Category: National Security

  • Tower 22, the U.S. base in Jordan where three U.S. troops were killed by a one-way attack drone late last month, suffered from inadequate anti-drone defenses, said military sources who have served on the base.

    The lethal attack followed a spate of one-way drone attacks on U.S. bases in neighboring Syria and Iraq in recent weeks, an escalation by anti-American militants since the outbreak of Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip. No one was reported killed in the previous attacks, including one on Al-Tanf in Syria, a base just 12 miles away from Tower 22.

    Despite the repeated attacks and a well-funded Pentagon’s investment in counter-drone technology, the U.S. military failed to stop the Tower 22 drone attack. 

    “We had a radar system called TPS-75 that was broken 80 percent of the time I was there.”

    “The air defenses were minimal, if any,” an Air Force airman, who served at Tower 22 last year, told The Intercept. “We relied heavily on aircraft from MSAB” — Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, a nearby Jordanian base that houses a U.S. military presence — “to stop any targets. We had a radar system called TPS-75 that was broken 80 percent of the time I was there.”

    A preliminary military investigation reported in the Washington Post on Tuesday concluded that the drone was never detected, likely by flying too low for the bases antiquated radar system. Just a week before the attack, the military announced an $84 million contract to work on a replacement to the TPS-75, a mobile, ground-based radar array from the 1960s.

    With inadequate defenses in place, the Tower 22 drone attack led to the deaths of the three U.S. service members and injuries to at least 40 others, casualties that spurred deepening U.S. military involvement in a tense Middle East.

    “The small U.S. military contingents in Iraq and Syria have long represented a vulnerability — as convenient targets for anyone wishing to make a violent anti-U.S. statement,” said Paul Pillar, a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute and Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies. “Over the past four months those targets have become an extension of the Gaza war.”

    After the Tower 22 deaths, prominent Republicans in Congress, such as Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., called for the U.S. to directly bomb Iran, which backs the militias that took responsibility for the attack. Last Friday, U.S. Central Command, the Pentagon’s combat command for the Middle East, announced that it had conducted airstrikes on over 85 Iranian-aligned targets in Iraq and Syria, the largest U.S. strike on the militias since Israel’s war on Gaza war began.

    The recriminations would only deepen U.S. involvement in the conflict, Pillar said: “The U.S. airstrikes on targets in Syria and Iraq — as retaliation for retaliation for the U.S. support for Israel — represents a further extension of the war in Gaza.”

    “Plenty of Reason to Harden Defenses”

    American service members familiar with Tower 22 outlined the small outpost’s paltry capabilities to detect and defend against air attacks.

    “They have outposts surrounding the base, but that does little to nothing when faced with attacking aircraft,” said the airman, who, like other members of the military who had been deployed to Tower 22, requested anonymity because they were not authorized to speak about the sensitive base. “Only solution was to ‘blackout,’” he added, referring to the practice of turning off lights to obscure locations during an air raid. “And even when we had blackouts no one adhered to the rules of the blackout.”

    An Army soldier currently deployed to another base in Jordan and who has served at Tower 22 echoed the airman’s account, saying bases in the area lacked key countermeasures for aerial threats, including capable alert systems and two defense systems designed for small, low-flying drones and rocket and artillery attacks, respectively. The network of small outposts in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq have to rely on warnings provided to them from outside the base through secure phone system, sometimes resulting in service members warning others by knocking on doors, the Army soldier said.

    The Associated Press appeared to reference the problem earlier this week, reporting that although the base has some counter-drone systems like the Coyote, “there are no large air defense systems” at Tower 22. The Army has not confirmed the presence of the Coyote, nor whether it was activated or employed during the drone attack. The Coyote is a Raytheon-manufactured small turbine engine-powered missile that is launched in the sky and loiters before undertaking a high-speed attack on low-flying drones.

    Spokespeople for the Pentagon could only tell The Intercept that Tower 22 possessed some kind of counter-unmanned aircraft system. When pressed on what specific capabilities the base had on the day of the attack, they declined to comment, citing operational security.

