle and deterred Iran, it was because it was engaged in diplomatic understandings with Iran that came to fruition and culminated in a detainee deal,” Vaez said.
Tehran and the United States, currently trading threats of ever-stronger responses, “are seeking to pressure each other into greater flexibility,” said Trita Parsi, co-founder of the Washington-based Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
“Both would like to get back to the truce they enjoyed prior to the October 7 attacks” by Hamas against Israel, Parsi said in written comments. “But whether the political will is available for real de-escalation remains unclear.”
“President Biden has been unmovable in his opposition to a cease-fire in Gaza thus far,” Parsi said, referring to mounting calls for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hamas. “And without such a cease-fire, real de-escalation remains very unlikely.”
Military Message
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on February 6, halfway through his latest trip to the Middle East to reduce regional tensions, that a proposal for a temporary cease-fire put together with the help of Qatar and Egypt and presented to Hamas and Israel, was “possible and, indeed, essential.”
While details of the proposal have not been made public, Blinken said that the goal is to use any pause in fighting to address humanitarian and reconstruction needs in Gaza and “to continue to pave a diplomatic path forward to a just and lasting peace and security for the region.”
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken waves as he boards his plane at an airport near Tel Aviv on February 8, during his trip to the Middle East
Asked by RFE/RL whether Washington is employing any diplomatic means, either directly or indirectly, to decrease tensions with Iran, a U.S. State Department spokesperson pointed to recent strikes carried out against Iranian-backed groups in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.
“Our military response to the killing of three U.S. service members by Iran-aligned militia groups and our continued action to degrade the Huthis’ ability to threaten international shipping sends the clearest message of all: the United States will defend our personnel and our interests,” a U.S. State Department spokesman said in written comments on February 7.
“When we are attacked, we will respond strongly, and we will respond at a time and place of our choosing,” the spokesman said.
Prior to the deadly attack on the U.S. base in Jordan, there had been reports of Washington using third states to send a nonmilitary notice to Iran.
Shortly after the Hamas assault on Israel in October, the U.S. Senate majority leader, Chuck Schumer, said that a congressional delegation to China had asked Beijing to exert its influence with Tehran to prevent the Israel-Hamas conflict from spreading.
In early January, the Lebanese news publication Al-Ahed News quoted Iran’s ambassador to Syria as saying that a delegation from an unidentified Gulf state had carried a message from the United States seeking to reduce the risk of an expanded regional conflict.
The U.S. State Department spokesperson said that beyond the recent U.S. strikes, “our message to Iran, in public and in private, has been a singular one: cease your support for terrorist groups and militant proxies and partners.”
Washington welcomes “any efforts by other countries to play a constructive role in trying to prevent these Iran-enabled attacks from taking place,” the spokesperson added, but referred to White House national-security spokesman John Kirby’s February 6 comment that “I know of no private messaging to Iran since the death of our soldiers in Jordan over a week ago.”
Lack Of Vision
The limits of diplomacy between the United States and Iran, according to Vatanka, “is not a lack of the ability to communicate, the problem is a lack of vision” to repair relations.
For political reasons and for a long time, Vantanka added, neither side has been interested in mending the bad blood that has existed between the two countries going back to 1979.
“Right now, the White House cannot afford to talk to Iran at a time when so many of Biden’s critics are saying he’s too soft on the Iranian regime,” Vatanka said. “On the other hand, you’ve got an Iranian supreme leader who is 84 years old. He’s really keen on two things: not to have a war with the Americans, because he doesn’t think that’s going to go well for Iran or his regime. But at the same time, he doesn’t want to see the Americans return to Tehran anytime soon. Certainly not when he’s alive.”
This, Vatanka explained, is because Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini “does not think the Americans want anything other than the fundamental objective of bringing about the end of the Islamic republic.”
The other major voice in Iranian foreign policy — the leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps — also see anti-Americanism as a worthwhile instrument to further their ideological and political aims at home and abroad, according to Vatanka.
“They think anti-Americanism is the ticket to mobilize the Islamic world around their flag and around their leadership,” Vatanka said.
More moderate voices when it comes to Iran’s foreign policy, Vatanka said, are labeled as traitors and weak and “are today essentially marginalized.”
EU diplomat Johan Floderus’s sister calls on Sweden to start speaking up loudly to demand his release
The family of a Swedish EU diplomat imprisoned in Iran for more than 663 days fear he will be given a death sentence or life imprisonment within the coming days after prosecutors sought the maximum sentence in his case.
“I ask how can this be happening? He is my brother and I’m like: they want to kill my younger brother? That is very hard to take in. I also feel so sad for him being there alone, you know, when I see the pictures of him I just want to be there for him,” said Johan Floderus’s sister, Ingrid.
There has been much talk of the possibility of a regional war in the Middle East ever since Hamas’s brutal assault on Israel on October 7, 2023, and Israel’s genocidal invasion of Gaza, in the context of a U.S. administration not willing to call for an immediate ceasefire. As an Iranian American socialist feminist activist with ties to activists in Iran, the U.S., Israel and Palestine…
A deadly U.S. drone strike in Baghdad late Wednesday drew swift criticism from Iraqi officials and foreign policy analysts, who warned that the Biden administration’s repeated attacks are further inflaming regional tensions and putting civilians at risk. Yehia Rasool, a spokesperson for the Iraqi military, said in a statement early Thursday that the U.S. “conducted a blatant assassination through…
Welcome back to the China In Eurasia Briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China’s resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.
I’m RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here’s what I’m following right now.
As Huthi rebels continue their assault on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, the deepening crisis is posing a fresh test for China’s ambitions of becoming a power broker in the Middle East – and raising questions about whether Beijing can help bring the group to bay.
Finding Perspective: U.S. officials have been asking China to urge Tehran to rein in Iran-backed Huthis, but according to the Financial Times, American officials say that they have seen no signs of help.
Still, Washington keeps raising the issue. In weekend meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Bangkok, U.S. national-security adviser Jake Sullivan again asked Beijing to use its “substantial leverage with Iran” to play a “constructive role” in stopping the attacks.
Reuters, citing Iranian officials, reported on January 26 that Beijing urged Tehran at recent meetings to pressure the Huthis or risk jeopardizing business cooperation with China in the future.
There are plenty of reasons to believe that China would want to bring the attacks to an end. The Huthis have disrupted global shipping, stoking fears of global inflation and even more instability in the Middle East.
This also hurts China’s bottom line. The attacks are raising transport costs and jeopardizing the tens of billions of dollars that China has invested in nearby Egyptian ports.
Why It Matters: The current crisis raises some complex questions for China’s ambitions in the Middle East.
If China decides to pressure Iran, it’s unknown how much influence Tehran actually has over Yemen’s Huthis. Iran backs the group and supplies them with weapons, but it’s unclear if they can actually control and rein them in, as U.S. officials are calling for.
But the bigger question might be whether this calculation looks the same from Beijing.
China might be reluctant to get too involved and squander its political capital with Iran on trying to get the Huthis to stop their attacks, especially after the group has announced that it won’t attack Chinese ships transiting the Red Sea.
Beijing is also unlikely to want to bring an end to something that’s hurting America’s interests arguably more than its own at the moment.
U.S. officials say they’ll continue to talk with China about helping restore trade in the Red Sea, but Beijing might decide that it has more to gain by simply stepping back.
Three More Stories From Eurasia
1. ‘New Historical Heights’ For China And Uzbekistan
Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev made a landmark three-day visit to Beijing, where he met with Xi, engaged with Chinese business leaders, and left with an officially upgraded relationship as the Central Asian leader increasingly looks to China for his economic future.
The Details: As I reported here, Mirziyoev left Uzbekistan looking to usher in a new era and returned with upgraded diplomatic ties as an “all-weather” partner with China.
The move to elevate to an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” from a “comprehensive strategic partnership” doesn’t come with any formal benefits, but it’s a clear sign from Mirziyoev and Xi on where they want to take the relationship between their two countries.
Before going to China for the January 23-25 trip, Mirziyoev signed a letter praising China’s progress in fighting poverty and saying he wanted to develop a “new long-term agenda” with Beijing that will last for “decades.”
Beyond the diplomatic upgrade, China said it was ready to expand cooperation with Uzbekistan across the new energy vehicle industry chain, as well as in major projects such as photovoltaics, wind power, and hydropower.
Xi and Mirzoyoev also spoke about the long-discussed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, with the Chinese leader saying that work should begin as soon as possible, athough no specifics were offered and there are reportedly still key disputes over how the megaproject will be financed.
2. The Taliban’s New Man In Beijing
In a move that could lay the groundwork for more diplomatic engagement with China, Xi received diplomatic credentials from the Taliban’s new ambassador in Beijing on January 25.
What You Need To Know: Mawlawi Asadullah Bilal Karimi was accepted as part of a ceremony that also received the credential letters of 42 new envoys. Karimi was named as the new ambassador to Beijing on November 24 but has now formally been received by Xi, which is another installment in the slow boil toward recognition that’s under way.
No country formally recognizes the Taliban administration in Afghanistan, but China – along with other countries such as Pakistan, Russia, and Turkmenistan – have appointed their own envoys to Kabul and have maintained steady diplomatic engagement with the group since it returned to power in August 2021.
Formal diplomatic recognition for the Taliban still looks to be far off, but this move highlights China’s strategy of de-facto recognition that could see other countries following its lead, paving the way for formal ties down the line.
3. China’s Tightrope With Iran and Pakistan
Air strikes and diplomatic sparring between Iran and Pakistan raised difficult questions for China and its influence in the region, as I reportedhere.
Both Islamabad and Tehran have since moved to mend fences, with their foreign ministers holding talks on January 29. But the incident put the spotlight on what China would do if two of its closest partners entered into conflict against one another.
What It Means: The tit-for-tat strikes hit militant groups operating in each other’s territory. After a tough exchange, both countries quickly cooled their rhetoric – culminating in the recent talks held in Islamabad.
And while Beijing has lots to lose in the event of a wider conflict between two of its allies, it appeared to remain quiet, with only a formal offer to mediate if needed.
