Category: looms,

  • The clock is ticking on the Colorado River. The seven states that use its water are nearing a 2026 deadline to come up with new rules for sharing its shrinking supplies. After more than a year of deadlock, there are rumblings of a new plan, but it’s far from final.

    So what happens if the states can’t agree before that deadline?

    There’s no roadmap for exactly what would happen next, but policy experts and former officials can give us some ideas. It would likely be complicated, messy and involve big lawsuits.

    “I think people are looking for a concise answer here,” said Brenda Burman, former commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation. “But there isn’t a concise answer.”

    While the details of that hypothetical future are fuzzy, experts generally agree on one thing: the states should do everything they can to avoid missing that deadline and heading into uncharted territory.

    “It’s our job to make sure that we are setting the path for the next 20 or 30 years of stability,” said Burman, who now manages the Central Arizona Project. “And if we fail in that job, shame on us.”

    An aerial view of train tracks running through red rocks next to water
    Rail tracks, emerge above the surface of Lake Powell on November 2, 2022. They are were part of a system to cart away rock during the construction of Glen Canyon Dam in the 1950s and 60s, and were dry again thanks to rapidly-dropping levels in Lake Powell. Alex Hager / KUNC

    Former federal officials can give some of the best insight into what might happen without a state deal, because federal agencies would likely step in to make sure reservoirs and dams stay functional. The Bureau of Reclamation, which manages water infrastructure across the West, and its parent agency, the Department of the Interior, would become major power players.

    Falling back to a ‘nightmare scenario’

    For more than a century, the Colorado River has been governed by a legal agreement called the Colorado River Compact. It was signed in 1922, when the river — and the West — looked a lot different. Over the years, policymakers have added a patchwork of temporary rules to adapt to modern times.

    In this century, climate change has driven the need to adapt. The river has been in a megadrought that goes back to 2000. With less water in the river, states have had to cut back on demand, even though the compact promises more water to users than the river itself could ever provide naturally. Drought conditions have become the new normal over the past two decades, and temporary rules that were implemented to rein in water demand aren’t keeping up with the pace of drying.

    The current rules for managing water were first implemented in 2007. They were slightly modified in 2012 and then expanded in 2019. All of those rules are set to expire in 2026. That expiration is the reason states are in a pinch to draw up new rules right now.

    The absolute last-chance deadline to implement new guidelines is October 1, 2026. If the states fail to submit a plan for managing water by then, the Colorado River would fall back to management rules from the 1970s.

    Brenda Burman, then commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation, speaks at a conference in Las Vegas in December 2019. Alex Hager / KUNC

    Experts say those rules, known as the Long Range Operating Criteria, or LROC, are “woefully insufficient” to deal with today’s drier, smaller river.

    “That’s a nightmare scenario,” said Anne Castle. “And I don’t think that the states or the federal government would allow that to happen.”

    Castle, a longtime water lawyer who served as assistant secretary for water and science at the Interior Department, said releasing water in accordance with those 1970s rules would quickly drain the nation’s largest reservoirs, Lake Mead and Lake Powell. That would jeopardize hydropower generation at major dams and could make it impossible to pass water from one side of those dams to the people and businesses downstream.

    Interior, which would presumably prefer to avoid failure at the dams it runs — Hoover Dam and Glen Canyon Dam — would likely get involved to stop reservoirs from losing their water. In the absence of guidance from the states, the Secretary of Interior could use his authority as the river’s “water master,” a role that gives him some legal power to make decisions about who gets how much water.

    And this administration has already made it clear that the current chief — Doug Burgum — would take advantage of that position. Scott Cameron, one of the highest ranking Colorado River officials in the Trump Administration, said as much to a conference of water experts gathered in Colorado in early June.

    “Secretary Burgum is prepared to exercise his responsibility as water master,” Cameron said. “He’s not looking forward to that, but in the absence of a seven state agreement, he will do it.”

    Federal action and likely lawsuits

    Say the Interior Secretary becomes water master and has to pull some levers on the Colorado River. The next big question is, which levers would he pull?

    His first option is the path of least resistance — sticking with those 1970s rules. They would send a lot of water from the top half of the river to the bottom. So the Upper Basin states of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming and New Mexico might want to take Interior to court.

    “No one could possibly come up with a set of rules that pleases everyone,” Castle said. “And [Interior will] do what they think they have the authority to do. But we all know that lawyers may disagree.”

