In the aftermath of 2021 February military coup there are widespread calls from civil society in Myanmar to overcome previous ethnic, religious and class differences and to consolidate the national unity movement against the common enemy – the Tatmadaw (Burmese army). Yet there is little to no sign of a coordinated countrywide resistance against the common enemy. This article considers the narrative surrounding the common enemy in Myanmar anti-military resistance: is it sufficient to recognise ethnic groups’ demands for self-determination, autonomy and equality?

Nonviolent protest and armed resistance have both been a feature of the response to the coup. However, the priorities of the Bamar ethnic majority and other ethnic groups have differed since the start of protests. The Bamar united under the flag of the National League for Democracy (NLD), demanding the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other detainees, and respect for the results of the 2020 election held under the controversial 2008 constitution. Meanwhile, ethnic minorities have demanded the abolition of the 2008 constitution and the establishment of a genuine federal democratic union.

Thus, many ethnic minorities’ armed groups, prominent in fighting the Tatmadaw, are cautious about openly joining the movement. Some large ethnic minority organisations are sympathetic and support the ongoing struggle, yet do not wish to form a unified coalition against the common enemy. Others have expressed neither support nor condemnation of the coup. However, this doesn’t mean that there is no way to unify the ethnic groups. Consensus exists around federalism, but it needs a framework that all groups would support.

Baggage From the Past

In the past, the majority Bamar were not concerned about the atrocities taking place in the ethnic minorities’ areas. However, since the coup their ideal scenario has been for the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) to endorse and support the people’s Spring Revolution under the leadership of the National Unity Government (NUG) in their struggle to reverse the Tatmadaw’s seizure of power. In a formal message sent on Christmas Eve in 2021, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) urged to continued, unified cooperation despite ethnic and religious differences, to defeat the common enemy as soon as possible.

CRPH is a body composed largely of the NLD representatives elected to the Union Parliament (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) in the November 2020 election, formed as part of political efforts to oppose the Tatmadaw. It then launched NUG, with senior NLD figures at its centre, but including a few lawmakers elected from the ethnic minorities’ parties in 2020. Within the NUG, senior NLD figures Aung San Suu Kyi and Win Myint retain their posts at the helm (as State Counsellor and President respectively), even though they are in prison.

Aung San Suu Kyi is the daughter of Burma’s independence hero, General Aung San. In 1991, while under house arrest under the previous military government, she was awarded Nobel Peace Prize as a beacon for human rights and democracy. She has been hugely popular among the country’s Buddhist majority, who saw her as a force that would propel Burma towards democratic transition. However, for the ethnic minorities in the country, she has been a democratic dictator.

When Aung San Suu Kyi came to power after the historic 2015 election that NLD won with a landslide, there was some competition between her government and the military over the control of the bureaucracy. However, she was indifferent to the Tatmadaw’s actions as a colonising force in multiple ethnic minority areas since Myanmar’s independence in 1948. Minority ethnic groups have been subjected to horrific atrocities including massacres, sexual violence, torture, forced labor and displacement by the Tatmadaw as well as state-sanctioned discrimination. Aung San Suu Kyi sought to appease and compromise with the Tatmadaw and even implicitly supported its genocide of the Rohingya. Her attitude reflected the lack of empathy by the Bamar majority for many ethnic communities that had long suffered abuses by the Tatmadaw.

In the period of the so-called democratic transition (2011-2021), certain ethnic minority political forces chose to collaborate with NLD and supported their electoral campaign. But the authoritarian behaviour of the NLD government has restricted political movements of the ethnic people. It mistreated less powerful groups and neglected their political demands in Parliament just as the Tatmadaw-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) did in the first half of the transition period.

Common Enemy Narratives

In the common enemy narrative, all blame for the suppression of minorities is projected onto the Tatmadaw. The fact that Suu Kyi and NLD failed to guarantee political, social, and economic rights of the ethnic minorities is forgotten. The CRPH messages on both Christmas Eve and Eid al-Fitr continued the narrative that the Tatmadaw is solely responsible for perpetual persecution and atrocities against the ethnic and religious minorities in the country.

Meanwhile, Rohingya genocide deniers are now part of the NUG despite never officially apologising to the public for their misjudgment and for inciting hatred. This includes Dr. Win Myat Aye, former social welfare minister of the country, now serving as the Union Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management at the NUG, and Khin Ma Ma Myo, current NUG Minister of Commerce.

