Category: Laos

  • Laos will merge several government ministries, reducing their number from 17 to 13, in a bid to cut costs and improve efficiency, the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party said in a plan released over the weekend.

    The party’s Central Committee said the restructuring was “necessary” to streamline and strengthen state affairs.

    But state employees said they were “confused” by the decision, noting that they had yet to receive any direct order — and didn’t know what it meant for potential job cuts.

    “We haven’t seen any official documents yet,” an official with the Ministry of Planning and Investment said on Monday, speaking on condition of anonymity due to fear of reprisal.

    “We heard a rumor … through social media” which said the Central Committee would “reduce employees or offer early retirement,” he said.

    Merging ministries

    The administration plan released over the weekend called for merging the Ministry of Planning and Investment into the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Energy and Mines into the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.

    It also said the Ministry of Natural Resources would be combined with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to become the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment.

    Additionally, the Ministry of Home Affairs was placed under the purview of the Party Central Committee’s Personnel and Organization Committee.

    Separately, the government’s media affairs department will now be overseen by the Party Central Committee’s Propaganda and Training Board. The Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism will become the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.

    The changes come as the leadership of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, or LPRP, approach the end of their five-year tenure, with elections for leaders set for next year. Lao is a one-party state, and leaders are selected by party officials.

    According to the ruling party’s administration plan, the number of state employees totaled 168,572 in 2024, excluding members of the armed forces. It was not immediately clear how many state employees would be affected by the restructuring.

    A Ministry of Home Affairs employee with knowledge of the Administration Plan confirmed to RFA on Monday that a merging had been agreed upon, but wasn’t yet underway.

    “We’re keeping our eyes on the news,” said the employee, who also declined to be named. “They should send official notifications and hold press conferences [to proceed with the merge]. But as of now we are working as usual.”

    ‘A lot to get done’

    A high-ranking official with the Ministry of Energy and Mines told RFA that she was unclear how state employees will be structured going forward, and said it may “take some time” to rearrange the workforce.

    “We have to wait for the process,” she said, adding that “I hope our new layout will be better.”

    The Energy and Mines official also noted that this is not the first time the ruling party has updated its plan, explaining that “it is normal to adjust administration to be on the right track, suitable with current conditions.”

    Another official from the Ministry of Energy and Mines could only say that the move had begun, adding that “it must be a lot to get done.”

    After the central administration restructuring is completed, the government will turn to rearranging local administration, which is expected to take place in July, state employees told RFA.

    The Central Committee has also called on the National Assembly’s Standing Committee to look into reducing the number of parliamentary committees from nine to five for its 2026-2030 term.

    In addition to the restructuring, Laos is also amending its Constitution and other laws to regulate state affairs, which the National Assembly will debate and approve during an extraordinary session next week.

    Translated by RFA Lao. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • [Read coverage of this story in Lao]

    Last year, an acquaintance approached Mali* with a proposition. A wealthy Chinese couple unable to conceive was looking for a surrogate. The going rate, about $6,000 to $7,000 plus daily spending money, represented a significant sum in a country where the monthly minimum wage is $82.

    “My friend used to be a surrogate mother, so she asked me if I wanted to be. I wanted to earn money,” Mali told RFA in an interview. “I wanted the money to build my own house.”

    At a clinic in Boten, which sits just across the border from China’s Yunnan province, a team of Chinese doctors deemed Mali fit for surrogacy and implanted her with a fertilized embryo. She was then moved to what she described as a “luxury hotel.”

    There, alongside women from Laos, Thailand and Myanmar, Mali began her nine-month wait.

    Surrogacy in Laos is illegal, but that has not prevented a shadow industry from taking hold. With its proximity to China, steep rates of poverty and high levels of corruption, the country has become the latest in Southeast Asia to attract those seeking commercial surrogates.

    Today, brokers routinely advertise for surrogates on Facebook. In one post, a broker promises up to 50,000 Chinese yuan ($6,890), with all expenses covered. Another promises 45,000 yuan, including an upfront payment of 3,000 yuan and more than $500 a month extra.

    “An air-conditioned room is provided,” the advertisement boasts.

    This ad seeking a surrogate was posted on Facebook on Jan. 29, 2025. It reads “A surrogate is needed. The compensation is 45,000 Chinese yuan. 3,000 Chinese yuan can be paid a month in advance. There is extra pay for food of 3 million [Lao kip] per month. An air-conditioned room is provided, plus there is extra pay for food and another monthly payment of 12 million [kip] per month.
    This ad seeking a surrogate was posted on Facebook on Jan. 29, 2025. It reads “A surrogate is needed. The compensation is 45,000 Chinese yuan. 3,000 Chinese yuan can be paid a month in advance. There is extra pay for food of 3 million [Lao kip] per month. An air-conditioned room is provided, plus there is extra pay for food and another monthly payment of 12 million [kip] per month.
    (RFA)

    Thailand banned commercial surrogacy in 2015, and Cambodia followed suit a year later, while surrogacy in Vietnam has been banned — with some exceptions — since 2003. Although all three countries have continued to see cases of illegal surrogacy, Laos was the sole regional gray-zone destination, with surrogacy neither regulated nor outright banned.

    In July 2021, the government outlawed commercial surrogacy, but with the infrastructure already in place, such legislation does not appear to have halted the industry.

    As with the brokers, fertility clinics continue to advertise surrogacy services in Laos. One Chinese service with programs in Laos and Kazakhstan promises a “fully-operated” medical center, unlimited attempts at a successful birth and a full refund if an infant fails to materialize. Packages begin at $60,000.

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    Mali, who spoke with RFA on the condition of anonymity because of the illegal nature of the work, offers a rare insight into how the cross-border industry operates.

    The team that handled Mali’s in vitro fertilization was made up of Chinese doctors and nurses, with a Lao interpreter providing support and helping arrange paperwork. Two months after the successful implantation of the embryo, Mali began traveling to China each month for checkups.

    Mali said she was given a border pass, which helped her get past border guards who have been trying to crack down on cases of Lao women being trafficked into China by marriage brokers.

    “The immigrant police officers tend to investigate any young Lao women who use a passport for crossing to China,” Mali explained to RFA.

    After the checkups in China, Mali would return via the same border crossing and continue to wait out her days in the hotel, where healthcare workers were on hand to keep an eye on the surrogates’ health.

    “The Chinese will pay for all fees like food, facilities, checkup fee, hospital fee and other fees. The surrogate woman does not need to be responsible for anything,” she said. “The only requirement is that the girl must be healthy.”

    The Boten Special Economic Zone in Laos, April 9, 2024.
    The Boten Special Economic Zone in Laos, April 9, 2024.
    (Lauren DeCicca/Getty Images)

    The 2021 law on the management of surrogacy and abortion deems altruistic surrogacy legal for married Lao couples unable to conceive naturally, but dictates that the surrogate must be a married maternal relative, aged 18 to 35, and free of a number of health conditions.

    “The law does not allow Lao women to carry a pregnancy for other people,” said a Lao public security officer who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he is not allowed to speak to the media. “They are not allowed to carry babies for foreigners including the Chinese. If it happens that means it is happening illegally.”

    Violating the law is dangerous. Facebook ads calling for surrogates attract commentators who point out the illegality of the practice. A local newspaper recently posted the human trafficking law under which surrogates can be prosecuted. With fines ranging from $450 to $45,000 and prison sentences from 5 years to life, the risks for would-be surrogates are incredibly steep.

    Then, there is the physical and sometimes emotional burden.

    And yet, women keep signing up, desperate for the opportunity a few thousand dollars might provide.

    At the end of January, Mali gave birth by C-section. All she knew about the parents was what the broker had shared — they were rich and couldn’t conceive. What she knew about the baby was what she saw in the briefest of moments before he was taken away: He was a boy, and he looked Chinese.

    “I know it is not my gene, but I carried the baby,” she said. “I saw the baby growing up everyday. I started to cry seeing the baby taken away.”

    Translated by Khamsao Civilize. Additional reporting by Abby Seiff. Edited by Abby Seiff and Jim Snyder.

    *Name has been changed for security reasons.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • BANGKOK – The Xayaburi hydro dam that blocks the Mekong River in Laos includes a system of passages and locks intended to keep fish moving up and down Southeast Asia’s longest river.

    Six years after the dam began operating and despite research funded by Australian aid, there are still doubts this system, intended to protect freshwater fisheries that are crucial to millions of people, works.

    What is Xayaburi dam?

    The Xayaburi dam is the first of numerous major dams planned for the Mekong, mostly in Laos. Some research has predicted the Mekong fishery – a chief source of protein and livelihoods for tens of millions of people in Southeast Asia – will decline by half if all are built.

    It is well established globally that hydro dams destroy fisheries because they prevent migratory species of fish from reaching feeding, spawning and nursery habitats.

    Arguments and activism against more dams could be strengthened if it is shown the Xayaburi fish passage is ineffective.

    What is the research about?

    Since 2019, fisheries experts from New South Wales-based Charles Sturt University have received Australian government funding to study the Xayaburi fish passage. Last year, they got further funding to extend the research until 2029.

    The researchers have a confidentiality agreement with the dam operator, Xayaburi Power Company Ltd., which has a final say about what information is released and how it is portrayed.

    The experts have published some research but not responded to questions on the record because of the confidentiality agreement.

    They, in funding proposals obtained under Australia’s Freedom of Information Act, say it’s inevitable more dams will be built on the Mekong. They also point out that the economic and social case for the hydro dams is tenuous.

    Citing Xayaburi, they pointed out it is projected to generate only modest profits whereas the potential damage to Mekong fisheries, which have an annual value of US$7-$8 billion, and the economies of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam is high.

    Still, the researchers say their work could help improve the performance of fish passages and influence the design of future dams. They say they have a narrow window of opportunity this decade to mitigate damage to the Mekong.

    A general view of the future site of the Luang Prabang dam is seen on the Mekong River outskirt of Luang Prabang province, Laos, Feb. 5, 2020.
    A general view of the future site of the Luang Prabang dam is seen on the Mekong River outskirt of Luang Prabang province, Laos, Feb. 5, 2020.
    (Panu Wongcha-um/Reuters)

    How did they conduct research?

    The Australian researchers working with Lao counterparts and Xayaburi Power Company staff used electroshock fishing to stun and capture several thousand Mekong fish.

    They are implanted with a microchip encased in a glass tube and released back to the river – many in the vicinity of the Xayaburi dam. Between 2019 and April 2024, nearly 4,900 microchipped fish were released into the Mekong.

    Antennae at the entrance and exit of the 480-meter long fish passage that extends from the right of the dam detect the microchips.

    The researchers said the results are “promising” because over a three-year period more than 80% of the 1,290 fish that were detected at the entrance were also eventually detected at its exit.

    That figure is less promising in another light – only some of the microchipped fish ever find their way into the fish passage. And once at its exit there’s another step to get beyond the dam – moving through intermittently operating locks.

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    In September 2022, another antennae array was installed to detect microchipped fish that had moved through either of two locks and got past the dam.

    Researchers said 400 microchipped fish were detected beyond the dam over nearly two years. That appears to be only a small proportion of the fish released at the dam.

    The researchers calculated that percentage, but have not released it nor the number of fish released near the dam.

    They noted it was challenging to calculate an “unbiased estimate” of the locks’ effectiveness because their antennae were installed three years after the research program began and they also had outages.

    As the research has continued, there is now likely more comprehensive data but because of the confidentiality agreement it is not clear it will be published.

    Did the researchers face constraints?

    The Australian researchers stressed the importance of studying whether fish can get past the dam in both directions — moving up the river and down it.

    However, for the first five years of the research, they lacked a sufficient budget to do that and Xayaburi Power Company had requested they only study upstream migration. It’s unclear why the company imposed that condition.

    A major shareholder in the dam, Thailand’s CK Power, did not respond to RFA’s questions.

    The researchers suggested there were political advantages to a limited scope of research even though it would limit the applicability of their work to other dams.

    “Focusing on upstream migration, at least initially, effectively mitigates a series of risks because our team is only focusing on one aspect,” they said. “The political pressure to provide answers to all migration questions is significantly reduced by this focused scope.”

    A general view of the future site of the Luang Prabang dam is seen on the Mekong River outskirt of Luang Prabang province, Laos, Feb. 5, 2020.
    A general view of the future site of the Luang Prabang dam is seen on the Mekong River outskirt of Luang Prabang province, Laos, Feb. 5, 2020.
    (Panu Wongcha-um/Reuters)

    How do other experts view the research?

    According to a study published last year, the researchers released more than 230 microchipped fish into the Mekong River in April 2022 some 350 kilometers (217 miles) downstream of the Xayaburi dam.

    More than a year later, five of those fish were detected in the dam’s fish passage.

    The study said the results showed the importance of including fish passages like that at Xayaburi in future Mekong dams.

    Other experts said the data underlined the dangers since the fish had migrated through locations where planned dams would block the river.

    Another point critics of Mekong dams make is that they’ll have compounding negative effects on fisheries.

    Even if something like 50% or 60% of fish could get past a dam, since each successive dam would quickly whittle down the proportion that completes the entire journey to a single-digit percentage.

    Edited by Taejun Kang.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Stephen Wright for RFA.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • About 20 families whose homes were affected by a deadly explosion last week in northern Laos are using their own money for immediate repairs because they don’t expect financial help from the provincial government, people with knowledge of the situation told Radio Free Asia.

    The Laotians are buying materials to hastily fix their homes following the blast in Nami village in Oudomxay province’s Xay district on Feb. 14 caused by illegal explosives inside a burning Chinese-owned vehicle parts shop.

    The explosion killed one Laotian and three Chinese nationals and injured nine others. Police said they are investigating the incident, which also severely damaged nearby buildings and some vehicles.

    Provincial officials sent about 380 soldiers to the area on Feb. 14-17 to help residents repair homes, while relevant officials assess the cost of the damage to compensate those affected, a villager who is a relative of an affected resident said Wednesday.

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    “Those affected cannot live in their houses, so they are fixing them immediately on their own,” he said.

    The roofs, ceilings, door and outside gates of several nearby homes were damaged in the explosion, though the main structures are intact, said the person who declined to be identified for fear of reprisal for speaking to the media.

    However, the residents don’t expect aid from the government, so they are repairing their houses at their own expense because provincial authorities have not publicly discussed any compensation for them, he said.

    A local official told RFA that relevant authorities have been collecting information about the damage so they can plan a budget to compensate those affected.

    “The officials have been busy collecting information since last week, and they are now finalizing the figures,” he said.

    Translated by Ounkeo Souksavanh for RFA Lao. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Laos.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Police in northern Laos said that last Friday’s deadly blast in a burning Chinese-owned vehicle parts shop that killed four people and injured three others was caused by illegal explosives located inside.

    Though police could not confirm why the shop had a huge quantity of explosives on the premises, Oudomxay province’s chief of police said they were for “sale or other purposes,” and that that they are investigating.

    “The shop owner smuggled the explosives and detonators and stored them away in his shop … and we don’t know exactly why yet,” he told reporters on Saturday. “We are still gathering information.”

    The blast killed one Laotian and three Chinese nationals and critically injured another three Chinese. In addition, the surrounding buildings were severely damaged including a newly-built luxury house.

    Chinese presence is palpable in Oudomxay and other regions in northern Laos, fueled in part by construction of the US$6 billion high-speed railway connecting Kunming, China to the Lao capital Vientiane.

    Further investigation

    Police were also unable to confirm what started the initial fire, an officer told RFA Lao on Monday.

    “We are still gathering evidence and we’re not sure,” the officer said. “I am just in the office, so I don’t really know that many details.”

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    RFA also asked the nearby military headquarters and the Department of Industry and Commerce, but both declined to provide information and suggested following official announcements on the matter.

    Meanwhile, the Chinese Consulate in nearby Luang Prabang province sent staff to visit the injured Chinese, a consular official, who requested not to be named, told RFA Lao.

