Category: Laos

  • Police discovered that 19 teenage girls and women were selling surreptitious sex at a restaurant during a raid in central Laos that resulted in the arrest of the restaurant’s two owners, a police officer told Radio Free Asia.

    Some of the girls were as young as 13, according to a village official in Khammouane province’s Hinboun district, who like many other sources in this report requested anonymity for security reasons.

    “The restaurant has been shut down,” the police officer said. “For the girls and women, we just told them to go back home to their parents. We didn’t fine or punish them.”

    The restaurant owners will be charged with human trafficking, he said.

    Authorities went to the restaurant on June 7 because of its loud noise, the village official said. There are three other restaurants in the village that are also suspected of offering prostitution, he said.

    Before they were sent home to their families, the girls and women underwent a re-education session in which they were told that providing sex service is against Lao tradition and law. 

    “The purpose of today’s session is to make sure that the participants understand the guidelines and policy of the government and Party,” Soukkhaseum Sitthideth, president of the Lao Women’s Union of Khammouane province said in a video of the session seen by RFA.

    “Lao women are traditionally conservative but nowadays in a digital era, our girls and women have changed,” she said. “Our tradition and culture have been affected by the changes. A great number of our girls and women have adopted a new lifestyle.”

    Laos faces many challenges when it comes to fighting human trafficking, including not having the resources to properly fund enforcement against those who trick or force young people into illicit work.

    Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath have left many Laotians in desperate financial situations amid a faltering economy and rampant unemployment.

    In February, police near Vientiane raided nightclubs, restaurants and karaoke bars along a busy highway and found 47 sex workers, including four girls under 18 years old.

    In that case, police also determined that most of the girls and women were from poor, rural families, an officer said at the time.

    Translated by Max Avary. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Lao.

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  • Chinese travel companies are illegally hiring Chinese to be tour guides in Laos to meet growing demand for Chinese speakers as visitor numbers surge after the pandemic border closures were lifted in 2022, residents in the country told Radio Free Asia.

    While many Lao citizens speak Chinese, most choose to work in other industries, and the Chinese companies actually prefer to hire their own, even if they lack work permits and are not registered with the police, the residents said.

    “Yes, we lack Chinese-speaking Lao tour guides these days,” said a Lao guide, who like other sources in this report insisted on not being identified for security reasons. “Some of them found something else to do when COVID hit Laos and they’re not coming back to work as tour guides anymore.” 

    Laos is a popular destination for Chinese visitors – many from neighboring Kuming province – because the two countries are connected by rail and have good diplomatic relations, sources said.

    ENG_LAO_CHINESE TOUR GUIDES_05132024.2.jpg
    Chinese tourists visit Luang Prabang, Laos, March 2024. (RFA)

    According to official statistics, nearly 700,000 Chinese visited Laos in 2023, the third-highest number behind Thailand and Vietnam. In the first quarter, that trend continued, with more than 240,000 Chinese visited the landlocked Southeast Asian country.

    There is no reliable data on the number of illegal Chinese tour guides, but many are known to work in Luang Prabang province and in the capital Vientiane, both popular tourist spots. 

    As of May, there are 270 registered Chinese-speaking Lao tour guides nationwide; 140 work in Luang Prabang province and 60 in Vientiane.

    Chinese package tours

    Chinese tourists, who typically are herded around on buses from site to site, prefer to use Chinese tour companies based in Laos, the guide said. Those companies arrange transportation into and around Laos with other Chinese companies, lodging with hotels run by Chinese owners, and meals with restaurants owned by Chinese. 

    The tour companies sometimes will hire only one or two Lao guides to hide their many illegal Chinese guides, the sources said. 

    A third guide said that sometimes the Chinese companies will hire Lao guides who speak languages other than Chinese, but they rarely ever do their jobs as guides and are only there to bail out the illegal Chinese guides.

    ENG_LAO_CHINESE TOUR GUIDES_05132024.3.jpg
    Chinese tourists visit Luang Prabang, Laos, March 2024. (RFA)

    If police approach a tour group to ask if they have a guide registered with the police, the Lao tour guides will show up with their credentials, while the Chinese guides lay low, another guide, who is registered, told RFA. 

    Local guides are skeptical that Chinese guides explain Lao history and culture accurately.

    “I have seen that when the Chinese tour guides explain something, sometimes the tourists will laugh,” she said. “When the Chinese tour guides lead the tour groups to temples, I am not sure if they explain about the Buddha statues with the correct information or not.”

    Despite the growing number of Lao youths interested in learning Chinese, most of them choose to work as interpreters in other sectors rather than to work as tour guides. 

    ENG_LAO_CHINESE TOUR GUIDES_05132024.4.jpg
    A steakhouse with a Chinese-language menu in Luang Prabang, Laos, March 2024. (RFA)

    And while some Lao youth speak Chinese language, they do not know Lao history and culture well enough, an English-speaking Lao guide told RFA.

    To deal with the shortage and encourage those who left the industry during the pandemic to return, the Lao Mass Media, Culture and Tourism Institute recently announced plans to conduct training for national level Lao tour guides from May to July, an official said.

    “Now, Chinese tourists are visiting Laos more and more, but we still do not have enough Chinese-speaking Lao tour guides,” the official said. “Thus, we will have tour guide training for those who want to be tour guides as priority to fill this gap.”

    Translated by Phouvong. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Lao.

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  • A gas station in northern Laos reported that a customer passed 14 fake 50,000 kip bills (worth US$2.34 each) to fill up the car’s gas tank, the owner of the establishment told Radio Free Asia.

    It’s one of many incidents of counterfeit bills surfacing at businesses in the region since the national bank’s April 26 warning that fake bills were circulating in the country.

    The problem seems to be most acute in the north, around the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, a de facto Chinese-controlled tourist zone centered on the Kings Romans Casino in Bokeo province.

    “When we touched the bank notes, we could feel the difference. They also don’t look authentic,” the gas station owner, from the same province, who like all anonymous sources in this report requested anonymity for security reasons, told RFA Lao.

    He said shortly afterward, bank employees came to receive a payment from the business. When the bills were run through a counting machine, they did not pass muster. The bank confiscated all but one of the counterfeit notes.

    “We kept only one for future reference,” he said.

    In Laos, the 50,000-kip note is the most frequently used, and the 100,000 kip note (worth $4.68) is the highest denomination. 

    With the rapid depreciation of the kip and soaring inflation, people now have to carry around large numbers of bills for many purchases or transactions.

    Seems widespread

    One day after the visit from the bank, the bank employees returned to the gas station with police to investigate. They said they were still not sure who was behind the counterfeiting scheme, which seems widespread.

    A storekeeper in Bokeo said eight counterfeit bills were discovered at her store.

    “Somebody must have spent them at our store. I don’t remember who it was because we have so many customers,” she said. “I found out when I deposited the money at our bank.”

    The bank double-checked all the notes in her deposit and called her with the bad news, she said. She gave all the information she had to the bank to help with their investigation.

    A bank employee from Bokeo said that every single note, either Lao or foreign is carefully checked.

    “In the time since the national bank issued the warning, we luckily haven’t received any fake bank notes,” the bank employee said.

    Tips on how to detect them

    A national bank official confirmed that they issued the warning and offered tips on how to detect counterfeit currency.

    “First, touch it. The fake ones are softer,” he said.  “Second, look at it through light. You’ll see a series of dark lines embedded in the real bank notes, while the fake ones don’t have lines.”

    The national bank last year issued similar warnings about counterfeit 100,000-kip, 50,000-kip and 1,000 Thai baht ($27) notes surfacing nationwide.

    In April 2019, police in the town of Luang Prabang in northern Laos arrested three Chinese nationals for spending counterfeit 50,000-kip and 100,000-kip banknotes at a market.