The common enemy narrative is also tangled with the populist characteristics of Suu Kyi’s NLD when it was in power. For the Bamar majority, the NUG is overwhelmingly the institutional leader representing the general will of the people in the Spring Revolution, as NLD did before the coup. NUG denies the existence of diverse opinions and interests among the people. Division of opinions on the formation and work of NUG is often seen as causing disunity. Anyone with different views faces censure. The common enemy narrative thus fails to demonstrate that the goal of the revolution is to find a solution by listening to different voices rather than forcing all the people to unite.

Insufficiency of Common Enemy Narrative

Ethnic groups have taken different political and military positions despite the widespread belief that the coup has unified different forces against the common enemy. Some groups are concerned about the NUG’s position on Bamar political dominance, e.g., whether they would create equal political space for the ethnic groups. Others think of the coup as an internal affair of the Bamar majority and distance themselves from the ongoing crisis.

On May 2021, National Unity Government (NUG) announced that it had formed a People’s Defense Force (PDF) with an array of anti-coup protesters and students opposed to the junta as the military wing of the organisation. In a statement, it said that the move was a precursor to establishing a Federal Union Army (FUA) together with Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) to make effective reforms in the security sector in order to terminate the 70-year-long civil war. But it has been more than a year and there is no sign that FUA will materialise.

There are at least eighteen active EAOs who have been fighting the Tatmadaw for self-determination. Only a few of them are considered in this article due to their positions de facto government with well-structured civil administration in certain ethnic minority areas. Some major EAOs, such as the Kachin Independence Organization/ Army (KIO/ KIA) and Karen National Union (KNU), supported anti-coup protesters and sheltered civil servants taking part in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), and protesters fleeing to the borderlands to avoid arrest and regroup. They also provided some military training and arms to the PDFs who hope to return to cities and towns across the country to defend themselves against the military. But among the EAOs neither strong political nor military collaboration has emerged to form an alliance with PDFs against the common enemy.

KNU, Myanmar’s oldest EAO, was one of the first armed groups to condemn the military coup and the first to publicly reject formal peace talks with the junta. Yet the group is cautious about collaborating with the NUG and expressed concerns about the political dominance of Bamar in the NUG. Padoh Taw Nee, Head of Foreign Affairs for the Karen National Union (KNU), told the Globe that “Ethnic nationalities are participating in the NUG, but we can’t see the substantial result that we had expected.” He also added that they “do not see this as a genuine attempt to create an ethnically diverse body.”

KIO/KIA is also dubious about the NUG’s position on the tyranny of the Bamar majority. The KIA’s chief of staff, General Gam Shawng Gunhtang still needed to urge NUG to commit to establish a genuine federal democracy even after almost a year after the formation of NUG. General N’Ban La, Chairman of KIO, also urges an end to racism among the Bamar in order to work together on ending dictatorship and for a true democracy in Myanmar. To this day, the group has barely made any public statement supporting the CRPH or the NUG.

These two armed groups have been the closest to the anti-coup movement and NUG as well as conducting coordinated operations with the PDF. They have been engaging in regular clashes with the Tatmadaw, yet mainly to regain their own lost territory and not to support the NUG.

Other groups like United Wa State Army (UWSA) and Arakan Army (AA) think that the coup is essentially an intra-Bamar civil-military struggle for power as the Burmese military and National League for Democracy are both predominantly ethnic Bamar. In the wake of the coup, they remained silent and have distanced themselves from both the NUG’s federal democratic vision and the junta’s military-dominated future polity.

UWSA openly announced that they will take no sides regardless of whoever rules the country as it is an internal matter for the Bamar. In recent peace talks with the Tatmadaw, which were declared illegal by the NUG, the Wa delegation stated that UWSA will not cooperate with either the Tatmadaw regime or the NUG regarding the ongoing crisis.

AA are also seen as bystanders. This is because the AA’s commander-in-chief General Twan Mrat Naing urged people in Rakhine State not to participate in the CDM or in street protests. AA has continued to largely honor its truce with the Myanmar military since then. Unlike UWSA, AA rejected the Tatmadaw’s invitation for peace talks and considers their relations with the NUG rather friendly at this juncture.

