Category: National Security

  • UQ News

    Journalists may face decades in prison for “foreign interference” offences unless urgent changes are made to Australia’s national security laws, according to a University of Queensland researcher.

    PhD candidate Sarah Kendall from UQ’s School of Law warned that reporting on issues relating to Australian politics, national security or international relations while working with overseas media organisations could place journalists at risk of criminal prosecution under the Espionage and Foreign Interference Act 2018.

    “The law could apply to any journalist, staff member or source who works for or collaborates with foreign-controlled media organisations,” Kendall said.

    “There could also be repercussions for journalists working overseas, as any news published in Australia is subject to these laws.”

    The Espionage and Foreign Interference Act 2018 covers nine foreign interference offences, with penalties ranging from 10 to 20 years imprisonment.

    “While these offences require some part of the person’s conduct to be covert or involve deception, this does not exclude legitimate journalistic activities,” Kendall said.

    “Journalists could be acting covertly whenever they liaise with a confidential source using encrypted technologies or engage in undercover work using hidden cameras.”

    Public interest protection
    In a Foreign Interference Law and Press Freedom briefing paper, Kendall recommended that the government introduce an occupation-specific exemption to protect journalists working in the public interest.

    The paper argues that the scope of offences be narrowed to remove “recklessness” and “prejudice to Australia’s national security” as punishable elements.

    “For example, a journalist could be accused of recklessly harming national security when they publish a story that reveals war crimes by members of the Australian Defence Force,” Kendall said.

    “Journalists and their sources could face up to 20 years in prison if any part of their conduct was covert, even if they are engaged in legitimate, good faith reporting.”

    Kendall said the law’s Preparatory Offence, which carries a potential jail term of 10 years, risked creating a dangerous precedent when combined with the offence of conspiracy.

    “This offence can capture the earliest stages of investigative reporting so a discussion between a journalist and source about a potential story on Australian politics could see them charged with conspiring to prepare for foreign interference,” Kendall said.

    Foreign Interference Law and Press Freedom is the latest report in UQ Law School’s Press Freedom Policy Papers series, a project aimed at laying the groundwork for widespread reform in laws spanning espionage, whistleblowing and free speech as they affect the media.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Ever since Ukraine launched a successful counteroffensive against Russian forces in late August, American officials have tried to claim credit, insisting that U.S. intelligence has been key to Ukraine’s battlefield victories.

    Yet U.S. officials have simultaneously downplayed their intelligence failures in Ukraine — especially their glaring mistakes at the outset of the war. When Putin invaded in February, U.S. intelligence officials told the White House that Russia would win in a matter of days by quickly overwhelming the Ukrainian army, according to current and former U.S. intelligence officials, who asked not to be named to discuss sensitive information.

    The Central Intelligence Agency was so pessimistic about Ukraine’s chances that officials told President Joe Biden and other policymakers that the best they could expect was that the remnants of Ukraine’s defeated forces would mount an insurgency, a guerrilla war against the Russian occupiers. By the time of the February invasion, the CIA was already planning how to provide covert support for a Ukrainian insurgency following a Russian military victory, the officials said.

    U.S. intelligence reports at the time predicted that Kyiv would fall quickly, perhaps in a week or two at the most. The predictions spurred the Biden administration to secretly withdraw some key U.S. intelligence assets from Ukraine, including covert former special operations personnel on contract with the CIA, the current and former officials said. Their account was backed up by a Naval officer and a former Navy SEAL, who were aware of the movements and who also asked not to be named because they were not authorized to speak publicly.

    The CIA “got it completely wrong,” said one former senior U.S. intelligence official, who is knowledgeable about what the CIA was reporting when the Russian invasion began. “They thought Russia would win right away.”

    When it became clear that the agency’s predictions of a rapid Russian victory had been wrong, the Biden administration sent the clandestine assets that had been pulled out of Ukraine back into the country, the military and intelligence officials said. One U.S. official insisted that the CIA only conducted a partial withdrawal of its assets when the war began, and that the agency “never completely left.”

    Secret U.S. operations inside Ukraine are being conducted under a presidential covert action finding.

    Yet clandestine American operations inside Ukraine are now far more extensive than they were early in the war, when U.S. intelligence officials were fearful that Russia would steamroll over the Ukrainian army. There is a much larger presence of both CIA and U.S. special operations personnel and resources in Ukraine than there were at the time of the Russian invasion in February, several current and former intelligence officials told The Intercept.

    Secret U.S. operations inside Ukraine are being conducted under a presidential covert action finding, current and former officials said. The finding indicates that the president has quietly notified certain congressional leaders about the administration’s decision to conduct a broad program of clandestine operations inside the country. One former special forces officer said that Biden amended a preexisting finding, originally approved during the Obama administration, that was designed to counter malign foreign influence activities. A former CIA officer told The Intercept that Biden’s use of the preexisting finding has frustrated some intelligence officials, who believe that U.S. involvement in the Ukraine conflict differs so much from the spirit of the finding that it should merit a new one. A CIA spokesperson declined to comment about whether there is a presidential covert action finding for operations in Ukraine.

    The U.S. intelligence community’s stunning failure at the beginning of the war to recognize the fundamental weaknesses in the Russian system mirrors its blindness to the military and economic weaknesses of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, when Washington failed to predict the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. While not all U.S. intelligence analysts underestimated the Ukrainian will to fight, the community’s missteps in Ukraine came just months after American intelligence gravely underestimated how fast the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan would collapse in 2021, leading to a rapid takeover by the Taliban.

    Some senior U.S. intelligence officials have since admitted they were wrong in projecting a quick Russian victory. In March, Avril Haines, the director of national intelligence, acknowledged during a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing that the CIA didn’t do well “in terms of predicting the military challenges that [Putin] has encountered with his own military.”

    The director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Army Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, said at the same March hearing that “my view was that, based on a variety of factors, that the Ukrainians were not as ready as I thought they should be, therefore I questioned their will to fight, [and] that was a bad assessment on my part.”

    “I think assessing … morale, and a will to fight is a very difficult analytical task,” he added. “We had different inputs from different organizations. And at least from my perspective as director, I did not do as well as I could have.”

    Yet these admissions mask a more fundamental failure that officials have not fully acknowledged: U.S. intelligence did not recognize the significance of rampant corruption and incompetence in the Putin regime, particularly in both the Russian army and Moscow’s defense industries, the current and former intelligence officials said. U.S. intelligence missed the impact of corrupt insider dealing and deceit among Putin loyalists in Moscow’s defense establishment, which has left the Russian army a brittle and hollow shell.

    “There was no reporting on the corruption in the Russian system,” said the former senior intelligence official. “They missed it, and ignored any evidence of it.”

    “There was no reporting on the corruption in the Russian system.”

    Following a string of Russian defeats, even prominent Russian analysts have begun to openly blame the corruption and deceit that plagues the Russian system. On Russian television last weekend, Andrey Gurulyov, the former deputy commander of Russia’s southern military district and now a member of the Russian Duma, blamed his country’s losses on a system of lies, “top to bottom.”

    Additionally, Putin imposed an invasion plan on the Russian military that was impossible to achieve, one current U.S. official argued. “You can’t really separate out the issue of Russian military competency from the fact that they were shackled to an impossible plan, which led to poor military preparation,” the official said.

    Remains of Russian uniforms in the destroyed village of Shandryholove near Lyman, Ukraine, 3rd of October 2022.

    Remains of Russian uniforms in the destroyed village of Shandryholove near Lyman, Ukraine, on Oct. 3, 2022.

    Photo: Wojciech Grzedzinski/Getty Images


    After Russia’s defeat in Lyman, in eastern Ukraine, last weekend, retired Army Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, who commanded U.S. Army forces in Europe from 2014 until 2018, also admitted that he had “overestimated Russia’s capabilities” before it invaded Ukraine because he “failed to realize the depth of corruption” in the Russian Ministry of Defense.

    The inability of the U.S. intelligence community to recognize the significance of Russian corruption appears to be the result of an over-reliance on technical intelligence. Before the war, high-tech satellites and surveillance systems allowed the U.S. to track the deployment of Russian troops, tanks, and planes, and to eavesdrop on Russian military officials, enabling U.S. intelligence to accurately predict the timing of the invasion. But it would have needed more human spies inside Russia to see that the Russian army and defense industries were deeply corrupt.

    Since the war began, a long list of weaknesses in the Russian military and its defense industries have been exposed, symbolized by the so-called jack-in-the-box flaw in Russian tanks. Ukrainian forces quickly learned that one well-placed shot could blow off a Russian tank turret, sending it sky high and killing the entire crew. It became clear that Russian tanks had been designed and built cheaply — with ammunition stored openly in a ring inside the turret that can explode when the turret is hit — and that crew safety had not been prioritized. In July, Adm. Tony Radakin, Britain’s military chief, said that Russia had lost almost 1,700 tanks in Ukraine.

    Weak leadership, poor training, and low morale have led to huge casualties among Russian rank and file soldiers. In August, the Pentagon estimated that 70,000 to 80,000 Russian troops had been killed or wounded in Ukraine. Ukraine has also suffered huge casualties, but Russian front-line strength has been badly weakened.

    Meanwhile, one of the biggest mysteries for U.S. analysts has been Russia’s failure to gain control of Ukraine’s skies, despite having a far larger air force. Aircraft design flaws, poor pilot training, and gaps in aircraft maintenance have left Russian aircraft vulnerable to Ukraine’s air defenses, which have been bolstered with Stinger missiles and other Western air defense systems.

    The failure of U.S. intelligence to see the dysfunction in the Russian army and defense industries means that it also didn’t foresee Russia’s ongoing battlefield defeats, which are now having a profound political and social impact on both Putin and Russia. Putin has ordered a partial mobilization to replace heavy battlefield losses, sparking large-scale protests. At least 200,000 people have already fled Russia, including thousands of young men seeking to avoid conscription.

    The post The CIA Thought Putin Would Quickly Conquer Ukraine. Why Did They Get It So Wrong? appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • In a cheerfully animated promotional video, a woman narrates Cubic Transportation Systems’ vision for the future. Travelers will pay fares using a ticket-free mobile account. Real-time data will be aggregated, linked, and shared. Deals — such as 50 percent off at a partner coffee shop — may even incentivize users to select certain transit routes at certain times.

    “The more information that is gathered, the more powerful the system becomes,” the narrator tells us. “The piece of the puzzle missing … is you.”

    This is “NextCity,” Cubic Transportation Systems’ idea of a smart city: an urban area that uses technology and networked data to optimize functioning and mobility.

    Over the past decade, Cubic has taken the first steps toward actualizing its vision by snapping up contracts for the development of mobile-based, contactless fare collection systems in eight of America’s 10 largest public transit networks. Gone are the days of cumbersome tokens and flimsy farecards; now, millions of bus and subway riders can pay their fare directly by hovering a smartphone or credit card over a reader.

    Transit authorities have embraced tap-to-pay technology for its convenience and speed, but privacy advocates are worried that the new fare collection systems pose serious surveillance and security risks. The concerns came to the fore as New York City’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority, or MTA, rolled out OMNY, a fare payment system backed by Cubic that’s slated to fully replace MetroCards by the end of 2023. Nevertheless, Cubic’s widespread use of touchless, mobile-based reader technology is sprouting up everywhere — including places like San Francisco and Miami, where public transit riders would need to dig deep into city documents to find Cubic’s roles.

    Cubic is a privately held corporation with broad and varied interests. In addition to its transit operation, Cubic is a vast military contractor doing hundreds of millions of dollars in business with the U.S. military and sales to foreign militaries. The company supplies surveillance technologies, training simulators, satellite communications equipment, computing and networking platforms, and other military hardware and software. Most of the headlines Cubic garners, though, stem from its increasingly indispensable role in public transit systems across the world.

    “I’m deeply concerned about how the development of smart cities creates growing incentives for companies like Cubic to aggregate our data and then sell it.”

    As Cubic’s quiet grip on fare collection takes hold in more cities, the company’s ability to process rider data grows with it, creating a sprawling corporate apparatus that has the extraordinary potential to gather up reams of information on the very people it is supposed to serve. In some cases, its access to that information is explicit in the transit systems’ privacy policies.

    “I’m deeply concerned about how the development of smart cities creates growing incentives for companies like Cubic to aggregate our data and then sell it to police, ICE, and other agencies,” said Albert Fox Cahn, founder and executive director of the Surveillance Technology and Oversight Project, referring to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. “Right now, our data is a huge part of the product, with almost no safeguards against these sorts of abuse.”

    Cubic did not respond to a request for comment.

    MG_1681-Cubic-MTA-NYC

    OMNY, a fare payment system backed by Cubic, installed on a turnstile in a Brooklyn subway station on Sept. 30, 2022.

    Photo: Elise Swain/The Intercept

    Turnstiles and Military Systems

    The privacy concerns around Cubic would be acute even if its interests were limited to transit, but the company wears dual hats as ubiquitous public service provider and defense contractor.

    Cubic Transportation Systems is but one division of Cubic Corporation. The company’s other concerns revolve around providing technologies to U.S. and other security forces. The defense contractor, Cubic Mission and Performance Solutions, handles Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance — or C5ISR — capabilities for the U.S. military. And Cubic also owns a variety of subsidiaries, including Abraxas Corporation, which supplies counterintelligence and cybersecurity software to agencies working in national security.

    Since 1992, U.S. government agencies have awarded Cubic’s defense wing and its subsidiaries billions of dollars in contracts, including more than $42.1 million from the Department of Defense this year alone. One of Cubic’s largest contracts came in 2020, when the Pentagon awarded the company $193.3 million for work on training systems, with over half of the money allocated to foreign military sales in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Oman, Poland, Qatar, Singapore, Australia, and the U.K.

    Cubic has also provided key support for U.S. drone operations. The company received $1.4 million from the U.S. Air Force in 2018 for Predator/Reaper training software, and in 2020, it signed a cooperative agreement with U.S. Special Operations for the research and development of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies related to drones. Cubic also sells surveillance technologies; a subsidiary that sells video enhancement software has clients including the New York Police Department, U.S. Secret Service, and military criminal investigators.

    The defense contracting business runs in parallel to the transit work — where Cubic’s reach is also international. The company has implemented contactless payment technology in other major cities globally, including London, Sydney, and Vancouver. It controls about 70 percent of the market for public transit fare collection across the U.S., U.K., and Australia.

    In 2013, when the Chicago Reporter flagged that the company responsible for Chicago’s Ventra system — cards for public transit — had national security ties, a Cubic Corporation spokesperson insisted that the transportation and defense wings were “entirely separate entities and not connected through anything but ownership.”

    In annual reports, however, the company emphasized the benefits of its “Living One Cubic” ethos. The reports describe the touchless reader at the center of Cubic’s transit business as “an innovation developed through engineering collaboration” across both divisions of the company. The 2019 annual report also cites the launch of a new internal product management system that will facilitate the sharing of “technical information and data amongst our engineering teams and the overall company.”

    The notion of “One Cubic” is also on display in lobbying disclosures. While Cubic has spent massive sums on more than two decades of defense-industry lobbying, Cubic Corporation has put lesser, though still significant funding into lobbying on transit issues; in 2015, the company started directing its resources into “promot[ing] Cubic transportation technology solutions.” In 2019, the company pushed for the “adoption of integrated fare payment and mobility as a service solutions” — corporate jargon for its mobile-based fare collection systems and public-private transit partnerships.

    Often, Cubic Corporation’s defense and transportation lobbying is targeted at the same lawmaker or handled by the same firm, with disclosures listing House and Senate defense authorizations alongside federal transportation appropriations.

    For Bill Budington, senior staff technologist at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the soft wall between Cubic’s transportation and military businesses raises questions that have yet to be addressed by transit authorities about the risks that personal data could move between the two sides of the company.

    “I think it depends on the overlap, and whether the technologies employed are bleeding over to the other side of the company,” said Budington. “And whether the typical concerns, when it comes to the privacy and security of data that’s being handled for the public, are lessened by the fact that you’re part of the intelligence community that is looking for targets and employing military technologies overseas.”

    He added, “That is something that should be raised to the public, and there should be a public debate about it. And I don’t think that there has been.”

    Vague Privacy Policy

    The Cubic Corporation’s privacy policy outlines the notably lenient guidelines governing the use of data provided both through Cubic’s own website and its contracts with clients. The sharing of personal information is permitted among recipients, including Cubic’s family of companies, affiliates, and subsidiaries; external auditors; police, regulators, government agencies, and judicial or administrative authorities; and third parties connected with mergers and acquisitions.

    The company also says it may share information “where disclosure is both legally permissible and necessary to protect or defend our rights” and in “matters of national security.” Personal data may be stored for up to 10 years.

    Cubic’s privacy policy allows data sharing between corporate divisions only if it’s for the product being delivered, not for ancillary business practices. However, Cahn said that it’s difficult to know what corporate firewalls are truly in place when dealing with private companies.

    “I think this highlights one of the broader design tensions with smart cities infrastructure,” Cahn said. “Oftentimes, we have a misalignment of incentives, where companies have every reason to look for ways to monetize our most intimate data, or as a government tracking tool, rather than having incentives to truly keep that information protected.”

    The guidelines for the MTA’s touchless system OMNY have been criticized for their weakness. The Surveillance Technology and Oversight Project found in a 2019 report that the policy permits the MTA and Cubic to store users’ personal data indefinitely, allowing law enforcement and other government agencies access to that and other information. The touchless system’s predecessor, the MetroCard, which Cubic designed and implemented in 1992, already enables enforcement agencies to track users’ whereabouts.

    “There should be some kind of oversight body that is making sure the new surveillance technology that’s employed isn’t going to violate the privacy rights of individuals.”

    Recent media reports noted that, because OMNY links credit card information to a user profile by design, location tracking could be connected to names, payment cards, and any other information web tracking and data scraping could tie to the account. According to TransitCenter, a group focused on improving public transportation in cities, OMNY would elevate tracking capabilities to a “near-instantaneous” level.

    The MTA’s OMNY privacy policy stipulates that Cubic and other vendors must adhere to privacy practices “at least as stringent” as those in the OMNY policy. Other Cubic-designed systems, though, do not disclose such restrictive rules. The Chicago Ventra program policy simply authorizes the sharing of personal information with Cubic, provided it “maintain[s] the confidentiality of the information” and uses it only as necessary for administering the program.

    Budington, of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, told The Intercept that phrases such as “necessary to provide services” or “as permitted by law” raise red flags. This vague language cannily obscures any specifics of what the company is doing with the provided data.

    “This is why we at EFF are big advocates for city council ordinances when surveillance technologies are employed on a population,” he said. “There should be some kind of oversight body that is making sure the new surveillance technology that’s employed isn’t going to violate the privacy rights of individuals.”

    Cubic-MTA-NYC

    A passenger successfully pays subway fare using OMNY, run by Cubic, in Brooklyn, N.Y. on Sept. 30th, 2022.

    Photo: Elise Swain/The Intercept

    Public Service, Private Equity

    Cubic Corporation had been publicly traded since it was founded in 1959, but in May 2021, Veritas Capital and Evergreen Coast Capital paid roughly $3 billion to take the company private. Veritas also owns the Department of Homeland Security’s biometrics database and has acquired business units of Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and other defense contractors. One critic has suggested that Cubic’s recent acquisition by the private equity firms could exacerbate the company’s lack of interest in safeguarding users’ data.

    Cubic’s defense industry ties highlight a stark paradox: Public transit is widely viewed as an essential public service, but the private contractors that enable the systems may have corporate incentives that don’t align with the goal of a common good. For instance, though the MTA has pushed back against privacy advocates’ concerns, Cubic’s own documents emphasize that it has broad ambitions for the use of rider data.

    A brochure for the back-end analytics tool that Cubic offers to transit agencies boasts that the technology can enable transit authorities to search and visualize large datasets to “make discoveries” and “identify trends.” The software can also aggregate and anonymize personally identifiable information, turning that information into “an analytics-ready dataset that can be securely consumed for research, monetization schemes, and other internal and external purposes.” Experts have noted that even purportedly anonymized data holds privacy risks, as it is often possible to re-identify users with their personal information.

    The company’s vision for NextCity would join data collected by Cubic with other smart-city infrastructure to “build a model for real-time data gathered across a transportation network.” Cubic Corporation’s annual reports outline how it aims to expand its portfolio beyond fare collection to include ride and bike sharing, tolls and parking, and traffic congestion reduction. Toward these ends, Cubic Corporation has acquired multiple companies in recent years that are focused on smart city technologies, including GRIDSMART, which supplies cameras to enable real-time traffic monitoring, and Delerrok, an electronic fare-collection system.

    For now, cities with Cubic’s mobile-based payment systems also offer the option to purchase fare cards with cash, albeit for an additional $5, at select retailers. Individual people concerned with their privacy might opt for this method despite the convenience of OMNY and similar systems.

    Despite the workarounds, transit authorities in major metropolitan areas are increasingly letting any notion of privacy fall by the wayside. As an increasing number of metropolitan areas embrace the concept of smart cities, the privacy risks associated with the technology are poised to grow — until, eventually, everyone’s choice between convenience and privacy might be made for them.

    The post Meet the Military Contractor Running Fare Collection in New York Subways — and Around the World appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • In early 2018, former National Security Agency chief Keith Alexander worked out a deal with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the cyber institute led by one of his closest aides, Saud al-Qahtani, to help the Saudi ruler train the next generation of Saudi hackers to take on the kingdom’s enemies.

    While the agreement between IronNet, founded by Alexander, and the cyber school was widely reported in intelligence industry outlets and the Saudi press at the time, it faced no scrutiny for its association with Qahtani, after the brutal killing of Jamal Khashoggi he reportedly orchestrated just a few months later.

    Alexander officially inked the deal with the Prince Mohammed bin Salman College of Cyber Security, Artificial Intelligence, and Advanced Technologies — a school set up to train Saudi cyber intelligence agents — at a signing ceremony in Washington, D.C., according to an announcement in early July.

    Qahtani’s proxy at the signing noted in a statement that “the strategic agreement will ensure [Saudi Arabia is] benefiting from the experience of an advisory team comprising senior officers who had held senior positions in the Cyber Command of the US Department of Defense.” Alexander’s for-profit cyber security firm IronNet would work closely with the Saudi Federation of Cybersecurity, Programming, and Drones, an affiliate of the college devoted to offensive cyber operations and at the time overseen by Qahtani.

    Saudi Arabia’s agreement with IronNet was part of a host of moves to step up its cyber capabilities, coinciding with a campaign against the kingdom’s critics abroad. Khashoggi, then a Washington Post columnist and prominent Salman critic, received a series of threatening messages, including one from Qahtani, warning him to remain silent. Khashoggi, whose family and close associates discovered listening malware electronically implanted on their smartphones, was then lured to the Saudi Embassy in Istanbul.

    It was there that a team dispatched by Qahtani detained and tortured the Saudi government critic. Qahtani, according to reports, beamed in through Skype to insult Khashoggi during the ordeal, allegedly instructing his team to “bring me the head of the dog.” Khashoggi was then dismembered with a bone saw.

    IronNet’s agreement tied to the alleged mastermind behind the killing of Khashoggi is not listed on the IronNet website, and it is not known if the business relationship still stands — or what the extent of it ever was. IronNet and representatives of the Saudi government did not respond to repeated requests for comment. The Saudi Arabia relationship, according to former IronNet employees, has largely been shrouded in secrecy, even within the firm.

    Qahtani’s role of enforcer on behalf of bin Salman, well known prior to the Khashoggi slaying, has closely followed the young prince’s meteoric rise as the effective leader of Saudi Arabia.

    In 2017, Qahtani played a pivotal role in the abduction and interrogation of hundreds of Saudi elites, who were held captive at the Ritz-Carlton in Riyadh, at which they were forced to pledge loyalty and money to Salman. Qahtani personally led the questioning efforts, according to reports.

    Later that year, he reportedly participated in the interrogation of former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri, who was beaten and forced to resign. The following year, according to the brother of Saudi women’s rights activist Loujain al-Hathloul, Qahtani also directly participated in the torture of al-Hathloul, where he mocked her and threatened to have her raped.

    On behalf of the kingdom, Qahtani has made it his personal quest to acquire and expand Saudi cyberwarfare tools. Beyond the deal with IronNet and other top-flight American cyber experts, he has spent over a decade directly negotiating the accumulation of computer and phone infiltration technology.

    Qahtani took the helm of official state-backed efforts to expand Saudi Arabia’s cyber offensive capabilities in October 2017, when he was named president of a committee called the Electronic Security and Software Alliance, later renamed the Saudi Federation for Cybersecurity, Programming, and Drones.

    Earlier this year, SAFCSP signed an agreement with Spire Solutions, a consulting firm that partners with a wide range of cyber intelligence contractors. Haboob, another cyber venture promoted by Qahtani, is a private venture that recruits hackers on behalf of the Saudi government. Haboob’s chair, Naif bin Lubdah, is on SAFCSP’s board of directors.

    In 2018, Chiron Technology Services, another American cyber consulting firm, also inked a memorandum of understanding to provide training to the same Saudi hacker school advised by IronNet. Chiron’s team includes top talent recruited from the U.S. Air Force, Army, and NSA, including Michael Tessler, who previously worked at the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations command, which handles high-profile computer infiltration missions of foreign governments.

    Jeff Weaver, the chief executive of Chiron, said in an email that his company signed a memorandum of understanding “with the college to develop a cybersecurity curriculum in support of their technical degree programs. However, no collaboration ever occurred, and they never called on us to contribute. We haven’t heard from them since 2018.”

    Online cyber sleuths identified Qahtani’s multiple handles on online hacking forums, where he was an active member seeking to purchase hacking tools. A screen name used by Qahtani, for instance, appeared to have purchased a remote access trojan known as Blackshades, which can infect targeted computers to modify and seize files, activate the webcam, and record keystrokes and passwords.

    Cybersecurity researchers have identified powerful hacking technology implanted on the phones of Khashoggi’s family, likely by agents of the United Arab Emirates, a close Saudi ally. Several received malicious texts that infected their phones with Pegasus, a tool created by the NSO Group to remotely access a target’s microphone, text messages, and location.

    Qahtani, who briefly faced house arrest, was swiftly cleared of wrongdoing in Khashoggi’s death by the Saudi government. Five of the hitmen in the squad sent to kill Khashoggi were sentenced to death, including Maher Abdulaziz Mutreb, an intelligence officer who worked under Qahtani. Qahtani’s current relationship with the institute is unknown.

    People hold posters of slain Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, near the Saudi Arabia consulate in Istanbul, marking the two-year anniversary of his death, Friday, Oct. 2, 2020. The gathering was held outside the consulate building, starting at 1:14 p.m. (1014 GMT) marking the time Khashoggi walked into the building where he met his demise. The posters read in Arabic:' Khashoggi's Friends Around the World'. (AP Photo/Emrah Gurel)

    People hold posters of slain Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, near the Saudi Arabia consulate in Istanbul, on Oct. 2, 2020.

    Photo: Emrah Gurel/AP


    Following Khashoggi’s killing, many U.S. firms faced pressure to exit business deals with Saudi Arabian entities. Yet, in the years following Khashoggi’s murder, the Saudi cyberwarfare institute central to the plot has continued to do business with Western defense industry leaders.

    In 2019, BAE Systems, a major defense contractor based in the U.S. and the U.K., entered into a training agreement with the MBS College of Cyber Security. Last year, Cisco unveiled a training relationship with the Saudi Federation of Cybersecurity, Programming, and Drones.

    BAE, reached for comment, distanced itself from the deal. “BAE Systems works with a number of partner companies based in Saudi Arabia,” said a spokesperson for the company. “ISE, one of our Saudi partner companies, was awarded a contract in 2019 by the MBS College for Cyber Security to provide support services to establish the college, such as general staffing and facilities management but this contract wasn’t activated and is still on hold.”

    Alexander has continued to do work in the region as a member of Amazon’s board. Intelligence Online, a trade outlet for intelligence contractors, reported, “As a partner of Amazon, for which it offers native surveillance of its AWS’ cloud traffic, IronNet helps the company win public contracts, especially since CEO Keith Alexander has sat on Amazon’s board.”

    IronNet, however, has faltered in recent months, with two waves of layoffs this year and a lawsuit from investors. The company has touted skyrocketing growth, like many defense-related contractors, by promising to harness growing security threats. Much of the American traditional defense industry has long sought lucrative foreign relationships, particularly with the Saudi Arabian government, a path IronNet appears to have attempted to follow.

    And President Joe Biden, who promised during his election campaign to make the Saudi state a “pariah” over the slaying, has since appeared to move on from the scandal. In June, he traveled to Riyadh to shore up the U.S.-Saudi alliance and request an increase in oil production. The four-year anniversary of Khashoggi’s slaying is on October 2.

    The post Former NSA Chief Signed Deal to Train Saudi Hackers Months Before Jamal Khashoggi’s Murder appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.


  • Afghanistan-Intercept-asadullah-full

    Col. Asadullah Akbari in his apartment on Sept. 1, 2022, in Jacksonville, Fla.

    Photo: Zach Wittman for The Intercept

    On a normal morning, Asadullah Akbari, a colonel in the Afghan National Army, would arrive at his office in Kabul to coordinate online meetings between Afghan officials and their U.S. advisers based in Qatar. After years of fighting across Afghanistan, Akbari had helped set up his country’s special forces training program and risen through the ranks. He now worked near the highest levels of the military, side by side with Afghanistan’s political leaders. Morning teleconferences with Western partners were part of his daily routine.

    He had grown accustomed to this relatively quiet life. But as the U.S.-backed Afghan government imploded last summer, a thick cloud of fear descended on the Afghan capital. Rumors spread that Taliban fighters were going house to house, hunting down Afghan military officials. Akbari stayed home, texting anxiously with his military and defense ministry colleagues, all of them trying to make sense of the sudden changes. Akbari’s future had seemed relatively predictable; now it was difficult to see even a few days ahead.

    On August 20, 2021 — five days after Kabul fell to the Taliban — Akbari headed to a well-known mall with his kids. Walking the streets of Kabul, where he’d spent most of his life, he had the distinct feeling that these could be his last days on earth. When his children begged him for candy and ice cream from the vendors on the street, he bought everything they wanted.

    Akbari knew in his heart that he and his colleagues had been left to their fate. Many of the senior Afghan officials they’d served under had already made their own arrangements and fled the city. People who had supervised Akbari for years suddenly stopped responding to his messages. It was the last betrayal, after years of corruption and double-dealing that he had personally witnessed from his perch in the Ministry of Defense. The Afghan government they’d spent two decades helping to build had collapsed. Now, its ruins were raining down on top of millions of ordinary Afghans like him.

    The fall of the Afghan government triggered a tidal wave of anguish and soul searching among Afghans and Americans who had invested years of their lives in the U.S. mission there. It was also personal for me as an Afghan journalist. For seven years, I worked at Etilaatroz, one of Afghanistan’s leading investigative news outlets. I reported and wrote scores of articles on politics and security in Afghanistan, including more than a dozen major investigations. Across all this reporting one theme stood out above all the rest: corruption. The greed, self-interest, and amorality of Afghan elites was like an acid that ate away at the institutions ordinary Afghans had sacrificed so much to build. In the end, that corruption would prove fatal to our hopes for building a free and independent nation.


    Col. Asadullah Akbari, who served in the Afghanistan army before being relocated to the United States as a refugee, reads information from his passport to an asylum attorney over the phone in his bedroom on Thursday, September 1, 2022 in Jacksonville, Florida.

    Col. Asadullah Akbari read information from his passport to an asylum attorney over the phone in his bedroom on Sept. 1, 2022 in Jacksonville, Fla.

    Photo: Zach Wittman for The Intercept

    I was among tens of thousands of Afghans evacuated by the U.S. government when the Taliban took control of Afghanistan last summer. Since then, during the nearly 10 months I spent with other refugees in a hotel in Albania and now in the United States, I’ve been trying to figure out what happened to my country and why. Like everyone, I watched in horror as my Etilaatroz colleagues still in Kabul were beaten by the Taliban for the crime of covering a protest. How could the gains of the last 20 years have evaporated so quickly?

    This remains an agonizing question for both Afghans and Americans. In April, the Senate Armed Services Committee announced the creation of an Afghanistan War Commission aimed at establishing why the U.S.-backed Afghan government and its security forces dissolved so spectacularly. The commission plans to provide a “comprehensive review of key decisions related to U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan” and to deliver a final report to Congress within three years, around the time President Joe Biden will complete his term in office.

    Eight months ago, I began calling Akbari and other sources in the former Afghan security forces. There were many questions about why the army did not fight that continued to bother me and other Afghans. Why, after years of grueling struggle, did soldiers in many parts of the country put down their guns in the face of the enemy? To find the answers, I started interviewing former military officers and government officials.

    They told me that corrupt, inexperienced commanders as well as leaders who valued loyalty above capability had weakened the chain of command. Tens of thousands of Afghans had given their lives for their country. In the end, ordinary soldiers were betrayed by leaders who failed to give them the tools they needed to succeed against a brutal insurgency.

    On August 20, the day Akbari walked to the mall, the Taliban were rushing to establish themselves across Kabul, flush with excitement over their victory. They had fought for years, suffering terrible losses themselves, and were now almost certain to take revenge on their enemies. Their knock on his door seemed inevitable. As Akbari walked into his home, he received an unexpected text message on his phone from a U.S. military adviser based in Qatar with whom he had regularly teleconferenced from Kabul.

    “Asadullah, where are you?”

    Within a few days, Akbari and his family were packed into the cargo hold of a plane with other Afghans who had been lucky or connected enough to make it out. The flight took him from Kabul to Qatar and then on to Jacksonville, Florida, where he and his family are the only Afghan residents in a rundown apartment complex. The speed with which his life had transformed gave it all an air of unreality.

    Akbari had spent decades at war, lost many friends, and suffered scars that he will carry for the rest of his life. Looking at Afghanistan today, he cannot escape the feeling that it was all for nothing.


    Col. Asadullah Akbari, who served in the Afghanistan army before being relocated to the United States as a refugee, flips through cell phone photos from his time in Afghanistan while in his apartment on Thursday, September 1, 2022 in Jacksonville, Florida.

    Col. Asadullah Akbari flips through cellphone photos from his time in Afghanistan while in his apartment in Jacksonville, Fla., on Sept. 1, 2022.

    Photo: Zack Wittman for The Intercept

    The Fall of the Three-Man Republic

    The U.S. is believed to have spent upwards of $2 trillion in Afghanistan — money that was, in many cases, eaten up by graft or funneled back to politically connected U.S. government contractors. Afghan military officers like Akbari saw the rot up close. In the final years of his government, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and a close circle of advisers were widely criticized for monopolizing decision-making and personnel appointments and gradually losing touch with the people they governed. Akbari regularly briefed Ghani, his senior advisers, and the Afghan defense minister; their constant changes to military leadership and their obsession with personal loyalty overshadowed efforts to prevent a Taliban takeover, he says.

    “I was 18 years old when I joined the army. I never saw happy days in Afghanistan, only war, blood, fighting, and clashes. And in the end, our leaders betrayed the country,” he told me. “I saw myself that we had no honest leaders and no one who was thinking of the national interest. They were only thinking of their own benefit and appointing those who were loyal to them.”

    “I never saw happy days in Afghanistan, only war, blood, fighting, and clashes. And in the end, our leaders betrayed the country.”