    According to Lao law, those caught making fake bills can be jailed between five to 15 years and fined between 50 million to 500 million kip ($2,340-$23,400). Those caught using the bills can be jailed between three months and five years, and fined between 2 million and 5 million kip ($94-$234).

    Translated by Max Avary. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Lao.

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  • Sixteen Indian nationals who said they were lured in Mumbai to work as online scammers in Laos were rescued this week from the Chinese-run Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, an official with knowledge of the situation told Radio Free Asia on Friday.

    The zone, which sits along the Mekong River in northwestern Bokeo province, is a gambling and tourism hub catering to Chinese tourists and has been described as a de-facto Chinese colony. 

    It has become a haven for cyber scams, prostitution, money laundering, drug trafficking, and human and wildlife trafficking by organized criminal networks.

    The Indians had been told by recruiters in Mumbai that they would get jobs related to cryptocurrency in Thailand’s Chiang Rai province, said the official, who like others in this report, did not want to be identified so he could speak freely. 

    But when they arrived, the Chinese bosses loaded them on a boat that crossed the Mekong River to Bokeo province, where the Indians said they were forced to work as online scammers or fake call center workers in the zone.

    Their plight came to light after one of the Indians managed to escape and return to India, where he filed a complaint with Mumbai police on March 24, The Laotian Times reported.

    One Lao official said that they had received a tip-off email from someone who knew about their predicament, and “took action right away to help these youngsters.”

    Hurt and abused

    An official involved in anti-human trafficking efforts said the Chinese running the operations physically abused some of the Indians, denied them food, and locked them up if they didn’t generate revenue. 

    “The Chinese bosses physically hurt the Indian nationals with hammers and sticks,” he told RFA. “They simply had to work for free or without getting paid.”

    Anti-human trafficking agents in India arrested two people believed to be in charge of agents who recruited up to 40 young Indian nationals so they could be sent to Laos to work as online scammers, said the official.

    The Indian Embassy in Laos posted on its website an advisory for Indian youths to beware of fake job offers from Laos. (India Ministry of External Affairs)
    The Indian Embassy in Laos posted on its website an advisory for Indian youths to beware of fake job offers from Laos. (India Ministry of External Affairs)

    Other Indians in the zone who find themselves in the same predicament contact Lao government officers daily for help, said a second official involved in anti-human trafficking activities.

    Since the beginning of the year, about 30 Indians have contacted a Lao anti-human trafficking office, which can help them find a safe temporary place to stay and send them home once authorities receive a tip about them, he said.

    Some information comes from India’s Ministry of External Affairs asking for help to get Indian nationals out of the zone, the second official said.

    It is unknown how many Indians are still working in the zone, he added.

    South Korean and Malaysian nationals have also fallen victim to traffickers who hand them over to Chinese in the zone to engage in cyber fraud, said the official with knowledge of the situation.

    The Embassy of India in Vientiane issued a recent notice on its website that it was aware that Indian nations were being lured for employment in Thailand or Laos as “digital sales and marketing executives” and “customer support services” by dubious companies involved in call-center scams and cryptocurrency fraud in the Golden Triangle SEZ.

    Translated by Phouvong for RFA Lao. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcom Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Lao.

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  • More than a dozen people have been infected by anthrax in two districts in southern Champassak province and authorities have responded by placing restrictions on the movement and slaughtering of some farm animals, several officials told Radio Free Asia. 

    Provincial health officials announced on March 12 that anthrax – a rare, serious infectious disease caused by bacteria – was found in the carcasses of 97 cows, buffaloes and goats. 

    Three people in Champassak tested positive for anthrax last week, but that number jumped to 14 on Tuesday, according to the provincial Health Department.

    The 14 patients all have large, dark scabs and are receiving treatment, a health official told RFA. Authorities believe they contracted anthrax – or what’s known as “black blood disease” – by eating meat from infected cows or buffaloes..

    Anthrax usually affects livestock like cattle, sheep and goats, but humans can be infected if they are exposed to contaminated animal products or animals. 

    According to the World Health Organization, anthrax isn’t generally considered to be contagious between humans, although there have been some cases of person-to-person transmission.

    The provincial health department has issued a notice asking local medical centers and authorities to report any new cases and urging anyone who develops black bumps on their body to see a doctor as soon as possible.

    “We’re concerned. We have stopped eating meat,” a Soukhoumma district resident told RFA. “Now, we eat only pork and fish.”

    Transporting and slaughtering farm animals has been temporarily banned, and people are required to properly bury their dead animals, the department said.

    A slaughterhouse worker told RFA that they are complying with the order and have stopped buying animals from local farmers. 

    An agricultural official in Pathoumphone district said authorities have stepped up surveillance efforts and have officially warned the public not to eat locally slaughtered meat.

    Translated by Max Avary. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Lao.

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  • Laos’ highest court is working to set up a special court in the notorious Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone to directly clamp down on an area that has attracted scam-related businesses and human trafficking, a government official told Radio Free Asia.

    Lao state media reported last week on the planned special court. A government official who works in the zone said the idea was first proposed several months ago.

    “There is now an agreement to open the People Court’s office in the zone,” he said on condition of anonymity for security reasons. 

    An office site and a place where court officials would live has already been selected, he said. Relevant officials in nearby Bokeo province have agreed to coordinate in forming the new court. 

    The Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, or SEZ, was established in 2007 in the northern province of Bokeo on a 3,000-hectare (7,400-acre) concession along the Mekong River where Laos, Myanmar and Thailand meet. 

    It’s become a gambling and tourism hub catering to Chinese citizens where investors – exempt from most national-level economic regulations – have built hotels, restaurants, casinos, a hospital, markets and factories.

    But it has also earned a reputation as a haven for criminal activities, including prostitution and drug trafficking.

    In August, a report from the International Crisis Group called for a “coordinated regional approach” – including through law enforcement – to combat the outsized impact illicit businesses have in the Golden Triangle SEZ and across the river at another special economic zone in Myanmar’s Shan state.

    Lao authorities currently do not have the right to enter special economic zones to conduct investigations.

    In June, however, the Golden Triangle SEZ management board handed oversight of a detention and rehabilitation center located inside the zone to Bokeo provincial police. And in January, officials from the Office of People’s Supreme Prosecutor visited the zone to discuss logistics for establishing a prosecutor’s office.

    ‘Money is god there’

    Laos’ judicial system includes a People’s Supreme Court that is located in Vientiane as well as local People’s Courts and Military Courts throughout the country. The special court would be directly overseen by the People’s Supreme Court.

    A former Lao government official told RFA that the special court could speed up criminal cases, which would help authorities tackle the zone’s large volume of crime.

    “This zone has almost become its own country already,” he said. “There are too many people who break the law.”

    But a resident of Bokeo province said a better approach would be to strengthen the current system of transferring criminal cases to the local People’s Court in Bokeo province.

    A lawyer in Vientiane said that court officials located inside the zone would be even more unlikely to resist bribes from wealthy Chinese business people who dominate the zone.

    “Everything will be difficult,” he told RFA. “In Laos, officials are afraid of rich people. If the rich people committed crimes in the zone, who would sue them in this court? It seems impossible to do so.”

    Another Lao resident of Bokeo province agreed with this sentiment. 

    “I have seen that when something bad happens in the zone, law enforcement’s response is weak,” he said. “These days, money is god there.”

    RFA contacted the People’s Supreme Court in Vientiane for comment on the planned special court, but a relevant official said he wasn’t able to comment.

    Translated by Phouvong. Edited by Matt Reed.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Lao.

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  • Ethnic Hmong villagers in remote areas of northern Laos are continuing to grow opium poppies despite government eradication efforts, due to long-held beliefs about the crop’s medicinal properties, according to officials and residents.

