Nick Cheesman’s recently published book, Myanmar: A Political Lexicon, examined particular Burmese words and phrases as they are applicable in the current sociopolitical context. It stressed the need to be careful about employing various terms, in both Burmese and English, when writing about contemporary Myanmar. Inspired by Nick’s book, the first part of this article looked briefly at the protocols affecting formal titles and designations. This follow-on piece is more concerned with personal names.

All Burmese names are particular. Most people do not have surnames or forenames (“Christian” names) in the Western sense. Names may be one to four syllables long, and are often chosen depending on the day of the week that a child is born. This is why many people in Myanmar share the same names. Needless to say, over the years this practice has made the compilation of a Myanmar telephone book a challenging task. Correspondence sent to someone working in a large organisation usually needs to be addressed to them with an added identifier, such as “Khin Maung (No.7)”, or “Maung Maung (Procurement)”. Cases of mistaken identity are common.

Occasionally, a child’s name may derive from those of its parents, as appears to be the case with regard to opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. “Aung San” comes from her father, independence hero Aung San, who was assassinated in 1947. “Suu” is said to come from her paternal grandmother and “Kyi” reportedly derives from her mother’s name, Khin Kyi. Past military regimes have sought to reduce Aung San Suu Kyi’s claim to these impeccable historical credentials by referring to her simply as “Suu Kyi” or “Ma Suu Kyi”, even Mrs Aris (her British husband’s surname). To her loyal followers, she is “Daw Suu” (Aunty Suu) or “Amay Suu” (Mother Suu).

Also, among the majority Bamar ethnic group names are usually preceded by an honorific, such as “U”, literally meaning “uncle”, or “Daw”, meaning “aunt”. Sometimes, it can be so closely associated with an individual that it is mistaken for part of his name, as was the case with Prime Minister U Nu. “U” can also form a part of a man’s name, as in U Tin U (also spelt Oo). The titles “Maung”, “Ko” (“brother”) and “Ma” (“sister”), usually given to younger men and women, are also found in personal names, as in Maung Maung Aye, Ko Ko Gyi and Ma Ma Lay. Some men adopt “Maung” as a sign of modesty, like the eminent historian and former Vice-Chancellor of Rangoon University Maung Htin Aung, whose birth name was Htin Aung.

There are other honorific titles, which are occasionally mistaken for personal names. For example, respected elders are often known by the title Saya (literally “teacher”), Sayagyi (“great teacher”) or, if female, Sayama. Senior Buddhist monks, such as the abbot of a monastery, are referred to as Sayadaw. Eminent personalities, teachers and ascetics credited with special powers can carry titles like Bodaw, Medaw or Dhamika. Military officers or distinguished former soldiers may be referred to as Bo. Some may have been awarded gallantry medals carrying titles like Thiha Thura. In English this means “brave lion”.

There is also a wide range of civil awards and honours, acknowledging outstanding service to the country, which carry specific titles. Some are more deserved than others. In 2022, for example, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the current junta leader, awarded himself the Thadoe Thiri Thudhamma (Most Glorious Order of Truth) and the Thadoe Maha Thray Sithu (Order of the Union of Myanmar). It now seems to be a requirement to refer to the Senior General by his military rank and all his civil titles whenever he is named in official announcements or the state-controlled news media.

Some of Myanmar’s ethnic minorities, like the Kachin, have family or clan names, which are placed before their given names, as in the case of Maran Brang Seng, where “Maran” is the name of a clan (or, strictly speaking, a sub-clan). Kachin leaders are often known by the title Duwa, literally meaning “big man”. Other ethnic minorities, such as the Mon, Kayin (Karen), Shan, Karenni and Chin have their own systems of honorifics and naming conventions. In the S’ghaw Kayin language, for example, “Saw” and “Naw” are broadly the Kayin equivalents of the Bamar titles “U” and “Daw”. In Shan the corresponding male term is “Sai” and in Mon it is “Nai”.

In Myanmar, personal names can be changed relatively easily, often without seeking official permission or requiring formal registration. This situation is further complicated by the frequent use of nicknames and other sobriquets as identifiers, such as “Moustache” Maung Lwin, “MI” (military intelligence) Tin Oo, Theippan (writer) Maung Wa, “Myanaung” (the town) U Tin, Tekkatho (university) Phone Naing, or “Guardian” (the magazine) Sein Win. Nicknames given during someone’s youth can persist into adulthood. Animists may give a young child an unpleasant name to keep away malevolent spirits, sometimes marking that person for life.