    Top former Afghan officials painted a picture of increasing paranoia on the part of Ghani and his aides, who feared not just disloyalty, but even a possible coup by officers of the Afghan military. Lt. Gen. Sami Sadat, the last commander of the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command, described Ghani to investigators for the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, or SIGAR, as a “paranoid president … afraid of his own countrymen,” adding that Ghani was “changing commanders constantly [to] bring back some of the old-school Communist generals who [he] saw as loyal to him, instead of these American-trained young officers who he [mostly] feared.”

    During the last two years of the Ghani government, power was held by a triumvirate: the Afghan president; his national security adviser, Hamdullah Mohib; and his chief of administrative office of the president, Fazel Mahmood Fazly. Many Afghans referred derisively to this group of power brokers as the “three-man republic.” Neither Mohib nor Fazly had experience in security or national defense. Mohib had been the Afghan ambassador to the United States, and Fazly was a surgeon who had previously been a political adviser to Ghani. Both men played a critical role in the catastrophic decision-making that led to the collapse of the army, Akbari said.

    “What I witnessed was that Hamdullah Mohib was given the widest authority in appointments. All the corps commanders were personally appointed by him and were doing whatever Mohib commanded,” Akbari said. “All orders were issued by Mohib and a group of officials in the presidential palace.” Mohib, meanwhile, has blamed Western countries for leaving their Afghan partners too abruptly, claiming that the sudden departure of American troops and contractors sapped the Afghan military’s morale and deprived it of the material support it needed to fight.

    When reached to comment for this story, Mohib referred me to an interview from earlier this year, in which he attributed the collapse of the Afghan government to U.S. political concessions made to the Taliban and Biden’s decision, in the summer of 2021, to announce a final withdrawal. While denying that he had enriched himself with Afghan government funds, Mohib pointed to the corrupting impact on Afghan institutions of “exorbitant amounts of unmonitored money” dumped into the country by the international community since 2001.

    The final Taliban offensive that toppled the government laid bare this corruption, which my colleagues and I had documented for years at Etilaatroz. At the moment of their country’s greatest crisis, many top officials and commanders simply abandoned Afghan soldiers and civilians, focusing instead on their own safety and grabbing whatever resources they could as they fled the country.

    By the end, the people in charge had given up on other factors and were making personnel appointments based entirely on what they thought would be their own interests, said Saleh Jahesh, a former head of the strategic planning office within Afghanistan’s National Security Council. “The major corps commanders were all known to have luxury houses in Dubai,” Jahesh told me.


    PANJWAYI DISTRICT, AFGHANISTAN -- MAY 4, 2021: Police chief Hajji Jumaah Izhaqzai, far right, gets the lay of the land from his men at the outermost outpost where his soldiers are holding the line against Taliban fighters in Panjwayi District, Afghanistan, Tuesday, May 4, 2021. The Taliban had made significant inroads into Panjwayi when 95 government checkpoints were abandoned Ñ only eight stayed manned Ñ, according to police chief Hajji Jumaah Izhaqzai. After he took over, his forces regained 33. But it wasnÕt easy. Izhaqzai still had ammunition, but many of his army-green Humvees bore the combat-grizzled patina of too many battles and too little maintenance. At a frontline base Ñ the ruins of an abandoned home, really Ñ down the highway, IzhaqzaiÕs men guarded a barbed wire cordon they dared not pass for fear of mines and snipers. Izhaqzai was confident he could defend the district, he said, but was wary of sympathizers among Panjwayi residents.ÒHalf the people here are with me, and half with the Taliban,Ó he said. (MARCUS YAM / LOS ANGELES TIMES)

    Afghan police hold the line against Taliban fighters in Panjwai District, Afghanistan, on May 4, 2021.

    Photo: Marcus Yam/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images

    A Great Crime

    Accusations from Biden and others that Afghans failed to fight the Taliban stung Akbari, whose job for years involved maintaining accurate statistics on Afghan security force casualties. The numbers of dead and wounded were sobering. Many of the elite commando units he’d worked with took heavy casualties in the last days of the war; in total, at least 66,000 Afghan police and military service members are estimated to have been killed since 2001.

    The U.S. had built an Afghan security infrastructure that was almost entirely dependent on foreign military and contractor support for its own maintenance and logistics. When the U.S. withdrawal began, Afghan soldiers found that they were suddenly unable to call in airstrikes or receive resupply by air, although their U.S.-led combat training had included these as critical components of their style of fighting.

    By the end, many Afghan soldiers were stuck holding positions that were impossible to defend and lacked even basic logistical support. The U.S. withdrawal only highlighted the unsustainable nature of the giant Afghan military apparatus that had been built over 20 years.

    “It was a myth that the Afghan security forces didn’t fight in the weeks before the collapse of the government. A lot of them stood and fought, and they died in huge numbers,” said Jonathan Schroden, an Afghanistan expert with the Center for Naval Analyses, a nonprofit military research and analysis center in Virginia. “But once word started getting around that if you stood and fought the Taliban there would be no cavalry to come save you, defections and surrenders began. The Taliban were then able to highlight these instances of security forces surrendering as part of a very successful psychological warfare campaign.”

    Long before the final collapse of the government, the Afghan security forces had already been struggling under the weight of high casualty rates, corrupt leadership, and low morale.

    “The number of new recruits became very low because people were not ready to send their sons to the Afghan National Army. They were aware of the situation and knew that if they send their sons, then they won’t go back home alive,” Akbari said. “Some soldiers were not able to go to their homes and see their families for more than a year.”

    Those Afghan soldiers and police who stayed in the fight had to deal with chronic shortages of food, fuel, warm clothing, and ammunition. Corruption in the procurement process steadily ate away at the military’s capacity, a systemic problem that SIGAR documented in real time throughout the war but which was never fixed. A 2017 SIGAR report on efforts to reform the procurement process said that the creation of a National Procurement Authority, which centralized contracts under Ghani’s office, was “one bright spot” in a system otherwise rife with corruption and graft. But according to Jahesh, the centralized authority slowed resupply missions, reducing transparency and creating more opportunities for corruption.

    Contracts sometimes took more than six months to be approved, Jahesh said, and prices were wildly inflated. In one instance, he recalled that the procurement authority approved a contract to buy watermelon for the Afghan army at 70 Afghanis per kilogram, while watermelons in the market cost about 1.4 Afghanis per kilogram, meaning the army paid 50 times more than the going rate.

    “The soldiers did not receive anything on time and they had no energy to fight simply because they had no vegetables, fruit, or meat to eat to meet their basic needs for calories,” Jahesh told me. “Commanders were being forced to sell military equipment from bases because they were receiving nothing from the government on time. Despite these shortages, on paper senior officials were making it look like everything was being provided for the soldiers.”

    “Once word started getting around that if you stood and fought the Taliban there would be no cavalry to come save you, defections and surrenders began.”

    I had witnessed supply shortages and other problems for years in my own reporting on the Afghan military. In October 2018, I visited a military base in a suburb of the city of Ghazni, which had recently been the site of fierce clashes between the Afghan military and the Taliban. Instead of training to fight, the Afghan soldiers I met were forced to spend their time gathering firewood to cook their meals as the government had failed to deliver propane and other vital supplies. A 2020 video shared on social media showed a group of wounded Afghan soldiers surrounded by the Taliban in Wardak Province, just south of Kabul. “We don’t have water, we don’t have food,” one of the soldiers said, addressing Ghani. “We have morals to fight if we receive support.”

    On top of the brazen economic inequality between themselves and top officials in the Afghan government, the sense of abandonment that many soldiers felt made it seem logical to return to their families rather than die for leaders who they expected would flee to safety in Dubai or Turkey in case of a Taliban victory. Afghan soldiers had been fighting and dying pointlessly for years. Those who perished in what had become a futile effort to stop the Taliban received little dignity, even in death.

    “We had many wounded personnel on our bases with wounds that became infected and who later died as a result,” Akbari said. “Some of these soldiers were temporarily buried inside the bases and dug up again when transport planes arrived to take them.”

    In some cases, the bodies of Afghans who died on the battlefield were even returned to the wrong families. “The family held a funeral ceremony for them,” Akbari recalled. “But after a while they were found to be alive and returned home.”

    While some families were mistakenly told that their sons, brothers, and cousins were dead, the bodies of others who had actually died were sometimes simply lost. Akbari says this ate at his conscience, even as he continued serving a government that he saw as the only hope of saving his country from the Taliban. “It was a great crime committed against them and their families,” Akbari told me.


    Col. Asadullah Akbari, who served in the Afghanistan army before being relocated to the United States as a refugee, poses for a portrait in his bedroom on Thursday, September 1, 2022 in Jacksonville, Florida.

    Col. Asadullah Akbari poses for a portrait in his bedroom in Jacksonville, Fla., on Sept. 1, 2022.

    Photo: Zach Wittman for The Intercept

    Haunted by the Past

    Though we came from different walks of life and served Afghanistan in different ways, Akbari and I are now both refugees in the United States. His days are spent looking for work and running through the bureaucratic gauntlet necessary to build a new life for his family. Like many other refugees, he spends his free time on WhatsApp, trying to learn about developments back in Afghanistan. Many nights he can’t sleep for thinking about the war.

    “Many of my colleagues from special forces units have been persecuted, tortured, and martyred by the Taliban. Their families have been tortured. A number of them are alive in Afghanistan and cannot leave the country; neither can they work nor can they stay in their homes,” Akbari told me. “They have a lot of financial and security problems. None of the defense ministry authorities worked for their evacuation to a safe place. These authorities are thinking about how and where to buy a house or car, and they do not think about soldiers, lieutenants, and officers who were on the front lines.”

    In Akbari’s mind, the failure of the war was not due primarily to the Americans, who could have withdrawn in any year since 2001 and seen the Afghan government collapse just as quickly. Instead, it was a product of a corrupt Afghan political class that has still not been held accountable for its failures. Recent news reports of former Afghan officials driving expensive luxury cars and living lavishly in Gulf Arab countries, Turkey, and the West do not surprise him. They are only the crowning insult to the efforts of ordinary Afghans who gave their lives in a tragic two-decade attempt to rebuild their country with international support.

    The corruption and mismanagement of Afghanistan by its own elites, enabled, in many cases, by their U.S. partners, has plunged the country into a new era of suffering under the Taliban. One day, Akbari and I both dream of returning. For now, we can only try to learn from what went wrong.

    “If I say that Afghanistan was a country during the Ashraf Ghani government, it would not be fair,” Akbari said. “Afghanistan was like a joint stock business company, in that every partner exercised as much authority as their share.”

    The post I Watched the Afghan Government Collapse Under the Weight of Its Own Greed appeared first on The Intercept.

  • At the beginning of a new “MasterClass” on diplomacy with Condoleezza Rice and the late Madeleine Albright, Rice explains that “some people have even said, ‘The diplomat lies for their country.’”

    Soon afterward, Albright makes similar remarks: “There are some incredible definitions of diplomacy, which is, it gives you the capability to go and lie for your country.”

    If this is in fact what diplomacy is all about — and presumably Rice and Albright would be in a position to know — this MasterClass shows that they are both incredibly committed diplomats.

    Albright, who died earlier this year, was America’s first female secretary of state, serving during the Bill Clinton administration. Rice was the second, during the administration of George W. Bush.

    The lies are just as boring as the parts that are true.

    It’s not all lies, of course. The entire Rice/Albright video lasts almost 3.5 hours, the same length as the extended DVD version of “The Fellowship of the Ring.” Most of the time, the two emit a quiet murmur of mind-obliterating platitudes, accompanied by what seems to be the music from C-SPAN and stock footage of a chessboard. For instance, Albright tells us that “Americans didn’t recognize well enough how fragile democracy was, but at the same time how resilient democracy was,” which is somehow both banal and incomprehensible.

    In fact, the lies are just as boring as the parts that are true. You might assume Rice and Albright would mislead viewers in cunning, complex ways that would require extensive effort to refute. Instead, they both just straightforwardly deny reality.

    All in all, watching the languorous, dull-but-accurate parts is like being forced to eat eight gallons of stale banana pudding. Then the lies are like a batch of botulism mixed in. By the end, you will definitely feel ill, but you can only ascribe it to the entire experience, rather than being able to narrow it down to one specific cause.

    Explicating all of Rice and Albright’s deceptions would require an article that would take longer to read than the running time of the MasterClass itself. So let’s just hit the highlights.

    The cruelest segment of the video, as measured by the chasm between the promised content and what’s actually delivered, is called “Learning From Failed Decisions.” The text below this title claims that Rice will share “her mistakes on 9/11 and Iraq.”

    However, it turns out the only mistake Rice made was believing her incompetent underlings. “I was in two situations,” she begins, “where the intelligence turned out in one case to be lacking, and in another case to be wrong.”

    The first, of course, is the 9/11 attacks. On September 11, 2001, Rice was Bush’s national security adviser — i.e., arguably the person most responsible in the U.S. government for addressing any threats of terrorism. Here’s her explanation for how she and her colleagues missed what was going on:

    All that the intelligence reports were saying … was, something big is going to happen. “There will be a wedding,” which was terrorist code for some kind of attack. But all of the intelligence actually pointed to something happening outside of the country.

    When I heard Rice say this, my brain seized up and ground to a confused halt. My thought process went something like:

    I —
    Wha
    HOW?!?!?!?
    where am i. have i slipped into an alternate universe where up is down & the sky is green & giraffes sing hit duets with taylor swift?

    This was because — although it may be fading from living memory — the most famous moment of Condoleezza Rice’s life occurred in 2004, when she acknowledged in front of the 9/11 Commission that the entire U.S. intelligence apparatus warned Bush that an Al Qaeda attack might be imminent inside America. Here, watch it for yourself:

    That’s right: The presidential daily brief delivered to Bush on August 6, 2001, one month before the 9/11 attacks, was headlined “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.” You can read the whole thing here. The very first sentence states, “Bin Laden since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the U.S.” Later, the brief warns that “FBI information … indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings.”

    So here, Rice put essentially no effort into her deceit. But what she says next is somehow even worse:

    We had a pretty bright wall between what the FBI could do and what the CIA could do. They didn’t talk to each other. So just to give an example — probably by now everybody knows the case of [Zacarias] Moussaoui, who was the flight student in Arizona who only wanted to learn to fly one way. That might have been a signal. He was known to the FBI. He was not known to the CIA.

    Almost everything about this is inaccurate. Rice is correct that Moussaoui was a member of Al Qaeda who came to the U.S. and attended flight school, where he did behave in peculiar ways. However, he did not go to flight school in Arizona, as Rice says; it was in Oklahoma and Minnesota. It’s not the case that he “only wanted to fly one way.” (According a report by the Justice Department inspector general, “Media reports later incorrectly reported that Moussaoui had stated that he did not want to learn to take off or land a plane.”)

    Most importantly, whatever wall prevented some information from passing between the FBI and the CIA, it did not stop Moussaoui from being caught. His behavior was so suspicious that he was in fact arrested on August 16, 2001, and (according to the same Justice Department report) the FBI then discussed the case with the CIA. Moussaoui was in prison on September 11. The bulk of the evidence also suggests that he was not part of the 9/11 plot, and was in the U.S. to conduct a subsequent attack. The horrible irony about Moussaoui and information sharing is that Al Qaeda didn’t know he’d been apprehended until after September 11. According to the 9/11 Commission report, if Osama bin Laden had been aware of it beforehand, he might have called off the operation.

    What’s going on here? The most likely explanation is that Rice is thinking of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, two of the five hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon. The CIA knew that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were in the U.S. but did not immediately and fully share this information with the FBI.

    In other words, Rice can’t be bothered to remember the most basic facts when coming up with excuses for herself. That’s the level of contempt she has for us.

    In other words, Rice can’t be bothered to remember the most basic facts when coming up with excuses for herself. That’s the level of contempt she has for us. She says the government’s failure to stop 9/11 still “haunts” her, but she’s not haunted enough to go back and read a few Wikipedia articles.

    Then there’s the Iraq War. “Every intelligence agency in the world,” Rice tells us, “including the Russians, for instance, believed that [Saddam Hussein] was reconstituting his weapons of mass destruction.”

    Let’s again recall the documented past. Here’s what Russian President Vladimir Putin said in October 2002 while standing next to British Prime Minister Tony Blair:

    Russia does not have in its possession any trustworthy data that supports the existence of nuclear weapons or any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and we have not received any such information from our partners as yet.

    Blair obviously heard and understood this, because he responded, “There may be a difference of perspective about weapons of mass destruction, there is one certain way to find out and that is to let the [United Nations] inspectors back in to do their job.”

    You’d also hope Rice would be interested enough in this issue to know by now what top CIA analysts believed. The head of Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center, the division at the agency tasked with investigating Iraq’s purported WMD, told a friend just before the war that he anticipated that the U.S. would find “not much, if anything.”

    Finally, by putting the blame on “intelligence” for the disastrous decisions of the Bush administration, Rice is engaging in a kind of meta-dishonesty, no matter what the intelligence was. One of Rice’s predecessors as secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, explained this cogently in a book with the same title as this MasterClass, “Diplomacy”:

    What political leaders decide, intelligence services tend to seek to justify. Popular literature and films often depict the opposite — policymakers as the helpless tools of intelligence experts. In the real world, intelligence assessments more often follow than guide policy decisions.

    Albright’s performance is just as shabby. At one point, she describes her pre-secretary of state role during Clinton’s first term as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. Iraq had been under severe sanctions since its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The sanctions were then extended after the Gulf War in 1991 as leverage to force Iraq to disclose and destroy all of its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. “It was my job to make sure all of the [sanctions] resolutions were carried out,” Albright tells us.

    The problem here is that Albright herself later explicitly explained that the U.S. would defy the relevant U.N. resolutions. Security Council Resolution 687 declared that once Iraq had been disarmed, the sanctions “shall have no further force or effect.” But just after Albright became secretary of state in 1997, she said this in a speech at Georgetown University on U.S policy toward Iraq:

    We do not agree with the nations who argue that, if Iraq complies with its obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, sanctions should be lifted.

    In other words, it didn’t matter what the U.N. resolutions said: The sanctions would remain indefinitely.

    Albright’s adamantine commitment to the sanctions regime led to her being questioned about it on “60 Minutes,” when she infamously declared that the suffering sanctions imposed on Iraqis was “worth it.”

    Incredibly enough, Albright also doesn’t voice any second thoughts now that we know Iraq had destroyed all of its banned weapons in 1991. By 1995, the Iraqi regime had been forced to hand over the last remnants of its WMD programs, the paper documentation. In other words, everything about the policy Albright carried out was based on a bogus premise. But she makes no mention of this at all.

    A smaller but intriguing falsehood comes when Albright looks straight into the camera and says, “It had never occurred to me that I could be secretary of state.” This is obviously ridiculous on its face; no one rises to that level without making prodigious efforts to do so. Albright shouldn’t be criticized for this particular lie — as she puts it, “The word ‘ambitious’ is something that men say lovingly or proudly to other men, but if they call a woman ambitious, it’s supposed to be derogatory.” But it’s preposterous for her to claim she somehow became secretary of state by accident — especially because her efforts involved such gruesome realpolitik.

    Her campaign to secure the position kicked into high gear as soon as Clinton was reelected on November 5, 1996. One stratagem in particular raised her stock in the White House: Her successful termination of the career of then-U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

    The previous August, Israel had bombed a U.N. peacekeeping compound in Lebanon, killing 106 civilians taking shelter there. The U.N. investigated and, much to the anger of Israel and the U.S., found that it was “unlikely” that the compound had not been knowingly targeted.

    While Boutros-Ghali’s term was about to expire, he was popular and was expected to be reappointed. Albright plotted to stop this in order to punish him for the U.N.’s distasteful description of Israel’s actions.

    A few weeks after Clinton won, Albright had a private dinner with Boutros-Ghali and urged him to voluntarily step down, promising him a foundation to run in Switzerland. He declined. Two days later on November 19, the U.N. Security Council voted 14-1 to give Boutros-Ghali a second term. The lone “no” vote was cast by Albright, and since the U.S. holds a veto on the Security Council, the resolution failed. The New York Times said, attributing the perspective to an anonymous American official, that “hostility toward the United States had never been so palpable.”

    But this was irrelevant to Albright, whose priorities lay elsewhere. As Richard Clarke, then a National Security Council official, later wrote, “Clinton was impressed that we [had] managed to oust Boutros-Ghali. … The entire operation had strengthened Albright’s hand in the competition to be Secretary of State in the second Clinton administration.”

    All this said, it’s unfair to claim that Rice and Albright never come up with anything that’s interesting and true. Both of them do so once. Surprisingly, neither anomaly occurs when they reflect on their trailblazing status at the top of the State Department. This suggests that they are diplomatically holding back, given that they must have crossed paths with some extraordinarily awful men.

    For Rice’s part, she tells an extremely charming story about her parents, and how when she was 4, they started holding elections for president of the family, complete with secret ballots. Rice won, and was reelected over and over, since her mother always voted for her and there were no term limits.

    Albright’s father was a Czech diplomat and academic (who actually inspired Rice when he had her as a student at the University of Denver). Albright explains that in Czechoslovakia and Europe generally, diplomacy was purely a province of society’s elites. So, she says, he was pleasantly surprised when teaching in America to run into his students working as waiters or at gas stations.

    The MasterClass website features many other videos — starring people like musician John Legend, filmmaker James Cameron, and screenwriter/producer Shonda Rhimes — but none of them deliver the same sense of spiritual desolation as Rice and Albright. Of course, none of the other “masters” are skilled practitioners of U.S. foreign policy.

    The post Condoleezza Rice and Madeleine Albright Conduct a MasterClass on the Banal Horror of U.S. Foreign Policy appeared first on The Intercept.

  • Marked as enemies of the new Taliban regime by his work with Westerners and his family’s Hazara ethnicity, Hamid, his wife, their 8-year-old daughter, and their new baby move furtively from place to place, living under assumed names. Their year in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan echoes Hamid’s own war-torn childhood as he tries to guarantee his daughter’s future. Suddenly, an escape route opens: Will they finally make it out?

    Transcript

    Hamid: After the crowd subsided, we leave the scene in clothes full of dirt and blood and bare feet.

    Summia Tora: That’s Hamid, the man I tried and failed to help leave Afghanistan last year. After the suicide attack at the Kabul airport last summer, Hamid and his family went back home. They huddled there, keeping their heads down. They kept using the nicknames Hamid had come up with when the Taliban took control. I’m not using their real names because they are still in danger.

    Hamid’s wife, Jamila, has a master’s degree in sociology. She was pregnant when the government collapsed. And then there was their daughter Eliza, who was just outside the blast radius of the bomb that killed more than 180 people at the airport.

    Hamid: As a father, everyone hopes for their children, the first thing is to be safe. And then they should have access to at least basic life facilities. Like, the first thing is education. Good nutrition. We cannot provide the basic needs. When we cannot provide it today, so the future, it worries us the most.

    Summia Tora: On December 2, 2021, Hamid got an email from Geres, the French NGO where he’d worked for four years.

    Hamid: “France does not wish to expand its reception capacity for political asylum. It is therefore with great sadness that we have to acknowledge that we cannot, today and without the support of France, help you to leave Afghanistan.”

    Summia Tora: So how did you feel, knowing all of this and receiving a rejection letter?

    Hamid: Hopeless. I lost the only option I had in my life to get out of this country. So I missed it. I missed the only hope for myself, for my family, for my kids.

    [Theme music]

    Summia Tora: I’m Summia Tora, a human rights advocate. This is No Way Home, a production of The Intercept and New America.

    In this four-part series, you’ve been hearing stories that were found, developed, and reported by Afghans like me, who have been forced into exile. Our stories reflect what we saw with our own eyes and what we and other Afghans have experienced firsthand since the U.S. military pulled out, the Afghan government collapsed, and the Taliban took over last summer.

    This is Episode Four: “Getting Out Alive.”

    [Theme music ends]

    Like everyone, Hamid and Jamila knew the Taliban’s history of denying basic rights to girls and women. It was one of the main reasons they risked their lives trying to leave last August.

    Jamila (translated voiceover): You know, it all happened so suddenly. There were fights in the provinces, and you would hear about it on Facebook that this province or that province has fallen. In that moment, the first thing I remembered was my daughter. I looked at her, and she was sleeping, and then I cried intensely and said, “My daughter’s future is over and ruined.”

    Summia Tora: But something else was even more threatening to Hamid and his family. They are Hazaras, an ethnic minority that has faced decades of discrimination in Afghanistan. Hiding is difficult: Their ethnicity is clear from his and his family’s facial features and their accents, and they practice Shia Islam in a place that is mainly Sunni.

    Hamid was born in Kabul and spent his early childhood in a mainly Hazara neighborhood called Dasht-e-Barchi. That’s where he and his family lived last year, when the U.S.-backed government fell.

    Hamid: I went to school until two grades in Dasht-e-Barchi, in west of Kabul. So I felt that it was obvious for everyone that like other people, except Hazaras, they had a good life. They had access to more facilities in their lives. They had cars, they had bicycles, they had motorcycles — all these things that most of the Hazaras didn’t have at that time.

    Summia Tora: Hamid was 8 years old when the Soviet-backed Afghan government collapsed — the same age his own daughter, Eliza, is now.

    When the mujahedeen factions that had been fighting the Soviets with backing from the U.S., Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries took Kabul, each group seized control of a different part of the city, and they began fighting each other. The country fell into civil war.

    The mujahedeen factions were dominated by different ethnic groups. A Hazara faction called Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Islami controlled Dasht-e-Barchi. Hamid and his family spent about six months in Dasht-e-Barchi, while the mujahedeen fired artillery at each other, destroying Kabul’s buildings and killing many civilians. Then his parents decided to take the family to Bamiyan, a mountainous province north of Kabul that is known as the Hazara homeland.

    Hamid: So when we left Kabul for Bamiyan, it was a very tough time. All the roads linked to Bamiyan were closed at that time, and everyone was detained and questioned.

    Summia Tora: Bamiyan has remained relatively peaceful over decades of war. But getting there was hazardous.

    Hamid: So when we were going in this route and passing these route, we were questioned. We were insulted, like Hazaras, for our features and our faces. And all the kids were, everywhere that the kids were around the street and when we were crossing, they were shouting at us and laughing.

    So many checkpoints were on the road and stopped our car many times and asking, “Who are you? Where you going?” And even they made us to pay them some money to allow them to cross the road.

    Summia Tora: The Taliban’s leaders grew up fighting the Soviets, and the group came to power for the first time in 1996 by defeating other mujahedeen factions.

    One of their most notorious acts, in 2001, was to destroy the giant 5th-century Buddhas carved into the mountains in Bamiyan. The Taliban blew up the towering sculptures with rockets, tank shells, and dynamite. When the Taliban took over Afghanistan last summer, some said they had changed. But much remained the same — including their attitude toward Hazaras.

    Last July, the Taliban killed nine Hazara men in Ghazni, a province southeast of Kabul. In August, just after the Taliban gained control of the country, Amnesty documented another massacre in the central province of Daykundi. The Taliban killed 13 Hazaras there, including a 17-year-old girl.

    Around the same time, some Taliban decapitated a statue of renowned Hazara leader, Abdul Ali Mazari, in Bamiyan city, the capital of the province that Hamid had fled to as a boy.

    Rabia Khan: Mazari was actually killed by the Taliban in 1995 when he went to meet them for peace talks. So I think, symbolically, the fact that you are destroying a statue of an important political leader for the Hazaras kind of shows what your intentions are and the direction of your rule on what it means for these people going forward.

    Summia Tora: That’s Rabia Khan, an academic in the U.K. who did her doctoral research on the Hazara community. In the late 1800s, Khan told me, Hazaras had their own self-governing region in the central part of the country, an area known as Hazarajat. But at the end of the 19th century, the Hazaras’ circumstances suddenly — and drastically — changed.

    Rabia Khan: The rhetoric of religion was used to justify a really horrific and severe war against the Hazaras, which started around 1890 and lasted for several years. And then in that time, countless Hazaras were massacred. And many Hazara women were raped.

    Summia Tora: Many were forced to flee to Iran and the part of British-occupied India that is now Pakistan. In the 1920s, a new Afghan king outlawed slavery — but for Hazaras, the practice continued.

    Rabia Khan: They were the cheapest slaves in Kabul. So what we see in the earliest 20th century is, although the war has ended for some time, perception of Hazaras as the slave class and having a low social status is something very prevalent in the wider society. So that’s something very widespread in the early to even mid-20th century, and that perception you can even say it persists to this day when we started to see more Hazara visibility in more recent years.

    Summia Tora: The 1990s, when Hamid was growing up, was a pivotal period for Hazaras in Afghanistan.

    Rabia Khan: And again, they’d be mocked and ridiculed for their appearance. So even the word “Hazara” was used as a pejorative. Not only in the 1990s, but even now “Hazara” is used as a pejorative by some people. And that there are even specific racial slurs that are used in reference to Hazaras only and not other ethnic communities. The most common one that came up in my interactions and discussions was with the Hazara community was a racial slur, which I won’t say in Persian, but the translation in English is “rat eater.”

    Summia Tora: After the United States forced the Taliban from power in 2001, Hazaras welcomed the new Western-backed government and embraced opportunities, particularly for education. They routinely scored at the top of the national university entrance exams, and Hazara-majority areas recorded among the highest voter turnout in elections. Many went to work for Western NGOs and the government. But with that progress came risks.

    Rabia Khan: So you see this very strange situation unfold post-2001, in terms of visibility and representation, but how that’s also almost a threat for the community. Because in having this heightened visibility, there’s now this perception that “Hazaras are now a threat, so something needs to be done about that.”

    Summia Tora: I thought of the story my dad had told me about the killing of Hazaras in northern Afghanistan. My parents left Afghanistan in the 1990s to escape persecution and give my siblings and me a better life. That’s what Hamid wanted for his kids, and especially for his daughter, Eliza.

    Eliza: I am 8 years old.

    Summia Tora: Aww.

    Summia Tora (in Dari): What subjects do you like to study?

    Eliza (in Dari): I like Dari and math subjects.

    Summia Tora (in Dari): Why do you like Dari and math?

    Hiding and Surviving

    Summia Tora: After we failed to get Hamid and his family out of Afghanistan, I kept in touch with him through my colleagues at Dosti Network, an organization I founded last year to help Afghans get aid and support, and to leave the country if necessary. But after the U.S. pulled out, many countries refused to help more Afghans evacuate.

    Hamid worked for a French nonprofit organization, Geres, which focuses on climate and the environment.

    Michael: The French government, I think, turned their backs on a lot of the civil society workers that they funded through their programs. Which is a shame because if you really think about it, it’s like the whole idea of trying to build up Afghanistan really was the idea that you tell people not to, say, pick up guns and fight through politics.

    Summia Tora: That’s the American I’m calling Michael, who worked with Hamid and tried to help him and his family leave last year.

    Michael: The whole idea of having a peaceful civil society was what NATO was trying to push, right? To build up this country. You can’t just say that it’s just the military members that were the ones that were at risk here. It was actually a lot of the civilian and civil society workers who were really a critical part to any kind of Afghanistan that would be peaceful and would actually be built under the principles that NATO was trying to achieve.

    Summia Tora: On March 24, I sent Hamid a text message to find out how he was doing and if he was still in Kabul.

    NBC: A missile striking an industrial park in western Ukraine [explosion]. A helicopter assault on an airport outside of Kyiv, close intense fighting. And there are civilian casualties.

    Summia Tora: The war in Ukraine had started a month earlier. Europe, Canada, the U.K., and the U.S. had welcomed thousands of Ukrainian refugees, while Afghans still had to jump through hoops and fill out endless forms. Hamid sent me a voice memo while standing in line at the passport office.

    Hamid (Dari translated): Salam, Summia Jan, I hope you are doing well. Sorry for the delay in responding, as I was standing in the passport line.

    Summia Tora: Hamid told me that he was still in Kabul, and that he and Jamila recently had a baby boy. Hamid was trying to get their travel documents in order when Afghanistan suddenly burst into the news again.

    Ari Shapiro (NPR): Three blasts rocked the Afghan capital, Kabul, on Tuesday. They appeared to target schools, and six people were killed.

    Summia Tora: On April 19, a school called Abdul Rahim Shahid — known for its students’ educational achievements — was attacked. Hamid had studied there himself years earlier.

    Hamid: The recent attack in Abdul Rahim Shahid high school. It reportedly killed about 200 schoolchildren. This attack also was called the series of ISIS attacks that targeted Hazara Shia ethnicities in west of Kabul, particularly schoolchildren in this area.

    Summia Tora: Dasht-e-Barchi had gained a reputation as a place where Hazaras could get a good education for their kids and lift their families out of poverty. But since 2015, deadly attacks like these had grown common. 

    Rabia Khan: That status and reputation of the area really changed post-2001, because there were so many targeted attacks against Hazaras there. Although there have been great achievements, and the community has really worked hard to lift themselves out of their previous circumstances, there were outside elements that made it very hard to just live a normal life as a Hazara in Kabul since 2001.

    Summia Tora: Bombings were occurring so frequently the shock of them wore off.

    Hamid (in Dari): Whenever there is a bomb incident and you find out, you are shocked, but when it keeps repeating often, you either become courageous, you don’t feel scared, or you try not to think about it because you know it will happen again.

    Summia Tora: Hamid would try to find out who was killed, how many people were injured, if any of the victims were family members. There were times where he was close — 500 meters from a targeted school. Bomb attacks had become a part of everyday life for them.

    So far, the Taliban has allowed education for girls up to sixth grade in schools that are segregated by sex. But Hamid and Jamila moved often to avoid being found by the Taliban, and they were too scared to send Eliza to school most days because of the threat of violence. After the attack at Shahid school, Hamid decided he’d had enough. He would take his family to Bamiyan.

    So this past May, they fled Kabul and made their way north. Bamiyan was familiar, but it was far from the life Hamid and Jamila had imagined for themselves and their children.

    Jamila (translated voiceover): We don’t have hope; we don’t have motivation. We are always thinking about how can we leave. We don’t feel free. Even now, when I am at home and my head is not covered, I constantly make sure the curtains are closed so that the Taliban don’t see and send [the Ministry for the] Propagation of Virtue to inspect. “Why is this woman walking around at home without her head covered?” I have no interest in going out. I am at home all day.

    Summia Tora: Hamid had managed to renew his and his family’s passports and to get one for his son. But they still couldn’t leave.

    Hamid: Having a passport is one side of the matter. The visa to leave the country is another side of the problem. So it is the only two countries we have, Iran and Pakistan, they give us visas. So if we go to Iran or Pakistan, we cannot accommodate. We don’t have, like, our expenses to live there. That is why we prefer to be here under the Taliban rule.

    Summia Tora: In Bamiyan, Hamid registered Eliza for school. But like Jamila, he felt lost.

    Hamid: Staying in Afghanistan, it is also scary here. And also everything is unknown. We don’t know what happens next. What is waiting for us? We don’t know, days and nights, what will happen, what our future would be. What should we do, which way we should follow to reach to our goal or to at least to stay safe. And it is a kind of advice for myself just to be patient. It is the only option right now.

    A Door Opens

    Summia Tora: Last month, I messaged Hamid to see how he was doing. He replied with amazing news: He and his family had made it to Pakistan. I reached him by phone there on August 15, exactly a year after Kabul fell to the Taliban.

