Category: Laos

  • This post is part of a series of essays highlighting the work of emerging scholars of Southeast Asia published with the support of the Australian National University College of Asia and the Pacific.

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    It was a dry November evening in 2018 when Sith, a man in his twenties, invited me to drink with his friends in Banmai. “What are you studying here in Banmai Resettlement, Ay [brother]?” Sith asked me as we headed toward his family’s house after buying a case of beer. I told him I was there to study electricity.“Are you an engineer?” he asked. “I also studied electrical engineering after secondary school, but I failed to finish it.”

    “No, I’m studying social science. I’m studying resettled villagers’ experiences of new electricity,” I said.

    “Experiences of new electricity, [bo]? Before moving here, we only had a small solar panel. We could turn on our light bulbs for two to three hours only. It was lesser during rainy days. We usually used oil lamps. We had to sleep early, because it’s very dark at night. We just stayed at home, because we’re afraid of accidents or malevolent spirits [phihay].  Here, people are more productive at night because of new electricity. People can now use all types of electric appliances and devices. Electricity has made us ‘modern’ [thansamai]. Electricity has given us ‘comfortable bodies’ [sabaygay]. If you have money here, you can now live like urbanites [khônnaimuang].”

    Many scholars have examined how dams on the Mekong mainstream and tributaries have impinged upon local communities who rely on the river system for food and livelihoods. However, there has been less scholarship devoted to how consumption of hydroelectricity in these communities has transformed the lives of the displaced.

    I wanted to bridge this gap in the literature via my doctoral research, by conducting ethnographic research for a year in Banmai Resettlement, the largest relocation community of the Nam Nua 1 (NNua1) Hydropower Project located in Bokeo Province. The project is considered by its developer as the flagship hydroelectric investment in Laos under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While in Banmai, I examined the ways whereby local communities, who have become consumers of the electricity produced by the dam that displaced them, perceive the impact of that process of consumption on them.

    Hydroelectric production—consumption

    In November 2014, a few months after the start of construction, the NNua1 displaced more than 1,750 households—10,000 individuals from 10 and 27 villages in Bokeo and Louangnamtha Province, respectively. Over 3,100 villagers, or approximately 560 households, were resettled in Banmai.

    I conducted oral history interviews with 128 of these Banmai households. They told me that in the years preceding resettlement, between 2010 and 2016, almost all families were using non-grid electricity generation sources, with the majority using solar panels. These sources of electricity, however, were unstable and provided power for only two to three hours per day. Stability suffered during the rainy season in particular. Since their relocation, all households have been connected to the grid, one of the entitlements promised and provided by the NNua1 and the Lao state.

    My interlocutor Sith’s experiences mirror those of many villagers I interviewed about their new grid connection. To consume 24/7 hydroelectricity is already a paradoxical experience for the resettled, after all, its generation is what forced them to leave their homes. But this electricity has also helped them adjust to their new environment. In my research, I wanted to examine the other paradoxes posed by this new consumption of electricity in Banmai: between darkness and light, modernity and memories, productivity and laziness, indigence and affluence, and “comfortable body” (sabaygay) and “poor heart” (thouk chai).

    Banmai residents experience an increased sense of modernity related to grid connection while reminiscing about more traditional social practices or activities that electricity has rendered obsolete Residents feel that 24/7 hydroelectricity makes the resettled somehow both productive and lazy. The new grid connection illuminates differences in wealth between the villagers of relative affluence and indigence. And finally, the new grid connection has given many of the resettled “comfortable bodies” (sabaygay) but not “happy hearts” (sabaychai).

    The goal of examining these paradoxes is not to sugar-coat the relocation process, but rather to present a more nuanced analysis of hydroelectric development. Unpacking these paradoxical experiences can account for the narratives of villagers who enjoyed the benefits of new electric consumption, without ignoring the inequality and impoverishment created by hydropower projects. Like any profit-driven physical infrastructure, hydroelectric infrastructure can simultaneously dispossess its end-users while providing them with real benefits.

    Modernity—memories

    We arrived at Sith’s home around 19:00, and saw Chan, a friend in his late twenties, carrying a duck whose feet were bound. Chan told Sith to grill it and prepare Luatpèng, a dish using duck’s blood. Other friends in their early twenties, Ton and Mek, joined us. Ton had brought his Bluetooth speaker and played Thai and Lao songs from his smartphone. Mek refused to drink beer on an empty stomach, so Sith told him to get vegetable soup from the refrigerator and reheat it on the electric hotpot (mosouki).

    The food warmed up in less than ten minutes and as Mek slurped his soup, the community megaphones (thôlakhông) produced a loud buzzing sound. The voice of the village headman came over the megaphones, apologising for the late announcement and reminding the villagers to attend a seminar the next morning on combating mosquito-borne diseases organised by the district government.

    After the announcement, Sith told me: “You see, electricity has really made us thansamai [modern], ay. Now, we can live like people in naimuang [urban areas].”

    Most of my participants expressed this new sense of urbanity thanks to 24/7 electricity consumption. Thansamai (modern/high-tech), samaimai (new era/generation), phatthana (developed), chaleunhounghuangkouaa (more prosperous), and sivilaikouaa (more civilised) were the adjectives used by many to describe how their grid connection has transformed their lifestyle practices from bannok (rural) into naimuang (urban). Within this transformation, however, there are apparent differences in perception regarding what has been gained and lost in the process.

    The grid connection, for instance, has brought modern entertainment to Banmai. In the past, only a few affluent households owned televisions and speakers, which they used for less than an hour a day because of the unstable electric supply. Now, many participants, particularly the youth, can play online videos, music, and mobile games. This has also exposed the resettled to global news, trends, and information.

    Many of my interlocutors, however, lamented the impact that new electric lights, televisions, and mobile phones had on one beloved pastime: they now seldom, if ever, gather together around a bonfire. Prior to their relocation, the bonfire served as a light source, a body heater, a mosquito repellent, a tool for cooking, and importantly, as a central gathering space for socialisation at night. People recalled that while they huddled close to the fire, they heard life stories and folktales from their parents and the elderly. They also learned to sing traditional Lao songs and play musical instruments, such as the khèn (a traditional Lao flute) and guitar. Before leaving their former homes, family members and neighbours felt closer and more connected because they gathered around the fire almost every night. Several participants, especially the elderly, bewailed how modern life in Banmai has led to a decline in such social connections.

    Electrification, however, has not meant a complete loss of traditional beliefs. Villagers I spoke to still situated their access to electricity within their traditional spiritual worldviews. Households spoke of the ways whereby stable and brighter electric lights might disempower spiritual beings, for instance. Many thought that the new light sources blocked the vision of (e.g., phi phong and phi pao) and warded off evil spirits (e.g., Khmu’s rôy kreun, Lamet’s proong, Lao Loum’s phi phong and phi pao). Brightness could also lay bare the identities and modus operandi of some malevolent ghosts (e.g., proong, phi ka, and phi kongkoy).

    Electricity consumption has also modernised how the resettled villagers store, prepare, and consume food and drinks in refrigerators, electric hotpots, and rice cookers. For many participants, especially youngsters, using an electric hotpot to prepare their meals was more comfortable, faster, and more modern than cooking with firewood/charcoal.

    Most elderly participants, however, preferred cooking meat over a fire or charcoal because it makes the meat tender and gives it a “smoky aroma” and “natural taste”. These relatively older participants discussed how the speed of cooking with electricity could ruin these qualities of the meat. Many younger participants, however, felt that this “natural taste” of food cooked with fire was just the older villagers’ “accustomed taste” (lotxat thi kheuy xin). Younger people admitted that perhaps they had become accustomed to eating food cooked with electricity, so they already lost the ability to recognise the “natural taste” mentioned by the elderly.

    These contrasts—modern entertainment v. bonfire gatherings, speedy food preparation v. time- and flavour-intensive cooking—show how different people disagree over which aspects of electrification feel like a benefit, and which feel limiting.

    Productivity—laziness

    When Chan, Ton, and Mek learned from Sith that I was studying the grid connection in Banmai, they told me their opinions over beers.

    “If the villagers had remained in their former villages without electricity, they would not have been able to run new businesses like the ice factory, furniture shops, and retail shops,” Chan told us. Ton added, “Here, some villagers can now make more Lao skirts, circular rattan meal bases, bamboo chairs, and chicken cages. They can now work at night because of new electric lights.”

    Mek, however, countered, “Electricity has also made the villagers lazy. Ton, for example, always wakes up so late, because he always plays Mobile Legends [a mobile game] and watches YouTube videos until dawn.”

    This conversation captures how 24/7 electricity simultaneously induces both a sense of economic productivity and indolence in Banmai. In terms of productivity, some villagers running “retail shops” (hankhaykhuang) in Banmai can now sell their merchandise after dark. Electric lights in chicken coops help poultry farmers protect chickens from potential predators. Refrigerators and freezers are crucial to some new businesses.

    Stable electric lights in Banmai have boosted productivity for local artisans. Women told me of increased output of Lao textiles, and men noted a rise in bamboo and rattan handicraft production. Before resettlement, these activities were just hobbies. After relocation, these crafts have become sources of income as an unfortunate corollary of the lack of employment opportunities in Banmai.

    Several participants thought their mobile phones powered by 24/7 electricity have made their work more productive. Those who farm use their smartphones to learn about agricultural techniques, crop and pest management, fertiliser application, or animal husbandry. Many also listened to Thai and Lao songs or radio on their phones while planting rice, hunting game, collecting forest products, or working in Chinese banana plantations near Banmai. They claimed their phones helped them feel good and stay motivated to do arduous work.

    Conversely, however, other participants told me that using smartphones excessively has had detrimental effects on their productivity. Several mused about how the large amount of time they dedicated to swiping their smartphone screens precluded them from concentrating on fulfilling their household or work duties. Rather than focusing on their studies, young people have been engrossed in mobile games. Many, like Mek, surmised that spending too much time scrolling on smartphones at night also interrupts their sleep patterns, making them lethargic and lazy (khikhan).

    People say they have become khikhan not only in engaging in physical activities but also in socialising. A confidant from Banmai also disclosed that his sex life with his significant other was curtailed due to smartphone-induced indolence. Although some mentioned the importance of social media in connecting with people they know who live and work in other towns or abroad, many, especially parents, bemoaned how smartphones contributed to feelings of disconnection within their families. Smartphone-induced indolence, one of the unexpected consequences of new electric consumption, has made the resettled globally integrated yet locally disconnected.

    Indigence—affluence

    Around 20:15, the grilled duck and Luatpèng were finally cooked. While eating and drinking, Sith and his friends shared more of their memories of their former villages with me.

    Sith suddenly asked me, “Ay, are you going to study the experiences of electricity of poor villagers in Banmai?”

    “Yes. Now they also have electricity. I want to learn about their new experiences,” I replied.

    “But they don’t have electric appliances. They only have electric lights given by the hydropower company.”

    The proponents of the NNua1 Project—NNua1 staff and officials, as well as Lao state actors involved in the relocation process—have lauded efforts to modernise the villagers who were formerly disconnected from the grid.

    Although almost all houses are now connected to the grid, the reach of this distributed modernity has been uneven because not everyone can afford to purchase electric appliances. Examining the electricity consumption of the resettled serves as a prism through which to understand disparities in accessing the modernity conferred by grid connection. Probing this uneven access also illuminates the continuities of past inequalities in the new settlement.

    This differential access is evident when comparing the lightscapes of the living rooms of wealthy and low-income families in the new settlement. I opted to focus on the living room because this part of the house lies within the reach of outsiders, and it serves as the place where the resettled perform their social identities.

    Households that ran profitable businesses in the older villages had big houses in Banmai. They also had cars, new lucrative businesses, and relatives working for the government. These families took advantage of both the practical and symbolic value of their new light sources to present something “beautiful” (ngam) and “modern” (thansamai) to their guests.

    In comparison to the aesthetic-oriented lighting of the affluent, the majority of families in Banmai used new electric lights mainly for practical reasons. Some indigent families had no electricity or electric lights at all in their living rooms during my fieldwork. These poorer families struggled to confront their new lives in the relocation site. Inauspiciously, they also failed to pay their electricity bill owing to the lack of livelihood opportunities and grazing and swidden areas in Banmai. When several indigent households went to the mountain to do shifting cultivation, unidentified burglars ransacked their houses and stole their few possessions, including their new electric lights given by the project.

    I also investigated the huge differences in the villagers’ kitchen and dining areas. The resettled who owned kitchen appliances mentioned their modernity in storing, preparing, and consuming food and cold drinks. Villagers who did not own kitchen appliances, by contrast, had remarkably limited capacity to pay close attention to the quality of their food. In fact, these villagers claimed that their experience of hunger in the new settlement was higher than in the past.

    The stories of the resettled who failed to experience the new electricity-induced modernity bear testimony to two facts. First, the NNua1 Project’s and its political goal of distributing “modern” experiences to all households in Banmai has failed to materialise. Second, experiences of poverty and modernity are possible at the same time. The experiences of the resettled challenge the claims of mainstream development practitioners and exponents of modernisation theory, who tend to equate modernity with development. When people feel they are becoming modern owing to infrastructure projects, it does not mean that their impoverishment is being addressed. Development is more complicated because it is multi-faceted; being modern is just one of its many facets.

    Comfortable body—poor heart

    Chan, Ton, and Mek agreed with Ton that the experiences of new electricity varied between the poor and the rich. They all agreed that it was easier for the affluent villagers to live like urbanites (khônnaimuang), and that their new access to the grid had made their “bodies comfortable” (sabaygay) but had failed to give the resettled “happy hearts” (sabaychai). As Sith put it:

    The project gave us electricity, but we don’t earn enough money here, because we lost our livelihoods here. Electricity has made us modern because it has reduced the time required for some of our activities. But it could not give us food to eat when we’re hungry; it could not give us medicine when we’re sick. Electricity has made our “bodies comfortable” [sabaygay]; moving here has made our “hearts poor” [thoukchai].

    On many occasions, the more prosperous villagers, notably those with substantial pre-relocation savings or pre-existing successful businesses, pointed out how their new electric consumption had made them feel sabaygay and sabaychai (literally: “comfortable/happy heart”). By sabaygay, they usually referred to how their grid connection and other physical infrastructure in Banmai meant less physical work. Their feelings of sabaychai also allude to the ways their electricity consumption and economic activities allow them to be closer to their family and to feel comfortable staying and retiring in Banmai. These claims of sabaygay and sabaychai show that some resettled express greater happiness living in Banmai than in their previous settlements.

    Concentrating solely on these affluent villagers’ experience gives us the impression that NNua1’s resettlement programs have been successfully implemented. But most of my participants explained to me that the success of these comparatively wealthy villagers could not be attributed merely to the newly built electric infrastructure and other benefits received from the hydropower project, nor to their self-perception of being “hardworking.” The wealthy have leveraged their past resources to operate profitable enterprises and to successfully integrate themselves into the market. These participants, who have both “comfortable/happy bodies and hearts” after relocation, represent a very small minority.

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    The majority of my household interview participants, like Sith, associated their new grid connection with the experience of being modern and having comfortable bodies (sabaygay), but not the happiness of the heart (thoukchai). They explained that their hearts had become poor since they moved to Banmai due to three principal factors: the disappearance of their prior food and livelihood sources, the project’s inadequate financial compensation and unfulfilled promises, and the perceived corruption and preferential treatment exhibited by some Lao staff of the NNua1 Company, its outsourced companies, and some local state officials. Their new coping strategies developed in response to their challenging economic conditions in Banmai further evoke feelings of thoukchai.  Examples of their precarious survival strategies include walking long distances to scavenge for wild edibles, eating their pets during food shortages, and resorting to amphetamine abuse as a means of mitigating the physical fatigue of new labor conditions in Chinese plantations.

    And not all villagers associated the sense of urbanity and modernity brought about by the new grid connection with physical comfort. About a quarter of the villagers I spoke with candidly stated that since relocation, their hearts and bodies had both become poorer (thoukchai, thoukgay). Among them were those who could not sell their labour to the market due to their age, disability, or gender, as well as ethnic minorities who had illegally returned to their former villages. These participants believed that their lives would have been better if the government had permitted them to remain in their original settlements. Their negative views of the relocation demonstrate how the infrastructure-centric approach to development of the NNual1, the Lao state, and the BRI is being challenged on the ground.

    The paradoxes of electricity I discussed demonstrate how rural electrification reshapes life in both enabling and estranging ways. Round-the-clock electricity can amplify not only modern and convenient living, but importantly, socioeconomic inequalities and disrupted traditional rhythms and relations. Wading across the pleasure, pain, and promise of electric power, this ethnographic analysis illuminates the political nature of Chinese infrastructure, not the spectacular but the intimate and inconspicuous.

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  • On 10 February 2025, my friend Lom (pseudonym) sends me a video clip she took on the street in Attapeu, in the far south of Laos. The video shows a large truck driving past a crowd gathered along the main road of town. I can see mainly women in formal dress: the traditional Lao sin skirt and a shawl worn usually for Buddhist ceremonies. The truck is dressed up, too: waves of white and golden cloth hang along the vehicle’s sides and reflect the sunlight. A red carpet covers the truck’s tray. Five men stand on top; one is resting his hands on a large rock in the middle. Many cone-shaped offerings (ton dok mai) made from rolled banana leaves and marigold flowers surround the rock. Another man on the truck takes pictures of the crowd. Behind the truck rolls a ute with giant speaker boxes that expel Lao instrumental music, announcing the arrival of the rock from afar to the people of Attapeu town.