    “To maintain operational security, it would not be prudent for us to discuss Tower 22’s defense capabilities,” Pentagon spokesperson Peter Nguyen said. 

    When White House national security spokesperson John Kirby was asked how the drone “might have gotten past the defense systems at Tower 22,” he demurred. Kirby said, “I think I’m going to let the Defense Department talk about the forensics on this.” 

    At a Pentagon press briefing on Monday, deputy Pentagon press secretary Sabrina Singh said, “We are still assessing what happened and how a one-way attack drone was able to impact the facility.”

    The drone attack at Tower 22 was the first instance of U.S. troops being killed by enemy forces since Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, but it was far from the first attack on U.S. personnel.

    On January 20, U.S. Central Command announced that three one-way drones attacked the Al-Tanf garrison, another U.S. base in Jordan just 12 miles from Tower 22. Multiple drones have also attacked U.S. bases in southern Syria, which Jordan borders.

    The airman who spoke with The Intercept said, “The drone attacks at Al-Tanf should’ve given military leadership plenty of reason to harden defenses prior to the attack on Tower 22.”

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  • The U.S. did not notify the Iraqi government before conducting airstrikes in the country on Friday, contrary to an assertion by the White House that it did.

    During a press call on Friday, White House national security spokesperson retired Adm. John Kirby said, “We did inform the Iraqi government prior to the strikes occurring.”

    On Monday, in response to questions from The Intercept, the White House said the Iraqis had not gotten advance warning of the strikes.

    “For operational security, we did not provide any kind of official pre-notification with specific details on these strikes,” a National Security Council spokesperson acknowledged. 

    During Monday’s State Department press briefing, spokesperson Vedant Patel also acknowledged the Iraqis had not gotten a warning. (The State Department had referred The Intercept’s questions to the White House.)

    The Iraqi government has denied that the U.S. provided any warning and has alleged that the strikes killed several civilians. On Saturday, the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered an official note of protest to the chargé d’affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad decrying “American aggression.” 

    “As well Iraq further emphasized its rejection to be a ground for settling scores between rival countries, as our country is not a place for sending messages, and show of force between adversaries,” a readout of the meeting says.

    The U.S. airstrikes came in response to attacks by local militant groups in Iraq and Syria, The Iranian-backed groups have escalated their attacks on American targets in the region since the start of Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip.

    The U.S. maintains a force of about 2,500 troops in Iraq, a nominal U.S. ally with close ties to neighboring Iran. The American presence, at Iraq’s invitation, is part of an effort to keep remnants of the Islamic State at bay.

    Last month, a coalition of the Iran-backed militias took responsibility for a drone attack against a U.S. base in Jordan that resulted in the death of three U.S. service members, a strike they said was motivated by U.S. support for Israel, as The Intercept has previously reported.

    The U.S. retaliation last week focused on 85 targets, the largest attack on Iranian-backed militias since Israel’s war on Gaza began.

    Despite the rising tensions in the region, the Biden administration has been at pains to say that its strikes are not part of Israel’s war on Gaza.

    “I absolutely don’t agree with your description of a ‘same larger conflict,’” Kirby said in response to a question about the regional fighting. Though he was not asked about Israel’s war, Kirby added, “There’s a conflict going on between Israel and Hamas.”

    The post White House Falsely Declared It Warned Iraq of Impending Airstrikes appeared first on The Intercept.

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  • A January U.S. Air Force personnel memo obtained by The Intercept describes military orders to be “on standby to forward deploy to support troops in the case of on ground US involvement in the Israel Hamas war.” According to a separate personnel document, the standby order related to personnel deployed last year to Iraq.

    While the documents do not suggest that U.S. military ground involvement in the war is forthcoming, the January memo is the latest intimation of the Pentagon’s preparations to support Israel in the wake of Hamas’s October 7 attack. Days after the attack, the U.S. military reportedly put 2,000 troops on prepare-to-deploy orders for potential support to Israel, though from neighboring countries — orders that were confirmed by a procurement document obtained by The Intercept.