    “The Chinese Consulate is not sure about the responsibility,” he said. “For any reason, the Chinese Consulate also cannot release any detailed information to the news media.”

    Meanwhile, while visiting with victims in a nearby hospital, Chinese Consular General Zhang Sheping called on the Lao government to determine the origin of the explosion and share information with the Chinese government, local media reported.

    What were the explosives for?

    The shop was probably hiding the explosives that would be used for mining purposes, a resident of Xay district told RFA Monday on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

    “Many people said it was some Chinese businessmen working together to bring in the explosives or that the owner was helping someone else store the explosive materials, and these are used in gold mining.”

    Another resident on Monday said that while officials were cleaning up, nobody was allowed on the shop premises.

    “I think they finished cleaning up yesterday, he said. “I think it is still under police investigation.

    Translated by RFA Lao. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • A Lao woman who traveled to China for an arranged marriage warned others to demand legal documents and to have in-person meetings with potential husbands before leaving the country.

    Any woman who enters into what she called a “sham marriage” runs the risk of being trafficked to another man after they arrive in China, she told Radio Free Asia.

    “To those who may want to come to China, they should think and do research carefully,” she said, requesting anonymity for security reasons. “They shouldn’t decide without knowing what they could be facing. I experienced that myself.”

    A newlywed man shows marriage books for him and his wife in Luliang, northern China’s Shanxi province on Feb. 11, 2025.
    A newlywed man shows marriage books for him and his wife in Luliang, northern China’s Shanxi province on Feb. 11, 2025.
    (Adek Berry/AFP)

    The woman said she jumped at the chance to move to China two years ago for an arranged marriage. But eventually she realized that a promised 60 million kip (US$2,750) payment was never going to come.

    “I heard many people say marrying a Chinese man would help to solve financial problems and make life more comfortable,” she said in an interview on Feb. 4. “I had too much excitement from a lack of experience at that time.”

    Arranged marriages between Chinese men and young Lao women have become more common in recent years as the women and their families seek financial security amid Laos’ bleak economy.

    A Lao anti-human trafficking activist who goes by the name Ms. Dee told RFA last month that a middleman is usually involved in forming an agreement. The young women and their families are paid at most 30,000 yuan (US$4,150) while the middlemen keep the remainder of the fee, which can be around 200,000 Chinese yuan (US$27,500), she said.

    “After being sent to China, the Lao girls of course expect to receive some money that they can send home to support their families. But in fact, their Chinese husbands refuse,” Ms. Dee said.

    ‘Just go with him’

    Another Lao woman told RFA in a separate interview that a middleman sold her to a man three days after she arrived in China.

    “I was told not to be too particular,” she said on Feb. 10. “Just go with him. I have no choice at all.”

    The middleman added that she would get paid for the marriage after about six months, and could then “run away with a new man and get paid again,” she said.

    But the money never came, and she said she worries that a typical 16-year-old Lao girl could also be easily tricked by middlemen who promise monthly payments of 2,000 yuan (US$275) to send to family back in Laos.

    “The middlemen always gave them nice images of being married to Chinese men. ‘He’ll buy you a smart phone, nice clothes, new shoes,‘” she said. “All those materialistic things plus thinking of being out of poverty.”

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    The woman who spoke to RFA on Feb. 4 said Lao women could end up with a Chinese man who has a criminal record and isn’t able to provide legal marriage documents.

    “If the Chinese man cannot come to Laos and provide you with any legal documents, be aware and never believe that,” she said. “Don’t believe it if a middleman told you they will provide all needed documents when you have arrived in China.”

    She added: “You cannot trust the middleman. They will not pay you after you are sent to China.”

    A Lao official at the Anti-Trafficking Department told RFA that the middlemen often target young women from hill tribes who lack awareness and whose families have financial hardship.

    Translated by Khamsao Civilize. Edited by Matt Reed.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.


  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • A fire and explosion at a Chinese-owned shop in northern Laos on Friday killed four people, including Chinese nationals, and injured several others, the Chinese consulate in Luang Prabang said.

    The blast occurred around 10 a.m. local time at the shop in Xay district in Oudomxay province, the consulate said. China’s Xinhua News Agency said it happened in Nami village and caused significant damage to surrounding houses.

    A fire truck sits outside a badly damaged commercial property as black smoke billows into the sky in Xay district of Oudomxay province in northern Laos, Feb. 14, 2025.
    A fire truck sits outside a badly damaged commercial property as black smoke billows into the sky in Xay district of Oudomxay province in northern Laos, Feb. 14, 2025.
    (Lao Red Cross in Oudomxay province)

    “After fire rescue [arrived], the fire was [put] under control and the injured were sent to the hospital,” the consulate said, adding that the cause of the incident is under investigation.

    Witnesses confirmed the blast to RFA Lao but had few details. Photos circulated by the Lao Red Cross in Oudomxay showed a fire truck parked at the front a badly damaged commercial property, with black smoke billowing into the sky.

    The consulate in Luang Prabang, which is also located in northern Laos, said the Chinese Embassy and consulate had activated an emergency response.

    An aerial view of the ruins of a Chinese-owned shop in Xay district of Oudomxay province in northern Laos, following an explosion on Feb. 14, 2025.
    An aerial view of the ruins of a Chinese-owned shop in Xay district of Oudomxay province in northern Laos, following an explosion on Feb. 14, 2025.
    (Oudomxay Province Red Cross Emergency Rescue Unit)

    Chinese presence is palpable in Oudomxay and other regions in northern Laos, fueled in part by construction of the US$6 billion high-speed railway connecting Kunming, China to the Lao capital Vientiane.

    Despite the injection of investment, Laotians have complained that Chinese have an outsized economic influence over its small Southeast Asian neighbor.

    Edited by Joshua Lipes and Mat Pennington.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Roseanne Gerin for RFA English.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Defying orders from Lao officials, a Chinese-owned potash mining company hasn’t stopped operating near two massive sinkholes in central Laos, a Lao official, a worker and residents told Radio Free Asia.

    On Dec. 4, a sinkhole measuring 20 meters (65 feet) wide and 10 meters (33 feet) deep opened up on farmland in Thakhaek district’s Pak Peng village in Khammouane province. On Dec. 21, another sinkhole — about half the size of the first — formed nearby.

    Residents suspect the sinkholes are a result of excavation at a potash mine in neighboring Nong Bok district, operated by Sino-Agri International Potash Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of Asia Potash International Investment (Guangzhou) Co., Ltd., linked to entities directed by China’s governing State Council.

    No one has been injured by the cave-ins, but villagers are anxious that more holes will appear.

    Earlier this month, Lao authorities told the company to stop operations near the sinkholes.

    But on Wednesday, an official with the government team investigating the matter told RFA Lao on condition of anonymity that Sino-Agri International “has never stopped operating near the sinkhole area.”

    Residents, who also declined to be named due to security concerns, also confirmed to RFA that the potash mine “is still running,” and that they regularly hear operations underway near the sinkhole area.

    Attempts by RFA to contact Sino-Agri International went unanswered.

    An employee who wished to remain nameless said the company continues to work “both above and underground all the time,” adding that more workers are being hired.

    No probe results yet

    Meanwhile, after nearly two months, an investigation into the cause of the sinkholes wrapped up on Sunday, a government team member told RFA, but official results have yet to be released.

    The team will hold another meeting next week to outline the investigation results, he said, noting that while the probe was initially expected to be completed by Jan. 21, there is no hard deadline.

    Khammouane Province Governor Vanxay Phongsavanh, center, and his delegation inspect a sinkhole in Pakpeng village, Laos, Dec. 4, 2024.
    Khammouane Province Governor Vanxay Phongsavanh, center, and his delegation inspect a sinkhole in Pakpeng village, Laos, Dec. 4, 2024.
    (Khammouane News)

    On Monday, Lao Nation Radio reported that the investigation had concluded, but cited a statement from the investigating team that it said had failed to address whether Sino-Agri International caused the sinkholes.

    The statement said that Lao government officials are working with a team from the company to conduct a seismic survey of the site “by the beginning of February.”

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    Residents angered

    The latest information about the investigation comes nearly two weeks after residents expressed frustration with the probe’s initial findings, which state media said suggested that the sinkholes were unrelated to the potash mine.

    On Jan. 16, Lao media cited a team from the Ministry of Energy and Mines, experts from Lao National University, and technicians from Sino-Agri International in a report as saying that “the activities of the potash mine may not be the cause of the sinkholes,” but noted that the investigation was still underway.

    Khammouane Province Governor Vanxay Phongsavanh, left, and his delegation inspect a sinkhole in Pakpeng village, Laos, Dec. 4, 2024.
    Khammouane Province Governor Vanxay Phongsavanh, left, and his delegation inspect a sinkhole in Pakpeng village, Laos, Dec. 4, 2024.
    (Khammouane News)

    Residents of Thakhek district were quick to dismiss the report.

    “They [the city and provincial officials] are like that — they don’t want the villagers to know,“ said one resident at the time. ”But the truth is nothing like this has happened before … The sinkholes are pretty close to their [the mine operator’s] drilling tunnel — no more than 150 meters (500 feet).”

    ‘We don’t know the real cause’

    An official with the Ministry of Energy and Mines investigation team told RFA at the time that his group was working daily to find the cause of the sinkholes.

    “As for the potash mine, we didn’t say it [the sinkholes] was related to the mine yet because we don’t know the real cause,” he said.

    But other residents said that while Lao authorities had consulted with Sino-Agri International during the investigation, “they ignored our concerns.”

    “It must be related to the mine since it happened while the tunnel was being drilled, and before exploration occurred,” another resident said. “Villagers can’t carry out a technical analysis, but according to our observation this is the first time something like this has happened [here] in decades.”

    Translated by RFA Lao. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • On the Thai-Myanmar border, sick patients are being sent home from hospital. In Laos, school meals have been interrupted. And in Cambodia, hundreds of staff at the agency responsible for clearing land mines have been furloughed.

    The U.S. State Department on Friday announced a 90-day freeze on nearly all foreign aid, followed one day later by a suspension of global demining programs, according to the New York Times. The pause is intended to give the State Department time to review programs “to ensure they are efficient and consistent with U.S. foreign policy under the America First agenda,” according to the announcement notice.

    In the days since, stop-work orders have been sent by the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, to local implementing partners ranging from media organizations to health clinics.

    The U.S. is one of Southeast Asia’s largest providers of aid, and its withdrawal will be felt most in the region’s poorest nations: Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. Japan provides more to those countries, but the U.S. has gradually increased aid to Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar from $380 million in 2015 to almost $520 million in 2022, according to Grace Stanhope, a research associate at the Lowy Center who works on its Southeast Asia Aid Map.

    Relief supplies from USAID are loaded into a plane at the Yangon International airport on May 12, 2008.
    Relief supplies from USAID are loaded into a plane at the Yangon International airport on May 12, 2008.
    (Sgt. Andres Alcaraz/U.S. Marine Corps via AFP)

    Groups that work with Tibetans, Uyghurs and North Koreans are also feeling the pinch. These include the Tibetan government-in-exile, which is based in Dharamshala, India, and which supports the diaspora community.

    On Tuesday, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a waiver exempting “life-saving” humanitarian aid, including medicine, shelter and food aid.

    While both the order and State Department notice make clear that programs can restart once reviews are complete, the impact in many countries has been immediate. RFA spoke with government officials and NGO staffers to better understand what an aid freeze looks like on the ground.

    The Department declined to respond to specific questions over email.

    Myanmar:

    Saturday marks the fourth anniversary of the Feb. 1, 2021 coup, in which the military overthrew the democratically elected government, imprisoning its top leadership. The spiraling civil war that has ensued has displaced 3.4 million people and expanded the refugee population in neighboring Thailand.

    Within the days of the stop-work order, a range of U.S.-funded healthcare services began grinding to a halt. In fiscal year 2024, which runs from Oct. 1, 2023 to Sept. 30, 2024, the U.S. provided $141 million in humanitarian aid to Myanmar.

    “In-patients at the refugee camp hospital were discharged and told to return home because health workers have been suspended from their duties,” a health worker speaking on the condition of anonymity due to security reasons told RFA. Volunteers were trying to relocate critical patients and send pregnant women in labor to external hospitals, The Irrawaddy reported.

    The worker added that approximately 20 civil relief groups providing healthcare with USAID assistance along the Thai-Myanmar border are now at risk of being suspended. A Reuters report said the International Rescue Committee, which funds the clinics, told them they would have to shut down by Friday.

    People fleeing fighting between the Myanmar military and opposition forces shelter on the Thai side of the Moei river, in Mae Sot district on April 7, 2023.
    People fleeing fighting between the Myanmar military and opposition forces shelter on the Thai side of the Moei river, in Mae Sot district on April 7, 2023.
    (AFP)

    Along the Thai-Myanmar border, nine refugee camps provide shelter to nearly 140,000 people.

    Inside those camps, schools have already “suffered a huge impact,” said Banyar, founder of the Karenni Human Rights Group. Teacher salaries would have to be halted and a pause on the purchase of textbooks and other school supplies, he said.

    Those who work on HIV/AIDS programs said they fear the funding may not resume. According to the CDC there are about 100,000 orphans in Myanmar due to AIDS, and testing and treatment programs have allowed hundreds of thousands to access antiretrovirals as well as lower the likelihood of contracting the virus in the first place.

    On Tuesday, the Trump administration issued a waiver permitting distribution of HIV medications, but this does not appear to restart broader preventative programs.

    In Bangladesh, where more than 1 million Rohingya who fled violence in Myanmar live in chronically underfunded refugee camps, there has been confusion over whether U.S.-funded food programs will continue. Last week, the Bangladesh government said that USAID would continue to provide food aid, but U.S. and U.N. officials appeared unsure where such information originated, according to a report from BenarNews.

    The pause has also already impacted a number of exile media newsrooms, which rely on small U.S. grants to provide open information in a country where journalists are routinely imprisoned, forcing a number of them to suspend staffers.

    A Rohingya refugee carrying a USAID bag reaches out to a woman as they arrive in Teknaf, Bangladesh on Sept. 9, 2017, after fleeing violence in neighboring Myanmar.
    A Rohingya refugee carrying a USAID bag reaches out to a woman as they arrive in Teknaf, Bangladesh on Sept. 9, 2017, after fleeing violence in neighboring Myanmar.
    (Emrul Kamal/AFP)

    Laos

    U.S.-funded programs in Laos range from maternal health to demining operations, a critical need in a country that remains the most heavily bombed in the world, per capita, as a result of U.S. aerial attacks in the 1960s and 70s during the Vietnam War. Less than 10 percent of land in Laos has been cleared of unexploded ordnance, according to Sera Koulabdara, CEO of Legacies of War, which works on education and advocacy around removal of landmines in Southeast Asia.

    “It is absolutely essential that we hold ourselves accountable for the devastation we caused,” she said. “Just this month in Laos, a 36-year-old man was killed while simply cooking, an innocent victim of an American war that continues to plague the country.”

    Chinese tourists take a photo with a China Aid plaque at the Patuxay Victory Monument on April 8, 2024, in Vientiane, Laos.
    Chinese tourists take a photo with a China Aid plaque at the Patuxay Victory Monument on April 8, 2024, in Vientiane, Laos.
    (Lauren DeCicca/Getty Images)

    A staffer at an agriculture NGO who spoke on the condition of anonymity as he was not authorized to speak to the press told RFA he was doubtful other foreign countries would be able to step in if U.S. funding was pulled.

    “After the COVID-19 pandemic, proposing for funding around the globe to support our projects is the biggest challenge — it is very difficult and the amount of the funds is also smaller now,” he said.

    The country faces a severe debt crisis that has sent the cost of food and other basic goods skyrocketing. In Houaphan, which is one of the poorest provinces in the country, a school meals program has already had to scale back, according to a teacher who spoke to RFA on the condition of anonymity.