Abdul Basit, an associate research fellow at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told me this approach reflects how China “shies away from situations like this,” in part to protect its reputation in case it intervenes and then fails.
Michael Kugelman, the director of the Wilson Center’s South Asia Institute, added that, despite Beijing’s cautious approach, China has shown a willingness to mediate when opportunity strikes, pointing to the deal it helped broker between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March.
“It looks like the Pakistanis and the Iranians had enough in their relationship to ease tensions themselves,” he told me. “So [Beijing] might be relieved now, but that doesn’t mean they won’t step up if needed.”
Across The Supercontinent
China’s Odd Moment: What do the fall of the Soviet Union and China’s slowing economy have in common? The answer is more than you might think.
Listen to the latest episodeof the Talking China In Eurasia podcast, where we explore how China’s complicated relationship with the Soviet Union is shaping the country today.
Invite Sent. Now What? Ukraine has invited Xi to participate in a planned “peace summit” of world leaders in Switzerland, Reuters reported, in a gathering tied to the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion.
Blocked, But Why? China has suspended issuing visas to Lithuanian citizens. Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis confirmed the news and told Lithuanian journalists that “we have been informed about this. No further information has been provided.”
More Hydro Plans: Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Energy and the China National Electric Engineering Company signed a memorandum of cooperationon January 24 to build a cascade of power plants and a new thermal power plant.
One Thing To Watch
There’s no official word, but it’s looking like veteran diplomat Liu Jianchao is the leading contender to become China’s next foreign minister.
Wang Yi was reassigned to his old post after Qin Gang was abruptly removed as foreign minister last summer, and Wang is currently holding roles as both foreign minister and the more senior position of director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission Office.
Liu has limited experience engaging with the West but served stints at the Communist Party’s anti-corruption watchdog and currently heads a party agency traditionally tasked with building ties with other communist states.
It also looks like he’s being groomed for the role. He recentlycompleted a U.S. tour, where he met with top officials and business leaders, and has also made visits to the Middle East.
That’s all from me for now. Don’t forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.
Until next time,
Reid Standish
If you enjoyed this briefing and don’t want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.
U.S. officials have said they believe air strikes on dozens of Iranian-linked sites in Syria and Iraq late on February 2 in retaliation for the killing of three U.S. troops in northwest Jordan were successful and warned more strikes will follow, as Baghdad expressed anger and concerns persisted of widening conflict in the region.
U.S. President Biden had warned of imminent action after a drone attack at a U.S. base in Jordan killed three U.S. service members on January 28.
Washington blamed Iran and its supply of weapons to militia groups in the region.
Reports said the U.S. strikes had hit seven locations, four in Syria and three in Iraq.
“Our response began today. It will continue at times and places of our choosing,” U.S. President Joe Biden said in a statement released shortly after the attacks that “our response began today,” adding, “It will continue at times and places of our choosing.”
“The United States does not seek conflict in the Middle East or anywhere else in the world. But let all those who might seek to do us harm know this: If you harm an American, we will respond,” he added.
General Yehia Rasool, a spokesman for Iraqi Prime Minister Shia al-Sudani accused the United States of a “violation” of Iraqi sovereignty with potentially “disastrous consequences for the security and stability of Iraq and the region.”
After a previous U.S. air strike in Baghdad, Sudani asked for the 2,000 or so U.S. troops in Iraq to be withdrawn — a sensitive bilateral topic.
U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said the United States “did inform the Iraqi government prior to the strikes” but did not provide details. He said the attacks lasted about 30 minutes and included B-1 bombers that had flown from the United States.
Kirby said defense officials would be able to further assess the strikes’ impact on February 3.
The U.K.-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights war monitor, which has extensive contacts inside Syria, said at least 18 pro-Iran fighters had been killed in a strike near Al-Mayadeen in Syria.
U.S. Central Command earlier confirmed the strikes, saying its forces “conducted air strikes in Iraq and Syria against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and affiliated militia groups.”
“U.S. military forces struck more than 85 targets, with numerous aircraft to include long-range bombers flown from United States,” it said, adding that it had struck “command and control operations, centers, intelligence centers, rockets, and missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicle storages, and logistics and munition supply chain facilities of militia groups and their IRGC sponsors who facilitated attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces.”
Syrian state media said there had been a number of casualties in several sites in Syria’s desert areas along the border with Iraq.
U.S. officials have said that the deadly January 28 attack in Jordan carried the “footprints” of Tehran-sponsored Kataib Hizballah militia in Iraq and vowed to hold those responsible to account at a time and place of Washington’s choosing, most likely in Syria or Iraq.
On January 31, Kataib Hizballah extremists in Iraq announced a “suspension” of operations against U.S. forces. The group said the pause was meant to prevent “embarrassing” the Iraqi government and hinted that the drone attack had been linked to the U.S. support of Israel in the war in Gaza.
Biden has been under pressure from opposition Republicans to take a harder line against Iran following the Jordan attack, but said earlier this week that “I don’t think we need a wider war in the Middle East. That’s not what I’m looking for.”
Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi has said Tehran “will not start any war, but if anyone wants to bully us, they will receive a strong response.”
Biden on February 2 witnessed the return to the United States of the remains of the three American soldiers killed in Jordan at a service at the Dover Air Force Base, Delaware.
The clashes between U.S. forces and Iran-backed militia have come against the background of an intense four-month military campaign in Gaza Strip against the U.S.- and EU-designated terrorist group Hamas after a Hamas attack killed at least 1,200 people in Israel, most of them civilians.
Iran-backed Huthi rebels in Yemen have also waged attacks on international shipping in the region in what they call an effort to target Israeli vessels and demonstrate support for Palestinians.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is traveling to his fifth round of crisis talks in the region from February 3-8, with visits reportedly planned to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Israel, and the West Bank in an effort to promote a release of hostages taken by Hamas in its brutal October 7 raids.
U.S. officials have said they believe air strikes on dozens of Iranian-linked sites in Syria and Iraq late on February 2 in retaliation for the killing of three U.S. troops in northwest Jordan were successful and warned more strikes will follow, as Baghdad expressed anger and concerns persisted of widening conflict in the region.
U.S. President Biden had warned of imminent action after a drone attack at a U.S. base in Jordan killed three U.S. service members on January 28.
Washington blamed Iran and its supply of weapons to militia groups in the region.
Reports said the U.S. strikes had hit seven locations, four in Syria and three in Iraq.
“Our response began today. It will continue at times and places of our choosing,” U.S. President Joe Biden said in a statement released shortly after the attacks that “our response began today,” adding, “It will continue at times and places of our choosing.”
“The United States does not seek conflict in the Middle East or anywhere else in the world. But let all those who might seek to do us harm know this: If you harm an American, we will respond,” he added.
General Yehia Rasool, a spokesman for Iraqi Prime Minister Shia al-Sudani accused the United States of a “violation” of Iraqi sovereignty with potentially “disastrous consequences for the security and stability of Iraq and the region.”
After a previous U.S. air strike in Baghdad, Sudani asked for the 2,000 or so U.S. troops in Iraq to be withdrawn — a sensitive bilateral topic.
U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said the United States “did inform the Iraqi government prior to the strikes” but did not provide details. He said the attacks lasted about 30 minutes and included B-1 bombers that had flown from the United States.
Kirby said defense officials would be able to further assess the strikes’ impact on February 3.
The U.K.-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights war monitor, which has extensive contacts inside Syria, said at least 18 pro-Iran fighters had been killed in a strike near Al-Mayadeen in Syria.
U.S. Central Command earlier confirmed the strikes, saying its forces “conducted air strikes in Iraq and Syria against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and affiliated militia groups.”
“U.S. military forces struck more than 85 targets, with numerous aircraft to include long-range bombers flown from United States,” it said, adding that it had struck “command and control operations, centers, intelligence centers, rockets, and missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicle storages, and logistics and munition supply chain facilities of militia groups and their IRGC sponsors who facilitated attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces.”
Syrian state media said there had been a number of casualties in several sites in Syria’s desert areas along the border with Iraq.
U.S. officials have said that the deadly January 28 attack in Jordan carried the “footprints” of Tehran-sponsored Kataib Hizballah militia in Iraq and vowed to hold those responsible to account at a time and place of Washington’s choosing, most likely in Syria or Iraq.
On January 31, Kataib Hizballah extremists in Iraq announced a “suspension” of operations against U.S. forces. The group said the pause was meant to prevent “embarrassing” the Iraqi government and hinted that the drone attack had been linked to the U.S. support of Israel in the war in Gaza.
Biden has been under pressure from opposition Republicans to take a harder line against Iran following the Jordan attack, but said earlier this week that “I don’t think we need a wider war in the Middle East. That’s not what I’m looking for.”
Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi has said Tehran “will not start any war, but if anyone wants to bully us, they will receive a strong response.”
Biden on February 2 witnessed the return to the United States of the remains of the three American soldiers killed in Jordan at a service at the Dover Air Force Base, Delaware.
The clashes between U.S. forces and Iran-backed militia have come against the background of an intense four-month military campaign in Gaza Strip against the U.S.- and EU-designated terrorist group Hamas after a Hamas attack killed at least 1,200 people in Israel, most of them civilians.
Iran-backed Huthi rebels in Yemen have also waged attacks on international shipping in the region in what they call an effort to target Israeli vessels and demonstrate support for Palestinians.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is traveling to his fifth round of crisis talks in the region from February 3-8, with visits reportedly planned to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Israel, and the West Bank in an effort to promote a release of hostages taken by Hamas in its brutal October 7 raids.
Welcome back to the China In Eurasia Briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China’s resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.
I’m RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here’s what I’m following right now.
As Huthi rebels continue their assault on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, the deepening crisis is posing a fresh test for China’s ambitions of becoming a power broker in the Middle East – and raising questions about whether Beijing can help bring the group to bay.
Finding Perspective: U.S. officials have been asking China to urge Tehran to rein in Iran-backed Huthis, but according to the Financial Times, American officials say that they have seen no signs of help.
Still, Washington keeps raising the issue. In weekend meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Bangkok, U.S. national-security adviser Jake Sullivan again asked Beijing to use its “substantial leverage with Iran” to play a “constructive role” in stopping the attacks.