    The Department of Defense did not respond to a request for comment on the personnel memo about preparing for ground involvement, but in the past the White House has stressed that its support for Israel in the Gaza war would not include boots on the ground.

    “There are no plans or intentions to put U.S. boots on the ground in combat in Israel,” White House national security spokesperson John Kirby said on October 17. “But as we’ve also said, we have significant national security interests in the region.” 

    Two days after Kirby’s remarks, the White House inadvertently shared a picture of President Joe Biden in Israel posing alongside members of the secretive U.S. special operations units, before quickly deleting it. In late October, the New York Times reported that American special operations personnel were in Israel to help with hostage rescue efforts.

    U.S. Still in the Middle East

    The documents obtained by The Intercept provide a stark reminder of the pervasive U.S. military presence in the Middle East, with personnel deployed to theaters where many Americans think the mission ended long ago — and how quickly those orders can be repurposed for new conflicts.

    The records, for instance, involve personnel deployed to Iraq in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, the U.S. military’s name for the war against the Islamic State group. Though ISIS was driven from its last strongholds years ago, the war persists, providing a legal basis for continued U.S. military presence in Iraq and Syria.

    “We have defeated ISIS in Syria, my only reason for being there during the Trump Presidency,” former President Donald Trump tweeted in December 2018. Shortly thereafter, Trump announced that U.S. troops in the country are “all coming back and they’re coming back now.” Trump would later announce that all U.S. troops in Iraq would be withdrawn as well.

    Despite the announcements, U.S. forces remained in Syria as well as Iraq, where they are still present to this day. The deployments are “part of a comprehensive strategy to defeat ISIS,” the White House informed Congress in December, “to limit the potential for resurgence of these groups and to mitigate threats to the United States homeland.”

    A grim reminder of the longevity of the anti-ISIS deployment emerged Sunday, when three American soldiers were killed in a drone attack on a secret U.S. base in Jordan, near the border of Syria.

    “These three fallen heroes were deployed to Jordan in support of Operation Inherent Resolve and the international coalition working to ensure the lasting defeat of ISIS,” Defense Department deputy press secretary Sabrina Singh said in a press briefing on Monday. 

    ISIS, however, did not launch the drone that killed the American soldiers. It was an alliance of Iraqi militias backed by Iran, according to the Pentagon.

    The deaths represent the first U.S. troops killed since the October 7 Hamas attack. And they may not be the last, if the militia claiming responsibility for the attacks is to be believed. A senior official from an alliance of Iraqi militia groups claiming credit for the attack tied it to U.S. support for Israel in its Gaza war, as The Intercept previously reported.

    “As we said before, if the U.S. keeps supporting Israel, there will [be] escalations,” the senior militia official said. “All U.S. interests in the region are legitimate targets, and we don’t care about U.S. threats to respond.”

    With U.S. troops stationed all over the Middle East fighting wars long declared over, there are plenty of targets.

    The post U.S. Military Personnel in Iraq Put on Standby to Support Ground Involvement in Israel’s War on Gaza appeared first on The Intercept.

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  • Rep. Ilhan OmaR, D-Minn., joined a growing chorus of elected officials and advocates urging the Pentagon to make amends to a Somali family following an investigation by The Intercept into a 2018 U.S. drone strike that killed a woman and her 4-year-old daughter.

    Omar, a Somali American, called on the Pentagon to contact the family of Luul Dahir Mohamed and Mariam Shilow Muse and offer compensation. “To date, the Department of Defense has refused to even respond or acknowledge repeated outreach from Luul and Mariam’s family, much less offer condolence payments,” Omar told The Intercept. “We owe it to the families of victims to acknowledge the truth of what happened, provide the compensation that Congress has repeatedly authorized, and allow independent investigations into these attacks.”

    Omar added that the U.S. drone program is fundamentally flawed and has killed thousands of innocent people over 20 years. “When we say we champion human rights and peace, we should mean it,” she said.

    Omar’s call for action follows a similar demand by Rep. Sara Jacobs, D-Calif., earlier this month and a December 2023 open letter from two dozen human rights organizations — 14 Somali and 10 international groups — calling on Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to compensate the family for the deaths.