    Summia Tora: Hello? It’s great to hear that you’ve heard back about your P-2 application. I had completely forgotten that you had applied for that. Would it be possible if you could share about the process of the P-2 application for the U.S.?

    Hamid: When I received the approval for my P-2 application for the U.S. program, I got so happy. It was a cheerful moment sharing this good news with my wife and my little kid.

    Summia Tora: A few months after the final U.S. withdrawal last year, Hamid had applied to come to the United States through what’s known as the Priority 2, or P-2, program. It’s a visa program for Afghans who worked as employees, contractors, or interpreters for U.S. and NATO forces, for U.S.-funded programs or projects, or for U.S.-based media organizations and NGOs. I knew Hamid had worked for Geres. But it turns out he’d also worked for an Afghan NGO that was funded by the U.S. embassy in Kabul.

    On August 2, about a year after he applied, he got an email from the U.S. government saying that he and his family met the eligibility requirements for the program.

    Hamid: When I received the approval for my P-2 application, actually it was in the morning. When I shared this good news with my wife, she suddenly stood up. She got so happy to express her feelings by shaking her hands and head to dance. And she got so hopeful, and also she got surprised. She was hopeful that we would be able to leave this country finally.

    Summia Tora: Hamid and his family drove from Bamiyan to Kabul and then took a taxi to the Pakistani border. The crossing was hot and crowded, and Hamid worried that his kids might get sick or overheated. But after 12 hours, they made it.

    They stayed in a hotel for a couple of nights in Islamabad, then found a house to rent. The U.S. makes Afghans go to a third country to await the next stage in their immigration process. Hamid and Jamila don’t speak Urdu, and they don’t have visas that allow them to work in Pakistan.

    Summia Tora: Do you have any thoughts about living in Pakistan and how long you’d be able to live there because you have to wait for a couple of months until the P-2 process moves forward?

    Hamid: Our concern is the unemployment for refugees. For sure, I’m looking for a job for myself and my wife too. And in Pakistan, particularly in Islamabad, it is very difficult to find a proper job. And also it is very low-paid job that does not cover the family expenses and it is very difficult to afford.

    Summia Tora: Leaving Afghanistan, as anyone who’s done it knows, comes with its own difficulties. Just ask my father.

    Summia Tora: So you are now in Virginia. What is it like living there?

    Sayed Tora: Living there have some benefits, and some it’s good. On the other side, it’s hard to live in USA. You have to work. You miss your friends, family. Now you can speak, but [laughs] there are no people to listen to you. [laughs] This is the difference. [laughs]

    Summia Tora: My father is safe, but his life isn’t the same, and it never will be. And it never will be for Hamid and his family.

    Summia Tora: Does getting this email and now moving to Pakistan, waiting for this process of P-2 — is it giving you hope about being able to have a future that you hope for, for yourself and for your family?

    Hamid: Actually it is not very certain that I can move to U.S. one day because I am right now in the third country. So I hope so, that it will happen one day to go to U.S. It is the only chance I have right now. And I hope so it will happen one day.

    [Credits]

    Summia Tora: No Way Home is a production of The Intercept and New America’s Afghanistan Observatory Scholars program.

    This episode was written and reported by me, Summia Tora.

    Our executive producer and editor is Vanessa Gezari.

    Supervising producer and editor is Laura Flynn.

    Candace Rondeaux is the director of Future Frontlines Program-New America and project editor.

    Ali Yawar Adili, is the Afghanistan Observatory Project Coordinator.

    Laura Flynn and Jose Olivares produced this episode.

    Rick Kwan mixed this episode.

    Zach Young composed our theme music.

    Legal review by David Bralow.

    Fact checking by Emily Schneider.

    Awista Ayub is the director and project manager of New America’s Fellows Program.

    Voiceover in this episode by Humaira Rahbin.

    To learn more, visit theintercept.com where you can find transcripts and show art.

    Philipp Hubert is our visual designer and Nara Shin our copy editor.

    Roger Hodge is editor-in-chief of The Intercept.

    If you want to give us feedback or have any questions, email us at podcasts@theintercept.com.

    Thanks, so much, for listening.

    The post No Way Home, Episode Four: Getting Out Alive appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • In March 2018, the U.S. government decided that five Yemeni men were so dangerous that there was only one solution: They needed to die. After a U.S. military commander gave the final sign-off, a missile ripped through their SUV, near the village of Al Uqla, and tossed the car into the air. Three of the men were killed instantly. Another died days later in a local hospital. The only survivor was Adel Al Manthari.

    Al Manthari’s body was ravaged. His entire left side was burned. His right hip was fractured and his left hand sustained catastrophic injuries to its blood vessels, nerves, and tendons. Despite multiple surgeries and nine months of medical treatment after the strike, he was permanently disabled. The severe burns left his skin vulnerable to infection, and his body has regularly been covered in bed sores due to his limited mobility.

    The U.S. military claimed that Adel Al Manthari and the others in the vehicle were “terrorist” from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, but independent inquiries said otherwise. There is no evidence to suggest that the United States ever reinvestigated the strike. And every day for the past four years, Al Manthari has paid the price for America’s shoot-first-ask-no-questions-later system of remote warfare. The irreparable damage to his body left Al Manthari unable to walk or work, robbing him of dignity and causing his daughters — ages 8 and 14 at the time of the strike — to drop out of school to help care for him. The psychological impact of the strike has been profound, leaving Al Manthari traumatized and in need of treatment. And the financial impact has been ruinous.

    Repeated surgeries and medical treatment plunged his family into debt and the bills have never ceased. While the U.S. has millions of dollars in funds earmarked for civilian victims of U.S. attacks, the military ignored pleas on Al Manthari’s behalf, leaving the 56-year-old to rely on a GoFundMe campaign earlier this year to save his life. But he’s back on the brink again, with more surgeries and bills, and, in an unusual move, his family agreed to share these new bills with The Intercept to provide itemized — and visceral — evidence of the financial as well as human cost of the U.S. attacking an innocent man and refusing to pay so much as a dime for his medical treatment.

    Al Manthari, who is receiving treatment in Egypt, now needs six weeks of hospitalization to recover from a hip replacement ($6,266.32), a skin graft operation on his left hand and arm ($7,000.00), and at least three physical therapy sessions a week for six months ($892.95), according to Reprieve, an international human rights organization that is representing him. The total cost of these treatments is close to $23,000, which includes hospitalization and medications; fees for a surgeon, doctors, and nurses; six months of rent for an apartment in Cairo for Al Manthari and his two adult sons, who are his main caretakers now; utilities; and transport to and from physical therapy. Once again, Al Manthari’s health and well-being rests with a crowdfunding campaign.

    But it doesn’t have to be this way.

    “It is appalling that innocent people, civilians who have no connection to armed groups, are left to fend for themselves,” said Aisha Dennis, project manager on extrajudicial executions at Reprieve. “It is heartening that ordinary people, particularly Americans, have stepped in to support Mr. Al Manthari where their government has failed. But it is not — it must not be — their job to do this. It is the duty of the people dropping the bombs, in this case the U.S. government, to face the wreckage they are causing to families and communities and address it with humanity.”

    adel-manthari

    Adel Al Manthari, then a civil servant in the Yemeni government, is treated for severe burns, a fractured hip, and serious damage to the tendons, nerves, and blood vessels in his left hand following a drone strike in Yemen in 2018.

    Photo: Reprieve

    Reparations Are Rare

    Al Manthari’s case highlights the seldom seen devastation to the lives of drone strike survivors and their families, especially those who live in areas outside formal war zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

    From Libya to SomaliaSyria to Yemen, the United States has left a trail of broken bodies and shattered families. Secret Pentagon investigations have shown that Hellfire missiles are often far more effective at killing people than the United States is at targeting the “right” ones. But every so often, an innocent person living in the backlands of an African or Middle Eastern nation survives a drone attack.

    Since at least World War I, the U.S. military has been paying compensation for harm to civilians. During the Vietnam War, solatia payments, as they are called, were a means for the military to make reparations for civilian injuries or deaths without having to admit guilt. In 1968, for example, the going rate for adult lives was $33. Children merited half that.

    At the beginning of the forever wars, activist Marla Ruzicka became a tireless advocate for war victims, founding the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (now the Center for Civilians in Conflict, or CIVIC) to advocate on their behalf and, with the assistance of Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., helped to secure tens of millions of dollars from the U.S. government for Afghans and Iraqis harmed by U.S. military operations.

    Between 2003 and 2006, the Defense Department paid out more than $30 million in solatia and condolence payments to “Iraqi and Afghan civilians who are killed, injured, or incur property damage as a result of U.S. or coalition forces’ actions during combat,” according to the Government Accountability Office. But in more recent years, the sums paid out have plummeted. From 2015 to 2019, for example, the U.S. paid just $2 million to civilians in Afghanistan.

    In 2005, after Ruzicka was killed by a suicide bomber in Iraq, a U.S. Agency for International Development program was renamed the Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund and began paying out tens of millions of dollars. But while the program was intended to provide assistance to Iraqis who suffered damages, injury, or death due to U.S. or coalition forces’ actions, experts say it was repurposed into a more general use fund for economic development, such as promoting local businesses and youth entrepreneurship. USAID was unable to provide statistics on just how much money was paid out under the program or what percentage went to victims of U.S. attacks. A spokesperson would only speak off the record, which The Intercept declined to do.

    Payouts under various compensation, solatia, and battle damage schemes have also varied widely — from $124 to $50,000, for example — for a civilian killed in Afghanistan. Basim Razzo, who survived a 2015 airstrike in Iraq that killed his wife, daughter, and two other family members and destroyed two homes he valued at $500,000, was offered a “condolence payment” of $15,000, which an Army attorney said was the capped limit. Razzo rejected it as “an insult.” But after Italian aid worker Giovanni Lo Porto was killed by a U.S. drone strike that same year while being held hostage by Al Qaeda, the U.S. paid his family $1.3 million as a “donation in the memory” of their son.

    While the United States provided compensation to significant numbers of Iraqis and Afghans affected by ground combat and, in certain cases, airstrikes in the first half of the so-called war on terror, more recent victims of drone attacks or the air war against Islamic State have rarely received reparations, experts say. Even those whose civilian casualty allegations have been deemed “credible” by the United States are seldom compensated.

    redacted-copy

    A doctor’s note in Arabic detailing Al Manthari’s need for hip replacement surgery due to a fracture suffered in a March 2018 U.S. drone attack. The total cost of the prosthetic hip and fees for the medical team was about 120,000 Egyptian pounds, or $6,451.

    Photo: Obtained by The Intercept

    Resorting to GoFundMe

    Earlier this year, Adel Al Manthari’s feet and legs blackened due to restricted blood flow, and his doctor said he was at imminent risk of developing gangrene. Unable to access the required medical care in Yemen, his family needed to get him to Egypt and, as is common in the region, pay in advance for medical care. For his treatment at Cairo’s Kasr al-Aini Hospital, according to documents provided to The Intercept by Reprieve, Al Manthari paid for admission fees ($327.96); an initial surgery on his leg ulcers ($322.58), two separate bills for hospital service fees ($913.98); a biopsy ($48.39); a skin graft operation to replace burned skin, reduce swelling, and begin to restore movement to his legs ($1,129.03); a gastric sleeve surgery to facilitate his hip replacement ($2,741.94); the costs of a hospital bed, follow-up care from nurses and consultants, blood tests, X-rays, scans, and medications ($7,795.68); three weekly physical therapy sessions to prepare for his hip replacement operation ($1,075.27); a hip prosthetic ($4,838.71); a hip replacement operation ($1,612.90); and a wheelchair and folding walker ($261.10), among other expenses.

    The total cost exceeded $21,000. The average per capita income in Yemen is around $2,200.

    Al Manthari was in danger of losing his legs and possibly his life, both of which ended up dependent on a GoFundMe campaign that had stalled at around $8,700. Media attention, largely from The Intercept, helped spur the generosity of strangers who donated enough money for Al Manthari to pay for the surgeries he needed to keep his legs and stave off death. But that was hardly the end of the medical care that the Yemeni drone strike survivor requires. He faces a lifetime of medical bills that the U.S. government is, thus far, unwilling to pay or even acknowledge.

    The exact status of Al Manthari’s plea for U.S. reparations is unclear. In 2018, CENTCOM announced that it was aware of civilian casualty reports stemming from the March 29, 2018 attack that injured him and was conducting a “credibility assessment.” Asked about the results four years later, CENTCOM spokesperson Lt. Col. Karen Roxberry told The Intercept, “We are not able to provide responses on this.” Investigations by the Associated Press and the Yemen-based group Mwatana for Human Rights both determined that the U.S. had attacked only civilians.

    In March, Sens. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., and Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., asked Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to open a new investigation into the airstrike that disabled Al Manthari, as well as 11 other U.S. attacks in Yemen. The Pentagon did not respond to repeated requests for comment on what actions, if any, Austin has taken in response to the request. In a letter to Murphy and Warren shared with The Intercept, Colin H. Kahl, the Pentagon’s top policy official, did not even address the issue of new investigations.

    “It’s tragic and shameful that covering the costs of medical care for people bombed by the U.S. has fallen on crowdsourcing.

    “It’s really important that they look back at these cases from the last five or 10 years — especially in theaters of war, like Yemen, where they have made few acknowledgements of civilian harm,” said Joanna Naples-Mitchell, a human rights attorney and director of the nonprofit Zomia Center’s Redress Program, which assists survivors of U.S. airstrikes to submit requests for amends. “You can count on one hand the cases in which they’ve offered condolence payments in the air wars against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.”

    The U.S. has conducted more than 91,000 airstrikes across seven major conflict zones and killed as many as 48,308 civilians, according to a 2021 analysis by Airwars, a U.K.-based airstrike monitoring group. But only a tiny fraction have received any type of reparations. In 2020, Congress began providing the Defense Department $3 million each year to pay for deaths, injuries, or damages resulting from U.S. or allied military actions, but in the time since, the U.S. has not announced a single ex gratia payment, leaving victims like Al Manthari to fend for themselves.

    “It’s tragic and shameful that covering the costs of medical care for people bombed by the U.S. has fallen on crowdsourcing,” Naples-Mitchell said. “Payments would be a drop in the bucket for the U.S. military, but there is clearly no system to help people. It’s even unclear that allocated funding, like the USAID Marla Fund, is currently being used for that purpose.”

    SANAA, YEMEN - APRIL 24:  Yemeni people gather in front of the parliament building during a demonstration to protest U.S. drone attacks on April 24, 2014 in the Yemeni capital of Sanaa. (Phot by Mohammed Hamoud/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)

    People gather in front of the parliament building to protest U.S. drone attacks on April 24, 2014 in Sana’a, Yemen.

    Photo: Mohammed Hamoud/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

    “Under Review”

    As Al Manthari’s health deteriorated in the spring, Reprieve repeatedly reached out to the Pentagon and U.S. Central Command, sending them detailed evidence about his case while requesting assistance with a medical evacuation to Egypt and financial aid for urgent medical care. On September 14, while this story was being reported and five months after Reprieve first reached out, CENTCOM finally responded, noting that the documents were “under review” to “determine if the information changes the assessment of the strike.” Reprieve was, however, met with silence from Austin; Anna Williams, the Pentagon’s senior adviser for civilian protection; and Cara Negrette, the Defense Department’s director for international humanitarian policy.

    Negrette and Williams declined to speak to The Intercept. Pentagon spokesperson Lt. Col. César Santiago asked that questions be sent in writing. Those questions, submitted on May 17, have still not been answered.

    The Pentagon appears to be dodging responsibility on many fronts. On May 26, Santiago told The Intercept that Negrette and Williams personally told him that they had never received any communications from Reprieve. “But they welcome any communications from Reprieve regarding this case,” Santiago said. “You can provide my email and I will facilitate communications with Ms. Negrette.”

    On June 1, Reprieve forwarded to Negrette and Williams four messages it had sent in April, including Al Manthari’s documents, and copied this reporter and Santiago. “As the matter is urgent, I look forward to your prompt confirmation of receipt and reply,” Reprieve’s June email said. This reporter followed up as well and was told in a June 6 email from Santiago, “I forwarded and provided the information to the appropriate office.” More than three months later, according to Dennis at Reprieve, the organization has yet to hear from Austin, Negrette, Williams, or Santiago.

    Reprieve also reached out to Caroline Krass, the general counsel of the Department of Defense. This reporter was CC’d on the message, which Krass read, according to a return receipt, on June 1. But Krass, said Dennis, never responded to Reprieve either.

    “It’s been a difficult and frustrating process. We contacted CENTCOM back on April 13, then on the first of June, the 7th of June, the 13th of July. When we finally were able to speak to someone by phone, we were told that the email was likely being blocked because it was coming from a .org.uk email address,” said Dennis. “If we, as a U.S. legal action charity, cannot get a substantive response from CENTCOM, what hope do civilians harmed by U.S. drone strikes living in Somalia, Syria, or Afghanistan have to access accountability?”

    While there is a formalized mechanism to contact CENTCOM concerning civilian harm allegations and millions of dollars set aside for victims, the Pentagon lacks a formal procedure in place to file claims for compensation. “There is no officially articulated process,” said Naples-Mitchell, who is currently representing more than a dozen victims of civilian casualty incidents acknowledged by the U.S. military. “When I spoke with a CENTCOM lawyer, he was very clear that they did not want the public to have the perception that there is an official process. They also shy away from using the word ‘claims’ because, I think, they are concerned that it suggests some sort of a legal application.”

    “If we, as a U.S. legal action charity, cannot get a substantive response from CENTCOM, what hope do civilians harmed by U.S. drone strikes living in Somalia, Syria, or Afghanistan have to access accountability?”

    Experts are hopeful that the Pentagon’s new Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, or CHMR-AP — which provides a blueprint for improving how the Pentagon addresses civilian harm — will be an impetus for the Defense Department to remake its broken claims and compensation programs. But experts say the CHMR-AP is light on the question of accountability. Austin has also publicly stated that the Pentagon has no intention of reinvestigating past civilian harm incidents.

    “The new DoD Action Plan includes some important steps towards remedying these policy failures, including improving investigation processes, recognizing the importance of amends to those harmed, and establishing a diverse menu of response options, from acknowledgements to condolence payments to the provision of medical care,” said Annie Shiel, senior adviser for U.S. policy and advocacy at CIVIC. “But even if implemented effectively, it’s unclear what difference those changes will make to someone like Adel Al Manthari, since the CHMR-AP doesn’t include a clear commitment to looking back at the many past cases of civilian harm that have gone under-investigated, unacknowledged, and without amends.”

    Dennis also welcomes the CHMR-AP, with caveats, calling for increased congressional oversight of civilian casualty issues — precisely what a new congressional Protection of Civilians in Conflict Caucus has pledged to do — as well as workable mechanisms for reporting civilian harm; deadlines for responding to complaints; genuine investigations, including site visits and witness interviews (which are rarely conducted); details about how disciplinary measures and individual criminal liability will be handled; and protections for whistleblowers. “If we see all of this, we might begin to see some semblance of accountability,” Dennis said.

    In the four years since the Al Uqla airstrike, Al Manthari has been largely immobile and easy to find. Asked if the fact that the U.S. military has taken no further action against a man previously deemed too dangerous to live was a tacit admission that Al Manthari is — as two independent investigations found — innocent of any terrorist ties, a U.S. military spokesperson demurred. “I’ll follow up with policy,” he said on June 6. “I’ll get back to you.” He never did.

    Maimed by a U.S. drone strike and abandoned to the cruel fate of crowdfunding, Al Manthari is again dependent on the kindness of strangers to get him through his next round of surgeries and follow-up care. And there’s no certainty that he, or the other victims suffering in America’s far-flung war zones of the last 20-plus years, will ever see the money owed to them for their losses, injuries, pain, and suffering.

    “There are likely thousands of cases like Adel Al Manthari’s — victims and survivors of devastating civilian harm, still waiting for any kind of acknowledgement or amends from the U.S. government,” said Shiel. “Far too many cases have been erroneously dismissed despite painstaking research from human rights groups and journalists. And even when the U.S. government confirms it caused civilian casualties, it has rarely made ex gratia payments or other amends. … The result is that civil society groups and journalists have had to fill this gap, from conducting rigorous investigations the government should be doing, to setting up crowdfunding campaigns to support victims. That’s just not how accountability is supposed to work.”

    The post Drone Debt: U.S. Refuses to Help Wounded Survivor of Wrongful Attack in Yemen appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • Maryam Barak, an Afghan journalist, made it to Italy with her family last summer. In Rome, she met Qader Kazimizada, another newly arrived Afghan who is helping refugees find community in an alien place.

    Transcript

    Qader Kazimizada: Come ti chiami?

    Nargis: Nargis.

    Qader Kazimizada: No, you have to complete it. Io mi chiamo —

    Nargis: Io mi chiamo Nargis.

    Qader Kazimizada: Quanti anni hai?

    Nargis: Sette anni.

    Qader Kazimizada: Complete it: Io ho sette anni. OK, very good. Da dove sei?

    Maryam Barak: Qader Kazimizada is playing with his 7-year-old daughter, Nargis, in their temporary home, a spacious apartment in central Rome. They have been living in Italy for about a year, and the children are learning the language.

    They’re picking it up more easily than their parents, who fled Afghanistan after Kabul fell to the Taliban. Qader and his family made it out and ended up in Rome, where they are trying to start a new life, in a new country and a new culture.

    [Theme music]

    Maryam Barak: From The Intercept and New America, this is No Way Home. In this four-part series, you’ll hear stories that were found, developed, and reported by Afghans like me, who have been forced into exile. Our stories reflect what we saw with our own eyes and what we and other Afghans have experienced firsthand since the U.S. military pulled out, the Afghan government collapsed, and the Taliban took over last summer.

    This is Episode Three: “Born Again.”

    [Theme music ends]

    Maryam Barak: I’m Maryam Barak, an Afghan journalist.

    I left my home, my identity, and everything on August 23, 2021. But still, I consider myself more fortunate than many other Afghan refugees: I am with my family in Italy. 

    What I’m about to tell you is a different kind of Afghan refugee story. It isn’t about the struggle to get out of Kabul or a dramatic life-and-death journey. Instead, it’s about adapting to life in a new country, about finding hope — despite all we have left behind. These quieter stories are just as common; they are stories of resilience.

    I met Qader Kazimizada as I was also trying to learn Italian and integrate into this new society. Qader already spoke English when he arrived in Italy with his family last fall, but he struggled to learn Italian. He soon realized that other Afghan refugees were having the same problem. He created a WhatsApp group to communicate with them. 

    Qader Kazimizada: So I created a group, and called them. “Are you ready? Do you need my help? I want to have a class for you.” They were surprised and really felt very happy: “Oh, that is wonderful, please! That is good.”

    Maryam Barak: Despite the fact that he himself was just beginning to learn Italian, Qader began teaching Afghan refugees what he had learned in his own classes, offering both support with the language and a sense of community. He taught the classes in languages Afghans could understand, like Persian. 

    Back in Afghanistan, Qader worked as a finance officer for Jesuit Refugee Services, an international nongovernmental organization that at the time provided education, vocational training, and emergency services to people in Afghanistan. Qader had been worried about the worsening security situation in the country, but like many others, he thought he and his family would be safe in Kabul, the country’s cosmopolitan capital. 

    Sitting in his living room in Rome, with his children playing near him, Qader told me about the day everything changed: August 15, 2021. He was at his office in Kabul when he learned that the Taliban had entered the city. He grabbed his laptop and immediately rushed home. When he got there, he realized the Taliban were already in his neighborhood. Suddenly, the lines of people rushing to the airport made sense.

    Qader Kazimizada: They have entered, and there are many people, many people, many young boys. They are clicking pictures with the Taliban.

    Maryam Barak: Working for a Catholic organization put Qader in danger. Leaving Afghanistan suddenly seemed like the only way to save his family. When the government collapsed, he started contacting every foreigner he had ever met, asking for help. Eventually, Jesuit Refugee Services said they could evacuate Qader, his wife, and two kids, Nargis and Firdaws. 

    But they couldn’t take everyone. Qader would have to leave his parents and siblings behind. He and his wife took their 7-year-old daughter and 3-year-old son to the airport. The Italian government agreed to take in the group. With no notice, Qader and his family were now headed to Rome.

    Qader Kazimizada: We didn’t have even any choice. There was no choice because at that moment, the only thing important was to get out from Kabul.

    Maryam Barak: When Qader and his family arrived in Italy, they spent two weeks in a hotel, quarantining because of pandemic-related restrictions. Then they were sent to a camp for refugees and migrants in Vibo Valentia, a city in the south of the country. The camp was crowded and isolated, and Qader’s wife and children struggled. 

    Qader Kazimizada: It was not a good place for the family. We were four families among 18 single refugees from Africa, from Pakistan, from different parts of Africa. And also we were not provided the keys, and there we had no actual privacy.

    Maryam Barak: Qader didn’t feel it was safe for his family. 

    Qader Kazimizada: They were drinking, shouting, fighting during the night at the corridor. I was always awake and standing behind the door, in order to avoid if they come at the door, because my family is here, my wife is here, my children are here. They will be scared.

    Maryam Barak: With the help of his former employer, Qader was eventually able to move his family out of the refugee camp and into an apartment in Rome, one of several homes made available to Afghan refugees through Italian charity organizations.

    That’s where we’re sitting. It’s April 2022, and Qader’s wife Habiba, who is nine months pregnant with their third child, plays with the kids. Qader’s daughter is attending an Italian school and loves her new home. 

    Qader Kazimizada: Fortunately, she found Italy very nice. And now she’s very happy. 

    Maryam Barak: And she is going to school? 

    Qader Kazimizada: She is going to school. She has found many, many friends. She goes to her friends’ houses. They are inviting her in order to play, to do homework together. Yesterday, one of these families took her to the sea. And she was very happy. She went with them.

    Maryam Barak: The Italian government evacuated 5,000 Afghans after August 15. Like other refugees resettling in Italy, they were given food and accommodations. Once they receive official refugee status, they begin the “reception and integration” process, including Italian language classes and employment training.

    The Italian government is paying for Qader’s apartment, and he receives about 380 euros a month for food and other expenses for his family of four, as well as a transit pass. Through the program, he has also started learning Italian. 

    In Afghanistan, Qader mostly spoke English at work to communicate with colleagues from around the world. He thought that would be enough to get by in Italy too. But he soon learned that was not the case at all. 

    Qader Kazimizada: It was something that really surprised me, oh my God, it is something that it is a little difficult, but anyhow I will cope with later. It was difficult, only the language, because many were not speaking in English, only Italiano. While we didn’t know anything in Italiano.

    Maryam Barak: Not speaking the language was a huge challenge for him, particularly as he needed help to navigate his new city. 

    Qader Kazimizada: I asked two police officers in English, “Where can I get bus 75 to go to Monteverde? They did not speak English, and they got very angry, said, “Qui Italia, Italia.” And now I understand that they were saying, “Where is this?” And asked me, “Where [are we]? Italia, Italia. Italiano, italiano.” And this was, for me, OK, no problem. I said, “Thank you.” I knew only one word: grazie.

    Maryam Barak: From then on, Qader became more serious about his Italian lessons. 

    In Italy, several refugee NGOs offer language classes, but a challenge for many Afghans learning Italian is that their teachers often rely on English as an intermediary language, which some Afghans don’t speak. As Qader continued his lessons and started studying more, it dawned on him that many Afghans would face even greater challenges than he did picking up the language. 

    Qader Kazimizada: We are learning Italiano, trying to get integrated with the people, with Italian people. How they can manage to learn Italian, while they have no English background?

    Maryam Barak: Qader was particularly worried about two Afghan families he knew who had a hard time settling in. 

    Qader Kazimizada: So I thought better to start a class for them. Because I knew English, so I was trying to do self-study. Then I thought, “OK, I can teach them!”

    Finding Hope Through Teaching Others

    Maryam Barak: Qader started teaching other Afghan refugees what he had learned in his own classes. His wife and children also joined his lessons.

    Qader Kazimizada: I told them that I will explain everything in Persian, and I will teach you very slowly. They said, “Yeah, that’s good.”

    Maryam Barak:  Word spread fast, and the number of participants increased day by day. He shared an open Zoom link, and as the classes continued, more Afghans called in from all around Italy. Then at a gathering organized by the Afghan community in Rome, Afghans introduced him as an Italian teacher.

    Qader Kazimizada: They said that Qader is an Italian teacher. And everyone was shocked! “How can it be possible?” I said, yeah, this is my motivation — that I can help. I help Afghan families as much as possible, but I have learned I can pass it to them, so they feel comfortable. They can learn a little bit, if not a lot, at least few things they can learn. It could be a basic step for them. 

    Maryam Barak: Inspired by Qader’s work, others jumped in to help, including Sitara, an Iranian refugee who had been living in Italy for several years. Because of privacy, she only wanted to use her first name.

    Qader Kazimizada: She came to me, said that “I’m really impressed by what you said, and I’m really interested to help you, if you want my help.” I said, “That is wonderful! I appreciate anyone who can help me. Welcome.”

    So she explained, “I used to teach in Iran, at a university, Italian for one year or one year and a half.” She said, “Here also I have a class teaching others, so maybe I can help you.” I said, “That is wonderful, please!”

    Maryam Barak: In 2015, Sitara had traveled to Afghanistan to film a documentary. She fell in love with the country and realized there was a huge disconnect between the reality of Afghan life and the ways in which the country was often portrayed by the international media.

    Sitara (translated voiceover): A country where we have always heard of war and terrorism, adversity, misery and extremism — here I met really lovely people. People [in] civil society who had tried to work on culture and art. I met them in person, up close. The efforts and struggles they, especially women, especially artists, had been making. There were poets, poetry nights, film festivals, and women filmmakers. It was all very strange to me, and it was an image that would not be transferred outside Afghanistan.

    Maryam Barak: After the collapse of the Afghan government, Sitara wanted to help Afghan refugees. When she met Qader, she thought this was the opportunity she had been looking for. So she started teaching Italian, using Persian as a go-between.

    Sitara (translated voiceover): The level of students, their age, their family situation, from where in Afghanistan they came, their background, and where they live now are different as night and day. It’s very different. Because we have a link open to people who want to introduce it to their friends, and we welcome all of them. And the door is open to all with a condition, the only condition. These classes are completely free and charitable: Be present and study.

    Maryam Barak: Sitara, a refugee herself, can relate to the challenges her students face.

    Sitara (translated voiceover): I may say migration is like being born again, or I may say it is a kind of death. That is, you die from a human being you were, from everything you had, from your previous life, and are born in a new world — especially when it is not self-imposed migration and it’s forced. In the case of Afghans, it happened overnight. They are still in shock, and I am sure that they are still digesting, processing the psychological consequences of what happened, the volume of violence that was inflicted on them, and the fear and horror that was imposed [on them].

    Maryam Barak: Qader’s Italian classes have helped him not only to learn and teach the language, but also to find a purpose in his new life, and a way to remain connected to other Afghans and build community. The classes also helped him overcome some of the emotional challenges that often accompany becoming a refugee — including a bout of depression in his first weeks after arriving in Italy. In those early days, he would walk around Rome by himself, trying to make sense of his new life. 

    Qader Kazimizada: I experienced depression in the beginning, so I was always thinking how to come out of that depression. Sometimes I used to go to Gianicolo, even during the night after 10 [p.m.] to walk and just see Rome, come back and sometimes get engaged with other things with my lessons.

    Maryam Barak: Afghan migrants from all over Italy are joining Qader’s classes today. 

    Mohammad Tahir is one of them. He lives in Ancona, a port city on the Adriatic Sea. Mohammad Tahir and his wife can’t read and write, so they worried that would make learning a new language even harder. Not speaking Italian made them feel cut off from their new community. 

    Mohammad Tahir (translated voiceover): There is a supermarket here that issues cards and where we go for shopping. At the counter when they count and tell us the amount of money, we just give the card [to pay]. When my children are with me, it’s a bit better. For me it is very hard, and my blood pressure goes up. When you cannot speak [the language], you feel dumb and it is very hard to bear.

    Maryam Barak: For the first five months in Italy, Mohammad Tahir’s family did not have access to language classes. But now they’re taking weekly lessons from native Italian speakers, and three of their children have started school. They also call into Qader’s Zoom classes for additional practice. This is Tahir’s wife, Latifa:

    Latifa Tahir (translated voiceover): Now it’s very good. Our anxiety has decreased significantly. In the past, when our electricity was gone, we could not tell our neighbors, who are all Italians, [that we didn’t have power]. We remained without electricity even for two days. We ate dinner in front of the telephone light. We could not turn on the central heating that had been out of commission and went through much trouble.

    Maryam Barak: Recently, I sat in on one of Qader’s Zoom classes. The lesson began with him greeting his students in Italian.

    Qader Kazimizada: Ciao buona sera. Ciao a tutti, come state?

    Ali Hussain: Bene grazie.

    Qader Kazimizada: OK, OK. 

    Student: Bene grazie.

    Qader: Come sta, Murtaza? Murtaza, come sta?

    Murtaza: Bene.

    Maryam Barak: The students I met in Qader’s class deeply appreciate his efforts. And Qader is happy to be helping people cope with the stress and anxiety that comes from leaving behind their country and adjusting to a whole new culture and language.

    He recalls a recent memory from class.

    Qader Kazimizada: During the class, the teacher asked him in Dari, in Persian, [say], “We have eaten dinner, and we have done our dinner.” Then, immediately, a little boy, he said, “Abbiamo, I think like that?” And another phrase, he said, “Abbiamo mangiato.” For me, immediately, without any thinking, I really got happy that, oh, thank God, I have done something. And this is what the fruit is: They are learning.

    Maryam Barak: Qader knows that learning Italian is only the first of many challenges ahead for him and fellow Afghans. For now, he is focused on finding a job, so that he can take care of his family in Italy and back in Afghanistan. 

    Qader Kazimizada: I am ready [for] any job, but in fact, this is important for me, the job which has a little more payment. [laughs] Now the first priority is this: At least I can stand on my feet. I can support my family here, and I can support my family there, if I can bring them here. I’m also thinking about starting maybe a small business, maybe cafe, coffee shop, restaurant, or whatever.

    Maryam Barak: The Italian classes he runs have helped him envision a future for himself and his family here. Qader hopes helping others can help him chart his own path in this new home. 

    Qader Kazimizada: I have been always thinking that I am a human being. I have to be — how to say? — I have to be a person who can at least help others, not harm others. I know that today, many, many people are harmed by each other. So I was always thinking that I have to be like this: My path has to be very defined, very clear that I have to help others if I can.

    [Credits]

    Maryam Barak: Next time on No Way Home. 

    Hamid: About staying in Afghanistan it is also scary here. Everything is unknown. We don’t know what happens next. What is waiting for us? We don’t know, days and nights, what will happen, what our future would be. What should we do, which way we should follow to reach to our goal or to at least to stay safe.

    Maryam Barak: No Way Home is a production of The Intercept and New America’s Afghanistan Observatory Scholars program. 

    This episode was written and reported by me, Maryam Barak. 

    Our executive producer and editor is Vanessa Gezari.

    Alice Speri also edited this story. 

    Supervising producer is Laura Flynn. 

    Candace Rondeaux is the director of Future Frontlines Program-New America and project editor. 

    Ali Yawar Adili is the Afghanistan Observatory Project Coordinator.