In order to build a coherent alliance, it is important to acknowledge that demands of ethnic minorities often go beyond challenging the rule. Although different groups hold different ideas, a consensus seems to exist in favor of freedom from Tatmadaw rule, of democracy and federalism, and of moving beyond the limits of the hybrid system that defined the political order of the past decade. Hence the NUG needs a clear and concrete road map for federalism where the minorities can picture their rightful positions in a new Myanmar.

Federalism is the Future

On March 2021, CRPH released the new Federal Democracy Charter (FDC) in an effort to convince ethnic armed groups that they have a historic opportunity to build the federal system they have long fought for. The document includes plans to abolish the 2008 Constitution and establish a new Federal Democracy Union, with a high degree of decentralisation and recognition of collective ethnic rights, customs and ownership of resources. It also emphasises equal rights among Myanmar’s states, who would have their own constitutions and legislative and judicial powers.

But there are concerns over the capacity of CRPH to uphold the understanding of genuine federalism as it has never been the priority of its mother-party, NLD whose policy of “Burmese chauvinism”, attempted to position Bamar as the core of the political system. The party refused to share power and to appoint elected candidates from ethnic parties in the ethnic areas. NUG is also following the same footsteps, as ethnic Bamar holds most of the political roles in the self-declared opposition government.

The FDC has received muted and reserved approval from the CDM and some EAOs, in part because it did not address some of the key issues for the ethnic minorities and the EAOs. This has been only the first step of CRPH’s political vision. There has not been any concrete plan for how to divide power between the union government and the states and how to protect sub-minorities within the main minorities living in the seven ethnic states. The NUG also must address the issue of autonomous zones, which cannot be ignored in any future federal system for Myanmar.

NUG will need to clearly demonstrate the allocation of power and responsibility for the judiciary in autonomous states. The role of the judiciary has been an important tools in dividing power and responsibilities between the center and autonomous units in successful federations. A federal constitution with fair division of judicial power can be a strong foundation for a just, free, peaceful and developed society.

The NUG also needs to have a clear vision of how judicially enforceable fundamental rights for marginalised communities will be protected against infringement by both central and constituent unit governments. There must be detailed provisions on the structure of local government to empower minorities within minorities to govern their own affairs, strengthening autonomy for local minority groups within constituent units.

Since the Charter is only a general road map, it is not impossible to resolve issues that require broader clarification and guarantees. However, the NUG needs to cooperate quickly and genuinely with the ethnic groups to reassure them. Once the NUG can guarantee a federal constitution that will satisfy the demands of all minorities, it will be the beginning of unifying all the nationalities in solidarity against the common enemy.

The post Common enemy: a hollow slogan for solidarity in Myanmar appeared first on New Mandala.

This post was originally published on New Mandala.

The tragedy of what appears could be a long-running civil war remains a distinct possibility in Myanmar today. Nevertheless, the term “civil war” itself is inappropriate. Rather Myanmar today resembles Europe during the Nazi occupation. While the sense of occupation by a foreign force had always existed in the ethnic minority areas with their well-armed insurgent organizations, there is a sense today that this is also the case in the Bamar heartland. The occupying army is Myanmar’s own national army (the Tatmadaw) which, from its foundation, has largely functioned as an autonomous state within a state. Those civilians who support the military, such as the members of the USDP, are treaters as collaborators.

Seen even from the conventional paradigm of military coups replacing a democratically elected government the reaction of the international community, and above all the “West”, is disappointing. Yet, once we change perspective to conceive of Myanmar as an occupied country then the reaction of the international community is simply irresponsible. To use a metaphor, Myanmar today is an international orphan. This is not to say, to pursue the analogy, it does not have a family. This ‘family’, in our view, can be divided into three: the kindly, but unengaged aunts, the self-serving and self-indulgent uncles and the feckless cousins.

The kindly, unengaged aunts

The first group, of kindly but unengaged aunts, is a caricature of the United States, the EU and the United Kingdom. Other countries, particularly the other three members of the Quad—Australia, India and Japan—can be considered part of this grouping. Certainly, they rapidly condemned the coup and, in some cases, introduced targeted sanctions against the generals and their immediate families. These were later reinforced to include military-linked conglomerates.

In recent years their political leaderships have heralded a pivot towards the Indo-Pacific with the aim, declared in various official strategy papers, of promoting democracy and confronting autocracy. By not making Myanmar a priority concern in their democratic Indo-Pacific posturing they have revealed the emptiness of these pompous declarations. Is there any post-coup situation in the world today of any greater moral clarity?