    Cambodia

    Like Laos, Cambodia still struggles with the legacies of decades of conflict as unexploded ordnance continues to maim and kill. The U.S. halt on funding demining programs is likely to set the government back in its goal to be mine-free by the end of the year.

    Staffers with the Cambodia Mine Action Center clear a minefield in Preytotoeung village, Battambang province, Cambodia, Jan. 19, 2023.
    Staffers with the Cambodia Mine Action Center clear a minefield in Preytotoeung village, Battambang province, Cambodia, Jan. 19, 2023.
    (Heng Sinith/AP)

    Heng Ratana, head of the government’s Cambodian Mine Action Center, said the agency receives about $2 million a year from the U.S. government.

    As a result of the funding freeze, the center plans to furlough 210 members of its approximately 1,700 workforce nationwide, he told RFA.

    “It is a complete shutdown. It is like a forced shutdown,” Heng Ratana said. “We request continued support for the operation because the U.S. funding [agreement] clearly states that it is to clear unexploded ordnance.”

    Brian Eyler, the director of the Southeast Asia Program and the Energy, Water and Sustainability Program at the Stimson Center said the funding pause had impacted his own programs, which focus on the Mekong River as well as broader security issues.

    He noted that a report launch planned for this week on how the U.S. could counter cybercrime in Southeast Asia had been halted, though he hoped the freeze would soon be lifted.

    Nop Vy, executive director of the Cambodian Journalists’ Association, or CamboJa, said 20 to 30 percent of their funding came from USAID, which the group used to run journalist training programs and help fund the independent media outlet, CamboJA News. In recent years, a number of independent media outlets have shut down or been forced by the government to close, leaving a vacuum in access to open information.

    Chok Sopheap, then-executive director of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights, delivers a speech to mark International Women's Day, March 8, 2023, in Phnom Penh.
    Chok Sopheap, then-executive director of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights, delivers a speech to mark International Women’s Day, March 8, 2023, in Phnom Penh.
    (Heng Sinith/AP)

    Heng Kimhong, executive director of the Cambodian Youth Network, said that the suspension of U.S. government assistance would reduce some of its activities related to youth empowerment and the ability to protect natural resources. A USAID fact sheet issued last year noted that deforestation contributed heavily to climate change in Cambodia, which is considered particularly prone to natural disaster.

    Still, Heng Kimhong said he was “optimistic” funding would be restored as the U.S. is “not a country that only thinks about itself,” he said. “The United States is a country that protects and ensures the promotion of maintaining world order, building democracy, as well as building better respect for human rights.”

    Tibet

    Tibet’s government-in-exile, the Central Tibetan Administration, or CTA, represents the Tibetan diaspora and administers schools, health centers and government services for Tibetan exiles in India and Nepal.

    Several sources speaking on the condition of anonymity told RFA that the suspension affects programs run by the CTA, the Tibetan Parliament and a range of Tibet-related non-governmental organizations, raising concerns over the continuity of key welfare programs supporting Tibetans outside of China.

    An upcoming preparatory meeting for the Parliament-in-Exile was postponed as a result of the funding pause, sources told RFA.

    “The directive applies uniformly to all foreign aid recipients. Since Tibetan aid has been secured through congressional support and approval, efforts are underway to work with the State Department and relevant agencies to expedite the review and approval process for continued assistance,” Namgyal Choedup, the representative of the Office of Tibet in Washington, told RFA.

    A person holds an “Aid Tibet” sticker before a press conference to highlight the plight of Tibetans, on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., on March 28, 2023.
    A person holds an “Aid Tibet” sticker before a press conference to highlight the plight of Tibetans, on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., on March 28, 2023.
    (Stefani Reynolds/AFP)

    Various Tibetan NGOs and activist groups based in India expressed their concerns about the impact of the freeze in foreign assistance programs and said they hoped it would be soon lifted.

    Gonpo Dhondup, president of the Tibetan Youth Congress, emphasized the importance of U.S. aid for the Tibetan freedom movement and community stability. Tsering Dolma, president of the Tibetan Women’s Association, said assistance has been crucial for maintaining the exile Tibetan community.

    “Despite the 90-day suspension, I hope an alternative arrangement can be made to ensure continued U.S. support,” Tashi, a Tibetan resident in Dharamsala, told RFA.

    North Korea

    While the U.S. has long banned providing aid to the North Korean government, it has been a supporter of North Korean human rights organizations. Such programs help with global advocacy efforts on behalf of those living inside the closed nation, and also support refugees abroad.

    A representative from a North Korean human rights organization, who requested anonymity to speak freely, said the group received the stop-work order from their U.S. funders Saturday and requested an exemption waiver.

    “We will not be able to pay staff salaries, making furloughs or contract terminations inevitable. Backpay is also impossible because providing backpay would imply that employees worked during that period.”

    Ji Chul-ho, a North Korean escapee who is the director of external relations at the South Korea-based rights organization NAUH, told RFA he worried about the longer term impacts of such a pause.

    “While this is said to be a temporary suspension of grant expenditures, I worry that it will lead to a reduction in North Korean human rights activities and make it harder for various organizations to raise their voices collectively,” he said.

    Sean Kang, co-founder of the Ohio-based North Korea Human Rights Watch, told RFA a funding pause was hugely disruptive.

    “U.S. government projects related to North Korea require meticulous planning and scheduling, maintaining security, and being carried out cautiously over the medium to long term,” he said. “A three-month [pause] in such projects can cause significant disruptions, and if funding is ultimately canceled, all the efforts made so far could be wasted, leading to an even greater loss.”

    Reporting by RFA Burmese, RFA Khmer, RFA Korean, RFA Lao, and RFA Tibetan.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Eight o’clock, 14 July 2024

    I arrive at the office of Ajan Mala, a teacher at a Public Health School in southern Laos. We grab brooms, buckets, sponges and floor cleaner and she walks ahead of me towards the student dorm. As we get closer, she spots people in the distance and yells: “Students, come and help clean Amelie’s room!”. Her tone sounds commanding and makes me uncomfortable; I do not wish to force anyone to clean my room. But Ajan Mala turns around, smiles and says she is just joking, that this is like “a game between teachers and students.” She assures me there is “midtaphāb (friendship) between them.

    At the student dormitory, Ajan Mala unlocks the door of my room-to-be. Suddenly there are around fifteen adults who pick up brooms, open all windows and doors, carry out beds and wardrobes, sweep and scrub. Ajan Mala tells me to dust the cobwebs from the wardrobes, while they will take care of the room’s interior and the bathroom.

    I take a step back, feeling slightly overwhelmed by the rush and what to me appears chaotic action. Everything seems to happen at once: while people are still sweeping, one student finds a few pieces of green rubber hose that he links together and connects to a tap outside. Suddenly water floods the tiled floors, and gushes towards the wooden furniture I am still dusting off. Afraid of water damage to the untreated timber, I ask a student to help me move the furniture away from the deluge. I hear the noises of engines, and behind the back window, a couple of men slash the plants that had crossed the threshold between in and outside.

    There are some teachers who help and some who watch. The school director, dressed in pink tracksuit and sun hat, walks by, takes a video with her phone, and kicks some snails off the corridor walls with her parasol. I watch one teacher pull out some plant with its root and stick it inside a plastic cup she found on the ground. She adds some dirt and says she’ll take it home to her garden. Ajan Mala squats and scrubs the walls, while her colleague mops the floor. I start to relax amongst these people who are chatting, joking, yelling teasing comments across the corridor—and the place is getting cleaner.

    But the action is over as quickly as it started; students and teachers begin to disappear. As I notice a group walking away through the corridor, I run after them with biscuits as thanks. They share the biscuits and then leave. Once everyone is gone, I get down on the floor with a bucket of water-vinegar mix and a sponge, and give each tile a final, thorough scrub (much gecko poo has survived the water flood). I feel grateful as if I received a welcome gift. But it also occurs to me, that the students and teachers seem used to this; not of course, to clean a visiting anthropologists’ room, but to clean together.

    Collective cleaning as labour: ǭkhǣngngān

    Cleaning together at a worksite or educational facility is a routine practice of collective, physical labour in Lao PDR. At my field site people called it ǭkhǣngngān (ອອກແຮງງານ). When I first read the term in the weekly lesson timetable, I falsely translated it to “workout”. I expected ǭkhǣngngān would be some outdoors exercise regime (“ǭk” as “out”, “hǣng” as “strong”, and “ngān” as “work”). When the day came around, I asked a student what we will do this afternoon. She replied “ǭkhǣngngān!”, and I asked “mǣn nyang?” (“what is this/that”), so she said “anāmai” (tidy up). That afternoon, we swept concrete floors, scraped snail poo off walls, and squatted down to pull out weeds along paths. The weeds were piled up together with plastic rubbish and set alight.

    A nursing student uses rubber strip as fire lighter (Photo: author)

    My Lao friends tell me ǭkhǣngngān happens at every government-run workplace and school. The organised, institutional character of this labour can be observed in a number of aspects. A specific slot is allocated to ǭkhǣngngān in the school’s weekly timetable, usually on a Thursday or Friday afternoon. The task of the day is determined by a senior staff member. Lists of participation are kept which students and teachers sign, and all are expected to participate. The place to be cleaned is an outdoors area, in the vicinity of the classroom or school offices, and this location puts ǭkhǣngngān in full view of the public. In government news publications, stories of ǭkhǣngngān sessions abound accompanied with imagery of groups working together, especially in preparation for days of national celebration: tidying up around government buildings, pulling weeds at a military school, or sweeping in the capital’s public parks. At my field site too, students and staff take pictures of their tidying-up session to post on social media.

    The term ǭkhǣngngān also sets this activity apart from other occasions of working together. “Work” in Lao is more commonly referred to as vīak: housework (vīak hư̄an), work on rice fields (vīak nā ), or gardens (vīak sūan), going to work (pai vīak). The nursing students at my field site work in groups for assignments (vīak kūm) and do homework (vīak bān). With most work, they refer specifically to the practice: hā kin (look for food, or go and get food), hed kin (prepare food), anāmai (tidy up), keb (collect). During our lunch break, we climb up on chairs or use long sticks to reach tamarind pods and raw papayas in the trees, we search for edible leafy greens, peel bamboo shoots, make a fire to cook bamboo soup or grill buffalo skin, prepare a floormat and dishes to eat on the classroom floor, and tidy up after the meal. None of this collective, physical labour that occurs on a daily basis would make the news.

    Whilst ǭkhǣngngān is structured by the institution, these everyday practices of working together evolve dependent on people’s needs. Who participates and how depends on individuals’ motivations, skills and time. Often one person starts an activity which then spills over to others. People verbally organise each other to a degree, but this occurs spontaneously and according to emerging needs and desires identified by the students themselves—nothing is pre-set by an authority. All this work happens out of view from the institution (school staff). There is no fixed lunch group, but people drop in and out, some go home to eat with their family or to a restaurant. In comparison, ǭkhǣngngān at first sight appears to be an “unnatural” way of people working together at this school.

    If working together already takes place on a daily basis, and seems to work to fulfill people’s needs, what then is the point of ǭkhǣngngān, and to whom? Is it just a means to make people tidy those large, shared spaces outside the classroom and office that no one would take care of otherwise? Or are there other reasons to make people work together in this particular way?

    Possible answers as to why ǭkhǣngngān persists at state-run institutions in Lao PDR can be derived from its roots in a Marxist–Leninist concept of collective labour. This becomes clear when looking at how the concept of ǭkhǣngngān is taught in a Lao schoolbook on “Civic Education” for Year 5 students published in 2019:

    People’s labour (kanǭkhǣngngān khǭng khon) is related to movements that have a social character. In that labour, people need to coordinate together to move together as a group. If just alone, a single person cannot earn food to live and resist disasters or forces that occur in the natural world. The ancient primitive people (khon pathombūhān) lived in a group before to carry out labour that had a social character because of that society. Therefore, as products (phalidtaphan) that affect each other, there is a relationship between person and person (khon), and labour is a power (kamlang) that creates (sāng) the person (khon) and society (sangkhom).

    In this reading, labour as movement is social in both process and outcome. Social labour is naturalised because this is what allows humans to survive since the “ancient primitive people”. But this labour is about more than mere use-value, such as procurement of food or building of shelters that protect from wind and weather — because labour here is also a generative power to create the person and society as its “products”.

    This means that neither person nor society are understood as abstract conditions or identities pre-existing to interpersonal relationships and practices of labour. The term (ǭk)hǣngngān as labour in this sense is used in Laos in political contexts, such as the “International Labour Organization” (ongkanhǣngngānsākon), and government news stories might use the term to refer to workers (phūǭkhǣngngān).

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    The kretek cigarette industry and its devastating public health impacts are sustained via a huge apparatus of labour, and appeals to cultural nationalism

    The organisation of weekly ǭkhǣngngān at all Lao government workplaces and schools is thus based in a socialist political philosophy of creating people and society through physical, collective labour. It links historically to the Soviet socialist organisation of unpaid, physical labour on Saturdays under the name of ‘Subbotnik’. Frederick Kaplan quotes from the Soviet Regulations of Subbotniks which describes them as “one of the forms of propaganda of the idea of labor service and self -organization of the working class” and as “a laboratory of communist labor”. Lenin in his 1920 handbill Pervomaisky Subbotnik, following the first large-scale Subbotnik for the Moscow–Kazan Railway, describes this process as a “matter of transforming the very habits of the people” from an individualist, capitalist economy towards labouring according to the two socialist rules of ‘“All for each and each for all”’, and ‘“From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”, in order to gradually introduce “communist discipline and communist labour”.

    Ǭkhǣngngān at government institutions in Laos can then be interpreted as the (intended) enactment of a socialist political theory about how people and society come to be. This political and symbolic loading turns it into more than just a mere tidying-up session, and hence it has a different frame compared to other types of working-together at the school, as described above.

    This idea of labour as a transformative power that builds certain kinds of people also shines through in how education is described at my field site, where I was conducting ethnographic research on nursing education. The stated objectives of the nursing course use the language of “creating” or “building” students to become part of collectives as “good citizens” and “professional nurses of the ASEAN community”, with not only professional knowledge and nursing skills, but also with “revolutionary morals”, “correct political thinking”, and “patriotism and unity”. Ǭkhǣngngān as part of this education then presumably intends to practice the “rules” of socialist labour to be applied in the context of public health work. Simultaneously, it serves the practical need for tidying-up schools and workplaces in absence of paid maintenance personnel in Laos’ resource-poor public health and education system.

    The term “labour” in anthropology is often used to describe “physical toil, performed out of necessity, coercion, or domination”. Folz and Smith see this application influenced by Marx’s writings on labour exploitation and class struggle. But for Marx, the process of work/labour (Arbeitsprozess) to begin with has positive connotations as that which makes humans human, as a practice of turning one’s abstract ideas or imaginings into things of the material world (Marx 1967, 141–142). In Volume One of Capital he describes this ideal state of working as a “play” of human’s “physical and intellectual powers”. Only from this conception of the working process could Marx develop his theory of  Entfremdung (alienation) of humans to their own work activities in the capitalist mode of production—and thereby to themselves as humans, and to other humans, whose work (and being) is perceived as a mere commodity.

    Instead of simply interpreting ǭkhǣngngān as physical toil due to state-driven coercion of nursing students into labour, I want to experiment with Marx’ concept of physical labour as attempt to realise an abstract idea or imaginings: in this case, the idea itself that people and society are created through the power of labour, which underpins the institution of ǭkhǣngngān in Laos. Further, I want to return to Marx’ ideal notion of the working process as a “play” of our “physical and intellectual powers”. I argue that despite its seemingly restrictive set-up, the social situation that ǭkhǣngngān creates takes the form of play and re-imagining: within a “high level” imaginative frame, people working and studying at Lao institutions use their own imagination, invent their own rules and transgressions, and thereby create their own game in physical action with others.