Reuters, citing Iranian officials, reported on January 26 that Beijing urged Tehran at recent meetings to pressure the Huthis or risk jeopardizing business cooperation with China in the future.
There are plenty of reasons to believe that China would want to bring the attacks to an end. The Huthis have disrupted global shipping, stoking fears of global inflation and even more instability in the Middle East.
This also hurts China’s bottom line. The attacks are raising transport costs and jeopardizing the tens of billions of dollars that China has invested in nearby Egyptian ports.
Why It Matters: The current crisis raises some complex questions for China’s ambitions in the Middle East.
If China decides to pressure Iran, it’s unknown how much influence Tehran actually has over Yemen’s Huthis. Iran backs the group and supplies them with weapons, but it’s unclear if they can actually control and rein them in, as U.S. officials are calling for.
But the bigger question might be whether this calculation looks the same from Beijing.
China might be reluctant to get too involved and squander its political capital with Iran on trying to get the Huthis to stop their attacks, especially after the group has announced that it won’t attack Chinese ships transiting the Red Sea.
Beijing is also unlikely to want to bring an end to something that’s hurting America’s interests arguably more than its own at the moment.
U.S. officials say they’ll continue to talk with China about helping restore trade in the Red Sea, but Beijing might decide that it has more to gain by simply stepping back.
Three More Stories From Eurasia
1. ‘New Historical Heights’ For China And Uzbekistan
Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev made a landmark three-day visit to Beijing, where he met with Xi, engaged with Chinese business leaders, and left with an officially upgraded relationship as the Central Asian leader increasingly looks to China for his economic future.
The Details: As I reported here, Mirziyoev left Uzbekistan looking to usher in a new era and returned with upgraded diplomatic ties as an “all-weather” partner with China.
The move to elevate to an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” from a “comprehensive strategic partnership” doesn’t come with any formal benefits, but it’s a clear sign from Mirziyoev and Xi on where they want to take the relationship between their two countries.
Before going to China for the January 23-25 trip, Mirziyoev signed a letter praising China’s progress in fighting poverty and saying he wanted to develop a “new long-term agenda” with Beijing that will last for “decades.”
Beyond the diplomatic upgrade, China said it was ready to expand cooperation with Uzbekistan across the new energy vehicle industry chain, as well as in major projects such as photovoltaics, wind power, and hydropower.
Xi and Mirzoyoev also spoke about the long-discussed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, with the Chinese leader saying that work should begin as soon as possible, athough no specifics were offered and there are reportedly still key disputes over how the megaproject will be financed.
2. The Taliban’s New Man In Beijing
In a move that could lay the groundwork for more diplomatic engagement with China, Xi received diplomatic credentials from the Taliban’s new ambassador in Beijing on January 25.
What You Need To Know: Mawlawi Asadullah Bilal Karimi was accepted as part of a ceremony that also received the credential letters of 42 new envoys. Karimi was named as the new ambassador to Beijing on November 24 but has now formally been received by Xi, which is another installment in the slow boil toward recognition that’s under way.
No country formally recognizes the Taliban administration in Afghanistan, but China – along with other countries such as Pakistan, Russia, and Turkmenistan – have appointed their own envoys to Kabul and have maintained steady diplomatic engagement with the group since it returned to power in August 2021.
Formal diplomatic recognition for the Taliban still looks to be far off, but this move highlights China’s strategy of de-facto recognition that could see other countries following its lead, paving the way for formal ties down the line.
3. China’s Tightrope With Iran and Pakistan
Air strikes and diplomatic sparring between Iran and Pakistan raised difficult questions for China and its influence in the region, as I reportedhere.
Both Islamabad and Tehran have since moved to mend fences, with their foreign ministers holding talks on January 29. But the incident put the spotlight on what China would do if two of its closest partners entered into conflict against one another.
What It Means: The tit-for-tat strikes hit militant groups operating in each other’s territory. After a tough exchange, both countries quickly cooled their rhetoric – culminating in the recent talks held in Islamabad.
And while Beijing has lots to lose in the event of a wider conflict between two of its allies, it appeared to remain quiet, with only a formal offer to mediate if needed.
Abdul Basit, an associate research fellow at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told me this approach reflects how China “shies away from situations like this,” in part to protect its reputation in case it intervenes and then fails.
Michael Kugelman, the director of the Wilson Center’s South Asia Institute, added that, despite Beijing’s cautious approach, China has shown a willingness to mediate when opportunity strikes, pointing to the deal it helped broker between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March.
“It looks like the Pakistanis and the Iranians had enough in their relationship to ease tensions themselves,” he told me. “So [Beijing] might be relieved now, but that doesn’t mean they won’t step up if needed.”
Across The Supercontinent
China’s Odd Moment: What do the fall of the Soviet Union and China’s slowing economy have in common? The answer is more than you might think.
Listen to the latest episodeof the Talking China In Eurasia podcast, where we explore how China’s complicated relationship with the Soviet Union is shaping the country today.
Invite Sent. Now What? Ukraine has invited Xi to participate in a planned “peace summit” of world leaders in Switzerland, Reuters reported, in a gathering tied to the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion.
Blocked, But Why? China has suspended issuing visas to Lithuanian citizens. Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis confirmed the news and told Lithuanian journalists that “we have been informed about this. No further information has been provided.”
More Hydro Plans: Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Energy and the China National Electric Engineering Company signed a memorandum of cooperationon January 24 to build a cascade of power plants and a new thermal power plant.
One Thing To Watch
There’s no official word, but it’s looking like veteran diplomat Liu Jianchao is the leading contender to become China’s next foreign minister.
Wang Yi was reassigned to his old post after Qin Gang was abruptly removed as foreign minister last summer, and Wang is currently holding roles as both foreign minister and the more senior position of director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission Office.
Liu has limited experience engaging with the West but served stints at the Communist Party’s anti-corruption watchdog and currently heads a party agency traditionally tasked with building ties with other communist states.
It also looks like he’s being groomed for the role. He recentlycompleted a U.S. tour, where he met with top officials and business leaders, and has also made visits to the Middle East.
That’s all from me for now. Don’t forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.
Until next time,
Reid Standish
If you enjoyed this briefing and don’t want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.
Welcome back to the China In Eurasia Briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China’s resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.
I’m RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here’s what I’m following right now.
As Huthi rebels continue their assault on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, the deepening crisis is posing a fresh test for China’s ambitions of becoming a power broker in the Middle East – and raising questions about whether Beijing can help bring the group to bay.
Finding Perspective: U.S. officials have been asking China to urge Tehran to rein in Iran-backed Huthis, but according to the Financial Times, American officials say that they have seen no signs of help.
Still, Washington keeps raising the issue. In weekend meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Bangkok, U.S. national-security adviser Jake Sullivan again asked Beijing to use its “substantial leverage with Iran” to play a “constructive role” in stopping the attacks.
Reuters, citing Iranian officials, reported on January 26 that Beijing urged Tehran at recent meetings to pressure the Huthis or risk jeopardizing business cooperation with China in the future.
There are plenty of reasons to believe that China would want to bring the attacks to an end. The Huthis have disrupted global shipping, stoking fears of global inflation and even more instability in the Middle East.
This also hurts China’s bottom line. The attacks are raising transport costs and jeopardizing the tens of billions of dollars that China has invested in nearby Egyptian ports.
Why It Matters: The current crisis raises some complex questions for China’s ambitions in the Middle East.
If China decides to pressure Iran, it’s unknown how much influence Tehran actually has over Yemen’s Huthis. Iran backs the group and supplies them with weapons, but it’s unclear if they can actually control and rein them in, as U.S. officials are calling for.
But the bigger question might be whether this calculation looks the same from Beijing.
China might be reluctant to get too involved and squander its political capital with Iran on trying to get the Huthis to stop their attacks, especially after the group has announced that it won’t attack Chinese ships transiting the Red Sea.
Beijing is also unlikely to want to bring an end to something that’s hurting America’s interests arguably more than its own at the moment.
U.S. officials say they’ll continue to talk with China about helping restore trade in the Red Sea, but Beijing might decide that it has more to gain by simply stepping back.
Three More Stories From Eurasia
1. ‘New Historical Heights’ For China And Uzbekistan
Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev made a landmark three-day visit to Beijing, where he met with Xi, engaged with Chinese business leaders, and left with an officially upgraded relationship as the Central Asian leader increasingly looks to China for his economic future.
The Details: As I reported here, Mirziyoev left Uzbekistan looking to usher in a new era and returned with upgraded diplomatic ties as an “all-weather” partner with China.
The move to elevate to an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” from a “comprehensive strategic partnership” doesn’t come with any formal benefits, but it’s a clear sign from Mirziyoev and Xi on where they want to take the relationship between their two countries.
Before going to China for the January 23-25 trip, Mirziyoev signed a letter praising China’s progress in fighting poverty and saying he wanted to develop a “new long-term agenda” with Beijing that will last for “decades.”
Beyond the diplomatic upgrade, China said it was ready to expand cooperation with Uzbekistan across the new energy vehicle industry chain, as well as in major projects such as photovoltaics, wind power, and hydropower.
Xi and Mirzoyoev also spoke about the long-discussed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, with the Chinese leader saying that work should begin as soon as possible, athough no specifics were offered and there are reportedly still key disputes over how the megaproject will be financed.
2. The Taliban’s New Man In Beijing
In a move that could lay the groundwork for more diplomatic engagement with China, Xi received diplomatic credentials from the Taliban’s new ambassador in Beijing on January 25.
What You Need To Know: Mawlawi Asadullah Bilal Karimi was accepted as part of a ceremony that also received the credential letters of 42 new envoys. Karimi was named as the new ambassador to Beijing on November 24 but has now formally been received by Xi, which is another installment in the slow boil toward recognition that’s under way.
No country formally recognizes the Taliban administration in Afghanistan, but China – along with other countries such as Pakistan, Russia, and Turkmenistan – have appointed their own envoys to Kabul and have maintained steady diplomatic engagement with the group since it returned to power in August 2021.