The failure of the Australian government to even introduce a basic system of targeted sanctions is puzzling. Cynically, in the context of Sino-Australian tensions doing so would send a clear message to Beijing on the unacceptability of its support for authoritarian regimes, while not being seen to directly criticize the PRC itself. The Morrison governments hesitancy to even provide permanent resident status to the 3,000 or so Burmese students in Australia represents a repudiation of Canberra’s bipartisan principled middle power tradition dating back to Dr Evatt.

This attitude is understandable from Narendra Modi in India in the light of his own autocratic ethno-nationalist agenda. However, it represents the betrayal of the Nehru tradition in foreign policy and, in realpolitik terms, is counterproductive given the continuing aggravation in Sino-Indian relations. Is it really in Delhi’s interest to see Mizoram and Manipur destabilized through a further influx of Myanmar refugees? In the context of Sino-Indian hostility is it in Delhi’s interest to see the PRC providing recognition, and carving out new economic benefits, with the Myanmar junta?  It is puzzling why India’s vaunted Look East Policy does not begin with its closest eastern neighbour but, so far, the Indian government has even prevented the Quad from making a clear statement on the release of political prisoners. India abstained in the 18^th June vote in the UN General Assembly demanding an arms embargo and he release of political prisoners, unlike the other three Quad members who voted yes. Yet for Quad members, with their principle objective of constraining China, Myanmar is of secondary importance. This, once again is amazingly short-sighted: constraining, but also cooperating with China for mutual benefit, begins in Myanmar.

The United States bears, at least indirectly, responsibility for the coup. It was the leader of the world’s greatest democracy, President Donald Trump, himself who in propagating the Big Lie of a stolen US presidential election in November 2020 provided a rhetorical fig-leaf for would be dictators everywhere to justify their actions. Certainly, in the Myanmar case it gave occasion for Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to play by the Thai playbook and undertake a coup in order to defend democracy against democratic irregularities, corruption, etc. with a vague promise of “free and fair” elections in the future.

The junta is implementing the next steps in the Thai playbook in using a subservient and compliant judicial system to imprison the leaders of the democratic opposition, making Aung San Suu Kyi ineligible to run again. As with the Future Forward Party in Thailand, the banning and dismantling of Myanmar’s National League for Democracy, is just a matter of time.

The Biden Administration’s overwhelming priority is the strengthening and reinvigorating of alliances in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific, to both constrain China and check Russia. Objectively drawing a redline in Myanmar would be a concrete way of achieving these multiple objectives but, alas, with the withdrawal from Afghanistan and other overriding issues, Myanmar remains largely invisible in the “Washington beltway”

In Europe as a result of Brexit, Myanmar no longer has a champion in the “Brussels bubble” and even in the United Kingdom, the PRC’s turpitude in Hong Kong is the key Asian issue, alongside mercantilist policies to promote a Global Britain.  Elsewhere in the European Parliament political representatives would rather spend their time making rhetorical points on the Uighur and Hong Kong, than come to the aid of the Myanmar people who overwhelmingly ask for their support.

How can this be explained? We would suggest that the close link in Western eyes between the person of Aung San Suu Kyi and Myanmar’s democratic trajectory has been a double-edged sword.  When she was under house arrest and in opposition, she was perceived as incarnating the democratic aspirations of the Myanmar people and maintained these in the arena of public debated. However, when the democratic icon of the 1990s and 2000s fell from her pedestal due to both her autocratic demeanour and, above all, her defence of the Tatmadaw against charges of genocide in the International Criminal Court, concern with Myanmar evaporated. The orphan baby of Burmese democracy was thrown out, so to speak, with the bathwater of personality-centred politics.

Rather than acting decisively on Myanmar, the “kindly but unengaged aunts” have has chosen to delegate the resolution of the Myanmar crisis to the “feckless cousins” of ASEAN discussed below. In Europe this appeals to the somewhat narcissistic encouragement of regional integration elsewhere as well as the hubris surrounding interregionalism.  As the world’s most institutionalized regional entity the EU has a rather optimistic view of its oldest regional partner, ASEAN. Yet, to date none of the mechanisms provided in this partnership—such as EU-ASEAN parliamentary dialogue or the ASEAN Strategic Partnership Agreement—have been activated.