Some Myanmar citizens were given or have adopted Western names. These include older people who attended Christian missionary schools in their youth, where such names were often handed out by teachers without prior consultation with either the children or their parents. Other Burmese use only one part of their name for convenience, for example when travelling abroad or dealing with foreigners who are unfamiliar with the country’s complex naming systems. It is not uncommon for an obituary to list more than one name by which the deceased was known.

Also, pen-names and pseudonyms have a long history in Myanmar. For example, during the last century activist writers often used noms de plume to escape identification and arrest by the British colonial authorities, or later military regimes. Foreigners too have resorted to pseudonyms, perhaps the most famous being Eric Blair (a.k.a. George Orwell), author of Burmese Days. More recently, foreign critics of the military regime have used pen names to avoid being blacklisted and denied entry to the country. For example, “Emma Larkin”, the celebrated author of Secret Histories, is the pen name of an American journalist.

Throughout Myanmar’s history, noms de guerre have also been common. For example, the birth name of General Ne Win, who effectively ruled the country from 1962 to 1988, was Shu Maung. Ne Win, which means “bright sun” (or “brilliant as the sun”) in Burmese, was a nom de guerre he adopted in 1941 and retained after the Second World War, probably to hide his mixed Chinese ancestry. Many members of the armed groups currently fighting the military regime have adopted noms de guerre to protect themselves and their families from retribution by the junta.

It is common among Myanmar’s armed forces (and indeed Myanmar society as a whole) for prominent figures to be given nicknames, many of which, while familiar and amusing, can also be quite respectful. For example, until he was pushed sideways by the new military regime in 1988, General Ne Win was often referred to by members of the Tatmadaw, and many of his civilian supporters, as Apho Gyi, meaning (in this context) “the old man”, or “the big guy”. He was also widely known (in English) as “Number One”, although this was not always out of respect or affection. Behind Ne Win’s back, the powerful intelligence chief Colonel Tin Oo was called “Number One and a Half”.

During the days of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), and after 1997 its nominal successor, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), regime leader Senior General Than Shwe was widely known to his troops as Aba Gyi, meaning “grandfather” or “great father”. He too was sometimes called “Number One”, even after his formal retirement from the Tatmadaw in 2011. Than Shwe’s long time deputy, Vice Senior General Maung Aye, was popularly known (at least in the army) as Aba Aye, or “father Aye”.

Individual military and police officers have attracted a range of derogatory nicknames. For example, when he was a cadet at the Defence Services Academy in the 1970s, Min Aung Hlaing was dubbed kyaung chee (“cat-shit”) by his fellow cadets. This was a reference to something deposited quietly but leaving a terrible smell. After the 2021 coup, Min Aung Hlaing’s opponents soon advertised the fact that, with a slight tonal shift, his initials in Burmese, Ma Ah La, translated as “mother-fucker”. Since extending a national State of Emergency for the fifth time in January 2024, he has been called Toe, which in Burmese means “extend” or “renew”.

Other notorious military officers have attracted similar nicknames. For example, after brutally crushing student protests in 1962, then Lieutenant Colonel, and later President, Sein Win was dubbed “The Butcher of Rangoon”. Following negotiations in 1997 with the drug-trafficking ethnic Wa community, then Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt was dubbed Foe Khin Nyunt, or “Number Four [heroin] Khin Nyunt”. Later, when Chief of Intelligence, he was known (in English) as “the Prince of Darkness”, or the “Prince of Evil”. For his role in suppressing the nation-wide “Saffron Revolution” in 2007, SLORC Chairman Senior General Than Shwe became known as Shwe wah yung lu that thamar Than Shwe, or “monk-killer” Than Shwe.

There are of course other terms, reflecting popular sentiments. Military intelligence officers, for example, are known on the street as kwe (“dogs”), sit kwe (“military dogs”), amair like kwe (“hunting dogs”), or kwe yu (“mad dogs”), among other epithets. According to the anthropologist Monique Skidmore, the latter name arose because night-time raids by intelligence officers on the homes of pro-democracy activists invariably set the local pi dogs barking. For decades, members of the police force have been called kywe, or “rats”, by their detractors. Tatmadaw soldiers call members of Kayin resistance groups nga pway (“ringworms”), among other things, as a calculated insult.