Formal diplomatic recognition for the Taliban still looks to be far off, but this move highlights China’s strategy of de-facto recognition that could see other countries following its lead, paving the way for formal ties down the line.
3. China’s Tightrope With Iran and Pakistan
Air strikes and diplomatic sparring between Iran and Pakistan raised difficult questions for China and its influence in the region, as I reportedhere.
Both Islamabad and Tehran have since moved to mend fences, with their foreign ministers holding talks on January 29. But the incident put the spotlight on what China would do if two of its closest partners entered into conflict against one another.
What It Means: The tit-for-tat strikes hit militant groups operating in each other’s territory. After a tough exchange, both countries quickly cooled their rhetoric – culminating in the recent talks held in Islamabad.
And while Beijing has lots to lose in the event of a wider conflict between two of its allies, it appeared to remain quiet, with only a formal offer to mediate if needed.
Abdul Basit, an associate research fellow at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told me this approach reflects how China “shies away from situations like this,” in part to protect its reputation in case it intervenes and then fails.
Michael Kugelman, the director of the Wilson Center’s South Asia Institute, added that, despite Beijing’s cautious approach, China has shown a willingness to mediate when opportunity strikes, pointing to the deal it helped broker between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March.
“It looks like the Pakistanis and the Iranians had enough in their relationship to ease tensions themselves,” he told me. “So [Beijing] might be relieved now, but that doesn’t mean they won’t step up if needed.”
Across The Supercontinent
China’s Odd Moment: What do the fall of the Soviet Union and China’s slowing economy have in common? The answer is more than you might think.
Listen to the latest episodeof the Talking China In Eurasia podcast, where we explore how China’s complicated relationship with the Soviet Union is shaping the country today.
Invite Sent. Now What? Ukraine has invited Xi to participate in a planned “peace summit” of world leaders in Switzerland, Reuters reported, in a gathering tied to the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion.
Blocked, But Why? China has suspended issuing visas to Lithuanian citizens. Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis confirmed the news and told Lithuanian journalists that “we have been informed about this. No further information has been provided.”
More Hydro Plans: Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Energy and the China National Electric Engineering Company signed a memorandum of cooperationon January 24 to build a cascade of power plants and a new thermal power plant.
One Thing To Watch
There’s no official word, but it’s looking like veteran diplomat Liu Jianchao is the leading contender to become China’s next foreign minister.
Wang Yi was reassigned to his old post after Qin Gang was abruptly removed as foreign minister last summer, and Wang is currently holding roles as both foreign minister and the more senior position of director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission Office.
Liu has limited experience engaging with the West but served stints at the Communist Party’s anti-corruption watchdog and currently heads a party agency traditionally tasked with building ties with other communist states.
It also looks like he’s being groomed for the role. He recentlycompleted a U.S. tour, where he met with top officials and business leaders, and has also made visits to the Middle East.
That’s all from me for now. Don’t forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.
Until next time,
Reid Standish
If you enjoyed this briefing and don’t want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.
The U.S. continues to launch airstrikes on Yemen in response to the campaign of missile and drone attacks on commercial ships along key global trade routes through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden led by Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis. The Houthi strikes have expanded from targets connected to Israel, in protest of the siege and bombing of Gaza, to ships affiliated with the U.S. and U.K.
The BBC’s characteristically mild-mannered note said it all: What is Tower 22? More to the point, what are US forces doing in Jordan? (To be more precise, a dusty scratching on the Syria-Jordan border.) These questions were posed in the aftermath of yet another drone attack against a US outpost in the Middle East, its location of dubious strategic relevance to Washington, yet seen as indispensable to its global footprint. On this occasion, the attack proved successful, killing three troops and wounding dozens.
The Times of Israel offered a workmanlike description of the site’s role: “Tower 22 is located close enough to US troops at Tanf that it could potentially help support them, while potentially countering Iran-backed militants in the area and allowing troops to keep an eye on remnants of Islamic State in the region.” The paper does not go on to mention the other role: that US forces are also present in the region to protect Israeli interests, acting as a shield against Iran.
While Tower 22 is located more towards Jordan, it is a dozen miles or so to the Syria-based al-Tanf garrison, which retains a US troop presence. Initially, that presence was justified to cope with the formidable threat posed by Islamic State as part of Operation Inherent Resolve. In due course, it became something of a watch post on Iran’s burgeoning military presence in Syria and Iraq, an inflation as much a consequence of Tehran’s successful efforts against the fundamentalist group as it was a product of Washington’s destabilising invasion of Iraq in 2003.
A January 28 press release from US Central Command notes that the attack was inflicted by “a one-way attack UAS [Unmanned Aerial System] that impacted on a base in northeast Jordan, near the Syrian border.” Its description of Tower 22 is suitably vague, described as a “logistics support base” forming the Jordanian Defense Network. “There are approximately 350 US Army and Air Force personnel deployed to the base, conducting a number of key support functions, including support to the coalition for the lasting defeat of ISIS.” No mention is made of Iran or Israel.
Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh found it hard to conceal the extent that US bases in the region have come under attack. Clumsily, she tried to be vague as to reasons why such assaults were taking place to begin with, though her department has, since October 17 last year, tracked 165 attacks, 66 on US troops in Iraq and 98 in Syria. The singular feature in the assault on Tower 22, she stressed, was that it worked. “To my knowledge, there was nothing different or new about this attack that we’ve seen in other facilities that house our service members,” she told reporters on January 29. “Unfortunately, this attack was successful, but we can’t discount the fact that other attacks, whether Iraq or Syria, were not intended to kill our service members.”
A senior official from the umbrella grouping known as Islamic Resistance in Iraq justified the attack as part of a broader campaign against the US for its unwavering support for Israel and its relentlessly murderous campaign in Gaza. (Since October 17, the group is said to have staged 140 attacks on US sites in both Iraq and Syria.) “As we have said before if the US keeps supporting Israel, there will [be] escalations.” The official in question went on to state that, “All the US interests in the region are legitimate targets, and we don’t care about US threats to respond.”
A generally accepted view among security boffins is that US troops have achieved what they sought to do: cope with the threat posed by Islamic State. As with any such groups, dissipation and readjustment eventually follows. Washington’s military officials delight in using the term “degrade”, but it would be far better to simply assume that the fighters of such outfits eventually take up with others, blend into the locale, or simply go home.
With roughly 3,000 personnel stationed in Jordan, 2,500 in Iraq, and 900 in Syria, US troops have become ripe targets as Israel’s war in Gaza rages. In effect, they have become bits of surplus pieces on the Middle Eastern chessboard and, to that end, incentives for a broader conflict. The Financial Times, noting the view of an unnamed source purporting to be a “senior western diplomat” (aren’t they always?), fretted that the tinderbox was about to go off. “We’re always worried about US and Iranian forces getting into direct confrontation there, whether by accident or on purpose.”
President Joe Biden has promised some suitable retaliation but does not wish for “a wider war in the Middle East. That’s not what I’m looking for.” A typically mangled response came from National Security Council spokesman John Kirby: “It’s very possible what you’ll see is a tiered approach here, not just a single action, but potentially multiple actions over a period of time.”
Rather than seeing these attacks as incentives to leave such outposts, the don’t cut and run mentality may prove all too powerful in its muscular stupidity. Empires do not merely bring with them sorrows but incentives to be stubborn. The beneficiaries will be the usual coterie of war mongers and peace killers.
A militia group that the Biden administration blamed for the deadly attack on U.S. forces stationed at a shadowy base in Jordan said Tuesday that it would stop targeting American troops in Iraq, a move that could clear the way for the withdrawal of U.S. soldiers more than two decades after the 2003 invasion. “We announce the suspension of military and security operations against the occupation…
To mark the Day of the Endangered Lawyer, the Law Society of England and Wales issued a press release on 24 January honouring legal professionals who are targeted for upholding the rule of law and defending a strong justice system.
The Law Society has published its annual intervention tracker which shows that the Society took 40 actions relating to 17 countries in 2023. Most of these actions were initiated by concerns relating to arbitrary arrest or detention (58%) followed by harassment, threats and violence (27%).
Law Society president Nick Emmerson said: “Across the world, lawyers continue to face harassment, surveillance, detention, torture, enforced disappearance and arbitrary arrest and conviction...
We use this day to draw attention to the plight faced by countless lawyers across the globe, as they fight for their right to freely exercise their profession and uphold the rule of law.
A recent example comes from Amnesty International on 25 January 2024: On 31 October 2023, human rights lawyer, Hoda Abdelmoniem, was due to be released after serving her unjust five-year prison sentence stemming solely from the exercise of her human rights. Instead, the Supreme State Security Prosecution (SSSP) ordered her pretrial detention pending investigations into similar bogus terrorism-related charges in a separate case No. 730 of 2020. During a rare visit to 10th of Ramadan prison on 4 January, her family learned that her health continues to deteriorate and that she developed an ear infection, affecting her balance and sight. She must be immediately and unconditionally released. [see also: https://humanrightsdefenders.blog/2020/11/29/2020-award-of-european-bars-associations-ccbe-goes-to-seven-egyptian-lawyers-who-are-in-prison/]
Warhawks in the United States wasted no time agitating for direct military conflict with Iran after a drone attack on a military base just inside Jordan’s border with Syria on Sunday killed three American troops and injured dozens more. Both Republican and Democratic members of Congress called on U.S. President Joe Biden to quickly respond with strikes inside Iran, which denied any connection to…
U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has asked Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to use Beijing’s influence on Iran to push it to stop the Houthis in Yemen from attacking Red Sea trade routes.
The appeal came during two days of meetings in Bangkok between the pair, according to a senior Biden administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity according to rules set by the White House.
Over 12 hours, the pair also discussed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Myanmar’s civil war, North Korea, Israel’s war with Hamas, the South China Sea, fentanyl and artificial intelligence, the official said.
It was their first meeting since Oct. 26, when Wang visited Washington in the run-up to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to San Francisco in November for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, during which he also held direct talks with U.S. President Joe Biden.
The official said the meeting was meant to build on the commitments made during that summit, including to reinstate military-to-military talks and to stem illicit Chinese exports of precursors for fentanyl, which has been called a leading cause of death for American adults.