    My friend turns her phone camera to show the destination of the truck: the recently finished City Pillar Park. The City Pillar Shrine, or hall (ho lak muang), will be the new home of this rock, or rather, of the giant gemstone hidden within. The gem will be carved out of its grey coat, lifted up the staircase and past the golden naga (mythical serpent) sculptures that typically guard Buddhist temples.

    A few weeks later, over lunch with Lom, I ask her why she thinks this stone is used in the City Pillar. She says that it was “given” by a Chinese company, three large pieces, to three significant places in town. She thinks this occurred so that in the future, when all  the stone has been taken, the next generations can still come and see it here. She calls this “kananoulak”, conservation. Another Attapeu friend who I asked told me this was hin on, the Lao term for Pagodite, also known as soap stone which is used in stone carvings and figurines often in religious contexts in China, Japan and Southeast Asia (its name is derived from “pagoda”’). It was found in Phouvong district, Attapeu province, and it is “more expensive than gold!”, my friend says. I ask whether people in Phouvong like to use or sell this stone? She answers: “Yes, people did in the past, but now the government has given all rights to take the stone to international companies. Now it is illegal for Attapeu people to take it.”

    Corporate mineral extraction in Attapeu province has rapidly increased over the past few years. In 2022, the Lao government granted ten companies land concessions and mining rights for an area equivalent to a quarter of the province’s land area. A contract to survey for Pagodite in the Phouvong area was signed in February 2023 by the Attapeu provincial government with a Chinese construction company (China is the largest trading partner and investor in Laos). Across the country, investments in mineral production of over US$2.47 billion were made in 2024, and sales of minerals and mineral products yielded more than US$3.2 billion, making minerals the most exported good from Laos. When announcing these numbers in 2025, the Director-General of the Department of Mines Management highlighted the importance of expanding the mineral sector to support Laos’ economic development goals.

    At the time Lom’s video reached me, I was at the Paksong agricultural festival, a coffee hub on the Bolaven plateau. Perhaps, what coffee is to the Bolaven, minerals like Pagodite are to Attapeu: a resource that some local people have put their hopes and work in to earn a living, perhaps even gain a slice of wealth. International investors try to make profit from both and have larger bargaining power with the government than farmers. But while coffee trees re-grow, and can support people’s livelihoods ongoingly, Attapeu’s mineral resources are only extracted once, mainly for export. The huge gemstone that travelled into town that day in February, accompanied by traditional music and everyday people’s astonished looks, was perhaps chosen to become part of the new city pillar because of this transience that adds to its material and symbolic value.

    In this article, I explore how the stone is wrapped up in stories of spiritual, political and economic powers at play in this province and beyond, which became symbolically “enshrined” in the new Attapeu city pillar. I approach “power” in the sense of power to—that is, generative energies to set things in motion and move people to act—and trace what activities around the Attapeu City Pillar inauguration can tell us about some current flows of power in Laos.

    Rather than cast in stone, any spiritual, political and economic powers require ongoing re-generation. Aware of this, the Lao government uses the City Pillar as a vehicle: it revives an ancient practice intended to establish and emplace a spiritual protective power to serve its own contemporary political and economic efforts. A beautiful gemstone is transported from a rural hinterland to the city centre, monks travel to the pillar inauguration event, worshippers gather to show their respect and direct some power towards their own desires, and images feature in government news and on social media—activities the government mobilises to bond citizens to projects of national development and sociocultural integration. Since in the end, as Holly High and Pierre Petit stress, the “state” is made up of people—some of whom we will meet here around the city pillar.

    Observations from a city pillar ceremony

    Sunday, 27 March 2025. Duan, a hospital nurse in her twenties, picks me up at six in the morning. She is disappointed when she sees the treats I bought, a package of coffee-flavoured lollies: “They are too small for the sai bat (alms-giving ceremony)! And your kathip (rice basket) is too large.” Duan wears a white long-sleeved jacket with delicate stitching, a sin, beige-golden heeled slippers, and a peacock broach holds her long, silky hair together. I feel under-dressed in my Ta Oi (ethnic minority group) sin and cotton shirt. I sense this is a big occasion for her.

    We drive the short distance to the City Pillar Park. Attapeu town was busy in the last three days: people from all over the province and further afield travelled to join the inauguration or “worship” ceremony of the Attapeu City Pillar (phithi bouang souang ho lak muang). As the Attapeu Online News writes, it is held to “worship the sacred things and thank the benefactors of the village, city, and nation”.

    The construction of the City Pillar Park and shrine took over three years. The celebratory events of the past two days included evening dances and music performances, but the highlight of the festival occurred last night: som phot pha, the night when the Buddha statue of the city pillar is endowed with spiritual powers. This powerful act requires an entourage of senior monks to meditate through the night, alongside laypeople. This morning, scattered rubbish across the park is testimony to the presence of many people who spent the last night here mediating, dressed all in white, and in need of nourishment.

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    We are here this early morning to join the alms-giving ceremony. Duan points me to a stall at the entry of the park to buy bigger treats: “There will be 55 monks, I heard, you need to buy enough!” I choose biscuit packages, return to Duan and she places the biscuits in her silver offering vessel. She has spread out our mat next to some other women, but we are moved by a man who says: “Not here, this is where the monks will walk.” Our final spot on the Western side is already illuminated by the sun that rises behind the pillar shrine. I feel hot and see sweat beads on Duan’s face. I worry I will get sunburnt, “My face will be red!”, and Duan worries that her skin will darken, “My face will get black!”.

    We decide to take a walk around the park. On the Northern side of the shrine, tables with chairs stand in the shade of open tents, in readiness for the special guests: local politicians, high representatives of organisations, and important businesses—a category Lao people refer to as “big people” (phou nyai). But today, the most special guests are revered monks who travelled here even from the capital Vientiane, Duan tells me. The signs on the table signify the reserved places for members of the Sangha. I notice on the signs a logo and read: “Vangtat Mining Company Working for the People”. A little further I find benches that also read “Vangtat Company Mining Group” (photos by author below). I learn that these are the main sponsors of this event.

    A monk announces the proceedings of the day over microphone, his dark orange robe almost matches the red carpet beneath his feet. Next to him stands a large wooden armchair with flower upholstery. Duan says it’s the Governor’s seat. I keep following Duan who is looking for the best photo spots: this one’s too dark, that one has too many people, that one…she tells me to take photos anyways. I see some people up on the pillar shrine. The doors are open, but I cannot look inside. I ask Duan if we can go up there, but she says that only men can go. That disappoints me; I want to see this stone up close.

    We return to our sunny spot. It is now around quarter past seven. A monk begins reciting, and in the same moment, Duan answers her phone. Her colleague is on his way here and wants to know what’s happening.  A man with a large camera walks around and films people. He asks a couple of middle-aged women in front of us to take their picture, because they are “phou ngam (beautiful people). I cover my face with my shawl for some shade. Duan hangs up and stands her phone against her offering bowl so that the camera films her face as she is chanting.

    Eventually it is time to “take merit” (ao boun). When the group of monks arrive at our spot, women reach with their arms in between our heads to place their sticky rice, treats and small money notes in the monks’ bowls and trays. These are emptied frequently in large bags carried by young novices. The atmosphere seems jolly: a woman opposite to me jokes with the monk about the sweating she must endure. People attract the monks’ attention by calling out “Ajan” (teacher)—nobody wants to miss out. I ask Duan what this practice means to her. She says it “makes us have happiness” (hai mi khouamsouk). I ask “do the monks give happiness?’ She says, “Yes, they eat our treats, make Amelie and Duan be happy”.

    When the last monk has passed us, Duan says “let’s go” and that now we can climb to the top of the pillar shrine, she has seen other women do so. We take off our shoes and leave them beneath the naga railing. It takes a little while for us to approach; many people wait to see the stone inside and take their picture. When we enter the shrine, I see the stone for the first time in its finished rectangular form. It is beautiful with its red, white and grey shades that remind me of flames and smoke rising in a dark sky. In front of the stone sits a Buddha statue made from the same stone, its lap is covered in money notes. We take more pictures, then Duan says it is time to go home, she has some housework to do for her parents.

    The pillar and spiritual powers: Buddhas, deities, and spirits

    To stress the spiritual significance of the event, the Attapeu Online News wrote that it was a “celebration and consecration, to give merit and praise towards the supreme city pillar deity, master of the place, master of the base, the ancestors, and is a dedication to bring luck to oneself and family to live well and happy”. My friend Ponsavad, a young woman from Attapeu city, consulted her family to explain that the city pillar hall is meant to “serve as an auspicious centre for the city”. They believed that the ritual was performed “to invite sacred deities to come and protect the people in the district”.

    The notion of a city pillar deity has been documented by anthropologists of Laos and other Theravada Buddhist countries. Kazuo Fukuura’s research on a community of spirit worshippers of the Chiang Mai city pillar traces the pillar’s origin directly to the Hindu and Buddhist God Indra, more than 700 years ago, after whom the pillar is named. Holly High’s study of myths surrounding the city pillar spirit Lady Si, situated in Vat Si Muang in Vientiane, indicate that the erection of this pillar reaches back as far as 1563 under the rule of King Setthathirat, at which time tradition required the generation of a tutelary deity by human sacrifice.

    My friend Souk, who grew up in Attapeu, believed that the custom of a female sacrifice (either voluntary or by murder) when a city pillar was established existed all over Laos. But he was not sure whether there was a previous city pillar in Attapeu, and where it would be located. According to some of the myths High collected, Lady Si’s decision to turn into a spirit by suicide was driven by a desire to spread Dharma, the Buddha’s teaching. For Ponsavad’s family, Dharma also played a role in the city pillar inauguration, as one of “three principal refuges: the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha”, which she told me “are central to our prayers and chants, representing enlightenment, the path of truth, and the community of noble disciples”, also referred to as the “three jewels”.

    Creations of and engagements with city pillars employ Buddhist concepts and deities in various ways, and not all Buddhists believe the same. Some people I asked in Southern Laos believed that through a som phot ceremony led by monks and attended by worshippers, the buddha statue within the city pillar would be endowed with protective power. Laypeople might bring their own Buddha statues from home to this event, since before the ceremonial act, they are mere objects. However, when I asked my friend Souk about these beliefs, he said of himself that he tries to follow the teachings of the Buddha, but does not believe in such “magic”. To him, good only comes from people’s actions—the power to affect our lives is within ourselves, not attached to, or radiating from, statues or rocks.

    The pillar and political power: Lao nationalism and socialism

    Spiritual powers of city pillars are entwined with the political power of the muang (a traditional city state, predating the nation), such as Vientiane or Chiang Mai, a term today used in Laos to refer to a city or district. John Clifford Holt, a historian of Buddhism in Laos, writes that Buddhist political power in Laos consolidated not until the 16th century (the time when the Vientiane City Pillar was established), and was influenced from the neighbouring Lan Na kingdom, today’s Chiang Mai region. Buddhism re-entered the official Lao historiography after a phase of initial marginalisation of religion under the socialist regime. Laos’ more recent city pillars are created with the intention to strengthen a sense of national unity and incorporate Buddhism. Whilst regional, provincial sentiments of belonging and pride are tapped into, the intention is to instil pride in the Lao nation as a whole.

    The pillar as an “historical and cultural symbol of the province”, as the Attapeu Online News write, thereby feeds into modern Laos’ socialist political culture, where selected notions of history and heritage of “good and beautiful customs” are evoked to enhance a sense of unity and nationhood amongst the “multi-ethnic Lao people”. When the Lao People’s Democratic Republic was established in 1975, Kaysone Phomvihane, leader of the Pathet Lao liberation movement, declared unity of the country a priority and, as Goudineau writes, ‘defended polyethnic solidarity in the context of a single and indissoluble Lao nation.’

    Constructions of a national Lao culture to support unity are ongoing and the recent revival of city pillars are part of this nation-building-project. In 2012, a new pillar shrine was established in the national capital, Vientiane, not far from the landmark Vat Si Muang temple. Goudineau describes this as an act to regain “symbolic control”: a plaque at the pillar that I visited in May 2025 claims this to be the site of an ancient city pillar erected in 1540, under the reign of King Phothisarat of the Lan Xang Hom Khao Kingdom (the land of the One Million Elephants and the White Parasol), hence before Lak Si Muang appeared under Photsirath’s son Setthathirat.

    Ideological (mega)projects: Xiong’an and Nusantara

    Two problematic planned cities, one postcolonial utopia

    The modern nation of Laos traces its origins back to kingdom of Lan Xang established by king Fa Ngum in 1353. Phothisarat made Theravada Buddhism the official religion of Lan Xang from the beginning of the 16th century, by rejecting indigenous spirit (phi) worship by decree. According to the plaque, the new Vientiane city pillar shrine “symbolizes unity and heroism spirit among Lao people in fighting for the protection of fatherland and for the social development in Vientiane and nationwide”. Champassak’s city pillar, Attapeu’s neighbouring province, also features a stone that stresses national unity and harmony. On one side of the stone, my friend Souk explained to me, a Buddhist monk appeals to everyone in this place that they should love each other like different-coloured flowers in the same tree—supposedly a lesson about love, and harmony, despite differences. The other side quotes a message linked to Fa Ngum, which addresses everyone on this land to not fight war against each other.

    As the newest addition, Attapeu’s City Pillar Shrine is described in local news as “preserving culture and enhancing the unity of local people” (note, that people from at least ten recognised ethnic groups live in Attapeu, in a population of around 160,000 in 2024). In his speech at the procession for moving the soap stone to the new city pillar hall on 10 February 2025, the provincial governor praised the “participation” and “cooperation of people of all ethnic groups in Attapeu” in a procession that “shows solidarity, love, and devotion to the good traditions, culture, and customs of the nation and the tribes in the land of Attapeu province”. He compared the beauty and complexity of the stone to Attapeu where many ethnic groups live together.

    Multiculturalism has gained some symbolic traction in Lao politics, which becomes especially apparent in Sekong’s city pillar, Attapeu’s neighbouring province. This pillar is surrounded by scenes of village work carved in stone, and ten statues of male-female couples accentuate (or fantasise?) differences in dress and tools deemed typical for their ethnic group identified by plaques. Here, the Lao couple is presented as standing alongside, and in line, with others who appear to guard the pillar.

    Yet, despite such government-initiated showcase of multi-ethnicity, there is a widespread sense that on national scale, the Lao-Tai population remains dominant in defining what makes up “being Lao.” Researchers of Laos have critiqued the government’s efforts to create unity as “Laoization” of ethnic minorities who are encouraged to resemble the livelihoods, cultural and spiritual outlooks of Buddhist, Lao-Tai people. The establishment and ceremonies surrounding the Attapeu City Pillar may be seen as part of this political project of social integration on provincial level, sending the message that worshipping the pillar-deity is important to all people of Attapeu, if not Laos. Spending this event with my friend Duan, I got a sense that the aesthetic performance of a devote, Lao Buddhist woman with bright skin may add to one’s cultural capital in her society, prompting to post her religious participation on social media.

    The pillar and powers of socioeconomic development

    The message of unity sent out during the Attapeu city pillar inauguration is not only socio-political but has also an important socio-economic dimension. Memorabilia of economic, corporate power were scattered around the place, from VIP table signs to public benches that carry the name of the Vangtat mining company. Mixing economics and religion, the corporation’s representatives were named as benefactors of Attapeu in the monk’s speech prior to the alms-giving ceremony.

    Established in Attapeu’s Sanxai district in 2009, the Vietnamese Vangtat Mining Company Ltd. Contributed to a further ”boost” in gold mining in Laos around 2019. In 2022, Vangtat received government approval to explore an area of 399.1 km2 and exploit 18 km2, with a target of 1,000,000 tons of rare iron ore, and 30,000 tons of rare earth minerals in Attapeu’s neighbouring Sekong province. According to a Radio Free Asia report, Vangtat had explored and mined 428 km2  by mid-2024 in Southern Laos. Investments and beneficiary often go hand in hand, and Vangtat recently made the government news for a 20 million kip sponsorship payment towards Laos’ ASEAN chairmanship.

    According to the Lao Ministry of Energy and Mines, mining projects must ensure three benefits: of the nation, of investors, and of the local area. The latter is especially controversial. Residents in the district where the city pillar stone was mined said in an interview to Radio Free Asia that mining in their region disrupted livelihoods by causing damage to roads, traffic and noise, and limited access to farmable land. Wages paid to local workers were considered too low. People found it hard to see the benefits for the local area that their government promises, and lamented a lack of monitoring for social and environmental impacts by officials based in the faraway provincial centre.

    Official statements instead spread narratives of cooperation, harmony and mutual benefit between mining companies and local communities. In the speech of Attapeu’s Provincial Governor in the local news on the day the nearly ten ton heavy soap stone was moved to the city pillar shrine from Phou Kang Hong, Phouvong District, he stresses his pride in seeing the peaceful cooperation between the Lao–China gemstone development company and Attapeu’s “multi-ethnic People”. These narratives are situated within the wider development ideology of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party. Five-Year Development plans are underpinned by a revolutionary mission of guiding and reforming the population through a socialist path: in essence, the population is supposed to unite in harmony and cooperate to realise development plans.