    His second option is a little more involved, but would also likely result in a lawsuit. There’s a catch with Interior’s power on the Colorado River. It is mostly able to make changes in the Lower Basin states of California, Arizona and Nevada.

    If Interior wanted to act boldly and force cutbacks to water use, cuts would likely hit those states disproportionately.

    A carving on the Hoover Dam shows one of the Bureau of Reclamation’s responsibilities, along with irrigation, power, and others. Alex Hager / KUNC

    “In either situation,” said Mike Connor, another former Reclamation commissioner. “Somebody is going to object and say, ‘You’re not acting consistent with the law’ and sue the Secretary to say ‘You made a bad decision.’”

    Connor, who served from 2009 to 2014, said Interior’s authority has never been specifically defined, but it mostly comes from the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act. That legislation created Hoover Dam, which creates Lake Mead, and the All-American Canal, which supplies water to California’s Imperial Valley. That gives the federal government some control of the nation’s largest reservoir and the water supply for the Imperial Irrigation District, the river’s single largest water user.

    There are a few other options besides Interior’s two paths, but they’re much harder to predict.

    While states hold most of the planning power on the Colorado River, other big entities could try to go around them. For example, the water department in a major city, or a large farm group could use their big budgets and legal teams to influence lawmakers and get a form of Colorado River rules passed by the U.S. Congress.

    States could also ask for an extension, kicking the can down the road by another year or two. The extended deadline could give them more time to coalesce around new rules, but policy experts say states should try to avoid that and agree on rules that are urgently needed to manage the shrinking river.

    “That sort of takes the foot off the accelerator and we haven’t really done anything,” Castle said.

    Will the states agree before the deadline?

    There is at least some reason to believe the states will steer the Colorado River away from collapse or court. For all of their disagreements, state water negotiators do seem to be on the same page about one thing: keeping their situation out of the Supreme Court.

    Amy Haas, executive director of the Colorado River Authority of Utah, told KUNC in February that it would be “folly” to take their negotiations to court.

    “We are the ones who should really shape the outcome here,” she said. “We’re the experts. We’re the water managers. We understand the system. Why would we want to relinquish that control and that responsibility?”

    States appear to be moving closer to implementing new Colorado River rules without any messy court battles. Early details of a proposal to distribute water cutbacks are emerging, and it appears that it could push states long mired in disagreement toward consensus.

    Three men and a woman sit at a table in front of a series of flags
    Water policymakers from (left to right) Utah, New Mexico, Colorado and Wyoming speak on a panel at the Colorado River Water Users Association conference in Las Vegas on December 5, 2024. Alex Hager / KUNC

    Instead of those states leaning on old rules that don’t account for climate change, they’re proposing a new system that divides the river based on how much water is in it today.

    State leaders were quick to emphasize that the plan is in its early stages, but cast it as a way to agree before the 2026 deadline.

    “I was very pessimistic that we were on a path towards litigation,” said Tom Buschatzke, Arizona’s top water negotiator. “I’m more optimistic now that we can avoid that path if we can make this work.”

    This story is part of ongoing coverage of the Colorado River, produced by KUNC and supported by the Walton Family Foundation.

    This story was originally published by Grist with the headline A deadline looms for a new Colorado River plan. What happens if there isn’t one? on Jul 5, 2025.


    This content originally appeared on Grist and was authored by Alex Hager, KUNC.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Growing U.S. security and diplomatic ties with Pacific island nations are unlikely to slow even if American foreign policy undergoes a major shake-up during Donald Trump’s second term, say former White House advisers and analysts.

    Following decades of neglect, Washington has in recent years embarked on a Pacific charm offensive to counter the growing influence of China in the region.

    While Trump’s unpredictably and climate change skepticism could be potential flashpoints in relations, deepening U.S. engagement with the Pacific is now firmly a consensus issue in Washington.

    Trump is likely to maintain focus on the relationship, experts say, but he will have to prove that U.S. attention extends beyond just security-related matters.

    “President Trump saw a strategic rationale for increased engagement in the Indo-Pacific and increased engagement in the Pacific islands,” said Alexander Gray, a senior fellow in national security affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council.

    “While the reality is that the security lens is going to galvanize our commitment of resources and time on the region, it’s important for us to send a message that we have other interests beyond just security,” added Gray, who was the first-ever director for Oceania & Indo-Pacific security at the National Security Council.

    “We have to show an interest in development, economic assistance and economic growth.”

    A number of firsts

    Trump’s first term between 2017-21 contained a number of firsts for relations between the world’s No. 1 economy and Pacific islands.