A working group on counternarcotics would be established on Tuesday and both Military-Maritime Consultative Agreement Meetings and talks about regulating artificial intelligence would be held in the Spring.
“The two sides are committed to continuing these strategic channels of communication,” the official said, adding there would be “a telephone call between the two leaders at some point in the coming months.”
Diplomatic telephone
On the apparently widening conflict in the Middle East that began with the attack on Israel by Hamas on Oct. 7, the White House official said Sullivan had pressed Wang to use Beijing’s influence on Iran to push it to end attacks by Houthis on trade ships transiting the Red Sea.
The Houthis’ latest attack took place Friday and this time directly targeted a U.S. warship, the USS Carney, which was patrolling the area to try to prevent further attacks in the lucrative trade route.
Both Hamas and the Houthis have been labeled “proxies” of Iran by the United States, with Tehran not viewed as having direct control of either group but being accused of funding and training both. The Houthis, meanwhile, are accused of targeting trade ships off Yemen’s coast in response to Israel’s invasion of Hamas-controlled Gaza.
As a major trading nation, China had its own interests in stopping the attacks on the Red Sea route and had the ability to pressure Iran as one of the biggest buyers of its oil, the White House official said.
“We would characterize both the economic and trade relationship as giving Beijing leverage over Iran to some extent. How they choose to use that, of course, is China’s choice,” the official said.
“Iran’s influence over the Houthis, and the Houthis’ destabilization of global shipping, raises serious concerns not just for the U.S. and China but for global trade,” they added. “There should be a clear interest in China in trying to quiet some of those attacks.”
The civil war in Myanmar was also discussed by Sullivan and Wang, building off talks between Sullivan and Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin on Friday, during which the official said Sullivan “stressed the importance” of getting humanitarian aid into Myanmar.
“I’m not sure I would characterize anything recently as constructive,” the official said, adding the United States still hoped China would come round to helping “bring us back to the path of denuclearization.”
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Alex Willemyns for RFA.
It is not only missiles that are being lobbed as U.S. and U.K. air strikes aim to stop the Iran-backed Huthi rebels in Yemen from targeting ships in a key global trade route — mutual threats of continued attacks are flying around, too.
The question is how far each side might go in carrying out their warnings without drawing Tehran into a broader Middle East conflict in defense of the Huthis, whose sustained attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden led to its redesignation as a terrorist organization by Washington last week.
“Our aim remains to de-escalate tensions and restore stability in the Red Sea,” the United States and the United Kingdom said in a joint statement following their latest round of air strikes on Huthi targets in Yemen on January 21. “But let us reiterate our warning to [the] Huthi leadership: we will not hesitate to defend lives and the free flow of commerce in one of the world’s most critical waterways in the face of continued threats.”
The Huthis responded with vows to continue their war against what they called Israel’s “genocide” of the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip.
“The American-British aggression will only increase the Yemeni people’s determination to carry out their moral and humanitarian responsibilities toward the oppressed in Gaza,” said Muhammad al-Bukhaiti, a senior Huthi political official.
On cue, the two sides clashed again on January 24 when the Huthis said they fired ballistic missiles at several U.S. warships protecting U.S. commercial vessels transiting the Bab al-Mandab Strait off the coast of Yemen. U.S. Central Command said three anti-ship missiles were fired at a U.S.-flagged container ship and that two were shot down by a U.S. missile destroyer while the third fell into the Gulf of Aden.
With the stage set for more such encounters, Iran’s open backing and clandestine arming of the Huthis looms large. While continuing to state its support for the Huthis, Tehran has continued to deny directing their actions or providing them with weapons. At the same time, Iran has showcased its own advanced missile capabilities as a warning of the strength it could bring to a broader Middle East conflict.
The United States, emphasizing that the goal is to de-escalate tensions in the region, appears to be focusing on preventing the Huthis from obtaining more arms and funding. In addition to returning the Huthis to its list of terrorist groups, Washington said on January 16 that it had seized Iranian weapons bound for the Huthis in a raid in the Arabian Sea.
The U.S. Navy responds to Huthi missile and drone strikes in the Red Sea earlier this month.
The United States and United Kingdom also appear to be focusing on precision strikes on the Huthis’ military infrastructure while avoiding extensive human casualties or a larger operation that could heighten Iran’s ire.
On January 24, the Pentagon clarified that, despite the U.S. strikes in Yemen, “we are not at war in the Middle East” and the focus is on deterrence and preventing a broader conflict.
“The United States is only using a very small portion of what it’s capable of against the Huthis right now,” said Kenneth Katzman, a senior adviser for the New York-based Soufan Group intelligence consultancy, and expert on geopolitics in the Middle East.
Terrorist Designation
The effectiveness of Washington’s restoration on January 17 of the Huthis’ terrorist organization label and accompanying U.S. sanctions — which was removed early last year in recognition of the dire humanitarian situation in Yemen and to foster dialogue aimed at ending the Yemeni civil war involving the Huthis and the country’s Saudi-backed government forces — is “marginal,” according to Katzman.
“They don’t really use the international banking system and are very much cut off,” Katzman said. “They get their arms from Iran, which is under extremely heavy sanctions and is certainly not going to be deterred from trying to ship them more weapons by this designation.”
But the strikes being carried out by the United States and the United Kingdom, with the support of Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands, are another matter.
The January 21 strikes against eight Huthi targets — followed shortly afterward by what was the ninth attack overall — were intended to disrupt and degrade the group’s capabilities to threaten global trade. They were a response to more than 30 attacks on international and commercial vessels since mid-November and were the largest strikes since a similar coalition operation on January 11.
Such strikes against the Huthis “have the potential to deter them and to degrade them, but it’s going to take many more strikes, and I think the U.S. is preparing for that,” Katzman said. “You’re not going to degrade their capabilities in one or two volleys or even several volleys, it’s going to take months.”
The Huthis have significant experience in riding out aerial strikes, having been under relentless bombardment by a Saudi-led military collation during the nine-year Yemeni civil war, in which fighting has ended owing to a UN-brokered cease-fire in early 2022 that the warring parties recommitted to in December.
“They weathered that pretty well,” said Jeremy Binnie, a Middle East defense analyst with the global intelligence company Janes.
“On the battlefield, airpower can still be fairly decisive,” Binnie said, noting that air strikes were critical in thwarting Huthi offensives during the Yemeni civil war. “But in terms of the Huthis’ overall ability to weather the air campaign of the Saudi-led coalition, they did that fine, from their point of view.”
Since the cease-fire, Binnie said, the situation may have changed somewhat as the Huthis built up their forces, with more advanced missiles and aging tanks — a heavier presence that “might make them a bit more vulnerable.”
“But I don’t think they will, at the same time, have any problem reverting to a lighter force that is more resilient to air strikes as they have been in the past,” Binnie said.
Both Binnie and Katzman suggested that the Huthis appear willing to sustain battlefield losses in pursuit of their aims, which makes the group difficult to deter from the air.
A cargo ship seized by Huthis in the Red Sea in November 2023.
The Huthis have clearly displayed their intent on continuing to disrupt maritime shipping in the Red Sea, which they claim has targeted only vessels linked to Israel despite evidence to the contrary, until there is a cease-fire in the Gaza Strip.
This has brought the Huthis’ complicated relationship with Iran under intense scrutiny.
‘Axis Of Resistance’
The Huthis have established themselves as a potent element of Iran’s so-called “axis of resistance” against Israel and the United States, as well as against Tehran’s regional archrival, Saudi Arabia.
But analysts who spoke to RFE/RL widely dismissed the idea that the Huthis are a direct Iranian proxy, describing the relationship as more one of mutual benefit in which the Huthis can be belligerent and go beyond what Tehran wants them to.
While accused by Western states and UN experts of secretly shipping arms to the Huthis and other members of the axis of resistance, Iran has portrayed the loose-knit band of proxies and partners and militant groups as independent in their decision-making.
The grouping includes the Iran-backed Hamas — the U.S. and EU designated terrorist group whose attack on Israel sparked the war in the Gaza Strip — and Lebanese Hizballah — a Iranian proxy and U.S. designated terrorist group that, like the Huthis, has launched strikes against Israel in defense of Hamas.
“The success of the axis of resistance … is that since Tehran has either created or co-opted these groups, there is more often than not fusion rather than tension,” between members of the network and Iran, explained Behnam Ben Taleblu, senior fellow at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank.
But the relationship is not simply about “Iran telling its proxies to jump and them saying how high,” Taleblu said. “It’s about Iran’s ability to find and materially support those who are willing to or can be persuaded to shoot at those Tehran wants to shoot at.”
Iran’s interest in a certain axis member’s success in a given area and its perception of how endangered that partner might be, could play a crucial role in Tehran’s willingness to come to their defense, according to Taleblu.
Middle East observers who spoke to RFE/RL suggested that it would take a significant escalation — an existential threat to Tehran itself or a proxy, like Lebanese Hizballah — for Iran to become directly involved.
“The Islamic republic would react differently to the near eradication of Hizballah which it created, versus Hamas, which it co-opted,” Taleblu said. “Context is key.”
“Iran is doing what it feels it can to try to keep the United States at bay,” Katzman said, singling out the missile strikes carried out on targets this month in Syria, Iraq, and Pakistan that were widely seen as a warning to Israel and the United States of Tehran’s growing military capabilities. Iran is “trying to show support for the Huthis without getting dragged in.”
Iran is believed to have members of its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps on the ground in Yemen. Tehran also continues to be accused of delivering arms to the Huthis, and at the start of the year deployed a ship to the Gulf of Aden in a show of support for the Huthis before withdrawing it after the U.S.-led coalition launched strikes in Yemen on January 11.
“So, they are helping,” Katzman said, “but I think they are trying to do it as quietly and as under the radar as possible.
A U.S.-led ground operation against the Huthis, if it came to that, could change Iran’s calculations. “Then Iran might deploy forces to help them out,” Katzman said.
KYIV — Ukrainian officials on January 27 said Russia had intensified attacks in the past 24 hours, with a commander saying the sides had battled through “50 combat clashes” in the past day near Ukraine’s Tavria region.