    In recent weeks, Lao authorities announced that they had destroyed 2,590 square meters (two-thirds of an acre) of Hmong-grown opium poppy fields in Luang Namtha province, which lies along the border with China and Myanmar, and another 11,000 square meters (2.7 acres) in Xieng Khouang province, on the Vietnamese border.

    However, they acknowledged that there are many poppy fields that are too remote to access in other areas of Xieng Khouang, as well as in Phongsaly province, which borders China and Vietnam.

    In its World Drug Report 2023, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, or UNODC, said it had documented 5,700 hectares (14,100 acres) of opium poppy cultivation in Laos, mostly in the country’s seven northern provinces of Phongsaly, Hua Phane, Luang Prabang, Oudomsay, Bokeo, Xieng Khouang, and Luang Namtha. Opium can be used to make heroin.

    An official from the National Defense Unit in Luang Namtha who, like others interviewed for this report, spoke on condition of anonymity due to security concerns, told RFA Lao that the cultivation and consumption of opium remains common among the Hmong in rural northern Laos, and is “difficult to control.”

    “There is a lot growing for local consumption and even though the region has set up rehab centers for people, there aren’t enough,” he said. “There are also still a lot of people who use opium as a medical treatment when they are sick.”

    The official said that the Hmong communities that continue to grow opium poppies and smoke opium are extremely remote, preventing authorities from accessing them or regularly patrolling the areas.

    “The areas where they live are far from other communities; 30-40 kilometers (19-25 miles) off the main roads, and only motorbikes can navigate the paths, so it’s hard to carry out inspections” he said. “It’s mostly ethnic villagers living there.”

    Use in treating sickness

    An official from the Natural Resources and Environment Unit in Xieng Khouang said that part of the reason ethnic communities still grow opium poppies and smoke opium in the province is due to their belief that it can help cure them when they are ill.

    Opium has a long history of medical use in relieving pain, inducing sleep, and treating bowel conditions.

    ENG_LAO_OpiumFields_02092024.2.jpg
    A Hmong tribesman takes a puff of opium at his village in Houaphan province, northern Laos, June 27, 2018. (Aidan Jones/AFP)

    The official said ethnic communities in Xieng Khouang mostly grow opium for personal consumption, and not in large quantities.

    While the overall amount that is grown can vary, he said, “the Hmong grow opium for use, not for sale.”

    A villager from Hua Phane told RFA that cultivation of opium poppies had decreased significantly in the province in recent years due to government and NGO campaigns educating residents about the dangers of opium.

    But he said that while the use of opium is down in Hua Phane, “that doesn’t mean it has ended.”

    “Some [ethnic] groups … grow it in remote areas, far away from the cities,” he said. “They grow it to use as medicine for their families.”

    Laos was the third-largest illicit opium poppy producing country in the world until 1998, but the UNODC says eradication efforts by the government and international partners “have reduced cultivation to marginal levels.”

    Nonetheless, the agency said, the northern part of Laos remains known as one of two opium producing countries in Southeast Asia, with the main driver of cultivation in the region being “primarily related to poverty.”

    Translated by Sidney Khotpanya. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Matt Reed.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Lao.

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  • A 20% year-over-year increase of agricultural exports from Laos in 2023 was largely on the back of Chinese plantations, according to trade officials, meaning that the country will reap few of the profits.

    Members of the business community told RFA Lao that the government needs to review its approach to foreign investment while improving its agricultural output to avoid a deepening trade deficit and improve the living standards of farmers in Laos.

    The Lao Ministry of Industry and Trade recently reported that last year Laos exported 9.5 million tons of agricultural products worth US$1.4 billion – an increase of just over 20% from 2022.

    However, the ministry acknowledged that most of the exported goods were produced by Chinese investors who leased land and grew vegetables and fruit in Laos to sell to China.

    Produce exports from Laos are largely cassava, potatoes, coffee, bananas and sugar. The country exports most of its products to China, Vietnam and Thailand, respectively.

    Chinese nationals run 933 projects in the agricultural sector in Laos, and their investments in the country are on the rise. Most of the projects adhere to what the Lao government refers to as the “2+3 System,” in which Laos provides land and labor, while foreign investors supply capital, expertise and a market for goods.

    Laborers at a Chinese-invested banana plantation in the Sing district of Luang Namtha province in northern Laos, in May 2019. (RFA)
    Laborers at a Chinese-invested banana plantation in the Sing district of Luang Namtha province in northern Laos, in May 2019. (RFA)

    An official with the Ministry of Industry and Trade confirmed to RFA that most agricultural products in Laos – including cattle, vegetables and fruit – are produced by Chinese nationals for export to China, rather than by Lao farmers.

    “China won’t allow goods produced by Lao farmers to enter China,” said the official who, like other sources interviewed for this report, spoke on condition of anonymity due to security concerns. “They only accept goods produced by Chinese factories and investors that meet their quality standards.”

    The Lao government will only receive a small portion of the US$1.4 billion in exports last year through taxes, tariffs, land concession fees and transportation fees, he added.

    Real value of foreign investment?

    A Lao businessman in Luang Prabang province said the government and the people of Laos “will only get 10% of [the export value] because most goods were produced by the Chinese.”

    He questioned whether the Lao government – and by extension, the people – gains more than it loses from foreign investment.

    “The government must be more competitive by improving the quality and increasing the quantity [of agricultural products]; if not, Laos can expect to face a large trade deficit every year,” the businessman said. “To do that, the country must increase its knowledge, budget and access to modern technology.”

    A laborer at a Chinese-invested banana plantation in the Sing district of Luang Namtha province in northern Laos, in May 2019. (RFA)
    A laborer at a Chinese-invested banana plantation in the Sing district of Luang Namtha province in northern Laos, in May 2019. (RFA)

    The Lao Ministry of Industry and Trade reported that in 2023, Laos imported US$6 billion worth of products and exported $5.3 billion, resulting in a trade deficit of US$700 million.

    Laos can export 33 agricultural products to China – most of them fruits, vegetables and cattle – 15 products to Vietnam and 15 products to Thailand. China is the main market for Lao exports and the market is growing annually.

    An official with the Asian Development Bank, or ADB, told RFA that in order to grow its exports, Laos must produce more of its own goods and improve their quality.

    “China has opened up its market for Lao products – particularly bananas, cassava, corn and fruit,” the ADB official said. “Laos exported about 300 million tons of bananas last year. These export can boost the Lao economy.”

    Translated by Max Avary. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Lao.

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  • Laos is again running out of gasoline, an indication that the country is still too dependent on its neighbors for fuel supplies and has failed to build adequate reserves following severe nationwide shortages in 2022. 

    Specifically, diesel fuel is hard to come by these days, as station after station has put up makeshift signs saying they are all sold out, urging lines of hundreds of vehicles to turn back and refuel elsewhere.

    Diesel, as opposed to regular gas, is important for shipping and commerce and necessary to keep supply lines open.

    The Lao government raised the official price of fuel four times in January alone, even though gas prices have been falling in the rest of the world.

    “I waited at the gas station for half an hour for diesel,” a motorist in the capital Vientiane told RFA Lao on condition of anonymity for security reasons. “A few hours later the station was completely out.”

    He was only allowed to purchase 200,000 kip (US$9.66) worth of diesel at each station and had to drive to several stations to fill up the tank.

    The motorist compared the situation to 2022, when gas shortages were but one indication of the country’s severely ailing economy at the time. 

    He was only allowed to purchase 200,000 kip (US$9.66) worth of diesel at each station and had to drive to several stations to fill up the tank.

    The current price of diesel in Vientiane is 20,780 kip per liter ($3.76 per U.S. liquid gallon), up 600 kip (three cents) from last week. 