    PHOTO

    Then-President Donald Trump meets with, from left, Marshall Islands President Hilda Heine, Federated States of Micronesia President David Panuelo and Palau President Tommy Remengesau on May 21, 2019.
    Then-President Donald Trump meets with, from left, Marshall Islands President Hilda Heine, Federated States of Micronesia President David Panuelo and Palau President Tommy Remengesau on May 21, 2019.

    He invited the leaders of Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau for a historic visit to the White House in May 2019. Later that year Mike Pompeo became the first-ever secretary of state to visit the Federated States of Micronesia.

    In 2019, the White House announced more than US$100 million in new assistance to the region under its so-called Pacific Pledge, with additional funding provided the following year. Money was funneled into USAID operations in Pacific islands nations, maritime security, internet coverage, environmental challenges and disaster resilience.

    The Biden-Harris administration built upon that relationship, including twice inviting Pacific Islands Forum leaders to meet at the White House in 2022 and 2023.

    “The importance of the Pacific is bipartisan in the U.S. system. In fact, re-engagement with the Pacific islands started under the previous Trump administration,” said Kathryn Paik, who served as director for the Pacific and Southeast Asia at the NSC under President Joe Biden.

    “This was largely due to increased Chinese interest in the region and the growing understanding within the U.S. system of the strategic importance of these islands.”

    In particular, the Biden administration’s commitment to tackling climate change chimed well with Pacific nations, which are vulnerable to rising sea levels and extreme weather events like cyclones that are predicted to become more frequent as the planet warms.

    Radically different approach

    Trump has taken a radically different approach — pledging to ramp up oil production and threatening to pull out of the Paris climate agreement for a second time.

    In June 2017, Trump announced the U.S. would formally withdraw from the Paris climate agreement, the first nation in the world to do so.

    That could make climate change a potential “flashpoint” between Pacific nations and another Trump administration, said Benjamin Reilly, a visiting professor at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney.

    “The climate change issue is right at the top of the agenda for Pacific island leaders. It creates lots of difficulties when you have an administration that’s seen as downplaying the importance of that,” he told BenarNews.

    President Joe Biden (R) meets with presidents of Pacific island nations at the U.S.-Pacific Island Country Summit in Washington, D.C., Sept. 29, 2022.
    President Joe Biden (R) meets with presidents of Pacific island nations at the U.S.-Pacific Island Country Summit in Washington, D.C., Sept. 29, 2022.

    Paik, who is now a senior fellow with the Australia Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the climate factor would complicate the relationship, but it was unlikely to “completely sink” it.

    Despite Trump’s open skepticism about dangerous planet warming, U.S. support for resilience efforts across the Pacific might not be affected, some observers said.

    “The Pacific certainly didn’t agree with us on our macro approach to climate change,” said Gray, who visited the region a number of times, including for the 2019 Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in Tuvalu. “But we made tremendous progress in advancing our relationships in the region because we were able to talk about resilience issues that affect people day to day.”

    Shared values, mutual respect

    Following Trump’s sweeping victory on Tuesday, Pacific island leaders tried to stress their shared interests with the U.S.

    “We look forward to reinforcing the longstanding partnership between our nations, grounded in shared values and mutual respect,” said Papua New Guinea Prime Minister James Marape.

    Tonga’s Prime Minister Siaosi Sovaleni and Fiji’s Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabukia both said they looked forward to advancing bilateral relations and Pacific interests.

    Pacific island nations have sought to benefit from the China-U.S. rivalry by securing more aid and foreign investment. But they have expressed alarm that their region is being turned into a geopolitical battleground.

    Reilly said a danger for any new president was treating the Pacific islands as a “geopolitical chess board.”

    “That’s a terrible way to actually engage and win hearts and minds and build enduring partnerships,” he said.

    Paik said the U.S. now needs to build on the successes of the first phase of American re-engagement.

    The U.S. renewed its compact of free association deals with Micronesia, Palau and the Marshall Islands earlier this year, but “some of the implementation is still pending,” she said. The deals give the U.S. military exclusive access to their vast ocean territories in exchange for funding and the right for their citizens to live and work in the U.S.

    “Some of the embassies have been opened, but we still only have one or two diplomats on the ground,” said Paik. “We still need to open an embassy in Kiribati and potentially other locations.

    “We need to get ambassadors out to the region. We need a permanent ambassador to the PIF.”