Meanwhile, Kyiv and Moscow continued to dispute the circumstances surrounding the January 24 crash of a Russian military transport plane that the Kremlin claimed was carrying Ukrainian prisoners of war.
Kyiv said it has no proof POWs were aboard and has not confirmed its forces shot down the plane.
Live Briefing: Russia’s Invasion Of Ukraine
RFE/RL’s Live Briefinggives you all of the latest developments on Russia’s full-scale invasion, Kyiv’s counteroffensive, Western military aid, global reaction, and the plight of civilians. For all of RFE/RL’s coverage of the war in Ukraine, click here.
General Oleksandr Tarnavskiy, the Ukrainian commander in the Tavria zone in the Zaporizhzhya region, said Russian forces had “significantly increased” the number of offensive and assault operations over the past two days.
“For the second day in a row, the enemy has conducted 50 combat clashes daily,” he wrote on Telegram.
“Also, the enemy has carried out 100 air strikes in the operational zone of the Tavria Joint Task Force within seven days,” he said, adding that 230 Russian-launched drones had been “neutralized or destroyed” over the past day in the area.
Battlefield claims on either side cannot immediately be confirmed.
Earlier, the Ukrainian military said 98 combat clashes took place between Ukrainian troops and the invading Russian army over the past 24 hours.
“There are dead and wounded among the civilian populations,” the Ukrianian military’s General Staff said in its daily update, but did not provide further details about the casualties.
According to the General Staff, Russian forces launched eight missile and four air strikes, and carried out 78 attacks from rocket-salvo systems on Ukrainian troop positions and populated areas. Iranian-made Shahed drones and Iskander ballistic missiles were used in the attacks, it said.
A number of “high-rise residential buildings, schools, kindergartens, a shopping center, and other civilian infrastructure were destroyed or damaged” in the latest Russian strikes, the bulletin said.
“More than 120 settlements came under artillery fire in the Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolayiv regions,” according to the daily update.
The General Staff also reported that Ukrainian defenders repelled dozens of Russian assaults in eight directions, including Avdiyivka, Bakhmut, Maryinka, and Kupyansk in the eastern Donetsk region.
Meanwhile, Kyrylo Budanov, chief of Ukrainian military intelligence, said it remained unclear what happened in the crash of the Russian Il-76 that the Kremlin claimed was carrying 65 Ukrainian prisoners of war who were killed along with nine crew members.
The Kremlin said the military transport plane was shot down by a Ukrainian missile despite the fact that Russian forces had alerted Kyiv to the flight’s path.
Ukrainian military intelligence spokesman Andriy Yusov told RFE/RL that it had not received either a written or verbal request to secure the airspace where the plane went down.
The situation with the crash of the aircraft “is not yet fully understood,” Budanov said.
“It is necessary to determine what happened – unfortunately, neither side can fully answer that yet.”
Russia “of course, has taken the position of blaming Ukraine for everything, despite the fact that there are a number of facts that are inconsistent with such a position,” he added.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has insisted Ukraine shot down the plane and said an investigation was being carried out, with a report to be made in the upcoming days.
In Kyiv, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy announced the creation of a second body to assist businesses in the war-torn country.
Speaking in his nightly video address late on January 26, Zelenskiy said the All-Ukraine Economic Platform would help businesses overcome the challenges posed by Russia’s nearly two-year-old invasion.
On January 23, Zelenskiy announced the formation of a Council for the Support of Entrepreneurship, which he said sought to strengthen the country’s economy and clarify issues related to law enforcement agencies. Decrees creating both bodies were published on January 26.
Ukraine’s economy has collapsed in many sectors since Russia invaded the country in February 2022. Kyiv heavily relies on international aid from its Western partnes.
The Voice of America reported that the United States vowed to promote at the international level a peace formula put forward by Zelenskiy.
VOA quoted White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby as saying that Washington “is committed to the policy of supporting initiatives emanating from the leadership of Ukraine.”
Zelenskiy last year presented his 10-point peace formula that includes the withdrawal of Russian forces and the restoration of Ukrainian territorial integrity, among other things.
Consider this paradox: without the Soviet Union (U.S.-designated nemesis since 1917), the United States would have never succeeded at placing the planet under its unilateral grip—often referred to by U.S. imperialists as the “new world order”. Or, rephrased differently, a world whereby the U.S. wants to rule unchallenged. This how it started: first, forget the Soviet Politburo—Mikhail Gorbachev practically annulled its role as the supreme decision-maker body of the Soviet Communist Party before proceeding to dismantle the Soviet state. In sequence, he, his foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, other anti-communists in his inner circle, and the Yeltsin group were the material instruments in the downfall of the USSR thus leading to U.S. success.
By a twist of events, with its unrelenting policy of economic, geopolitical, and military pressure to submit the new Russia to its will, the United States effectively forced it to intervene in Ukraine many years later. After 33 years from the dismantling the Soviet Union (first by Gorbachev’s contraptions of perestroika and glasnost, and then by Yeltsin’s pro-Western free-marketers), Russia is now breaking up the monstrous American order it helped create. Today, it seems that Russia have reprised its founding principles in the world arena—not as an ideologically anti-imperialist Soviet socialist republic, but as an anti-hegemonic capitalistic state.
The process for the U.S. world control worked like this: taking advantage of Gorbachev’s dismantlement of the socialist system in Eastern Europe and his planned breakup of the USSR, the United States followed a multi-pronged strategy to assert itself as the sole judge of world affairs. The starting point was the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. With the success of its two-stage war to end that occupation (Operations: Desert Shield, 1990, and Operation: Desert Storm, 1991) the United States achieved multiple objectives. Notably, it removed the USSR completely from the world scene even before it was officially dismantled, and it put Iraq and the entire Arab world under its effective control, and it tested its new world order.
Far more important, with a considerably weakened Russia taking the seat of the USSR at the Security Council, the United States finally completed its takeover of the United Nations. Although the hyperpower is known for routinely operating out of the international norms and treaties, and has myriad methods to enforce its influence or control over foreign nations, it is a fact that whoever controls the Security Council can use its resolutions—and their ever-changing interpretations— as authorization for military interventions in the name of so-called collective international legality.
Still, it is incorrect to say that the United States has become the omnipotent controller without considering the other three permanent members of the Security Council: Britain, France, and China. First, aside from being the two states with a known history of imperialism and colonialism, Britain and France are NATO countries. As such, they pose no threat to U.S. authority. This leaves China. (For now, I shall briefly discuss China’s role vis-à-vis the U.S. taking control of the Security Council after the demise of the USSR, while deferring its relevance to U.S. plans in Ukraine to the upcoming parts)
China has been rising as world power since the early 1990s onward. That being said, China’s world outlook has been consistently based on cooperation and peace among nations. China is neither an imperialist nor expansionist or interventionist state, and its claim on taking back Taiwan is historical, legal, and legitimate. That being said, China’s abstention from voting on serious issues is seriously questionable. Interpretation: China seems primarily focused on building its economic and technological structures instead of antagonizing U.S. policies that could slow its pace due to its [China] growing integration in the global capitalistic system of production. Consider the following two Western viewpoints on China’s voting practices:
The Australian think tank, Lowy Institute, states, “China used its UN Security Council rotating presidency in August … China did not veto any UN Security Council resolutions between 2000 and 2006.”
Observation: but the period 2000–2006 was the post-9/11 Orwellian environment in which the United States broke all laws of the U.N. and turned the organization into its private fiefdom. Does that mean China had caved in to U.S. pressure and subscribed to its objectives? Based on its history, ideals, stated foreign policy principles, and political makeup, my answer is no. Yet, we do know that China has often been moving alongside U.S. objectives—by remaining silent on them. Examples include the U.S. 13-year blockade of and sanctions on Iraq (starting in 1990 and theoretically ending after the U.S. invasion in 2003), as well post-invasion occupation that is lasting through present by diverse ways and methods.
Wikipedia (Caveat: never take anything printed on this website seriously unless you verify content rigorously) stated the following on China, “From 1971 to 2011, China used its veto sparingly, preferring to abstain rather than veto resolutions not directly related to Chinese interests. China turned abstention into an “art form”, abstaining on 30% of Security Council Resolutions between 1971 and 1976. Since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, China has joined Russia in many double vetoes. China has not cast a lone veto since 1999.”
Observation: by abstaining, China seems playing politics and patently taking sides with Washington on critical issues. Is china conspiring, in some form, with the U.S. for selfish reasons? Are there other reasons?
No science is needed to prove that China is neither fearful of the United States nor subservient to it or uncertain about its own great place in the world. Simply, China favors dialogue over confrontation and patience over nervous impulses. Although such conduct may unnerve some who want to see China stand up to the hyper-imperialist bully, the fact is, China is no hurry to play its cards before the issue of Taiwan is resolved. Still, by its own problematic actions at the Security Council, China is not a dependable obstacle to U.S. plans. Of interest to the anti-imperialist front, however, is that China’s voting record on Iraq, Libya, and Yemen has left dire consequences on those nations.
Russia’s Intervention in Ukraine: Dialectics
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine was calculated and consequential. It was calculated based on symmetric response to U.S. long-term planning aiming at destabilizing it. The consequentiality factor is significant. Russia’s action did not precede but followed a protracted standoff with Ukraine following U.S.-organized coup in 2014. Not only did that coup topple the legitimate government of Viktor Yanukovych, but also veered Ukraine’s new rulers toward a fanatical confrontation with Russia and ethnic Russians—a sizable minority in Donbass.
Could comparing U.S. and Russian reactions to each other’s interventions shed light on the scope of their respective world policies? How does all this apply to Ukraine? First, Ukraine is not a conflict about territory, democracy, sovereignty, and all that jargon made to distract from the real issues and for the idle consumption of news. Second, to understand the war on Ukraine, we need to place Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in a historical context that —at least since the dismantlement of the USSR.