    A truck driver in the southern province of Savannakhet ran into a similar issue while trying to refuel there, saying he was turned away at several stations before finally getting a chance to refuel.

    “I put more than four-million-kip (US$200) worth of diesel into my truck,” he said. “I’m afraid that the shortage will soon get worse.”

    A gas station attendant in Vientiane told RFA that most stations do have regular gas to sell, but are out of diesel.

    “I just asked my boss, who said we don’t have any diesel right now and we have no idea when we’ll have more,” he said.

    An attendant in Savannakhet said they were running out at the station he works at.

    “We have only about 1,000 liters (about 266 gallons) of diesel left, so since yesterday, we aren’t selling diesel to large vehicles like tractor trailers, only to small cars.”

    An employee of a fuel import company in Vientiane said that to ease the shortage it distributed 4,000 liters of diesel to each gas station in the capital on Wednesday morning.

    But a gas station attendant said that the 4,000 liters would be sold in only two hours.

    We’re working on it

    The government has been frantically trying to fix the problem, an official from the Lao Ministry of Industry and Trade told RFA.

    “All relevant departments of the government are trying to solve the shortage,” he said. “They’ve already issued a couple of announcements this morning.” 

    A statement from the Lao Fuel and Gas Association on Tuesday said the reason behind the shortage was that key oil refineries in neighboring countries like Thailand and Vietnam have suspended production to upgrade their production lines, and that they should resume production by the end of the month.

    The Interior Trade Department, the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Lao Fuel and Gas Association have, meanwhile, been in talks with fuel importers and distributors to try to find solutions.

    On Wednesday morning, the Interior Trade Department said in a statement that Laos imports 140 million liters (37 million gallons) of fuel per month, 80% of which is diesel. In January alone, Laos imported 106 million liters (28 million gallons), not enough for the rest of the month – especially because demand is expected to increase as the shortage is prolonged.

    Price spike

    The prices keep going up because the kip is again depreciating against the U.S. dollar, an official from the Ministry of Industry and Trade told RFA.

    “We buy gasoline in U.S. dollars from other countries and sell it in kip,” he said. “When we want to buy more gas, we have to exchange the kip for U.S. dollars. To keep up with the depreciation we have to raise prices.”

    The kip had been only slightly declining against the U.S. dollar until late 2021, when it fell off a cliff. According to xe.com, in September 2021 $1 was worth about 9500 kip. By the end of 2022 it had passed the 17,000 mark. The kip stabilized in the beginning of 2023, but continued its decline in April and passed the 20,000 mark in September, before stabilizing again at around 20,500 in the last few months of the year.

    The nationwide gas shortage is partly due to a shortage in foreign currency, the English-language Vientiane Times, a mouthpiece for the Lao government, reported Wednesday.

    The report also mentioned the temporary closure of an oil refinery in Thailand, saying that the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and the Lao Fuel and Gas Association were trying to buy diesel fuel from other sources to fill the gap.

    Translated by Max Avary. Edited by Eugene Whong.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Lao.

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  • Dissidents face an uncertain future in Taiwan and South Korea after fleeing

    When Li Cheng En pushed his standup paddleboard off the Xiamen beach on China’s Fujian coastline, a mother and son stood nearby, watching him. It was dark, and he moved quickly, but felt sure he’d be caught. Li had spent the day scouting for a secluded beach from which he could launch his bold plan to flee China. But everywhere he went there were fences or security guards and cameras.

    “At around 7.30pm, when I decided to go, I thought that there was no more choice for me,” he says. He waited for the security guard shift change. “I rushed into the water and thought that if they would catch me, they would catch me.”

    Continue reading…

    This post was originally published on Human rights | The Guardian.

  • For U.S. mass media, Henry Kissinger’s quip that “power is the ultimate aphrodisiac” rang true. Influential reporters and pundits often expressed their love for him. The media establishment kept swooning over one of the worst war criminals in modern history. After news of his death broke on Wednesday night, prominent coverage echoed the kind that had followed him ever since his years with…

    Source

    This post was originally published on Latest – Truthout.

  • Revenue from tourism, foreign investment and exports will help Laos’ struggling economy grow by 4% in 2024, the International Monetary Fund said in a forecast.

    But that won’t be enough to counter the continuing high inflation rates – more than 25% – that have put many Laotians on the edge of poverty, several Laotians told Radio Free Asia.

    “People in rural areas are still looking for food from forested areas,” a Saravane province resident said. “They don’t have the money to buy food in the market. They only buy the necessities.”

    If the government can’t get inflation under control, no one will benefit from economic growth, a Xieng Khouang province resident said.

    “People are getting poorer by the day,” he said. “They live paycheck to paycheck. Most products and merchandise sold in the markets are imported.”

    The Asian Development Bank also predicted this month that the Lao economy would expand by 4% next year. It said last month that the country would grow by 3.7 percent in 2023.

    But an ADB official told RFA that the rate of inflation would remain at 28% year over year – the same as it was in 2023.

    Price controls, wage increases

    Inflation has soared to as much as 40% in recent years following a depreciation in the Lao currency and declines in foreign investment.

    Earlier this year, Lao authorities imposed price controls on basic necessities such as pork, rice and natural gas. The government has also raised the minimum wage several times since 2022 to address the cost of living crisis.

    Last week, Lao Prime Minister Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone acknowledged at a conference in Vientiane that the economy has been sluggish due to high debt levels, inflation, high gasoline prices and several other factors. 

    But economic growth in Laos will strengthen as tourism, exports and service industries recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, and as investment from neighboring Thailand, China and Vietnam resumes, according to the ADB official.

    The IMF forecast was released on Oct. 18, but an updated prediction should be available next month, once officials look at more export and tourism data.

    “One issue is that the currency is still fluctuating,” an IMF representative told RFA on Friday. “That needs to be fixed quickly if they want the macroeconomy to stabilize.”

    The government must also entice more foreign investment, motivate locals to increase their export-oriented production and lower the amount of import if it wants more consistent growth, he said.

    Translated by Sidney Khotpanya. Edited by Matt Reed.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • At least 41 volunteer teachers in northeastern Laos have resigned, leaving many schools short-staffed as the former teachers seek paying jobs amid high inflation and a weak economy.

    There are more than 7,600 volunteer teachers across the country, but due to budgetary constraints the Lao government can only hire less than 1,000 each fiscal year, according to the Ministry of Education and Sport.

    In Laos’ centrally-planned economy, workers in schools and hospitals are generally government employees, and those who want jobs in their chosen fields are dependent on government quotas, as well as passing an examination. 

    Many young people therefore work as volunteers in classrooms and clinics until there is an opening for salaried staff.

    Xiengkhouang province, in the northeast, has 124 volunteer teachers compared to 165 volunteer teachers last year, an official at the province’s Department of Education and Sport told Radio Free Asia on Monday.

    “After the exam results were posted [in April and May], many of them decided to resign,” the official said. “This will affect the quality of education. Some teachers will have to teach in classes where students in different grades study together. Some will have to teach for more hours.”

    ‘Living in a hard time’

    One volunteer teacher who resigned this year told RFA she taught at a school in the province’s Kham district for nine years but finally gave up hope that she would be added to the government payroll.

    “My patience reached its limit,” she said. “I miss my students, but I cannot wait any further. I got married and have a child to take care of, and my husband doesn’t want me to teach anymore.”

    The long commute to the school, staying in a teacher’s dormitory on weekdays and the realization that she would probably have to wait several more years before she would be hired all contributed to her decision, she said.

    Across the country, administrators are merging schools and closing others because of a teacher shortage, which is largely driven by the government’s lack of funds.