The self-interested and self-indulgent uncles

The second part of the family is the self-interested and self-indulgent uncles, namely China and Russia. While it is debatable whether Beijing encouraged the coup, it is clear that since it has been most accommodating in providing recognition to the junta. The PRC has legitimate security, especially energy security, interests in Myanmar and real concerns about instability on its southern borders. The paradox is that these would best be protected under a civilian administration supported by the people of Myanmar than by a Sinophobic and incompetent junta. Yet, as with Modi’s India, Beijing’s ideological blinkers on the benefits of authoritarianism has meant that the PRC is not the loveable country Xi Jinping seeks to project.

Russian behaviour in Myanmar, namely ensuring sales of its weaponry and promoting Putin’s autocratic agenda worldwide, is more perfidious and self-indulgent. Like in the Donbass and Belorussia, Myanmar provides an occasion for Putin’s macho promotion of Russia as a great power. Having largely lost both Vietnam and now India to the West, Moscow is left with Naypyidaw and Vientiane as its last Asian playgrounds.

The feckless cousins

Finally, the third group is the feckless cousins, Myanmar’s Southeast Asian neighbours of ASEAN, to whom the international community has bestowed responsibility to resolve the crisis. In our view, this misconceived sub-contracting is premised on the vague notion of ASEAN’s regional centrality. Yet, it is one thing to pay lip service to “ASEAN centrality” out of diplomatic politeness. It is another thing to actually believe that it can bring results.  “Centrality” is a question of positioning and, indeed, by default ASEAN has been the core around which other regional bodies such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC, the RCEP, etc, have been grafted. But “centrality” per se indicates to us nothing about capability or capacity, let alone political willingness.

It took almost three months after the coup for ASEAN on 24^th April to organise a summit on Myanmar to which the junta leader, and he alone, was invited. Five months after the coup ASEAN’s promised special envoy has not been appointed both due to internal failure to agree on a candidate and a lack of approval from the junta itself . All ASEAN has achieved so far is to provide de facto legitimacy to the junta and buy it time. At both its emergency summit of 24 April and in the visit of two of its emissaries on 5 to 7 June, ASEAN has given legitimacy to the junta, without even any contact with the democratically elected leaders in Myanmar. It is hard to see how an even-handed dialogue can be organised between the jailers and the jailed, as calls from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore for the release of political prisoners have gone unheeded.

ASEAN has been successful over 50 years in maintaining peace between its members. However, it has neither the “carrots” nor “the sticks” to bring about change within one of them. For example, under the 2008 ASEAN Charter there are no provisions for any member to be expelled. Above all, the sacrosanct, and self-serving, principle of non-interference will always negate the application of the seventh of the Charter’s purposes and principles: the strengthening of democracy and the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Moreover, not only is there a serious systemic issue, but there is also clearly a lack of political will to promote a return to democracy in Myanmar: the majority of ASEAN members have authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. What is the interest of the Thai master of coups, ex-General, now PM Prayut, in seeing the Burmese civil disobedience movement succeed? Would it not further encourage the Thai members of the Milk Tea Alliance who periodically occupy the streets of Bangkok to continue denouncing a kindred patriarchal regime? Does the Politburo of the Vietnamese Communist Party want to see netizens succeed in virtually challenging an authoritarian regime? As for Cambodian PM Hun Sen, and Philippines President Rodrigo ‘Digong’ Duterte, aka The Punisher, democratic values are the least of their concerns. Finally, ASEAN is chaired at the moment by the Sultan of Brunei, the last remaining absolute monarch in Asia.

The divisions within ASEAN came into focus during the non-binding vote in the UN General Assembly on 18 June, calling for an arms embargo and the release of political prisoners (item 34-A/75/L.85.Rev. 1). Six ASEAN countries voted yes: Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar itself, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam. The other four—Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand—abstained. Divisions of this kind within a regional entity based on the principle of consensus have only one result: procrastination and a degree of immobilism, otherwise known as the ASEAN Way.

Conclusions

When an orphan’s extended family fails lamentably, fortunately there is an alternative: turning to your friends. In the countries of the “kindly and unengaged aunts” their parliaments—for example the French Senate, the US Congress and the Australian Parliament—pushing for more assertive action from their country’s respective executives. Civil society groups in Southeast Asia increasingly see the combat for Myanmar’s democracy as their own. In the West a vocal Burmese diaspora, advocacy groups, academics and other supporters are pushing to ensure that this orphan is not forgotten. It remains a moot point whether this will lead to concrete and tangible actions, such as the recognition of the National Unity Government, and international intervention of the basis of the Right to Protect will ensue.