    The April 1, 2018, attack in Somalia killed at least three, and possibly five, civilians, including Luul and her daughter. A formerly secret U.S. military investigation, obtained by The Intercept via the Freedom of Information Act, acknowledged the deaths of a woman and child in the strike but concluded their identities might never be known. This reporter traveled to Somalia and spoke with seven members of Luul and Mariam’s family. For more than five years, they have tried to contact the U.S. government, including through U.S. Africa Command’s online civilian casualty reporting portal, but never received a reply.

    Last month, the Defense Department released its long-awaited “Instruction on Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response,” or DoD-I, which established the Pentagon’s “policies, responsibilities, and procedures for mitigating and responding to civilian harm” and directed the military to “respond to individuals and communities affected by U.S. military operations” including “expressing condolences” and providing so-called ex gratia payments to next of kin.

    “Congress appropriates $3 million every year specifically to make payments to civilian victims and survivors of U.S. operations,” Omar said. “However, those funds have never been used in Somalia — despite confirmed civilian deaths there.”

    “Families around the world live in fear and terror that they or their children will be killed in a drone strike.”

    Pentagon spokesperson Lisa Lawrence said that the Defense Department is “committed to mitigating civilian harm” and “responding appropriately if harm occurs” but could not say if Austin even intends to contact Luul and Mariam’s family. “I don’t have that information,” she told The Intercept.

    “Thousands of civilians have been killed in unaccountable strikes over the past two decades,” said Omar. “Families around the world live in fear and terror that they or their children will be killed in a drone strike.” She told The Intercept that the “Biden Administration has made commendable progress on civilian harm in our drone program, but this strike and its aftermath is more proof that there is simply no way to conduct the program humanely.”

    The post Ilhan Omar Demands Pentagon Compensate Somali Drone Strike Victims appeared first on The Intercept.

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  • When an Iraqi militant group killed three U.S. service members at a base in Jordan over the weekend, the militants were clear about their motives: It was retaliation for American support for Israel.

    “As we said before, if the U.S. keeps supporting Israel, there will [be] escalations,” a senior official from an alliance of Iraqi militia groups said in claiming responsibility for the attack. “All the U.S. interests in the region are legitimate targets, and we don’t care about U.S. threats to respond.”

    The statement is not new or surprising. While the need for U.S. troops to be stationed at the Tower 22 military base — a dusty outpost on the Syria–Jordan border — has a dubious, if any, relationship to U.S. national security, the U.S. presence has been very helpful to Israel. The U.S. military in the region serves to deter Iran as well as Israel’s many other enemies.

    Now, establishing deterrence against Israel’s adversaries is threatening to suck the U.S. back into a broader, open conflict in the Middle East. Take, for example, the recent U.S. attacks against the Houthis in Yemen, which began after the rebels attacked ships in the Red Sea to force an Israeli ceasefire in Gaza.

    Especially at a time when the U.S. is trying to pivot away from the region, Israel increasingly looks like a liability to U.S. interests in the Middle East. American officials are forced to expend significant economic, political, and military resources to shield Israel’s government from local threats and deflect international outrage over its campaign in Gaza. Israel, it turns out, extracts a tremendous cost from the U.S. — often in treasure but, as the world saw over the weekend in Jordan, sometimes in blood — with few discernable strategic gains for the Americans.

    “Israel’s main selling point to its Western sponsors and allies has been its depiction as an omnipotent local gendarme, and the best bulwark of Western interests in the Middle East,” said Mouin Rabbani, a Middle East affairs expert and co-editor of the Arab Studies Institute’s online publication Jadaliyya. “But now that premise doesn’t really hold.”

    Today, some Americans are questioning why the U.S. has become so deeply involved in Israel’s war on Gaza, which has inflicted a horrifying civilian toll and is now bringing U.S. troops into conflict across the region.