    Jose Olivares helped with production. 

    Rick Kwan mixed this episode.

    Zach Young composed our theme music.

    Legal review by David Bralow.

    Fact checking by Emily Schneider

    Awista Ayub is the director and project manager of New America’s Fellows Program. 

    Voiceovers by Humaira Rahbin and Mir Miri. 

    To learn more, visit theintercept.com where you can find transcripts and art of the show.

    Philipp Hubert is our visual designer and Nara Shin our copy editor.

    Roger Hodge is editor-in-chief of The Intercept. 

    If you want to give us feedback or have any questions, email us at podcasts@theintercept.com.

    Thanks, so much, for listening.

    The post No Way Home, Episode Three: Born Again appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • As the Taliban claimed territory last summer, Mir Abdullah Miri and his cousin Aziz both planned to flee their homes in Herat, a city in western Afghanistan. Mir, an educational researcher, made it to the Afghan capital and tried to get on a flight, while Aziz, a cellphone programmer, decided to cross into Iran on foot with his wife and two young children, hoping to reach relatives in Germany. After Aziz and his family set off through Afghanistan’s southern desert, Mir was left to untangle the mystery of what really happened to them in that desolate wilderness, where thousands of Afghans have risked their lives in search of a way out.

    Transcript

    A quick warning: This episode includes descriptions of a traumatic experience. Please listen at your discretion.

    Leila (translated voiceover): I couldn’t walk. My toenails were completely ripped off. All my toenails were torn off on the way. I felt it myself. I couldn’t sit down to take off my shoes, but I could feel that my toenails were coming off.

    I had to take care of my children. I had fallen in several places, and my eyes were closed. All I could hear was my daughter and son crying.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: When the Taliban seized Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, Leila’s husband, Aziz, quickly started planning the family’s exit from the country. Their attempt to leave would irreversibly change their lives — and mine.

    Leila (translated voiceover): I don’t know who had given me water. It was a stranger. One of them offered to carry my daughter, but I didn’t trust them. I was worried he might take my daughter and run away or something.

    [Theme music]

    Mir Abdullah Miri: This is No Way Home, a production of The Intercept and New America.

    In this four-part series you’ll hear stories that were found, developed, and reported by Afghans like me, who have been forced into exile.

    Our stories reflect what we saw with our own eyes and what we and our families have experienced firsthand since the U.S. military pulled out, the Afghan government collapsed, and the Taliban took over last summer.

    This is Episode Two: “The Desert of Death.”

    [Theme music ends]

    Mir Abdullah Miri: My name is Mir Abdullah Miri. I’m an educational researcher living in the U.K. Around this time last year, I was still in Afghanistan, fighting to get out. And so was my cousin, Aziz.

    The last time I saw Aziz, he was standing in front of the cellphone store where he worked in Herat, the third largest city in Afghanistan. Located in the western part of the country, the city has been home to many renowned poets, writers, and artists. A jewel along the Silk Road, Herat has long been coveted by conquerors and occupiers.

    [Sounds of gunfire]

    In July of 2021, Taliban fighters were intensifying their attacks in Herat. This was about a month before they would take control of the capital, Kabul.

    That day in front of the cellphone store, Aziz and I had a short conversation. He told me about his plans to leave the country and settle in Germany. He had an uncle and cousin there. His wife, Leila, said Aziz wanted a better life for their kids.

    Leila (translated voiceover): He would say, “I don’t like raising my son here. My son should go and study somewhere he deserves.” Because our son knew the English alphabet and was smart.

    Aziz: Ice.

    Amir: Ice.

    Aziz: Ice.

    Amir: Ice.

    Aziz: Cream.

    Amir: Cream.

    Aziz: Ice cream.

    Amir: Ice cream.

    Aziz: Cookie ice cream.

    Leila: Aziz would say, “He is a waste here. I want to raise my son somewhere he deserves.”

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Aziz wanted to raise his children somewhere where they could go to school, play, and have fun. But getting to Germany was going to be more difficult for Aziz and his family than I realized the last time I saw him.

    For reasons that will become apparent, I’m using pseudonyms for all of the subjects in this story.

    Leila (translated voiceover): Both Aziz and I had passports. Our passports had expired. Our son and newborn daughter didn’t have a passport.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: The original plan was to get to Germany through Iran, then Turkey. But because Aziz and his family didn’t have passports or proper travel documents, their options for getting there were limited.

    [Sounds from passport office]

    Following the collapse of the government, Afghanistan’s passport offices were flooded with people. They were forced to close because of malfunctioning biometric equipment, leaving thousands of Afghans stranded.

    Leila (translated voiceover): Aziz would say, “I can’t afford to go illegally from Islam Qala border. I will go from Nimroz with my uncle because he has taken this route before.”

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Islam Qala is a town in Afghanistan on the border with Iran. It’s much closer to Herat than Nimroz, but also more heavily patrolled.

    Nimroz, a province in the southwestern part of Afghanistan, borders Iran and Pakistan. It’s a well-known smuggling hub, where drugs, people, money, and more are trafficked between borders.

    Leila (translated voiceover): I think he would not have taken this illegal route if the passport office had been open.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: To make the journey, Aziz sold his laptop. He learned from relatives that his uncle Ahmad wanted to go to Iran, so he would come along too. Leila’s dad knew a smuggler in Herat who could help them get there.

    The day Aziz decided to leave the country, he wrote on Facebook, “Goodbye Afghanistan, Goodbye Herat.”

    That same day, Aziz visited his aunt to say goodbye and ask for her blessing. They waited to hear from the smuggler.

    Leila (translated voiceover): We were supposed to exactly go at 4 o’clock on Friday. Our bags were packed in the morning. We were ready to go, but it did not happen, and the smuggler called us and said that we would go tomorrow. The next day, again, it did not happen and was delayed to the next day, which was Sunday, when he called and told us that on Monday at 4:00 p.m., he would definitely move us from Herat to Nimroz.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: On Monday, August 30, 2021, two weeks after the Afghan government had collapsed and the Taliban had taken control of the country, Aziz posted on Facebook: “O God, send blessings upon Muhammad and the Progeny of Muhammad.” Perhaps a sign that he was nervous about the journey ahead.

    The Journey Begins

    [Sounds of the Herat bus terminal]

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Later that day, Aziz, his wife, their 3-year-old son, and infant daughter, and his uncle, along with his wife and their baby, went to the Herat bus terminal.

    Leila: We only had taken one extra set of clothes, because I had a little daughter who was a newborn. So I took a small bag with medicines and syrups for my son because he had dust allergies, and formula milk, boiled water, and a baby bottle for my daughter. I knew that there might not be water and food available during this trip, and I may not be able to breastfeed my daughter.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: The smuggler was supposed to take Aziz’s family across the border, but they only had about a third of what they needed in cash to pay him. They also needed money to cover travel expenses like food, lodging, and transportation along the way.

    They told the smuggler they would pay the rest when they arrived in Iran. They set off to Nimroz to meet the smuggler.

    [Sounds of crowds in Nimroz]

    Leila (translated voiceover): Once we arrived in Nimroz, all the crossing points were closed. It was very crowded in Nimroz. There was no car that we could take. We stayed there four nights. After four nights, I told Aziz that it was not possible: “Now that it is impossible to go, let’s return home.” He told me that he would not return even if he died during this journey.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Fearing life under the Taliban and economic collapse, hundreds of thousands of people across the country have tried to flee. Although the desert and mountainous terrain is treacherous, Nimroz is easier for people to cross into Iran illegally.

    Hotels were packed. The deserts and mountains were crowded with people. Everyone wanted to leave. While they were waiting for the smuggler, Leila and Aziz got into an argument.

    Leila (translated voiceover): I told him that we have our house; we have everything. We don’t care if others leave. Let’s return. Aziz said, “Had I known you are like this, I wouldn’t have married you.” He even told me, “Even if I get killed, I won’t return home. Bury me in Iran next to my father’s grave if I die. I won’t return to Afghanistan.”

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Migration from Afghanistan rose in the months before the Afghan government fell to the Taliban.

    VOA: The number of Afghans crossing the border illegally has increased by 30 to 40 percent since May, when international forces began withdrawing from Afghanistan and the Taliban increased its attacks.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: The number of people trying to leave was still high at the end of August last year.

    Afghans make up one of the largest refugee populations in the world. Over 2 million Afghan refugees are registered in Iran and Pakistan, which together are home to about three-quarters of Afghan refugees. At least 1,500 Afghans have lost their lives on migration routes across Asia and Europe since 2014, according to the International Organization for Migration; most of those deaths occurred while crossing into Iran.

    Since there is so little official data on the deaths of migrants, the actual figure is probably much higher. Most of these deaths occur along the Afghanistan-Iran route that Aziz and his family chose.

    Afghan refugees have had devastating experiences in Iran. In May 2020, 23 Afghan migrants who were trying to cross the border to Iran drowned in the Harirud River after Iranian border guards beat them and forced them to jump into the water. A month later, Iranian police shot at a car carrying Afghan migrants. The car burst into flames; three people died.

    [Sounds from the streets of Qom, Iran]

    Aziz had grown up in Qom, Iran. His parents had migrated there during the Afghan civil war in the 1990s. When Aziz was 7, his dad died in a traffic accident. At the time, Aziz’s mom was only 20 years old, left to raise three kids. To make ends meet, she cleaned their neighbors’ houses. As a kid, Aziz would work half a day and go to school the other half. After finishing high school, he was no longer eligible for free education in Iran.

    In 2008, seven years after the U.S. military arrived in Afghanistan, Aziz and his family moved to Herat. It took Aziz a few years to get used to living in Afghanistan. He started working as a software programmer at a cellphone store. Leila and Aziz married in 2015. A few years later, he got his bachelor’s degree in computer science.

    Aziz grew to love Herat. He used to call himself Aziz HRT — short for Herat — a nickname he chose to show his regard for his new home. Even his Facebook pictures had the caption “Aziz HRT.” For several years, Aziz lived a normal life in Herat, until insecurity and conflict in the country increased, leading many Afghans to flee their homes.

    As the economy weakened, Aziz struggled to make ends meet. He began thinking about getting a new job or a part-time job, but he didn’t succeed because almost everyone had a similar problem.

    [Sounds from Nimroz]

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Back in Nimroz, Leila and Aziz were growing impatient. They still hadn’t heard from the smuggler. They had no information about their border crossing or know what to expect.

    When they finally got a hold of the smuggler the next day, he told them to keep waiting. Aziz, Ahmad, and their wives and children were sharing a space with five other families.

    Leila (translated voiceover): It is a place where you cannot make a call, and no one helps you [if you] cry out of pain.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Leila described their time in Nimroz.

    Leila (translated voiceover): We lived on fruits like melon and watermelon. During the four nights in Nimroz, in our initial place, we could make calls and were in contact. The internet also worked but not properly. We were told to hide our phones. I even took my marriage ring off my finger. I was told to hide my ring because we would be chased.

    From Smuggler to Smuggler

    Mir Abdullah Miri: After four days and no progress, Aziz found a new smuggler, Khalil, with the help of a family friend.

    It’s not hard to find a smuggler in Nimroz who will agree to take you across the border for the right price.

    Leila (translated voiceover): The smuggler said, “It’s up to you. You have a choice to make: All border crossings are closed, except Kalagan, which requires four hours of walking.”

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Khalil, the new smuggler Aziz found, warned that the only route open to them was not safe for a family with two young children. But Aziz insisted.

    Leila (translated voiceover): It was Friday, and the smuggler himself moved us to a new lodging place. He didn’t charge us for the place, but he charged us for the food. The food was like what you’d cook for a small child. And because the food is not enough, the child won’t get full. He would charge us 200 Afghani per person for that food.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: It was very expensive for them, and the accommodations were sparse.

    Leila (translated voiceover): The new place was inside the city. It was inside the city but in the backstreets. It was a ruined house and had two floors. Married people were on one floor; singles were on the other floor. The women and children were on one side of the room, and the men — whether their husbands, brothers, and everyone else — were on the other side of the room. There was only a curtain between men and women.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Before I continue, let me explain how smugglers work in this part of the country.

    Smuggling networks work with sarafs: basically freelance financial agents. The sarafs act as intermediaries between smugglers and migrants. Migrants usually pay the sarafs in advance, but the money is only handed over to the smuggler once the client has reached his destination.

    Migrants are usually divided into groups of 5 to 10. They rely on their guides for information about the geography and length of the trip. Throughout the journey, they’re passed from one smuggler to another, all part of the same network.

    The new smuggler gave them a phone number and told them to use it if they got lost. Khalil told them that they were now Abdullah Kaj’s people, another smuggler. He told them what to expect from the journey.

    Leila (translated voiceover): He told us to put the phone number in each child’s pocket, so they could be found in case they were lost along the way.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: By rickshaws, the smuggler took Leila, Aziz, their two children, his uncle, and his uncle’s family to a place where another set of smugglers would meet them.

    Leila (translated voiceover): The weather was unbearably hot. We were in a desert. It was not in our control. We didn’t have the choice to decide [when to go and how to go]. When you say “smuggling,” it’s clear from its name. It’s not for you to say. You have to bear it.

    All the children were crying; even my son and my daughter were crying. I didn’t know how to calm them.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: In the desert, they arrived to find pickup trucks and cars.

    Leila (translated voiceover): The cars were not that comfortable to sit in. They were worn-out Toyotas. It was me, my two children, my uncle’s wife, two other women — who were our distant relatives — with a child each, plus the bags we had. We were crammed into the second row of the cabin with difficulty. The men had to sit on the back of the truck.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: After about nine hours, they were dropped off near a tent in the desert in Pakistan. About an hour later, another car drove them through the desert and hills.

    Leila (translated voiceover): Around 2:00 to 2:30 am, I had a Nokia phone with myself, and I was able to check the time. He stopped near a hill and told us to rest there, and they would move us again at 5:00 a.m. There were so many people sleeping there who had arrived earlier. There were cars and one tent there. They were all migrants. When we stopped there, the vehicle remained with us and the guy went somewhere else. There, my daughter was crying a lot and did not take anything. I mean, I couldn’t sleep from 2:30 am — when we arrived there — until 5:00 am until they moved us.

    There, it was full of sand, thorns, and thistles. Because we were so bone-tired and exhausted, we laid down there without even thinking if it was sand, rock, clumps of earth, or whatever. My son didn’t eat at all during the way. Whatever I give him, he would throw up. He would even throw up a drop of water I give him.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: The next morning, they left at 5:00 a.m. The driver spoke Balochi on the phone, a language spoken in the region they were passing through between Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

    It is known as Dasht-e Margo, or the Desert of Death. Leila and Aziz didn’t realize this.

    Four hours later, they were dropped off at a site with little shade, just a few palm trees and no water.

    Leila (translated voiceover): After an hour, two cars came. They asked, “Who are Abdullah Kaj’s people?”

    Mir Abdullah Miri: That’s the smuggler.

    Leila (translated voiceover): “We are,” we said. The men raised their hands. The smugglers said that the men would go in one car and the women in another.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Aziz didn’t want the families separated. He insisted on being able to travel together with his wife and children.

    Leila (translated voiceover): The smuggler told Aziz, “Wait here. Once you’re burnt in the sun here until the evening, then you will regret it.”

    Mir Abdullah Miri: And so they were left in the desert.

    Leila (translated voiceover): But we didn’t know that the weather would get that hot under those palm trees.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Every few hours, they would change places, chasing the shade of the palm trees. Finally, about eight hours later, a pickup truck pulled up, and people crowded around it. Aziz and his family were allowed in. They were put on the back of the pickup truck.

    Leila (translated voiceover): The driver would drive so fast. He told us to hold fast. If anything like the bags, our kids, or ourselves fall, he would not stop for us to take our kids because there are patrol cars all around us.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Along the way, each family had to pay people at different checkpoints.

    Leila (translated voiceover): Most of our money was spent paying the Taliban and the Baloch tribespeople along the way. They would take money from everyone, both families and singles. Those who did not have money, they would hit them.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Leila shared a story about a young man traveling with them.

    Leila (translated voiceover): He gave his bag and his phone to us to hide because the poor man said, “These are all I had. Hide them because I have nothing else, and I might end up hungry and thirsty.” When the Taliban searched and couldn’t find anything, they hit him as much as they could.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Around midnight, they arrived at a place called Abbas Hostel, where they would be staying for the night. It had no roof — so they huddled under the desert sky.

    Leila (translated voiceover): It wasn’t a hostel. It was a big compound with four walls and two doors. I should tell you, it was like a moat. It was water and dirt. There was no place to sit. We finally decided to sit next to a toilet on the dry ground, in the dirt. We had no option except to sit there. There, we ate no food and drank no water — nothing.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: The next stop was at the mountains on the Pakistan-Iran border. By that point, two nights had passed since they had left Nimroz. They reached the mountains in the evening and were told to rest for two hours. They had a long walk ahead.

    Leila (translated voiceover): Once he dropped us off there, we walked a few steps. We sat at the top of the mountain. Aziz was too tired to sit. He lay there on the rocks. Our son was also lying there, next to his dad.

    There was no one we could buy food or water from. We had taken only some dried bread with us since we knew that dried bread doesn’t go bad easily.

    [Sounds of motorbikes]

    Mir Abdullah Miri: A few smugglers on motorbikes showed up at 9:00 p.m. and divided the group in two and assigned each to a different smuggler: “Mojib Baloch” and “Asmaan.” Aziz and his family were told that Asmaan would be their smuggler.

    They were told to shout “Asmaan! Asmaan!” whenever they were lost, since the route was dark and crowded.

    Leila (translated voiceover): All of us had to walk. It was too dark to see anything. In fact, we couldn’t see ahead of us. Our small mobile phone had a light, but the smuggler even told us to [keep it] off because if police patrols saw it, they would follow and find us.

    The smuggler was on a motorbike, and he would himself go two, three mountains ahead of us and stand on the top of a mountain and signal us with his big light, asking us to follow him. He told us if we didn’t follow him, we would be left behind.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Aziz had a backpack and carried his 3-year-old son, Amir. Leila carried their baby daughter in her arms. Aziz and Leila walked together, holding hands.

    Leila (translated voiceover): My son was crying a lot. As Aziz walked, he would put Amir down, held his hand, and asked him to follow him. Within minutes, he’d put him back on his shoulder. I held my daughter’s hand. Amir would cry a lot and say things like, “Daddy, I’m sleepy. Daddy, I’m hungry. Daddy, I’m dying.” His daddy was silent.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: They hadn’t walked more than 30 minutes before Aziz couldn’t go any further.

    Leila (translated voiceover): Once Aziz couldn’t walk, in the dark, a man approached us and offered to carry our bags because my son was crying a lot and my daughter had also started crying at this point. We even stopped and sat down to rest in a few places. But the guy took our bag and soon disappeared with our water and food.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Leila called for their uncle, Ahmad. The route was crowded with donkeys and motorbikes that typically smuggled gas, but since nearly all the borders were now closed, the business of smuggling humans was booming.

    Aziz was in pain.

    Leila (translated voiceover): Aziz would moan and cry “Aakh, aakh.” [expression of pain]

    Mir Abdullah Miri: They stopped a man on a motorbike to ask about taking the family the rest of the way.

    Leila (translated voiceover): The motorbiker looked very scary. Aziz talked to the motorbiker and asked how much he would take us. The guy said, “400,000 tomans per person.” Aziz said, “I don’t mind. It’s me, my wife, and my children.”

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Aziz agreed to pay the fee, which was around 1,200 Afghani or $14, but they needed to make it down the steep mountain first. Uncle Ahmad helped Aziz down. Leila and the rest of the family followed closely.

    Leila (translated voiceover): When the motorbiker stopped there, he would shout out, “Amir? Leila? Amir? Leila?” I would reply, “We are here. We are here.” He was worried about us a lot.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Once they reached the bottom of the mountain, Aziz sat on the ground in pain and even more exhausted.

    Leila (translated voiceover): He was conscious, but he couldn’t find people to help him get on the motorbike. I implored some people to get him on the motorbike. Six people put him on the motorbike.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Ahmad would accompany Aziz on the motorbike with the smuggler. Leila was left with the children and her uncle Ahmad’s family. The plan was to meet at the next hostel in Iran.

    Leila was growing tired too, now carrying her two children on her own. After two and a half hours, the motorbike driver came back alone. He told Leila that they took Aziz to the hospital.

    Leila (translated voiceover): I got worried and I asked, “What has happened that you took him to the hospital?” “His blood pressure had gone up,” he replied.

    He lied to me.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: The smuggler had come back to take her and the children down the mountain. Initially, she refused to go with him. But she was so tired, she ultimately gave in.

    Leila (translated voiceover): The smuggler forced my son on his motorbike. Then I sat on his motorbike with my daughter. I was crying and asking him, “Where did you take my husband?” “We took him to hospital. Now I will take you there,” he replied. My son was crying a lot. He would tell my son to stop crying, as he would take us to his dad.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: The smuggler didn’t take them to the hospital as he had promised. He took them here and there, Leila said it felt like he was stalling.

    They had crossed the border into Iran. But it would be awhile before she would see their Uncle Ahmad again.

    Leila (translated voiceover): Suddenly I saw Uncle Ahmad from behind us.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Ahmad told Leila that he would take her to see Aziz. He took her to Zahedan, a city in Iran. Once there, Ahmad told her, Aziz was in a hospital in Afghanistan. So they would need to return.

    Leila was overwhelmed, anxious, and frustrated. She had been told so many contradictory things about Aziz. No one was giving her clear answers. Her children were crying, and she cried with them, begging others to tell her what happened to her husband.

    In order to get back to Afghanistan, they had to turn themselves into the authorities in Zahedan. Because they didn’t have the proper travel documents and crossed into Iran illegally, they had to be deported back home.

    After spending a few days and nights in Iran, they were deported to Afghanistan on September 12, 2021.

    No Clear Answers

    I was sitting in a Kabul hotel when I received a call from my brother, Omid. My family and I had received word that the U.K. government would evacuate us. I was told that I was eligible to be relocated to England because I was working as a trainer with the British Council. But chaos at the airport, and then the suicide bombing, grounded commercial flights.

    Omid told me that Aziz was missing after trying to cross the Afghanistan-Iran border. Together we began trying to find Aziz.

    Omid, who lives in Herat, had an Iranian visa. He set off to look for Aziz in Iran. Ahmad had told Omid that he wasn’t sure if Aziz was still alive. Ahmad had told other relatives that Aziz was in Khash, a city in Iran.

    But while searching for Aziz, Omid learned that his body was actually in a hospital in Saravan, a city in southeastern Iran, 100 miles away from Khash. The hospital staff told Omid that Aziz’s body had been discovered by villagers in Saravan, which wasn’t far from where he was supposed to meet Leila.

    Aziz’s body had been in the desert for a couple of days before it was taken to the hospital on September 9, 2021, they told Omid. According to the hospital report, Aziz died of three things: the first, being hit by a hard object; the second, head injuries and concussions; and the third, a cerebral hemorrhage. His brain was bleeding. When Omid saw Aziz’s body, he noticed that his clothes were torn.

    Aziz’s death remains a mystery. What happened to him? Did he fall? Was he pushed? Was he beaten? Did he suffer a heart attack? Did anyone help him, or did they leave him behind? Did he have time to realize what was happening? Was he alone when he died? And why was Ahmad giving conflicting stories?

    I’ve talked to those who were directly or indirectly involved in this trip and who had information about Aziz and his decision to leave the country. We all have tried retracing Aziz’s steps.

    When I asked Ahmad what happened to Aziz, he revealed more than he had told Leila:

    Ahmad (translated voiceover): Finally, as we approached the hostel, I saw Aziz have three hiccups on the motorbike, like someone who was breathing his last breaths. I took him to the hostel. When I took him to the hostel, I put him on my lap and called him nephew, nephew, breathe, breathe, but he didn’t breathe at all.

    There were 3 to 4 people in the hostel. I asked them to check him, he is my nephew, why he is not breathing. I was pushing his chest to help him breathe, but nothing helped; he couldn’t breathe.

    A guy at the hostel told me Aziz had died. May he rest in peace.

    I was told not to tell Leila about Aziz’s death because if she cried, all the travelers would be fucked up.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Meaning it could put them all in danger of being captured by the police.

    Ahmad (translated voiceover): I asked the smuggler what happened to my nephew. He told me, “We took him to the hospital to give electric shock, we took him to the morgue.”

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Leila doesn’t understand why Ahmad wouldn’t tell anyone what really happened. When they got back to Herat, everyone would ask Ahmad to tell them everything, and according to Leila, Ahmad would say, “This was everything.”

    She has her own theories.

    Leila (translated voiceover): I think Aziz fell off the mountain because Ahmad was so frail, and as he was helping Aziz get off the motorbike, he must have fallen.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: The mystery surrounding Aziz’s death has torn our family apart. We’ve all been left to speculate about what actually happened and whether anyone could have helped Aziz or saved him.

    Illegal migration is a difficult decision. Many uncertainties await the traveler. The journey becomes even harder when you start from a war-torn country like Afghanistan, at a moment when power is shifting, when many people are terrified and running for the exits.

    Afghanistan has had confusing policies to prevent or discourage the use of smugglers. Only recently has the Taliban ordered a ban on migration from Nimroz to Iran. But it’s been reported that those who pay bribes to the Taliban border guards can continue their journey.

    Leila (translated voiceover): Aziz was someone who loved his family. He loved his children. He always said, “Leaving home is like leaving your soul.” When he left home, he indeed left his soul behind.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Since Aziz passed away, his family has been struggling. Leila and her children live with Aziz’s mom and brother. They don’t have any source of income and rely on the little money Aziz’s brother gives them to cover living costs.

    Leila: When Aziz died, my daughter was two and half months old. I had to pay for diapers, medicine, and doctors. Once we got back, I had to spend a lot on my kids’ health. My son has a blood infection. Even now, if he gets a microbe in his body, we have to pay a lot for his treatment.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Leila worries about the future of her children.

    Leila (translated voiceover): All the dreams Aziz and I had as a couple were buried. Now, the only dream I have is for my children to get educated in a good place.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: When I talked to Leila about this, she fought back tears.

    Leila (translated voiceover): I just want from my God that whatever good or bad memories I had here in Afghanistan, I leave them in Afghanistan. I even just want to be somewhere where I can put up a tent, where I can live with my children, because there are no good memories left for us from Afghanistan. And even today my son cried for about an hour, saying, “Mommy, I want to see my dad’s clothes. Open dad’s closet so I can see my dad’s clothes.”

    Mir Abdullah Miri: She worries about the trauma her son, Amir, still carries. He’s scared all the time. When he’s sleeping, even when Leila is next to him, he wakes up and cries, “Where’s my mommy?”

    Leila (translated voiceover): Every night when he goes to bed, he does not fall asleep until he recalls those days. He says, “Mommy, when I grow up, I won’t take you to the mountains. I’m afraid of mountains.”

    [Credits]

    Mir Abdullah Miri: Next time on No Way Home.

    Maryam Barak: What I’m about to tell you is a different kind of Afghan refugee story. It isn’t about the struggle to get out of Kabul or a dramatic life-and-death journey. Instead, it’s about adapting to life in a new country, about finding hope — despite all we have left behind.

    Qader Kazimizada: We didn’t even have any choice. There was no choice, because at that moment, the only thing was important was to get out from Kabul.

    They were drinking, shouting, fighting during the night at the corridor. I was always awake and standing behind the door in order to avoid if they come at the door, because my family is here, my wife is here, my children are here. They will be scared.

    We are learning Italiano, trying to get integrated with the people, with Italian people.

    Mir Abdullah Miri: No Way Home is a production of The Intercept and New America’s Afghanistan Observatory Scholars program.

    This episode was written and reported by me, Mir Abdullah Miri.

    Our executive producer and editor is Vanessa Gezari.

    Supervising producer and editor is Laura Flynn.

    Candace Rondeaux is the director of Future Frontlines Program-New America and project editor.

    Ali Yawar Adili is the Afghanistan Observatory project coordinator.

    Jose Olivares helped with production.

    Rick Kwan mixed this episode.

    Zach Young composed our theme music.

    Legal review by David Bralow.

    Fact checking by Emily Schneider.

    Awista Ayub is the director and project manager of New America’s Fellows Program.

    Voiceovers by Humaira Rahbin and Ali Yawar Adili.

    To learn more, visit theintercept.com where you can find transcripts and art of the show. Philipp Hubert is our visual designer and Nara Shin our copy editor.

    Roger Hodge is editor-in-chief of The Intercept.

    If you want to give us feedback or have any questions, email us at podcasts@theintercept.com.

    Thanks, so much, for listening.

    The post No Way Home, Episode Two: The Desert of Death appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • Early on the morning of August 15, 2021, Shershah Ahmadi was struggling to find a ride home. In Foroshgah, one of the busiest open-air bazaars in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, crowds swarmed around money-changers and lined up at banks as people scrambled to lay their hands on the cash they would need to escape the coming Taliban onslaught. Every taxi and bus looked packed. Suddenly, Ahmadi’s phone buzzed as the WhatsApp group he shared with several dozen other pilots in the Afghan Air Force’s Special Mission Wing lit up.

    Ahmadi’s boss, Special Mission Wing Cmdr. Gen. Hamidullah Ziarmal, was ordering him and the other pilots to get to Hamid Karzai International Airport immediately. On any other day, Ahmadi wouldn’t have thought twice. After eight years in the Afghan Air Force, responding to a direct order from a superior officer was as natural as breathing.

    But on that day — the day the Taliban streamed into the heart of Kabul and plunged the city into chaos — every move Ahmadi made seemed like a fateful choice between his family and his country.

    He understood well what was being asked of him. If he followed the order, there was a good chance that he might never see his wife and 3-year-old daughter again. If he disobeyed, he could be considered absent without leave and insubordinate for failing to heed a direct command. Flouting the order to muster at the airport could also mean that millions of dollars’ worth of helicopters and airplanes paid for by U.S. taxpayers would fall into the hands of the Taliban. Either way, Ahmadi’s life might soon be at risk.

    Shershah Ahmadi is not his real name. In exchange for speaking frankly to The Intercept, the former Afghan Air Force pilot asked to be identified by a pseudonym because he fears retaliation and potential complications to his visa status, and that of his family, in the United States.

    Born and raised in Kabul, Ahmadi had enrolled in Afghanistan’s National Military Academy in 2008, when he was 17, at a time when the Taliban’s hold on territory was mostly confined to the south and east of the country. Thirteen years later, as they returned to power, he was one of dozens of Afghan pilots whose decisions would have consequences for Afghanistan’s security, as well as that of other countries in the region and the U.S.

    Today, more than a quarter of the former Afghan Air Force fleet is in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and the status of the aircraft has become a critical sticking point in a three-way diplomatic dispute between the Taliban regime and its northern neighbors. The decision many Afghan pilots made to fly military aircraft across the country’s northern borders last August has effectively blocked any near-term chance that the Taliban can fully secure the country’s rough and mountainous terrain. But the status of the Afghan air fleet is far from resolved, and Taliban leaders have said that they are determined to reconstitute the country’s military.

    Maj. Gen. Yasin Zia, Afghanistan’s former chief of Army staff, said that he and Afghan Air Force commanders were left with few options after former President Ashraf Ghani surreptitiously fled the country last August. In an interview with The Intercept last month, Zia explained that only the Air Force’s Special Mission Wing remained relatively intact. The SMW, established in the summer of 2012, had at least 18 Mi-17 helicopters and five UH-60 Black Hawks; the fleet also included 16 PC-12 single-engine fixed-wing cargo planes, providing Afghan forces with assault, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. “The president had fled, and the defense minister was escaping,” Zia said. “The chain of command no longer existed among the forces.”

    Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces Gen. Mohammad Yasin Zia, center right, along with other commanding officers visit the 777 Special Mission Wing in Kabul, Afghanistan, Wednesday, April 28, 2021. (MARCUS YAM / LOS ANGELES TIMES)

    Chief of Army Staff Maj. Gen. Yasin Zia, center right, and other commanding officers visit the 777 Special Mission Wing in Kabul, Afghanistan, on April 28, 2021.

    Photo: Marcus Yam/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images

    Zia, who also served as Afghanistan’s acting minister of defense from March to June 2021, now leads an anti-Taliban resistance force. He told The Intercept that he, Ziarmal, and Afghan Air Force Cmdr. Gen. Fahim Ramin ordered Ahmadi and the other Afghan pilots to fly the country’s aircraft across the border to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan last August.

    “I made the decision based on two main reasons,” Zia said. “To save the lives of the pilots who had fought the Taliban and who were left alone — this was the least I could do for my colleagues as a veteran Army officer. And to keep the Air Force fleet from falling into the hands of the Taliban. Imagine if the Taliban had gotten those aircraft — how they would have been used against the people resisting them today in Andarab, Panjshir, and other parts of the country.”

    Zia’s account, which was backed up by interviews with three Afghan Air Force pilots and two former Afghan security officials, suggests that the United States, which had invested billions in the Afghan Air Force over more than a decade, had no plan in place to prevent the Taliban from gaining control of the aircraft, highly trained pilots, and other support staff if the republic collapsed. A team of U.S. military personnel hastily located and destroyed dozens of aircraft in the Kabul airport two days after the country fell to the Taliban.

    In response to questions for this story, a Pentagon spokesperson said that the U.S. military planned to back the Afghan security forces it had built. “Senior U.S. officials repeatedly informed the Ghani government and [Afghan security forces] that the U.S. intended to continue to provide critical support to the Afghan Air Force, including salaries, maintenance, logistics, pilot training, likely through contracting and from outside of Afghanistan,” Lt. Col. Rob Lodewick, the Pentagon’s Afghanistan spokesperson, told The Intercept in an email.

    The U.S. “continued to fly missions in support” of Afghan operations “into early August” of last year, Lodewick added, but he did not say what happened between early August and the middle of that month, when the Taliban took control of Kabul — a critical period in the war. Former Afghan security officials and pilots told The Intercept that U.S. air support had stopped by the time the Taliban were advancing toward Kabul. Even experts working for the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction noted that by mid-August of last year, “U.S. forces had withdrawn; even ‘over-the-horizon’ U.S. air support had ceased — and the Afghan Air Force (AAF), a crucial part of a security force that the United States had spent two decades and $90 billion building and supporting, was nowhere in evidence.”

    Lodewick, however, doubled down on the Biden administration’s refrain that Afghans’ “lack of a will to fight” led to their defeat by the Taliban.

    “They had the people. They had the equipment. They had the training. They had the support,” Lodewick wrote. “Long-term commitments such as these, however, can only accomplish so much if beneficiary forces are not willing to stand and fight. One needs only to look at the current situation in Ukraine for an example of what an equipped, trained and resilient force is truly capable of achieving.”

    Still reeling from the swift turn of events in Kabul, Ahmadi had reached a terrifying crossroads. There in the market bazaar in Foroshgah, the world clanged noisily around him. Cars honked. Shopkeepers slammed their windows and locked their doors. Police and soldiers surreptitiously slipped out of their uniforms while civilians whizzed by shouting into their cellphones. Time was running faster than Ahmadi’s thoughts. He had to decide to return to his family or follow the orders of a military that was crumbling by the hour.