    No sitting U.S. president has ever visited a Pacific island nation.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Harry Pearl for BenarNews.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Military junta troops have destroyed major roads that connect several towns and cities controlled by rebel forces in northern Myanmar’s Shan State in what could be preparation for renewed fighting in the area, residents told Radio Free Asia.

    Junta forces used bulldozers on Wednesday to damage a road connecting Namtu township and Namsang Man Ton, which has been under the control of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA.

    On Thursday, junta bulldozers made a section of the Lashio-Hsenwi road impassable. That part of the road, which leads to Hsenwi, Kun Long and Chinshwehaw townships, is an area controlled by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or MNDAA.

    The TNLA, MNDAA and Arakan Army together make up the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which in October launched an offensive that has dealt the military a series of defeats, pushing government forces back.

    Residents of Lashio told RFA that security has been tightened at the entrance to the strategic town, which is home to the military’s northeast command headquarters.

    ENG_BUR_ROADS DESTROYED_06142024.2.jpg
    The road leading to Lashio city under the control of Brigade 6 of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) was destroyed by the junta, June 13, 2024. (PSLF/TNLA News via Telegram)

    That’s likely a reaction to a nearby buildup of forces by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, a resident told RFA on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

    “It’s been apparent that the junta has also been gathering its forces and weapons near the area controlled by the ethnic armed organizations,” the resident said. 

    “Moreover, insurgent forces have been seen near Lashio,” the resident. “And now the roads to Lashio have been cut off. It is expected that conflict will occur very soon.”

    Ceasefire violation

    A resident of Moe Meik township, who requested not to be named, told RFA that people are already fleeing to safe areas ahead of expected armed clashes between the junta and the alliance.

    “We have learned that the ethnic alliance force is headed to this area,” he said. “Almost all the people have left the town now.”

    The destroyed roads have led to a rise in the price of rice and other goods, a Namtu township resident told RFA. Gasoline has increased from 3,600 kyat (US$1.72) to 4,000 kyat (US$1.91) per liter and is being sold on a limited basis, he said.

    In nearby Kutkai township, the price of rice has risen by 50,000 kyat (US$24) per bag as people rush to buy supplies, a resident there said.

    Three Brotherhood Alliance and junta representatives agreed to a Chinese-brokered ceasefire during a round of talks in January. Less than a week after the agreement, both sides were accused of violating the deal. 

    ENG_BUR_ROADS DESTROYED_06142024.4.jpg
    Members of the Kokang army (MNDAA) clean up the Rantheshan camp, which they had just captured, October 29, 2023. (The Ko Kang via Facebook)

    Junta forces carried out artillery shelling on June 9 on a TNLA outpost between Pang Tin and Man Pying villages, which is located about 32 kilometers (20 miles) away from Moe Meik. 

    Troop movements and other preparations by the TNLA are in response to the shelling, several residents said.

    TNLA spokeswoman Lway Yay Oo told RFA that the junta is violating the January ceasefire agreement, and they will carry out retaliatory attacks if junta troops conduct more military action.

    “It was found that the junta has sent more drones and forces in northern Shan state. They are also cutting off routes,” he said. “It is deliberately creating fear in the public.”

    Calls by RFA to junta spokesperson Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun for a response to the TNLA spokeswoman’s remark went unanswered.   

    It’s unlikely that members of the Three Brotherhood Alliance would accept another ceasefire, military and political commentator Hla Kyaw Zaw said.

    “Even if China tries to prevent it again, the TNLA will not stop its mission,” he said. “Now that the junta has cut through the roads, the TNLA has reason to attack.”

    Translated by Aung Naing. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Burmese.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Thousands of residents have fled the capital of western Myanmar’s Rakhine state in anticipation of a looming battle between the rebel ethnic Arakan Army and junta soldiers, local residents told Radio Free Asia.

    Fighting in the fortified administrative and military hub of Sittwe is expected to be intense, and would come after close to three months of heightened conflict between the military and the Arakan Army, or AA. 

    In recent weeks, the AA has seized several junta military camps in the townships that encircle Sittwe, including Mrauk-U, Minbya, Kyauktaw and Rathedaung.

    The military junta has blocked highways and waterways throughout Rakhine since November, making it hard for people to leave the state capital.

    Those who have decided to stay are digging bunkers at their homes, placing sandbags nearby and otherwise searching for safe places or moving to nearby rural areas, local residents said.

    “In Sittwe, you cannot use roads or waterways,” a resident of the state capital told RFA. “So, some leave for Yangon out of fear – and they have to go there by air.”