    Yet an observer would be hard-pressed to find any acknowledgement of wavering commitment within Washington. Prominent American politicians have loudly professed the importance of Israel to U.S. strategic interests and values since October 7. In the days after Hamas attacked Israel, President Joe Biden proclaimed, “Well, the truth of the matter is, if there weren’t an Israel, we’d have to invent one” — a refrain he’s used for decades to make the case that supporting Israel is critical to U.S. interests.

    Presidential candidates vying to take over Biden’s job have been just as effusive about the U.S.–Israel relationship. Robert F. Kennedy likened the state of Israel to the U.S. “having an aircraft carrier in the Middle East.” In a recent Republican presidential debate, Nikki Haley went so far as to say, “Israel doesn’t need us, we need Israel.”

    “U.S. military and diplomatic protection has disincentivized the Israelis from pursuing compromises.”

    Israel’s usefulness to the U.S. was arguably at its height during the Cold War. As neighboring Arab states built military and intelligence relationships with the Soviet Union, Israel fought these regimes and portrayed itself as a bulwark of U.S. influence in the region. Since then, the relationship has been almost entirely lopsided, as the U.S. has played a far more helpful role to Israel by helping it confront enemies like Iran and develop strategic ties with the Gulf Arab nations. Despite portraying itself as an ally during the U.S. occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan and counterterror campaigns against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, Israel was mostly absent — likely because its involvement would provoke condemnation and retaliation, not to mention that few Middle Eastern governments crucial to the coalitions’ operations recognize Israel.

    Without a national security rationale for maintaining relations with Israel, domestic political pressure appears to be the primary driver of steadfast U.S. support. The political gains for pro-Israel politicians have ultimately enabled Israel to reject solutions to end the political turmoil in the region, while forcing the U.S. to continue intervening on its behalf.

    “U.S military and diplomatic protection has disincentivized the Israelis from pursuing compromises,” said Trita Parsi, co-founder and executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. “When we give unquestioned support and blank checks, we feed the worst behavior of countries that we consider allies.”

    A US soldier takes part in the "Eager Lion" multinational military manuever, in the Al-Zarqa governorate, some 85km northeast of the Jordanian capital Amman, on September 14, 2022. - The United States, Jordan, and 28 partner nations are taking part in the multinational military exercise, from September 4 to 15, 2022, representing one of the largest military exercises in the region, and designed to exchange military expertise and improve interoperability among partner nations. (Photo by Khalil MAZRAAWI / AFP) (Photo by KHALIL MAZRAAWI/AFP via Getty Images)
    A U.S. soldier takes part in the Eager Lion multinational military maneuver in the Zarqa governorate in Jordan on Sept. 14, 2022.
    Photo: Khalil Mazraawi/AFP via Getty Images

    Lopsided Relationship

    For years, the Tower 22 outpost and other U.S. military bases in Iraq, Syria, and neighboring countries like Jordan have been criticized for making U.S. troops sitting ducks with no benefit to U.S. interests.

    And yet thousands of troops are stationed throughout the Middle East, some for the protection of maritime shipping or counterterrorism operations, but many for fighting a proxy war against Iran. The U.S. has made huge efforts for years to deter Iran on Israel’s behalf — owing mostly to hostile and frequently antisemitic rhetoric from Iran — while hawkish Israeli leaders have sabotaged efforts at détente like the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.

    U.S. military officials periodically criticize the impact of uncritical U.S. support for Israel on American interests in the region, where Israel remains unpopular for its policies against Palestinians. These complaints, even from U.S. military officials, have often been walked back under political pressure. Despite repeated vows by American leaders to reduce the country’s footprint in the Middle East, the U.S.’s commitment to Israel has turned into military involvement across the region. There are strikes against the Houthis in Yemen, aircraft carriers in the eastern Mediterranean to deter Hezbollah in Lebanon, and skirmishes with Iranian-backed militias in Syria and Iraq.

    The costs for the U.S. from this new era of conflict are rapidly adding up. According to a recent report in Politico, an estimated $1.6 billion has already been spent on unanticipated U.S. military expenses in the region since October 7 — a price tag Pentagon officials say they cannot pay without a new budget from Congress. Global ammunition shortages are also forcing the U.S. to scramble to replenish its depleted supplies at a time when it is also struggling to contain threats in Europe and East Asia.