    ǭkhǣngngān: playing with the regulations

    Above, I  outlined the basic organising characteristics of ǭkhǣngngān: the idea(l) situation and structure of mobilising physical labour. The first was a bounded temporality. A Lao friend who speaks English and has participated in ǭkhǣngngān said he would translate the term to “the day we clean together”. He emphasised the temporality of a day per week that was allocated to ǭkhǣngngān. At my field site, ǭkhǣngngān has a spot in the weekly class timetable on an afternoon at the end of the week. But despite this dedicated slot, teachers may also call students to ǭkhǣngngān on other days, such as when lessons are cancelled, a new term begins, or for special visitors.

    The actual beginning and ending of ǭkhǣngngān, as I observed it, are rather fluid. Some students and teachers who live nearby go home during lunch break, change outfit from their uniforms to casual clothes and return for the clean-up. Others just wait in the airconditioned classroom until it is time, take naps, eat snacks, drink the odd rice spirit and chat. When people re-gather, it takes some time to determine the location of the clean-up in communication between teachers and students, for people to make their way to that location, to gather cleaning equipment and get started. Action subsides when people spontaneously decide it is enough. This happens less by verbal communication and rather by simply stopping and doing something else.

    Watching others finish in their own time is also totally normal and accepted. Distractions come easy: if a market seller walks through, with bags of bamboo shoots and sour fruit hanging off the ends of a stick over her shoulders, students and teachers stop to buy and eat, always inviting others with a vigorous “kin, kin!” (eat, eat!). Most ǭkhǣngngān that I participated in took no longer than an hour (prior to national holidays, they took up to three hours), but the lesser part of that time would be actually spent with cleaning up.

    In terms of outcome, an expected end goal of ǭkhǣngngān, in my experience, is not clearly defined. The direct objective is indeed to create some level of spatial order (which follows its own logic) and some people show a lot of commitment: they bring their own tools from home, expose themselves to toxic smoke, pick weeds with bare hands, and sharpen the blades of a grass cutter with a circular saw (and no goggles). Yet, incapable of achieving anything close to complete order—the school (a former hospital) is huge, the people few, the buildings in various stages of decay, and any plant grows at an enormous speed during the wet season—people seem to follow their own energy level and motivation in how much they clean up.

    Effectiveness comes second to play: two adult men carry a basket of weeds away that a single boy could master, hold on to one handle each and joke about. While some students still sweep, rake and burn-off, another asks his classmate to take a video of his latest karaoke/dance performance. There is no “vote” or formal collective decision-making process to stop. But once most people have stopped, the final finish call “phǭ (enough) and “mư̄a bān (go home) come from the class leader or a teacher.

    People do not celebrate or preserve the results of their labour either. The day we cleaned up my room, I discovered a half-eaten package of biscuits with crumbs covering the ground that was cleaned fifteen minutes earlier. I see people frequently throw plastic and cigarette butts in the grass around the classroom which they clean up at the next ǭkhǣngngān. And the rubbish and weeds set on fire never burn down completely, but leave sad-looking piles that greet us as we enter the schoolgrounds and classroom.

    Playing with an idea of serious labour

    To sum up, the practice of ǭkhǣngngān was messier and more playful than some outsider might expect of collective physical labour at an institution run by a socialist state. It felt more like a casual hang-out than any kind of physical toil for the institution. Because of its fluidity in temporality and achievement what seems to count most is turning up and doing something together, including continuous chatter, joking and eating.

    However, people like to play with the idea that this ought to be a serious affair: like Ajan Mala on the day I moved in, students and teachers alike shout commands at someone further away, then turn to the people close to them, and laugh together. People also sometimes tease those right next to them about not doing a good job, which might result in a playful little wrestle. When students bring children who join in, this is another source of play and amusement for the adults. No one would say a child was in the way of the adults labouring.

    Yet some formalities are kept. Students still address their teachers with the formal “Ajan”, never with first names. Participation is recorded on a list, which at my first clean-up day the class leader asked me to sign. Since then, I always sign when the list is handed around. This record-keeping indicates the possibility that there could be positive and negative consequences of people’s presence or absence in ǭkhǣngngān (that this could indeed be serious!). When I asked a student whether there is a problem if someone does not join ǭkhǣngngān, she said that “if they give a reason, if they have family or other work, there is no problem if they don’t come”.

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    Students are supposed to notify the school prior when they are unavailable. I asked the same student why lists are kept. She said “so that the school director can see how many people came, how many did not come with a reason, how many did not come without a reason”. “And if people do not give a reason and do not come many times?” “Then the director will talk to them,” she responded. A possible consequence could be a lowering of one’s score, which according to students can occur due to breaks with the school’s regulations (such as incorrect uniform wearing). However, the barrier to participation is very low: physical presence at ǭkhǣngngān alone seems to count as participation. I have seen the odd person turn up, sit on a bench, chat and sign their name on the list. Play never exists completely outside of social rules, whether these are made explicit or unspoken. But it cannot be assumed that official ones are always the strongest.

    Granted its jovial character, ǭkhǣngngān keeps shared facilities clean(er). One student also pointed out that the cutting and burning of grass was important to contain dangers of mosquitoes and snakes around the school. The school uses about 20% of a former hospital’s space and has the sole responsibility to maintain it. But people speak more about social benefits. They say ǭkhǣngngān is “mūan” (fun, enjoyable), because “mī lāi khon, yǭkkan (have many people, joke with each other). A common story I hear in Laos is that at government work sites ǭkhǣngngān results in extended beer drinking, though this is not the case at my field site. The benefits of ǭkhǣngngān are also perceived by people who do not work at government institutions: a Lao friend who works at a private language school tells me they employ a “mǣ bān” (literally mother / woman of the house, but means cleaner). Yet, each morning the staff clean together before starting their desk work. He likes this and says: “we can talk together when we clean together. If you just go to work, go in your room, do not talk, not good. When we first arrive, we clean together, talk together. Then if you have a problem, is easier, I think”.

    The tangible outcomes of this cleaning up were much less impressive, and certainly took up less time, than most other work I saw students engage in outside of ǭkhǣngngān. Although ǭkhǣngngān was a space of labour for the institution, it was simultaneously a space to play for students where the actual outcome of labour mattered much less than in their day-to-day lives.

    This does not mean that work outside of ǭkhǣngngān happens always in a serious manner. Instigated by students, I picked fruit from trees in a village head office’s backyard, our giggles travelled through the open door inside the office where other students collected information and exchanged amused looks with us. I saw a student drop her hair ribbon in front of a teacher who checked her outfit for compliance with regulations—the teacher and the whole class broke out in laughter. I sat in the car with teachers on a work excursion who laughed about their own imagining that I was “collecting information” about how many frogs and crabs they bought on the way to the district health department.

    Students taking a break to pick tamarind pods (Photo: author)

    It is not as easy as allocating specific behaviours of obedience or transgression to spaces—as Sarinda Singh has observed in her studies of worker dormitories in Laos— or to constellations of people interacting. No place at the institution is reserved for any one kind of behaviour, and no person is excepted from play. The atmosphere and dynamics of interaction can change from one moment to another. I would suggest that when people joke and when not can be an indicator for the power of particular imaginings that turn into reality at a specific moment.

    Labour, in Marx’ initial reading, is a practice in which humans play with imaginings about what their handwork ought to do, what is supposed to be realised and materialised through their practices. In this process that Marx called Verwirklichung (real-making), people’s own imaginings and those of others fold into each other and create ever-new expressions. Our imaginings are not fixed, but can easily shift and change in the process. And so the results are never identical with what anyone imagined their ideas would do prior to the practice.

    Nursing students, for instance, might venture to the village head’s office to collect information about public health for their assignment, and then get distracted by fruit they spot in the backyard. A teacher might turn up at a classroom to discipline people who do not follow the dress code, but then breaks out in laughter when a student drops her ribbon in front of his feet. An anthropology student with a serious interest in nursing education in Laos might be joked about by a group of teachers who imagine she is collecting information on the most random things such as dead frogs (and they were correct).

    For sure, not all people are equally able to realise their ideas or imaginings in the work process. What can be brought closest to real-making—or rather, is recognised by others as real—is where power dynamics can be located. But then, there is no objective judge as to what is made real: to some observers of ǭkhǣngngān, the state’s idea (as implemented by its officials) does mobilise the power of labour to form a group that gathers every week and makes a real difference to the tidiness of the school. Some might say ǭkhǣngngān subjects students to physical, at times risky, labour as an unfair condition to receive an education and progress in the public sector.

    To others, ǭkhǣngngān is just a thin frame that is filled with people’s play who realise their idea of a fun time together, for that moment, and then disperse again. Of course, these realities can exist simultaneously. People were aware of what the basic idea was: they named the practice of “anāmai” or “the day we clean up” when I asked what the term meant. They consciously played with the idea that this ought to be taken seriously and made sure that people like me who were not used to their game (yet) understood they were “just joking”. During my time with them, I admired the students’ ways of finding enjoyment when they were called to ǭkhǣngngān yet again, when smoke stung in our eyes and lungs, when we watched the buildings crumble around us, and the jungle crawl back in. Together, the students developed and played their own game—which, perhaps, is a real power of imagination and labour.

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    The post “Playing” with labour: on collective cleaning in Lao PDR appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Eight o’clock, 14 July 2024

    I arrive at the office of Ajan Mala, a teacher at a Public Health School in southern Laos. We grab brooms, buckets, sponges and floor cleaner and she walks ahead of me towards the student dorm. As we get closer, she spots people in the distance and yells: “Students, come and help clean Amelie’s room!”. Her tone sounds commanding and makes me uncomfortable; I do not wish to force anyone to clean my room. But Ajan Mala turns around, smiles and says she is just joking, that this is like “a game between teachers and students.” She assures me there is “midtaphāb (friendship) between them.

    At the student dormitory, Ajan Mala unlocks the door of my room-to-be. Suddenly there are around fifteen adults who pick up brooms, open all windows and doors, carry out beds and wardrobes, sweep and scrub. Ajan Mala tells me to dust the cobwebs from the wardrobes, while they will take care of the room’s interior and the bathroom.

    I take a step back, feeling slightly overwhelmed by the rush and what to me appears chaotic action. Everything seems to happen at once: while people are still sweeping, one student finds a few pieces of green rubber hose that he links together and connects to a tap outside. Suddenly water floods the tiled floors, and gushes towards the wooden furniture I am still dusting off. Afraid of water damage to the untreated timber, I ask a student to help me move the furniture away from the deluge. I hear the noises of engines, and behind the back window, a couple of men slash the plants that had crossed the threshold between in and outside.

    There are some teachers who help and some who watch. The school director, dressed in pink tracksuit and sun hat, walks by, takes a video with her phone, and kicks some snails off the corridor walls with her parasol. I watch one teacher pull out some plant with its root and stick it inside a plastic cup she found on the ground. She adds some dirt and says she’ll take it home to her garden. Ajan Mala squats and scrubs the walls, while her colleague mops the floor. I start to relax amongst these people who are chatting, joking, yelling teasing comments across the corridor—and the place is getting cleaner.

    But the action is over as quickly as it started; students and teachers begin to disappear. As I notice a group walking away through the corridor, I run after them with biscuits as thanks. They share the biscuits and then leave. Once everyone is gone, I get down on the floor with a bucket of water-vinegar mix and a sponge, and give each tile a final, thorough scrub (much gecko poo has survived the water flood). I feel grateful as if I received a welcome gift. But it also occurs to me, that the students and teachers seem used to this; not of course, to clean a visiting anthropologists’ room, but to clean together.

    Collective cleaning as labour: ǭkhǣngngān

    Cleaning together at a worksite or educational facility is a routine practice of collective, physical labour in Lao PDR. At my field site people called it ǭkhǣngngān (ອອກແຮງງານ). When I first read the term in the weekly lesson timetable, I falsely translated it to “workout”. I expected ǭkhǣngngān would be some outdoors exercise regime (“ǭk” as “out”, “hǣng” as “strong”, and “ngān” as “work”). When the day came around, I asked a student what we will do this afternoon. She replied “ǭkhǣngngān!”, and I asked “mǣn nyang?” (“what is this/that”), so she said “anāmai” (tidy up). That afternoon, we swept concrete floors, scraped snail poo off walls, and squatted down to pull out weeds along paths. The weeds were piled up together with plastic rubbish and set alight.

    A nursing student uses rubber strip as fire lighter (Photo: author)

    My Lao friends tell me ǭkhǣngngān happens at every government-run workplace and school. The organised, institutional character of this labour can be observed in a number of aspects. A specific slot is allocated to ǭkhǣngngān in the school’s weekly timetable, usually on a Thursday or Friday afternoon. The task of the day is determined by a senior staff member. Lists of participation are kept which students and teachers sign, and all are expected to participate. The place to be cleaned is an outdoors area, in the vicinity of the classroom or school offices, and this location puts ǭkhǣngngān in full view of the public. In government news publications, stories of ǭkhǣngngān sessions abound accompanied with imagery of groups working together, especially in preparation for days of national celebration: tidying up around government buildings, pulling weeds at a military school, or sweeping in the capital’s public parks. At my field site too, students and staff take pictures of their tidying-up session to post on social media.

    The term ǭkhǣngngān also sets this activity apart from other occasions of working together. “Work” in Lao is more commonly referred to as vīak: housework (vīak hư̄an), work on rice fields (vīak nā ), or gardens (vīak sūan), going to work (pai vīak). The nursing students at my field site work in groups for assignments (vīak kūm) and do homework (vīak bān). With most work, they refer specifically to the practice: hā kin (look for food, or go and get food), hed kin (prepare food), anāmai (tidy up), keb (collect). During our lunch break, we climb up on chairs or use long sticks to reach tamarind pods and raw papayas in the trees, we search for edible leafy greens, peel bamboo shoots, make a fire to cook bamboo soup or grill buffalo skin, prepare a floormat and dishes to eat on the classroom floor, and tidy up after the meal. None of this collective, physical labour that occurs on a daily basis would make the news.

    Whilst ǭkhǣngngān is structured by the institution, these everyday practices of working together evolve dependent on people’s needs. Who participates and how depends on individuals’ motivations, skills and time. Often one person starts an activity which then spills over to others. People verbally organise each other to a degree, but this occurs spontaneously and according to emerging needs and desires identified by the students themselves—nothing is pre-set by an authority. All this work happens out of view from the institution (school staff). There is no fixed lunch group, but people drop in and out, some go home to eat with their family or to a restaurant. In comparison, ǭkhǣngngān at first sight appears to be an “unnatural” way of people working together at this school.

    If working together already takes place on a daily basis, and seems to work to fulfill people’s needs, what then is the point of ǭkhǣngngān, and to whom? Is it just a means to make people tidy those large, shared spaces outside the classroom and office that no one would take care of otherwise? Or are there other reasons to make people work together in this particular way?

    Possible answers as to why ǭkhǣngngān persists at state-run institutions in Lao PDR can be derived from its roots in a Marxist–Leninist concept of collective labour. This becomes clear when looking at how the concept of ǭkhǣngngān is taught in a Lao schoolbook on “Civic Education” for Year 5 students published in 2019:

    People’s labour (kanǭkhǣngngān khǭng khon) is related to movements that have a social character. In that labour, people need to coordinate together to move together as a group. If just alone, a single person cannot earn food to live and resist disasters or forces that occur in the natural world. The ancient primitive people (khon pathombūhān) lived in a group before to carry out labour that had a social character because of that society. Therefore, as products (phalidtaphan) that affect each other, there is a relationship between person and person (khon), and labour is a power (kamlang) that creates (sāng) the person (khon) and society (sangkhom).

    In this reading, labour as movement is social in both process and outcome. Social labour is naturalised because this is what allows humans to survive since the “ancient primitive people”. But this labour is about more than mere use-value, such as procurement of food or building of shelters that protect from wind and weather — because labour here is also a generative power to create the person and society as its “products”.