Premise
The study of reactions by political states to military interventions and wars is an empirical science. By knowing who is intervening, who is approving, and who is opposing, and by observing and cataloging their conduct vis-à-vis a conflict, we can definitely identify pretexts, motives, and objectives. For example, when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, the reaction of the United States, key European countries, Israel, Arab Gulf states, Egypt, and Jordan were unanimously approving—and supporting with instigation, money, weapons, and logistics. The Soviet Union on the other hand, called for dialogue, negotiation, and other ways to end the conflict.
In the Iraq-Iran War, the U.S., Europe, and Israel wanted the war to continue so both would perish by it. Henry Kissinger the top priest of U.S. Zionism simplified the U.S. objective with these words, “The ultimate American interest in the war (is) that both should lose”. Consequently, Western weapons sales to both contenders skyrocketed—war is business. The Arab Gulf states, for example, financed and wanted Iraq to defeat Iran—its revolutionary model threatened their feudal family systems of government. They also looked for surgical ways to weaken Iraq thus stopping its calls for the unification of Arab states.
It turned out, when the war ended after eight years without losers and winners, that U.S. and Israel’s objective evolved to defeat Iraq that had become, in the meanwhile, a regional power. The opportunity came up when Iraq, falling in the U.S. trap (April Glaspie’s deception; also read, “Wikileaks, April Glaspie, and Saddam Hussein”) invaded Kuwait consequent to oil disputes and debts from its Gulf-U.S.-instigated war with Iran. As for Iran, it became the subject of harsh American containment and sanction regimes lasting to this very date.
Another example is the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. While the USSR, China, Arab States, and countless others only condemned but did nothing else as usual, Ronald Reagan, on the other hand, approved and sent his marines to break up the Palestinian Resistance and expel it from Lebanon, which was an Israeli primary objective.
United States: Reaction to the Russian Invasion of Afghanistan
When the USSR intervened in Afghanistan in 1979, that country became an American issue instantly. Cold war paradigms played a paramount role in the U.S. response. Not only did the U.S. (with Saudi Arabia’s money) invent so-called Islamist mujahedeen against the Russian “atheists” (operation Cyclone), but also created ad hoc regional “alliances’—similar to those operating in Ukraine today—to counter the Soviet intervention.
Russia: Reaction to U.S.’s many interventions and invasions
When Lyndon Johnson invaded the Dominican Republic (1965), when Ronald Reagan mined the Nicaraguan ports (1981-85), and when George H.W. Bush invaded Panama (1989) and moved its president to U.S. prisons, the USSR reacted by invoking the rules of international law—albeit knowing that said law never mattered to the United States. The Kremlin of Mikhail Gorbachev stated that the invasion is “A flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and norms of relations among states”.
But did he do anything to hold the U.S. accountable? Gorbachev knew well that words are cheap, and that from an American perspective such charter and norms are ready for activation only when they serve U.S. imperialist purpose. The U.S., of course, did not give a hoot to Gorbachev’s protestation—and that is the problem with Russian leaders: they avoid principled confrontation with the futile expectation that the United States would refrain from bullying Russia. One can spot this tendency when Russian leaders kept calling U.S. and European politicians “our partners” while fully knowing that the recipients are probably smirking in secret.
Another catastrophic example is Gorbachev’s voting (alongside the United States) for the U.N. Resolution 678 to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait by January 15, 1991. According to my research, that was the first time in which a resolution came with a deadline. Meaning, the United States (and Gorbachev) were in a hurry to implement Bush’s plan for world control.
Not only did the Gorbachev regime approve Resolution 678, but also approved all U.S. resolutions pertaining to Iraq since the day it invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The statement is important. It means that Gorbachev’s role was structurally fundamental in allowing the United States to become the de facto “chief executive officer” of world affairs. At the same time, his role was also the material instrument in turning Russia into a U.S. vassal for over two decades since the dissolution of the USSR. [After becoming a former president of a superpower, Gorbachev made a living by taking commissioned speeches at various U.S. universities and think tanks]
From attentively reading Resolution 678, it is very clear that the objective was not about the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. Decisively, it was about the disarming of Iraq for the sake of the Zionist entity in Palestine. In fact, the U.S. bombing of Iraq in 1991 was never meant just to end that occupation by dislodging Iraqi forces from Kuwait. It was enacted to destroy Iraq’s civilian structures and infrastructures, its army, and its nascent military industry including its nuclear capabilities.
The point: Gorbachev as a convert from communism to capitalism closed his eyes to U.S. objectives in Iraq and the world—these were unimportant to his plan since he obviously tied a deeply altered USSR to the wheel of U.S. imperialism while thinking he and his regime still mattered. With that, he doomed future Russia to protracted hardship and the world to suffer at the hands of U.S. violent imperialists and Zionists.
The Example of Libya: Zionist hyper-imperialist Barack Obama bombed Libya in 2011. [For the record, the Jerusalem Post (top publication in the Zionist state) called Obama, “An insider’s view: Eight years watching the first Jewish US president”. (Describing Obama as Jewish is irrelevant. He was a Zionist at the service of Israel via a constructed career powered by opportunism and sycophancy) Obama’s bombing of Libya is testimony to Russia’s betrayal of just causes when that suits its calculations.
Russia of Dmitry Medvedev (and Putin as his prime minister) explicitly accepted the U.S. plan by not vetoing UNSC 1970, and UNSC Resolution 1973 that declared the whole of Libya a No-Fly Zone. Once the resolution was passed, the U.S. (and NATO) transformed it at once into a colossal bombing of that country. (Debating whether Russian’s general conduct toward U.S. tactics was an expression of pragmatism, concession, collusion, or weakness goes beyond the scope of this work. I reported on Lavrov’s statement on the Libyan issue further down in this series.)
As for the United States, a fascist Hillary Clinton disguised as an “intelligent diplomat” epitomized the U.S. role for government change in Libya as follows. Referring to the brutal murder of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, Obama’s Secretary of State said, “We came, we saw, he died”. Aside from theatrically debasing Mark Anthony’s famous victory exclamation with her crazed laughter, Clinton’s “WE” confirmed the basics: Odyssey Dawn was a code name, not for a romantic beginning for Libya but for Obama’s imperialist war to conquer its oil and depose its leader.
Two other events are significant for their long-term implications: U.S. invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Regardless of U.S. pretexts, Russia reacted to each invasion differently. In the case of Afghanistan, it sided with the United States in spite of the fact that Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban had nothing to do with the still very much suspicious attack on the United States on September 11, 2021. It is imperative to recall what Tony Blair said prior to the Anglo-American invasion. Media and public records of the British government can confirm that Blair thundered to the Taliban, “Surrender Bin Laden, or lose power”. The Taliban offered to comply if the U.S. could prove that Bin Laden was behind the attack. The U.S. never responded—it just invaded.
In the case of Iraq, Russia, together with France and Germany, vehemently opposed the planned invasion but only within the realm of the UNSC. The U.S. and Britain invaded nevertheless. Aside from protesting, however, neither Russia nor any other country took any punitive action against the top two imperialist powers. More than that, Russia of the first Putin presidency sent neither weapons nor money to Iraq and Afghanistan to help them fight the invaders. Germany and France did the same. Was that for “solidarity” with invaders or fear from U.S. retribution?
What is worse, Russia and China had even accepted the U.S.‑imposed U.N. resolution 1483 that crowned the United States and Britain as the occupying powers of Iraq. That acceptance is a moral, historical, and legal blunder that the passing of time will never erase. This how it should be interpreted politically: with the passing of that resolution, Russia and China had not only legalized the U.S. imperialist occupation of Iraq, but also lent international legitimacy to the invasion and it is false motives.
A question: why did not the United States and Britain try to declare themselves as the occupying powers of Afghanistan? The answer is prompt: look no farther than the Zionist Israeli project to re-shape and control Iraq and other Arab countries via the United States. Accordingly, Afghanistan is not relevant to this scheme.
To close, I’m not suggesting that interventions by any country are tolerable as long as “A” can do whatever “B” does or vice versa, or, as long as they do not stand in the way of each other. That would void the struggle for a just world system where natural states could enjoy independence and security. Rather, to address persistent questions on the current configuration of the world order, we must tackle first the issue of exclusive entitlement. That is, we like to know according to what rule Russia, China, or any other country should remain mute while the dictatorial, violent hyper-empire continues staking its claim to arrange the world according to its vision? If this rule turns out to be by means of fire, death, and printed money, then we may finally understand the miserable situation of the world today and find all possible means to end it.
It is no small matter, but the “indispensable nation” [Madeleine Albright’s words] seems to think it deserves this exclusivity. American biblical preachers, hyper-imperialists, multi-term politicians, think tanks, proselytes of all types, military industry, and neophyte politicians seeking promotions within the system, and, before I forget, Zionist neocon empire builders often declare that the U.S. is predestined to rule over others. Biden, a self-declared Zionist has recently re-baptized the notion of U.S. ruling over others when he declared that the U.S. must lead the new world order.
Another Subject: American ideologues of permanent wars persistently talk about what appears to be a fixed target: Ukraine must win and Russia must lose. What hides behind such frivolous theatrics? First off, why Ukraine must win and Russia must lose? Stating so because Russia intervened in Ukraine is non sequitur. The United States, Britain, France, and Israel have been punching the world with invasions for decades without anyone being able to stop them. Ineluctably, therefore, there should be fundamental reasons for wanting to see Russia lose.
To begin, U.S. tactics to frame wars in terms of winning and losing is at the very least childish and makes no sense. Further, whereas waging wars of domination are built on a hypothetical model that ends with “we win they lose”, the resulting indoctrination paradigm is invariably translated into an ideological construct whereby winning is a sign of power and losing is a sign weakness. Again, that makes no sense. One could lose not out of weakness or could win not out of strength. In endless situations, winning or losing in any field is a function of varied dynamic and static forces leading to either outcome by default.
In real context, the fabricated philosophy pivoting around the must-win scenario while discarding potential devastating reactions by a designated adversary is of paramount significance to understand the dangerous mindset of American politicians and war planners. As they prepare pretexts for a war by choice, they completely jump over the possibility that an opposite response could devastate them. How does the process work?