Informers, both paid and unpaid, are popularly known as dalan, although this word has occasionally been translated into English as “spies”. Anti-regime elements who are accused of being “traitors”, “lackeys of the colonialists”, “agents of a foreign power”, “puppets” or “Western stooges”, have been labelled pasein yo in official speeches and stories in state-controlled news media outlets like the New Light of Myanmar. The term is usually translated into English as “axe handles”. This is an apparent allusion to those Burmese nationals or organisations that purportedly support foreigners (the “axe heads”) in their opposition to the military government and, ipso facto in its view, the country.

Another label commonly used by both sides of the political divide (including in popular culture, like songs and movies) is thit sar phauk, literally someone who breaks a legal promise (of allegiance), hence “traitor” or “betrayer”. Those who change their views depending on the audience, or prevailing political climate, have been dismissed as thar ku, or opportunists.

Those Burmese of South Asian ancestry and members of the Rohingya community, indeed all Muslims in Myanmar, are routinely called kalar. This was once a descriptive term for foreigners. During the colonial period, for example, Caucasians were known as kalar pyu, or “white kalar” and foreign women as kalar ma. However, the word has always had perjorative overtones. For example, the SLORC and SPDC tried to shame Aung San Suu Kyi by accusing her of disloyalty for marrying a foreigner or, in their words, a kalar pyu. In 2017, Facebook decreed that use of kalar constituted hate speech and banned it from the platform.

Many pundits, journalists and activists writing about contemporary events in Myanmar do not seem to bother too much about the niceties of names and titles, simply employing whatever words are most commonly used in their own circles, or which reflect their particular political views. Scholars and officials, however, are required to be scrupulously accurate and objective, and thus need to be more circumspect. This can lead at times to cumbersome language, the pedantic use of footnotes or long explanations carefully describing what suite of official titles is being used, and why.

This may seem tiresome to some, but the field of Myanmar studies is heavily sown with factual, political and moral landmines, all threatening to explode should terms deemed inaccurate or inappropriate by one side or another be used. Not so very long ago, the use of “Myanmar” rather than “Burma” was enough to cause eruptions in the activist community, in one case including death threats. As noted earlier, even governments have become caught up in such controversies, causing diplomatic incidents.

Thus, harking back to Confucius 2,500 years ago, the correct use of names is one among the many challenges of writing about this deeply troubled, but fascinating country.

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The Chinese philosopher Kong Fuzi (“Master Kong”, or “Confucius” to Western audiences) is reported to have said about 2,500 years ago that:

If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success.

This analect, or saying, highlights a problem well known to Myanmar-watchers: those looking at, or writing about, the country very quickly run up against the question of what to call it, and what to call the various actors and institutions who play a part in its politics, security and civil society. Not only are there the formal names, which seem constantly to be changing, but there are also the literary names, the politically correct names, the more commonly used names and other names used in the vernacular sense.

Nick Cheesman’s recently published book, Myanmar: A Political Lexicon, which critically examines the use of particular Burmese words and phrases in the current context, brings home the complexity of this issue. Inspired by his fine work, the following jottings (and those in a second part to this article) might be of interest to New Mandala’s readers, and give prospective students of Myanmar an idea of what to expect. I have focussed on political and security issues, as they are the fields best known to me, but I dare say others with interests in other subject areas could compile similar lists.

After Myanmar’s armed forces crushed a nation-wide pro-democracy uprising in 1988, the country’s official name (in English) was changed from its post-1974 form, the “Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma”, back to the “Union of Burma”, which had been adopted when Myanmar regained its independence from the United Kingdom (UK) in 1948. In 1989, the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) changed the country’s name once again, this time to the “Union of Myanmar”, which had long been the vernacular version, in the literary register at least. In the official declaration of the country’s independence, for example, it was called the Union of Burma in the English language version and the Union of Myanmar in the Burmese version.

In 2011, after formal promulgation of the 2008 national constitution, the country’s official name was changed yet again, this time to the “Republic of the Union of Myanmar”. This name is currently recognised by the opposition National Unity Government (NUG), although on its website the NUG also refers to the “Federal Union of Myanmar”, the ultimate goal of the shadow government’s publicly declared 12-point roadmap to national renewal.