The post Myanmar: An International Orphan appeared first on New Mandala.

This post was originally published on New Mandala.

Parmaukkha, a Burmese monk known for his ultra-nationalist stance, commented that Burmese “who can think about the future will not protest against the current [junta] government”.  He justified his statement on the premise that the Aung San Suu Kyi led National League for Democracy (NLD) is a grave threat to Buddhism and ethnic Bamar. The reaction among the Buddhist sangha (Buddhist monastic order) in Myanmar towards the February coup is, however, far from uniform.

The abbot of Mingyi monastery in Mandalay, Myawaddy Sayadaw, was detained just days after the coup on 1^st February. He is one of the fiercest critics of the military junta and in the months since his arrest, several other monasteries have been raided with the junta targeting monks who led anti-coup protests. Other monks arrested include Thaw Pa Ka. Interestingly, both Thaw and Myawaddy participated in the 2007 Saffron Revolution, when monks took to the streets in droves and led protests to express disapproval of the withdrawal of a fuel subsidy, a measure which resulted in a rise in the price of food and daily necessities. Although the protest movement involved other groups such as veterans of  the 88 Generation, monks became the face of the protests when they overturned their alms bowls, indicating that they were spurning donations from the military junta and therefore undermining its political and moral legitimacy.

The relationship between the monks and the military however, has changed significantly since Saffron Revolution. A sizeable number of monks who participated in the Saffron Revolution have been imprisoned or sent into exile, with the sangha in a much weakened state to stage another round of anti-military protest. Buddhist nationalism has occupied a more central place in the sangha than it did a decade ago, due to the perceived threat from Islam in Rakhine and other parts of Myanmar.

In the interest of livelihood
Historically, Buddhism in Myanmar has been entwined with the discourse on governance and legitimacy. In the pre-colonial era, the Burmese monarchy had an interdependent relationship with the sangha. The sangha would bestow moral legitimacy on the King, in exchange for the latter serving as the patron and defender of the Buddhist faith. Should the King be perceived as failing to fulfil his duties, the sangha would cease to offer moral and political legitimacy. Even though the monarchy was eliminated during colonial rule, the framework for legitimacy has remained largely intact. The sangha continues to expect the incumbent regime—regardless of whether it was elected or otherwise—to champion Buddhist beliefs. As the sangha lost its patron with the dismantling of Burmese monarchy during the British colonial rule, monks became dependent upon ordinary, predominantly Buddhist Bamar populations for alms-giving and temple donations. Consequently, monks became reliant on the well-being of the community and furthermore, their position as spiritual leaders made them highly involved in and concerned with the plight of ordinary Bamar and Buddhists. Several monks also act as community leaders as they run organizations which do charity and social work for struggling members of the society, leading to their participation in social protest movements over the years.

Rise of Buddhist nationalism

In the most recent decade, closer ties between certain Buddhist ultran-ationalist organisations and the military have emerged, due to both groups being wary of perceived “Islamic threats”. Several ultra-nationalist groups led by monks have formed in the past decade. Exploiting rising tensions between the Muslim Rohingya and Buddhists in Rakhine, these groups justified their hard-line political stance of majoritarianism and exclusivity under the pretext of protecting and preserving the Buddhist sāsana against external threats. In turn, these groups explicitly support the military, which adopted violent measures against the Rohingya.

One of the most prominent groups, the MaBaTha (Association for the Protection of Race and Religion) called on its supporters to vote for the military-backed Union of Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in the 2015 General Election. And in 2017, Sitagu Sayadaw, one of Myanmar’s most revered monks, quoted from “The Victory of Dutthagamani” during a sermon for military officers with the former suggesting that the killings of non-Buddhist was justified. Ashin Wirathu, a key leader within the MaBaTha—who was charged with sedition when the National League for Democracy (NLD) held office—called on his supporters to “do the right thing” in the 2020 General Election, which was likely perceived as asking his followers to vote out the NLD. In contrast to the USDP, the NLD is perceived by some nationalist monks as a party which will not prioritise the protection of Buddhist religion and its sanctity in the state.