    This narrative of national development is instilled throughout education, as I observed myself in politics classes during my PhD fieldwork at a state-run tertiary education institute. The government’s vision of national socioeconomic progress demands the population to make sacrifices; those considered “lagging behind” (commonly ethnic minorities) are requested to relocate and change their agricultural methods to what is deemed more innovative. As harbingers of modernisation, international investments into the country’s resources and infrastructural development are celebrated in official news; every deal is portrayed as testimony for socioeconomic progress. I found that many physical structures in Attapeu—new hospitals, an airport, and now a city pillar—were built with international, corporate money in exchange for land concessions or resource extraction deals. In Attapeu, investors such as the Hoang Anh Gia Lai Group employ the same narratives as aid organisation, promising to “reduce poverty” and “eliminate hunger”.

    Ideological (mega)projects: Xiong’an and Nusantara

    Two problematic planned cities, one postcolonial utopia

    Meanwhile, Attapeu province has sad stories to tell of development turning against itself: a partial collapsed hydropower dam drowned people and robbed villagers of their livelihoods, rapid deforestation due to banana or rubber plantations limit access to free food sources and harm biodiversity, corporate mineral mining disrupts villager’s lives and pays poor local wages, the airport operated only for one year and lies since in decay, and during my research I learnt that the newish provincial hospital has an unsafe sewage system—ironically, a public health risk.

    Heritage and powers enshrined

    City pillars in Laos attempt to preserve a piece of tangible wealth or heritage of a region that over its tumultuous history sacrificed a lot, long before it called itself a nation. Vientiane’s monument is said to host ancient relics that escaped pillaging from Siam, French colonisation, and American imperialism. Attapeu’s city pillar shrine now holds one exemplar of a sought-after stone, mined by and exported to its more powerful neighbours, mainly China and Vietnam. Though some commentators have described the current political-economic dynamics neocolonial, it is not as simple as depicting Laos as victim. Danelle Tan argues that, by attracting economic powers such as China, the Lao government manages to maintain its own power, whilst “the minorities, the farmers and the poor” bear the costs.

    Attapeu’s new city pillar stands there to celebrate, not to mourn, the treasures of the province. One big, shiny piece is now enshrined to be preserved for generations—“heritage” has been declared. In the governor’s words, as a “priceless” mineral, the stone symbolises the “abundance and wealth of the land and water resources of our Attapeu province”. For some, it may just be a dead rock hidden away. For others, who live in or can travel to the centre of the province, and participate in activities of worship like Duan and I, the soap stone block and Buddha may regenerate spiritual, political and economic powers—as well as more mundane hopes for happiness—that reverberate far beyond Attapeu.

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  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • A pack of cigarettes in Laos costs as little as 32 U.S. cents, thanks to a secret deal between the Lao government and British tobacco giant, Imperial Brands.

    In a new report, The Examination, a news site that focuses on global health threats, looks into who benefited from the 2001 deal and how an agreement capping excise taxes has hit government revenues in the Southeast Asian nation and kept the price of cigarettes among the lowest in the world. That’s had serious public health consequences for Laos, which has very high rates of smoking.

    Radio Free Asia’s Mat Pennington spoke with Jason McLure, an investigative journalist with The Examination who reported the story. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

    RFA: Can you tell us about the deal?

    Jason McLure: This story is about a deal that dates to 2001 when the communist government of Laos was privatizing the country’s state tobacco monopoly. Now, what they did instead of having an open tender … they basically invited Imperial Brands and a local company called ST Group, run by a local businessman named Sithat Xaysoulivong, to bid on this. And ultimately what the Lao government decided to do was to form a joint venture with Imperial Brands and Mr. Sithat Xaysoulivong and his ST Group.

    Now, the way this was done was very unusual and it also highlighted some very close political connections between Mr. Xaysoulivong and the Lao government at the time.

    RFA: So who really benefited from this? And what was the fiscal impact for the Lao government? Did they lose revenue?

    McLure: The way the deal was structured was the Lao government retained 47% of the tobacco monopoly and Imperial Brands, this British tobacco giant, got 34%. The remaining 19% of the company was owned by this offshore company called S3T which, we know and learned was owned partly by Imperial Brands and partly by Mr. Sithat Xaysoulivong who, as it happened, was an in-law of the Lao prime minister at the time, Bounnhang Vorachit. So there was clearly some familial relationship involved. And ultimately this deal paid $28 million over basically two decades to the former prime minister’s in-law. And this had big consequences for the Lao government. One tobacco control group did a study of the consequences of this deal on public health, and what they found was that the Lao government missed out on $143 million in tobacco tax revenue and that is because one provision of this tobacco contract capped cigarette excise taxes and essentially left Laos with some of the cheapest cigarettes in the world.

    RFA: How much is a packet of cigarettes in Laos?

    McLure: The cheapest brands of cigarettes in Laos cost about 7,000 kip. That’s about 32 U.S. cents. So, we were able to look at WHO (World Health Organization) data from all around the world and find that basically these are some of the very cheapest cigarettes in the world.

    RFA: So what have been the health impacts of this?

    McLure: So the health impacts, they really have been significant in Laos. As in many other Asian countries, relatively few women smoke, but somewhere around 37 to 40% of men smoke. So there’s a very high smoking rate there. It’s one of the highest in the world, at least among men. And this is in part a direct consequence of these very cheap cigarettes that are a consequence of this 25-year contract that was signed back in 2001.

    Now, there’s a lot of data, a lot of research from tobacco control researchers and public health researchers that show the best way to cut smoking rates to get people to quit smoking, or especially to prevent them from starting to smoke, is to increase the price of cigarettes. And the way that governments can do this is by increasing tobacco excise taxes. Now, this 25-year contract in Laos absolutely prevented the Lao government from doing that.

    RFA: And as we know, Laos is one of the poorest countries in Asia, and it doesn’t have a very well-developed health system. So you can see what the sort of impacts would be.

    McLure: That’s right. One of my colleagues visited one of the government hospitals in Laos, and she interviewed people who were there with smoking-related diseases. And the treatment was extremely expensive. And even for many people who have common smoking-related diseases like emphysema or lung cancer … particularly people in the countryside, people in villages, any form of radiation or chemotherapy or treatments like that are going to be out of reach.

    RFA: So what does Imperial Brands say about this?

    McLure: During our reporting, we reached out to Imperial Brands to ask them about this contract and specifically to ask why they decided to include an in-law of the prime minister at the time as part of this contract. And what they told us was that, for one thing, they said they comply with all regulations and generally behave in an ethical manner. But they didn’t respond to the substance of our questions. We asked them as well about why this contract was kept secret for so long. The contract, in fact, itself, contained a secrecy provision. They told us that this type of confidentiality is normal in such commercial arrangements.

    RFA: And did the Lao government respond at all to any of your inquiries or Mr. Sithat Xaysoulivong or Mr. Bounnhang Vorachit?

    McLure: Unfortunately, the Lao government, Mr. Vorachit, Mr. Sithat, even the current Lao Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone, they did not respond to our inquiries for this story.

    RFA: I understand that this isn’t a problem that’s totally isolated to Laos, that major tobacco companies have reached deals with authoritarian countries and other nations.

    McLure: That’s right. You know, what’s really a little bit unusual about this deal is that we were able to get the documents that showed exactly how the payments flowed from the Lao tobacco company and Imperial to the in-law of Laos’ then prime minister. But we’ve seen that British American Tobacco, another one of the tobacco giants, has been involved in dealings with the North Korean regime in violation of U.S. sanctions. In fact, they agreed to pay more than $620 million as part of a deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S. Justice Department as a result of that.

    RFA: So what’s the future of this agreement in Laos? I understand that it’s coming up to its term now.

    McLure: Well, that is an interesting question because this is a 25-year agreement that was signed in 2001. It will expire next year. Now, the government of Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone has already informed Imperial that they won’t be renewing this agreement again. However, they did leave the door open to negotiating a new agreement with the same tobacco company. We’ll see if that comes to pass and whether or not any insiders like Mr. Sithat, the in-law of former Prime Minister Vorachit, are involved. One thing that we do know is that Mr. Sithat is also close to the family of the current Prime Minister Sonexay. So it remains to be seen. Ultimately, what we’ve been told is that the current prime minister will be the one making the decision. And as we’ve seen, this could have huge impacts on the future of smoking in Laos and on Laos’ public health.

    The Examination is a nonprofit newsroom that investigates global health threats. Their investigative report was supported in part by a grant from the Pulitzer Center.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Mat Pennington for RFA.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • French police have arrested four suspects in connection with a knife attack on exiled Lao democracy activist Joseph Akaravong, including the man who stabbed and seriously wounded the activist before fleeing the scene, local media reported Wednesday.

    The main suspect – a man in his 30s who stabbed Akaravong three times in the throat and torso on Saturday – was arrested on Tuesday in Nîmes, about 300 miles (480 kilometers) from the city of Pau, Pau public prosecutor Rodolphe Jarry said in a statement on Wednesday. The suspects were not named.

    Akaravong was rushed to a hospital in Pau in critical condition after the attack. His condition has since stabilized, Jarry told French media.

    The public prosecutor’s office in Pau has launched an investigation into what they are referring to as an “attempted assassination.” Authorities did not confirm if the attack was politically motivated at this time, reported France’s Le Monde.

    Human rights advocates say the attack fits a broader pattern of targeting activists abroad. Rights group Manushya Foundation described the attack as an example of “transnational repression.”

    “The attack on Joseph is part of a dangerous and escalating pattern, in which authoritarian regimes continue to monitor, pressure, and even harm activists across borders,” the foundation said in a statement.

    Akaravong, one of the most prominent critics of the communist government in Laos, fled the Southeast Asian nation in 2018 after criticizing the collapse of a saddle dam at the Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy hydropower project in Attapeu province that killed dozens of villagers. He was granted political asylum in France in March 2022, the foundation said.

    According to the Manushya Foundation, Akaravong was attacked while he was meeting with another Lao woman activist who had recently traveled to France after completing a five-year prison sentence in Laos last September for her criticism of the government on Facebook.

    The foundation did not name the woman activist, but last September, Houayheuang Xayabouly was freed from prison in southern Laos. She was arrested in September 2019 after she criticized the government on Facebook for delaying a flood rescue effort.

    In recent years, other Lao activists have gone missing or faced violence both inside Laos and outside the country, typically in neighboring Thailand.

    The Pau public prosecutor’s office did not immediately respond to RFA’s request for comments.

    Written by Tenzin Pema. Edited by Mat Pennington.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Staff.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • When my son was born almost two years ago, we held a small hu plig or “soul-calling” ceremony to welcome his spirit to the world and into our family. The shaman my parents appointed for the ceremony, a Hmong man from Laos, was both a friend of the family and kin on my mother’s side. A gregarious and exuberant man, he stood at the front door and chanted for my son’s spirit to come home while the…

    Source

    This post was originally published on Latest – Truthout.

  • Ride-hailing app inDrive is under risk of being scrapped in Laos after recent reports of sexual assaults by drivers that raised concerns over a lack of safety provisions for users, state media say.

    A 15-year-old girl reported to police that she was sexually assaulted by an inDrive operator after she booked a journey on Saturday in the capital, Vientiane, from the bus terminal to her workplace.

    Screen from InDrive rideshare app
    Screen from InDrive rideshare app
    (InDrive)

    Police in Vientiane told RFA that they are aware of the complaint. It was unclear if the driver has been contacted or brought in for questioning.

    In March, another InDrive driver was accused of sexually assaulting a female passenger and forcing her to watch a sexually explicit video on his phone.

    InDrive does not have a physical presence in Laos although it has become popular with both drivers and passengers in the Southeast Asian nation. The company was founded in Russia and is now incorporated in California.

    Last month, the Lao Department of Public Works and Transport requested that the government take action to close the ride-share app, alleging it lacks certification in Laos, making its operations illegal.

    A report in the state-run Vientiane Times says the department has also criticized the app for being “unsafe” and untrustworthy as passengers have no means to contact the company in case of accidents or crimes.

    RFA spoke to registered taxi drivers in Laos who raised concerns that inDrive drivers have not undergone criminal background checks, despite claims by the company that all drivers are vetted.

    RFA contacted inDrive through its website to ask whether the company was assisting police regarding the latest complaint, but the company has not replied.

    The CEO of the company, Arsen Tomsky, relocated to Ukraine after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. The company currently operates in nearly 900 cities across more than 48 countries, its website says.

    InDrive is a private company valued at more than $1.2 billion. Its key point of difference from other ride-hailing apps is that it allows passengers to barter with drivers on a set price for a journey.

    Edited by Mat Pennington.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Ginny Stein for RFA and RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Ride-hailing app inDrive is under risk of being scrapped in Laos after recent reports of sexual assaults by drivers that raised concerns over a lack of safety provisions for users, state media say.

    A 15-year-old girl reported to police that she was sexually assaulted by an inDrive operator after she booked a journey on Saturday in the capital, Vientiane, from the bus terminal to her workplace.

    Screen from InDrive rideshare app
    Screen from InDrive rideshare app
    (InDrive)

    Police in Vientiane told RFA that they are aware of the complaint. It was unclear if the driver has been contacted or brought in for questioning.

    In March, another InDrive driver was accused of sexually assaulting a female passenger and forcing her to watch a sexually explicit video on his phone.

    InDrive does not have a physical presence in Laos although it has become popular with both drivers and passengers in the Southeast Asian nation. The company was founded in Russia and is now incorporated in California.

    Last month, the Lao Department of Public Works and Transport requested that the government take action to close the ride-share app, alleging it lacks certification in Laos, making its operations illegal.

    A report in the state-run Vientiane Times says the department has also criticized the app for being “unsafe” and untrustworthy as passengers have no means to contact the company in case of accidents or crimes.

    RFA spoke to registered taxi drivers in Laos who raised concerns that inDrive drivers have not undergone criminal background checks, despite claims by the company that all drivers are vetted.

    RFA contacted inDrive through its website to ask whether the company was assisting police regarding the latest complaint, but the company has not replied.

    The CEO of the company, Arsen Tomsky, relocated to Ukraine after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. The company currently operates in nearly 900 cities across more than 48 countries, its website says.

    InDrive is a private company valued at more than $1.2 billion. Its key point of difference from other ride-hailing apps is that it allows passengers to barter with drivers on a set price for a journey.

    Edited by Mat Pennington.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Ginny Stein for RFA and RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.


  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • At the end of 1992 after the dissolution of powerful friend the Soviet Union, the Ho Chi Minh National Political Academy, a major organ of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) with responsibility for ensuring continued CPV rule, assigned its Institute of International Relations to study ASEAN countries and their political systems.  When the report landed on the desks of CPV comrades they read that ASEAN governments were pro-West and anticommunist. But what came after was reassuring. ASEAN governments, the report stressed, are “determined to defend their ruling regimes, and refuse to share power with the people”. Moreover, the nation-building formula of the ASEAN states, consisting of an “export-oriented market economy, limited democracy, and even authoritarianism in some countries” was not in essence different to Vietnam’s. Having completed its homework, Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995.

    The spread of market Leninism from China into Vietnam and then Laos was a powerful emollient, helping bringing about peace in a region previously wracked by the bloodiest conflicts of the Cold War. It was a development warmly welcomed by Singaporean diplomats, who emphasised, in the words of senior diplomat S. R. Nathan, that “we were not anti-communist, we were non-communist”.  Singapore’s elder statesman and former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew began to visit Vietnam frequently and remains revered there. Thailand,  eager to bury the memory of its role in the Vietnam War as America’s staunchest ally, similarly leapt on the opportunity to bring the communist states into the fold, launching its “battlefields into market places” initiative.

    These policies accelerated the emergence in Southeast Asia of what Nicole Jenne has called a “no war” community: a group of nations with relatively low expectations of interstate conflict, based on a pragmatic recognition that each has a low capacity for conventional warfare.

    In a recent article for in Democratization, I argue that in mainland Southeast Asia, this “no war” community has been the foundation for something altogether less wholesome: an authoritarian security community, a group of contiguous states that collude in transnational repression and illicit cross-border business, and to share authoritarian governance techniques and mutually legitimise their authoritarian rule.

    The authoritarian security community (ASC) theory offers an additional transnational mechanism for understanding, beyond domestic political explanations, why Southeast Asia has been part of the global decline in democracy.

    While there is variation in how to characterise that decline, and how serious it is in historical terms, a turn away from liberal democratic forms of governance worldwide is one of the major contemporary trends in international politics. The decline comprises both a deterioration in democratic institutions and governance in established democracies and in what limited democratic practice exists in autocracies. These parallel trends are reflected in falling scores across a range of democracy rating indices such as the Freedom House Index, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. This decline is thought to have begun around 2006.

    The decline of democracy has been significantly more serious in mainland Southeast Asia, compared with the maritime states. Between 2005 and 2023, the average score for among significant maritime Southeast Asian states (the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia) on V-Dem’s Deliberative Democracy Index declined by 9%.  Over the same period, average scores across five mainland Southeast Asian states fell by 46%.  A comparable maritime–mainland gap can be found in the democracy scores of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index: between 2006 to 2022 maritime Southeast Asian states slipped by 5%, while the analogous scores for the mainland states fell by 9%.

    Looking more deeply into the trend data reveals that the scores for the two formal communist party-states, Laos and Vietnam, have remained relatively constant, albeit low. The states which have produced the falling regional-average scores are Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar. As the figure below shows, Thailand and Cambodia especially have evinced the greatest downward shifts, moving back towards the consistently low scores of their one-party neighbours since 2005.

    Figure 1. The decline of democracy in mainland Southeast Asia 2000-2021.