    “Volunteer teachers are the true devotees, as they use their own resources and time to teach students,” said the father of a student in Xiengkhouang’s Paek district. 

    But the poor economy has brought hardship to everyone – even those civil servants who make a salary – so it’s understandable that volunteer teachers would want to look elsewhere for work, he said.

    “Everything now is three times as expensive,” he said.

    The mother of a volunteer teacher who recently resigned from a school in Xiengkhouang’s Phoukout district said her daughter has since left Laos for a job in South Korea, where several thousand Laoatians work in factories and on farms.

    “Our family is living in a hard time,” she said. “My daughter is now a legal migrant worker in South Korea and she is the only income earner for the family.”

    The provincial official told RFA that, even with a tight budget, administrators are looking for ways to pay the remaining volunteer teachers.

    “We had a meeting with relevant offices, and there is now a process to draft a policy for paying volunteer teachers,” he said.

    Translated by Phouvong. Edited by Matt Reed.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Authorities in Laos told American and United Nations diplomats that detained Chinese rights attorney Lu Siwei was still in the country, even after he was sent back to face detention in China, his wife told Radio Free Asia in a recent interview.

    Lu, who is now being held in the Xindu Detention Center in the southwestern Chinese province of Sichuan, was repatriated to China in early September after being arrested in Laos en route to join his family in the United States.

    His detention in Laos and subsequent repatriation is another example of transnational “long-arm” law enforcement by Beijing, rights activists and commentators have warned.

    Xindu Detention Center officials contacted his family on Oct. 4 informing them that he was being held there and requesting they send clothes, medication and money for him, but gave no details of his repatriation, nor of any criminal charges against him, his U.S.-based wife Zhang Chunxiao said.

    Lu suffers from a severe skin condition and has been without his regular medication for two months now, she said.

    Lu’s lawyer confirmed on Sept. 14 that his client had left Laos for China several days earlier. Yet the authorities in Laos were still claiming that he was still in the country, Zhang said.

    ENG_CHN_LuSiweiDetained_10052023.2.jpg
    Zhang Chunxiao, shown with her husband, Lu Siwei, says her husband suffers from a severe dermatological condition and has been without his regular medication for two months. They are seen in this undated photo. Credit: Provided by Zhang Chunxiao

    “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Laos kept telling the United Nations and American diplomats that Siwei was still in Laos,” Zhang said. “What I really don’t understand is how the Laos government would … be willing to deceive everyone.”

    “[My husband] had already been sent back, and they were still saying that he was still in Laos. Why would they do that?”

    The exact date of Lu’s repatriation on a bus along with dozens of other wanted Chinese nationals remains unclear.

    Laos ‘in debt’ to China

    According to an official notification dated Sept. 11 issued by the Chinese Embassy in Laos to the Lao Ministry of Public Security, Lu was “approved for criminal detention” by police in the southwestern Chinese province of Sichuan on Sept. 3, on suspicion of “illegally crossing a border.”

    The document, a copy of which was circulating on social media at the time, and which has now been proven genuine, informed the Lao authorities that the Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China “requires that the suspect Lu Siwei be transferred to China, to be brought to justice as soon as possible.”

    Taiwanese democracy activist Lee Ming-cheh, who has served jail time in China for his activism, said the Lao authorities are clearly willing to do as Beijing tells them.

    “Laos is in a great deal of debt to China under the Belt and Road [infrastructure] initiative,” Lee said. “Laos’ political system is also a dictatorship like China’s, so it’s pretty normal that Laos would send Lu Siwei back there.”

    It is unclear whether Lu will be allowed visitors, but could be denied visits from his family or lawyers if he is charged with a crime linked to “national security,” like subversion, Lee said.

    ENG_CHN_LuSiweiDetained_10052023.3.jpg
    One of the two activists [left] traveling with Chinese rights lawyer Lu Siwei [right] argues with police who were in the process of detaining Lu, near the Thanaleng dry port, 13 kilometers (8 miles), south of Vientiane, on July 28, 2023. Credit: Anonymous source via AP

    Zeng Jianyuan, chairman of the overseas-based New School for Democracy, agreed.

    “Today just proves that Laos has succumbed to Chinese power,” Zeng said. “It’s a betrayal of … the values respected in their society, which is Buddhist.”

    He said it was ironic that the news about Lu’s fate is only emerging around the Oct. 1 anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China under late supreme leader Mao Zedong.

    “They have arrested someone who really took practical action to achieve the revolutionary ideals of the Chinese Communist Party,” Zeng said. 

    “Repatriating Lu Siwei was an act of betrayal, and it’s very sad.”

    Translated by Luisetta Mudie. Edited by Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Hwang Chun-mei for RFA Mandarin.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Sixty-eight organisations sign letter amid fears Lu Siwei could be deported at request of Chinese authorities

    Sixty-eight human rights groups have signed an open letter calling on the Laos government to release Lu Siwei, a Chinese former human rights lawyer detained by Laotian police near Vientiane last week.

    Lu was seized by police on Friday as he attempted to board a train from Laos to Thailand, where he planned to catch a flight to the US to join his wife and daughter. Nearly one week later, he appears to still be held in Laotian immigration detention, despite reportedly being told that he would be deported to China.

    Continue reading…

    This post was originally published on Human rights | The Guardian.

  • Activists and family members fear Lu Siwei will be deported back to China, where he could be sent to prison

    A Chinese rights lawyer stripped of his licence for taking on sensitive cases has been arrested in Laos, and activists and family members are worried he will be deported back to China, where he could be jailed.

    Lu Siwei was seized by Laotian police on Friday morning while boarding a train for Thailand. He was on his way to Bangkok to catch a flight to the US to join his wife and daughter.

    Continue reading…

    This post was originally published on Human rights | The Guardian.

  • A severe lack of teachers in Laos is forcing school districts to use volunteer staff, merge some schools and close others, a trend that lawmakers warn could cause future generations to lose access to education.

    During the Lao National Assembly’s 5th ordinary session, from June 26 to July 18, lawmakers spent a lot of time discussing the teacher shortage.

    Representing the southern province of  Savannakhet, Xayxomseun Phothisan urged the assembly to hire more state employees and approve budgets to pay teacher salaries so that each school would have the adequate number of faculty needed to function.

    “If the government does not have any solution to this urgent problem,  more schools in many provinces will be closed and students will lose access to education,” she said.

    ENG_LAO_TeacherShortage_07192023.2.jpg
    Students have lunch, which came from international donors, at a rural school in Savannakhet province, Laos, March 2023. Credit: RFA

    This year, the government is allowing recruitment of 285 new teachers nationwide, down from the 340 it hired last year. The downward trend in teacher hiring began in 2017, when the state employee quotas were reduced each year due to limited budget.

    School closures

    Savannakhet province has only 223 teachers on its payroll for the entire province. More than 430,000 people in Savannakhet are aged 19 or younger, though not everyone in that demographic goes to school. 

    Though the province ranks first in the nation for school attendance between the ages 6-11, only 68.7% of Savannakhet children between the ages of 6-8 are attending school. For ages 9-11, the percentage rises to 85.2%.

    There are also 21 schools in the province that are staffed by unpaid volunteers, many of whom quit when they learned, sometimes after eight years of working, that they would not be able to transition into paid roles.

    Because of the teacher shortage, the province is expected to close 25 schools.

    The Lao government has approved the province hiring 47 new teachers, but spread over 15 educational districts, it means only three new teachers per district, nowhere near enough to serve the student population.

    Most of the schools experiencing teacher shortages were primary schools in rural areas, because teachers have little desire to work there, representatives of Savannakhet province’s Department of Education and Sport told RFA’s Lao Service. 