    This means that neither person nor society are understood as abstract conditions or identities pre-existing to interpersonal relationships and practices of labour. The term (ǭk)hǣngngān as labour in this sense is used in Laos in political contexts, such as the “International Labour Organization” (ongkanhǣngngānsākon), and government news stories might use the term to refer to workers (phūǭkhǣngngān).

    Indonesia’s killer commodity

    The kretek cigarette industry and its devastating public health impacts are sustained via a huge apparatus of labour, and appeals to cultural nationalism

    The organisation of weekly ǭkhǣngngān at all Lao government workplaces and schools is thus based in a socialist political philosophy of creating people and society through physical, collective labour. It links historically to the Soviet socialist organisation of unpaid, physical labour on Saturdays under the name of ‘Subbotnik’. Frederick Kaplan quotes from the Soviet Regulations of Subbotniks which describes them as “one of the forms of propaganda of the idea of labor service and self -organization of the working class” and as “a laboratory of communist labor”. Lenin in his 1920 handbill Pervomaisky Subbotnik, following the first large-scale Subbotnik for the Moscow–Kazan Railway, describes this process as a “matter of transforming the very habits of the people” from an individualist, capitalist economy towards labouring according to the two socialist rules of ‘“All for each and each for all”’, and ‘“From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”, in order to gradually introduce “communist discipline and communist labour”.

    Ǭkhǣngngān at government institutions in Laos can then be interpreted as the (intended) enactment of a socialist political theory about how people and society come to be. This political and symbolic loading turns it into more than just a mere tidying-up session, and hence it has a different frame compared to other types of working-together at the school, as described above.

    This idea of labour as a transformative power that builds certain kinds of people also shines through in how education is described at my field site, where I was conducting ethnographic research on nursing education. The stated objectives of the nursing course use the language of “creating” or “building” students to become part of collectives as “good citizens” and “professional nurses of the ASEAN community”, with not only professional knowledge and nursing skills, but also with “revolutionary morals”, “correct political thinking”, and “patriotism and unity”. Ǭkhǣngngān as part of this education then presumably intends to practice the “rules” of socialist labour to be applied in the context of public health work. Simultaneously, it serves the practical need for tidying-up schools and workplaces in absence of paid maintenance personnel in Laos’ resource-poor public health and education system.

    The term “labour” in anthropology is often used to describe “physical toil, performed out of necessity, coercion, or domination”. Folz and Smith see this application influenced by Marx’s writings on labour exploitation and class struggle. But for Marx, the process of work/labour (Arbeitsprozess) to begin with has positive connotations as that which makes humans human, as a practice of turning one’s abstract ideas or imaginings into things of the material world (Marx 1967, 141–142). In Volume One of Capital he describes this ideal state of working as a “play” of human’s “physical and intellectual powers”. Only from this conception of the working process could Marx develop his theory of  Entfremdung (alienation) of humans to their own work activities in the capitalist mode of production—and thereby to themselves as humans, and to other humans, whose work (and being) is perceived as a mere commodity.

    Instead of simply interpreting ǭkhǣngngān as physical toil due to state-driven coercion of nursing students into labour, I want to experiment with Marx’ concept of physical labour as attempt to realise an abstract idea or imaginings: in this case, the idea itself that people and society are created through the power of labour, which underpins the institution of ǭkhǣngngān in Laos. Further, I want to return to Marx’ ideal notion of the working process as a “play” of our “physical and intellectual powers”. I argue that despite its seemingly restrictive set-up, the social situation that ǭkhǣngngān creates takes the form of play and re-imagining: within a “high level” imaginative frame, people working and studying at Lao institutions use their own imagination, invent their own rules and transgressions, and thereby create their own game in physical action with others.

    ǭkhǣngngān: playing with the regulations

    Above, I  outlined the basic organising characteristics of ǭkhǣngngān: the idea(l) situation and structure of mobilising physical labour. The first was a bounded temporality. A Lao friend who speaks English and has participated in ǭkhǣngngān said he would translate the term to “the day we clean together”. He emphasised the temporality of a day per week that was allocated to ǭkhǣngngān. At my field site, ǭkhǣngngān has a spot in the weekly class timetable on an afternoon at the end of the week. But despite this dedicated slot, teachers may also call students to ǭkhǣngngān on other days, such as when lessons are cancelled, a new term begins, or for special visitors.

    The actual beginning and ending of ǭkhǣngngān, as I observed it, are rather fluid. Some students and teachers who live nearby go home during lunch break, change outfit from their uniforms to casual clothes and return for the clean-up. Others just wait in the airconditioned classroom until it is time, take naps, eat snacks, drink the odd rice spirit and chat. When people re-gather, it takes some time to determine the location of the clean-up in communication between teachers and students, for people to make their way to that location, to gather cleaning equipment and get started. Action subsides when people spontaneously decide it is enough. This happens less by verbal communication and rather by simply stopping and doing something else.

    Watching others finish in their own time is also totally normal and accepted. Distractions come easy: if a market seller walks through, with bags of bamboo shoots and sour fruit hanging off the ends of a stick over her shoulders, students and teachers stop to buy and eat, always inviting others with a vigorous “kin, kin!” (eat, eat!). Most ǭkhǣngngān that I participated in took no longer than an hour (prior to national holidays, they took up to three hours), but the lesser part of that time would be actually spent with cleaning up.

    In terms of outcome, an expected end goal of ǭkhǣngngān, in my experience, is not clearly defined. The direct objective is indeed to create some level of spatial order (which follows its own logic) and some people show a lot of commitment: they bring their own tools from home, expose themselves to toxic smoke, pick weeds with bare hands, and sharpen the blades of a grass cutter with a circular saw (and no goggles). Yet, incapable of achieving anything close to complete order—the school (a former hospital) is huge, the people few, the buildings in various stages of decay, and any plant grows at an enormous speed during the wet season—people seem to follow their own energy level and motivation in how much they clean up.

    Effectiveness comes second to play: two adult men carry a basket of weeds away that a single boy could master, hold on to one handle each and joke about. While some students still sweep, rake and burn-off, another asks his classmate to take a video of his latest karaoke/dance performance. There is no “vote” or formal collective decision-making process to stop. But once most people have stopped, the final finish call “phǭ (enough) and “mư̄a bān (go home) come from the class leader or a teacher.

    People do not celebrate or preserve the results of their labour either. The day we cleaned up my room, I discovered a half-eaten package of biscuits with crumbs covering the ground that was cleaned fifteen minutes earlier. I see people frequently throw plastic and cigarette butts in the grass around the classroom which they clean up at the next ǭkhǣngngān. And the rubbish and weeds set on fire never burn down completely, but leave sad-looking piles that greet us as we enter the schoolgrounds and classroom.

    Playing with an idea of serious labour

    To sum up, the practice of ǭkhǣngngān was messier and more playful than some outsider might expect of collective physical labour at an institution run by a socialist state. It felt more like a casual hang-out than any kind of physical toil for the institution. Because of its fluidity in temporality and achievement what seems to count most is turning up and doing something together, including continuous chatter, joking and eating.

    However, people like to play with the idea that this ought to be a serious affair: like Ajan Mala on the day I moved in, students and teachers alike shout commands at someone further away, then turn to the people close to them, and laugh together. People also sometimes tease those right next to them about not doing a good job, which might result in a playful little wrestle. When students bring children who join in, this is another source of play and amusement for the adults. No one would say a child was in the way of the adults labouring.

    Yet some formalities are kept. Students still address their teachers with the formal “Ajan”, never with first names. Participation is recorded on a list, which at my first clean-up day the class leader asked me to sign. Since then, I always sign when the list is handed around. This record-keeping indicates the possibility that there could be positive and negative consequences of people’s presence or absence in ǭkhǣngngān (that this could indeed be serious!). When I asked a student whether there is a problem if someone does not join ǭkhǣngngān, she said that “if they give a reason, if they have family or other work, there is no problem if they don’t come”.

    Indonesia’s killer commodity

    The kretek cigarette industry and its devastating public health impacts are sustained via a huge apparatus of labour, and appeals to cultural nationalism

    Students are supposed to notify the school prior when they are unavailable. I asked the same student why lists are kept. She said “so that the school director can see how many people came, how many did not come with a reason, how many did not come without a reason”. “And if people do not give a reason and do not come many times?” “Then the director will talk to them,” she responded. A possible consequence could be a lowering of one’s score, which according to students can occur due to breaks with the school’s regulations (such as incorrect uniform wearing). However, the barrier to participation is very low: physical presence at ǭkhǣngngān alone seems to count as participation. I have seen the odd person turn up, sit on a bench, chat and sign their name on the list. Play never exists completely outside of social rules, whether these are made explicit or unspoken. But it cannot be assumed that official ones are always the strongest.

    Granted its jovial character, ǭkhǣngngān keeps shared facilities clean(er). One student also pointed out that the cutting and burning of grass was important to contain dangers of mosquitoes and snakes around the school. The school uses about 20% of a former hospital’s space and has the sole responsibility to maintain it. But people speak more about social benefits. They say ǭkhǣngngān is “mūan” (fun, enjoyable), because “mī lāi khon, yǭkkan (have many people, joke with each other). A common story I hear in Laos is that at government work sites ǭkhǣngngān results in extended beer drinking, though this is not the case at my field site. The benefits of ǭkhǣngngān are also perceived by people who do not work at government institutions: a Lao friend who works at a private language school tells me they employ a “mǣ bān” (literally mother / woman of the house, but means cleaner). Yet, each morning the staff clean together before starting their desk work. He likes this and says: “we can talk together when we clean together. If you just go to work, go in your room, do not talk, not good. When we first arrive, we clean together, talk together. Then if you have a problem, is easier, I think”.

    The tangible outcomes of this cleaning up were much less impressive, and certainly took up less time, than most other work I saw students engage in outside of ǭkhǣngngān. Although ǭkhǣngngān was a space of labour for the institution, it was simultaneously a space to play for students where the actual outcome of labour mattered much less than in their day-to-day lives.

    This does not mean that work outside of ǭkhǣngngān happens always in a serious manner. Instigated by students, I picked fruit from trees in a village head office’s backyard, our giggles travelled through the open door inside the office where other students collected information and exchanged amused looks with us. I saw a student drop her hair ribbon in front of a teacher who checked her outfit for compliance with regulations—the teacher and the whole class broke out in laughter. I sat in the car with teachers on a work excursion who laughed about their own imagining that I was “collecting information” about how many frogs and crabs they bought on the way to the district health department.

    Students taking a break to pick tamarind pods (Photo: author)

    It is not as easy as allocating specific behaviours of obedience or transgression to spaces—as Sarinda Singh has observed in her studies of worker dormitories in Laos— or to constellations of people interacting. No place at the institution is reserved for any one kind of behaviour, and no person is excepted from play. The atmosphere and dynamics of interaction can change from one moment to another. I would suggest that when people joke and when not can be an indicator for the power of particular imaginings that turn into reality at a specific moment.

    Labour, in Marx’ initial reading, is a practice in which humans play with imaginings about what their handwork ought to do, what is supposed to be realised and materialised through their practices. In this process that Marx called Verwirklichung (real-making), people’s own imaginings and those of others fold into each other and create ever-new expressions. Our imaginings are not fixed, but can easily shift and change in the process. And so the results are never identical with what anyone imagined their ideas would do prior to the practice.

    Nursing students, for instance, might venture to the village head’s office to collect information about public health for their assignment, and then get distracted by fruit they spot in the backyard. A teacher might turn up at a classroom to discipline people who do not follow the dress code, but then breaks out in laughter when a student drops her ribbon in front of his feet. An anthropology student with a serious interest in nursing education in Laos might be joked about by a group of teachers who imagine she is collecting information on the most random things such as dead frogs (and they were correct).

    For sure, not all people are equally able to realise their ideas or imaginings in the work process. What can be brought closest to real-making—or rather, is recognised by others as real—is where power dynamics can be located. But then, there is no objective judge as to what is made real: to some observers of ǭkhǣngngān, the state’s idea (as implemented by its officials) does mobilise the power of labour to form a group that gathers every week and makes a real difference to the tidiness of the school. Some might say ǭkhǣngngān subjects students to physical, at times risky, labour as an unfair condition to receive an education and progress in the public sector.

    To others, ǭkhǣngngān is just a thin frame that is filled with people’s play who realise their idea of a fun time together, for that moment, and then disperse again. Of course, these realities can exist simultaneously. People were aware of what the basic idea was: they named the practice of “anāmai” or “the day we clean up” when I asked what the term meant. They consciously played with the idea that this ought to be taken seriously and made sure that people like me who were not used to their game (yet) understood they were “just joking”. During my time with them, I admired the students’ ways of finding enjoyment when they were called to ǭkhǣngngān yet again, when smoke stung in our eyes and lungs, when we watched the buildings crumble around us, and the jungle crawl back in. Together, the students developed and played their own game—which, perhaps, is a real power of imagination and labour.

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  • Lao authorities have temporarily shut down a Vietnamese-owned iron ore mining operation in the northeastern part of the country after a washing reservoir overflowed and its wastewater polluted two local rivers, officials and area residents said.

    Authorities have ordered the operation run by Tienhao Kaobang Co. to remain closed until the washing reservoir has been repaired, said people who live in Viengxay district of Houaphanh province and who have complained about pollution in the Nam Xang and Nam Poon rivers.

    “The company is not allowed to operate until the reservoir repair is completed,” said a resident who declined to be identified out of fear of retribution.

    The wastewater released discolored and muddied the water in the rivers and killed fish, he said.

    Affected villagers said they are concerned that the contaminated water will affect their rice production and livestock that drink from the two rivers.

    The mining industry has been a key driver of economic growth in the small, landlocked Southeast Asian nation for years, but it has had negative environmental impacts.

    If tailings — leftover material from the processing of iron ore that can contain potentially toxic elements — are not properly managed and contained in washing reservoirs, they can pollute water sources, affect soil quality, harm aquatic life, and potentially pose health risks to humans.

    Complaints

    Villagers from seven communities downstream from the mine and their respective chiefs complained to district officials after the incident occurred on Jan. 12, the head of one village told Radio Free Asia.

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    On Monday, Outhone Bounvilay, head of the Natural Resources and Environment Office of Viangxay district, told Lao National Radio that the discoloration was caused by an overflow of wastewater from the iron ore washing reservoir in Fongxang village.

    He also said Lao officials have an agreement with the company to temporarily stop its operations until the problem is resolved.

    When RFA called the Natural Resources and Environment Office to ask about compensation for villagers whose water resources are now polluted, a staffer said investigators were collecting water samples to analyze.

    Another villager said she saw a post saying that the company would compensate residents, but it gave no further details.

    Both district officials and the company are collaborating with local villages, including six situated along the Nam Xang River, to evaluate the impact and ensure fair compensation, the online Laotian Times said.

    In a December 2024 incident, wastewater leaked from the same mining operations into the Nam Xang River, prompting authorities to urge the company to adopt stricter measures to prevent other incidents, the news outlet said.

    Translated by Khamsao Civilize for RFA Lao. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Joshua Lipes.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.


  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.


  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Laos has ordered a Chinese-owned potash mine believed responsible for two massive sinkholes in Khammouane province to cease operations until further notice, and to fill the sinkholes in, an official told Radio Free Asia.

    On Dec. 4, a sinkhole measuring 20 meters (65 feet) wide and 10 meters (33 feet) deep opened up on farmland in Thakhaek district’s Pak Peng village. On Dec. 21, another sinkhole — about half the size of the first — formed nearby.

    Residents suspect the sinkholes are a result of excavation at a potash mine in neighboring Nong Bok district, operated by Sino-Agri International Potash Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of Asia Potash International Investment (Guangzhou) Co., Ltd., which is linked to entities directed by China’s governing State Council.

    After a month of central government inspections of the mine, the cause remains unclear.