    Afghan Boots, Foreign Wings

    Ahmadi’s dilemma was not a new one. Afghanistan’s military history is replete with stories about pilots who either helped would-be rulers secure power in Kabul or spirited them to safety when their political strategies failed. King Amanullah Khan first established the Afghan Air Force in 1921 with aircraft donated by the Soviet Union, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

    In the decade following the 1979 Soviet invasion, the Afghan fleet grew to 500 aircraft, all Soviet-made. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, infighting between mujahideen factions backed by the United States destroyed most of the planes and helicopters. But some of the aircraft survived. When the Taliban took power the first time around in 1996, they did so with the help of about two dozen Soviet-made Mi-21 helicopter gunships that they had captured during battles with forces loyal to the late Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud and the government of former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani.

    But then, as now, the aircraft quickly fell into disrepair; the Taliban’s pariah status meant that they could not import parts or rely on the highly skilled labor and expertise of foreign military advisers to maintain the air fleet. Then, as now, Termez International Airport in neighboring Uzbekistan briefly served as a way station for Afghan pilots who flew over the border when the Taliban seized control of Kabul. In at least one case after the Taliban took the capital in 1996, the Uzbek government turned over an aircraft to Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Afghan Uzbek warlord and leader of one of the most notorious jihadist factions of the 1980s and ’90s. The Taliban still had the upper hand, albeit with a small air force, including about 20 Soviet-made fighter jets.

    In the first 10 years after U.S. troops swooped into the country following Al Qaeda’s attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001, American and NATO jet fighters, helicopters, and drones dominated the Afghan skies. Yet it wasn’t until nearly a decade later that the United States began to substantially invest in building the Afghan Air Force.

    Afghanistan’s first post-Taliban defense minister, Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak, was a vocal advocate for building the new Afghan military along the lines of NATO nations. His obsession with American-made F-16 jet fighters was a regular talking point whenever he met with Pentagon officials. It was an expensive proposition: Even under the best circumstances, the cost of operating the Lockheed Martin-made F-16 Falcon would be about $8,000 an hour, according to at least one estimate.

    Afghan Air Force pilots wear pendants to show completion of Black Hawk training at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, Nov. 20, 2017.

    Afghan Air Force pilots wear Black Hawk pendants signifying their completion of Black Hawk training, at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, on Nov. 20, 2017.

    Photo: Tech. Sgt. Veronica Pierce/U.S. Air Force

    Beyond the financial barriers, there was the practical challenge of setting up a permanent U.S. training and equipment mission. It wasn’t until 2005, four years after U.S. and allied Afghan forces routed the Taliban, that then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld ordered the establishment of a dedicated command structure for the U.S.-led mission to train and equip Afghan security forces. But that entity did not turn to building up the Afghan Air Force until two years later.

    There were other problems as well. In Washington, a major political transition was underway between the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, who sent thousands of American troops surging into Afghanistan in a renewed attempt to pacify it. It was only in 2009, as resurgent Taliban forces swept from their southern redoubts ever closer to Afghanistan’s heartland around Kabul, that Afghan pilots could begin providing air support to the country’s ground troops — and then only with help from American military advisers.

    Corruption affected everything from fleet maintenance to fuel suppliers, flight performance, and capacity-building. For instance, Afghan officials often awarded training slots based on patronage and family relations, according to a 2019 report by the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, or SIGAR.

    Another challenge was a string of “green-on-blue” attacks in which Afghan soldiers attacked their U.S. and NATO counterparts. A turning point came in April 2011, when an Afghan Air Force pilot fatally shot nine Americans at the air base command headquarters in Kabul. An inquiry led by the U.S Air Force Office of Special Investigations indicated that some American military advisers on base at the time believed that the shooter, Col. Ahmed Gul, had been secretly recruited by the Taliban to infiltrate the Air Force.

    The massacre of the American advisers to the Afghan Air Force was one of the deadliest of its kind. It changed the way the Pentagon provided air support to Afghan forces, former Lt. Gen. Sami Sadat, the last commander of the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command, told The Intercept.

    “Before 2008, the U.S. Army had quite casual rules of engagement with the Afghan Army. At that time, we did not have the green-on-blue attacks, and the risk for the U.S. and Afghan soldiers working together was very limited,” Sadat, who now lives in the U.K. and runs a security firm, recalled in an interview in July. “It was after 2008 that the green-on-blue matter increased, and the partnership between the U.S. and Afghan officers became difficult due to the huge risk.”

    An Afghan Mi-17 lands during a resupply mission to an outpost in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, Sunday, May 9, 2021. The Afghan Air Force, which the U.S. and its partners has nurtured to the tune of $8.5 billion since 2010, is now the governmentÕs spearhead in its fight against the Taliban. Since May 1, the original deadline for the U.S. withdrawal, the Taliban have overpowered government troops to take at least 23 districts to date, according to local media outlets. That has further denied Afghan security forces the use of roads, meaning all logistical support to the thousands of outposts and checkpoints Ñ including re-supplies of ammunition and food, medical evacuations or personnel rotation Ñ must be done by air. (MARCUS YAM / LOS ANGELES TIMES)

    Afghan Mi-17 helicopters land at an outpost in Ghazni province, Afghanistan, on May 9, 2021.

    Photo: Marcus Yam/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images

    While some Afghan military officials lobbied for a NATO-style air regiment, others argued that sticking with Warsaw Pact equipment was more pragmatic. In the end, the Pentagon split the difference, despite concerns about the costs and risks of relying on foreign suppliers like Russia and Ukraine.

    In 2013, the U.S. said it would pay $572 million to Rosoboronexport, the export wing of Russia’s state-owned arms company, Rostec, for 30 Russian-built Mi-17 military helicopters. But the Pentagon canceled the deal after a furor erupted in Congress over the purchase of Russian aircraft at a time when the U.S. was pressing Russia to stop supplying Syria with weapons. After the U.S. sanctioned Russia over its annexation of Crimea and military incursion in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the Pentagon stopped supplying Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters to Kabul altogether.

    In 2016, the Obama administration ordered a halt to all dealings with Russian arms manufacturers, including Rostec. A year later, the Pentagon began transitioning the Afghan Air Force from Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters to the U.S.-made Black Hawk attack helicopter. It was a jarring change for most Afghan Air Force pilots, who had decades of experience flying and fixing Russian aircraft. Black Hawks were notoriously difficult to maintain and couldn’t operate as well at high altitudes.

    The U.S. ban on Russian weaponry and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, meanwhile, also made it next to impossible for the Afghan Air Force to repair and maintain its remaining Russian-made aircraft. Russia objected to the scheduled overhaul of the Mi-17s by Ukrainian companies, calling the deal “illegal.” Russian companies also accused Motor Sich and Aviakon, the two Ukrainian firms contracted by the U.S. to repair the Afghan aircraft, of poor oversight and of endangering the lives of American and Afghan soldiers.

    This was the story of the Afghan Air Force under the Americans: Suspicion, mistrust, start, stop, start again, and reset the strategy. By July 2021, according to a May SIGAR report, the Afghan Air Force had 131 usable aircraft and another 31 in various states of disrepair.

    Abandoned and Afraid

    In January 2021, eight months before Afghanistan fell to the Taliban, SIGAR warned the Defense Department in a classified report that the Afghan Air Force would collapse without continued U.S. training and maintenance.

    The report came as Afghan security forces sustained increasing casualties amid an aggressive Taliban offensive. Battlefield medical evacuation missions that had been critical to the Afghan military’s continued capabilities grew far more challenging. A year after the Taliban takeover, interviews with more than a dozen former Afghan military and government officials and Western diplomats confirm what many Afghan pilots like Ahmadi already knew: The Afghan Air Force was struggling to stay alive in those final weeks and was wholly unprepared to hold the line against the Taliban when President Joe Biden decided to move forward with the Doha agreement that his predecessor Donald Trump had negotiated.

    By July 2021, a month before the Taliban surged into Kabul, one in five Afghan aircraft were out of service, according to Reuters. Meanwhile, an estimated 60 percent of Afghanistan’s UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were grounded with no plan by the Afghan or U.S. governments to fix them, according to a senior Afghan Army officer interviewed by SIGAR. As the Taliban advanced in the summer of 2021, most of the 17,000 support contractors were withdrawn from the country.

    “The system wouldn’t have collapsed if the logistical support that was promised by the U.S. military continued.”

    “The system wouldn’t have collapsed if the logistical support that was promised by the U.S. military continued,” Sadat told The Intercept. “For instance, when the first province fell to the Taliban, in the entire [Afghan Air Force] there was only one laser-guided missile.” (Lodewick, the Pentagon spokesperson, declined to comment on supply levels without “knowing the specific airframe or munition being referenced … nor a specific date window” but said that the Afghan Air Force “had a significant number [of] aerial munitions in its inventory,” including “a small number of GBU-58 laser-guided bombs which afforded the AAF precision strike capabilities from their A-29 aircraft.”)

    The pace of the Taliban advance surprised many Afghan pilots interviewed for this story, including Ahmadi. The Afghan Air Force’s three major airfields in the western city of Herat, the southern city of Kandahar, and the northern city of Mazar-i Sharif fell like dominoes to the Taliban on August 12, 13, and 14, respectively, leaving some Afghan Air Force pilots and staff scrambling to get to Kabul, while others flew their aircraft to neighboring Uzbekistan.

    “In the last year preceding the Taliban takeover, the military turned into defense mode and only in the last few weeks were allowed to launch attacks,” Ahmadi recalled. “By that time, the Taliban had already made major territorial advancements.”

    An Afghan pilot stands next to A-29 Super Tucano plane during a handover ceremony of A-29 Super Tucano planes from U.S. to the Afghan forces, in Kabul, Afghanistan September 17, 2020. REUTERS/Omar Sobhani - RC290J9DAOTC

    An Afghan pilot stands next to a Super Tucano aircraft during a handover ceremony of those planes from the U.S. to Afghan forces, in Kabul, Afghanistan, on Sept. 17, 2020.

    Photo: Omar Sobhani/Reuters

    Choosing Flight

    On August 15, 2021, the situation grew more tense by the hour as rumors spread about the Taliban’s advance into the capital. Ahmadi, convinced by the growing chaos around him and the urging of his commanders, turned and started running toward the airport.

    He was one of dozens who heeded the order to quickly muster at the Afghan Air Force’s operational headquarters at the main airport in Kabul. Once there, at around 11 a.m., he found a number of his colleagues in uniform, standing near their aircraft.

    A few hours later, news broke that Ghani and his aides had flown out of the country. At the Air Force headquarters, panic set in. Ghani’s departure meant the end of everything. Days after his escape, on August 18, Ghani posted a video on his Facebook page in which he said that he’d left the country to avoid bloodshed. The former Afghan president, who is now in the United Arab Emirates, stands accused of taking millions of dollars in cash, though a recent report by SIGAR indicates that Ghani and his entourage may have taken only around $500,000 with them.

    Ahmadi looked around at his fellow pilots as they absorbed the news that the country’s commander in chief, the man who by law held their fate and that of 38 million Afghans in his hands, had abandoned his post. In an instant, all their years of hard work seemed to evaporate.

    Ahmadi picked up his phone to call his wife, an engineer and civil servant. He tried to keep his voice calm as he told her that he did not know where he would end up or whether he would see her and their daughter again anytime soon. His wife had burned all of Ahmadi’s military service documents and his uniform and buried his service weapons in their backyard garden. Ahmadi could not stop thinking about what would happen if the Taliban came knocking on the door of their family home in Kabul after he had flown over the border, leaving his wife and daughter behind.

    Ahmadi boarded a PC-12 surveillance plane with eight other Afghan Air Force staff. His boss, Ziarmal, and Zia, the former chief of Army staff, ordered Ahmadi to fly to Uzbekistan, where Ghani and other senior officials of his government had landed only hours earlier. The U.S. military controlled the Kabul airport at the time, meaning that American air traffic controllers would have been aware of the Afghan pilots’ flight routings.

    But Uzbek officials on the ground, overwhelmed by an influx of hundreds of Afghan military personnel, refused to grant Ahmadi entry to Termez International Airport, he said. The government of Uzbekistan did not respond to multiple requests for comment. Ahmadi was forced to turn back to Kabul and refuel before preparing to fly out again near midnight on August 15. By then the Taliban had consolidated control over most of the Afghan capital, but following a tenuous deal struck with U.S. officials in Doha, they had largely stayed outside the airport.

    Ahmadi thought about how at least seven of his colleagues had reportedly been killed after Taliban squads hunted them down in their homes. That’s when he made up his mind to go to Tajikistan. He contacted Tajik authorities, asking if he could land; they said yes.

    Ahmadi felt a rush of relief when he touched down hours later at Bokhtar International Airport in southern Tajikistan with eight staff members of the Afghan Air Force onboard. Nearly 143 Afghan pilots and Air Force personnel, who flew in on three planes and two helicopters, reportedly landed at Bokhtar in the early hours of August 16. As Ahmadi disembarked from his plane, he thought that the worst was over. But the feeling was short-lived. Once the Afghan pilots were on the ground, Tajik authorities confiscated their mobile phones and other belongings and transferred them to a dormitory at Naser Khosrow University.

    Ahmadi said that Tajik officials soon came to him with a demand: Join the “resistance forces,” a group of armed men, including some members of the former Afghan Army, who were fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan’s northern Panjshir province near the Tajik border under the command of Ahmad Massoud. The son of the legendary mujahideen commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, who fought the Soviets and the Taliban before he was assassinated by Al Qaeda in 2001, the younger Massoud had openly called for the U.S. and NATO to arm his fighters, known as the National Resistance Front, or NRF. But there weren’t many takers among U.S. officials, and some Afghan pilots were equally skeptical about joining the resistance.

    Exhausted and disillusioned, Ahmadi and most of his colleagues could not imagine getting into another war and returning to the hell they had just fled. Suddenly, the Tajik government’s warm reception for the Afghan pilots turned chilly. After refusing to fight for the resistance forces, Ahmadi and his fellow pilots were transferred to a sanitarium on the outskirts of Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, where they had to go down to a nearby river for drinking water. Tajik authorities had seized their cellphones, meaning that they had no way to contact their families back home. Ahmadi’s story lines up with similar reports published in the days and weeks after the U.S. withdrawal.

    The Tajik government did not respond to requests for comment, but Zia, the former chief of Army staff, denies that the Afghan pilots in Tajikistan were pressured into joining the NRF. Most of the aircraft flown into Tajikistan were fixed-wing planes like Ahmadi’s, Zia told The Intercept, and would have been useless in mountainous Panjshir province, where there were few suitable landing zones. “Pushing the pilots to join the resistance forces was not demanded by the Tajik government nor by the resistance leadership,” Zia said, adding that a number of pilots in Tajikistan aspired to join the resistance forces and had talked about it with their colleagues.

    The only thing that kept Ahmadi sane during his days in Tajikistan were surreptitious calls to his wife on a cellphone that one of the pilots had somehow managed to hide from the Tajik authorities. Eventually, the pilots used the phone to call their old U.S. military advisers and ask for help in securing their release and safe passage out of Tajikistan. Ahmadi and his colleagues were ultimately evacuated and flown to the UAE with help from officials at the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe, he said. Three months later, in April, Ahmadi was allowed to emigrate to the U.S.

    A member of the Taliban walks out of an Afghan Air Force aircraft at the airport in Kabul on August 31, 2021, after the US has pulled all its troops out of the country to end a brutal 20-year war.

    Members of the Taliban walk out of an Afghan Air Force plane at the airport in Kabul on August 31, 2021.

    Photo: Wakil Kohsar/AFP via Getty Images

    A Double Betrayal

    In the days leading up to the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan last year, videos and photos of the Taliban flying U.S.-made Black Hawk helicopters cropped up on social media. At the time, the Taliban claimed to have captured more than 100 Russian-made combat helicopters. But the makeup of the Taliban’s air fleet remains unclear. Taliban representatives did not respond to requests for comment from The Intercept. Without a fully functioning air force, the Taliban cannot suppress ongoing resistance in the north or fend off what the White House calls “over-the-horizon” attacks, like the drone strike that killed Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul in late July.

    While there is always a chance that Pakistan, Iran, China, or even Russia might consider helping the Taliban replace the aircraft that Afghan pilots flew out of the country last year, doing so would not be without risks. Since the United States has sanctioned most of the Taliban’s key leaders, any move by another country to materially assist the current Afghan government would raise the prospect of additional U.S. sanctions on the Taliban’s suppliers.

    In the months since Ahmadi settled in the United States, the Taliban have continued to fixate on rebuilding the Afghan Air Force, calling on former Afghan pilots to return to service, promising that they would be granted amnesty. But those guarantees ring hollow to Ahmadi and many of his fellow pilots. Since the Taliban’s declaration of general amnesty for Afghan security forces, hundreds of former government officials and Afghan soldiers have been forcibly disappeared and assassinated, according to Human Rights Watch.

    Meanwhile, an estimated 4,300 former Afghan Air Force staff, including 33 pilots, have joined the Taliban. Some of those pilots have since been captured by National Resistance Front forces. In a video taped by the NRF and posted on YouTube in June, one Afghan pilot said that he was captured by the group while on a mission to provide Taliban forces with tents and other supplies. The pilot also said that he had served the Afghan Air Force for 33 years irrespective of the ruling political regime. More recently, the Islamic State’s Afghanistan affiliate claimed responsibility for an assault on Taliban vehicles in Herat and an IED attack in Kabul that killed two Taliban military pilots.

    A satellite image of Bokhtar International Airport in Tajikistan in May 2022 shows at least 16 fixed-wing aircraft on the tarmac. These aircraft appeared at Bokhtar after mid-August 2021, according to images analyzed by The Intercept, and match the description of Afghan Air Force planes flown there by Ahmadi and other pilots after the Taliban took Kabul.

    A satellite image of Bokhtar International Airport in Tajikistan in May 2022 shows at least 16 fixed-wing aircraft on the tarmac. These aircraft appeared at Bokhtar after mid-August 2021, according to images analyzed by The Intercept, and match the description of Afghan Air Force planes flown there by Ahmadi and other pilots after the Taliban took Kabul.

    Screenshot: The Intercept/Google Earth

    Ahmadi and the pilots who helped keep Afghan aircraft out of the Taliban’s hands are now grappling with a double betrayal: Let down by their Western allies after years of joint warfare, they sacrificed the safety of their families for a government that abandoned them.

    Today Ahmadi lives in New Jersey, sharing a one-bedroom apartment with an Afghan Air Force colleague. A federal program for refugees covers his rent, utilities, some transportation, and other costs for up to eight months, but Ahmadi is desperate to supplement his income.

    “I have a family who I haven’t been able to send a penny to since I left Afghanistan,” he told The Intercept. “I hope that when people and authorities in the U.S. read this story, they understand what we are going through and they will hopefully help me reunite with my family.”

    He spends his days searching Google for aviation jobs — flight attendant, flight operations, ground crew — and filling out applications. Having lost the career he spent his life building, he hopes to fly again someday. While he’s grateful to be in the United States, he remains concerned about his wife and daughter, now 4. They have moved twice since Ahmadi left to ensure their safety.

    “My daughter no longer speaks to her father on the phone as easily,” Ahmadi’s wife told The Intercept. “It’s as if she doesn’t recognize him anymore.”

    The post When the Taliban Took Kabul, an Afghan Pilot Had to Choose Between His Family and His Country appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • On September 11, 2001, w­e were children, living with our families as refugees in Iran and Pakistan, like more than 3 million other Afghans at the time. The U.S. bombing campaign to oust the Taliban government ushered in years of conflict and death, but it also meant that we and our families could go home to Afghanistan at last.

    We became adults in a country struggling to cope with current and past conflicts, but also one that was full of hope and promise. We went to school, pursued careers, and grew fully invested in rebuilding Afghanistan.

    Then, last summer, we became refugees once again.

    In the days after the Taliban’s swift toppling of the U.S.-backed Afghan government, fearing our accomplishments would make us targets, we scrambled to get ourselves and our loved ones to safety. We are among tens of thousands of Afghans who were either outside the country already or who managed to escape, while countless more tried and failed.

    Becoming a refugee doesn’t get easier every time you are displaced. Like our parents before us, we’ve had to start from scratch. The past year has been filled with the logistics of survival: Where would we live? How would we provide for ourselves and our families? How would we get our stranded relatives to safety, reunite our families, and create new lives in languages we didn’t speak?

    Knowing that millions of our fellow Afghans — both those who left and those who stayed — were living their own unique versions of this drama felt overwhelming. That’s why we chose to tell some of their stories in this podcast, No Way Home.

    Created in partnership with The Intercept and the Future Frontlines Program at New America, No Way Home tells the story of last summer’s perilous exodus brought on by two decades of broken promises in the U.S. war on terror. Over four episodes, we tell both our own stories and those of other Afghans who tried to leave when the U.S. military pulled out of Afghanistan a year ago: a businessman with an activist daughter; a valued employee of a French environmental NGO; a cellphone programmer determined to build a better life for his kids; and a finance officer for Jesuit Refugee Services who became a refugee himself. These stories seek to give a voice to just a few of the millions whose lives were upended last year.

    All of the stories start on August 15, 2021 — a day some Afghans carry seared on their souls like their own 9/11. That day, the Taliban marched into Kabul and Afghanistan’s former president, Ashraf Ghani, fled the country in a helicopter. The podcast talks about those first frantic days and the weeks and months that followed, as some got out — or died trying — and others were left behind.

    In the first episode, Summia Tora, an Afghan human rights advocate, talks about her parallel efforts to evacuate her father and a longtime NGO worker named Hamid, his pregnant wife, and their young daughter, as a suicide bomber stalks the Kabul airport. In the second episode, Mir Abdullah Miri, an educational researcher now living in the U.K., sets out to investigate a family tragedy set against the backdrop of last summer’s exodus, when his cousin Aziz, a cellphone programmer, decided to cross into Iran on foot with his wife and two young children, hoping to reach relatives in Germany. In episode three, Maryam Barak, an Afghan journalist who was evacuated to Italy, tells the story of Qader Kazimizada, another newly arrived Afghan who has healed by helping other refugees find community in an alien place. In the fourth and final episode, Tora tells the story of Hamid and his family’s year of hiding in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and a surprise, last-minute opportunity to escape.

    Working on this podcast, in which our own stories are intertwined with those of our fellow Afghans, gave us a sense of community at a time when we felt adrift. Interviewing Sayed Tora, Qader Kazimizada, Hamid, and many others allowed us to reflect on our own journeys. Becoming reporters gave us an identity beyond “refugee” to define ourselves and our purpose. As we scattered around the world, far from family and friends, working on this project with other Afghans helped us find a bit of home through Zoom meetings and Slack chats.

    It is important that we, Afghans, be the ones to tell these stories. There are certain nuances that only we can capture when reporting on Afghanistan. We wanted to represent the diversity of our country, its ethnicities and languages, and the various ways in which our fellow Afghans have experienced the events of the last year.

    At the same time, we strove to tell stories that would resonate with an international audience. Sayed, Hamid, Qader, and Aziz wanted to live in safety with their families and give their children opportunities they didn’t have. They all hoped to do that at home, in Afghanistan.

    The post Telling Afghanistan’s Stories — in Their Own Words appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • A new congressional caucus called on Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III Thursday to disclose details of the U.S. role in an airstrike that killed more than 160 Nigerian civilians at a displaced persons’ camp, including many children.

    The group, known as the Protection of Civilians in Conflict Caucus, asked Austin to turn over classified documents and answer questions about the U.S. military’s involvement, which was first revealed by The Intercept in July.

    While the Nigerian air force expressed regret for carrying out the 2017 strike, which also seriously wounded more than 120 people, the attack was referred to as an instance of “U.S.-Nigerian operations” in a formerly secret U.S. military document. Just days after the attack, U.S. Africa Command secretly commissioned Brig. Gen. Frank J. Stokes to undertake an “investigation to determine the facts and circumstances of a kinetic air strike (‘strike’) conducted by Nigerian military forces in the vicinity of Rann, Nigeria,” according to the document, which The Intercept obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. Stokes’s findings were never made public.

    The document, reporting by Nigerian journalists, and interviews with experts suggest that the U.S. may have launched this rare internal investigation because it secretly provided intelligence or other support to the Nigerian armed forces who carried out the deadly strike. The U.S. inquiry was ordered by the then-top American general overseeing troops in Africa; Stokes was specifically told to avoid questions of wrongdoing or recommendations for disciplinary action, according to the document.

    The group that sent the letter was formed late last month, following the Pentagon’s release of its Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, which calls for broad changes to military doctrine to reduce risks to noncombatants. Reps. Sara Jacobs, D-Calif.; Jason Crow, D-Colo.; Ro Khanna, D-Calif.; Andy Kim, D-N.J.; and Tom Malinowski, D-N.J., launched the Protection of Civilians in Conflict Caucus to provide oversight of the Pentagon and advance policies that prevent and respond to civilian casualties from military operations conducted by the United States and its allies.

    “Given the previously unreported nature of the U.S. military’s involvement in this strike and subsequent investigation, and your recent commitments to transparently responding to civilian harm, we request that the Department make available the investigation and all accompanying documentation to Members of the House Armed Services Committee,” reads the group’s letter to Austin, asking for the information to be furnished within 90 days.

    The letter raises questions about the nature of U.S. involvement in the 2017 attack, including about the circumstances that led to targeting of the displaced persons’ camp; whether corrective action was taken by the Nigerian or U.S. militaries; if AFRICOM or the State Department had knowledge of the U.S. role in the attack; and whether the United States has continued to assist the Nigerian military in airstrikes or ground operations.

    “Congress has a critical role to play in ensuring that the United States prevents, mitigates, and responds to civilian harm with transparency and accountability — and that includes harm committed when working by, with and through partners,” said Annie Shiel, the senior adviser for U.S. policy and advocacy at the Center for Civilians in Conflict. “Given that AFRICOM has apparently investigated the strike already, I hope the Defense Department will respond transparently to this inquiry — and to the demands of civil society groups — by publicly releasing the investigation and acknowledging any U.S. role in the strike and its impact.”

    In July, AFRICOM spokesperson Kelly Cahalan did not answer The Intercept’s questions about the results of Stokes’s investigation; she also did not respond to more recent questions about whether the command would turn over information on the strike to members of Congress.

    “The United States has a duty to provide clear information on the extent of support provided to the Nigerian military for the Rann airstrike and the consequences of this support,” said Anietie Ewang, Human Rights Watch’s Nigeria researcher. “If their collaboration with the Nigerian authorities in any way contributed to the killing of civilians during the strike, they should acknowledge this and share in the responsibility to ensure accountability and redress for victims, which the Nigerian authorities have failed to do.”

    Secret U.S. involvement in other nations’ errant airstrikes is an underreported form of civilian harm. Earlier this year, The Intercept revealed how U.S. targeting assessments carried out for the Dutch military led to a 2015 airstrike on an ISIS bomb factory in Hawija, Iraq, that touched off secondary explosions, killing at least 85 civilians. No Americans were held accountable for the civilian deaths in the Hawija strike, in keeping with a litany of attacks from Somalia to Libya and from Syria to Yemen that the Pentagon has failed to investigate or reinvestigate despite civilian casualty allegations. The U.S. has conducted more than 91,000 airstrikes across seven major conflict zones and killed as many as 48,308 civilians, according to a 2021 analysis by Airwars, a U.K.-based airstrike monitoring group.

    The Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan — written at the direction of Austin in response to reporting by the New York Times and others — provides a blueprint for improving how the Pentagon addresses civilian casualties. The plan requires military personnel to consider potential harm to civilians in any airstrike, ground raid, or other type of combat. It also signals a more nuanced understanding of how civilian harm extends beyond deaths and injuries to include damage to infrastructure and essential services on which civilians depend, but experts say the plan is light on the question of accountability. That, potentially, is where Congress can play a key role.

    “The Protection of Civilians in Conflict Caucus can make a mark with how they proceed on this case by ensuring they leave no stone unturned,” said Ewang. “They should go beyond uncovering the extent of U.S. involvement in the airstrike to asking critical questions about civilian casualty assessments and push for accountability and redress if there is any indication of U.S. responsibility.”

    The post Lawmakers Seek Answers on Pentagon’s Role in Deadly Airstrike appeared first on The Intercept.

  • One April afternoon in Tokyo, the U.S. president made a welcome promise to reduce his military’s presence in Okinawa. Three U.S. service members had raped a 12-year-old Okinawan girl the previous September, and enraged locals had spent months protesting the Japanese prefecture’s dense network of U.S. bases.

    “When the Prime Minister asked us to consider the concerns of the people of Okinawa and I became acquainted with them, as a result of some of the unfortunate incidents that you know well about,” said President Bill Clinton, standing side by side with Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, in the April 1996 speech, “it bothered me that these matters had not been resolved before now, before this time.” His administration agreed to close the Futenma Air Station, a major Marine Corps base in the populous Okinawan city of Ginowan, within five to seven years.

    On Tuesday evening in Washington, 87 Okinawan and international civil society groups will send a letter to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, urging the Democratic Congress under President Joe Biden to at last close the base. It has been more than 26 years since Clinton promised a swift end to the Futenma Air Station, and the Japanese and U.S. governments have spent the decades pushing environmentally destructive plans for construction and moving goalposts for their completion. As the years dragged on, the likely timeline for Futenma’s closure pushed from the original 2001-03 estimates to 2025, to 2035, to 2040, to — as the letter’s authors argue — realistically, never.


    A photo shows Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS FUTENMA) in Gonowan City, Okinawa Prefecture on January 7, 2022. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma is a United States Marine Corps base, and home to approximately 3,000 Marines of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and other units, and has been a U.S. military airbase since the defeat of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. ( The Yomiuri Shimbun via AP Images )

    A photo shows Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture, on Jan. 7, 2022.

    Photo: Yomiuri Shimbun via AP


    While Okinawan civilians wait, Futenma remains open, and the Marines stationed there continue to make their presence violently known. The surrounding area has seen a military helicopter crash at Okinawa International University and a piece of one fall onto the grounds of Futenma No. 2 elementary school. Ginowan and other Okinawan towns have been found with polluted water from toxic military firefighting foam and fuel pipelines. And Futenma, though the focal point of the push for closure, is far from the only U.S. base causing problems: Okinawa, with a land mass about two-thirds the size of Rhode Island, has 32 U.S. military installations.

    The catch is that the closure is not really a closure; it’s a relocation. In the U.S. and Japanese governments’ eyes, the new base project, called the Futenma Replacement Facility, or FRF, must be completed before Futenma can close. In order to complete it, the Japanese government must dump landfill — sourced from at-times-controversial locations across Japan and Okinawa — into Henoko-Oura Bay, an area of unique biological diversity about 26 miles from Futenma. “From an engineering perspective,” the letter argues, “there is no prospect that its defining feature,” an airport landing strip, “will ever be constructed.” Following a geological survey conducted by the Japanese government, the seafloor for which the airplane runway is destined was deemed “soft as mayonnaise.”



    Signed by 52 organizations from Okinawa and Japan and 35 from abroad, including the Asia Pacific American Labor Alliance, the Center for Biological Diversity, and CODEPINK, the letter comes at a time of heightened tensions between Western-aligned powers and China over Taiwan’s autonomy. Due to its close proximity to Taiwan, Okinawa — whose U.S. military installations occupy 15 percent of the main island’s existing land — is considered a key strategic location. Expanding the land to put a new base there is, supposedly, crucial to countering China; simply paring down to 31 is out of the question.

    “Okinawa was very important to Taiwan’s history, and to the notion of kind of constraining or containing China,” James Lin, a historian of modern Taiwan at the University of Washington, told The Intercept. “So I imagine that if there’s any kind of conflict that Okinawa would be very much involved.”

    In March, the government of Japan declared Okinawa a “combat zone” in the event of a Taiwan contingency.

    Last month, Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi told the press that five Chinese ballistic test missiles had landed in Japan’s “exclusive economic zone” for the first time ever. The missiles, sent in response to a controversial visit to Taipei by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, reportedly landed in the waters southwest of Hateruma: one of Okinawa Prefecture’s southernmost islands, almost 300 miles from the main island and about half that distance from Taiwan.

    In just over a month since, China has conducted a slew of military exercises and imposed economic sanctions on Taiwan, buzzing drones and planes through Taiwanese airspace and banning imports and exports of various fruits, fish, and sand as an ever-expanding list of U.S. officials made trips to the island.

    The list of high-profile fellow visitors has included Sens. Ed Markey, D-Mass., and Marsha Blackburn, R-Tenn.; Reps. John Garamendi, D-Calif.; Don Beyer, D-Va.; Alan Lowenthal, D-Calif.; Aumua Amata Coleman Radewagen, R-American Samoa; and Republican governors Eric Holcomb of Indiana and Doug Ducey of Arizona. The congressional delegations are relatively popular in Taiwan, said Lin, though Pelosi’s visit “was actually quite dangerous and had significant repercussions for Taiwan, in terms of economic sanctions, in terms of the missile tests.”

    “The increasing tensions between U.S. and China have made many of us in Okinawa extremely uncomfortable living here,” Hideki Yoshikawa, the director of the Okinawa Environmental Justice Project and the letter’s lead author, wrote in an email to The Intercept. While he tries not to be an alarmist or emphasize worst-case scenarios, Yoshikawa said, “what has been taking place in Ukraine since Feb. this year has certainly made us think about the worst.”

    The dynamic between Japan and Okinawa in many ways parallels the relationship the United States has with Hawaii. Like that Pacific archipelago, Okinawa was once ruled by a local monarchy, known in Okinawa’s case as the Ryukyu Kingdom. Imperial Japan and China struggled for control over the Ryukyus, which traded with both empires for centuries, until Japan annexed it in 1879. Japan’s successful colonization made the island chain that became Okinawa the country’s youngest prefecture, akin to a U.S. state. Some Ryukyuans now organize for designation as an Indigenous people — which the United Nations has recommended that Japan grant — but the Japanese government still refuses to recognize them.

    In the wake of World War II, Japan formally gave up both its military and its southernmost prefecture: A new peace mandate in the constitution barred it from possessing an army with the capacity for offense, and the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco put Okinawa under U.S. civil administration. Just over 20 years later, the islands reverted to Japanese control, with the condition that the U.S. could maintain military occupation at a network of bases — intended as a “strategic deterrent” against China and a protective stopgap for Japan. Now, as tensions strain over Taiwan, Okinawa stands to end up in the crosshairs.

    “If a military conflict between the two super powers (U.S. and China), with Japan involved, becomes a reality, either by plan or by accident, I expect, missiles will fly from China (or its war ships and planes) to hit U.S. bases and Japanese Self-Defense Forces bases in Okinawa,” Yoshikawa told The Intercept.

    The United States did tap its forces in Okinawa amid an earlier high-pressure episode concerning Taiwan: During the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Clinton administration ordered a fleet of U.S. battleships to sail from Okinawa through the strait in response to a series of Chinese missile tests. Occurring between 1995 and 1996 — with its climax just before the promised Futenma base closure — it was hailed as “the biggest display of US military power in Asia since the Vietnam War” by the BBC.

    Last month, on the heels of the various U.S. congressional trips and the resultant Chinese show of force, two U.S. naval ships again sailed through the Taiwan Strait. The hawks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies have termed the current situation “The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis.”