    The capital Vientiane also faces a teacher shortage, with 900 on payroll – far short of what it needs. There are around 3 million youth aged 19 or younger in Vientiane, yet the central government will allow hiring only 16 new teachers. The capital is expected to close seven schools.

    “The lack of teachers is widespread,” an official from Vientiane’s Department of Education and Sport told RFA. “We need over 900 more teachers in order to meet our plan. …The only thing we can do is to inform students to go to schools in other villages and dissolve the small schools, where there are no teachers.”

    The official said that Vientiane had already merged seven schools since 2021 including three last year as the teacher supply dwindles. 

    Aging teachers

    In Luang Prabang province’s XiengNgeun district, volunteer teachers are quitting in large numbers, an education official said.

    ENG_LAO_TeacherShortage_07192023.3.jpg
    Students have lunch, which came from international donors, at a rural school in Savannakhet province, Laos, March 2023. Credit: RFA

    “We need about 100 more teachers for primary and secondary schools,” the official said. “The quality of our education in the district, according to the national indicators, may not meet the plan.”  

    He said that many of the paid teachers are old and close to retirement, and some of them face health problems. However, development of younger teachers to replace them is lagging. 

    Though the district has not seen a school closure yet, when the old teachers retire the problem will get worse, he said.

    “The quota from the central government to the province to recruit new state employees has been reduced,” the district official said. “We only received permission to hire 10 new teachers this year. … For primary schools in the city areas, we have a solution by assigning one teacher to teach in 2 or 3 schools. But in the rural areas, that kind of thing is very hard to do.”

    Translated by Phouvong. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • More than 500 prison inmates have been sentenced to death in Laos – some more than a decade ago – but the country’s dysfunctional legal system and unclear prison procedures have left the inmates languishing for years, the country’s minister of public security said.

    Many of the inmates were convicted on drug charges and have had their sentences reduced to life in prison, Lt. Gen. Vilay Lakhamfong, head of the Ministry of Public Security and deputy prime minister, told lawmakers at a National Assembly session on Thursday. 

    Authorities have even released some inmates who had originally been sentenced to death, which hasn’t helped Laos make any headway on combating illicit drug production, trafficking, and related criminal activity, he said. 

    “Lao laws do not mandate where and how to execute them, by firing squad or by lethal injection,” Lakhamfong told lawmakers. 

    International organizations oppose the two execution methods, he said, adding that about 90% of Laos’ death-row sentences are drug-related.

    “They don’t want us to do that; therefore, we have to keep them in jail and give them life sentences,” Lakhamfong said. 

    Laos has not officially abolished the death penalty, though the last known execution, done by shooting, occurred in 1989, according to the World Coalition Against the Death Penalty. In the past, authorities never disclosed the number of prisoners put to death, the crimes they had committed, or the places of execution.

    Now government and legal bodies involved in drafting laws are updating death-sentence procedures and are expected to complete their work by year end, Lakhamfong said.  

    Largely poor landlocked Laos is part of the Golden Triangle, an area that converges with Myanmar and Thailand at the confluence of the Mekong and Ruak rivers, and is a haven for crimes, including the drug trade, by organized criminal networks.

    Though Lao authorities have committed to combating drug trafficking, it remains rife in the Golden Triangle. In February, authorities there seized 500 kilograms of crystal meth in one of the largest hauls of the narcotic in the notorious zone. 

    Setting a bad example

    Meanwhile, members of the general public have urged authorities to execute inmates on death row so that people have faith in the country’s legal system.

    One Laotian told Radio Free Asia that if authorities continue to pardon prisoners with death sentences, they will likely return to drug trafficking or the drug trade once they are out of jail.

    “They should execute them, not just say it but do it, in the middle of a field and let all the other [prisoners] see it,” he said.

    Another Lao citizen said if the inmates are let out of prison, it will set a bad example for others involved in the drug trade because they won’t fear getting caught and sent to jail.

    “Inmates with death sentences should be executed right away if a court verdict orders an execution, and the law should be decisive and trustworthy,” he said. “If they do not execute them, then those who are in drug businesses right now will not fear the law, and that will undermine the country’s judicial system.”

    A Lao legal expert, who declined to be named so he could speak freely, said authorities should carry out death sentences based on legal mandates, rather than keeping inmates in jail for 10-20 years, reducing their sentences to life in prison, and later releasing them.

    “It is not good for society if inmates often ask for a pardon from a death sentence to get life in prison, but after 10 to 20 years are released,” he said.

    Translated by Sidney Khotpanya for RFA Lao. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Matt Reed.

    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Lao.

  • Laos has begun importing gasoline from China instead of purchasing it from neighboring Thailand amid an ongoing economic crisis, including surging inflation that has prompted one lawmaker to call for an increase in salaries for domestic workers and state employees.

    The first shipments of gasoline arrived in Laos last week following the signing of a memorandum of understanding in late May by the Vientiane Petroleum State Enterprise, managed by the Lao Ministry of National Security, SINOPEC Hong Kong and SINOLAO. 

    Under the deal, Laos will import fuel from China for wholesale and retail distribution, according to the Laotian Times.

    SINOPEC Hong Kong delivered the initial fuel consignments to the two Lao entities at the Boten international border crossing in Luang Namtha province on June 27. 

    Gasoline prices in Laos have increased four times this year amid a serious economic slump characterized by high inflation, worsening public finances and the devaluation of the Lao currency, the kip.

    But some consumers said they believe that the price of petrol will drop slightly or remain the same because the Chinese entered the deal to make a profit. 

    “It’s businesses — not policy, not aid,” said a Lao entrepreneur who imports fuel, asking not to be identified to speak freely. “If the government imports more, it will reduce gas prices in Laos, and the price at the pumps will go down.”

    The Lao government has turned to China for gasoline because it doesn’t have the foreign currency to buy it from Thailand, which accepts payments only in Thai baht or U.S. dollars, said a Lao intellectual who is familiar with the situation. 

    China, however, accepts Lao kip or Chinese yuan as payment, or allows the Lao government to take out a loan with a high interest rate to pay for gasoline imports, ensnaring the country in a debt trap, he said.

    Landlocked Lao does not have its own gasoline production company, but rather a business in Xiengkhouang province that refines imported crude oil from overseas.

    Call to raise salaries

    As rising prices, including that of gasoline, hit Laotians hard in their wallets, some officials are trying to mitigate the financial pain.

    Also on June 27, Oudom Vongkaysone, a lawmaker from Borikhamxay province, urged the government to increase the salaries of both ordinary Lao workers and state employees.

    He urged the government to increase the monthly minimum wage to 1.8 million-2 million kip (US$94-104).

    During a meeting of the National Assembly, Vongkaysone said that if the government could not increase salaries, it should find other ways to lessen their financial hardship, such as issuing more bonuses, paying overtime or increasing pension amounts. 

    Otherwise more state employees will quit their jobs and more workers will head to neighboring countries for better-paying jobs, he said.

    He also called on the Lao government to rein in inflation and urged citizens to use the kip in financial transactions instead of foreign currency.

    A Lao garment factory worker told Radio Free Asia that she cannot live on her 1.3 million kip monthly salary, and wants to see her pay raised to 2 million-3 million kip so she and her family can survive the country’s high inflation.

    An official from the Lao Federation of Trade Unions who requested anonymity so as to speak freely told RFA that a decision to raise the minimum wage would take a long time to implement if adopted.

    “The government has to conduct a survey of the price of goods in the market first to find out if it is necessary or not to raise the minimum wage,” he said.

    Businesses opposed

    Some Laotians have headed to Thailand and South Korea for jobs, where wages are higher than at home.

    “The rate of exchange is high, 1 million Lao kip can’t buy much, and foods and essential things are more expensive than before,” said one Laotian. “Workers have gone to work in Thailand because the pay rate is higher over there.”