    ENG_BUR_FleeingSitwe_01262024.2.png

    There are four flights a day with about 50 people on each flight, according to the resident, who did not want to be named for security reasons. Several local residents told RFA that plane tickets from Sittwe to Yangon are fully booked until the end of March, and some people are chartering planes to get out.

    Sittwe’s population is over 120,000, including students from several universities, according to 2019 statistics from the general administration department. Some local residents estimated that as many as 30 percent of residents have already left.

    Gaining ground

    The AA and two other rebel groups make up the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which launched a campaign in October on junta forces in the northern and western parts of the country. 

    Last week, nearly 300 junta troops surrendered to the AA after it took control of two major military junta encampments in Kyauktaw. And on Wednesday, the Three Brotherhood Alliance said in a statement that the AA had won full control of Pauktaw, a port city just 16 miles (25 kilometers) east of Sittwe.

    Landline and internet connections have been shut down in northern Rakhine’s townships, including Sittwe, residents said. In some areas, only the Mytel telecom network has been available.Residents said they have had to wait one or two days to withdraw cash from banks in Sittwe and are also having difficulty buying basic commodities such as food and oil as prices rise.

    Plane tickets to Yangon cost between 350,000 kyats (US$166) and 500,000 kyats (US$238), the Sittwe resident said. 

    “Impoverished individuals and people who can’t afford to buy airline tickets can’t run anywhere,” he said. “They can’t afford to live in Yangon. So there are many people who have to stay here.”   

    RFA couldn’t immediately reach Rakhine state’s junta spokesperson Hla Thein to ask about the steady stream of residents leaving Sittwe.  

    At a Jan. 20 meeting with state level departmental officials, junta-appointed Rakhine chief minister Htein Lin said security has become the administration’s top focus in the state.

    The Sittwe resident who spoke to RFA about flights to Yangon said he and his family are also trying to travel to Myanmar’s biggest city.

    “I’m worried about being unable to flee home if something happens. I have a family and children,” he said. “Battles can affect children emotionally. I don’t want to force them to live with such hardships.”

    Translated by Htin Aung Kyaw. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster. 


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Burmese.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Banned by the State Department from traveling to the United States until he became India’s prime minister in 2014, Narendra Modi was on Thursday ushered into the White House for the second time in as many years amid praise from U.S. President Joe Biden.

    Standing next to Modi – who was denied U.S. visas over his role as governor in Gujarat’s 2002 anti-Muslim riots – Biden said the pair were “trusted partners” who share the “core principles” of democracy.

    “Welcome, Mr. Prime Minister. Welcome back to the White House,” Biden said. The meeting, he added, was happening at an “inflection point” in world history that was forcing their countries together.

    ENG_CHN_ModiVisit_06222023.2.jpg
    India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi stands with President Joe Biden as they watch the United States Army Old Guard Fife and Drum Corps during a State Arrival Ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House, Thursday, June 22, 2023, in Washington, D.C. (Manuel Balce Ceneta/Associated Press)

    For his part, Modi glossed over any bygones – and travel bans.

    He had only seen the White House’s exterior when he traveled to the country “as a common man” 30 years ago. But not this time: “This grand welcome ceremony at the White House today,” the premier said, “is an honor and pride for the 1.4 billion people of India.”

    “Thank you, Mr. President, for your friendship,” he added.

    The specter of China

    During the morning ceremony, neither Biden nor Modi betrayed the reasons for the embrace of their two countries. 

    But there were clues.

    One was in the abundance of announcements that followed, headlined by a US$2.7-billion factory to be built in India by U.S. microchip maker Micron, which was last month banned from selling in China amid the ongoing chip war between the United States and Beijing.

    There were deals, too, for General Electric to build fighter jet engines for India’s military, as well as for the sale of Stryker armored vehicles and lightweight long-range howitzers, which India’s military currently positions along its disputed Himalayas border with China.

    ENG_CHN_ModiVisit_06222023.3.JPG
    America’s General Electric will build jet engines for India’s LCA Tejas fighter [shown]. (Samuel Rajkumar/Reuters file photo)

    China’s specter was also present during an afternoon press conference at the White House, with Biden asked his views of Modi’s crackdown on religious and media freedoms in the context of his recent public comments that Chinese President Xi Jinping is a “dictator.” 

    “We’re straightforward with each other and we respect each other,” Biden said of Modi, without answering the reporter’s question.