    The local sources of authoritarian learning

    So what has happened in mainland Southeast Asia?  Many might immediately hypothesise that close proximity to China offers an explanation. But caution is warranted before blaming China.  China’s role as a “Black Knight” purveyor of authoritarianism is in fact considerably nuanced, and the scholarly literature is ambivalent.  While one school of thought strongly argues that China wants a world in which authoritarian regimes are given greater respect and deference and is actively exporting a model to achieve this, another observes that it is pragmatic and regime-neutral in diplomatic practice.

    The characterisation of China as a “passive Black Knight” makes sense of this apparent dichotomy. While China will shore up old autocratic friends, make knowledge about authoritarian governance available, seek to remould international institutions and hope its example wins adherents, it will not actively promote or foster regime change.

    As a passive Black Knight, China certainly played a critical role in facilitating Cambodia’s transition from competitive to hegemonic authoritarianism after 2013.  After a near election loss, Cambodia’s autocrat Hun Sen closed down democratic space, banned independent media and ultimately, in 2017, dissolved the main opposition party.  To minimise delegitimising criticism from the West, and replace withdrawn foreign aid and assistance, he significantly strengthened relations with China, which boosted military and economic assistance.

    But notions of a “China Model” exerting a powerful pull on Southeast Asian leaders need to be kept in perspective. Prayuth Chan-ocha’s junta government in Thailand largely used references to Xi Jinping’s “China model” to justify decisions already made—that is, instrumentally, in the same way Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban cited Russia, China, Turkey and Singapore as models to legitimise decisions of indigenous origin.

    The survey evidence for Southeast Asian nations wishing to emulate China is also weak. In the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s annual State of Southeast Asia survey between 2020–2024, respondents who had stated they trusted China were offered the option of selecting “my country’s political culture and worldview are compatible with China’s” as the reason they trusted China. Over five years only an average of 16% from mainland Southeast Asian countries selected this option.

    In fact, looking within Southeast Asia itself for transnational authoritarian flows provides equally persuasive evidence. As I noted that the outset, ASEAN has provided an inviting and indeed nurturing environment for authoritarian regimes. Beyond ensuring that domestic repression remains out-of-scope for discussion under ASEAN’s non-interference principle, Southeast Asian autocrats learn from each other.

    Hun Sen confessed to emulating the ways in which Indonesia’s Golkar under Suharto, and Malaysia’s UMNO under Mahathir, had strengthened their regimes by forming strong patron–client relationships between the ruled and the rulers. Singapore, an economically successful authoritarian state, is another model for ASEAN states. Cambodia and Vietnam have all studied Singapore’s management of “rule of law”, which has frequently been a method of silencing critique. (Strikingly, so has China, establishing that the flow of authoritarian influence has not been only one way.)

    This learning has also occurred within the Mekong community of states. In 2017, Hun Sen publicly exhorted Cambodia to examine Thai laws used in Thailand to dissolve political parties— and within a month the Cambodian parliament passed such amendments.

    In actual fact, it is within mainland Southeast Asia that transnational authoritarianism has been most conspicuous, paralleling democracy’s more precipitous decline. Ample evidence suggests the later-joining Mekong members of ASEAN—Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam—have extended ASEAN’s illiberal practices to a new level of subregional collusion, linking up with founding member Thailand in the process.

    The Mekong at the border tripoint of Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos (Photo: IUCNweb on Flickr)

    Crime (for security forces) and punishment (for dissidents) across borders

    Two phenomena illustrate this deeper level of illiberalism, and both are intrinsic to the notion of an authoritarian security community: transnational repression and cross-border kleptocratic networks. The authoritarian regimes of the Mainland Southeast Asian ASC perceive transnational spaces as potential sanctuaries for regime adversaries and sources of democratic contagion. As such, they are prepared to cooperate to shut this space down, even to the point of tolerating encroachments on their sovereignty.

    Since at least 2014, Mekong security services been active in transnational repression, including the assassination, disappearance, rendition and detention of dissidents, opposition party members and journalists. The region rates with sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East as one of the world’s hotbeds of transnational repression.

    In 2021, Thailand was in the top 10 of origin countries globally practising transnational repression, with at least 25 cases known to have occurred on Thai territory. Reciprocity has been evident. A Thai anti-monarchist was kidnapped and “disappeared” in Cambodia in 2020 . Conversely, multiple Cambodian dissidents seeking refuge were monitored and apprehended by Cambodian security services permitted to operate on Thai soil. Five Thai anti-monarchists disappeared or were murdered in Laos between 2016 and 2018; meanwhile, a Laos dissident disappeared in Thailand in 2019. Cooperation between Vietnamese and Cambodian security forces may have as also occurred, with Vietnamese activists in Cambodia attacked with acid in 2017. Vietnamese dissidents were handed to visiting officers from Vietnam’s security forces by the Thais.

    Thailand’s deinstitutionalised democracy movement

    Thai conservatives have sought to prevent reformists from putting down roots in society—and it’s worked

    Joint border committees have been facilitators of transnational repression. In 2018, Thailand’s then deputy prime minister Pravit Wongsawan and Cambodian defence minister Tea Banh hosted a Cambodian–Thai General Border Committee meeting. Banh then signed an agreement on the return of “fugitives”  and “monitor individuals who escape the law by crossing the border”. After the Myanmar military’s 2021 coup, junta leader Minh Aung Hlaing agreed with Prayuth Chan-ocha that Thai police would arrest politicians from the former Myanmar government fleeing into Thai territory. These agreements made public what was already occurring informally and tacitly: security forces cooperating in the repression of dissidents beyond their borders.

    Turning to cross-border kleptocratic networks, the 2015 discovery of mass graves in Malaysia exposed a massive people-smuggling ring spanning Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and Malaysia, trafficking mostly Rohingya people numbering in the tens of thousands annually.  International outrage resultied in the Thai government appointing police major general Paween Pongsirin to head a police investigation.

    Paween’s investigation found 115 alleged offenders, including four officers from Thailand’s Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) and a navy officer. One of the ISOC officers arrested, Major General Manas Kongpan, was of three-star rank. The arrests of military personnel displeased key figures in the Thai junta government, including Prayuth and Pravit, who organised for Paween to be sent to Thailand’s restive and violent Southern provinces where the trafficking networks were particularly strong.

    Fearing for his life, Paween fled to Australia, with the Australian government granting asylum.  In a statutory declaration, Paween wrote that the “people who are seeking to harm me are at the highest level of military, police and government in Thailand.  They have shown that they do not hold themselves to the law or the rules of the country”.

    The price paid for peace

    Mainland Southeast Asia’s security forces catalyse cross-border networks that offer opportunities for personal financial gain, and stabilise authoritarian governance via transnational repression. There is a circular relationship between the cross-border kleptocratic networks and the authoritarian nature of the regimes: on the one hand it is the weak accountability and rule of law that offers opportunities for graft and illicit trade, on the other, the criminal conduct creates incentives for the maintenance of authoritarian rule, since any move to accountability or stronger rule of law is likely to expose the culpable actors. Criminal networks may reinforce, overlap with, or emerge from the security-oriented transnational networks, who frequently act with impunity, confident in the knowledge that the higher echelons of the regime will mostly protect them in order to maintain a visage of invulnerability and a citizenry too cowed to protest or resist the depredations.

    Few would argue with the proposition that Southeast Asia’s peace is a good thing. But if the price of peace is deepening repression, questions are warranted.

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  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.


  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.


  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Laos will merge several government ministries, reducing their number from 17 to 13, in a bid to cut costs and improve efficiency, the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party said in a plan released over the weekend.

    The party’s Central Committee said the restructuring was “necessary” to streamline and strengthen state affairs.

    But state employees said they were “confused” by the decision, noting that they had yet to receive any direct order — and didn’t know what it meant for potential job cuts.

    “We haven’t seen any official documents yet,” an official with the Ministry of Planning and Investment said on Monday, speaking on condition of anonymity due to fear of reprisal.

    “We heard a rumor … through social media” which said the Central Committee would “reduce employees or offer early retirement,” he said.

    Merging ministries

    The administration plan released over the weekend called for merging the Ministry of Planning and Investment into the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Energy and Mines into the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.

    It also said the Ministry of Natural Resources would be combined with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to become the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment.

    Additionally, the Ministry of Home Affairs was placed under the purview of the Party Central Committee’s Personnel and Organization Committee.

    Separately, the government’s media affairs department will now be overseen by the Party Central Committee’s Propaganda and Training Board. The Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism will become the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.

    The changes come as the leadership of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, or LPRP, approach the end of their five-year tenure, with elections for leaders set for next year. Lao is a one-party state, and leaders are selected by party officials.

    According to the ruling party’s administration plan, the number of state employees totaled 168,572 in 2024, excluding members of the armed forces. It was not immediately clear how many state employees would be affected by the restructuring.

    A Ministry of Home Affairs employee with knowledge of the Administration Plan confirmed to RFA on Monday that a merging had been agreed upon, but wasn’t yet underway.

    “We’re keeping our eyes on the news,” said the employee, who also declined to be named. “They should send official notifications and hold press conferences [to proceed with the merge]. But as of now we are working as usual.”

    ‘A lot to get done’

    A high-ranking official with the Ministry of Energy and Mines told RFA that she was unclear how state employees will be structured going forward, and said it may “take some time” to rearrange the workforce.

    “We have to wait for the process,” she said, adding that “I hope our new layout will be better.”

    The Energy and Mines official also noted that this is not the first time the ruling party has updated its plan, explaining that “it is normal to adjust administration to be on the right track, suitable with current conditions.”

    Another official from the Ministry of Energy and Mines could only say that the move had begun, adding that “it must be a lot to get done.”

    After the central administration restructuring is completed, the government will turn to rearranging local administration, which is expected to take place in July, state employees told RFA.

    The Central Committee has also called on the National Assembly’s Standing Committee to look into reducing the number of parliamentary committees from nine to five for its 2026-2030 term.

    In addition to the restructuring, Laos is also amending its Constitution and other laws to regulate state affairs, which the National Assembly will debate and approve during an extraordinary session next week.

    Translated by RFA Lao. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • [Read coverage of this story in Lao]

    Last year, an acquaintance approached Mali* with a proposition. A wealthy Chinese couple unable to conceive was looking for a surrogate. The going rate, about $6,000 to $7,000 plus daily spending money, represented a significant sum in a country where the monthly minimum wage is $82.

    “My friend used to be a surrogate mother, so she asked me if I wanted to be. I wanted to earn money,” Mali told RFA in an interview. “I wanted the money to build my own house.”

    At a clinic in Boten, which sits just across the border from China’s Yunnan province, a team of Chinese doctors deemed Mali fit for surrogacy and implanted her with a fertilized embryo. She was then moved to what she described as a “luxury hotel.”

    There, alongside women from Laos, Thailand and Myanmar, Mali began her nine-month wait.

    Surrogacy in Laos is illegal, but that has not prevented a shadow industry from taking hold. With its proximity to China, steep rates of poverty and high levels of corruption, the country has become the latest in Southeast Asia to attract those seeking commercial surrogates.

    Today, brokers routinely advertise for surrogates on Facebook. In one post, a broker promises up to 50,000 Chinese yuan ($6,890), with all expenses covered. Another promises 45,000 yuan, including an upfront payment of 3,000 yuan and more than $500 a month extra.

    “An air-conditioned room is provided,” the advertisement boasts.

    This ad seeking a surrogate was posted on Facebook on Jan. 29, 2025. It reads “A surrogate is needed. The compensation is 45,000 Chinese yuan. 3,000 Chinese yuan can be paid a month in advance. There is extra pay for food of 3 million [Lao kip] per month. An air-conditioned room is provided, plus there is extra pay for food and another monthly payment of 12 million [kip] per month.
    This ad seeking a surrogate was posted on Facebook on Jan. 29, 2025. It reads “A surrogate is needed. The compensation is 45,000 Chinese yuan. 3,000 Chinese yuan can be paid a month in advance. There is extra pay for food of 3 million [Lao kip] per month. An air-conditioned room is provided, plus there is extra pay for food and another monthly payment of 12 million [kip] per month.
    (RFA)

    Thailand banned commercial surrogacy in 2015, and Cambodia followed suit a year later, while surrogacy in Vietnam has been banned — with some exceptions — since 2003. Although all three countries have continued to see cases of illegal surrogacy, Laos was the sole regional gray-zone destination, with surrogacy neither regulated nor outright banned.

    In July 2021, the government outlawed commercial surrogacy, but with the infrastructure already in place, such legislation does not appear to have halted the industry.

    As with the brokers, fertility clinics continue to advertise surrogacy services in Laos. One Chinese service with programs in Laos and Kazakhstan promises a “fully-operated” medical center, unlimited attempts at a successful birth and a full refund if an infant fails to materialize. Packages begin at $60,000.

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    Mali, who spoke with RFA on the condition of anonymity because of the illegal nature of the work, offers a rare insight into how the cross-border industry operates.

    The team that handled Mali’s in vitro fertilization was made up of Chinese doctors and nurses, with a Lao interpreter providing support and helping arrange paperwork. Two months after the successful implantation of the embryo, Mali began traveling to China each month for checkups.

    Mali said she was given a border pass, which helped her get past border guards who have been trying to crack down on cases of Lao women being trafficked into China by marriage brokers.

    “The immigrant police officers tend to investigate any young Lao women who use a passport for crossing to China,” Mali explained to RFA.

    After the checkups in China, Mali would return via the same border crossing and continue to wait out her days in the hotel, where healthcare workers were on hand to keep an eye on the surrogates’ health.

    “The Chinese will pay for all fees like food, facilities, checkup fee, hospital fee and other fees. The surrogate woman does not need to be responsible for anything,” she said. “The only requirement is that the girl must be healthy.”

    The Boten Special Economic Zone in Laos, April 9, 2024.
    The Boten Special Economic Zone in Laos, April 9, 2024.
    (Lauren DeCicca/Getty Images)

    The 2021 law on the management of surrogacy and abortion deems altruistic surrogacy legal for married Lao couples unable to conceive naturally, but dictates that the surrogate must be a married maternal relative, aged 18 to 35, and free of a number of health conditions.

    “The law does not allow Lao women to carry a pregnancy for other people,” said a Lao public security officer who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he is not allowed to speak to the media. “They are not allowed to carry babies for foreigners including the Chinese. If it happens that means it is happening illegally.”

    Violating the law is dangerous. Facebook ads calling for surrogates attract commentators who point out the illegality of the practice. A local newspaper recently posted the human trafficking law under which surrogates can be prosecuted. With fines ranging from $450 to $45,000 and prison sentences from 5 years to life, the risks for would-be surrogates are incredibly steep.

    Then, there is the physical and sometimes emotional burden.

    And yet, women keep signing up, desperate for the opportunity a few thousand dollars might provide.

    At the end of January, Mali gave birth by C-section. All she knew about the parents was what the broker had shared — they were rich and couldn’t conceive. What she knew about the baby was what she saw in the briefest of moments before he was taken away: He was a boy, and he looked Chinese.

    “I know it is not my gene, but I carried the baby,” she said. “I saw the baby growing up everyday. I started to cry seeing the baby taken away.”

    Translated by Khamsao Civilize. Additional reporting by Abby Seiff. Edited by Abby Seiff and Jim Snyder.

    *Name has been changed for security reasons.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • BANGKOK – The Xayaburi hydro dam that blocks the Mekong River in Laos includes a system of passages and locks intended to keep fish moving up and down Southeast Asia’s longest river.

    Six years after the dam began operating and despite research funded by Australian aid, there are still doubts this system, intended to protect freshwater fisheries that are crucial to millions of people, works.

    What is Xayaburi dam?

    The Xayaburi dam is the first of numerous major dams planned for the Mekong, mostly in Laos. Some research has predicted the Mekong fishery – a chief source of protein and livelihoods for tens of millions of people in Southeast Asia – will decline by half if all are built.

    It is well established globally that hydro dams destroy fisheries because they prevent migratory species of fish from reaching feeding, spawning and nursery habitats.

    Arguments and activism against more dams could be strengthened if it is shown the Xayaburi fish passage is ineffective.

    What is the research about?

    Since 2019, fisheries experts from New South Wales-based Charles Sturt University have received Australian government funding to study the Xayaburi fish passage. Last year, they got further funding to extend the research until 2029.

    The researchers have a confidentiality agreement with the dam operator, Xayaburi Power Company Ltd., which has a final say about what information is released and how it is portrayed.

    The experts have published some research but not responded to questions on the record because of the confidentiality agreement.

    They, in funding proposals obtained under Australia’s Freedom of Information Act, say it’s inevitable more dams will be built on the Mekong. They also point out that the economic and social case for the hydro dams is tenuous.

    Citing Xayaburi, they pointed out it is projected to generate only modest profits whereas the potential damage to Mekong fisheries, which have an annual value of US$7-$8 billion, and the economies of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam is high.

    Still, the researchers say their work could help improve the performance of fish passages and influence the design of future dams. They say they have a narrow window of opportunity this decade to mitigate damage to the Mekong.

    A general view of the future site of the Luang Prabang dam is seen on the Mekong River outskirt of Luang Prabang province, Laos, Feb. 5, 2020.
    A general view of the future site of the Luang Prabang dam is seen on the Mekong River outskirt of Luang Prabang province, Laos, Feb. 5, 2020.
    (Panu Wongcha-um/Reuters)

    How did they conduct research?

    The Australian researchers working with Lao counterparts and Xayaburi Power Company staff used electroshock fishing to stun and capture several thousand Mekong fish.