    An aerial photo shows a landfill work at a coastal area of Henoko in Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture on December 10, 2021. Henoko has been chosen as the relocation of U.S. Futenma Air Base, nearly 33-hectare section of waters surrounded by seawalls south of U.S. Marine Corps Camp Schwab in the region although more than eighty per cent of the Okinawan opposed to the relocation plan. ( The Yomiuri Shimbun via AP Images )

    An aerial photo shows landfill work at a coastal area of Henoko in Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture, on Dec. 10, 2021. Henoko has been chosen as the relocation site of U.S. Air Station Futenma.

    Photo: Yomiuri Shimbun via AP


    “The Japanese government is intensifying its efforts to frame the FRF project in the narrative of deterrence against threats from neighboring countries,” Yoshikawa and his co-signatories write in their letter. But “with rising awareness of the soft seafloor issues and with the very feasibility of the FRF construction in serious question, the Government’s arguments about deterrence and strategy are unconvincing.”

    The original proposal for the facility would have required the government to fill the bay — home to more than 5,000 aquatic species, including the critically endangered Okinawa dugong, rare blue coral colonies, and dozens of new crustacean species discovered in 2009 alone — with dirt. The current proposal requires so-called ground reinforcement work, or the driving of compacted sand pillars into the seafloor to fortify its slushy consistency and support the base.

    “Despite the seafloor reinforcement work being a significant revision to the original plan, the Okinawa Defense Bureau has not adequately reassessed the safety and feasibility of base construction,” the letter states. As a result, Denny Tamaki, the governor of Okinawa prefecture — who faces a reelection contest largely focused on the base issue on September 11 — has repeatedly denied requests to approve permits for the base’s construction. The Japanese government has repeatedly overridden him.

    The letter also asks the U.S. government to compel the Department of Defense to disclose when, exactly, it learned of the seafloor issue and release its own reports. The Japanese government didn’t acknowledge the problem until 2019, despite the fact that a Japanese geological survey discovered it in 2015. When the surveyors tested the force required to drive a spike into the seafloor, they found “that instead of being driven into the soil with a hammer, the testing spike sank of its own weight.”

    At the Center for Strategic and International Studies, generally known for beating the drums of war and not for urging restraint, Mark Cancian wrote in 2020 of the FRF project: “It appears unlikely that [the base construction] will ever be completed.”

    Appealing to the Armed Services Committee’s presumed desire to strengthen U.S. military strategy, the letter finds it “regrettable that a bill proposed in June 2020 by the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, which would request the DoD to study the soft seafloor issues, was not adopted into the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act.” At the time, Tamaki had recently met with legislators in Washington, and the Readiness Subcommittee’s version of the NDAA would reportedly have compelled the Defense Department to study the seafloor both for its soft consistency and the presence of earthquake fault lines. But it never appeared in the final NDAA. The office of Rep. John Garamendi, the Readiness Subcommittee’s chair, did not respond to The Intercept’s request for comment.

    “We would be used as human shields for military bases, not the other way around.”

    Yoshikawa hopes that, assuming environmental preservation is not enough, the sheer incompetency of the FRF project will allow U.S. lawmakers to see that its strategic advantage is overpromised.

    “Clearly, building yet another giant U.S. base in Okinawa does not decrease, but rather increases, the likelihood of attack,” the letter argues in its concluding notes.

    Yoshikawa pointed out that the articles of the Geneva Convention, which seek to protect civilian populations amid military conflicts, would prove useless in Okinawa: The physical proximity between the bases and civil society would make the convention’s protections difficult, if not impossible, to enforce.

    “We would be used as human shields for military bases, not the other way around,” Yoshikawa said. “We don’t want to be used and we don’t want our seas, forests, lands and skies to be used in the conflicts of states.”

    Correction: September 6, 2022, 8:36 p.m.
    This story previously referred to the 1995 rape of an Okinawan girl by U.S. service members as a rape and murder; though she was beaten, the victim survived.

    The post As Taiwan Tensions Build, Concerned Okinawans Push for U.S. Military Base Closure appeared first on The Intercept.

  • The U.S. Navy mandates that a suicide hotline for veterans be accessible from the homepage of every Navy website, but a previously unreported internal audit found that most of the pages reviewed were not in compliance.

    Sixty-two percent of the 58 homepages did not comply with Navy regulations for how to display the link to the Veterans Crisis Line, or VCL, which is run by the Department of Veterans Affairs, according to a 2019 investigation conducted by the Naval Audit Service and obtained by The Intercept via the Freedom of Information Act. Almost three years since the audit, The Intercept has found that many Navy homepages are still missing the required icon linking to a resource that has been shown to help veterans in crisis. In the eight years since the mandate was first introduced, hundreds of sailors and tens of thousands of veterans have killed themselves.

    “When suicide crisis links and phone numbers are not prominently advertised on Navy Web sites, there is a missed opportunity to facilitate and encourage Sailors, civilians, and veterans to seek assistance in a critical time of need,” the audit reads.

    The White House has been sounding the alarm on suicide among current and former members of the military. In a recent speech, President Joe Biden said that an average of 17 veterans kill themselves every day — meaning that the number of veterans who die by suicide each day is nearly equal to the number of U.S. troops killed in combat in 2020 and 2021 combined.

    Military and elected officials are making unprecedented efforts to address suicide in the military. The Defense Department set up an independent panel to assess the scope of the crisis and advise steps toward prevention, while Congress has pushed for bipartisan legislation that would devote billions of dollars to veterans’ mental health as well as improvements to the VCL system that included its incorporation into 988, the suicide hotline formerly known as the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline that launched in July.

    “Our country’s military and federal government must ensure this critical lifesaving resource is easily accessible for veterans and active-duty service members in crisis,” Rep. Mikie Sherrill, D-N.J., a Navy veteran who serves on the House Armed Services Committee and spearheaded the changes to the VCL, told The Intercept. “It is unacceptable that a majority of the Navy homepages do not contain the required link to the Veterans Crisis Line.”

    The audit report says the Navy Office of Information, or CHINFO, did not provide clear guidance or sufficient oversight to ensure compliance on Navy websites. However, Charlie Spirtos, a Navy spokesperson, told The Intercept that blame lies with individual commanders who have failed to enforce the mandate.

    “CHINFO is the lead for developing policy for publicly accessible website content across the Navy, and for maintaining cognizance for content of publicly accessible websites across the Navy,” he wrote in an email. But he said compliance “rests on individual commanders, commanding officers, and officers in charge.” It is not clear how the Navy enforces compliance with the regulations. A Navy spokesperson, speaking on the condition of anonymity, did not have an answer for The Intercept.

    Spirtos also said that the nearly 80 websites under CHINFO’s purview were now in compliance with the Navy’s VCL regulations, but after repeated questions from The Intercept, Cmdr. Reann Mommsen, a Navy spokesperson, clarified that an unspecified number of homepages were missing the VCL icon.

    “A review and update is underway to ensure all Navy websites contain the logo,” she said.

    Since 2007, the Veterans Crisis Line has fielded more than 6.2 million calls, providing 1.1 million referrals to VA suicide prevention coordinators and more than 233,000 dispatches of emergency services.

    Many veterans have reported that they were able to get the help they needed when calling the hotline. In a 2021 study in the journal Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior, 87 percent of users expressed satisfaction with the VCL, almost 82 percent found it helpful, and nearly 73 percent said that it kept them safe. Of those with suicidal thoughts, almost 83 percent said that calling the hotline helped stop them from killing themselves. A study from earlier this year in the American Journal of Preventive Medicine found that callers had five times greater odds of a reduction in distress, almost five times greater odds of a reduction in suicidal ideation, and 11 times greater odds of a reduction in suicidal urgency by the end of the call.

    Research also shows that promoting the VCL increases the likelihood that veterans in crisis will call. A 2016 study of VCL advertising campaigns found that “messaging was associated with help seeking,” which supports significant associations found in a 2014 study between public messaging and an increased awareness and use of crisis lines among veterans.

    Since 2014, the Secretary of the Navy has mandated that all Navy homepages contain an icon and link to the Veterans Crisis Line. A 2020 Navy Suicide Prevention Program handbook also states that all Navy websites must display a “Life Is Worth Living” icon, hyperlinked to the Military Crisis Line, or MCL, for active-duty personnel. However, according to Spirtos, that requirement is defunct.

    The 2019 Navy audit examined 58 Navy homepages and found that 36 were “noncompliant,” 27 used an outdated “Life Is Worth Living” icon, eight used the VCL icon, four used both icons, one used a “Suicide Prevention” icon, and 18 had no icon at all. (The report does not list which websites were surveyed by auditors.) The audit also discovered that the URL to the required VCL icon within the regulations was broken.

    Research shows that promoting the Veterans Crisis Line increases the likelihood that veterans in crisis will call.

    The Naval Audit Service found that 23 of 36 noncompliant commands were unaware of the requirement; the other 13 did not respond.

    The Naval Audit Service recommended that CHINFO “establish internal controls and oversight to ensure all Navy Web sites display the required Veterans Crisis Line link” by September 30, 2021, to which the Department of the Navy Chief of Information agreed.

    But almost one year since the target date passed, the Navy has still failed to comply with its own regulations, according to a follow-up investigation by The Intercept.

    When The Intercept began its own survey this spring of 58 Navy homepages — including Navy.mil and some of the largest commands — it found 57 percent without a “Life Is Worth Living” icon, a VCL icon, or a working VCL link.

    After reaching out to CHINFO for comment on the findings, compliance radically changed. Screenshots available through the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine show that just before or just after The Intercept submitted questions, Naval Special Warfare Command and U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility and Japan Regional Maintenance Center, for example, did not display the VCL link. Now working links appear on those homepages as well as 48 others surveyed by The Intercept. However, 87 percent of the 58 websites still do not have the VCL icon.

    For example, the homepage of Navy.com, the Navy’s recruitment website, lacks both a VCL link and icon. The homepage of the Secretary of the Navy — the office that issued the VCL regulation — provides an outdated “Life Is Worth Living” icon that links to the 988 hotline rather than the VCL.

    Spirtos said that since the audit, websites that were once overseen by CHINFO are now on a new web host provided by Defense Media Activity, the Pentagon’s internal media and public relations organization.

    “All of these websites comply with the Veterans Crisis Line link requirement,” Spirtos told The Intercept. But Mommsen later acknowledged that while links were present on all the homepages, the VCL logo is not. The Intercept found that out of those 79 websites under Defense Media Activity’s purview, just 17 — or 21.5 percent — fully comply with the VCL regulations.


    American flags representing each of the 1,892 veterans and servicemembers who died by suicide in 2014 stand on the National Mall in March 2014 in Washington, D.C.

    American flags representing each of the 1,892 veterans and service members who died by suicide in 2014 stand on the National Mall in March 2014 in Washington, D.C.

    Photo: Ken Cedeno/Corbis via Getty Images

    While the Veterans Crisis Line has been a benefit to many former military personnel, outside experts and government watchdogs for years have highlighted management and quality control issues, including long wait times, crisis calls sent to voicemail, and improperly trained staffers. Recent investigations by the VA Office of Inspector General have also highlighted lethal shortcomings. In 2018, for example, a veteran died of an overdose of alcohol and drugs after speaking to two crisis-line responders who failed to contact local authorities. The next year, a veteran shot and killed a family member after talking with a VCL staffer. The inspector general found that the “responder’s management of … [the] call was insufficient and delayed.”

    Congress has taken significant steps to provide resources and improvements to the VCL and mental health care for veterans in general. Last year, Sherrill, the New Jersey representative, helped lead bipartisan efforts to require an outside evaluation of the VCL’s training curriculum, improve responder guidance for high-risk callers, and increase quality control over calls. The efforts also enabled the VCL to become part of 988, which aims to be a more professionalized system that can not only assist callers but also dispatch mobile response teams.

    This spring, Congress passed an omnibus spending bill that included $13.2 billion in funding for veterans’ mental health, $598 million of which was allocated to suicide prevention outreach. In June, the House passed the Support the Resilience of Our Nation’s Great Veterans Act — known as the STRONG Veterans Act — which mandates improvements to the training of VCL staff, including in the critical areas of risk assessment, lethal means assessment, substance use and overdose risk assessment, referrals to care, and dispatch of emergency services. The legislation also requires the development of enhanced guidance and procedures to respond to callers at high risk of overdose. It is now awaiting action in the Senate.

    “Far too many servicemembers return home suffering from the invisible wounds of war, and it’s on us to make sure the Department of Veterans Affairs has the tools it needs to connect those who served with their earned support,” said Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee Chair Jon Tester, D-Mont., who wrote the VCL bill within the STRONG Veterans Act, in a June press release.

    The Pentagon is also grappling with how to address the military suicide crisis. Between 2016 and 2020, the suicide rate among active-duty service members jumped 33.5 percent, prompting a Government Accountability Office report in April that found gaps in suicide prevention policies, programs, and activities — such as counseling for service members. The Navy was singled out for specific failures in command- and base-level suicide prevention efforts. While the Army and Air Force have, for example, designated a director of psychological health at each base outside the continental United States — as required by Defense Department policy — the Department of the Navy had “not fully done so for Navy and Marine Corps installations,” according to the report. The same month the report was issued, three sailors aboard the Navy’s USS George Washington died by suicide in just one week.

    “Suicide is a massive problem for us,” said Russell Smith, master chief petty officer of the Navy, during a congressional hearing in May.

    Between 2016 and 2020, the suicide rate among active-duty service members jumped 33.5 percent.

    This spring, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin ordered the creation of an independent commission to address military suicides. The committee will conduct a review of “relevant suicide prevention and response activities” and report back on necessary policy changes to Austin and the congressional armed services committees.

    The Defense Department has expressed support for suicide hotlines for current and former service members. “The VCL/MCL is a vital resource in the military community setting that provides support to individuals in crisis,” Maj. Charlie Dietz, a Pentagon spokesperson, told The Intercept via email. “It provides free and confidential support to veterans and Service members 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.”

    Whether the Navy will enforce its own VCL regulations remains an open question. Whether the Senate Armed Services Committee — which provides oversight of the U.S. military, including the Department of the Navy — cares to intervene is also unclear. After weeks of failing to respond to emails from The Intercept concerning the Navy audit, Cole Stevens, a committee spokesperson, declined to comment. After multiple follow-ups, Stevens still did not offer comment.

    Veterans’ advocates, however, are eager to see the Navy comply with its regulations — and for other service branches to implement similar policies.

    “Adding information, phone numbers, or links to the Veterans Crisis Line on service websites is a simple step to increase awareness for those service members, veterans, and family members who are struggling and need assistance,” said Ron Conley, the former national commander of the American Legion and current chair of the veterans association’s committee on post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury. “The American Legion urges all the military services to include Veterans Crisis Line information on all unit and command homepages.”

    The 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline offers 24-hour support for those experiencing difficulties or those close to them, by chat or by telephone at 988.

    The post The Navy Promised to Do More to Prevent Veteran Suicides. It’s Failing at the Most Basic Measure. appeared first on The Intercept.


  • 397285 02: UNDATED PHOTO Osama bin Laden (L) sits with his adviser Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian linked to the al Qaeda network, during an interview with Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir at an undisclosed location in Afghanistan. In the article, which was published November 10, 2001 in Karachi, bin Laden said he had nuclear and chemical weapons and might use them in response to U.S. attacks. (Photo by Visual News/Getty Images)

    Osama bin Laden, left, sits with Ayman al-Zawahiri circa Nov. 10, 2001, at an undisclosed location in Afghanistan.

    Photo: Getty Images

    What if a character that was once viewed as something of a boogeyman, even a Hitler-esque evil, was suddenly killed — and no one seemed to care? That’s more or less what happened this week, when Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s longtime leader, was finally tracked down by the United States.

    Zahawiri, one of small circle of men responsible for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, was reportedly killed by a drone strike on a house in a trendy area of Kabul, Afghanistan. His death came over 20 years after the events that first made his name a byword for infamy.

    Members of Gen Z could be forgiven for not knowing who he was, but that no one else seemed to care much seemed odd. Unlike Osama bin Laden’s death more than a decade ago, which prompted an outpouring of street celebrations and chest-beating by U.S. politicians and national security elites, the reaction to Zawahiri’s demise has been noticeably muted.

    This won’t be the last drone strike or raid that the U.S. carries out in the Middle East, but the killing of Zawahiri marks the close of a particular chapter in American history. That it went so quietly suggests that the cultural and political behemoth that was the war on terror had already long preceded Zawahiri into the grave.

    The United States is now preoccupied with a deadly war in Ukraine, as well as a growing rivalry with China that is likely to put far more strain on its resources than Al Qaeda ever did. After the collapse of the terrorist group the Islamic State, the U.S. has faced almost no jihadist attacks and is instead being hit with wave after wave of deadly far-right terrorism.

    President Joe Biden announced Zawahiri’s killing in a sleepy address given Monday evening, saying, “People around the world no longer need to fear the vicious and determined killer.” Very few, though, had been fearing Zawahiri — who had become better known for his conspiracy videos on global politics rather than actual terrorism — for a long time.

    Biden’s usual subdued delivery was in this case matched by the reaction. If bin Laden’s death was a blockbuster, Zawahiri’s didn’t even go straight to VHS: NPR’s morning news had the killing as just another news item. By noon, the Zawahiri news had been pushed off the top of the New York Times’s website by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and a Style section story about an iconic New York City guitar teacher.


    WASHINGTON, DC - AUGUST 01: U.S. President Joe Biden speaks from the Blue Room balcony of the White House on August 1, 2022 in Washington, DC. Biden announced that over the weekend, U.S. forces launched an airstrike in Afghanistan that killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri, 71, took over leadership of al-Qaeda in 2011, shortly after American forces killed Osama bin Laden. The president said there were no civilian casualties.  (Photo by Jim Watson-Pool/Getty Images)

    President Joe Biden announces the killing of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri from the White House on Aug. 1, 2022, in Washington, D.C.

    Photo: Jim Watson/Getty Images

    That Zawahiri’s death did not command much attention is a sign that global jihadism is not much of a priority anymore for the U.S. public — and also for Islamists themselves.

    On the latter group, one need only look at the very country where Zawahiri was assassinated. The victory of the Afghan Taliban over the U.S. military and its allies in Afghanistan taught an important lesson to Islamists around the world. Whereas the Islamic State group carried out terrorist attacks against Western civilians that enraged foreign publics and justified crushing military responses, the Taliban laser-focused on the conflict on the ground at home against the Afghan central government, even cutting deals with the Americans to keep their troops out of the fray.

    The result for Islamists in Afghanistan was far more successful than bin Laden’s famous idea of targeting the “far enemy” — the U.S. — as a means of drying up support for regional dictatorships. International terrorism was always a departure for Islamist groups, whose focus even in carrying out foreign attacks was to effect changes back home.

    It seems likely that, as other analysts have noted, Islamist groups will return to this older model of fighting, which largely leaves the West out of it, rather than continuing with the failed approaches of bin Laden, Zawahiri, and their more radical offspring like the Islamic State group.

    The killing of Zawahiri may provide a modicum of justice for the victims of the September 11 attacks. Indeed, it was the rare episode in the war on terror where someone responsible for 9/11 paid a price for it, however extrajudicial the punishment may have been. Only five of the hundreds of men held at the notorious Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp were put on trial for 9/11; they remain there, their cases stalled in pretrial hearings.

    While it’s hard to find 9/11 perpetrators who paid for the attack in any way, millions of others have died, been wounded, or driven from their homes because of U.S. military actions following the attacks. The vast majority of these innocent victims had nothing to do with September 11 and indeed had never done any harm to the United States.

    The great tragedy and crime of the war on terror was that the United States decided to take revenge for it on entire civilian populations of countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, who bore no guilt for the 9/11 attacks. The historical record is a morally ugly one for the U.S., which is what makes it even harder to celebrate the killing of even one deserving terrorist after watching millions of other lives destroyed along the way.

    An era is over with the death of Zawahiri, even if a rising generation of young Americans are not even aware of the fact. Jihadist terrorism may yet make a comeback, but I doubt it will do so anytime soon in a manner that affects Americans the way that September 11 did.

    Zawahiri paid a price, yes. The great shame, however, are the many, many other criminals in this conflict who harmed innocent people without facing even an illusion of justice, inside the courts or outside them.

    The post Al Qaeda Honcho Zawahiri Got Droned and No One Gave a Shit appeared first on The Intercept.


  • U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during a "Save America Rally" near the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., on Wednesday, Jan. 6, 2021. Trump's months-long effort to toss out the election results and extend his presidency will meet its formal end this week, but not without exposing political rifts in the Republican Party that have pitted future contenders for the White House against one another. Photographer: Shawn Thew/EPA/Bloomberg via Getty Images

    U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during a “Save America Rally” near the White House in Washington, D.C., on Jan. 6, 2021.

    Photo: Shawn Thew/EPA/Bloomberg via Getty Images

    Donald Trump is a murderous cult leader who incited the mob that attacked the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, hoping that his supporters would kill his own vice president, Mike Pence, and as many members of Congress as possible so that he could become a dictator.

    That was the inescapable conclusion from Thursday night’s chilling prime-time, nationally televised hearing of the House January 6 committee. The committee combined a wide range of evidence and testimony to reveal a timeline of the insurrection, showing how Trump eagerly sent his mob to the Capitol and then refused for hours to call them off when they broke into the building. Instead, he wanted to join and lead them.

    On January 6, Trump was not much different from Jim Jones at Jonestown, as he urged his rabid followers to kill American democracy.

    Trump controlled the insurrection, and he could easily have stopped his cult members from attacking the Capitol, the hearing revealed. But he didn’t want to stop them. For months, he had tried everything to overturn the 2020 election and failed, so now he was willing to try assassination.

    Some of the most damning evidence presented during the hearing was audio of insurrectionist leaders and video from inside the Capitol, showing how the rioters were keyed into every Trump tweet in real time and were eager to do his bidding. The evidence showed that the insurrectionists believed — indeed, knew — that they were following Trump’s orders.

    As soon as the insurrection began, Trump’s family members and White House aides, along with leading members of Congress, tried to get him to call off the mob — because they all knew that it was his mob and that he could call them off if he chose to do so. That fact alone is damning evidence that should be used to prove his leadership of the insurrection in a criminal investigation by the Justice Department.

    But Trump refused to listen to any of them. “The mob was accomplishing [Trump’s] purpose,” Rep. Adam Kinzinger, an Illinois Republican, said during Thursday’s hearing.

    In fact, Trump did not lift a finger to try to stop the insurrection during its most critical hours, the committee revealed. He didn’t call anyone in the government — not at the Pentagon, or the Justice Department, or the Department of Homeland Security — for help gaining control over the violent crisis at the Capitol. Testimony by former Trump aides and others, including Gen. Mark Milley, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, showed that Trump did nothing except call Republican senators to try to get them to refuse to certify the election. “You’re the commander in chief. You’ve got an assault going on on the Capitol of the United States of America, and there’s nothing? No call? Nothing? Zero?” Milley told the committee in disbelief.

    It was finally Pence, not Trump, who ordered the military to send the National Guard to the Capitol, Milley said in audio of his testimony played during Thursday night’s hearing.

    Pence’s role as the presiding officer during the congressional certification of the election on January 6 made him a target for Trump and the mob, and his Secret Service detail feared for their own lives, the committee revealed. An unidentified White House aide who was listening to radio traffic from the Secret Service told the committee that agents were calling their families to say goodbye. Trump showed no remorse for the danger in which he had put his own vice president, telling a White House staffer later that day that Pence had let him down by refusing to block the congressional certification.

    It was hours after the insurrection began — and only after it was clearly starting to lose momentum — that Trump grudgingly made a half-hearted statement urging his supporters to go home.

    The next day, the president showed no remorse. The committee played previously unseen video outtakes from the public statement he made on January 7, showing that he refused to say that the election was over and struggled about whether to say his followers had done anything wrong.

    There was just one light moment in the hearing about the darkest day in modern American history: The committee showed video footage of Sen. Josh Hawley running for his life through the halls of Congress just after he was photographed outside the Capitol raising his fist in support of the mob.

    The post The Cult of Donald Trump appeared first on The Intercept.


  • An image of former President Donald Trump displayed on a screen during a hearing of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the US Capitol in Washington, D.C., July 12, 2022. Whether far-right extremists who attacked the US Capitol were encouraged by or even conspired with then-President Trump will be the subject of today's hearing by the House committee investigating the riot. Photographer: Doug Mills/The New York Times/Bloomberg via Getty Images

    An image of former President Donald Trump is displayed on a screen during a hearing of the House January 6 committee in Washington, D.C., on July 12, 2022.

    Photo: Doug Mills/The New York Times/Bloomberg via Getty Images


    At the end of Tuesday’s hearing of the House January 6 committee, Rep. Liz Cheney revealed yet one more bombshell from a congressional investigation that has been full of them.

    Former President Donald Trump, Cheney said, called a witness who is planning to testify at a future House hearing, in an apparent attempt to influence their upcoming testimony. Cheney did not identify the witness but said that the committee was alerted about the call by the witness’s lawyer. Trump called the witness in the last few days — after the committee’s previous hearing, in which former White House aide Cassidy Hutchinson delivered explosive testimony about Trump’s volatile behavior on January 6. The committee has referred the matter to the Justice Department for investigation into possible witness tampering by Trump.

    The January 6 committee’s investigation into the insurrection and Trump’s efforts to overturn the 2020 election has turned into perhaps the best congressional inquiry since the Church Committee’s legendary investigation of the intelligence community in the 1970s. The House committee has patiently and meticulously laid out the evidence of Trump’s illegal efforts to overturn the election and incite a violent insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, making it clear, once and for all, that he was the puppet master behind the surging mob seeking to prevent the congressional certification of Joe Biden’s victory in the 2020 presidential election.

    In fact, the allegation of witness tampering by Trump is just the latest in a series of possible criminal acts disclosed by the committee. In seven hearings so far, the committee has portrayed the former president’s behavior as far worse than was previously known. The House committee has uncovered much more than the media ever expected and has provided mountains of evidence that should be used by the Justice Department to intensify its criminal investigation of Trump and his cronies.

    During Tuesday’s hearing, the committee showed that Trump carefully planned to incite the mob to march on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, when Congress was meeting to certify the election results. In fact, the leaders of the rally held outside the White House on January 6 knew in advance that Trump was planning to urge the crowd to go to the Capitol. “POTUS is going to have us march there/the Capitol,” said Kylie Jane Kremer, a rally organizer, in a January 4, 2021, text message shown by the committee.

    The committee also showed that Trump decided to incite the insurrection after all of his other illicit efforts to overturn the election had failed. Tuesday’s hearing focused in part on a bizarre meeting at the White House on December 18, 2020, in which Trump surrounded himself with conspiracy theorists, including attorney Sidney Powell and former national security adviser Michael Flynn, to discuss seizing voting machines. Pat Cipollone, Trump’s former White House lawyer, testified about how he fought the crazed ideas coming from the people whispering to Trump in his final days in the White House. Right after the marathon meeting ended in the middle of the night, Trump began to incite an insurrection. At 1:42 a.m. on December 19, he wrote a tweet urging his supporters to come to Washington. “Be there, will be wild.”

    Tuesday’s astonishing hearing added to the portrait of an unhinged Trump that was sketched by Hutchinson in her June 28 hearing. Hutchinson, a key aide to Trump’s chief of staff Mark Meadows, disclosed that Trump knew that some in the crowd on January 6 were armed and still urged them to go to the Capitol. She also revealed that Trump wanted to go to the Capitol to lead the crowd and that he tried to grab the steering wheel from a Secret Service agent when his detail refused to take him there.

    The hearings of the January 6 committee, including Hutchinson’s testimony, have been must-see television, depicting Trump as a psychopath and a criminal who sought to turn the U.S. into a dictatorship.

    The post Donald Trump Is Even More Unhinged Than We Thought appeared first on The Intercept.

  • The Department of Justice building in Washington, DC, on February 9, 2022. (Photo by Stefani Reynolds / AFP) (Photo by STEFANI REYNOLDS/AFP via Getty Images)

    The Department of Justice building in Washington, D.C., on Feb. 9, 2022.

    Photo: Stefani Reynolds / AFP via Getty Images


    For more than 100 years, the Espionage Act, one of the worst laws in American history, has stayed on the books, impervious to reform.

    A relic of World War I, when the government sought to stifle anti-war dissent, the law is so vague and yet so draconian that it has become a handy weapon for federal prosecutors to use against a wide array of targets — often individuals considered politically dangerous by mainstream America. For generations, it was used against American communists; in the 21st century, the Espionage Act has been repeatedly employed against whistleblowers who disclose embarrassing government secrets to the press. The Biden administration is now fighting to extradite Julian Assange, the WikiLeaks founder, so he can be tried under the Espionage Act, among other charges.

    It’s easy to see why prosecutors love this antiquated law. Unlike other measures that might be used to prevent the disclosure of classified information, the Espionage Act carries extraordinarily heavy penalties, including life in prison. Prosecutors use the Espionage Act like a cudgel, convincing whistleblowers to plead guilty to a lesser charge, like mishandling classified information, to avoid a lengthy prison sentence. That way, prosecutors get quick convictions without going to trial.

    Because prosecutors find the Espionage Act such a useful tool, it is probably not going away anytime soon. It is an abuse of the legal system, but the Justice Department has no incentive to stop using it.

    The occasional efforts by members of Congress to reform the Espionage Act have never gotten very far. In recent years, Sen. Ron Wyden, an Oregon Democrat, has tried, and failed, to change it; now Rep. Rashida Tlaib, a Michigan Democrat, is trying again. In an amendment to the massive 2022-23 Pentagon spending bill known as the National Defense Authorization Act, Tlaib would, among other things, allow whistleblowers charged in leak cases to defend themselves by arguing that their disclosures to the media were in the public interest.

    One of the worst things about the current law is that there is no way for whistleblowers to argue in court that they had a valid, even laudable reason to reveal government secrets. They are not allowed to explain that what they did was designed to help the American people know the truth about the government’s actions. A so-called public interest defense would be thrown out of court.

    That gap in the law led to hypocrisy and tragedy in the case of Reality Winner. The former National Security Agency contractor was arrested in 2017 for anonymously leaking to a news outlet an NSA document showing that Russian intelligence tried to hack into U.S. state-level voting systems during the 2016 election. But while Winner was in jail awaiting trial, the Senate intelligence committee issued a report revealing that federal officials did not adequately warn state officials of the threat to their voting systems from the Russian hackers. Instead, the Senate report found that state officials only found out about the hacking threat from the press. That meant that The Intercept, which published the document along with a story about its significance, provided a critical public service. But even as the Senate implicitly lauded Winner’s actions, she wasn’t allowed to make the same argument in her own defense. Winner eventually pleaded guilty to avoid a longer prison term. (The Press Freedom Defense Fund, of which I am the director, supported Winner’s legal defense. Like The Intercept, the fund is part of First Look Institute.)

    Like previous efforts to reform the Espionage Act, Tlaib’s amendment is likely to be rejected, perhaps in the next few days, as the House Rules Committee considers hundreds of amendments to the Pentagon budget bill. (Since the Pentagon budget must pass every year, it gets decked out like a Christmas tree with measures totally unrelated to Pentagon spending. This year, it has become an especially attractive platform for conservative culture warriors. Rep. Matt Gaetz, a Florida Republican and close ally of Donald Trump, has submitted an amendment that would express the sense of Congress “that combating extremism in the military should not be a top priority for the Department of Defense.”)

    The Espionage Act will likely continue to withstand reform because few in Congress want to be labelled soft on national security. Like others who go against conventional wisdom, whistleblowers have very few allies.

    The post Rashida Tlaib Is Trying to Fix the Espionage Act, but Whistleblowers Are Probably Out of Luck appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • WASHINGTON, DC - JANUARY 21: Members of the Patriot Front march with anti-abortion activists during the 49th annual March for Life rally on January 21, 2022 in Washington, DC. The rally draws activists from around the country who are calling on the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn the Roe v. Wade decision that legalized abortion nationwide. (Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)

    Members of the Patriot Front march with anti-abortion activists during the 49th annual March for Life rally on Jan. 21, 2022, in Washington, D.C.

    Photo: Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images


    In 1982, an extremist group calling itself the Army of God kidnapped Dr. Hector Zevallos and his wife. Zevallos was an abortion provider in Edwardsville, Illinois, and his abduction signaled the rise of a new generation of white nationalist extremist groups, many of which made opposition to abortion their top priority.

    Zevallos and his wife were eventually released, but the rightist Supreme Court succeeded in overturning Roe v. Wade last month thanks in part to decades of unrelenting violence by the Army of God and other anti-abortion extremists — violence that set the stage for the rise of the white nationalist domestic terror groups that threaten American democracy today. The Army of God was an early precursor to today’s pro-Trump paramilitary organizations.

    Over the past four decades, the right-wing campaign against Roe v. Wade has been the most violent protest movement in modern American history. Despite recent complaints by conservatives about acts of violence associated with the George Floyd protests in 2020, no other recent social protest movement comes close to anti-abortion activists’ long record of violence.

    Between 1977 and 2021, anti-abortion extremists committed at least 42 clinic bombings, 196 clinic arsons, and 11 murders of doctors and clinic staffers, according to data compiled by the National Abortion Federation.

    The political side of the anti-abortion movement has only occasionally and very reluctantly condemned the violence, and instead has taken advantage of the intense media attention that clinic bombings and the murders of doctors have generated for their cause. Anti-abortion leaders have long considered terrorism a useful political tool, keeping up the pressure against legalized abortion while also attracting zealous new recruits. In the process, anti-abortion extremists have helped build a foundation for the pro-Trump extremist groups that are proliferating today.

    To skirt the law, anti-abortion extremists have tended to form groups without much structure, making it more difficult for them to be sued by reproductive rights groups or investigated by law enforcement. The Army of God, for example, had such an amorphous framework that abortion rights activists and federal officials found it difficult to determine whether the organization really existed or not, despite investigations by a Justice Department anti-abortion violence task force and the FBI in the 1990s.

    After Don Benny Anderson and two other men who had called themselves the Army of God were charged in the Zevallos kidnapping and sent to prison, the group’s name was widely used by other extremists throughout the anti-abortion underground. Yet the Army of God seemed to be nothing more than a nom de guerre, a name invoked by extremists who did not want to claim personal responsibility for major acts of violence. Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun, the author of the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision, received a threatening letter from the Army of God in 1984; as a result, security guards were assigned to protect him whenever he appeared in public.

    But while the group lacked any apparent organization, there were real people committing real acts of violence in its name. And there were anti-abortion activists who worked hard to expand the Army of God’s reach. In fact, the group’s most potent weapon became a document known as the “Army of God Manual,” an anonymously written how-to guide to anti-abortion violence that circulated widely in the extremist underground. In the days before the internet, the manual was printed out and secretly distributed by hand or mail.

    The Justice Department struggled to uncover the truth about the Army of God. In 1994, a federal grand jury in Alexandria, Virginia, investigating anti-abortion violence issued a subpoena to John Burt, a longtime extremist. When officials learned that Burt had a copy of the “Army of God Manual,” they flew back to his home with him to get it. The manual explained that the group’s soldiers did not usually communicate with each other or meet. “That is why the Feds will never stop this Army,” the manual states. “Never.”