Another development since the 2007 revolution is that the relationship between the military and ultra-nationalist groups has become increasingly close and public. Portraying itself as an active defender of Buddhist faith in recent years, the military has donated generously to monasteries and Buddhist organisations, including groups whose members have been charged with sedition. When General That Pon came under fire for donating USD $20,000 to Buddha Dhamma Prahita Foundation ( successor of the MaBaTha), he defended himself by saying that he was simply donating to monks for charity, implying he was acting in the interDests of the Buddhist faith. Such acts illustrate the military’s tacit backing for these radical monks and their symbiotic relationship.

Present predicament

The competing demands to both secure the livelihoods of Burmese through ending the violence, but also to defend the Buddhist faith against the perceived Islamic threats by supporting the military, leads to the present scenario of divergent responses within the sangha. In the recent coup, the split within the sangha is more evident than ever. On 17 March the Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee (MaHaNa) released a statement condemning the military’s violence during protests, signaling a rift between the military and the government-appointed body that oversees the sangha. On the other hand, monks supporting the military were reported to have used slingshots to attack anti-coup protestors on 10th March. Independently, monks all over Myanmar have also taken action to intervene and prevent bloodshed by joining the protests and organising prayers.

With the military acknowledging that a lack of support from monks may lower the morale of their rank and file, a stronger anti-coup message from Burmese monks still has the potential to weaken the military junta’s legitimacy.

The post Split within the sangha: divergent responses towards the Myanmar coup appeared first on New Mandala.

This post was originally published on New Mandala.

Calls for Responsibility to Protect (R2P) have become a mainstay of the demonstrations in Myanmar. Such calls were also made earlier in the aftermath of the Cyclone Nargis disaster in 2008 and the Rakhine State riots in 2012. In these instances, the international community called for R2P in Myanmar, but this time it is the people of Myanmar who demand protection. Will they achieve their goal?

We need R2P in Myanmar
We need R2P in Myanmar
We need R2P in Myanmar#R2PforMyanmar #R2PforMyanmar #R2PforMyanmar pic.twitter.com/m4oAyZR71O

— AungMyint Than (@than_aungmyint) March 30, 2021

The international community’s failure to act in Rwanda in the 1990s led to the consideration of how international society should have prevented the humanitarian crisis. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) presented The Responsibility to Protect report in December 2001, which defined the concept of R2P and generated an intense debate worldwide.

The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) adopted the concept of R2P with strict limitations on the scope of responsibility to protect against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.  In the following years, the UN also released a number of reports involving R2P, such as Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Early Warning Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect, and The Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangement in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.

These documents and reports dictate that states have a primary responsibility to protect their citizens, but the international community bears a responsibility to intervene when the target state is unwilling or unable to do so. R2P in practice refers mainly to military intervention, whether this is sending a peacekeeping force or the forces of a particular state or military alliance. Its introduction was intended as an alternative to the principle of non-intervention and non-use of force. However, the R2P is not a legal instrument, and it can also hardly be marked as a norm so far. In other words, it is merely a concept, and it remains the responsibility of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to determine whether armed intervention should be authorized.

The first difficulty facing a military intervention in Myanmar based on the R2P concept is the resolution process. Given R2P has no agreed triggering criteria, the adoption of R2P is discussed on a case-by-case basis. Although most states welcomed the idea of R2P, the exact timing of the protection is controversial.

Despite calls for intervention from various coalitions and individuals to date, no draft resolution for R2P intervention in Myanmar has materialised. Even if a state presents a draft resolution to the UNSC, reaching an agreement on Myanmar will not be easy. After all, the discussion on the Syrian case is nearly a decade old and has yet to reach a consensus. On top of that, the UNSC members are already divided on their interests.

This is evident from the fact that the 31 March UNSC session ended inconclusively with no sign of any agreement on what specific action the council would take. A divergence of views emerged from this meeting, where the British Ambassador to the UN stated that, “All measures are at our disposal”, while the Chinese Ambassador advocated to “step up diplomatic efforts and encourage the parties to narrow differences so as to find a way out”.

Considering Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter enshrines the norm of non-intervention, the application of R2P for military intervention requires, in principle, the consent of the targeted government. In the case of Darfur in Sudan, the UNSC used the R2P in 2006 for the first time. With due consent of the Sudanese government the Security Council adopted Resolution 1769 for presenting a joint UN-AU peacekeeping force. Given the fact that there is no anarchic or multi-government situation in Myanmar, the junta is much less likely to welcome outside armed intervention because they would themselves be the target of armed forces.