    They are implanted with a microchip encased in a glass tube and released back to the river – many in the vicinity of the Xayaburi dam. Between 2019 and April 2024, nearly 4,900 microchipped fish were released into the Mekong.

    Antennae at the entrance and exit of the 480-meter long fish passage that extends from the right of the dam detect the microchips.

    The researchers said the results are “promising” because over a three-year period more than 80% of the 1,290 fish that were detected at the entrance were also eventually detected at its exit.

    That figure is less promising in another light – only some of the microchipped fish ever find their way into the fish passage. And once at its exit there’s another step to get beyond the dam – moving through intermittently operating locks.

    RELATED STORIES

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    In September 2022, another antennae array was installed to detect microchipped fish that had moved through either of two locks and got past the dam.

    Researchers said 400 microchipped fish were detected beyond the dam over nearly two years. That appears to be only a small proportion of the fish released at the dam.

    The researchers calculated that percentage, but have not released it nor the number of fish released near the dam.

    They noted it was challenging to calculate an “unbiased estimate” of the locks’ effectiveness because their antennae were installed three years after the research program began and they also had outages.

    As the research has continued, there is now likely more comprehensive data but because of the confidentiality agreement it is not clear it will be published.

    Did the researchers face constraints?

    The Australian researchers stressed the importance of studying whether fish can get past the dam in both directions — moving up the river and down it.

    However, for the first five years of the research, they lacked a sufficient budget to do that and Xayaburi Power Company had requested they only study upstream migration. It’s unclear why the company imposed that condition.

    A major shareholder in the dam, Thailand’s CK Power, did not respond to RFA’s questions.

    The researchers suggested there were political advantages to a limited scope of research even though it would limit the applicability of their work to other dams.

    “Focusing on upstream migration, at least initially, effectively mitigates a series of risks because our team is only focusing on one aspect,” they said. “The political pressure to provide answers to all migration questions is significantly reduced by this focused scope.”

    A general view of the future site of the Luang Prabang dam is seen on the Mekong River outskirt of Luang Prabang province, Laos, Feb. 5, 2020.
    A general view of the future site of the Luang Prabang dam is seen on the Mekong River outskirt of Luang Prabang province, Laos, Feb. 5, 2020.
    (Panu Wongcha-um/Reuters)

    How do other experts view the research?

    According to a study published last year, the researchers released more than 230 microchipped fish into the Mekong River in April 2022 some 350 kilometers (217 miles) downstream of the Xayaburi dam.

    More than a year later, five of those fish were detected in the dam’s fish passage.

    The study said the results showed the importance of including fish passages like that at Xayaburi in future Mekong dams.

    Other experts said the data underlined the dangers since the fish had migrated through locations where planned dams would block the river.

    Another point critics of Mekong dams make is that they’ll have compounding negative effects on fisheries.

    Even if something like 50% or 60% of fish could get past a dam, since each successive dam would quickly whittle down the proportion that completes the entire journey to a single-digit percentage.

    Edited by Taejun Kang.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Stephen Wright for RFA.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • About 20 families whose homes were affected by a deadly explosion last week in northern Laos are using their own money for immediate repairs because they don’t expect financial help from the provincial government, people with knowledge of the situation told Radio Free Asia.

    The Laotians are buying materials to hastily fix their homes following the blast in Nami village in Oudomxay province’s Xay district on Feb. 14 caused by illegal explosives inside a burning Chinese-owned vehicle parts shop.

    The explosion killed one Laotian and three Chinese nationals and injured nine others. Police said they are investigating the incident, which also severely damaged nearby buildings and some vehicles.

    Provincial officials sent about 380 soldiers to the area on Feb. 14-17 to help residents repair homes, while relevant officials assess the cost of the damage to compensate those affected, a villager who is a relative of an affected resident said Wednesday.

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    “Those affected cannot live in their houses, so they are fixing them immediately on their own,” he said.

    The roofs, ceilings, door and outside gates of several nearby homes were damaged in the explosion, though the main structures are intact, said the person who declined to be identified for fear of reprisal for speaking to the media.

    However, the residents don’t expect aid from the government, so they are repairing their houses at their own expense because provincial authorities have not publicly discussed any compensation for them, he said.

    A local official told RFA that relevant authorities have been collecting information about the damage so they can plan a budget to compensate those affected.

    “The officials have been busy collecting information since last week, and they are now finalizing the figures,” he said.

    Translated by Ounkeo Souksavanh for RFA Lao. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Laos.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Police in northern Laos said that last Friday’s deadly blast in a burning Chinese-owned vehicle parts shop that killed four people and injured three others was caused by illegal explosives located inside.

    Though police could not confirm why the shop had a huge quantity of explosives on the premises, Oudomxay province’s chief of police said they were for “sale or other purposes,” and that that they are investigating.

    “The shop owner smuggled the explosives and detonators and stored them away in his shop … and we don’t know exactly why yet,” he told reporters on Saturday. “We are still gathering information.”

    The blast killed one Laotian and three Chinese nationals and critically injured another three Chinese. In addition, the surrounding buildings were severely damaged including a newly-built luxury house.

    Chinese presence is palpable in Oudomxay and other regions in northern Laos, fueled in part by construction of the US$6 billion high-speed railway connecting Kunming, China to the Lao capital Vientiane.

    Further investigation

    Police were also unable to confirm what started the initial fire, an officer told RFA Lao on Monday.

    “We are still gathering evidence and we’re not sure,” the officer said. “I am just in the office, so I don’t really know that many details.”

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    RFA also asked the nearby military headquarters and the Department of Industry and Commerce, but both declined to provide information and suggested following official announcements on the matter.

    Meanwhile, the Chinese Consulate in nearby Luang Prabang province sent staff to visit the injured Chinese, a consular official, who requested not to be named, told RFA Lao.

    “The Chinese Consulate is not sure about the responsibility,” he said. “For any reason, the Chinese Consulate also cannot release any detailed information to the news media.”

    Meanwhile, while visiting with victims in a nearby hospital, Chinese Consular General Zhang Sheping called on the Lao government to determine the origin of the explosion and share information with the Chinese government, local media reported.

    What were the explosives for?

    The shop was probably hiding the explosives that would be used for mining purposes, a resident of Xay district told RFA Monday on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

    “Many people said it was some Chinese businessmen working together to bring in the explosives or that the owner was helping someone else store the explosive materials, and these are used in gold mining.”

    Another resident on Monday said that while officials were cleaning up, nobody was allowed on the shop premises.

    “I think they finished cleaning up yesterday, he said. “I think it is still under police investigation.

    Translated by RFA Lao. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • A Lao woman who traveled to China for an arranged marriage warned others to demand legal documents and to have in-person meetings with potential husbands before leaving the country.

    Any woman who enters into what she called a “sham marriage” runs the risk of being trafficked to another man after they arrive in China, she told Radio Free Asia.

    “To those who may want to come to China, they should think and do research carefully,” she said, requesting anonymity for security reasons. “They shouldn’t decide without knowing what they could be facing. I experienced that myself.”

    A newlywed man shows marriage books for him and his wife in Luliang, northern China’s Shanxi province on Feb. 11, 2025.
    A newlywed man shows marriage books for him and his wife in Luliang, northern China’s Shanxi province on Feb. 11, 2025.
    (Adek Berry/AFP)

    The woman said she jumped at the chance to move to China two years ago for an arranged marriage. But eventually she realized that a promised 60 million kip (US$2,750) payment was never going to come.

    “I heard many people say marrying a Chinese man would help to solve financial problems and make life more comfortable,” she said in an interview on Feb. 4. “I had too much excitement from a lack of experience at that time.”

    Arranged marriages between Chinese men and young Lao women have become more common in recent years as the women and their families seek financial security amid Laos’ bleak economy.

    A Lao anti-human trafficking activist who goes by the name Ms. Dee told RFA last month that a middleman is usually involved in forming an agreement. The young women and their families are paid at most 30,000 yuan (US$4,150) while the middlemen keep the remainder of the fee, which can be around 200,000 Chinese yuan (US$27,500), she said.

    “After being sent to China, the Lao girls of course expect to receive some money that they can send home to support their families. But in fact, their Chinese husbands refuse,” Ms. Dee said.

    ‘Just go with him’

    Another Lao woman told RFA in a separate interview that a middleman sold her to a man three days after she arrived in China.

    “I was told not to be too particular,” she said on Feb. 10. “Just go with him. I have no choice at all.”

    The middleman added that she would get paid for the marriage after about six months, and could then “run away with a new man and get paid again,” she said.

    But the money never came, and she said she worries that a typical 16-year-old Lao girl could also be easily tricked by middlemen who promise monthly payments of 2,000 yuan (US$275) to send to family back in Laos.

    “The middlemen always gave them nice images of being married to Chinese men. ‘He’ll buy you a smart phone, nice clothes, new shoes,‘” she said. “All those materialistic things plus thinking of being out of poverty.”

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    The woman who spoke to RFA on Feb. 4 said Lao women could end up with a Chinese man who has a criminal record and isn’t able to provide legal marriage documents.

    “If the Chinese man cannot come to Laos and provide you with any legal documents, be aware and never believe that,” she said. “Don’t believe it if a middleman told you they will provide all needed documents when you have arrived in China.”

    She added: “You cannot trust the middleman. They will not pay you after you are sent to China.”

    A Lao official at the Anti-Trafficking Department told RFA that the middlemen often target young women from hill tribes who lack awareness and whose families have financial hardship.

    Translated by Khamsao Civilize. Edited by Matt Reed.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.


  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • A fire and explosion at a Chinese-owned shop in northern Laos on Friday killed four people, including Chinese nationals, and injured several others, the Chinese consulate in Luang Prabang said.

    The blast occurred around 10 a.m. local time at the shop in Xay district in Oudomxay province, the consulate said. China’s Xinhua News Agency said it happened in Nami village and caused significant damage to surrounding houses.

    A fire truck sits outside a badly damaged commercial property as black smoke billows into the sky in Xay district of Oudomxay province in northern Laos, Feb. 14, 2025.
    A fire truck sits outside a badly damaged commercial property as black smoke billows into the sky in Xay district of Oudomxay province in northern Laos, Feb. 14, 2025.
    (Lao Red Cross in Oudomxay province)

    “After fire rescue [arrived], the fire was [put] under control and the injured were sent to the hospital,” the consulate said, adding that the cause of the incident is under investigation.

    Witnesses confirmed the blast to RFA Lao but had few details. Photos circulated by the Lao Red Cross in Oudomxay showed a fire truck parked at the front a badly damaged commercial property, with black smoke billowing into the sky.

    The consulate in Luang Prabang, which is also located in northern Laos, said the Chinese Embassy and consulate had activated an emergency response.

    An aerial view of the ruins of a Chinese-owned shop in Xay district of Oudomxay province in northern Laos, following an explosion on Feb. 14, 2025.
    An aerial view of the ruins of a Chinese-owned shop in Xay district of Oudomxay province in northern Laos, following an explosion on Feb. 14, 2025.
    (Oudomxay Province Red Cross Emergency Rescue Unit)

    Chinese presence is palpable in Oudomxay and other regions in northern Laos, fueled in part by construction of the US$6 billion high-speed railway connecting Kunming, China to the Lao capital Vientiane.

    Despite the injection of investment, Laotians have complained that Chinese have an outsized economic influence over its small Southeast Asian neighbor.

    Edited by Joshua Lipes and Mat Pennington.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Roseanne Gerin for RFA English.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Defying orders from Lao officials, a Chinese-owned potash mining company hasn’t stopped operating near two massive sinkholes in central Laos, a Lao official, a worker and residents told Radio Free Asia.

    On Dec. 4, a sinkhole measuring 20 meters (65 feet) wide and 10 meters (33 feet) deep opened up on farmland in Thakhaek district’s Pak Peng village in Khammouane province. On Dec. 21, another sinkhole — about half the size of the first — formed nearby.

    Residents suspect the sinkholes are a result of excavation at a potash mine in neighboring Nong Bok district, operated by Sino-Agri International Potash Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of Asia Potash International Investment (Guangzhou) Co., Ltd., linked to entities directed by China’s governing State Council.

    No one has been injured by the cave-ins, but villagers are anxious that more holes will appear.

    Earlier this month, Lao authorities told the company to stop operations near the sinkholes.

    But on Wednesday, an official with the government team investigating the matter told RFA Lao on condition of anonymity that Sino-Agri International “has never stopped operating near the sinkhole area.”

    Residents, who also declined to be named due to security concerns, also confirmed to RFA that the potash mine “is still running,” and that they regularly hear operations underway near the sinkhole area.

    Attempts by RFA to contact Sino-Agri International went unanswered.

    An employee who wished to remain nameless said the company continues to work “both above and underground all the time,” adding that more workers are being hired.

    No probe results yet

    Meanwhile, after nearly two months, an investigation into the cause of the sinkholes wrapped up on Sunday, a government team member told RFA, but official results have yet to be released.

    The team will hold another meeting next week to outline the investigation results, he said, noting that while the probe was initially expected to be completed by Jan. 21, there is no hard deadline.

    Khammouane Province Governor Vanxay Phongsavanh, center, and his delegation inspect a sinkhole in Pakpeng village, Laos, Dec. 4, 2024.
    Khammouane Province Governor Vanxay Phongsavanh, center, and his delegation inspect a sinkhole in Pakpeng village, Laos, Dec. 4, 2024.
    (Khammouane News)

    On Monday, Lao Nation Radio reported that the investigation had concluded, but cited a statement from the investigating team that it said had failed to address whether Sino-Agri International caused the sinkholes.

    The statement said that Lao government officials are working with a team from the company to conduct a seismic survey of the site “by the beginning of February.”

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    Residents angered

    The latest information about the investigation comes nearly two weeks after residents expressed frustration with the probe’s initial findings, which state media said suggested that the sinkholes were unrelated to the potash mine.

    On Jan. 16, Lao media cited a team from the Ministry of Energy and Mines, experts from Lao National University, and technicians from Sino-Agri International in a report as saying that “the activities of the potash mine may not be the cause of the sinkholes,” but noted that the investigation was still underway.

    Khammouane Province Governor Vanxay Phongsavanh, left, and his delegation inspect a sinkhole in Pakpeng village, Laos, Dec. 4, 2024.
    Khammouane Province Governor Vanxay Phongsavanh, left, and his delegation inspect a sinkhole in Pakpeng village, Laos, Dec. 4, 2024.
    (Khammouane News)

    Residents of Thakhek district were quick to dismiss the report.

    “They [the city and provincial officials] are like that — they don’t want the villagers to know,“ said one resident at the time. ”But the truth is nothing like this has happened before … The sinkholes are pretty close to their [the mine operator’s] drilling tunnel — no more than 150 meters (500 feet).”

    ‘We don’t know the real cause’

    An official with the Ministry of Energy and Mines investigation team told RFA at the time that his group was working daily to find the cause of the sinkholes.

    “As for the potash mine, we didn’t say it [the sinkholes] was related to the mine yet because we don’t know the real cause,” he said.

    But other residents said that while Lao authorities had consulted with Sino-Agri International during the investigation, “they ignored our concerns.”

    “It must be related to the mine since it happened while the tunnel was being drilled, and before exploration occurred,” another resident said. “Villagers can’t carry out a technical analysis, but according to our observation this is the first time something like this has happened [here] in decades.”

    Translated by RFA Lao. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • On the Thai-Myanmar border, sick patients are being sent home from hospital. In Laos, school meals have been interrupted. And in Cambodia, hundreds of staff at the agency responsible for clearing land mines have been furloughed.

    The U.S. State Department on Friday announced a 90-day freeze on nearly all foreign aid, followed one day later by a suspension of global demining programs, according to the New York Times. The pause is intended to give the State Department time to review programs “to ensure they are efficient and consistent with U.S. foreign policy under the America First agenda,” according to the announcement notice.

    In the days since, stop-work orders have been sent by the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, to local implementing partners ranging from media organizations to health clinics.

    The U.S. is one of Southeast Asia’s largest providers of aid, and its withdrawal will be felt most in the region’s poorest nations: Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. Japan provides more to those countries, but the U.S. has gradually increased aid to Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar from $380 million in 2015 to almost $520 million in 2022, according to Grace Stanhope, a research associate at the Lowy Center who works on its Southeast Asia Aid Map.

    Relief supplies from USAID are loaded into a plane at the Yangon International airport on May 12, 2008.
    Relief supplies from USAID are loaded into a plane at the Yangon International airport on May 12, 2008.
    (Sgt. Andres Alcaraz/U.S. Marine Corps via AFP)

    Groups that work with Tibetans, Uyghurs and North Koreans are also feeling the pinch. These include the Tibetan government-in-exile, which is based in Dharamshala, India, and which supports the diaspora community.

    On Tuesday, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a waiver exempting “life-saving” humanitarian aid, including medicine, shelter and food aid.

    While both the order and State Department notice make clear that programs can restart once reviews are complete, the impact in many countries has been immediate. RFA spoke with government officials and NGO staffers to better understand what an aid freeze looks like on the ground.

    The Department declined to respond to specific questions over email.

    Myanmar:

    Saturday marks the fourth anniversary of the Feb. 1, 2021 coup, in which the military overthrew the democratically elected government, imprisoning its top leadership. The spiraling civil war that has ensued has displaced 3.4 million people and expanded the refugee population in neighboring Thailand.

    Within the days of the stop-work order, a range of U.S.-funded healthcare services began grinding to a halt. In fiscal year 2024, which runs from Oct. 1, 2023 to Sept. 30, 2024, the U.S. provided $141 million in humanitarian aid to Myanmar.