    But entrepreneurs who own businesses in Laos are against raising the minimum wage, saying the move would threaten their survival. They would not be able to pay their workers 1.8 million-2 million kip per month if the lawmaker’s proposal is adopted, some of them said.

    “Entrepreneurs don’t want to pay high salaries,” said one business owner.

    A factory owner said his enterprise could not afford to pay higher salaries of about 1.6 million-1.8 million kip, but no more.

    “It would be too much to pay,” he told RFA.

    A garment factory owner in the capital Vientiane said she could not immediately raise salaries to 1.8 million kip or more because of high production costs and the kip’s devaluation, and that any future increases should be incrementally implemented over several months.

    An official at the Ministry of Finance said the government’s ability to raise the monthly minimum wage depends on the state budget, and salaries cannot be increased if there is a deficit.

    “We want to raise the salaries of state employees between 1.8 million and 2.5 million kip per month, but it depends on the state budget,” he said.

    Translated by Sidney Khotpanya for RFA Lao. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The effort to fight widespread government corruption in Laos – for years a declared goal of the country’s top leaders – got a boost from the United Nations this week.

    At a training conducted by the U.N.’s Office on Drugs and Crime, Vientiane municipal workers learned how to recognize money laundering, audit the finances of state enterprises and inspect government concession projects.

    Berlin-based Transparency International’s 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Laos 126 of 180 countries it evaluated in fighting corruption.

    “Cooperation included officials from the state inspector general’s office and others from related outside sectors,” an official from the Office of Inspector General told Radio Free Asia. “This time we did the training in Vientiane. Later, we’ll have one for government officials in Savannakhet province.”

    The government has promised in the past to address corrupt practices that have put off potential foreign investors from pumping money into much-needed infrastructure and development.

    However, despite the enactment of an anti-corruption law that criminalizes the abuse of power, public sector fraud, embezzlement and bribery, Laos’ judiciary is weak and inefficient, and officials are rarely prosecuted.

    One official who said he worked as an inspector in Vientiane for a decade told RFA last year that he and his colleagues review the finances of government offices and departments but not those of individual officials who are powerful members of the party and the government.

    “Nobody would dare inspect them,” he said.

    ‘They do it in a group’

    It could be very difficult to solve Laos’ corruption problem, even with stricter laws, a Laotian who asked to remain anonymous said to RFA this week. So far, no government officials have been sent to prison for corruption, he said.

    “Laws are strict but enforcement is weak, and that’s not strong enough to solve the problem,” he said.

    Over the last two or three years, some officials have been fired or moved to other positions – but that’s been the extent of the government crackdown, a former state employee told RFA. 

    “There are many state employees who are corrupt,” he said. “Police, tax collectors, even employees of mineral companies. They do it in a group, with the involvement of high-ranking officials.”

    A report last year from the country’s State Inspection Authority said the Lao government had lost US$767 million to corruption since 2016, with government development and investment projects – such as road and bridge construction – the leading source of the widespread graft.

    At the time, nearly 3,700 members of the communist Lao People’s Revolutionary Party had been disciplined, with 2,019 expelled and 154 people charged, the report said.

    Another report from the Asian Development Bank found that almost 70 percent of businesses that applied for registrations, licenses and permits in Laos paid bribes to government officials to get approval.

    Translated by Sidney Khotpanya. Edited by Matt Reed.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Lao.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Laos’ Ministry of Home Affairs has launched a hotline that citizens can call for government assistance, but many are afraid to use it because callers must reveal personal information.

    After dialing 1526 to report an issue, callers must also provide their names, phone numbers and addresses so that police or officials can contact them if they require more information.

    “If they call asking authorities to solve a particular problem, the police can call them back easily after the issue is investigated and solved,” a related government official, who like all sources in this report requested anonymity for security reasons, told RFA’s Lao Service. 

    The official said since the hotline was launched on June 1, many have called asking for the ministry to solve problems and others have called to comment on the work of the ministry, but she was not at liberty to discuss how many people have called or what any of their requests were.

    The Lao government has been using hotlines for public engagement since 2016. The country’s National Assembly also has an open hotline where people can raise issues for it to address.

    But several Lao residents said they were reluctant to use the new hotline because they doubt the ministry can do anything to solve the problem, and they do not want to get in trouble for reporting problems.

    “If you ask for help from the government in a one-party country, and ask them too many times, it’s not good for you,” a resident said. “You have to reveal all your personal information so everybody is afraid to call.”

    Another resident said he was not interested in using them because hotlines in the past were ineffective in solving problems.

    A third villager said that usually nobody answers government hotlines so it is useless to call them.

    A Lao resident who identified as a Christian said that Christians have used hotlines once in a while to inform the ministry when they are harassed by local authorities. 

    Sometimes officials come to try to solve the problem but most of the time the complaints are ignored, the person said.

    “The good part of using the hotline is that we can inform the ministry of problems that we are concerned about and need them solved,” the Christian said. “However, many problems are still not solved … they always say they are still working on it”

    A Lao intellectual told RFA that most people do not trust government hotlines because they are afraid of retribution. For example, if they were to reveal government corruption, the responsible officials could use the power of their positions to punish them.

    Translated by Sidney Khotpanya. Edited by Eugene Whong.

    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Lao.


  • This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Radio Free Asia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Recently, a group of advocates, NGO workers and scholars working in the Mekong region gathered to discuss the far-reaching and compounding impacts of hydropower dams on regional environments and societies. Using the notion of rupture as a way to explore dramatic socio-ecological change, and its consequences, this gathering included a sobering discussion of current pressures faced by civil society in Mekong countries.

    Just as the Mekong river has been controlled and curtailed by dams, so have the voices of civil society actors who contest environmental and social injustices in the region. Such contestation is not just about dams, but also about land, resources, and rights.

    Illustration of the workshop discussion on civil society and rupture.

    Over the last five years, pressure on civil society actors has increased dramatically in the Mekong region. Advocates for social and environmental justice, and the citizens they speak for, now fear arrest, intimidation and violence, as authoritarian states seek to control dissenters and critics. Take, for example, the arrests of environmental advocates in Cambodia in 2021 and Vietnam in 2022, which have served as a stark warning to those who speak out.

    This rising sense of oppression goes hand in hand with new atmospheres of violence and despotic power globally—as seen in the record number of environmental defenders killed in 2021. Citizens across China and Southeast Asia are now contending with new forms of state coercion and violence. The case of Myanmar is most blatant, with the execution of four pro-democracy advocates in July 2022. Yet state power also advances through the deployment of laws to manage emerging public health and safety issues like COVID-19 and cyber-crime: conveniently, these laws enable oppressive states to silence dissent, as seen in Cambodia, Myanmar and the Philippines.

    In short, as environmental and social pressures intensify in the Mekong region, it appears that governments have become increasingly sensitive to contestation. This is especially true in the context of environmental struggles, which are now more than ever struggles over political space, freedom of expression, and social justice. In this context, we find that—like the Mekong river itself, whose waters cannot be entirely controlled—potentialities and possibilities for power to be exercised by ordinary people still remain, even as controls on civil society shift and tighten.

    Shrinking political space

    The space for civil society to operate may be understood in terms of people’s perceptions of what political actions and expressions are possible. These openings are uneven across issues, groups, time and space: some political expressions may be possible in capital cities with few repercussions, while the same activity in an Indigenous or ethnic minority community would be suppressed by governments. Likewise, critical moments for civil society can open and close, as seen recently in Vietnam in the context of parliamentary meetings or high-level negotiations over trade agreements: these are moments of high NGO influence and political tension. Importantly, the fact that political space has become more constricted in the Mekong region in recent years does not mean this will always and everywhere be the case. Advocates continue to find pathways to work within existing spaces, pressing against their boundaries.