What do the people in Myanmar want to achieve through R2P? Needless to say, pro-democracy protesters in the country aim to overthrow the military government and return to democratic government. Unfortunately, they are bound to be deeply disappointed because this does not fall under the scope of R2P, which only applies to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

On the other hand, the death toll among demonstrators had reached 543 as of April 1, and the actual number could be higher. Meanwhile, Thomas Andrews, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, stressed that the acts of the junta are likely to meet the legal threshold for crimes against humanity. Likewise, Kevin Rudd, former Australian prime minister, was more direct in saying that Myanmar is currently a “textbook case for R2P”.

Regardless of the feasibility of conducting an investigation, assuming an UNSC-authorized one is conducted, and the Burmese military is found to have committed crimes against humanity, could this translate into the adoption of interventions under R2P? The failure of previous attempts to move towards R2P in Syria, and it’s misapplication in Libya is evidence of the great difficulties in effective implementation.

Once the R2P is formally discussed in the UNSC, it is likely that the Burmese warlords could publicly promise to stop using weapons against the demonstrators or alter its repression approach. Then, this situation would leave the UNSC in the middle of an endless investigation and delay the adoption of a resolution on military intervention.

Even if there would be a draft mandate to end the Myanmar junta’s crimes against humanity, China and Russia would surely be concerned that military intervention would be steered in a non-mandated direction, given the precedent set in Libya, when intervention from the US, UK, and France continued after regime change. As veto holders, they can therefore prevent the resolution from being passed.

R2P is not a panacea. In fact, the capacity of R2P is limited, and the decision-making process is fraught with political gamesmanship. With all these factors in play, the Myanmar people’s call for the R2P to help them end this crisis is arguably unlikely to translate into action.

The post The people’s call for R2P: to be or not to be? appeared first on New Mandala.

This post was originally published on New Mandala.

Ko Nyi Nyi Aung Htet was 23 years old when he was killed on February 28, 2021 by the Tatmadaw while peacefully protesting against the February 1st coup d’état in Yangon, Myanmar. He was shot in his abdomen. A graduate of the University of West Yangon with a bachelor’s degree in the Myanmar language, he found employment as a network engineer with one of the many Internet companies that were founded during the past five years as Myanmar opened after decades of isolation. Such companies have brought hope of a better life to university graduates who faced staggeringly high rates of unemployment under military rule – at least when universities were permitted to operate.

Ko Nyi Nyi Aung Htet enjoyed working and playing. One of his favorite pastimes was playing Mobile Legends, a mobile multiplayer online battle arena. Released in 2016, the game has become popular in Southeast Asia and was among the games chosen for the 2019 Southeast Asian Games in the Philippines. He was known by many players of the game. When not online, he enjoyed spending time with his twin brother and his dog named Par Kyel.

With the Tatmadaw taking control of the government again and already taking steps to return the country to isolation (internet blocked, banks closed, international flights cancelled), much of the most promising new careers are now highly uncertain. With this hope for his future being crushed, he joined the protestors.

He knew what he risked. The Tatmadaw has a long history of brutality against the civilian population of Myanmar. Many have been killed and many have been held as political prisoners in deplorable conditions – sometimes for decades. He persisted, nevertheless, for he believed  that democracy and a bright future would not return to Myanmar if the Tatmadaw succeeded.

The Tatmadaw relies on its old playbook in dealing with protestors. It promulgated a law making illegal any group in excess of four people. It initially maintained the appearance of restraint using water canons and rubber bullets to mask its use of live rounds. It attempted to shut off the means of protestor communication. It released violent prisoners into neighborhoods, from where protestors came, to wreck havoc, loot, and rape. It identified where some protestors lived and dragged them from their homes under the cover of night. It attempted to plant people among the protestors and instructed them to hurl projectiles at the police. This was designed to give the police justification for using deadly force. It had soldiers dressed as civilians pretend to be pro-Tatmadaw protestors and had them attack the peaceful protestors while police stood by. Finally, the Tatmadaw has resorted to using machine guns, grenades, and bulldozers.

It was in this phase that Ko Nyi Nyi Aung Htet‘s life was taken.

The post A Myanmar Life Ended appeared first on New Mandala.

This post was originally published on New Mandala.