    “One of the fundamental reasons that I believe the U.S.-China relationship is not in the space it is in with the U.S.-Indian relationship,” he said, “is that there’s an overwhelming respect for each other.”

    ‘A pretty amazing transition’

    The personal bonhomie between Biden and Modi marks a dramatic shift in relations between the countries, with New Delhi long skeptical of American foreign policy aims and one of the primary architects of the stridently neutral Cold War-era Non-Alignment Movement.

    A socialist republic according to the preamble of its 1950 Constitution, India nonetheless long hewed closer to the Soviet Union. In fact, the historical ties between Moscow and New Delhi – and India’s reliance on Russian-made weaponry – were widely seen as key to Modi’s recent reluctance to isolate Russia amid its invasion on Ukraine.

    ENG_CHN_ModiVisit_06222023.4.jpg
    Workers at Russia’s MiG factory assemble a MiG-29K fighter jet for the Indian Navy in Moscow in 2011. (Associated Press)

    But that has shifted as China – a historical rival of India, and one with which it shares a disputed 3,400-kilometer (2,100-mile) border – has supplanted Russia as the lead geopolitical rival to the United States.

    “On security ties, we’ve really seen a pretty amazing transition in the last couple of decades,” said Richard M. Rossow, chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

    Rossow said in a call last week to preview Modi’s visit that India’s longtime policy of nonalignment has over recent years “kind of shifted to language of strategic autonomy” and put an end to its historical reluctance to work too closely with the United States.

    “That really is not exactly true when we focus on the main strategic threat that we both look at and share in the Indo-Pacific region, which is China,” he said. “We’ve found it relatively easy to open up doors that may have been closed 10-15 years ago.”

    But that has not meant any alliances with the United States, with Modi at times warming to American advances when appearing threatened by China’s growing power while thumbing his nose at other times.

    “Trying to define what this relationship is,” Rossow said of U.S.-Indian ties, “is like crossing the river by feeling pebbles with your feet.”

    Autonomous India

    From Washington’s perspective, though, a stronger but fiercely independent India can still aid U.S. foreign policy objectives.

    “As is well known in D.C. policy circles, India will never be a treaty ally of the United States,” explained Milan Vaishnav, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the director of its South Asia program. “However, U.S. strategists see India playing a central role in their larger framework of deterring China.”

    Vaishnav told Radio Free Asia that even if they do not become official allies, “the United States and India view their futures as inextricably linked” on technology, defense and the broader economy, because India provides an alternative to China as a manufacturing base.

    Amid U.S.-led efforts to “de-risk” supply chains away from a reliance on Chinese manufacturers, Vaishnav said, American officials are keen, in particular, to help India find “a foothold in the semiconductor market” and thereby establish a long-term alternative source market.

    Rossow of CSIS said the same logic extended to India’s military and the need “to reduce reliance on Russia as a major military supplier.”

    “We’re really trying to push the envelope … beyond what we’ve ever done for a country that’s not an ally” in terms of sharing military technology, he said, with an explicit aim of “helping India to become more self-reliant in some areas of weapons production.”

    ENG_CHN_ModiVisit_06222023.5.jpg
    Indian troops clash with China’s People’s Liberation Army soldiers along the de facto border between India and China in this undated photo. (RFA screenshot from citizen journalist video)

    Speaking on the condition of anonymity on Wednesday evening, a senior Biden administration official also alluded to China as a key factor driving India closer to the United States militarily.

    “I think some of the challenges that they faced along their own borders have concentrated their attention and caused them to focus intensively on both greater preparation on the defense side, and also seeking closer partnerships internationally,” the official told reporters.

    The multipolar world

    Ultimately, with India’s main priority to maintain its autonomy, playing off other world powers to its advantage is the aim of its game.

    It’s a foreign-policy shift that has been forged by Modi’s external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar, a strategic realist who former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger singled out in an interview with The Economist as “the practicing political leader that is quite close to my views.” 

    The author of the foreign-policy treatise “The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World,” Jaishankar’s view of the emerging world order is one defined by a multipolarity of four major powers – China, Russia, India and the United States, who can at best be “frenemies.”

    New Delhi won’t be constrained by any commitments to – or against – its “frenemies,” the minister has made clear. In the meantime, though, why not take what you can get without entering into alliances? 

    “We would like to have multiple choices. And obviously try to make the best of it,” he told The Economist. “Every country would like to do that. Some may be constrained by other obligations, some may not.”

    Edited by Malcolm Foster


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Alex Willemyns for RFA.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.