    For Israel, however, the U.S.’s presence only fortifies its strategic initiatives. “The Israelis view the American presence in the region as very important, because it creates a backstop for them,” said Parsi. “The U.S. presence gives Israel greater maneuverability to carry out strikes in places like Syria and Lebanon, but also a sense of deterrence against those who would like to retaliate against them, since it may mean that the U.S. is dragged into the conflict as well.”

    It is increasingly clear that the longer the U.S. maintains a lopsided relationship with Israel, not only will it remain stuck in the region, but also the less likely that Israel will compromise with its neighbors to achieve peace.

    Over seven decades after its creation, Israel has failed to come to terms with most of its neighbors and refused many diplomatic opportunities that could have ended much of the violence in the Mideast. Arab governments have recently proposed a new plan that would end the war and create a Palestinian state in exchange for regional recognition of Israel, which Israeli leaders have already rejected.

    The Israelis themselves had been clear about these dynamics. Despite progress on limited agreements like the Abraham Accords, which would normalize Israeli relations with Gulf Arab monarchies, Israeli officials have reiterated that they are averse to any more significant deals that would allow the U.S. to draw down its presence in the region. That will make it much harder to leave a part of the world where the U.S. has few interests, yet continues to lose much in terms of resources, reputation, and lives.

    “As more and more people have come to the conclusion that the U.S. doesn’t need to be in the Middle East at the same level militarily,” Parsi said, “they will begin to question what the purpose is of having this military alliance with Israel.”

    NEW YORK, NY - JANUARY 15: Pro-Palestinian demonstrators march on January 15, 2024 in New York City. Pro-Palestinian supporters marched on Martin Luther King Jr Day to demand healthcare and an end of Israel's war in Gaza. (Photo by Eduardo MunozAlvarez/VIEWpress)
    Pro-Palestinian demonstrators marched on Martin Luther King Jr. Day on Jan. 15, 2024, in New York.
    Photo: Eduardo Munoz Alvarez/VIEWpress via Getty Images

    Domestic Interests

    Absent a compelling foreign policy rationale, the strongest advocacy for U.S. support for Israel largely comes from the American political establishment. Powerful pro-Israel lobby groups in the U.S. like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee use a combination of money, political messaging, and coercion to push for uniform pro-Israel support in Congress. Their fight has only become fiercer as public support for the U.S.–Israel relationship declines among younger Americans and liberals.

    “The routine description of the U.S.–Israeli relationship as a close alliance is mostly a function of American domestic politics, and how Israel fits into those politics, rather than an apolitical consideration of U.S. interests overseas or national strategy,” said Paul Pillar, a former CIA analyst and expert on the Middle East.

    After two decades of bloody and fruitless conflicts in the Middle East, Biden may find himself between Iraq and a hard place. A strong military response to the drone strike against U.S. troops in Jordan that risks triggering a broader war is unlikely to be popular among Americans, many of whom have made no secret of their clear desire to end U.S. involvement in the region. The escalating crisis is revealing U.S. and Israeli priorities to be mismatched.

    “Recent events, particularly the Israeli assault on the Gaza Strip, underscore the substantial gulf between our interests and the policies being pursued by the Israeli government,” Pillar said. “It is plain for all to see that these differences are substantial, even as the Biden administration has bent over backwards to support the Israeli government, despite the enormous horror taking place in Gaza.”

    U.S. intelligence and political officials are currently trying to engineer a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in Gaza, an agreement that would be in the U.S.’s interest toward an end to the war and deescalation of regional conflict. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, however, has suggested that those discussions may run counter to his own interests.

    “As long as the war continues, he will retain his position, power, and political coalition, while fending off the day he will have to face a political reckoning,” said Pillar. “From his point of view, expanding the war and dragging the U.S. in deeper, even beyond what is going on in Yemen and the Red Sea, would be in his interest, even as it would be against U.S. interests.”