    However, the company has been ordered to fill both sinkholes, a government official said Monday, speaking to RFA Lao on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

    “The two sinkholes will be filled up with dirt. The company will carry out this task,” the official said, adding that after meeting with central government officials, a cause has not yet been determined.

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    Because fault has not been determined, the company may not have to pay compensation, the official said.

    A Pak Peng resident told RFA that those who live near the sinkholes are terrified of further collapses.

    “They are scared. The sinkholes are right in the middle of the rice fields,” the villager said.

    Filling in the holes is only a temporary fix, a Lao expert told RFA.

    “Underground extraction is very dangerous. One day the mine will collapse,” he said. “Dirt is excavated and water flushes will cause more sinkholes over the next 20 years. It won’t be long before we start seeing the consequences.”

    Translated by RFA Lao. Edited by Eugene Whong.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • A Vietnamese Buddhist monk who became an internet sensation earlier this year has crossed from Laos into Thailand on his way to India.

    Thich Minh Tue, who gained fame in Vietnam after his ascetic lifestyle attracted a following as he traveled by foot across Vietnam, began a pilgrimage to Buddhist sites in India in late November.

    He crossed from Vietnam into Laos on Dec. 12 and arrived in southern Laos’ Champassak province last week.

    Tue, 43, lives as a monk though he does not belong to Vietnam’s state-approved Buddhist monastic order.

    (Amanda Weisbrod/RFA)

    At about 10:30 am on Tuesday, he and five other mendicant monks left the Vang Tao border crossing in Laos and passed through the Chong Mek border crossing in Thailand after spending 19 days in Laos.

    People knelt in front of the border crossing and scattered flowers and sprinkled water on the road as signs of respect for the monks.

    At the Chong Mek border crossing in Thailand’s Ubon Ratchathani province, about 100 people, mainly small traders and tuk-tuk drivers from Thailand and Laos, gathered to welcome the monks. About 20 Vietnamese YouTubers were also there early to report the news.

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    Accompanying the monks on the walking journey through Laos were two well-know Vietnamese YouTubers — Doan Van Bau and Le Kha Giap. They were joined by four Thai volunteers handling logistics and two police officers from Ubon Ratchathani province who were dispatched to ensure order.

    Live video from YouTuber Doan Van Bau, who escorted the monks from Vietnam, shows Tue and monks Minh Tang, Minh Tri, Chon Tri, An Lac and Vo Sanh left Laos and entered Thailand without any problem when volunteers took care of the immigration procedures.

    Vietnamese monk Thich Minh Tue walks through Chong Mek, Ubon Ratchathani Province, Thailand, on his way to India., Dec. 31, 2024.
    Vietnamese monk Thich Minh Tue walks through Chong Mek, Ubon Ratchathani Province, Thailand, on his way to India., Dec. 31, 2024.
    (RFA)

    Long pilgrimage

    The group will walk 1,300 kilometers (800 miles) in two months in Thailand before entering Myanmar to continue their journey to India, Doan Van Bau said.

    Tue and the other monks left from the Bo Y border crossing in Vietnam’s Gia Lai province on Dec. 12 and passed through the Lao provinces of Attapeu, Sekong and Champassak, before arriving at the Vang Tao border crossing.

    Vietnamese monk Thich Minh Tue, center, arrives in Chong Mek, Ubon Ratchathani Province, Thailand, Dec. 31, 2024, on his way to India.
    Vietnamese monk Thich Minh Tue, center, arrives in Chong Mek, Ubon Ratchathani Province, Thailand, Dec. 31, 2024, on his way to India.
    (RFA)

    Bau said one of the people accompanying the group will take care of procedural issues as they walk to Thailand’s Mae Sot province en route to Myanmar.

    Tue became known to many people when he walked from the south to north Vietnam in May.

    When arriving in the city of Hue in early June, Tue and a group of more than 70 people who followed him were suppressed and dispersed by the police during a midnight raid. They took Tue to his hometown in Gia Lai province to scan his fingerprints for citizenship identification.

    On Nov. 25, Tue wrote a letter expressing his desire to travel to India and visit Buddhist relics, and asked for advice on directions and procedures.

    Translated by Anna Vu for RFA Vietnamese. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Vietnamese.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Plans to proceed with a benefits-and-risks review of a proposed hydropower dam on the Mekong River has sparked concern in both Laos and Thailand about the impact on communities and the ecosystem.

    The US$2-billion, 12-turbine Sanakham hydropower dam will be built about 155 kilometers (100 miles) west of the Lao capital of Vientiane, and 25 km (15 miles) upstream from Sanakham district of Vientiane province, near the Thai-Lao border.

    More than 62,500 people in Thailand and Laos will be forced to relocate due to rising waters, according to submitted documents.

    Lao residents say they have hardly had a chance to give feedback on the project.

    “I’m so concerned that we’ll have to move to another village,” a Sanakham district resident told Radio Free Asia. “They [the government] did not clearly explain it to us at all.”

    Dozens of hydropower dams have already been built on the Mekong and its tributaries, and there are plans to build scores more in the coming years. The Lao government wants to harness their power generation to boost the economy, which has been battered by soaring inflation and a weakening currency.

    Electricity generated by the dam, to be built by China-owned Datang (Lao) Sanakham Hydropower Co. Ltd. and Thailand’s Gulf Energy Development Public Co. Ltd., will mainly be exported to Thailand.

    Thailand’s Office of National Water Resources said on Dec. 17 that it would begin the consultation process during which Mekong River Commission member countries and other stakeholders review proposed projects to try to reach a consensus on whether or not they should proceed.

    The Thai National Mekong Commission is holding four public information forums about the dam for residents living in the eight Thai provinces along the Mekong River during the coming weeks.

    ‘Rushed ahead’

    International Rivers, a group acting to protect rivers and the communities that depend on them, said there there has been little up-to-date information publicly available about the project.

    “It appears this process is being rushed ahead, with little regard for the needs of local residents to be able to make arrangements to attend the forums, let alone prepare and develop informed opinions about the project specifics,” the group said in a Dec. 21 statement.

    Villagers who will be affected by the dam don’t want to move, a resident of Kenethao district in Xayaburi province said.

    “They don’t want to relocate at all [because] here they have their livelihoods,” he said. “If they moved somewhere far away, what would happen to their lives? If they have no choice but to move, then they should get more compensation.”

    Phonepaseuth Phouliphanh, secretary general of the Lao National Mekong Committee, told Radio Free Asia that the project developer will take into consideration concerns raised about the dam.

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    “All project developments have both good and bad impacts which we cannot avoid,” he told Radio Free Asia. “We have done research to ensure the impact is as little as possible.”

    After hearing the concerns from people in areas to be affected by the dam, the Lao government or the project developer will review and correct issues that may occur, he added.

    Thai concerns

    Meanwhile, some Thai residents and advocacy groups also oppose the construction of the dam.

    Channarong Wongla, a member of the Chiang Khan Conservation Group and Local Fisheries Group in Chiang Khan, a district in Thailand that will be affected by the dam, said other hydropower projects have already altered water routes and islands and caused erosion.

    With hydropower projects in the past, including Laos’ Xayaburi Dam, developers moved ahead with their projects regardless of the concerns raised by residents, he told International Rivers.

    “Most importantly, for the Sanakham Dam project, the [Thai] ombudsman and the National Human Rights Commission have already provided a clear basis for a more precautionary approach recognizing the serious impacts on local people and ecosystems,” he was quoted as saying.

    A report by the ombudsman said there “was still a serious lack of information on the transboundary impacts of the dam project and that clear commitments of accountability are required from both the developers and government agencies in Thailand,” he said.

    Construction of the Sanakham Dam was expected to begin in 2020, but was put on hold when government officials from Thailand’s National Mekong Commission raised questions about the impacts of the project and called for comprehensive technical studies on its environmental, social and transboundary effects, according to International Rivers.

    The “snap decision” to schedule expedited public information sessions for the Sanakham Dam marked a distinct shift in the Thai government’s approach to the project, the group said.

    Translated by RFA Lao. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Vietnam’s barefoot monk has arrived in southern Laos’ Champasak province and could cross into Thailand later this weekend on his way to India, two eyewitnesses told Radio Free Asia on Friday.

    Vietnam’s ‘barefoot monk,’ Thich Minh Tue, was spotted in Paksong district, southern Laos, receiving alms from supporters as he passed through.

    Thich Minh Tue became an internet sensation earlier this year after his ascetic lifestyle attracted a following as he traveled by foot across Vietnam.

    In late November, he began a walking pilgrimage to Buddhist sites in India. He crossed from Vietnam into Laos on Dec. 12.

    Tue is walking with two other followers and a camera man, one of the eyewitnesses said. He traveled through the provincial capital, Pakse, and crossed the Mekong river on Friday.

    “Villagers pop their heads out of the windows to look at them,” the eyewitness said.

    The route of Thich Man Tue, the
    The route of Thich Man Tue, the “barefoot monk”
    (RFA)

    Tue and the others set up camp near Phu Salao, where a golden statue of Buddha sits atop a mountain, another eyewitness said.

    “There are villagers greeting him wherever he goes,” the eyewitness said. “Residents laid pads on the path as he was walking by and offered him alms, but he did not accept money or food. So we sit and pay respect to him.”

    Previous pilgrimage

    In early June, authorities in Vietnam dispersed Tue and a group of followers while they were on another cross-country pilgrimage in Thua Thien Hue province.

    At the time, several social media influencers documented his pilgrimage on TikTok and other platforms. He amassed legions of supporters who were drawn to his simple lifestyle and humble attitude.

    Tue sports a shaved head, patched robe and a rice cooker as an alms bowl. He isn’t officially a monk because he’s not recognized by the state-sanctioned Vietnam Buddhist Sangha.

    Tue disappeared from public view for extended periods after the June raid. Last month, a letter purported to be written by Tue said he had renounced his vow of poverty, although supporters questioned its authenticity.

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    Authorities in Vietnam are almost always wary of social movements outside of the control of the ruling Communist Party.

    Allowing Tue to leave for India was a win-win situation for Vietnam, Buddhist scholar Nguyen Thanh Huy told RFA earlier this month.

    It “alleviates the challenges in ensuring security and reduces societal pressure stemming from waves of public opinion.”

    In Laos, Tu didn’t give advance notice of the journey to the Buddhist Fellowship Organization, the governing body of the country’s Buddhist community, according to a monk from the organization.

    So, he hasn’t received accommodation from other religious fellows, but Lao police and other security officers have been following him “to make sure he is safe and so on,” the monk said.

    Translated by Khamsao Civilize. Edited by Matt Reed.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The communist apparatchiks who run Laos must appease China if they are to stop their national debt crisis from worsening and avoid an outright default.

    The IMF’s latest report on Laos, released last month, was particularly damning about the country’s future. Real GDP growth likely peaked this year, at around 4.1 percent, and will slide from 3.5 percent next year down to 2.5 percent by 2029.

    In other words, Laos isn’t going to be able to grow itself out of debt anytime soon.

    Moreover, debt servicing costs, spending that is not actually paying off the principal on its monumental debt, will rise from around $1.1 billion this year to $1.5 billion next year and peak at $1.8 billion in 2026, the equivalent of a fifth of exports.

    Laos cannot even start to comprehend paying off its debt, which because of the country’s inflation crisis fluctuates as a percentage of GDP ratio. It was 131 percent of GDP in 2022, down to 108 percent this year but potentially up to 118 percent in 2025.

    The IMF politely suggested that “alternative options to bring debt toward a sustainable level could also be considered,” yet noted that “the authorities’ financing plan…critically relies on the continued extension of debt relief from China.”

    Debt deferrals

    All that matters for Vientiane, at least for the short term, is that Beijing continues offering debt deferrals.

    In 2023, these amounted to $770 million, about 5 percent of Laos’s GDP, according to the IMF. They were worth $222 million in 2020, $454 million in 2021, and $608 million in 2022.

    What other options has Laos got?

    It won’t turn to the IMF for a bailout, since that will come with political conditions – and half of national debt is owed to China, which doesn’t do debt write-offs.

    The money Vientiane owes Beijing is vast for Laos, but peanuts for Beijing.

    The International Monetary Fund headquarters in Washington, D.C, Dec. 19, 2016.
    The International Monetary Fund headquarters in Washington, D.C, Dec. 19, 2016.
    (Cliff Owen/AP)

    Laos’s debts could be completely forgiven tomorrow and nobody in Beijing would notice. But Chinese lenders don’t like having their pockets pinched and no superpower wants to be seen as a dog being wagged by its tail.

    Some people think Vientiane could offer more debt-for-equity swaps, whereby China reduces the debt in exchange for land or mineral rights or a stake in a state company.

    However, for all the cries of “debt traps,” it is noticeable that there hasn’t been any major debt-for-equity swap since a Chinese state-owned firm was given majority control of a joint venture (EDL-T) with Electricite du Laos, which effectively handed Beijing Laos’ power grid, including its electricity exports. But that was in 2021!

    Few desirable assets

    Beijing has presumably browsed and doesn’t fancy anything it sees. As one source told me, “there aren’t enough saleable assets” in Laos for equity swaps to touch the sides of the country’s debt.

    Even for natural resources or land, usually a Chinese company will get a multi-decade concession for very low rent. So it makes little sense for Chinese state firms to buy, in the form of a debt swap, what they essentially get for free, since the revenue the Lao government collects will eventually be paid back to the Chinese state.

    Nor are swaps all too appealing when it comes to state-run companies.

    There’s one reason why Laos’s nationalized companies are so indebted and it isn’t because they’re so well run. Électricité du Laos, the state utility, accounts for perhaps a third of all the state’s debts, for instance.

    Laos' Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone attends the 27th ASEAN-Japan Summit in Vientiane, Laos, Oct. 10, 2024.
    Laos’ Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone attends the 27th ASEAN-Japan Summit in Vientiane, Laos, Oct. 10, 2024.
    (Nhac Nguyen/AFP)

    That leaves only debt deferrals, which allow Vientiane to pay back other private creditors and facilitate future loans, all the while avoiding what it must eventually do: massively increase state revenue.

    According to the IMF, Laos needs a primary surplus of around 17 percent each year to bring its debt-to-GDP ratio down to a sustainable threshold (35 percent) by 2029.

    Next year, Laos will likely run a primary surplus of around 3 percent, per the IMF report. In other words, Vientiane needs to boost revenue or cut expenditure (or both) by more than five-fold.

    Austerity is unpopular

    But the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) clearly doesn’t think now is the time to dig deeper into the pockets of ordinary people and businesses, especially as economic growth is set to slow in the coming years and the inflation crisis won’t be curbed anytime soon.

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    It would be politically suicidal for Vientiane to considerably raise taxes while the ordinary Loatian has seen his wealth decimated in recent years. In fact, the party has recently committed to higher state spending.

    At first blush, Vientiane’s immobility might appear problematic for the current rulers of the communist party whose jobs are in the line ahead of a reshuffle at the National Congress in early 2026.

    That’s especially the case for Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone, who naturally gets the most flak. Party grandees will retreat into conclaves most of next year to make these decisions, and appeasing China will be a key consideration.

    Yet, while the Lao public is incensed by just how appallingly their rulers have managed the economy, the powers that be understand no-one has any real idea of how to get out of this mess other than austerity during a devastating economic crisis.

    This isn’t something to be admitted publicly in a one-party state. Neither is admitting that the task of austerity is essentially being kicked to the next generation of party apparatchiks, who will have to suffer the consequences.

    George Orwell once remarked that “it is a feeling of relief, almost of pleasure, at knowing yourself at last genuinely down and out…It takes off a lot of anxiety.”

    Likewise, the current LPRP leadership must feel a certain freedom from knowing that there’s only one way out of its predicament: Keep appeasing Beijing and keep up the debt deferrals.