    “In-patients at the refugee camp hospital were discharged and told to return home because health workers have been suspended from their duties,” a health worker speaking on the condition of anonymity due to security reasons told RFA. Volunteers were trying to relocate critical patients and send pregnant women in labor to external hospitals, The Irrawaddy reported.

    The worker added that approximately 20 civil relief groups providing healthcare with USAID assistance along the Thai-Myanmar border are now at risk of being suspended. A Reuters report said the International Rescue Committee, which funds the clinics, told them they would have to shut down by Friday.

    People fleeing fighting between the Myanmar military and opposition forces shelter on the Thai side of the Moei river, in Mae Sot district on April 7, 2023.
    People fleeing fighting between the Myanmar military and opposition forces shelter on the Thai side of the Moei river, in Mae Sot district on April 7, 2023.
    (AFP)

    Along the Thai-Myanmar border, nine refugee camps provide shelter to nearly 140,000 people.

    Inside those camps, schools have already “suffered a huge impact,” said Banyar, founder of the Karenni Human Rights Group. Teacher salaries would have to be halted and a pause on the purchase of textbooks and other school supplies, he said.

    Those who work on HIV/AIDS programs said they fear the funding may not resume. According to the CDC there are about 100,000 orphans in Myanmar due to AIDS, and testing and treatment programs have allowed hundreds of thousands to access antiretrovirals as well as lower the likelihood of contracting the virus in the first place.

    On Tuesday, the Trump administration issued a waiver permitting distribution of HIV medications, but this does not appear to restart broader preventative programs.

    In Bangladesh, where more than 1 million Rohingya who fled violence in Myanmar live in chronically underfunded refugee camps, there has been confusion over whether U.S.-funded food programs will continue. Last week, the Bangladesh government said that USAID would continue to provide food aid, but U.S. and U.N. officials appeared unsure where such information originated, according to a report from BenarNews.

    The pause has also already impacted a number of exile media newsrooms, which rely on small U.S. grants to provide open information in a country where journalists are routinely imprisoned, forcing a number of them to suspend staffers.

    A Rohingya refugee carrying a USAID bag reaches out to a woman as they arrive in Teknaf, Bangladesh on Sept. 9, 2017, after fleeing violence in neighboring Myanmar.
    A Rohingya refugee carrying a USAID bag reaches out to a woman as they arrive in Teknaf, Bangladesh on Sept. 9, 2017, after fleeing violence in neighboring Myanmar.
    (Emrul Kamal/AFP)

    Laos

    U.S.-funded programs in Laos range from maternal health to demining operations, a critical need in a country that remains the most heavily bombed in the world, per capita, as a result of U.S. aerial attacks in the 1960s and 70s during the Vietnam War. Less than 10 percent of land in Laos has been cleared of unexploded ordnance, according to Sera Koulabdara, CEO of Legacies of War, which works on education and advocacy around removal of landmines in Southeast Asia.

    “It is absolutely essential that we hold ourselves accountable for the devastation we caused,” she said. “Just this month in Laos, a 36-year-old man was killed while simply cooking, an innocent victim of an American war that continues to plague the country.”

    Chinese tourists take a photo with a China Aid plaque at the Patuxay Victory Monument on April 8, 2024, in Vientiane, Laos.
    Chinese tourists take a photo with a China Aid plaque at the Patuxay Victory Monument on April 8, 2024, in Vientiane, Laos.
    (Lauren DeCicca/Getty Images)

    A staffer at an agriculture NGO who spoke on the condition of anonymity as he was not authorized to speak to the press told RFA he was doubtful other foreign countries would be able to step in if U.S. funding was pulled.

    “After the COVID-19 pandemic, proposing for funding around the globe to support our projects is the biggest challenge — it is very difficult and the amount of the funds is also smaller now,” he said.

    The country faces a severe debt crisis that has sent the cost of food and other basic goods skyrocketing. In Houaphan, which is one of the poorest provinces in the country, a school meals program has already had to scale back, according to a teacher who spoke to RFA on the condition of anonymity.

    Cambodia

    Like Laos, Cambodia still struggles with the legacies of decades of conflict as unexploded ordnance continues to maim and kill. The U.S. halt on funding demining programs is likely to set the government back in its goal to be mine-free by the end of the year.

    Staffers with the Cambodia Mine Action Center clear a minefield in Preytotoeung village, Battambang province, Cambodia, Jan. 19, 2023.
    Staffers with the Cambodia Mine Action Center clear a minefield in Preytotoeung village, Battambang province, Cambodia, Jan. 19, 2023.
    (Heng Sinith/AP)

    Heng Ratana, head of the government’s Cambodian Mine Action Center, said the agency receives about $2 million a year from the U.S. government.

    As a result of the funding freeze, the center plans to furlough 210 members of its approximately 1,700 workforce nationwide, he told RFA.

    “It is a complete shutdown. It is like a forced shutdown,” Heng Ratana said. “We request continued support for the operation because the U.S. funding [agreement] clearly states that it is to clear unexploded ordnance.”

    Brian Eyler, the director of the Southeast Asia Program and the Energy, Water and Sustainability Program at the Stimson Center said the funding pause had impacted his own programs, which focus on the Mekong River as well as broader security issues.

    He noted that a report launch planned for this week on how the U.S. could counter cybercrime in Southeast Asia had been halted, though he hoped the freeze would soon be lifted.

    Nop Vy, executive director of the Cambodian Journalists’ Association, or CamboJa, said 20 to 30 percent of their funding came from USAID, which the group used to run journalist training programs and help fund the independent media outlet, CamboJA News. In recent years, a number of independent media outlets have shut down or been forced by the government to close, leaving a vacuum in access to open information.

    Chok Sopheap, then-executive director of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights, delivers a speech to mark International Women's Day, March 8, 2023, in Phnom Penh.
    Chok Sopheap, then-executive director of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights, delivers a speech to mark International Women’s Day, March 8, 2023, in Phnom Penh.
    (Heng Sinith/AP)

    Heng Kimhong, executive director of the Cambodian Youth Network, said that the suspension of U.S. government assistance would reduce some of its activities related to youth empowerment and the ability to protect natural resources. A USAID fact sheet issued last year noted that deforestation contributed heavily to climate change in Cambodia, which is considered particularly prone to natural disaster.

    Still, Heng Kimhong said he was “optimistic” funding would be restored as the U.S. is “not a country that only thinks about itself,” he said. “The United States is a country that protects and ensures the promotion of maintaining world order, building democracy, as well as building better respect for human rights.”

    Tibet

    Tibet’s government-in-exile, the Central Tibetan Administration, or CTA, represents the Tibetan diaspora and administers schools, health centers and government services for Tibetan exiles in India and Nepal.

    Several sources speaking on the condition of anonymity told RFA that the suspension affects programs run by the CTA, the Tibetan Parliament and a range of Tibet-related non-governmental organizations, raising concerns over the continuity of key welfare programs supporting Tibetans outside of China.

    An upcoming preparatory meeting for the Parliament-in-Exile was postponed as a result of the funding pause, sources told RFA.

    “The directive applies uniformly to all foreign aid recipients. Since Tibetan aid has been secured through congressional support and approval, efforts are underway to work with the State Department and relevant agencies to expedite the review and approval process for continued assistance,” Namgyal Choedup, the representative of the Office of Tibet in Washington, told RFA.

    A person holds an “Aid Tibet” sticker before a press conference to highlight the plight of Tibetans, on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., on March 28, 2023.
    A person holds an “Aid Tibet” sticker before a press conference to highlight the plight of Tibetans, on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., on March 28, 2023.
    (Stefani Reynolds/AFP)

    Various Tibetan NGOs and activist groups based in India expressed their concerns about the impact of the freeze in foreign assistance programs and said they hoped it would be soon lifted.

    Gonpo Dhondup, president of the Tibetan Youth Congress, emphasized the importance of U.S. aid for the Tibetan freedom movement and community stability. Tsering Dolma, president of the Tibetan Women’s Association, said assistance has been crucial for maintaining the exile Tibetan community.

    “Despite the 90-day suspension, I hope an alternative arrangement can be made to ensure continued U.S. support,” Tashi, a Tibetan resident in Dharamsala, told RFA.

    North Korea

    While the U.S. has long banned providing aid to the North Korean government, it has been a supporter of North Korean human rights organizations. Such programs help with global advocacy efforts on behalf of those living inside the closed nation, and also support refugees abroad.

    A representative from a North Korean human rights organization, who requested anonymity to speak freely, said the group received the stop-work order from their U.S. funders Saturday and requested an exemption waiver.

    “We will not be able to pay staff salaries, making furloughs or contract terminations inevitable. Backpay is also impossible because providing backpay would imply that employees worked during that period.”

    Ji Chul-ho, a North Korean escapee who is the director of external relations at the South Korea-based rights organization NAUH, told RFA he worried about the longer term impacts of such a pause.

    “While this is said to be a temporary suspension of grant expenditures, I worry that it will lead to a reduction in North Korean human rights activities and make it harder for various organizations to raise their voices collectively,” he said.

    Sean Kang, co-founder of the Ohio-based North Korea Human Rights Watch, told RFA a funding pause was hugely disruptive.

    “U.S. government projects related to North Korea require meticulous planning and scheduling, maintaining security, and being carried out cautiously over the medium to long term,” he said. “A three-month [pause] in such projects can cause significant disruptions, and if funding is ultimately canceled, all the efforts made so far could be wasted, leading to an even greater loss.”

    Reporting by RFA Burmese, RFA Khmer, RFA Korean, RFA Lao, and RFA Tibetan.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Eight o’clock, 14 July 2024

    I arrive at the office of Ajan Mala, a teacher at a Public Health School in southern Laos. We grab brooms, buckets, sponges and floor cleaner and she walks ahead of me towards the student dorm. As we get closer, she spots people in the distance and yells: “Students, come and help clean Amelie’s room!”. Her tone sounds commanding and makes me uncomfortable; I do not wish to force anyone to clean my room. But Ajan Mala turns around, smiles and says she is just joking, that this is like “a game between teachers and students.” She assures me there is “midtaphāb (friendship) between them.

    At the student dormitory, Ajan Mala unlocks the door of my room-to-be. Suddenly there are around fifteen adults who pick up brooms, open all windows and doors, carry out beds and wardrobes, sweep and scrub. Ajan Mala tells me to dust the cobwebs from the wardrobes, while they will take care of the room’s interior and the bathroom.

    I take a step back, feeling slightly overwhelmed by the rush and what to me appears chaotic action. Everything seems to happen at once: while people are still sweeping, one student finds a few pieces of green rubber hose that he links together and connects to a tap outside. Suddenly water floods the tiled floors, and gushes towards the wooden furniture I am still dusting off. Afraid of water damage to the untreated timber, I ask a student to help me move the furniture away from the deluge. I hear the noises of engines, and behind the back window, a couple of men slash the plants that had crossed the threshold between in and outside.

    There are some teachers who help and some who watch. The school director, dressed in pink tracksuit and sun hat, walks by, takes a video with her phone, and kicks some snails off the corridor walls with her parasol. I watch one teacher pull out some plant with its root and stick it inside a plastic cup she found on the ground. She adds some dirt and says she’ll take it home to her garden. Ajan Mala squats and scrubs the walls, while her colleague mops the floor. I start to relax amongst these people who are chatting, joking, yelling teasing comments across the corridor—and the place is getting cleaner.

    But the action is over as quickly as it started; students and teachers begin to disappear. As I notice a group walking away through the corridor, I run after them with biscuits as thanks. They share the biscuits and then leave. Once everyone is gone, I get down on the floor with a bucket of water-vinegar mix and a sponge, and give each tile a final, thorough scrub (much gecko poo has survived the water flood). I feel grateful as if I received a welcome gift. But it also occurs to me, that the students and teachers seem used to this; not of course, to clean a visiting anthropologists’ room, but to clean together.

    Collective cleaning as labour: ǭkhǣngngān

    Cleaning together at a worksite or educational facility is a routine practice of collective, physical labour in Lao PDR. At my field site people called it ǭkhǣngngān (ອອກແຮງງານ). When I first read the term in the weekly lesson timetable, I falsely translated it to “workout”. I expected ǭkhǣngngān would be some outdoors exercise regime (“ǭk” as “out”, “hǣng” as “strong”, and “ngān” as “work”). When the day came around, I asked a student what we will do this afternoon. She replied “ǭkhǣngngān!”, and I asked “mǣn nyang?” (“what is this/that”), so she said “anāmai” (tidy up). That afternoon, we swept concrete floors, scraped snail poo off walls, and squatted down to pull out weeds along paths. The weeds were piled up together with plastic rubbish and set alight.

    A nursing student uses rubber strip as fire lighter (Photo: author)

    My Lao friends tell me ǭkhǣngngān happens at every government-run workplace and school. The organised, institutional character of this labour can be observed in a number of aspects. A specific slot is allocated to ǭkhǣngngān in the school’s weekly timetable, usually on a Thursday or Friday afternoon. The task of the day is determined by a senior staff member. Lists of participation are kept which students and teachers sign, and all are expected to participate. The place to be cleaned is an outdoors area, in the vicinity of the classroom or school offices, and this location puts ǭkhǣngngān in full view of the public. In government news publications, stories of ǭkhǣngngān sessions abound accompanied with imagery of groups working together, especially in preparation for days of national celebration: tidying up around government buildings, pulling weeds at a military school, or sweeping in the capital’s public parks. At my field site too, students and staff take pictures of their tidying-up session to post on social media.

    The term ǭkhǣngngān also sets this activity apart from other occasions of working together. “Work” in Lao is more commonly referred to as vīak: housework (vīak hư̄an), work on rice fields (vīak nā ), or gardens (vīak sūan), going to work (pai vīak). The nursing students at my field site work in groups for assignments (vīak kūm) and do homework (vīak bān). With most work, they refer specifically to the practice: hā kin (look for food, or go and get food), hed kin (prepare food), anāmai (tidy up), keb (collect). During our lunch break, we climb up on chairs or use long sticks to reach tamarind pods and raw papayas in the trees, we search for edible leafy greens, peel bamboo shoots, make a fire to cook bamboo soup or grill buffalo skin, prepare a floormat and dishes to eat on the classroom floor, and tidy up after the meal. None of this collective, physical labour that occurs on a daily basis would make the news.

    Whilst ǭkhǣngngān is structured by the institution, these everyday practices of working together evolve dependent on people’s needs. Who participates and how depends on individuals’ motivations, skills and time. Often one person starts an activity which then spills over to others. People verbally organise each other to a degree, but this occurs spontaneously and according to emerging needs and desires identified by the students themselves—nothing is pre-set by an authority. All this work happens out of view from the institution (school staff). There is no fixed lunch group, but people drop in and out, some go home to eat with their family or to a restaurant. In comparison, ǭkhǣngngān at first sight appears to be an “unnatural” way of people working together at this school.

    If working together already takes place on a daily basis, and seems to work to fulfill people’s needs, what then is the point of ǭkhǣngngān, and to whom? Is it just a means to make people tidy those large, shared spaces outside the classroom and office that no one would take care of otherwise? Or are there other reasons to make people work together in this particular way?

    Possible answers as to why ǭkhǣngngān persists at state-run institutions in Lao PDR can be derived from its roots in a Marxist–Leninist concept of collective labour. This becomes clear when looking at how the concept of ǭkhǣngngān is taught in a Lao schoolbook on “Civic Education” for Year 5 students published in 2019:

    People’s labour (kanǭkhǣngngān khǭng khon) is related to movements that have a social character. In that labour, people need to coordinate together to move together as a group. If just alone, a single person cannot earn food to live and resist disasters or forces that occur in the natural world. The ancient primitive people (khon pathombūhān) lived in a group before to carry out labour that had a social character because of that society. Therefore, as products (phalidtaphan) that affect each other, there is a relationship between person and person (khon), and labour is a power (kamlang) that creates (sāng) the person (khon) and society (sangkhom).

    In this reading, labour as movement is social in both process and outcome. Social labour is naturalised because this is what allows humans to survive since the “ancient primitive people”. But this labour is about more than mere use-value, such as procurement of food or building of shelters that protect from wind and weather — because labour here is also a generative power to create the person and society as its “products”.

    This means that neither person nor society are understood as abstract conditions or identities pre-existing to interpersonal relationships and practices of labour. The term (ǭk)hǣngngān as labour in this sense is used in Laos in political contexts, such as the “International Labour Organization” (ongkanhǣngngānsākon), and government news stories might use the term to refer to workers (phūǭkhǣngngān).

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    The organisation of weekly ǭkhǣngngān at all Lao government workplaces and schools is thus based in a socialist political philosophy of creating people and society through physical, collective labour. It links historically to the Soviet socialist organisation of unpaid, physical labour on Saturdays under the name of ‘Subbotnik’. Frederick Kaplan quotes from the Soviet Regulations of Subbotniks which describes them as “one of the forms of propaganda of the idea of labor service and self -organization of the working class” and as “a laboratory of communist labor”. Lenin in his 1920 handbill Pervomaisky Subbotnik, following the first large-scale Subbotnik for the Moscow–Kazan Railway, describes this process as a “matter of transforming the very habits of the people” from an individualist, capitalist economy towards labouring according to the two socialist rules of ‘“All for each and each for all”’, and ‘“From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”, in order to gradually introduce “communist discipline and communist labour”.