Also, in 1989 a number of other place names were changed by the SLORC to reflect their indigenous roots and to conform more closely to their original pronunciation in the Burmese language. For example, Arakan State became Rakhine State and Tenasserim Division became Tanintharyi Division. The Mergui Archipelago became the Myeik Archipelago, the Irrawaddy River became the Ayeyarwady River and the Salween River became the Thanlwin River. The city of Rangoon became Yangon, Moulmein became Mawlamyine, Akyab reverted to Sittwe and Maymyo became Pyin Oo Lwin. The ethno-linguistic groups formerly known as the Burmans and the Karen are now called the Bamar and the Kayin. The people of Kayah State are widely known as Karenni (Red Karen), the state’s name until it was changed by the Burmese government in 1952.

Just to complicate things, in the 2008 constitution, written before the armed forces stepped back from direct rule in 2011, the names of Myanmar’s seven administrative “Divisions”, which are dominated by ethnic Bamar, were changed to “Regions”. There are also seven States, one Union Territory, one Self-Administered Division and five Self-Administered Zones.

The new names have been accepted by most countries, the United Nations and other major international organisations. A few governments, activist groups and news media outlets, however, still cling to “Burma” as the name of the country, apparently as a protest against the SLORC’s refusal to put the question of a name change to the people of Myanmar. The old name was also believed to be the preference of then opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was held under house arrest by the military regime for periods totalling almost 15 years, and is now back in prison. Of necessity, the new name is cited in all formal diplomatic exchanges, but failure consistently to acknowledge and use it in public has prompted complaints by successive Myanmar administrations.

These complaints have been directed mainly at the United States’ government which, even now, 35 years later, insists on using “Burma” in official correspondence and Congressional documents. For example, all US laws and regulations levelling sanctions against Myanmar since 1988 refer specifically to “Burma”, as demonstrated by the “Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability (BURMA) Act” of 2022. It has been suggested that one reason for Washington’s obduracy is that official recognition of the country’s new name would require a revision of all these laws and regulations, something that successive US governments have been unwilling to pursue.

Questioned about the official name of the country soon after her party took office in 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi stated her continuing preference for the colonial-era term “Burma”, but said that both names were now acceptable.

From January 1862, when British Burma was declared a separate province of (British) India, Yangon (then known as Rangoon) had been the capital. After the UK dispatched troops to the royal capital of Mandalay and completed its three-stage conquest of Burma in January 1886, Rangoon was confirmed as the administrative capital of the entire country. It remains the commercial capital, but in November 2005 the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), which replaced the SLORC in 1997, formally designated the newly-built city of Naypyidaw (or Nay Pyi Taw), 327 kilometres north of Yangon, as the seat of Myanmar’s government.

The terms “Rangoon regime”, “Yangon regime”, or in some cases simply “Rangoon” or “Yangon”, have been used by some authors and commentators as shorthand terms for the central government, including the military government that was created in 1962 and re-invented in 1974, 1988 and 1997. The government after 2005 was sometimes referred to as the “Naypyidaw regime”, or “Naypyidaw”, to reflect the administrative change that took place that year. Since the 2021 coup, however, that has become less common, although formally Naypyidaw remains the capital of the country.

Another well-known Burmese name is Tatmadaw. Since 1948, the name has been the vernacular term for Myanmar’s tri-service (army, navy and air force) armed forces. It is usually translated as “royal force”, but the honorific daw no longer refers to the Burmese monarchy. Rarely used in foreign publications before the 1988 uprising, it has since gained wide currency in English language and other works on Myanmar. Sometimes, the Tatmadaw is referred to simply as “the army”, reflecting that service’s overwhelming size and influence, compared with the other two.

The English term “Defence Services”, which first appeared in 1952, usually refers only to the armed forces, but is sometimes used in a wider context to refer collectively to the armed forces, the Myanmar Police Force (MPF), the “People’s Militias”, border guard forces and sundry other state-endorsed paramilitary units. The Myanmar Fire Services Department and Myanmar Red Cross Society are considered “reserve forces for national defence” by the military regime and as such have also been included in this broad category. As the 2008 constitution decrees that “all the armed forces in the Union shall be under the command of the Defence Services”, the formal title (in English) of the Tatmadaw’s most senior officer is Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services.

Thanks to numerous references made by journalists and on-line commentators, another Burmese term that has become familiar since the 1988 uprising is Lon Htein, used to describe the paramilitary units of the police force that have been called out to quell civil unrest. Lon Htein is short for Lon-chon-hmu Htein-thein Tat-yin, literally translated as “security preservation battalion”. Usually translated into English as “riot police”, the Lon Htein has suffered several variations of name over the years, from “riot security forces” to “police regiments” and “police security battalions”, even “police combat battalions”. While the term Lon Htein still crops up in articles and blogs, these forces are now collectively referred to as the Police Security Unit.