    David Hutt is a research fellow at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) and the Southeast Asia Columnist at the Diplomat. He writes the Watching Europe In Southeast Asia newsletter. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of RFA.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by David Hutt.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • A 19-year-old Lao girl who was forced to work at a Chinese-run online scam center in Myanmar for two years is safe at a rehabilitation facility for human trafficking victims in Thailand, two Thai officials told Radio Free Asia.

    The young woman had sent two messages to RFA earlier this month saying she had been released from the scam center and had made her way across the border to a police station in Thailand’s Mae Sot district.

    However, a Thai police officer said last week that there was no evidence that a 19-year-old Lao woman had recently sought safety at a police station in Mae Sot.

    On Wednesday, an official at a rehabilitation center in Thailand’s Phitsanulok province confirmed to RFA that the woman was sent to the facility on Dec. 13 after Thai authorities identified her as a human trafficking victim.

    Under an agreement with Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam, Thailand must provide physical and mental treatment for trafficking victims before sending them back to their home country, the rehabilitation official said.

    “After she arrived here, we had to process her case,” he said. “Firstly, she will go through all steps for physical and mental treatment.”

    The young woman spoke with RFA on Wednesday.

    “I am in Pissanulok province now, at the rehabilitation center,” she said. “As soon as I left, I informed my mom on Dec. 3. I left Burma near the end of November.”

    Another official at the rehabilitation center told RFA that they are interviewing her for a report that will be sent to the Thai and Lao governments.

    After that, Lao officials will visit her family to make sure that she will be safe when she returns, the official said.

    Translated by Phouvong. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Authorities in southwestern Laos’ Champassak province are forcing migrants from other parts of the country to hand over “staying fees,” according to residents who say they are a form of exploitation by corrupt officials.

    Last week, residents of other provinces living in Champassak took to social media to complain that local authorities are making them pay nearly 55,000 kip (US$2.50) per month — a substantial amount in a nation in the midst of an economic downturn with a minimum wage of 1.6 million kip (US$73) per month — to live in their villages.

    When asked about the payments, a village-level official who, like others interviewed for this report, spoke on condition of anonymity due to security concerns, told RFA Lao that such “staying fees” are “part of local rules to ensure authorities can provide security” in their communities.

    But a migrant from another province living in Champassak, who also declined to be named, told RFA that “there should be no staying fee collection” for Lao nationals, suggesting that “authorities just want to make some extra money” to pad their salaries.

    “If they collect a staying fee from foreigners or visitors from other countries, that is something justified,” he said. “What I’ve observed is that authorities try to collect as much as they can for this fee … but residents can only afford to pay around US$2.50 per month.”

    Power distribution lines originating from a hydro power plant that runs through Pak Se district, Champassak province, Laos, July 25, 2018.
    Power distribution lines originating from a hydro power plant that runs through Pak Se district, Champassak province, Laos, July 25, 2018.
    (Ye Aung Thu/AFP)

    The migrant said that while authorities have no right to collect such high fees, people end up paying them because they want to avoid trouble and have no way to lodge a formal complaint.

    “Residents can’t say anything and simply have to pay the fee as ordered,” he said.

    An official from Champassak’s Pakse district told RFA that she believes public frustration with the staying fees is due to some corrupt officials asking for more than what local laws allow.

    According to the law, she said, officials can only collect staying fees of 40,000 kip (US$1.80) per month for up to three consecutive months, and are required to provide documentation certifying temporary residency.

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    But government salaries start at 1.85 million kip (US$84.50) per month, or only slightly above minimum wage, so many officials are looking for ways to supplement their pay, she said.

    “Not all officials perform their duties as prescribed in the policy,” she said. “It’s because their salaries are so low — that’s why they want to earn extra money.“

    The official said that provincial police “are investigating this issue,” as it falls under their jurisdiction.

    “If authorities are found to have abused their power to take money from residents, they will … face punishment according to the law,” she added.

    Village-level officials in other provinces told RFA that they do not charge Lao migrants a staying fee to reside in their communities.

    “There is no such policy for us to do so,” said one official from a village in Savannakhet province. “We only collect money from businesses in the amount they are comfortable to donate when we need funds to build roads, schools, and small hospitals.”

    Attempts by local officials to collect staying fees from Lao migrants have been shut down by central authorities in the past.

    In 2018, authorities in some villages in Vientiane’s Sikhottabong district required residents from other provinces to pay 55,000 kip per family or 48,000 kip (US$2.20) per individual for three months to live there.

    Shortly after the staying fees were announced, the central government ordered local authorities to end the policy.

    Translated by Phouvong. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Phouvong for RFA Laos.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The governments of Laos and Cambodia have stirred controversy after announcing awards for a casino magnate blacklisted by the U.S. for criminal activity and a scion of the country’s first family known for flaunting their wealth.

    Residents told RFA that they fear awarding the two men will legitimize their bad behavior and lead to further problems for both countries.

    On Dec. 6, Viengsavanh Siphandone, the governor of Laos’ Luang Namtha province, bestowed a national award on Zhao Wei, the head of the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, which lies along the Mekong River in Bokeo province.

    The governor presented Zhao, the Chinese founder of the Hong Kong-registered Kings Romans Group, with the “Third Class Development Medal” at an award ceremony inside his economic zone for donating materials and funds worth 1.3 billion kip (US$60,000) to the Luang Namtha police headquarters.

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    The award drew criticism from members of the public, who told RFA Lao that the government had no business celebrating an entrepreneur who is known for supporting criminal enterprises.

    “Zhao Wei … opens loopholes for [gangs involved in] human trafficking and money scams,” one resident of the capital Vientiane said, speaking on condition of anonymity citing fear of reprisal. “He is not only notorious locally for his involvement in transnational crimes, but internationally as well.”

    Kings Roman Group operates the Kings Romans Casino in the Golden Triangle SEZ, which Zhao is said to hold de facto control of, and which caters mainly to Chinese tourists.

    The Blue Shield casino, operated by the Kings Romans Group, stands in the Golden Triangle special economic zone on the banks of the Mekong river in Laos, March 2, 2016.
    The Blue Shield casino, operated by the Kings Romans Group, stands in the Golden Triangle special economic zone on the banks of the Mekong river in Laos, March 2, 2016.

    In 2018, the U.S. Treasury Department declared the Zhao Wei network a “transnational criminal organization,” or TCO, and imposed sanctions on Zhao and three other individuals and three companies across Laos, Thailand and Hong Kong.

    “Based in Laos within the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (GTSEZ), the Zhao Wei TCO exploits this region by engaging in drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, bribery, and wildlife trafficking, much of which is facilitated through the Kings Romans Casino located within the GTSEZ,” said a Treasury Department statement announcing the sanctions.

    Legitimizing criminal activities

    On Aug. 9 and 12, Lao and Chinese police raided and arrested more than 2,000 people on charges of committing crimes in the SEZ, where thousands have been lured through trafficking networks and forced to work as online scammers.

    Many of the women lured to the SEZ have also been forced to become sex workers.

    An official who took part in the rescue of three victims from the SEZ earlier this year told RFA he is worried that the award will legitimize Zhao’s activities and lead to more human trafficking there.

    “By deciding to award Zhao Wei the medal, the government has opened more opportunities for him to trick women into prostitution,” he said.

    Police raid a restaurant suspected of providing sex services to customers in Vientiane, capital of Laos, Jan. 2022.
    Police raid a restaurant suspected of providing sex services to customers in Vientiane, capital of Laos, Jan. 2022.

    This is the second time the Lao government has bestowed an award on Zhao. In 2022, the Bokeo Military Command presented him with a medal courage, saying it recognized his contributions to national defense and public security within the Golden Triangle SEZ.

    The Lao government says it is cracking down on the cyber-scamming industry, which a United States Institute of Peace report earlier this year said could be worth as much as 40% of the country’s formal economy.

    The think tank estimated that criminal gangs could be holding as many as 85,000 workers in slave-like conditions in compounds such as those in the Golden Triangle SEZ.

    Hun family scion receives medal of honor

    In Cambodia, King Norodom Sihamoni conferred the Royal Order of Monisaraphon to Hun Panhaboth — the grandson of Senate President Hun Sen’s elder brother — per the request of the Interior Ministry and Prime Minister Hun Manet, according to a royal decree dated Oct. 9.

    The award is generally given to Cambodians who contribute to or support the fields of education, arts, literacy, science or social affairs.

    Hun Panhaboth is the son of Hun Chanthou, who is the daughter of Hun Sen’s late elder brother Hun Neng. According to a report by Global Witness, Hun Chanthou and Hun Neng’s four other children own around 40 major companies.

    Hun Panhaboth is known in Cambodia for flaunting his wealth both at home and abroad, and even for boasting about his illegal activities, such as selling weapons to private citizens, on his Facebook and Instagram pages.

    Cambodia's Senate President Hun Sen walks past an honor guard in Phnom Penh on April 3, 2024.
    Cambodia’s Senate President Hun Sen walks past an honor guard in Phnom Penh on April 3, 2024.

    He owns luxury vehicles including a McLaren worth nearly US$1 million, a Bentley and an Audi worth more than US$200,000 each, and a private Airbus 72 helicopter. He is known to have given his girlfriend gifts worth nearly US$100,000 for her birthday and shuttled her on a private plane from Australia to Cambodia.

    Hun Panhaboth‘s lavish lifestyle has also been widely reported in the foreign press, including by Thai newspaper MRG Online, which claimed that he has used his family ties to procure contracts for large development projects.

    After facing criticism in the media, Hun Panhaboth assumed the role of a philanthropist, distributing gifts to the poor and posting the acts on social media.

    Philanthropy dwarfed by negative impact

    Sok Ey San, spokesperson for the ruling Cambodian People’s Party, told RFA that the government only confers the medal of honor on those who have “shown great achievements and contributions to the nation and the people,” although he refused to elaborate on what achievements or contributions Hun Panhaboth had made.

    Sok Ey San also dismissed concerns about Hun Panhaboth writing posts to Facebook about selling firearms, saying he was “a minor [at the time] and not mature enough to think seriously.”

    “He just posted that for fun — nobody thinks what he did on Facebook was serious,“ he told RFA.

    Youth group leaders RFA Khmer spoke with said they believe the government awarded Hun Panhaboth the national medal of honor for his acts of philanthropy, but suggested that they were dwarfed by those that have had a negative impact on society.

    Mat Vanny, chairman of the board of the South Korea-based Democratic Movement for National Unification, said that given Hun Panhaboth’s involvement in illegal activity and his penchant for flaunting his wealth, he is unqualified to receive such an honor.

    He added that the conferment will “devalue the award,” as well as the reputations of the government and king who gave it to him.

    Em Bunnarith, president of the Australia-based Global Cambodian Youth Network, said that in a country with a dynastic and corrupt leadership, such as Cambodia, decisions to award a medal of honor don’t go through proper assessment.

    “What the government has done will make our youth feel hopeless,” he said. “It means that if they have no connections … they will have no opportunity to contribute to the nation.”

    Regardless of what Hun Panhaboth has done, Em Bunnarith said, the Hun family will likely elevate his position within the armed forces to help protect the family name.

    Translated by Ounkeo Souksavanh and Sovannarith Keo. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao and RFA Khmer.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • In early August, the authorities in Laos delivered an ultimatum to scammers operating in the notorious Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone: Clear out or face the consequences.

    On Aug. 12, the Lao police, supported by their Chinese counterparts, swooped in. Some 711 people were arrested during the first week. Another 60 Lao and Chinese nationals were arrested by the end of the month, and more arrests have been made since.

    The way Vientiane frames it, Laos is now getting tough on the vast cyber-scamming industry that has infested much of mainland Southeast Asia.

    In Laos, the sector could be worth as much as the equivalent of 40 percent of the formal economy, according to a United States Institute of Peace report earlier this year.

    The think tank estimated that criminal gangs could be holding as many as 85,000 workers in slave-like conditions in compounds in Laos.

    People in Laos tell me there is some truth to Vientiane’s assertions. This might have been why Laos was downgraded to Tier 2 on the U.S. State Department’s annual human trafficking ranking in July, while Myanmar and Cambodia were downgraded to the lower Tier 3.

    According to one expert, “Laos is taking this issue more seriously than Cambodia and has more capacity to respond than Myanmar.”

    A man stands on a small boat travelling along the Mekong river in front of the Kings Roman casino in the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone in Laos, Jan. 14, 2012.
    A man stands on a small boat travelling along the Mekong river in front of the Kings Roman casino in the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone in Laos, Jan. 14, 2012.

    Admitting a problem is the first step, but Vientiane has been somewhat fortunate in how the scam industry has structured itself differently in Laos.

    In Cambodia and Myanmar, for instance, scamming tends to be geographically dispersed with compounds across the country and controlled by different syndicates.

    Zhao Wei’s empire

    In Laos, however, the industry was, until very recently, almost entirely centered in the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, an autonomous area long notorious for organized crime and run by the Chinese crime boss Zhao Wei and his Kings Roman Group, which has close ties to organized crime in China and Hong Kong.

    The United Wa State Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Myanmar-based militias with large stakes in Southeast Asia’s drug trade, are also active in criminal activity, including scam centers, within the SEZ.

    Zhao We, left, a Chinese crime figure who is tied to the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone in Laos, is awarded a medal by the Bokeo Military Command, Oct. 1, 2022.
    Zhao We, left, a Chinese crime figure who is tied to the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone in Laos, is awarded a medal by the Bokeo Military Command, Oct. 1, 2022.

    Initially, this centralization of criminality was a problem.

    After the Golden Triangle SEZ was founded in 2007, on a 99-year concession awarded to Zhao, it essentially operated as a mini-fiefdom. The Lao authorities were not even allowed entrance to the economic zone, giving the criminals carte blanche.

    This was a concern of a few nationalists within Laos’s communist party but tolerated by the majority, who regarded crime as a lesser evil, since Zhao and his associates were bringing in considerable foreign investment — and, of course, some cash to the political elites.

    However, as the cyberscam problem has metastasized since 2022, this situation has made it somewhat easier for Laos to respond.

    Because Zhao and his associates had established laundering trails to China and Myanmar years earlier, it meant that, unlike in Cambodia, most of the revenue from the scam industry immediately left Laos.

    This limited the amount of money needing to be recycled or laundered through local conglomerates, thus reducing the sums needed to corrupt Laotian officials, politicians, and tycoons.

    This meant that officials, especially those outside Bokeo province where the SEZ is located, weren’t contaminated by scam money, so they were not invested in protecting the racket.

    Sovereignty over SEZ

    By comparison, the scam industry is more geographically dispersed and controlled by more numerous players in Cambodia. This means much of the revenue stays within Cambodia where it is laundered through businesses run by some of the most prominent Cambodian oligarchs and politicians.

    So well-connected has the industry become that even if a faction within Cambodia’s government favored a full-frontal assault on the scammers, they know they would have to take on most of the country’s political aristocracy and oligarchy, risking strife within the ruling party.

    Scamming isn’t such an existential threat for the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, or LPRP.

    Police arrest scammers in Laos’ Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, Aug. 15, 2024.
    Police arrest scammers in Laos’ Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, Aug. 15, 2024.

    Indeed, the normally sedate National Assembly has noisily pressed Vientiane to tackle the scam problem, even last year rejecting a proposed government bill to toughen up regulations on SEZs for being too weak.

    In May, the Lao government reshuffled the leadership of Bokeo province, where the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone is located, ostensibly to clean out officials who had been bought off.

    Vientiane has somewhat reasserted its sovereignty over the zone this year.

    Through discussion and threats, it got Zhao and his Kings Roman Group to accept greater access for Laotian police and troops to the economic zone. That said, Zhao and associates can still limit what Lao authorities can do in the zone

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    Another advantage is that Zhao serves more at the whim of the Chinese Communist Party, which wants to crack down on parts of the scam industry in Southeast Asia, than some of the more independent operators in Cambodia and Myanmar.

    And the Lao government is also more dependent on Beijing than Cambodia’s authoritarian government.