    An increasingly important political space for civil society in the region is the legal domain. While the law can and should provide an avenue to pursue justice, it can also be used as a weapon by ruling authorities to target oppositional voices. The Vietnamese government’s use of “tax evasion” charges, for example, alongside new “financial compliance” rules for NGOs, illustrate how the law can be used instrumentally as a means of oppression. Here, critical voices are silenced using mundane domestic laws that render politics invisible and prevent international support from being channelled to advocates. The consequences for those who are targeted, and their families and communities, are devastating. As one participant at our workshop from Vietnam observed: “fighting these legal cases takes all of our time and passion”.

    Laws that are purported to formalise civil society space are a double-edged sword that can also be used by states as instruments of control. A clear example is Cambodia’s 2015 “Law on Associations and Non-Government Organisations” (LANGO), which has been used to suspend organisations that contest government-backed land grabbing and resource appropriation. This, in conjunction with other silencing instruments in Cambodia’s penal code like the 2020 “Incitement to Commit a Felony”, has had a chilling effect on civil society.

    In contrast, in Laos, where civil society has long been highly curtailed, the legal domain is now a key platform for NGOs and advocates to express their concerns. For example, openings have emerged for civil society to participate in dialogues with donors and the Lao National Assembly on “legal reform”. But such opportunities can also be a burden, as civil society’s limited capacity is distracted and absorbed into an endless legal-regulatory churn in Vientiane. Local NGOs observed that policy discussions in the capital have had little impact upon conditions faced by villagers in rural areas, where a UN Special Rapporteur observed a “near total lack of space for freedom of expression” after the arrests of villagers involved in land conflicts.

    Agency in a constrained world

    In contemplating these new constraints to civil society in the Mekong region, we must consider how agency now appears in different forms and places. We adopt the concept of agency here, as opposed to resistance, because it implies a wider repertoire for the oppressed. Broadly speaking, agency can be explored in terms of the practices, habits and ideas of actors that might transform existing institutions and social relations—or indeed reproduce them. Agency is distinct from resistance because it can be performed within dominant structures, without overtly challenging them—a notion that is akin to James Scott’s “weapons of the weak”. Viewed in this way, we observed three key domains of agency:

    First, we note the power of social media to gain visibility for key issues, even though this domain has become risky for those who dare to be outspoken. In Laos, for example, urban citizens and NGOs used social media to connect and organise emergency relief in the aftermath of the 2018 Xepian Xe Nam Noy dam collapse. This generated awareness of the far-reaching devastation caused by the incident, and helped to extend assistance to displaced villagers, even through NGO-government collaborations. Yet the limits for civil society were underscored in 2019 when a young woman from southern Laos, was arrested after she posted social media commentary critical of the government’s slow and inadequate response to flood-affected communities, among other matters.

    Similarly in Cambodia, social media and smartphones provide a vital means of connection for citizens who are affected by dams, as well as forest and land encroachments. Kuy Indigenous villagers in Prey Long, for example, have used communication technology to gather data and report on illegal logging, in a form of “geographic citizen science”. Five years ago, advocates in urban land disputes in Battambong also used social media to criticise the ruling elite and raise awareness of the rights of informal settlers. Yet government tolerance of such activities has declined, as signalled by the arrest of some young advocates working for the NGO Mother Nature in 2021, after their Facebook posts. Tellingly, Cambodia’s ruling party is allegedly in discussions with Chinese advisors over potential assistance to strengthen government control over its citizens’ use of social media.

    Second, we observe the potential of innovative and flexible networks, which are both formal and informal. As seen in Vietnam between 2013-2018, advocates for healthy rivers developed cross-sector relationships over time, in order to achieve their goals iteratively. This approach led to the government’s cancellation of the controversial Dong Nai dams in 2015, after challenges mounted by an influential network that included researchers, civil society, and sympathetic government officials. Local government officials can provide critical support in such cases, as they are often motivated by their own personal origins in or close social ties to communities impacted by environmental damage: a distinctive dynamic in the Vietnamese setting, where government power is more decentralised. Similar hybrid networks have also been crucial for defending rivers in Thailand.

    As political space contracts, we now see an increasing role for informal networks or coalitions, which adopt long-term and adaptive strategies. Being less visible means that these groups can be more nimble and flexible; they can avoid direct conflict; and they can even foster conversations with government officials or other powerful actors. This may involve the pursuit of narrowed or less radical conversations in the short term, as currently seen in Laos and Vietnam, where civil society organisations have settled for government engagements that involve neutral activities like service delivery, tree planting, or humanitarian relief. In such contexts, change can only be incremental. Yet, while tinkering around the edges of trouble, advocates can gradually build skills, trust, capacities, and room to manoeuvre.

    Third, and finally, we observe agency in the production of knowledge, especially when this is driven by local villagers and their agendas. In Thailand, for example, co-producing knowledge has become a way to “fight back” against oppression, and to gain recognition for local perspectives and experiences of environmental change. This has been made famous in the method of Tai Baan research which is now providing regional inspiration: Tai Baan is a highly collaborative knowledge-making strategy that was developed in 2000 with villagers in Pak Mun, Thailand, as a way to document and communicate their experiences of a hydropower dam. A key achievement of this “knowledge advocacy” was to ensure that government officials heard villagers’ voices.

    Participatory action research of this kind was also deployed around Cambodia’s Lower Sesan II dam which became operational in 2018. Oxfam, for example, trained women in water monitoring, which enabled them to lobby local authorities to address contaminated water in relocated villages. International NGOs also worked with local networks to support Indigenous communities in the dam-affected area to map and seek recognition of their traditional territories—a strategy that has strengthened local voices and identities, albeit not without challenges. Ultimately, this work helped to empower some Indigenous Bunong families to refuse forced relocation by the government, so that they could remain on their customary lands.

    Rupture and the Mekong’s New Environmental Politics

    It is now abundantly clear that “environmental issues are not just environmental issues in the Mekong region”, as one member of our group noted. To illustrate this, we have shared our observations of increased government controls on civil society in relation to hydropower dams, as well as in wider natural resource management and land contests in urban and rural areas.

    Our findings show how the environmental frame acts as a window into the production of political space in the Mekong region today—and the results are sobering. While authorities have long considered the words “activist” and “human rights” to be highly provocative, our observations show how the envelope of provocation has widened. Criticism is barely tolerated, and government intimidation of civil society is manifesting across various scales and circumstances: from the arrests of rural villagers involved in isolated land disputes, to the silencing of NGO workers engaged in efforts to regulate and bring transparency to international markets. This new environmental politics is, if nothing else, “complex, nonlinear and undetermined”.

    For local civil society advocates seeking social and environmental justice, it is now hard to think in terms of success or failure: they recognise that they are engaged in a long-term struggle. Windows of opportunity may emerge, but they are often narrow and fleeting. This means that many advocates and ordinary citizens are facing exhaustion, and emotions are running high.

    Tragically too, the urgency of environmental decline and dispossession in many settings does not allow for advocates to “play the long game” on civil society and human rights in the region: many citizens are now faced with an emotional, political and material-environmental squeeze. This resonates with Saidiya Hartman’s “politics in a lower frequency”, whereby operating in highly dominated and violent spaces calls for “local, multiple, and dispersed sites of resilience”.

    Ultimately, we find some hope in the Mekong region’s “low frequency politics”, in which unexpected coalitions or unusual collaborations show promise. We have now seen how knowledge advocacy and communications through social media can be mobilised for change. Yet caution is required: donors and international partners need to be aware of the new political contours of civil society in the region, especially the potential risks of doing “political work” for local citizens and collaborators.

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