    Ǭkhǣngngān at government institutions in Laos can then be interpreted as the (intended) enactment of a socialist political theory about how people and society come to be. This political and symbolic loading turns it into more than just a mere tidying-up session, and hence it has a different frame compared to other types of working-together at the school, as described above.

    This idea of labour as a transformative power that builds certain kinds of people also shines through in how education is described at my field site, where I was conducting ethnographic research on nursing education. The stated objectives of the nursing course use the language of “creating” or “building” students to become part of collectives as “good citizens” and “professional nurses of the ASEAN community”, with not only professional knowledge and nursing skills, but also with “revolutionary morals”, “correct political thinking”, and “patriotism and unity”. Ǭkhǣngngān as part of this education then presumably intends to practice the “rules” of socialist labour to be applied in the context of public health work. Simultaneously, it serves the practical need for tidying-up schools and workplaces in absence of paid maintenance personnel in Laos’ resource-poor public health and education system.

    The term “labour” in anthropology is often used to describe “physical toil, performed out of necessity, coercion, or domination”. Folz and Smith see this application influenced by Marx’s writings on labour exploitation and class struggle. But for Marx, the process of work/labour (Arbeitsprozess) to begin with has positive connotations as that which makes humans human, as a practice of turning one’s abstract ideas or imaginings into things of the material world (Marx 1967, 141–142). In Volume One of Capital he describes this ideal state of working as a “play” of human’s “physical and intellectual powers”. Only from this conception of the working process could Marx develop his theory of  Entfremdung (alienation) of humans to their own work activities in the capitalist mode of production—and thereby to themselves as humans, and to other humans, whose work (and being) is perceived as a mere commodity.

    Instead of simply interpreting ǭkhǣngngān as physical toil due to state-driven coercion of nursing students into labour, I want to experiment with Marx’ concept of physical labour as attempt to realise an abstract idea or imaginings: in this case, the idea itself that people and society are created through the power of labour, which underpins the institution of ǭkhǣngngān in Laos. Further, I want to return to Marx’ ideal notion of the working process as a “play” of our “physical and intellectual powers”. I argue that despite its seemingly restrictive set-up, the social situation that ǭkhǣngngān creates takes the form of play and re-imagining: within a “high level” imaginative frame, people working and studying at Lao institutions use their own imagination, invent their own rules and transgressions, and thereby create their own game in physical action with others.

    ǭkhǣngngān: playing with the regulations

    Above, I  outlined the basic organising characteristics of ǭkhǣngngān: the idea(l) situation and structure of mobilising physical labour. The first was a bounded temporality. A Lao friend who speaks English and has participated in ǭkhǣngngān said he would translate the term to “the day we clean together”. He emphasised the temporality of a day per week that was allocated to ǭkhǣngngān. At my field site, ǭkhǣngngān has a spot in the weekly class timetable on an afternoon at the end of the week. But despite this dedicated slot, teachers may also call students to ǭkhǣngngān on other days, such as when lessons are cancelled, a new term begins, or for special visitors.

    The actual beginning and ending of ǭkhǣngngān, as I observed it, are rather fluid. Some students and teachers who live nearby go home during lunch break, change outfit from their uniforms to casual clothes and return for the clean-up. Others just wait in the airconditioned classroom until it is time, take naps, eat snacks, drink the odd rice spirit and chat. When people re-gather, it takes some time to determine the location of the clean-up in communication between teachers and students, for people to make their way to that location, to gather cleaning equipment and get started. Action subsides when people spontaneously decide it is enough. This happens less by verbal communication and rather by simply stopping and doing something else.

    Watching others finish in their own time is also totally normal and accepted. Distractions come easy: if a market seller walks through, with bags of bamboo shoots and sour fruit hanging off the ends of a stick over her shoulders, students and teachers stop to buy and eat, always inviting others with a vigorous “kin, kin!” (eat, eat!). Most ǭkhǣngngān that I participated in took no longer than an hour (prior to national holidays, they took up to three hours), but the lesser part of that time would be actually spent with cleaning up.

    In terms of outcome, an expected end goal of ǭkhǣngngān, in my experience, is not clearly defined. The direct objective is indeed to create some level of spatial order (which follows its own logic) and some people show a lot of commitment: they bring their own tools from home, expose themselves to toxic smoke, pick weeds with bare hands, and sharpen the blades of a grass cutter with a circular saw (and no goggles). Yet, incapable of achieving anything close to complete order—the school (a former hospital) is huge, the people few, the buildings in various stages of decay, and any plant grows at an enormous speed during the wet season—people seem to follow their own energy level and motivation in how much they clean up.

    Effectiveness comes second to play: two adult men carry a basket of weeds away that a single boy could master, hold on to one handle each and joke about. While some students still sweep, rake and burn-off, another asks his classmate to take a video of his latest karaoke/dance performance. There is no “vote” or formal collective decision-making process to stop. But once most people have stopped, the final finish call “phǭ (enough) and “mư̄a bān (go home) come from the class leader or a teacher.

    People do not celebrate or preserve the results of their labour either. The day we cleaned up my room, I discovered a half-eaten package of biscuits with crumbs covering the ground that was cleaned fifteen minutes earlier. I see people frequently throw plastic and cigarette butts in the grass around the classroom which they clean up at the next ǭkhǣngngān. And the rubbish and weeds set on fire never burn down completely, but leave sad-looking piles that greet us as we enter the schoolgrounds and classroom.

    Playing with an idea of serious labour

    To sum up, the practice of ǭkhǣngngān was messier and more playful than some outsider might expect of collective physical labour at an institution run by a socialist state. It felt more like a casual hang-out than any kind of physical toil for the institution. Because of its fluidity in temporality and achievement what seems to count most is turning up and doing something together, including continuous chatter, joking and eating.

    However, people like to play with the idea that this ought to be a serious affair: like Ajan Mala on the day I moved in, students and teachers alike shout commands at someone further away, then turn to the people close to them, and laugh together. People also sometimes tease those right next to them about not doing a good job, which might result in a playful little wrestle. When students bring children who join in, this is another source of play and amusement for the adults. No one would say a child was in the way of the adults labouring.

    Yet some formalities are kept. Students still address their teachers with the formal “Ajan”, never with first names. Participation is recorded on a list, which at my first clean-up day the class leader asked me to sign. Since then, I always sign when the list is handed around. This record-keeping indicates the possibility that there could be positive and negative consequences of people’s presence or absence in ǭkhǣngngān (that this could indeed be serious!). When I asked a student whether there is a problem if someone does not join ǭkhǣngngān, she said that “if they give a reason, if they have family or other work, there is no problem if they don’t come”.

    Indonesia’s killer commodity

    The kretek cigarette industry and its devastating public health impacts are sustained via a huge apparatus of labour, and appeals to cultural nationalism

    Students are supposed to notify the school prior when they are unavailable. I asked the same student why lists are kept. She said “so that the school director can see how many people came, how many did not come with a reason, how many did not come without a reason”. “And if people do not give a reason and do not come many times?” “Then the director will talk to them,” she responded. A possible consequence could be a lowering of one’s score, which according to students can occur due to breaks with the school’s regulations (such as incorrect uniform wearing). However, the barrier to participation is very low: physical presence at ǭkhǣngngān alone seems to count as participation. I have seen the odd person turn up, sit on a bench, chat and sign their name on the list. Play never exists completely outside of social rules, whether these are made explicit or unspoken. But it cannot be assumed that official ones are always the strongest.

    Granted its jovial character, ǭkhǣngngān keeps shared facilities clean(er). One student also pointed out that the cutting and burning of grass was important to contain dangers of mosquitoes and snakes around the school. The school uses about 20% of a former hospital’s space and has the sole responsibility to maintain it. But people speak more about social benefits. They say ǭkhǣngngān is “mūan” (fun, enjoyable), because “mī lāi khon, yǭkkan (have many people, joke with each other). A common story I hear in Laos is that at government work sites ǭkhǣngngān results in extended beer drinking, though this is not the case at my field site. The benefits of ǭkhǣngngān are also perceived by people who do not work at government institutions: a Lao friend who works at a private language school tells me they employ a “mǣ bān” (literally mother / woman of the house, but means cleaner). Yet, each morning the staff clean together before starting their desk work. He likes this and says: “we can talk together when we clean together. If you just go to work, go in your room, do not talk, not good. When we first arrive, we clean together, talk together. Then if you have a problem, is easier, I think”.

    The tangible outcomes of this cleaning up were much less impressive, and certainly took up less time, than most other work I saw students engage in outside of ǭkhǣngngān. Although ǭkhǣngngān was a space of labour for the institution, it was simultaneously a space to play for students where the actual outcome of labour mattered much less than in their day-to-day lives.

    This does not mean that work outside of ǭkhǣngngān happens always in a serious manner. Instigated by students, I picked fruit from trees in a village head office’s backyard, our giggles travelled through the open door inside the office where other students collected information and exchanged amused looks with us. I saw a student drop her hair ribbon in front of a teacher who checked her outfit for compliance with regulations—the teacher and the whole class broke out in laughter. I sat in the car with teachers on a work excursion who laughed about their own imagining that I was “collecting information” about how many frogs and crabs they bought on the way to the district health department.

    Students taking a break to pick tamarind pods (Photo: author)

    It is not as easy as allocating specific behaviours of obedience or transgression to spaces—as Sarinda Singh has observed in her studies of worker dormitories in Laos— or to constellations of people interacting. No place at the institution is reserved for any one kind of behaviour, and no person is excepted from play. The atmosphere and dynamics of interaction can change from one moment to another. I would suggest that when people joke and when not can be an indicator for the power of particular imaginings that turn into reality at a specific moment.

    Labour, in Marx’ initial reading, is a practice in which humans play with imaginings about what their handwork ought to do, what is supposed to be realised and materialised through their practices. In this process that Marx called Verwirklichung (real-making), people’s own imaginings and those of others fold into each other and create ever-new expressions. Our imaginings are not fixed, but can easily shift and change in the process. And so the results are never identical with what anyone imagined their ideas would do prior to the practice.

    Nursing students, for instance, might venture to the village head’s office to collect information about public health for their assignment, and then get distracted by fruit they spot in the backyard. A teacher might turn up at a classroom to discipline people who do not follow the dress code, but then breaks out in laughter when a student drops her ribbon in front of his feet. An anthropology student with a serious interest in nursing education in Laos might be joked about by a group of teachers who imagine she is collecting information on the most random things such as dead frogs (and they were correct).

    For sure, not all people are equally able to realise their ideas or imaginings in the work process. What can be brought closest to real-making—or rather, is recognised by others as real—is where power dynamics can be located. But then, there is no objective judge as to what is made real: to some observers of ǭkhǣngngān, the state’s idea (as implemented by its officials) does mobilise the power of labour to form a group that gathers every week and makes a real difference to the tidiness of the school. Some might say ǭkhǣngngān subjects students to physical, at times risky, labour as an unfair condition to receive an education and progress in the public sector.

    To others, ǭkhǣngngān is just a thin frame that is filled with people’s play who realise their idea of a fun time together, for that moment, and then disperse again. Of course, these realities can exist simultaneously. People were aware of what the basic idea was: they named the practice of “anāmai” or “the day we clean up” when I asked what the term meant. They consciously played with the idea that this ought to be taken seriously and made sure that people like me who were not used to their game (yet) understood they were “just joking”. During my time with them, I admired the students’ ways of finding enjoyment when they were called to ǭkhǣngngān yet again, when smoke stung in our eyes and lungs, when we watched the buildings crumble around us, and the jungle crawl back in. Together, the students developed and played their own game—which, perhaps, is a real power of imagination and labour.

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    The post “Playing” with labour: on collective cleaning in Lao PDR appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Eight o’clock, 14 July 2024

    I arrive at the office of Ajan Mala, a teacher at a Public Health School in southern Laos. We grab brooms, buckets, sponges and floor cleaner and she walks ahead of me towards the student dorm. As we get closer, she spots people in the distance and yells: “Students, come and help clean Amelie’s room!”. Her tone sounds commanding and makes me uncomfortable; I do not wish to force anyone to clean my room. But Ajan Mala turns around, smiles and says she is just joking, that this is like “a game between teachers and students.” She assures me there is “midtaphāb (friendship) between them.

    At the student dormitory, Ajan Mala unlocks the door of my room-to-be. Suddenly there are around fifteen adults who pick up brooms, open all windows and doors, carry out beds and wardrobes, sweep and scrub. Ajan Mala tells me to dust the cobwebs from the wardrobes, while they will take care of the room’s interior and the bathroom.

    I take a step back, feeling slightly overwhelmed by the rush and what to me appears chaotic action. Everything seems to happen at once: while people are still sweeping, one student finds a few pieces of green rubber hose that he links together and connects to a tap outside. Suddenly water floods the tiled floors, and gushes towards the wooden furniture I am still dusting off. Afraid of water damage to the untreated timber, I ask a student to help me move the furniture away from the deluge. I hear the noises of engines, and behind the back window, a couple of men slash the plants that had crossed the threshold between in and outside.

    There are some teachers who help and some who watch. The school director, dressed in pink tracksuit and sun hat, walks by, takes a video with her phone, and kicks some snails off the corridor walls with her parasol. I watch one teacher pull out some plant with its root and stick it inside a plastic cup she found on the ground. She adds some dirt and says she’ll take it home to her garden. Ajan Mala squats and scrubs the walls, while her colleague mops the floor. I start to relax amongst these people who are chatting, joking, yelling teasing comments across the corridor—and the place is getting cleaner.

    But the action is over as quickly as it started; students and teachers begin to disappear. As I notice a group walking away through the corridor, I run after them with biscuits as thanks. They share the biscuits and then leave. Once everyone is gone, I get down on the floor with a bucket of water-vinegar mix and a sponge, and give each tile a final, thorough scrub (much gecko poo has survived the water flood). I feel grateful as if I received a welcome gift. But it also occurs to me, that the students and teachers seem used to this; not of course, to clean a visiting anthropologists’ room, but to clean together.

    Collective cleaning as labour: ǭkhǣngngān

    Cleaning together at a worksite or educational facility is a routine practice of collective, physical labour in Lao PDR. At my field site people called it ǭkhǣngngān (ອອກແຮງງານ). When I first read the term in the weekly lesson timetable, I falsely translated it to “workout”. I expected ǭkhǣngngān would be some outdoors exercise regime (“ǭk” as “out”, “hǣng” as “strong”, and “ngān” as “work”). When the day came around, I asked a student what we will do this afternoon. She replied “ǭkhǣngngān!”, and I asked “mǣn nyang?” (“what is this/that”), so she said “anāmai” (tidy up). That afternoon, we swept concrete floors, scraped snail poo off walls, and squatted down to pull out weeds along paths. The weeds were piled up together with plastic rubbish and set alight.

    A nursing student uses rubber strip as fire lighter (Photo: author)

    My Lao friends tell me ǭkhǣngngān happens at every government-run workplace and school. The organised, institutional character of this labour can be observed in a number of aspects. A specific slot is allocated to ǭkhǣngngān in the school’s weekly timetable, usually on a Thursday or Friday afternoon. The task of the day is determined by a senior staff member. Lists of participation are kept which students and teachers sign, and all are expected to participate. The place to be cleaned is an outdoors area, in the vicinity of the classroom or school offices, and this location puts ǭkhǣngngān in full view of the public. In government news publications, stories of ǭkhǣngngān sessions abound accompanied with imagery of groups working together, especially in preparation for days of national celebration: tidying up around government buildings, pulling weeds at a military school, or sweeping in the capital’s public parks. At my field site too, students and staff take pictures of their tidying-up session to post on social media.

    The term ǭkhǣngngān also sets this activity apart from other occasions of working together. “Work” in Lao is more commonly referred to as vīak: housework (vīak hư̄an), work on rice fields (vīak nā ), or gardens (vīak sūan), going to work (pai vīak). The nursing students at my field site work in groups for assignments (vīak kūm) and do homework (vīak bān). With most work, they refer specifically to the practice: hā kin (look for food, or go and get food), hed kin (prepare food), anāmai (tidy up), keb (collect). During our lunch break, we climb up on chairs or use long sticks to reach tamarind pods and raw papayas in the trees, we search for edible leafy greens, peel bamboo shoots, make a fire to cook bamboo soup or grill buffalo skin, prepare a floormat and dishes to eat on the classroom floor, and tidy up after the meal. None of this collective, physical labour that occurs on a daily basis would make the news.

    Whilst ǭkhǣngngān is structured by the institution, these everyday practices of working together evolve dependent on people’s needs. Who participates and how depends on individuals’ motivations, skills and time. Often one person starts an activity which then spills over to others. People verbally organise each other to a degree, but this occurs spontaneously and according to emerging needs and desires identified by the students themselves—nothing is pre-set by an authority. All this work happens out of view from the institution (school staff). There is no fixed lunch group, but people drop in and out, some go home to eat with their family or to a restaurant. In comparison, ǭkhǣngngān at first sight appears to be an “unnatural” way of people working together at this school.

    If working together already takes place on a daily basis, and seems to work to fulfill people’s needs, what then is the point of ǭkhǣngngān, and to whom? Is it just a means to make people tidy those large, shared spaces outside the classroom and office that no one would take care of otherwise? Or are there other reasons to make people work together in this particular way?