    Pressure from China

    That means Vientiane, which relies almost entirely on Chinese investment for economic growth and on Chinese debt relief so the state doesn’t go bust, cannot say no when Beijing orders it to move on the scammers.

    The raids on the Golden Triangle SEZ in August came after a meeting earlier that month between the Lao Ministry of Public Security and Zhao – and just weeks after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Vientiane.

    However, we must also ask whether Laos’s cure is actually creating a worse disease.

    According to a USIP report last month, the Aug. 6 meeting between government officials and Zhao Wei, weeks before the raid on his GTSEZ, “gave criminal kingpins and their senior [scam] compound managers ample time to relocate. Many of them shifted operations to Cambodia or the Myanmar border with Thailand.”

    Simply scaring off some scammers to Cambodia might not be the best regional response, although Vientiane probably won’t give a fig about this.

    An apparent call center in Laos is raided by authorities, Aug. 9, 2024.
    An apparent call center in Laos is raided by authorities, Aug. 9, 2024.

    However, Vientiane would care if scammers are now merely set up shop elsewhere in Laos. One source tells me that they are already embedding themselves in the capital and near the Laos-China border.

    Depending on how things play out, Laos might end up with a diffuse scam industry that’s structured a lot more like Cambodia’s — and which is far harder to dismantle.

    Dispersing the scam compounds means increasing contacts between the criminals and officials from other provinces. Less sophisticated syndicates mean more of the scamming profits stay in-country, laundered through the local economy, infecting everything.

    Narco-states like Mexico and Colombia have learned the brutal lesson that it’s simpler to deal with an illegal industry run by one dominant cartel, even one you have to tolerate, rather than a scorched-earth free-for-all between many warring factions.

    Possibly, a similar impulse may be why Vientiane seemingly wants to push Zhao and his associates enough for some smaller operators to flee the country, but not enough that the Golden Triangle SEZ collapses.

    David Hutt is a research fellow at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) and the Southeast Asia Columnist at the Diplomat. He writes the Watching Europe In Southeast Asia newsletter. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of RFA.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by David Hutt.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • At least 371 families displaced by the construction of the Laos-China Railway project, completed three years ago, have yet to receive full compensation after refusing to accept what they say are inadequate offers from the Lao government.

    The families, who mostly live in the capital of Vientiane, were forced from their land by the project, part of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road Initiative” of infrastructure development linking China to its neighbors.

    A bridge on the Laos-China railway in Luang Prabang province, Laos, Sept, 2023.
    A bridge on the Laos-China railway in Luang Prabang province, Laos, Sept, 2023.

    Khamphan Phommathat, the president of Laos’ State Inspection Authority, confirmed that the 371 families remain uncompensated at a meeting of the Lao National Assembly last week, noting that the government had already paid US$83 million to 6,504 of 6,875 families affected by the project.

    “The reason why the issue remains unsolved is because the government and affected families still cannot agree on the calculation of a unit price for their houses, farmland, and trees lost to the project, while in other cases, some families simply can’t accept the unit price offered by the government,” he said.

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    In August last year, residents told RFA that they had been offered 80,000 kip (US$4.10) per meter, but were asking for 150,000 kip (US$7.70) per meter.

    The US$6 billion railway connecting the two Communist neighbors opened in December 2021. The World Bank projected that it would boost tourism, freight transport and trade in agriculture.

    The line runs from Vientiane into northern Laos, passing through 10 stations in the country, including the major tourist draw of Luang Prabang and the Chinese border town of Boten. It ends in Kunming in the southwestern Chinese province of Yunnan.

    It’s the first railroad to penetrate any distance into Laos, a country whose transport infrastructure has long been constrained by poverty, mountainous terrain and sparse population.

    Residents of a resettlement village for those affected by the construction of the Laos-China railway in Laung Prabang province, Laos, Sept, 2023.
    Residents of a resettlement village for those affected by the construction of the Laos-China railway in Laung Prabang province, Laos, Sept, 2023.

    But the project has been criticized for displacing several thousand farmers from their land. Many have faced long delays in getting reimbursement for their lost property, as others have been shortchanged in the payments they did receive.

    Speaking to RFA, an official who is involved in compensation negotiations said that the primary reason for the delay is because the government is low-balling residents.

    “There will be an increase to the previously offered unit price that [the government] agreed to,” said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the situation with the media. “However, many years have already passed and the economic situation [in Laos] has shifted, so it looks like the offered unit price is too low.”

    The Chinese funded Nam Khan 3 dam in Luang Prabang province, Laos, Sept, 2023.
    The Chinese funded Nam Khan 3 dam in Luang Prabang province, Laos, Sept, 2023.

    Another official working on the compensation issue, who also declined to be named, echoed the assessment that the government’s offering is too low.

    “The National Assembly already approved the unit price for compensation, but in practice families affected see it as too low and won’t agree to accept it,” he said. “The government also cannot agree to the unit price that affected families proposed. The only thing the government can do is to push villagers to accept its offer.”

    There is currently no projection for when the compensation scheme will be complete, but the State Inspection Authority’s Khamphan Phommathat told the National Assembly that the government will do its best to finalize the offer’s unit price.

    “We will continue to push in order for people to get compensation from what they already lost to the Laos-China railway project,” he said.

    Translated by Phouvong. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • A young woman who was forced to work at a Chinese-run scam center in Myanmar for two years is now in Thailand and expects to return to Laos soon.

    Last week, Radio Free Asia reported that the woman, who withheld her name out of fear of reprisals, was one of several Laotians trafficked to work as scammers at a place called “Casino Kosai” in an isolated development near the town of Myawaddy in Kayin state.

    Casino Kosai is in an area near the Thai border where ethnic Karen rebels have been engaged in intense fighting with military junta troops in recent months.

    It was unclear exactly how the young woman, who just turned 19, had gained her release, but her mother said that scam center operators had agreed to let her go.

    “It is the happiest moment in my life as soon as I heard from my daughter that the Chinese bosses would release her,” her mother said. “She was preparing to pack her belongings and the car would come to pick her up.”

    The woman told Radio Free Asia that she faced beatings whenever she failed to scam potential victims.

    “The Chinese bosses hit me and torture me every day,” she said in a text message. “Why isn’t anybody coming to help me?”

    The woman’s mother said her daughter was initially promised a factory job in Thailand, but was later sold to the Chinese scam gang and brought to Myanmar.

    She said her daughter told her about the abuse at the scam center and about working up to 19 hours a day.

    “I have no idea what to do to bring my daughter back home,” said the mother. “The Chinese bosses use cattle prods to torture her if she doesn’t do her job well.”

    The young woman told RFA Lao in a voice message that she arrived in Mae Sot on Wednesday, adding that she was unsure when she would continue on to Laos.

    On Friday, the woman told RFA that she was staying at a police station in Thailand’s Mae Sot district.

    RFA Lao spoke about the woman’s case with an official from the Lao Ministry of Public Security, who said that rescuing people from scam centers in areas in Myanmar that are not under junta control “is very difficult,” adding that there was little the Lao government could do about the situation.

    RFA was unable to reach Thai police in Mae Sot to ask for more information.

    Translated by Phouvong. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • A massive sinkhole that opened up in a rice paddy in central Laos’ Khammouane province was likely caused by excavation at a Chinese-owned potash mine, residents said Thursday.

    Residents of Thakhaek district’s Pakpeng village discovered a 20-meter (65-foot) wide, 10-meter (33-foot) deep sinkhole on their farmland, located around 800 meters (half a mile) away from area residences, according to a report Tuesday by the Laophattana newspaper.

    Residents reported hearing a loud boom at around 1 a.m. and found the depression later that morning.

    In the two days since, the sinkhole has increased in size to 25 meters (82 feet) in width and 15 meters (49 feet) in depth, the Khammouane News Facebook page reported Thursday.

    Photos posted to Facebook show a gaping hole that exposed several layers of substrate, containing a tree that was uprooted in the collapse.

    Khammouane Province Governor Vanxay Phongsavanh, left, and his delegation inspect a sinkhole in Pakpeng village, Laos, Dec. 4, 2024.
    Khammouane Province Governor Vanxay Phongsavanh, left, and his delegation inspect a sinkhole in Pakpeng village, Laos, Dec. 4, 2024.

    Pakpeng villagers told RFA Laos they believe the hole was formed due to excavation at a nearby concession leased by China’s Sino-Agri Mining Development Company Limited, which operates a mine at the site.

    “It happened near my rice paddy where I grow rice every year,” said one of the villagers, who spoke to RFA on condition of anonymity citing fear of reprisals. “I am not sure what caused this, but I know there is a potash mining operation [about 500 meters (1,640 feet)] from my rice paddy … It seems like they dug a ventilation shaft in the ground.”

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    On Wednesday, a delegation of officials from the Khammouane province Department of Energy and Mines, led by provincial governor Vanxay Phongsavanh, and Sino-Agri representatives visited the site for an initial investigation, but no conclusions were reached regarding what caused the pit to form, according to Khammouane News.

    A Thakhaek district official, who also declined to be named, told RFA that an investigation is ongoing, but acknowledged that the nearby potash mine may have had a role in the collapse.

    Khammouane Province Governor Vanxay Phongsavanh, center, and his delegation inspect a sinkhole in Pakpeng village, Laos, Dec. 4, 2024.
    Khammouane Province Governor Vanxay Phongsavanh, center, and his delegation inspect a sinkhole in Pakpeng village, Laos, Dec. 4, 2024.

    “The incident took place around 500 meters from an underground tunnel,” he said, confirming the villager’s suspicion that Sino-Agri had built a ventilation shaft for the potash mine. “The tunnel is around 300 meters (1,000) below the surface.”

    Khammouane News reported that, after inspecting the sinkhole, officials ordered Sino-Agri to secure the site with a fence to prevent people and animals from falling into the pit.

    Translated by Phuovong. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.


  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.


  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • On Nov. 19, Sok Chenda Sophea, who was only brought in as Cambodia’s foreign minister last year, was given the heave-ho and replaced by his predecessor, Prak Sokhonn.

    The previous day, the urbane and much-praised Saleumxay Kommasith was dismissed as the foreign minister of Laos and demoted upstairs to the Prime Minister’s Office.

    It is unusual for foreign ministers in both countries to be reshuffled.

    Sok Chenda Sophea was only the third foreign minister since the ruling Cambodian People’s Party cemented its power in 1998; Saleumxay was only the fourth foreign minister since the communist takeover in Laos in 1975.

    In one interpretation, Saleumxay was merely a casualty of an ongoing carve-up of the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party by the Siphadones and Phomvihanes, the two most important political clans.

    Laos' Foreign Minister Saleumxay Kommasith takes to the podium to speak during a press conference after the 57th Association of Southeast Asian Nations Foreign Ministers' Meeting (AFP Photo/Tang Chhin Sothy)
    Laos’ Foreign Minister Saleumxay Kommasith takes to the podium to speak during a press conference after the 57th Association of Southeast Asian Nations Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AFP Photo/Tang Chhin Sothy)

    It is expected that 2025 will be a year of horse trading and in-fighting between grandees ahead of the National Congress in January 2026, when the party’s new five-year leadership is announced.

    Saleumxay was replaced by Thongsavanh Phomvihane, previously head of the ruling communist party’s foreign policy commission and brother of the National Assembly chair, Saysomphone Phomvihane.

    Saysomphone stands a good chance of becoming the next party chief, but there are still doubts about whether Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone, the scion of the Siphandone clan, will get a second term.

    Uncertain geopolitics ahead

    Once considered the party’s “crown prince,” Sonexay’s reputation has suffered badly because of his handling of Laos’s ongoing economic catastrophe, which shows no signs of improving.

    Saleumxay was seen by some as a challenger to Sonexay, especially after impressing this year as the minister who guided Laos’s ASEAN chairmanship.

    Yet, he was not universally popular within the ruling communist party. Many apparatchiks perceived him as an aloof, independent-minded upstart who rose too quickly.

    Removing Saleumxay increases Sonexay’s chances of keeping his job. Putting a Phomvihane in the foreign ministry also increases that family’s influence, too.

    Beyond domestic political concerns, the removal of the two foreign ministers comes as their governments prepare for more uncertain times internationally.

    According to Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet, Prak’s reappointment will increase the “government’s capabilities” amid intensifying geopolitical tensions.

    Prak is an experienced diplomat accustomed to fighting Cambodia’s corner amid new Cold War rivalries, whereas Sok Chenda Sophea was principally an economics-minded functionary – appointed last year because he wasn’t geopolitically-minded.

    The neophyte Hun Manet administration wanted a foreign minister who would focus entirely on increasing trade and investment, which was Sok Chenda Sophea’s sole remit as the former head of Cambodia’s investment council.

    Cambodia Foreign Minister Sok Chenda Sophea, center, walks  during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Foreign Ministers meeting in Vientiane, Laos, July 25, 2024. (AP Photo/Achmad Ibrahim)
    Cambodia Foreign Minister Sok Chenda Sophea, center, walks during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Foreign Ministers meeting in Vientiane, Laos, July 25, 2024. (AP Photo/Achmad Ibrahim)

    Under Sok Chenda, the foreign ministry shifted many of its diplomatic duties, allowing it to concentrate on tapping foreign governments for more money.

    That left other ruling party grandees like Hun Manet and his father, Hun Sen, still in power in Phnom Penh, to operate their own foreign policy – pursuing controversial issues, like the territorial disputes with neighboring Vietnam and Thailand, that could impair economic relations.

    Trump tariffs

    Phnom Penh presumably thinks this dual system is no longer workable. Donald Trump’s return as U.S. president in 2025 means Washington will no longer separate geopolitics from trade, so it makes little sense for Phnom Penh to do so, either.

    Moreover, it knows it will face a much more hostile relationship with the incoming Trump administration, with its threatened blanket 10-20% tariff on global imports when the U.S. is the largest purchaser of Cambodian goods.

    Trump also will bring Marco Rubio in as secretary of state. Washington’s leading China hawk is expected to take a much tougher stance on Beijing’s partners in Asia, such as Cambodia, and on mainland Southeast Asia’s vast scam industry that is increasingly victimizing U.S. citizens.

    Unlike Sok Chenda Sophea, Prak is more of a ruling-party partisan who can push back against U.S. criticism. Presumably, Phnom Penh realizes it’ll soon have to wade into a new fight with Washington, making it even more important to be on the best terms with Beijing.

    Beijing won’t be displeased by Prak’s return.

    Attuned to Beijing

    China is believed to have grown weary with some of the princelings installed in Hu Manet’s cabinet during last year’s vast generational succession process.

    It has been lobbying for the return of Prak, an old-style politician who understands how Beijing prefers things to be done.

    In Vientiane, Saleumxay did a good job in recent years of pitching Laos to the rest of the world, including the West, and as the only fluent English speaker in the Politburo was key to securing some important development assistance packages from Japan, the U.S., and European states.

    Yet Laos’s dire economic situation, particularly its massive debts to China, isn’t improving, and only Beijing has the ability to assist meaningfully.

    A damning report by the IMF published last week noted that Laos’s economy “critically relies on the continued extension of debt relief from China.” Vientiane knows it must narrow its foreign relations again to focus squarely on China.

    Indeed, the communist party is eager to find a more senior role for pro-Beijing figures like Sommath Pholsena, currently a deputy president of the National Assembly and a childhood friend of Xi Jinping, China’s president. He’ll likely be the next National Assembly chair.

    Thongsavanh Phomvihane, the new foreign minister, started his career at Laos’s embassy in Beijing, has closer ties to the Chinese Communist Party, and is more of a party loyalist than Saleumxay.

    Like Prak, he’s an older, more traditional and safer pair of hands, someone who understands what Beijing wants and how to provide that.

    David Hutt is a research fellow at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) and the Southeast Asia Columnist at the Diplomat. He writes the Watching Europe In Southeast Asia newsletter. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of RFA.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by David Hutt.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.