    Another extremist anti-abortion group that was fluid and shifting was the Lambs of Christ, founded by Norman Weslin, a former Green Beret who became a Catholic priest and was arrested at least 80 times for leading clinic blockades. James Kopp, who murdered the abortion provider Dr. Bernard Slepian in 1998 in Amherst, New York, was affiliated with the Lambs of Christ, but federal investigators were unable to connect any anti-abortion organization to Kopp’s killing of Slepian. Kopp fled to France, and a couple who were anti-abortion activists pleaded guilty to conspiring to help him avoid capture; he was ultimately sentenced to life in prison. Kopp’s nickname in the anti-abortion movement was “Atomic Dog,” a name mentioned in the Army of God manual.

    The intentionally loose and informal organizational structure used by anti-abortion extremists has been adopted by pro-Trump white nationalist extremists as well.

    The intentionally loose and informal organizational structure used by anti-abortion extremists has been adopted by pro-Trump white nationalist extremists as well. For example, extremist leader Thomas Rousseau was involved with a group called Vanguard America at the violent Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017. James Fields, who marched with Vanguard America at the rally, was arrested for driving his car into a crowd of counter-protesters, killing Heather Heyer and wounding many others. Vanguard America’s connection to Fields was devastating, despite the group’s denials that he was really a member.

    With Vanguard America mired in controversy, Rousseau simply quit the group and created a new, nearly identical one, now known as Patriot Front. Last month, 31 members of Patriot Front, including Rousseau, were arrested when police in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, stopped a U-Haul truck full of Patriot Front members, all dressed alike and wearing masks to hide their identities. They were on their way to start a riot at a Pride event in downtown Coeur d’Alene, police said. On July 2, about 100 masked members of Patriot Front marched through Boston, carrying metal shields and a banner saying “Reclaim America.” The group was accused of assaulting a Black man during their march.

    WASHINGTON, DC - JANUARY 21: Members of the Patriot Front attend the 49th annual March for Life rally on January 21, 2022 in Washington, DC. The rally draws activists from around the country who are calling on the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn the Roe v. Wade decision that legalized abortion nationwide. (Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)

    Members of the Patriot Front march with anti-abortion activists during the 49th annual March for Life rally on Jan. 21, 2022, in Washington, D.C.

    Photo: Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images


    Today, anti-abortion extremists and white nationalists are forging alliances, and the dividing lines between them are increasingly blurred.

    The anti-abortion and white nationalist camps seemed to merge during the January 6 insurrection. Longtime anti-abortion extremist John Brockhoeft livestreamed himself outside the U.S. Capitol during the riot, claiming he was “fighting for our beloved President Donald J. Trump.” In 1988, Brockhoeft was arrested outside an abortion clinic in Pensacola, Florida, after authorities, who had been tipped off by his wife, found explosives in his car. He later admitted to committing a series of arsons and bombings of abortion clinics in Ohio. Brockhoeft served seven years in prison.

    Also at the Capitol on January 6 was Jason Storms, now the national director of Operation Save America — the current name for Operation Rescue, once the nation’s largest and most volatile anti-abortion protest organization. He was joined by other members of the group, which reported on its website that Storms and others had “set up the Lord’s beachhead at this immense gathering.

    “We went to DC, meeting other OSA brethren there to engage in worship, prayers of repentance, to preach the Word of God, the Gospel, and to explain to the thousands there why our nation is on the precipice of ruin,” the group’s website says.

    White nationalist and anti-abortion extremists have bonded over their shared white Christian nationalism and their fears of white demographic decline. The “great replacement,” a conspiracy theory claiming that the U.S. government is seeking to replace white Americans with nonwhite immigrants, has motivated white nationalists to oppose abortion alongside with their opposition to immigration; some white nationalists only want abortion banned for white women.

    Patriot Front members attended the January “March for Life” in Washington, which has long been the largest event of the anti-abortion movement, held annually on the anniversary of the Roe v. Wade decision. They carried banners that read like something straight out of the Third Reich: “Strong families make strong nations.”

    The post Anti-Abortion Zealots Were Precursor to Donald Trump’s Right-Wing Shock Troops appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • Last spring, a van arrived at an inspection station near one of the gates at Fort Eustis in Newport News, Virginia. Military police noticed what looked like chemicals inside and that passengers were “displaying signs of illness.” Soon first responders arrived, donned protective gear, and, according to a military press release, searched “the vehicle for possible CBRNE exposure,” using the acronym for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives.

    That “CBRNE exposure” wasn’t real — it was part of a training exercise. “My biggest takeaway is that all the agencies work well together,” Tim Scott, a lieutenant with the Fort Eustis Fire Department, said at the time, noting that coordination among multiple agencies was essential to ensuring that a similar real-world incident could be handled efficiently and effectively.

    But an internal Army audit obtained exclusively by The Intercept indicates that a genuine CBRNE event might have ended in disaster.

    The results of the audit, issued just days after the April 2021 exercise at Fort Eustis, were dismal. Investigators surveyed five Army bases to ascertain whether they were prepared to deal with an actual CBRNE emergency, like a chemical weapons accident or “dirty bomb” attack. In every case, they were not.

    “The Army didn’t take the required actions to ensure that installation first responders had the necessary equipment and training to respond to a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident at the five installations we reviewed,” according to the document, which was obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. According to the audit, such failings likely exist across the Army, which operates around 1,800 bases, depots, and other sites worldwide, including storage facilities for America’s remaining chemical weapons and a research institute that works with lethal pathogens like anthrax and plague.

    The audit placed the lion’s share of the blame on the emergency management branch of the headquarters of the Department of the Army for failing to provide “sufficient oversight.” The Army did not provide comment about the audit’s findings prior to publication. “None of us are familiar with the report or its contents so we will need to ask around, which may take some time,” spokesperson Richard Levine told The Intercept.

    Fort Eustis firefighters review a handbook to determine the proper way to proceed during a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives exercise at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia, April 27, 2021. Multiple agencies coordinated to quickly and safely respond to the simulated threat.

    Fort Eustis firefighters wear protective equipment during a CBRNE training exercise at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Va., on April 27, 2021.

    Photo: Joint Base Langley-Eustis

    The audit, which was conducted from September 2019 through December 2020, found that the Army failed to provide enough required respiratory protection for all civilian first responders. At two bases, the Army also neglected to ensure that all civilian personnel completed CBRNE preparedness training.

    The Army did not disclose the names of all five installations in the redacted document, but the audit mentions Kentucky’s Blue Grass Army Depot, where both explosive munitions and chemical weapons are stored; Fort Bliss in Texas, which is larger than the state of Rhode Island; and Washington state’s Joint Base Lewis-McChord, which has a population of approximately 110,000 active-duty troops, family members, and civilian employees. The audit determined that civilian first responders at the latter two bases were also not using required National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health-approved respirators.

    The auditors determined that the five installations were lacking a total of 241 pieces of equipment necessary for CBRNE response missions, including hand-held devices designed to detect chemical warfare agents, air-purifying gas masks, and hazmat boots. The investigators also “couldn’t determine the existence of six other items,” including additional chemical agent detectors and decontamination shelters, valued at more than $142,000.

    When equipment was located by auditors, large quantities — 89 percent of 440 pieces that were collectively valued at around $1.2 million — were not listed in required documents, leaving the items “susceptible to loss or theft” or the Army in danger of purchasing “unnecessary or duplicate equipment.”

    The investigators also found that key “personnel confirmed the lack of clear roles and responsibilities for assessing equipment requirements and documentation” and “weren’t provided specific guidance on determining, fielding, or sustaining” required gear. “These adverse conditions likely exist Armywide,” according to the audit, “and should be corrected.”

    The audit’s findings come as the possibility of military CBRNE catastrophes is on the rise. The Defense Department recently announced plans to build nuclear microreactors to power far-flung, austere military bases. An earlier Army effort to field portable nuclear reactors resulted in an explosion and meltdown that killed three military personnel in Idaho in 1961.

    SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA - JULY 12:  A fire burns on the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard at Naval Base San Diego on July 12, 2020 in San Diego, California. There was an explosion on board the ship with multiple injuries reported.  (Photo by Sean M. Haffey/Getty Images)

    A fire burns on the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard at Naval Base San Diego on July 12, 2020.

    Photo: Sean M. Haffey/Getty Images

    Last year, the Defense Department warned that chemical and biological weapons “threats remain significant and are expanding at an exponentially accelerated pace.” The military also continues to store its own chemical weapons at the U.S. Army Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado as well as the Blue Grass Army Depot. (The last chemical agents in the U.S. stockpile are scheduled to be destroyed, under the Chemical Weapons Convention, by September 30, 2023.)

    In 2019, due to safety concerns over insufficient decontamination methods, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention shut down research at the Army’s Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in Fort Detrick, Maryland, where work centers on toxins and germs, including so-called select agents such as the Ebola virus, smallpox, anthrax, plague, and the poison ricin. Work there resumed in 2020.

    That same year, a fire and “massive” explosion destroyed the $1.2 billion amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard due to, among many issues, a disorganized federal and civilian response and Navy firefighters reportedly lacking the necessary equipment to battle the blaze.

    The post Army Bases Shockingly Unprepared for Chemical, Biological Attacks appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • The death of a French volunteer in Ukraine is the first clear evidence that there are at least some far-right extremists among the foreign fighters who have flocked there to fight Russian forces. Wilfried Bleriot, 32, was killed in action, according to Ukraine’s International Legion in a Facebook post on June 4, 2022. In the photo of Bleriot posted by the International Legion, which was formed after Russia’s February invasion and is open to volunteer fighters from all over the world, he displays front and center on his body armor the black-and-white patch of the so-called Misanthropic Division, said to be an overtly fascist volunteer wing of Ukraine’s ultranationalist Azov Battalion.

    The Misanthropic Division’s violent, hate-filled Telegram channel was the first to announce Bleriot’s death, one day earlier, on June 3. The post said that he died on June 1 in Kharkiv and included a photo in which the thin and bearded Bleriot wears a T-shirt that says “Misanthropic Division” across the front.

    In 2018, the Los Angeles Times described the Misanthropic Division as “one of many neo-Nazi groups that have mushroomed throughout Ukraine in recent years.” In 2020, the Daily Beast characterized it as “the militant foreign volunteer wing of Ukraine’s neo-Nazi Azov Battalion.” The Guardian, in 2014, also said that the Misanthropic Division “is linked to the Azov battalion.” There are few other mentions of it in the news archive.

    Bleriot was a “man who fought bolshevism and antifascism all his life,” according to the Telegram post, a “brother-in-arms,” who died defending Europe and Ukraine from “Asiatic hordes.” Among members of the group chat, Bleriot has become a martyr, a fallen comrade to be mourned and celebrated. One meme shows a Black Sun wheel — an icon of Nazi occultism — behind his smiling face.

    Bleriot was from Bayeux, a town in the north of France. In an interview with an Argentinian reporter, uploaded to Reddit on March 3, he identifies himself as a Norman, says that he is “ready to kill Russians,” and “ready to die.” He adds that he left behind two children at home, and starts to cry. Bleriot’s family could not be reached for comment. Efforts to reach French authorities for comment on whether Bleriot was known to them were also unsuccessful.

    A spokesperson for the Azov Battalion, which began around 2014 as a far-right street gang and has since evolved into a professional special operations regiment of the Ukrainian army, did not immediately respond to an inquiry about Bleriot and the Misanthropic Division. But back in April, I met with Andriy Biletsky, the founder of the Azov movement, at their base in Kyiv. I had not heard of the Misanthropic Division then, but I did ask Biletsky about foreign fighters. “We have volunteers from different countries,” he told me. “We’ve had Europeans, Japanese, people from the Middle East.” He also mentioned Belarusian, Georgian, Russian, Croat, and British volunteers. He pointed out that some of them had been Jews. However, “I can assure you that there are no Americans,” he said. “Not even western Europeans for that matter,” he added, slightly contradicting himself.

    The Azov base, in the semi-industrial outskirts of Kyiv, was in an abandoned Soviet factory compound. Inside the main building, a yellow flag with Azov’s notorious Wolfsangel symbol in the center hung from the rafters. In two places, there were Black Sun clocks on the walls; such sun wheels, or Sonnenrads, also found on the floor of Heinrich Himmler’s castle in Germany, are widely used by contemporary adherents of Nazi ideology to signal their Aryan supremacist beliefs. Azov apologists say that they are merely indigenous Ukrainian symbols that must be understood in an Eastern European context. In any case, the sun wheels, backlit by blue neon, certainly lent the Azov base a neo-Nazi aesthetic. There were soldiers in full battle gear walking around, looking as squared-away and intimidating as any in Ukraine, and two women who worked as secretaries. The ground floor was full of new recruits, exclusively young white men, speaking Ukrainian and Russian.

    TOPSHOT - A recruit to the Azov far-right Ukrainian volunteer battalion, supports a tattoo on his scalp depicting a Kalashnikov and the word 'Misanthropic' as he takes part in their competition in Kiev, on August 14, 2015 prior leaving to the battle fields of eastern Ukraine. Two people were killed in another round of intense shelling between Western-backed Ukrainian government's forces and pro-Russian fighters in the separatist east, officials from both sides said. Ukraine's military spokesman Andriy Lysenko said one soldier was killed and six wounded in the past 24 hours of fighting across the mostly Russian-speaking war zone. AFP PHOTO/ SERGEI SUPINSKY (Photo by Sergei SUPINSKY / AFP) (Photo by SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images)

    A recruit to the Azov Battalion with a tattoo on his scalp depicting a Kalashnikov and the word “Misanthropic,” in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Aug. 14, 2015.

    Photo: Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images

    Since Azov formed about eight years ago, it has attracted relentless controversy for its quasi-fascist ideology, unapologetically espoused by Biletsky, and alleged abuses against the few minority groups that exist in Ukraine, including the Roma. There is plenty of photographic evidence of Azov fighters displaying Nazi symbols on the battlefield (often with the intent to troll Russia). Azov has tried to clean up its image in recent years and present itself as depoliticized, and it is now an official component of the Ukrainian military, not an independent militia. But it has far more autonomy than any other regiment of the army. It presents itself as an elite corps and has attained an extraordinary degree of prestige and admiration in the eyes of ordinary Ukrainians for its stalwart defense of Mariupol, its home base, which finally fell to the Russians on May 20, following a dramatic, three-month-long siege. Although many hundreds of Azov soldiers were taken prisoner, many more young Ukrainian men have signed up to replace them.

    “Azov is growing,” Maksym Zhorin, the commander of an Azov special operations unit in Kyiv, told me in April. “Our emphasis is on the future.” He added, “It might sound weird, but the actions of the Russian federation have been beneficial for us.”

    As I noted in a recent piece for Harper’s, when I left the base, I saw a small group of men hanging around outside the gate, and guessed from their appearance (paramilitary attire, neck tattoos, ball caps) that they were foreign volunteers. With several Azov soldiers standing next to my translator and me as we waited for a taxi, I didn’t think it wise to approach them, but I overheard them speaking English. The one phrase I caught distinctly, over the idling engine of an armored vehicle, was “foreign legion.” Also, who knows who was responsible for it, but “WHITE POWER” was spray-painted on the kiosk right in front of us, alongside the driveway — in English, no less.

    White-Power-ukraine

    White supremacist graffiti is spray-painted on a kiosk outside the Azov Battalion’s base in Kyiv on April 6, 2022.

    Photo: Seth Harp

    Bleriot’s death, the possible existence of more extremists like him among the ranks of Ukraine’s foreign fighters, and the rise of Azov as an internal military power should not be taken as representative of Ukraine’s society, government, and armed forces as a whole. Russian propaganda would have people believe that Ukraine and its military are full of neo-Nazis and completely under the sway of radical Russophobes. These falsehoods evaporate as soon as you set foot in the country. Ukraine does have a notably vigorous and aggressive ultranationalist sector, but even Azov, the most powerful and influential far-right force, remains a fringe movement. Ukraine is one of the biggest countries in Europe and contains multitudes. Its president is Jewish, a former TV comedian. Before Russia invaded, issues like corruption and economic stagnation were much bigger problems in the lives of ordinary people than the specter of roving gangs of fascist youths. If the Russians were really worried about neo-Nazi, ultranationalist, and white-supremacist militants, they would look in their own country, where such movements flourish as much as, if not more than, in Ukraine.

    Likewise, Bleriot should not be taken as representative of the Ukrainian Army’s International Legion. Amid the chaos of the first two months of the war, most of the foreigners who flocked to Ukraine to fight were turned away and went home. The International Legion only accepted those with substantial military experience, mostly from the U.S. and U.K. Bleriot, who told an Argentinian interviewer that he had served one year in the French army, would have barely made the cut. There’s little doubt that he claimed the Misanthropic Division’s neo-Nazi ideology, as articulated in spaces like its Telegram channel, but such extremists, isolated and small in number, also find their way into the U.S. military on a regular basis.

    As for the Misanthropic Division, it’s hard to tell how real it is, and how sizable. The extent of its actual association with the Azov Battalion is also unclear. Take Bleriot, for example. There’s no indication that he was with any Azov unit when he died in Kharkiv, in the northeast of Ukraine, far from Azov’s main areas of operation in the south. It may be that the Misanthropic Division is not a real-world unit with a leader and a chain of command so much as a twisted military clique that anyone online can claim.

    Images readily available on the internet show young men from the U.K., France, Germany, Spain, Poland, Portugal, Brazil, and elsewhere displaying the group’s piratical-looking flag, often in conjunction with other hate symbols, and it’s possible to find photos and videos of Ukrainian soldiers, who appear to be engaged in actual combat, sporting its various badges, patches, and T-shirts. It could be a cohesive military unit made up of foreign volunteers, sheltered under the wing of the Azov Battalion, but I can find no convincing evidence, at the moment, that it is anything more than a toxic Telegram meme popularized by Azov’s most black-pilled fanboys, only a few of whom may really be serving in the unit.

    The loosely organized International Legion, which may not have any central command, is limited in its ability to vet volunteers.

    The real question, when it comes to Ukraine’s foreign legion and some of the more distasteful characters that its international call-to-arms has attracted, is how much of a threat they pose to their countries of origin. The loosely organized International Legion, which may not have any central command, is limited in its ability to vet volunteers. Radical miscreants from all over the world who subscribe to the blood-and-soil ideology of neo-Nazi subcultures like the Misanthropic Division have a very real opportunity to travel to Ukraine, get military training, and participate in intense armed conflict against a technologically advanced enemy. If they survive, their combat experience could give them the confidence and ability to carry out acts of political violence in their home countries. This is clearly cause for concern at a time when incidents of hate crimes and domestic terrorism are on the rise.

    In the same Facebook post of June 4 that announced Bleriot’s death, the International Legion also disclosed the death of Björn Benjamin Clavis, a German of unknown age. The photo of him shows a man who looks about 30 with buzzed hair in the uniform of Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Force. On the back of his right hand is an unmistakable tattoo of an Iron Cross, which the Anti-Defamation League describes as a “commonly-used hate symbol” favored by “neo-Nazis and other white supremacists.”

    It’s possible that Clavis got the tattoo for innocuous reasons. It’s not that uncommon a symbol. The logo of the Independent Truck skateboard company, for example, looks a lot like an Iron Cross. So does the badge given out for marksmanship in the U.S. Army. However, the ADL’s analysis suggests that nonracist display of the Iron Cross mostly takes place in the United States. In Germany, where Clavis was from, it is very much associated with the Third Reich.

    The post Foreign Fighters in Ukraine Could Be a Time Bomb for Their Home Countries appeared first on The Intercept.

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  • UNITED STATES - JUNE 28: Cassidy Hutchinson, an aide to former White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows, is sworn in to the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol hearing to present previously unseen material and hear witness testimony in Cannon Building, on Tuesday, June 28, 2022.  (Tom Williams/CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images)

    Cassidy Hutchinson is sworn in to the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol hearing on June 28, 2022.

    Photo: CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Imag

    With her surprise testimony at Tuesday’s hearing of the House January 6 committee, former Trump aide Cassidy Hutchinson broke open the inside story of the coup plotting that was underway at the White House before and during the insurrection, and in the process suddenly raised Donald Trump’s legal jeopardy.

    Above all, Hutchinson, a former aide to Mark Meadows, Trump’s White House chief of staff, showed that Trump knew that many of his supporters who marched on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, were armed and dangerous, and still encouraged them to march on Congress. He even sought to go to the U.S. Capitol himself to lead them in person, and lunged at a Secret Service agent to try to take control of his presidential limousine so he could drive up to Capitol Hill to lead the armed mob.

    Hutchinson’s stunning testimony, the most dramatic since the House hearings started, recalls that of Alexander Butterfield, the White House aide during Watergate who revealed to the Senate Watergate Committee that President Richard Nixon had a taping system in place in the Oval Office. Butterfield’s testimony suddenly changed the trajectory of the Watergate scandal and helped lead to Nixon’s 1974 resignation.

    The January 6 hearings have disclosed far more than was previously known about Trump’s efforts to overturn the 2020 election, raising questions about why the Justice Department has not been as aggressive in its own inquiry. The success of the House hearings may finally be forcing the Justice Department to intensify its criminal investigation. Last week, the FBI raided the home of Jeffrey Clark, a former Justice Department official who sought to help Trump pressure state officials not to certify Biden’s win in Georgia; the Justice Department also seized the phone of John Eastman, a lawyer for Trump who wrote memos urging then-Vice President Mike Pence to overturn the presidential election during the congressional certification process.

    During Tuesday’s hearing, Hutchinson painted a vivid picture of Trump’s insane behavior as he sought to prevent Joe Biden from assuming office. On the day of the insurrection, Hutchinson testified, Trump tried to force the Secret Service to drive him to the U.S. Capitol to take charge of the insurrection himself. Trump had incited the mob during a speech outside the White House, urging his supporters to go up to the Capitol while Congress was in the process of certifying the election. The crowd then followed his directions and marched to the Capitol.

    Immediately after his speech to the crowd outside the White House, he tried to grab the steering wheel of his limousine from the Secret Service agent who was driving.

    By that time, Trump was already furious that the Secret Service was refusing to let his heavily armed supporters into the secured area outside the White House. Hutchinson testified that Trump said that “they’re not here to hurt me. Take the fucking mags away,” referring to the metal detectors used to check for weapons. “Let my people in. They can march to the Capitol from here.”

    Beyond January 6, Hutchinson also revealed that Trump was mentally unbalanced throughout the months in which he sought to overturn the election. She said that on December 1, 2020, Trump threw a plate with ketchup on it against a wall in the White House when he found out that Attorney General William Barr had just told the press that there was no significant voter fraud during the presidential election. She added that Trump had thrown objects in the White House before, including inside the Oval Office.

    Hutchinson also said that Meadows did almost nothing to try to rein in Trump during the insurrection, and later sought a presidential pardon.

    Hutchinson’s testimony came as Rep. Liz Cheney, the Wyoming Republican who is vice chair of the House committee, said that there is evidence of witness tampering against others speaking to the committee. Several witnesses have received phone calls and messages in which people tried to pressure them before testifying, Cheney said.

    The post Hutchinson’s January 6 Testimony Was an Alexander Butterfield Moment appeared first on The Intercept.

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  • US Attorney General Merrick Garland and Ukrainian Prosecutor General of Ukraine Iryna Venediktova, meet in Krakovets, at the Ukraine border with Poland, Tuesday, June 21, 2022. (AP Photo/Nariman El-Mofty)

    U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland and Ukrainian Prosecutor General of Ukraine Iryna Venediktova, meet in Krakovets, Poland, on June 21, 2022.

    Photo: Nariman El-Mofty/AP

    “There is no place to hide,” said U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland during a surprise trip to Ukraine this week, announcing that a veteran prosecutor known for hunting down Nazis would lead American efforts to investigate Russian war crimes. “We will pursue every avenue available to make sure that those who are responsible for these atrocities are held accountable,” he added.

    Garland didn’t need to travel 4,600 miles in pursuit of war criminals. If he wanted to hold those responsible for atrocities accountable, he could have stayed home.

    In a suburban Maryland neighborhood, just over an hour away from Garland’s office, I once interviewed a U.S. Army veteran who confessed to shooting, in Vietnam, an unarmed elderly man in 1968. He didn’t just tell me. He told military criminal investigators in the early 1970s but was never charged or court-martialed. He retired from the Army in 1988.

    The United States is awash in war criminals. Some are foreigners who fled accountability in their homelands. Most are homegrown. They live in places like Wheelersburg, Ohio (a confessed torturer), and Auburn, California (a West Point grad who presided over a massacre). Like these veterans, most have never been charged, much less tried or convicted. If Garland or Eli Rosenbaum, whom he tapped to lead the Ukraine War Crimes Accountability Team, want to find them, I can provide addresses.

    I located those veterans through the records of a secret war crimes task force set up by the Pentagon during the Vietnam War. Today, even that bare modicum of accountability has vanished. It’s now anathema for the Defense Department to mention U.S. personnel and “war crimes” in the same breath.

    Last month, a Pentagon investigation of a 2019 attack in Syria that killed dozens of people, including women and children, found “numerous policy compliance deficiencies” in the military’s initial review of the airstrike, but ultimately held that no one violated the laws of war and no disciplinary action was warranted.

    The anonymous personnel involved in the Syria strike — including the F-15 pilot, drone crew, lawyers, analysts, and members of a Special Operations task force — are typical of Americans involved in civilian deaths during the 20-plus years of the so-called war on terror who have rarely been publicly identified, criminally investigated, or subjected to the scrutiny of anything like a war crimes accountability team. We generally don’t know their names though due to the work of journalists and nongovernmental organizations, we know their handiwork.

    Aimal Ahmadi, whose daughter Mailka and his elder brother Zimarai Ahmadi was among 10 relatives killed by a wrongly directed US drone strike on August 29, stands outside his house in Kabul on December 14, 2021. (Photo by WAKIL KOHSAR / AFP) (Photo by WAKIL KOHSAR/AFP via Getty Images)

    Aimal Ahmadi, whose young daughter and elder brother were among 10 civilians killed by a U.S. drone strike in August, outside his house in Kabul, Afghanistan, on Dec. 14, 2021.

    Photo: Wakil Kohsar/AFP via Getty Images

    There was the August 2021 “righteous strike” against a terrorist target in Afghanistan that actually killed 10 civilians, seven of them children. There were the air and artillery attacks in Raqqa, Syria, that the Pentagon said killed 159 civilians, but Amnesty International and Airwars, a U.K.-based airstrike monitoring group, found had left more than 1,600 civilians dead. There was the drone strike that killed 30 pine nut farm workers in Afghanistan in 2019. An April 2018 attack in Somalia that killed a 22-year-old woman and her 4-year-old daughter. An airstrike in Libya, later that year, that killed 11 civilians. The attack that same year in Yemen that killed four civilians and left another, Adel Al Manthari, gravely injured. The seven separate attacks in Yemen by the United States — six drone strikes and one raid — between 2013 and 2020 that killed 36 members of the intertwined al Ameri and al Taisy families. And the military’s confidential assessments of more than 1,300 reports of civilian casualties from airstrikes in Iraq and Syria from 2014 to 2018, published as “The Civilian Casualty Files” by the New York Times late last year, among so much other evidence.

    Last year, then-Pentagon (now National Security Council) spokesperson John Kirby claimed that “no military in the world works as hard as we do to avoid civilian casualties.” Experts said otherwise. “Civilian protection is not prioritized. We’re not the best because we’re choosing not to be the best,” Larry Lewis, who spent a decade analyzing military operations for the U.S. government, told The Intercept. The seemingly endless number of known civilian casualty incidents that deserve an investigation or reinvestigation also indicates that Kirby’s spin just isn’t true. What’s also clear is that the Pentagon, as Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin put it in April, has no intention to “re-litigate cases.”

    This week, a leaked draft of House Armed Services Committee Chair Adam Smith’s version of the 2023 defense spending bill called for a Commission on Civilian Harm to investigate the human toll of 20-plus years of war. “At a minimum, the Commission has the potential to provide the most comprehensive assessment and accounting of civilian harm during the war on terror,” Brian Finucane, a senior adviser at the International Crisis Group, told The Intercept. A war crimes accountability team assembled by Garland could put iron in the commission’s glove.

    Recently, Beth Van Schaack, the State Department’s ambassador at large for global criminal justice, noted that Russian war crimes were not the actions of “a rogue unit, but rather a pattern and practice across all the areas in which Russia’s forces are engaged.” She added that responsibility extended to “individuals up the chain of command who are aware that their subordinates are committing abuses and who failed to do what is necessary to either prevent those abuses or to punish the perpetrators.” To that end, before conducting investigations of civilian harm committed by drone pilots and special operators across war zones from Syria to Somalia, and Libya to Yemen, the U.S. should start with the original architects of the “war on terror” and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, including former President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice.

    If Garland is truly outraged by “heart-wrenching accounts of brutality and death” and committed to pursuing “every avenue of accountability for those who commit war crimes,” he doesn’t need to dispatch investigators abroad. There are plenty of war criminals, hiding in plain sight, right here.

    The post U.S. Vows to Hunt Russian War Criminals — but Gives a Pass to Its Own appeared first on The Intercept.

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  • The Pentagon must step up its efforts to track and publicly report on civilians hurt and killed by U.S. military operations, according to an unreleased draft of the 2023 defense spending bill.

    The Defense Department must establish a Commission on Civilian Harm and do more to mitigate the impact of civilian casualties, according to a draft version of the National Defense Authorization Act, or NDAA, for Fiscal Year 2023 obtained by The Intercept. The so-called chairman’s mark — House Armed Services Committee Chair Adam Smith’s version of the NDAA — contains legislation and funding recommendations that must still be considered, debated, and voted on. The House Armed Services Committee is slated to consider Smith’s draft of the bill and offer amendments later this week.

    “These proposals reflect that after 20 years, the accumulation of reports — by you, by the New York Times, the excruciating reporting on the strike in Kabul last year — led Congress to a tipping point where they felt the need to legislate in order to better understand civilian harm and to do something about it,” Brian Finucane, a senior adviser at the International Crisis Group and former legal adviser to the State Department, told The Intercept.

    While the civilian harm measures in the markup appear to constitute a major improvement, especially the requirement to set up the Commission and substantive changes to the Defense Department’s annual civilian casualty report, known colloquially as Section 1057, experts say they still fall short. There is also, they note, no guarantee that the measures will make it to the final version of the NDAA.

    “It’s a good improvement, but we wish it went further,” said a Democratic congressional staffer familiar with the document. “We are pleased with the 1057 changes and the COE and Commission on Civilian Harm, and really hope those pieces stay in.”

    The draft bill, which was shared with The Intercept prior to its public release this week, contains elements of directives set forth in Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s January memo directing subordinates to draw up a “Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan” that has yet to be released. The chairman’s mark also bears the imprint of legislation to overhaul the Pentagon’s civilian harm prevention, mitigation, reporting, and transparency policies, introduced in April by Reps. Jason Crow, D-Colo.; Ro Khanna, D-Calif.; Sara Jacobs, D-Calif.; and Tom Malinowski, D-N.J., as well as Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass.

    The chairman’s mark contains proposed changes to the Pentagon’s “Annual Report on Civilian Casualties,” including new requirements to release geographic coordinates of attacks, justifications for the strikes, whether the military conducted any witness interviews or site visits, and information on the number of men, women, and children affected. This last mandate is especially crucial, said Heather Brandon-Smith, the legislative director for militarism and human rights for the Friends Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker group.

    It “requires them to look at the human faces of these operations.”

    “Obviously, it would all help assess compliance in terms of legal obligations regarding proportionality, but it also requires them to look at the human faces of these operations. These are real people who are being killed, so this is very important,” she told The Intercept. “All of these changes are really welcome and it’s fantastic that Chairman Smith has put them in his mark.”

    The Commission on Civilian Harm, as detailed in the chairman’s mark, would be composed of 12 civilians not already employed by the government — including experts in human rights law, U.S. military operations, and other relevant topics — tasked to study the people affected by U.S. military operations as well as Pentagon policies, procedures, and regulations for the prevention, mitigation, and response to civilian harm over the entire so-called war on terror. Experts say it could be a game-changer.

    “At a minimum, the commission has the potential to provide the most comprehensive assessment and accounting of civilian harm” since 2001, said Finucane. “There has been a lot of reporting by think tanks, the media, and NGOs on civilian harm, but the mandate of this commission would be very broad and comprehensive and could provide a holistic overview of the harm done by U.S. military operations over the last 20 years.”

    The commission, whose members will be appointed by Congress, is tasked to investigate the “record of the United States with respect to civilian harm … by investigating a representative sample of incidents of civilian harm that occurred where the United States used military force (including incidents confirmed by media and civil society organizations and dismissed by the Department of Defense).” The body will be authorized to investigate whether civilian casualties have been concealed by the military, what mechanisms exist for whistleblowers, the effectiveness of oversight by the inspector general, and the accuracy of civilian harm estimates offered to the public. To this end, the group is empowered to conduct hearings and witness interviews, as well as review Defense Department documents and, if useful, visit the sites of U.S. attacks that hurt or killed noncombatants.

    The commission also has a mandate to assess whether the military has implemented past recommendations to enhance the protection of civilians and minimize, investigate, and respond to civilian harm, from civil society organizations, Congress, the Pentagon, and other government agencies. The independent body is authorized to assess the responsiveness of the Defense Department to civilian harm allegations and to evaluate how well it has investigated incidents and compensated victims. The 12 members will also assess whether current civilian harm policies comply with international humanitarian and human rights law.

    Experts were far less impressed with the bill’s language on the Center for Excellence in Civilian Harm Mitigation, which Austin mandated in his January memo and is directed to “institutionalize and advance knowledge, practices, and tools for preventing, mitigating, and responding to civilian harm.”

    The bicameral April civilian harm bill proposed $25 million in annual funding for the center, but such language is absent from the chairman’s mark, along with many other details. “Unlike the legislation governing the commission, the provision on the Center of Excellence is very vague. It doesn’t specify who should be heading it up or what kind of expertise they should have,” said Brandon-Smith. “It also doesn’t come with any funding and it doesn’t specify that there should be new staff with expertise in the relevant areas.”

    While experts were optimistic about the proposed changes in the chairman’s mark writ large, they remained cautious as to whether recommendations would be applied and institutional changes at the Defense Department would result. Even though he saw great promise in the Commission on Civilian Harm, Finucane offered a caveat. “The question of whether it will change anything is an open one. There have been a number of blue-ribbon commissions empowered by Congress over the years, which have issued reports that have been read by a half-dozen people and then quietly filed away,” he told The Intercept. “It’s hard to say whether or not the ultimate recommendations of this commission — were it ever to be established — would actually be implemented.”

    The post Pentagon Must Do More to Mitigate Civilian Harm, Says House Armed Services Committee Chair appeared first on The Intercept.

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  • At least four detainees held at the U.S. military prison at Guantánamo Bay have been infected with Covid-19, detainees’ legal teams told The Intercept. It is the first outbreak of Covid within the maximum-security prison.

    The outbreak occurred in Camp Six, a communal block built in 2006 that houses low-value detainees who have never been charged with any crime. Lawyers said the detainees are now living under tightened restrictions.

    “We’re worried because there is no clarity about the conditions in which they’re living.”

    “We’re worried because there is no clarity about the conditions in which they’re living,” said Mansoor Adayfi, a former detainee at the prison, speaking in his capacity as Guantánamo project coordinator for the London-based advocacy group CAGE. “Are they being treated? How bad is their infection? Have they been taken to the hospital? Nine brothers died at Guantanamo — two, I can tell you, died of medical negligence.”