Houthi-affiliated Yemeni coastguard patrols the Red Sea, flying Palestinian and Yemeni flags. [Credit: AFP]
In the topsy-turvy world of corporate media reporting on U.S. foreign policy, we have been led to believe that U.S. air strikes on Yemen, Iraq and Syria are legitimate and responsible efforts to contain the expanding war over Israel’s genocide in Gaza, while the actions of the Houthi government in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iran and its allies in Iraq and Syria are all dangerous escalations.
In fact, it is U.S. and Israeli actions that are driving the expansion of the war, while Iran and others are genuinely trying to find effective ways to counter and end Israel’s genocide in Gaza while avoiding a full-scale regional war.
We are encouraged by Egypt and Qatar’s efforts to mediate a ceasefire and the release of hostages and prisoners-of-war by both sides. But it is important to recognize who are the aggressors, who are the victims, and how regional actors are taking incremental but increasingly forceful action to respond to genocide.
A near-total Israeli communications blackout in Gaza has reduced the flow of images of the ongoing massacre on our TVs and computer screens, but the slaughter has not abated. Israel is bombing and attacking Khan Younis, the largest city in the southern Gaza Strip, as ruthlessly as it did Gaza City in the north. Israeli forces and U.S. weapons have killed an average of 240 Gazans per day for more than three months, and 70% of the dead are still women and children.
Israel has repeatedly claimed it is taking new steps to protect civilians, but that is only a public relations exercise. The Israeli government is still using 2,000 pound and even 5,000 pound “bunker-buster” bombs to dehouse the people of Gaza and herd them toward the Egyptian border, while it debates how to push the survivors over the border into exile, which it euphemistically refers to as “voluntary emigration.”
People throughout the Middle East are horrified by Israel’s slaughter and plans for the ethnic cleansing of Gaza, but most of their governments will only condemn Israel verbally. The Houthi government in Yemen is different. Unable to directly send forces to fight for Gaza, they began enforcing a blockade of the Red Sea against Israeli-owned ships and other ships carrying goods to or from Israel. Since mid-November 2023, the Houthis have conducted about 30 attacks on international vessels transiting the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden but none of the attacks have caused casualties or sunk any ships.
In response, the Biden administration, without Congressional approval, has launched at least six rounds of bombing, including airstrikes on Sanaa, the capital of Yemen. The United Kingdom has contributed a few warplanes, while Australia, Canada, Holland and Bahrain also act as cheerleaders to provide the U.S. with the cover of leading an “international coalition.”
President Biden has admitted that U.S. bombing will not force Yemen to lift its blockade, but he insists that the U.S. will keep attacking it anyway. Saudi Arabia dropped 70,000 mostly American (and some British) bombs on Yemen in a 7-year war, but utterly failed to defeat the Houthi government and armed forces.
Yemenis naturally identify with the plight of the Palestinians in Gaza, and a million Yemenis took to the street to support their country’s position challenging Israel and the United States. Yemen is no Iranian puppet, but as with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran’s Iraqi and Syrian allies, Iran has trained the Yemenis to build and deploy increasingly powerful anti-ship, cruise and ballistic missiles.
The Houthis have made it clear that they will stop the attacks once Israel stops its slaughter in Gaza. It beggars belief that instead of pressing for a ceasefire in Gaza, Biden and his clueless advisers are instead choosing to deepen U.S. military involvement in a regional Middle East conflict.
The United States and Israel have now conducted airstrikes on the capitals of four neighboring countries: Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Iran also suspects U.S. and Israeli spy agencies of a role in two bomb explosions in Kerman in Iran, which killed about 90 people and wounded hundreds more at a commemoration of the fourth anniversary of the U.S. assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020.
On January 20, an Israeli bombing killed 10 people in Damascus, including 5 Iranian officials. After repeated Israeli airstrikes on Syria, Russia has now deployed warplanes to patrol the border to deter Israeli attacks, and has reoccupied two previously vacated outposts built to monitor violations of the demilitarized zone between Syria and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
Iran has responded to the terrorist bombings in Kerman and Israeli assassinations of Iranian officials with missile strikes on targets in Iraq, Syria and Pakistan. Iranian Foreign Minister Amir-Abdohallian has strongly defended Iran’s claim that the strikes on Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan targeted agents of Israel’s Mossad spy agency.
Eleven Iranian ballistic missiles destroyed an Iraqi Kurdish intelligence facility and the home of a senior intelligence officer, and also killed a wealthy real estate developer and businessman, Peshraw Dizayee, who had been accused of working for the Mossad, as well as of smuggling Iraqi oil from Kurdistan to Israel via Turkey.
The targets of Iran’s missile strikes in northwest Syria were the headquarters of two separate ISIS-linked groups in Idlib province. The strikes precisely hit both buildings and demolished them, at a range of 800 miles, using Iran’s newest ballistic missiles called Kheybar Shakan or Castle Blasters, a name that equates today’s U.S. bases in the Middle East with the 12th and 13th century European crusader castles whose ruins still dot the landscape.
Iran launched its missiles, not from north-west Iran, which would have been closer to Idlib, but from Khuzestan province in south-west Iran, which is closer to Tel Aviv than to Idlib. So these missile strikes were clearly intended as a warning to Israel and the United States that Iran can conduct precise attacks on Israel and U.S. “crusader castles” in the Middle East if they continue their aggression against Palestine, Iran and their allies.
At the same time, the U.S. has escalated its tit-for-tat airstrikes against Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The Iraqi government has consistently protested U.S. airstrikes against the militias as violations of Iraqi sovereignty. Prime Minister Sudani’s military spokesman called the latest U.S. airstrikes “acts of aggression,” and said, “This unacceptable act undermines years of cooperation… at a time when the region is already grappling with the danger of expanding conflict, the repercussions of the aggression on Gaza.”
After its fiascos in Afghanistan and Iraq killed thousands of U.S. troops, the United States has avoided large numbers of U.S. military casualties for ten years. The last time the U.S. lost more than a hundred troops killed in action in a year was in 2013, when 128 Americans were killed in Afghanistan.
Since then, the United States has relied on bombing and proxy forces to fight its wars. The only lesson U.S. leaders seem to have learned from their lost wars is to avoid putting U.S. “boots on the ground.” The U.S. dropped over 120,000 bombs and missiles on Iraq and Syria in its war on ISIS, while Iraqis, Syrians and Kurds did all the hard fighting on the ground.
In Ukraine, the U.S. and its allies found a willing proxy to fight Russia. But after two years of war, Ukrainian casualties have become unsustainable and new recruits are hard to find. The Ukrainian parliament has rejected a bill to authorize forced conscription, and no amount of U.S. weapons can persuade more Ukrainians to sacrifice their lives for a Ukrainian nationalism that treats large numbers of them, especially Russian speakers, as second class citizens.
Now, in Gaza, Yemen and Iraq, the United States has waded into what it hoped would be another “US-casualty-free” war. Instead, the U.S.-Israeli genocide in Gaza is unleashing a crisis that is spinning out of control across the region and may soon directly involve U.S. troops in combat. This will shatter the illusion of peace Americans have lived in for the last ten years of U.S. bombing and proxy wars, and bring the reality of U.S. militarism and warmaking home with a vengeance.
Biden can continue to give Israel carte-blanche to wipe out the people of Gaza, and watch as the region becomes further engulfed in flames, or he can listen to his own campaign staff, who warn that it’s a “moral and electoral imperative” to insist on a ceasefire. The choice could not be more stark.
New Zealand’s defence minister has defended a decision to send six NZ Defence Force staff to the Middle East to help “take out” Houthis fighters as they are “essentially holding the world to ransom”.
On Tuesday, Prime Minister Christopher Luxon, Foreign Minister Winston Peters and Defence Minister Judith Collins confirmed the plan at the first Cabinet meeting for the year.
The deployment, which could run until the end of July, will support the military efforts led by the United States to protect commercial and merchant vessels.
The Houthis attacks are disrupting supply lines, and forcing ships to voyage thousands of kilometres further around Africa in protest against the Israeli war on Gaza.
‘Firmly on side of Western backers of Israel’
A security analyst also said the US-requested deployment could be interpreted as New Zealand “planting its flag firmly on the side of the Western backers of Israel”.
Speaking to RNZ Morning Report, Defence Minister Judith Collins denied it showed New Zealand being in support of Israel over the war on Gaza.
She said it was a “very difficult situation”, but not what the deployment was about.
“It’s about the ability to get our goods to market . . . we’re talking about unarmed merchant vessels moving through the Red Sea no longer able to do so without being attacked.”
Collins said New Zealand had been involved in the Middle East for a “very long time” and it needed to assist where possible to remain a good international partner and to make sure military targets were “taken out”.
Houthis had been given a number of serious warnings, Collins said, and its actions were “outrageous”.
“They are essentially holding the world to ransom.”
NZ would not allow ‘pirates’
New Zealand was part of the world community and would not stand by and allow “pirates to take over our ships or anyone’s ships”.
Collins said she was not expecting there to be any extension or expansion of the deployment which would end on July 31.
The opposition Labour Party is condemning the coalition government’s deployment of Defence Force troops to the Middle East, saying it has “shades of Iraq”.
Labour foreign affairs spokesperson David Parker made clear his party’s opposition to the deployment.
“We don’t think we should become embroiled in that conflict . . . which is part of a longer term civil war in Yemen and we think that New Zealand should stay out of this, there’s no UN resolution in favour of it . . . we don’t think we should get involved in a conflict in the Middle East.”
‘Deeply disturbing’, say Greens
The Green Party’s co-leaders have also expressed their unhappiness with the deployment, describing it as “deeply disturbing”.
In a statement, Marama Davidson and James Shaw said they were “horrified at this government’s decision to further inflame tensions in the Middle East”.
“The international community has an obligation to protect peace and human rights. Right now, what we are witnessing in the Middle East is a regional power play between different state and non-state groups. This decision is only likely to inflame tensions.”
Davidson and Shaw indicated they would call for an urgent debate on the deployment when Parliament resumes next week.
This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.
“How dare we have a conversation about trade when there are children right now being treated without anaesthetic?”
British journalist Myriam Francois on the Houthis blockade of shipments in the Red sea amid Israel’s war on Gaza. pic.twitter.com/Yg9RV2ek4p