    Possible answers as to why ǭkhǣngngān persists at state-run institutions in Lao PDR can be derived from its roots in a Marxist–Leninist concept of collective labour. This becomes clear when looking at how the concept of ǭkhǣngngān is taught in a Lao schoolbook on “Civic Education” for Year 5 students published in 2019:

    People’s labour (kanǭkhǣngngān khǭng khon) is related to movements that have a social character. In that labour, people need to coordinate together to move together as a group. If just alone, a single person cannot earn food to live and resist disasters or forces that occur in the natural world. The ancient primitive people (khon pathombūhān) lived in a group before to carry out labour that had a social character because of that society. Therefore, as products (phalidtaphan) that affect each other, there is a relationship between person and person (khon), and labour is a power (kamlang) that creates (sāng) the person (khon) and society (sangkhom).

    In this reading, labour as movement is social in both process and outcome. Social labour is naturalised because this is what allows humans to survive since the “ancient primitive people”. But this labour is about more than mere use-value, such as procurement of food or building of shelters that protect from wind and weather — because labour here is also a generative power to create the person and society as its “products”.

    This means that neither person nor society are understood as abstract conditions or identities pre-existing to interpersonal relationships and practices of labour. The term (ǭk)hǣngngān as labour in this sense is used in Laos in political contexts, such as the “International Labour Organization” (ongkanhǣngngānsākon), and government news stories might use the term to refer to workers (phūǭkhǣngngān).

    Indonesia’s killer commodity

    The kretek cigarette industry and its devastating public health impacts are sustained via a huge apparatus of labour, and appeals to cultural nationalism

    The organisation of weekly ǭkhǣngngān at all Lao government workplaces and schools is thus based in a socialist political philosophy of creating people and society through physical, collective labour. It links historically to the Soviet socialist organisation of unpaid, physical labour on Saturdays under the name of ‘Subbotnik’. Frederick Kaplan quotes from the Soviet Regulations of Subbotniks which describes them as “one of the forms of propaganda of the idea of labor service and self -organization of the working class” and as “a laboratory of communist labor”. Lenin in his 1920 handbill Pervomaisky Subbotnik, following the first large-scale Subbotnik for the Moscow–Kazan Railway, describes this process as a “matter of transforming the very habits of the people” from an individualist, capitalist economy towards labouring according to the two socialist rules of ‘“All for each and each for all”’, and ‘“From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”, in order to gradually introduce “communist discipline and communist labour”.

    Ǭkhǣngngān at government institutions in Laos can then be interpreted as the (intended) enactment of a socialist political theory about how people and society come to be. This political and symbolic loading turns it into more than just a mere tidying-up session, and hence it has a different frame compared to other types of working-together at the school, as described above.

    This idea of labour as a transformative power that builds certain kinds of people also shines through in how education is described at my field site, where I was conducting ethnographic research on nursing education. The stated objectives of the nursing course use the language of “creating” or “building” students to become part of collectives as “good citizens” and “professional nurses of the ASEAN community”, with not only professional knowledge and nursing skills, but also with “revolutionary morals”, “correct political thinking”, and “patriotism and unity”. Ǭkhǣngngān as part of this education then presumably intends to practice the “rules” of socialist labour to be applied in the context of public health work. Simultaneously, it serves the practical need for tidying-up schools and workplaces in absence of paid maintenance personnel in Laos’ resource-poor public health and education system.

    The term “labour” in anthropology is often used to describe “physical toil, performed out of necessity, coercion, or domination”. Folz and Smith see this application influenced by Marx’s writings on labour exploitation and class struggle. But for Marx, the process of work/labour (Arbeitsprozess) to begin with has positive connotations as that which makes humans human, as a practice of turning one’s abstract ideas or imaginings into things of the material world (Marx 1967, 141–142). In Volume One of Capital he describes this ideal state of working as a “play” of human’s “physical and intellectual powers”. Only from this conception of the working process could Marx develop his theory of  Entfremdung (alienation) of humans to their own work activities in the capitalist mode of production—and thereby to themselves as humans, and to other humans, whose work (and being) is perceived as a mere commodity.

    Instead of simply interpreting ǭkhǣngngān as physical toil due to state-driven coercion of nursing students into labour, I want to experiment with Marx’ concept of physical labour as attempt to realise an abstract idea or imaginings: in this case, the idea itself that people and society are created through the power of labour, which underpins the institution of ǭkhǣngngān in Laos. Further, I want to return to Marx’ ideal notion of the working process as a “play” of our “physical and intellectual powers”. I argue that despite its seemingly restrictive set-up, the social situation that ǭkhǣngngān creates takes the form of play and re-imagining: within a “high level” imaginative frame, people working and studying at Lao institutions use their own imagination, invent their own rules and transgressions, and thereby create their own game in physical action with others.

    ǭkhǣngngān: playing with the regulations

    Above, I  outlined the basic organising characteristics of ǭkhǣngngān: the idea(l) situation and structure of mobilising physical labour. The first was a bounded temporality. A Lao friend who speaks English and has participated in ǭkhǣngngān said he would translate the term to “the day we clean together”. He emphasised the temporality of a day per week that was allocated to ǭkhǣngngān. At my field site, ǭkhǣngngān has a spot in the weekly class timetable on an afternoon at the end of the week. But despite this dedicated slot, teachers may also call students to ǭkhǣngngān on other days, such as when lessons are cancelled, a new term begins, or for special visitors.

    The actual beginning and ending of ǭkhǣngngān, as I observed it, are rather fluid. Some students and teachers who live nearby go home during lunch break, change outfit from their uniforms to casual clothes and return for the clean-up. Others just wait in the airconditioned classroom until it is time, take naps, eat snacks, drink the odd rice spirit and chat. When people re-gather, it takes some time to determine the location of the clean-up in communication between teachers and students, for people to make their way to that location, to gather cleaning equipment and get started. Action subsides when people spontaneously decide it is enough. This happens less by verbal communication and rather by simply stopping and doing something else.

    Watching others finish in their own time is also totally normal and accepted. Distractions come easy: if a market seller walks through, with bags of bamboo shoots and sour fruit hanging off the ends of a stick over her shoulders, students and teachers stop to buy and eat, always inviting others with a vigorous “kin, kin!” (eat, eat!). Most ǭkhǣngngān that I participated in took no longer than an hour (prior to national holidays, they took up to three hours), but the lesser part of that time would be actually spent with cleaning up.

    In terms of outcome, an expected end goal of ǭkhǣngngān, in my experience, is not clearly defined. The direct objective is indeed to create some level of spatial order (which follows its own logic) and some people show a lot of commitment: they bring their own tools from home, expose themselves to toxic smoke, pick weeds with bare hands, and sharpen the blades of a grass cutter with a circular saw (and no goggles). Yet, incapable of achieving anything close to complete order—the school (a former hospital) is huge, the people few, the buildings in various stages of decay, and any plant grows at an enormous speed during the wet season—people seem to follow their own energy level and motivation in how much they clean up.

    Effectiveness comes second to play: two adult men carry a basket of weeds away that a single boy could master, hold on to one handle each and joke about. While some students still sweep, rake and burn-off, another asks his classmate to take a video of his latest karaoke/dance performance. There is no “vote” or formal collective decision-making process to stop. But once most people have stopped, the final finish call “phǭ (enough) and “mư̄a bān (go home) come from the class leader or a teacher.

    People do not celebrate or preserve the results of their labour either. The day we cleaned up my room, I discovered a half-eaten package of biscuits with crumbs covering the ground that was cleaned fifteen minutes earlier. I see people frequently throw plastic and cigarette butts in the grass around the classroom which they clean up at the next ǭkhǣngngān. And the rubbish and weeds set on fire never burn down completely, but leave sad-looking piles that greet us as we enter the schoolgrounds and classroom.

    Playing with an idea of serious labour

    To sum up, the practice of ǭkhǣngngān was messier and more playful than some outsider might expect of collective physical labour at an institution run by a socialist state. It felt more like a casual hang-out than any kind of physical toil for the institution. Because of its fluidity in temporality and achievement what seems to count most is turning up and doing something together, including continuous chatter, joking and eating.

    However, people like to play with the idea that this ought to be a serious affair: like Ajan Mala on the day I moved in, students and teachers alike shout commands at someone further away, then turn to the people close to them, and laugh together. People also sometimes tease those right next to them about not doing a good job, which might result in a playful little wrestle. When students bring children who join in, this is another source of play and amusement for the adults. No one would say a child was in the way of the adults labouring.

    Yet some formalities are kept. Students still address their teachers with the formal “Ajan”, never with first names. Participation is recorded on a list, which at my first clean-up day the class leader asked me to sign. Since then, I always sign when the list is handed around. This record-keeping indicates the possibility that there could be positive and negative consequences of people’s presence or absence in ǭkhǣngngān (that this could indeed be serious!). When I asked a student whether there is a problem if someone does not join ǭkhǣngngān, she said that “if they give a reason, if they have family or other work, there is no problem if they don’t come”.

    Indonesia’s killer commodity

    The kretek cigarette industry and its devastating public health impacts are sustained via a huge apparatus of labour, and appeals to cultural nationalism

    Students are supposed to notify the school prior when they are unavailable. I asked the same student why lists are kept. She said “so that the school director can see how many people came, how many did not come with a reason, how many did not come without a reason”. “And if people do not give a reason and do not come many times?” “Then the director will talk to them,” she responded. A possible consequence could be a lowering of one’s score, which according to students can occur due to breaks with the school’s regulations (such as incorrect uniform wearing). However, the barrier to participation is very low: physical presence at ǭkhǣngngān alone seems to count as participation. I have seen the odd person turn up, sit on a bench, chat and sign their name on the list. Play never exists completely outside of social rules, whether these are made explicit or unspoken. But it cannot be assumed that official ones are always the strongest.

    Granted its jovial character, ǭkhǣngngān keeps shared facilities clean(er). One student also pointed out that the cutting and burning of grass was important to contain dangers of mosquitoes and snakes around the school. The school uses about 20% of a former hospital’s space and has the sole responsibility to maintain it. But people speak more about social benefits. They say ǭkhǣngngān is “mūan” (fun, enjoyable), because “mī lāi khon, yǭkkan (have many people, joke with each other). A common story I hear in Laos is that at government work sites ǭkhǣngngān results in extended beer drinking, though this is not the case at my field site. The benefits of ǭkhǣngngān are also perceived by people who do not work at government institutions: a Lao friend who works at a private language school tells me they employ a “mǣ bān” (literally mother / woman of the house, but means cleaner). Yet, each morning the staff clean together before starting their desk work. He likes this and says: “we can talk together when we clean together. If you just go to work, go in your room, do not talk, not good. When we first arrive, we clean together, talk together. Then if you have a problem, is easier, I think”.

    The tangible outcomes of this cleaning up were much less impressive, and certainly took up less time, than most other work I saw students engage in outside of ǭkhǣngngān. Although ǭkhǣngngān was a space of labour for the institution, it was simultaneously a space to play for students where the actual outcome of labour mattered much less than in their day-to-day lives.

    This does not mean that work outside of ǭkhǣngngān happens always in a serious manner. Instigated by students, I picked fruit from trees in a village head office’s backyard, our giggles travelled through the open door inside the office where other students collected information and exchanged amused looks with us. I saw a student drop her hair ribbon in front of a teacher who checked her outfit for compliance with regulations—the teacher and the whole class broke out in laughter. I sat in the car with teachers on a work excursion who laughed about their own imagining that I was “collecting information” about how many frogs and crabs they bought on the way to the district health department.

    Students taking a break to pick tamarind pods (Photo: author)

    It is not as easy as allocating specific behaviours of obedience or transgression to spaces—as Sarinda Singh has observed in her studies of worker dormitories in Laos— or to constellations of people interacting. No place at the institution is reserved for any one kind of behaviour, and no person is excepted from play. The atmosphere and dynamics of interaction can change from one moment to another. I would suggest that when people joke and when not can be an indicator for the power of particular imaginings that turn into reality at a specific moment.

    Labour, in Marx’ initial reading, is a practice in which humans play with imaginings about what their handwork ought to do, what is supposed to be realised and materialised through their practices. In this process that Marx called Verwirklichung (real-making), people’s own imaginings and those of others fold into each other and create ever-new expressions. Our imaginings are not fixed, but can easily shift and change in the process. And so the results are never identical with what anyone imagined their ideas would do prior to the practice.

    Nursing students, for instance, might venture to the village head’s office to collect information about public health for their assignment, and then get distracted by fruit they spot in the backyard. A teacher might turn up at a classroom to discipline people who do not follow the dress code, but then breaks out in laughter when a student drops her ribbon in front of his feet. An anthropology student with a serious interest in nursing education in Laos might be joked about by a group of teachers who imagine she is collecting information on the most random things such as dead frogs (and they were correct).

    For sure, not all people are equally able to realise their ideas or imaginings in the work process. What can be brought closest to real-making—or rather, is recognised by others as real—is where power dynamics can be located. But then, there is no objective judge as to what is made real: to some observers of ǭkhǣngngān, the state’s idea (as implemented by its officials) does mobilise the power of labour to form a group that gathers every week and makes a real difference to the tidiness of the school. Some might say ǭkhǣngngān subjects students to physical, at times risky, labour as an unfair condition to receive an education and progress in the public sector.

    To others, ǭkhǣngngān is just a thin frame that is filled with people’s play who realise their idea of a fun time together, for that moment, and then disperse again. Of course, these realities can exist simultaneously. People were aware of what the basic idea was: they named the practice of “anāmai” or “the day we clean up” when I asked what the term meant. They consciously played with the idea that this ought to be taken seriously and made sure that people like me who were not used to their game (yet) understood they were “just joking”. During my time with them, I admired the students’ ways of finding enjoyment when they were called to ǭkhǣngngān yet again, when smoke stung in our eyes and lungs, when we watched the buildings crumble around us, and the jungle crawl back in. Together, the students developed and played their own game—which, perhaps, is a real power of imagination and labour.

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  • Lao authorities have temporarily shut down a Vietnamese-owned iron ore mining operation in the northeastern part of the country after a washing reservoir overflowed and its wastewater polluted two local rivers, officials and area residents said.

    Authorities have ordered the operation run by Tienhao Kaobang Co. to remain closed until the washing reservoir has been repaired, said people who live in Viengxay district of Houaphanh province and who have complained about pollution in the Nam Xang and Nam Poon rivers.

    “The company is not allowed to operate until the reservoir repair is completed,” said a resident who declined to be identified out of fear of retribution.

    The wastewater released discolored and muddied the water in the rivers and killed fish, he said.

    Affected villagers said they are concerned that the contaminated water will affect their rice production and livestock that drink from the two rivers.

    The mining industry has been a key driver of economic growth in the small, landlocked Southeast Asian nation for years, but it has had negative environmental impacts.

    If tailings — leftover material from the processing of iron ore that can contain potentially toxic elements — are not properly managed and contained in washing reservoirs, they can pollute water sources, affect soil quality, harm aquatic life, and potentially pose health risks to humans.

    Complaints

    Villagers from seven communities downstream from the mine and their respective chiefs complained to district officials after the incident occurred on Jan. 12, the head of one village told Radio Free Asia.

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    On Monday, Outhone Bounvilay, head of the Natural Resources and Environment Office of Viangxay district, told Lao National Radio that the discoloration was caused by an overflow of wastewater from the iron ore washing reservoir in Fongxang village.

    He also said Lao officials have an agreement with the company to temporarily stop its operations until the problem is resolved.

    When RFA called the Natural Resources and Environment Office to ask about compensation for villagers whose water resources are now polluted, a staffer said investigators were collecting water samples to analyze.

    Another villager said she saw a post saying that the company would compensate residents, but it gave no further details.

    Both district officials and the company are collaborating with local villages, including six situated along the Nam Xang River, to evaluate the impact and ensure fair compensation, the online Laotian Times said.

    In a December 2024 incident, wastewater leaked from the same mining operations into the Nam Xang River, prompting authorities to urge the company to adopt stricter measures to prevent other incidents, the news outlet said.

    Translated by Khamsao Civilize for RFA Lao. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Joshua Lipes.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.


  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.


  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Laos has ordered a Chinese-owned potash mine believed responsible for two massive sinkholes in Khammouane province to cease operations until further notice, and to fill the sinkholes in, an official told Radio Free Asia.

    On Dec. 4, a sinkhole measuring 20 meters (65 feet) wide and 10 meters (33 feet) deep opened up on farmland in Thakhaek district’s Pak Peng village. On Dec. 21, another sinkhole — about half the size of the first — formed nearby.

    Residents suspect the sinkholes are a result of excavation at a potash mine in neighboring Nong Bok district, operated by Sino-Agri International Potash Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of Asia Potash International Investment (Guangzhou) Co., Ltd., which is linked to entities directed by China’s governing State Council.

    After a month of central government inspections of the mine, the cause remains unclear.

    However, the company has been ordered to fill both sinkholes, a government official said Monday, speaking to RFA Lao on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

    “The two sinkholes will be filled up with dirt. The company will carry out this task,” the official said, adding that after meeting with central government officials, a cause has not yet been determined.

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    Because fault has not been determined, the company may not have to pay compensation, the official said.

    A Pak Peng resident told RFA that those who live near the sinkholes are terrified of further collapses.

    “They are scared. The sinkholes are right in the middle of the rice fields,” the villager said.

    Filling in the holes is only a temporary fix, a Lao expert told RFA.

    “Underground extraction is very dangerous. One day the mine will collapse,” he said. “Dirt is excavated and water flushes will cause more sinkholes over the next 20 years. It won’t be long before we start seeing the consequences.”

    Translated by RFA Lao. Edited by Eugene Whong.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.