    The Covid outbreak was confirmed by two sources that spoke to The Intercept — one of whom requested anonymity in order to protect people held at the prison from retaliation — as well as a social media post from the sister of a detainee. According to one source, at least one detainee tested positive more than a week ago. (The Department of Defense did not immediately respond to a request for comment.)

    “We were saddened by the news that a number of brothers in Guantánamo were infected with the coronavirus,” the sister of one of the sick detainees wrote on Facebook in Arabic.

    Adayfi, the former detainee and author of the memoir “Don’t Forget Us Here,” described the camp where the outbreak happened: “Camp Six doesn’t have any windows, except for small slits of light near the high ceilings. You feel like you’re in a deep pit. It’s a building within a building.”

    Built by a Halliburton subsidiary and initially used for solitary confinement, Camp Six is now used for communal living. Adayfi said once the communal areas are closed, the cells become isolated from each other and communication is only possible by shouting. “It feels like solitary confinement,” he said. “Camp Six is really terrible. Terrible.”

    “I’m concerned not only because of the Covid, but in general,” said Beth Jacob, an attorney working with Guantánamo detainees, of the general health of her five clients in the prison. Two of the men she represents have fallen ill with Covid, she said.

    Jacob said the history of brutality faced by Guantánamo detainees could contribute to poor health outcomes. “Their health is bad because of the conditions under which they’ve been held,” she said. “My guys both were held by the CIA, one for a year, one for two years. That was not gentle. It was a long time ago, but it’s still lasting physical damage.”

    In 2002, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the prison camp at the U.S. base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, was opened to hold suspected militants of the “War on Terror.” Since then, nearly 800 men and boys have passed through the prison. It became notorious for torture and its extrajudicial detention and treatment of prisoners.

    In recent years, the number of detainees dwindled as men — the vast majority of whom never faced charges — were repatriated, released to third countries, or died in detention. Today, 37 men remained imprisoned at the camp, 25 of whom are considered low-risk detainees, and ten of whom are in active military commission cases.

    While all the detainees at Guantánamo have been vaccinated against the coronavirus, how many doses they’ve now received is unknown.

    The post Guantánamo Bay Prison’s First Covid Outbreak Shrouded In Secrecy appeared first on The Intercept.

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  • WASHINGTON, DC - JANUARY 21: Members of the right-wing group, the Patriot Front, and their founder, Thomas Ryan Rousseau, second from left, prepare to march with anti-abortion activists during the 49th annual March for Life along Constitution Ave. on Friday, Jan. 21, 2022 in Washington, DC.  (Kent Nishimura / Los Angeles Times via Getty Images)

    Members of the Patriot Front, and their founder, Thomas Ryan Rousseau, second from left, prepare to march with anti-abortion activists in Washington, D.C., on Jan. 21, 2022.

    Photo: Kent Nishimura / Los Angeles Times via Getty Images

    During its initial hearings over the past week, the House January 6 committee has taken the nation back a year and a half to the frightening days when Donald Trump and his followers nearly overturned the 2020 presidential election. Thanks to graphic evidence from the insurrection and candid testimony from members of Trump’s inner circle, the congressional hearings have garnered strong television ratings and drawn intense media interest.

    But unlike past congressional hearings into other major scandals like Watergate, the hearings have not provided a sense of closure or of lessons learned but rather one of foreboding. That’s because they don’t just offer a look back at what happened in the 2020 election, but also a glimpse of what is likely to happen in 2024. The January 6 hearings feel like a prequel.

    In fact, even as the hearings constitute the clearest public account of Trump’s coup attempt, a series of incidents around the country has ominously shown that the threat of a repeat in 2024 is very real.

    During the first hearing, the House committee highlighted the leading roles played on January 6 by pro-Trump white nationalist groups, particularly the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers. The committee documented how the Proud Boys helped lead the insurrectionist mob into the U.S. Capitol building in Washington, D.C.

    The Justice Department has also focused on the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers leaders, charging them with seditious conspiracy for planning to prevent the “lawful transfer of presidential power by force” on January 6. On Wednesday, prosecutors made public a document showing that Enrique Tarrio, the leader of the Proud Boys, had specific plans to gain control of key buildings in Washington in an effort to overturn Joe Biden’s election. The criminal charges against the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers have signaled that the Justice Department is intensifying its probe into the planning behind the insurrection, a shift from its earlier practice of issuing minor charges against low-level individuals who stormed the Capitol.

    Meanwhile, other white nationalist groups are starting to rise to prominence. On June 11, for example, just two days after the first January 6 committee hearing, police in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, stopped a U-Haul truck and arrested 31 men, all wearing identical clothes, who police later said were planning to start a riot at a Pride event in the city’s downtown. They were members of a white nationalist group called the Patriot Front, formed in the wake of the violent white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017.

    In addition to the racist language about a “European diaspora” that typifies white nationalist groups, the Patriot Front’s “manifesto” includes fascist, dictatorial rhetoric that could make the group a natural successor to the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers as Trump’s favorite white nationalist group, whether he gets reelected in 2024 or not. The Patriot Front’s rhetoric sounds vaguely socialist, but only because its goal is to get the “collective” — America — to bend to the will of a white nationalist autocracy. “Individualism, while originally good in concept and proposition, has been allowed to run rampant in our modern society, where it has become a plague in its amplification,” the manifesto states. “The nation of the future will not abolish the individual, nor will it ruthlessly enforce a sole collective, but the merits of both must be structured to complement one another.”

    It’s not surprising that the Patriot Front chose to attack in Coeur d’Alene. The small city in northern Idaho, which was once a Democratic stronghold thanks to a heavy concentration of unionized miners, has in recent decades become a magnet for conservatives and right-wing extremists. The Aryan Nations, a white nationalist group prominent in the 1990s and labeled a domestic terrorist organization by the FBI, was based in the area before it splintered and its power waned in the face of investigations, lawsuits, and internal division. After the Patriot Front arrests, Jim Hammond, the mayor of Coeur d’Alene, insisted that “we are not going back to the days of the Aryan Nations. We are past that.”

    Yet droves of conservatives are still moving to northern Idaho from California and other states; many Los Angeles police officers have retired in the area. Some real estate agents in northern Idaho specifically market themselves as conservative to attract right-wing customers who want to move into the region.

    The arrests in Idaho came just as the Department of Homeland Security issued a warning of a heightened threat of domestic terrorism from such extremist groups throughout this year, spurred at least in part by the midterm elections. To be sure, Homeland Security’s warnings are often overblown, but the department does warn that among the groups extremists may target are racial and religious minorities, government facilities and personnel, and the media.

    The House committee’s second hearing on Monday focused on Trump’s lies about the election, showing that he kept pushing to overturn the results even as he was repeatedly told by top advisers that there was no proof of fraud. Former Attorney General William Barr testified that he told Trump the Justice Department had looked into claims of voter fraud and found them to be “bullshit.” Former Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue told Trump that the fraud claims were “not supported by the evidence developed.”

    But Trump kept pushing. Thursday’s hearings focused on the former president’s attempts to force then-Vice President Mike Pence to derail the certification of the election on January 6. The hearing showed that Trump kept pressuring Pence even though he and his allies knew it would be illegal for Pence to interfere with the certification. Trump kept up the brutal pressure on Pence, calling him a “wimp” and “pussy” on a phone call from the White House, and after the mob broke into the Capitol, calling for Pence to be hanged, Trump didn’t bother to check in on him.

    The House committee has shown conclusively that Trump’s own inner circle repeatedly told the president that his claims of a stolen election were false, yet his election lies continue to dominate the Republican Party.

    More than 100 Republican candidates who say the 2020 election was stolen have been nominated for either statewide office or Congress, according to recent analysis by the Washington Post. If elected, they could use their new power to try to overturn the 2024 presidential election to make sure that Trump or another Republican is installed in the White House. They could join other Republicans like Rep. Barry Loudermilk of Georgia, who, on January 5, 2021, gave a tour of the Capitol to someone who joined the insurrection the next day screaming threats about House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, according to footage released by the January 6 committee.

    A confrontation in New Mexico shows the continuing threat the Republican Party poses to the integrity of U.S. elections. This week, the New Mexico Supreme Court was forced to order county commissioners in rural Otero County to certify results from the June 7 primary election there. The three county commissioners, including Couy Griffin, founder of “Cowboys for Trump,” who is due to be sentenced Friday on charges related to his involvement in the January 6 riot, have refused to certify the results because the votes in the primary were counted by voting machines from Dominion, a company that was repeatedly and falsely attacked by Trump and his supporters as they sought to hold onto power.

    Dominion Voting Systems has filed defamation lawsuits against Rudy Giuliani and Sidney Powell, who both lied publicly about the company’s machines while trying to help Trump invalidate Biden’s victory. But that hasn’t stopped Republicans from buying into the lies.

    Under pressure from the state Supreme Court, the Otero County commissioners finally scheduled a new vote Friday on whether to certify the primary results — the same day that Couy Griffin is scheduled to be sentenced by a court in Washington for trespassing on the Capitol grounds on January 6.

    Griffin said Thursday that he may try to vote on the certification by phone from his sentencing hearing — and that he plans to vote no again.

    The post In the Shadow of the Jan. 6 Hearings, Right-Wing Militancy Is on the Rise appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • The U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., U.S., on Thursday, Jan. 6, 2022. President Biden plans a blistering critique of Donald Trump as he marks the one-year anniversary of the Jan. 6 riot at the U.S. Capitol with a speech that will warn of the dangers of misinformation and subverting democracy. Photographer: Stefani Reynolds/Bloomberg via Getty Images

    The U.S. Capitol on the one-year anniversary of the January 6 riot in Washington, D.C., on Jan. 6, 2022.

    Photo: Stefani Reynolds/Bloomberg via Getty Images

    Ryan Kelley, a Republican candidate for governor of Michigan, was arrested by the FBI on Thursday morning in connection with his involvement in the January 6 insurrection.

    Kelley’s arrest provided a fitting lead-in to the first hearing of the House January 6 committee, televised live and in prime time on Thursday night. His arrest helped underscore the degree to which the Republican Party has been captured by the Trumpist forces that were behind the insurrection, and which today seem unashamed and determined to sabotage democracy again to try to usher in a right-wing, authoritarian government as soon as possible.

    For those who have already chosen to forget, the January 6, 2021, insurrection was the worst domestic attack on the United States government since the Civil War, involving a mob of thousands who were hellbent on stopping the congressional certification of the election of Joe Biden as president in order to keep Donald Trump in power. Incited to march on the U.S. Capitol by Trump, the mob overwhelmed the police guarding the Capitol and succeeded in delaying the certification and nearly stopping it. In the process, the mob threatened the lives of members of Congress, who were forced to flee the House and Senate chambers.

    For an attention-deficient nation, where few people remember anything that happened before last week’s verdict in the Johnny Depp-Amber Heard case, Thursday night’s hearing provided a gut-punch reminder of just how violent and dangerous the insurrection was, how close it came to overturning the 2020 presidential election, and how much of a threat to American democracy remains today from the right-wing furies unleashed by Trump.

    For nearly a year, the House select committee has been investigating what happened on January 6 as well as the conspiracy behind it. It has conducted about 1,000 interviews to document the full and ugly story behind Trump’s obsessive, monthslong efforts to overturn the 2020 election, climaxing in the violence on January 6.

    The committee’s leading members now say they have evidence that shows that Trump committed crimes in connection with the insurrection. Rep. Liz Cheney, the Wyoming Republican who is the committee’s vice chair, said during Thursday night’s hearing that Trump had a “sophisticated seven-part plan” to overturn the presidential election, which will be examined in future hearings. She also blamed Trump for inciting the riot on January 6, saying that “Trump summoned the mob, assembled the mob, and lit the flame of this attack.”

    Video footage aired during Thursday’s hearing backed that up, showing how the insurrectionists took their lead from Trump even as they were seeking to knock down fences, scale walls, and smash windows to get into the Capitol. One used a megaphone to read a Trump tweet criticizing Vice President Mike Pence for refusing to use his role as the presiding officer during the congressional certification process to overturn the election in Trump’s favor. In response, the mob chanted “Hang Mike Pence.”

    In order to bring the story to life for the forgetful American public, the committee brought in James Goldston, a former network news executive, to help produce the hearings. The result was a compelling hearing that wove in videos of the insurrection that had never before been aired, along with videos of testimony from a wide range of officials, including some who said Trump didn’t want the insurrection to stop. In a video of his earlier interview with the committee, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley also said that it was Pence, not Trump, who finally ordered National Guard troops to reinforce the police at the Capitol.

    “There were two or three calls with Vice President Pence. He was very animated, and he issued very explicit, very direct, unambiguous orders. There was no question about that,” Milley said. “He was very animated, very direct, very firm to Secretary Miller. ‘Get the military down here, get the guard down here. Put down this situation, et cetera.’”

    But Milley said he was told by the White House to say that it was Trump who ordered the troops to the Capitol.

    Milley also said that Trump’s chief of staff Mark Meadows told him that “we have to kill the narrative that the vice president is making all the decisions.”

    Sandra Garza, girlfriend of late US Capitol Police officer Brian Sicknick, right, embraces Caroline Edwards, a US Capitol Police officer injured in the Jan. 6 riot, during a hearing of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the US Capitol in Washington, D.C., US, on Thursday, June 9, 2022. A year and a half after a violent mob of Trump supporters stormed the US Capitol to block the transfer of presidential power, lawmakers are ready to show the country what their investigation reveals about how it all happened. Photographer: Ting Shen/Bloomberg via Getty Images

    Sandra Garza, partner of late U.S. Capitol Police officer Brian Sicknick, right, embraces Caroline Edwards, a U.S. Capitol Police officer injured in the January 6 riot, in Washington, D.C., on June 9, 2022.

    Photo: Ting Shen/Bloomberg via Getty Images

    The most gripping moment of Thursday night’s hearing came during the live testimony of Capitol Police officer Caroline Edwards, who was injured, knocked unconscious, and later hit with chemical spray as she tried to defend the Capitol. “I was called a lot of things,” she recalled. “I was called Nancy Pelosi’s dog.”

    The hearing also showed the degree to which the extremist groups leading the insurrection, the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers, took their lead from Trump personally. The Proud Boys were mobilized by Trump’s calls for their help during a presidential debate in 2020, when he said that the Proud Boys should “stand back and stand by.” Separately, the Justice Department has charged Proud Boys leader Enrique Tarrio and Oath Keepers leader Stewart Rhodes, along with other members of their groups, with seditious conspiracy in connection with January 6. The sedition charges seem to represent a significant escalation in the Justice Department’s prosecution of those involved in the riot and come after months of criticism of Attorney General Merrick Garland for only bringing minor charges against low-level individuals who were in the mob.

    The House committee plans to go beyond January 6 to examine Trump’s concerted effort to overturn the election. Former Attorney General William Barr said he told Trump that he had lost the election and that there was no evidence of significant voter fraud. “I repeatedly told the president in no uncertain terms that I did not see evidence of fraud, you know, that would have affected the outcome of the election,” Barr said in testimony to the committee, shown on video.

    But Trump ignored the truth and kept pushing to overturn the election throughout the months between the election in November 2020 and Biden’s inauguration in January 2021. After Barr resigned, he tried to get rid of acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen in order to install a lackey, Jeffrey Clark, to get the Justice Department to back his efforts to overturn the election.

    In addition to the investigations by the House committee and the Justice Department, prosecutors in Georgia are also investigating whether Trump violated Georgia election laws by his constant efforts to pressure Georgia officials to overturn the results in that state. The House committee is examining what happened in Georgia as well, and Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger may testify before the committee in a future hearing.

    Despite the historic importance of the insurrection, many reporters and pundits in the mainstream press spent the days leading up to the hearings downplaying their significance, as if they were ready to move on from reporting on the riot. One of their favorite journalistic devices has been to compare, negatively, the public’s interest in the January 6 hearings with the prominence of the Watergate hearings of the 1970s.

    But for anyone who still doubts the importance of developing a comprehensive record of January 6 and Trump’s efforts to subvert democracy, all you need to do is see what Trump said Thursday. Trump said on his new “Truth Social” site that the insurrection was “not simply a protest, it represented the greatest movement in the history of our Country to Make America Great Again.”

    The post Jan. 6 Hearings Seek to Remind a Forgetful Nation About the Day Donald Trump Almost Engineered a Coup appeared first on The Intercept.

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  • Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), informs journalists next to a camera used in Iran about the current situation in Iran during his special press conference at the agency's headquarters in Vienna, Austria on June 09, 2022. - Iran is removing 27 surveillance cameras at nuclear facilities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) head Rafael Grossi said, calling it a "serious challenge" to the agency's work in the Islamic republic. (Photo by JOE KLAMAR / AFP) (Photo by JOE KLAMAR/AFP via Getty Images)

    IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi shows journalists a camera like the ones Iran is removing from nuclear sites, during a press conference at the agency’s headquarters in Vienna on June 9, 2022.

    Photo: Joe Klamar/AFP via Getty Images


    The nuclear deal negotiated by President Barack Obama and Iran in 2015 was based on a simple premise: In exchange for lifting economic sanctions, Iran’s nuclear energy program would be put under strict international surveillance. The deal made sense for both sides. Iran would get sanctions relief and the chance to integrate itself in the global economy, and the United States would get an off-ramp to avoid yet another costly war in the Middle East.

    The agreement never really got a chance to take hold, however, because the U.S. broke its word. In a fit of personal pique at his predecessor — and with the encouragement of Israel and the Gulf Arab states — President Donald Trump violated the accord by unilaterally reimposing sanctions and waging a “maximum pressure” campaign aimed at collapsing the Iranian economy.

    The deal has been on life support ever since.

    Now, the Iranians may be ready to pull the plug on this sick patient. This week, Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency that it would be removing 27 cameras that monitor nuclear sites — cameras that were installed as part of the 2015 agreement. This move was described by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi as a “fatal blow” to the agreement, in a statement that also called on both sides to return to the deal.

    Grossi is right that the nuclear deal may now be in its final days. But it would be wrong to attribute its death to this final step — which comes only after years of overt violations by the United States.

    The U.S. and Iran now appear to be on a glide path to a conflict that no one wanted.

    The U.S. and Iran now appear to be on a glide path to a conflict that no one wanted and that diplomats spent years of negotiations trying to avoid. When the deal was signed in 2015, it seemed these efforts had borne fruit. The successful push by hawks aiming to kill the agreement has now brought things to a breaking point. The original motive of the nuclear deal was to avoid a war over this issue that was already looming a decade ago. With no deal, we might again be hurtling toward exactly that war.

    Under Trump, the Iranian government continued to partially comply with the nuclear deal in the hopes of reviving it if a Democratic administration came back into power. President Joe Biden did win the White House in 2020, but instead of going back to the deal, he has chosen to maintain the sanctions that Trump imposed — the very measures the nuclear deal was intended to lift.

    The sanctions devastated the Iranian economy and drove millions of middle-class Iranians into poverty. If they are lifted in future — doubtful, at this point — it is still unlikely that Iran would ever get the investment from Western companies that it hoped to receive following the original deal. It’s clear now that U.S. sanctions on Iran could be reimposed with any shifting political winds in the U.S. That is a situation which makes it virtually impossible for foreign enterprises to invest there.

    The Iranian side lost much when the deal was torpedoed. Now the international community is going to take a possible hit to its aim of stopping nuclear proliferation. The removal of some of the surveillance cameras at nuclear sites means that the world is moving closer to the murky status quo ante that existed before the 2015 nuclear deal.

    Although Iran has not said it would build a bomb, whatever nuclear activities that it conducts now will be done with drastically diminished international oversight. The IAEA, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, has already said that it believes that Iran is only “weeks away” from having a significant enough quantity of enriched uranium to put them within reach of a bomb. The loss of their surveillance capacity now means Iran could cross that threshold without them even knowing.

    “Today, the IAEA is ‘flying blind’ about the details of Iran’s activities because it is unable to retrieve surveillance data being stored on the agency’s cameras as a consequence of U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018,” said John Tierney, executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in a press release about the news of the camera removals. “These new steps mean the IAEA is losing more data every day and it will be harder to trace every aspect of Iran’s nuclear program should negotiators find a diplomatic off-ramp to escalation. Once again, the United States, and the world, are better off with the limitations on Iran’s nuclear program than without them.”

    At first blush, it might make sense to blame Iran for the rapidly closing window of a revived nuclear deal. Yet to do so ignores the history of the deal and absolves the U.S. of its actions: Why should Iran be expected to continue its compliance during talks over a new deal while the U.S. has not taken any steps toward restoring its own compliance?

    The removal of the cameras is another sign of the failures of Washington’s posture toward Iran. The Trump administration bet that it could simply strong-arm Iran into sacrificing its nuclear program without offering sanctions relief or any other concessions in return.

    Even though Trump did not want to suffer the consequences of a full-scale conflict with Iran, his withdrawal from the deal has set up for exactly that outcome: The U.S. will continue to reap what Trump sowed. Although Biden served as vice president in an administration that had made the nuclear deal a diplomatic centerpiece, he has been unwilling to return to compliance in a manner that might salvage the agreement.

    With nuclear monitoring now curtailed, the same hawks that have long pushed for attacking Iran’s nuclear program will continue to do so. Although Iran has little hope of coming out victorious in a direct confrontation with the U.S. and its allies, it has advanced ballistic missile capacity as well as proxies on standby in many countries. A war with Iran would mean casualties and suffering for the U.S. and its allies unlike any of the wars with nonstate actors that America has fought in the two decades since 9/11.

    The U.S. will continue to reap what Trump sowed.

    A new war in the Middle East is simply not worth it from the perspective of U.S. interests. The best-case scenario is a signed agreement that controlled Iran’s nuclear program, while giving the Iranians a piece of the global economic pie that would be theirs to lose. Obama himself calculated that such an outcome made the most sense for all involved. Due to the structural inability of the U.S. government, including the Biden administration, to stick to its signed diplomatic agreements, the war that Obama tried to avoid may yet break out.

    The deal to avert confrontation was already in hand. We should remember, as costs of the conflict mount, that it was the U.S. that blew up the off-ramp.

    The post Iran Is Backing Out of the Nuclear Deal That U.S. Had Already Reneged On for Years appeared first on The Intercept.

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  • FBI agent Grayden Ridd had a confidential message for his informant. An FBI team had been given the green light by the Justice Department to ambush and derail a planned meeting between a reporter and a source, and the informant’s job was to let the FBI know when and where the meeting would take place.

    The reporter whose meeting they planned to target was me.

    It was January 2014, and I was an investigative reporter in the Washington bureau of the New York Times focusing on national security. The FBI wanted to stop me from obtaining documents that I’d been told would reveal the details of massive spying operations by the National Security Agency. The FBI was convinced that I was in contact with someone they had secretly nicknamed the “second Snowden,” who was about to give me an archive that they feared could go far beyond what former NSA contractor Edward Snowden had leaked about the agency’s spying operations the year before.

    The FBI’s plan to grab my source at our scheduled meeting was approved by top officials at the FBI and the Justice Department during the Obama administration, according to audio recordings I obtained of several phone conversations between Ridd and his informant. At the time, Eric Holder was U.S. attorney general and James Comey was FBI director.

    “Right now, they are on board,” Ridd said in one phone conversation to plan the ambush operation, referring to top Justice Department and FBI officials. “I have to periodically go up to the throne room and recommit them. … We actually have a lot of buy-in and a lot of support, but I do need to feed the beast.”

    The FBI declined to comment and the Justice Department did not respond to requests for comment. Holder did not answer a request for comment left with his office; Comey did not respond to a request for comment conveyed through his lawyer. Ridd did not respond to a request for comment placed with a relative or to a knock at the door of his home in Washington, D.C.

    The FBI’s attempt to identify and catch my source came as the Justice Department was waging a seven-year legal campaign against me in connection with a separate leak investigation. The Obama Justice Department had subpoenaed me and was demanding that I testify in court and reveal the confidential sources I had relied on for a chapter about a botched CIA operation in my 2006 book, “State of War.” I included the story in my book after the Times killed an article on the same topic under pressure from the White House and the CIA.

    The attempt to derail my reporting on the purported NSA leaks came during a critical period in my legal battle with the Justice Department. In January 2014 — just as the FBI was planning its ambush operation — the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to hear arguments over my subpoena in the leak case involving the mismanaged CIA program. At the time, I was facing the possibility of going to prison for refusing to reveal my sources if the Supreme Court did not rule in my favor. But the Justice Department did not disclose to the Supreme Court that the FBI was simultaneously targeting my reporting on a completely separate story. The Justice Department and the FBI have also never acknowledged to me that they planned to conduct a raid at the scheduled meeting with my source.

    The FBI’s attempt to catch my source underscores the obsession over leaks to the press that has gripped the U.S. national security community in recent years, under both Republican and Democratic administrations. The FBI, CIA, and other agencies are now willing to take actions that would have been considered far outside the bounds of acceptable policy just a few years ago to prevent stories in the press that will embarrass powerful officials and reveal government wrongdoing.

    The Trump administration went to even greater extremes than its predecessor to target the press. In 2017, then-CIA Director Mike Pompeo reportedly considered kidnapping WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, who at the time was living in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London. Yahoo News reported last September that former President Donald Trump even raised the possibility of assassinating Assange. Pompeo was reportedly obsessed with targeting Assange after a massive leak of CIA hacking tools, known as Vault 7. WikiLeaks published Vault 7 documents in 2017, revealing that the CIA had the ability to hack the computer systems built into a wide range of consumer products, including cars, televisions, and home appliances. In April 2017, Pompeo labeled WikiLeaks a “hostile intelligence service.”

    I have previously been reluctant to write what I know about the FBI’s scheme to ambush my source because the story is so complicated and confused that I am still not sure I fully understand it. But Michael Schmidt, my former colleague at the Times, made some elements of the story public when he wrote about the episode in his 2020 book, “Donald Trump v. The United States: Inside the Struggle to Stop a President.” The CIA’s reported discussion of kidnapping or even killing Assange finally convinced me that I should share what I know about how the FBI also tried to target my reporting.

    source-spy-risen-embed-1

    In late 2013, I met a source who was disgusted by the massive scale of the NSA’s surveillance operations and wanted to expose the full scope of the agency’s global power, which the source claimed went far beyond what Snowden had revealed. He said he was considering providing me with the NSA documents to prove it. Our first meeting was designed to help him decide whether he could trust me enough to give me the documents.

    That initial meeting went well. We got along, and we agreed to get together again. The source had scheduled an upcoming trip to Brussels, so we agreed to meet in Belgium. I hoped he might be ready to hand over the documents.

    I chose Bruges, a historic Belgian city where we would easily blend in among the crowds of foreign tourists. To be honest, I also chose Bruges because I wanted to visit the city; one of my favorite movies was “In Bruges,” the dark comedy starring Colin Farrell and Brendan Gleeson. The film’s plot, about two hitmen waiting for something to happen in the Belgian city, made Bruges seem like an appropriate backdrop for a secret meeting with the source.

    After a quick internet search of bars and restaurants, I chose the Café Rose Red in the city’s center as the place for our meeting. It was likely to be packed with tourists.

    The source and I would be joined at the meeting by an American lawyer who had originally introduced us. I had known the lawyer for several years. When I first met him, he was in private practice and occasionally handled legal matters for individuals involved in the government’s national security apparatus. Later, he split his time between the United States and Europe; he told me that he was sometimes involved in international arms deals.

    The lawyer seemed to be an adrenaline junkie, someone who had found a home on the dark side of international intelligence. I considered him primarily a go-between, someone who occasionally introduced me to people involved in national security matters both in the United States and overseas, as well as people involved in more questionable activities, such as arms deals and money laundering. I found his contacts helpful to my reporting; through him, I gained access and insights into the intelligence underworld.

    But by the time of the planned meeting in Bruges in 2014, the American lawyer had begun to inform on me and my new source for the FBI, I later learned. I don’t know exactly when he began to do so. (I’ve tried throughout my career to protect my sources. While the FBI knows who the lawyer is, I will not name him, even though he betrayed me.)

    As I prepared to travel to Bruges, I tried to take a few precautions to avoid detection. I planned to fly from Washington to Paris, then pay cash for a train ticket to Bruges. I hoped that would reduce the digital evidence of my travel. I didn’t know that my efforts were pointless because the FBI was already closely tracking my movements based on information the American lawyer had fed them.

    Just before I was scheduled to leave Washington, I received an anonymous email from an odd address that I had never seen before. The email contained a brief but stunning message. It said not to go to Bruges.

    Uncertain who was behind the message, I canceled my travel plans.

    Much later, I asked the American lawyer if he knew what had happened and whether he had sent the email. He admitted that he was responsible for the warning.

    Eventually, he confessed to me that the FBI had been waiting in Bruges to trap my source. He said that the FBI knew about the meeting because he had told them about it, and that he had also told the FBI that the source wanted to provide me with NSA documents. He admitted that he had been informing on me.

    He said that, based on the information he had provided, the FBI had sent a large team to Bruges to try to arrest my source. The FBI told the American lawyer that senior Justice Department officials wanted to grab the source when I was not there, so they asked the lawyer to find a way to try to prevent or at least delay my arrival in Bruges.

    Before I got the anonymous email warning me not to come, the lawyer and his FBI handler brainstormed how to keep me from getting to Bruges. In one phone conversation, he told Ridd that he would have his assistant pick me up at the train and then pretend to have car trouble so that I couldn’t get to the café in time.

    “I will put, without sort of pulling back the curtain, I will put my colleague, who he has a great deal of confidence in, on him for logistical support, and tell him ‘Hey, she’ll meet up with you, she’ll help make your arrangements and be your driver,’ and essentially put her on him to keep tabs on him,” the American lawyer told Ridd. “She would have strict instructions to essentially queer that whole deal, up to and including having the car break down.”

    But that wasn’t good enough for Ridd, who wanted the American lawyer to stop me from traveling to Europe.

    “That is a good tool at a tactical level,” Ridd responded when the American lawyer suggested having his assistant stage a car breakdown. “But that doesn’t save us from the wrath of the attorney general and headquarters. If he shows up in country, all hell is going to break loose and so, if at all possible, our primary goal needs to be to dissuade, to talk him out of it. … We need for him to not be in Europe for that weekend, and … when I say ‘we,’ I really mean you, because, brother, you’re turning out to be the one who’s got to do it. … The higher powers are going to have a conniption if he is in country or floating around Europe.”

    Ultimately, the FBI’s plans came to nothing. The source I was hoping to meet did not go to Bruges either, so the arrest didn’t take place. The FBI team in Bruges waited and waited, according to the lawyer, frustrated and in vain. “The plan turned into a debacle,” Schmidt wrote in his book. “The source never arrived at the café, and the informant ended up getting drunk while waiting for him. When higher-ups at the bureau learned what had happened, they grew furious that an entire team had been sent to Belgium based on information from a man with little track record as a source who was also known to be double-crossing a reporter on the same matter.”

    The American lawyer later told me that he had also warned the source not to come to Bruges. I am still not sure about his motivations. I don’t know whether he told me not to come because the FBI asked him to stop me or because he wanted to prevent the FBI’s operation from succeeding. The American lawyer had introduced me to the source in the first place and had set up our introductory meeting. Why would he go out of his way to do that, only to turn around and set a trap with the FBI?

    I never again heard from the source I was trying to meet, and I never obtained a cache of NSA documents from him. In fact, I am not sure whether he really had the documents or ever planned to give them to me.

    When the lawyer confessed that he had been informing on me to the FBI, he apparently did not tell me the whole story. In his book, Schmidt reported that the lawyer also told the FBI that he had broken into one of my computers. He gave the FBI a flash drive that he claimed included data from a computer that I owned.

    Schmidt wrote that the FBI never opened the flash drive, and that it sat untouched in a safe at the FBI’s Washington Field Office. When officials sought approval from Holder to check the drive’s contents, the then-attorney general denied the request and was furious that it had been put in writing, Schmidt wrote. Schmidt also reported that the FBI cut its ties to the American lawyer, that two FBI agents involved in targeting my source and me were disciplined, and that one of those agents left the bureau. I do not know whether Ridd was one of the agents disciplined or what has happened to him since. The Justice Department briefly considered whether the American lawyer had violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for gaining access to my computer, according to Schmidt, but the bureau did not tell me about that possibility.

    I may never know the truth, but I doubt that the flash drive the American lawyer gave the FBI actually contained any of my data. Schmidt writes that the lawyer told the FBI he could “install spyware” on my computer and that he had secretly copied a trove of documents from my computer when I invited him to my house in 2014. But I don’t think he ever had the access or the skill to successfully hack my devices. My skepticism is based on my own experience with him. Soon after the FBI’s attempt to arrest my source, the lawyer also gave me a flash drive, one that he claimed included NSA documents from the source. The flash drive could not be opened; the password he gave me didn’t work. I became suspicious of the drive and whether it contained malware, so I turned it over to the New York Times security team for analysis. The security team couldn’t find anything; they also talked to the American lawyer and questioned him about the drive.

    I strongly suspect that the lawyer purposefully gave me a nonfunctional flash drive and that he probably played some kind of game with the drive he gave to the FBI as well. In his recorded calls with Ridd, the lawyer discussed putting a thumb drive containing secret documents in a microwave to destroy it before giving it to me. I have concluded that the American lawyer loved to play games with everyone, on all sides.

    The lawyer told Ridd that he frequently lied to me and my colleagues at the Times. “During the course of my career with Jim … there have been a number of instances where I’ve lent Jim assistance or I’ve pointed him in a particular direction, and I’m talking in years past, where it was mundane news reporting,” the lawyer said. “The moments that were important, I betrayed Jim.”

    In the run-up to the ill-fated operation in Bruges, he continued, the dishonesty had intensified. “I, just bluntly Grayden, I lie my ass off every day, OK, when I have to deal with these guys. Everything about my relationship with Jim has become a lie, and it takes just one stick to fall down and then I’m afraid that the whole house collapses on top of me, and it is incredible pressure for me.”

    But the recordings suggest that the lawyer often misled the FBI at the same time that he was informing on and lying to me.

    In one conversation, the American lawyer told Ridd that I was planning to arrange with European intelligence services to show them any NSA documents I obtained from the new source. “If he gets his hands on documents … then presumably those documents are … going to be stuck under the nose of people in Brussels and that’s going to be a really bad thing,” the lawyer said.

    That was not true; it was one of several false or misleading statements the American lawyer made to his FBI handler. I wonder if the lawyer told the FBI that he had introduced me to the source, that he had set up our initial meeting, or that he told the source not to come to Bruges.

    After he confessed that he had betrayed me, the American lawyer told me that the FBI had also become very suspicious of him, and that he was resisting their efforts to get him to take a polygraph. The recordings of his conversations with Ridd detail his arguments with the FBI over the issue. The lawyer acted offended that the FBI would question his truthfulness and credibility.

    “If people are not comfortable with the veracity of my reporting, Grayden, it hits me very much the wrong way,” the American lawyer told Ridd. “I’m sorry guys at [FBI headquarters] don’t get it … but somebody should let them know that … I’ve been around the block and I’m a nice guy, and I have busted my ass for the benefit of the government on this. … Either the reporting is good and the facts are good or they’re not, and if they’re not, we should all walk away.”

    It was a masterful performance.

    The post The FBI Tried to Ambush My Source. Now I’m Telling the Whole Story. appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.