Taken together, the armed forces, the national police force and Myanmar’s three main intelligence agencies (the Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs, the MPF Special Branch and the Bureau of Special Investigations) are often referred to as the country’s “security forces”, and are widely acknowledged to constitute the core of the state’s coercive apparatus.

At times, however, other government agencies, such as the Ministry of Border Affairs, the General Administration Department and the Prisons Department have been included in this term. Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications, the Ministry of Immigration and Population, and the bureaucratic organs responsible for conducting census surveys, have also contributed to the state’s surveillance capabilities. Ad hoc militias and informal gangs of thugs overtly or covertly employed by the government as coercive muscle and “enforcers” in local neighbourhoods are not seen as legitimate members of the so-called “uniformed” or “disciplined” services. Accordingly, they are not accepted (by anyone) as members of Myanmar’s security forces.

Over the years, some components of Myanmar’s intelligence apparatus have changed their names. The military intelligence organisation, for example, has periodically been renamed, usually to coincide with structural and personnel changes in the armed forces. These adjustments have not always been known to, or recognised by, foreign observers. Also, Burmese language titles have been translated into English in different ways. For example, the title “Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs” (OCMSA) has sometimes been written as the “Office of the Chief of Military Affairs Security”, or simply “Military Affairs Security”. It has also been called the “Department of Security on Military Affairs” and the “Directorate of Defence Services Security”.

The use of popular names for such institutions has added another complication. For example, ever since 1948, and regardless of its formal title, the Tatmadaw’s intelligence arm has been widely known as the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), or simply the “MI” (“em-eye”). Similarly, the national police force’s Intelligence Bureau, and later its Special Investigations Department (or, strictly translated, “Information Police”), has long been known in both English and Burmese as Special Branch, or “SB”. It even appears as “Special Branch” in internal police documents and reports prepared for the MPF by outside agencies.

All this has meant that in the international news media, online commentaries and other literature some of Myanmar’s security forces have been called by several different names, and not always accurately.

Since the coup d’etat on 1 February 2021, many activist groups and commentators have refused to call the new military regime by its self-granted title, the State Administration Council (SAC), which on 1 August that year branded itself a “provisional” or “caretaker” government. They refer simply to “the junta” or “the military regime”, names rejected by the military leadership. Junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has been denied any official status or recognition, being widely known as “the junta chief” or Ma Ah La, the Burmese acronym for his personal name.

The same critics have also objected to calling Myanmar’s armed forces the Tatmadaw, on the grounds that they do not deserve the status and prestige that was once associated with that title. The opposition movement and its supporters prefer the description sit-tat (or sitdat), which in the Burmese language simply means “military force”, or “armed forces”. This is despite the fact that “Tatmadaw” occurs in the official (Burmese language) name of the opposition People’s Defence Force (PDF). Another popular epithet is thubon sit-tat, or “rebel army”. Some governments, like that of the US, avoid such linguistic and diplomatic conundrums by simply referring in public (albeit ungrammatically) to “the Burmese military”.

Controversy also surrounds the term used to describe those ethnically-based armed groups fighting Myanmar’s central government, some of them for decades. The Kayin struggle, for example, has been described as the longest-running insurgency in the world, dating from 1949. For many years, these groups have been known as “ethnic armed organisations” (EAO), or variations thereof, such as “armed ethnic groups”. Although it is widely used in the international news media, these insurgents dislike the term “rebels”, as it suggests a lack of legitimacy, both for the groups themselves and their struggles for independence, autonomy or other goals.

Since the 2021 coup, not all EAOs have openly declared their support for the opposition movement but those that have, and are loosely allied with the NUG and PDF, are increasingly being referred to as “ethnic resistance organisations” (ERO). An alternative meaning of ERO found in some sources is “ethnic revolutionary organisations”. This follows moves by some activists and sympathetic observers to describe the current conflict as a “revolution” and not a “civil war” (the more common term). This view seems to be based on the nature of the armed struggle, the scope of the opposition’s aims and the number of people in Myanmar who appear to support them. A more neutral term also used from time to time is “non-state armed groups”.

Added to the complexity and confusion arising from the shifting use of official and politically sensitive titles is Myanmar’s even more complicated landscape of personal names. This is examined in part two of this article.

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The post Name-calling in Myanmar: on protocols appeared first on New Mandala.

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