    And so it is that, with little choice left, the Biden administration promised to retaliate forcefully for the deaths of the three troops in Jordan. With growing anti-war sentiment in the U.S., however, it is not clear how far its response will go. Biden is left facing a situation where domestic politics, particularly the influence of pro-Israel groups and politicians, continue to pull the U.S. military into a region where it is losing precious lives and resources, all with little to show in return.

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  • Amid a raft of U.S. strikes targeting Houthi rebels in Yemen, the Pentagon has boots on the ground in the country — a fact the Defense Department has recently refused to acknowledge.

    “A small number of United States military personnel are deployed to Yemen to conduct operations against al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIS,” the White House told Congress in its most recent War Powers Act report on December 7. 

    This month, the U.S. began its military campaign against the Houthis for attacking shipping vessels in the Red Sea, a move the Yemeni rebels said was aimed at getting Israel to end its assault on Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.

    As the U.S. began to attack, defense officials suddenly became more reticent about the American military presence in Yemen. In a press briefing on January 17, Pentagon press secretary Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder was asked if he could give assurances that the U.S. had no troops on the ground in Yemen. Ryder responded, “I’m not aware of any U.S. forces on the ground.”

    The National Security Council and the Defense Department did not respond to requests for comment.

    “It’s possible that U.S. forces are spread so widely around the globe that not even the professional tasked with knowing that can keep track of it all,” said Erik Sperling, the executive director of Just Foreign Policy, who worked on Yemen as a Capitol Hill staffer. “But it’s also possible that, given the dramatic expansion in US presence in the region in recent months, he is trying to skirt the question to avoid greater scrutiny.”

    “It’s possible that U.S. forces are spread so widely around the globe that not even the professional tasked with knowing that can keep track of it all.”

    The Yemen conflict is a touchy subject for the Biden administration, which has repeatedly said that it is taking care not to allow Israel’s war in Gaza to metastasize into a broader regional war. As it has become increasingly difficult to deny the threat of a growing conflict, the administration is nonetheless trying.

    “We currently assess that the fight between Israel and Hamas continues to remain contained in Gaza,” Ryder said on January 17, following strikes on the Houthis by the U.S. and coalition partners. 

    “We don’t think that we are at war,” Pentagon deputy press secretary Sabrina Singh said the next day, on January 18. “We don’t want to see a regional war.”

    Her remarks were met with incredulity by one member of the press corps, who quipped: “We’ve bombed them five times now … if this isn’t war, what is war?” 

    Despite the rhetoric, tension with the Houthis has reached its highest point in years. 

    The U.S. has conducted eight rounds of strikes on Houthi targets in the past month alone. On December 18, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced the creation of a U.S.-led coalition to defend ships against Houthi attacks called Operation Prosperity Guardian. Since then, the coalition has conducted both cruise missile strikes and airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen.

    The strikes came after attacks by the Houthis on merchant ships in the Red Sea, through which a substantial amount of global shipping passes. The Houthis, a rebel group in Yemen that controls most of the country’s most populous territories, blockaded the Red Sea, with the stated objective of halting Israel’s war in Gaza.

    The U.S. military has quietly assigned a name to its operation targeting Houthi assets in Yemen. Observers have pointed out that formal names for operations suggest they will be long term in nature. (Officials have not identified an end date for the fight against the Houthis.) Called “Poseidon Archer,” the name for the anti-Houthi strikes is another fact the Biden administration has refused to acknowledge.

    “So, this mission is just, ‘We’re striking the Houthis?’” cracked one member of the White House press corps after spokesperson John Kirby declined to provide the name. “I would — I’d refer you to the Pentagon if they’ve given it an operational name or not,” Kirby responded. “That’s really for them to speak to.”

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  • Three drone strikes last year by the government of Burkina Faso killed scores of civilians, according to a report released Thursday by Human Rights Watch. The attacks, targeting Islamist militants in crowded marketplaces and at a funeral, left at least 60 civilians dead and dozens more injured.

    The drone strikes in Burkina Faso and Mali are just the latest in a yearslong string of atrocities carried out as part of Burkina Faso’s counterterrorism campaign against the Al Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, or JNIM, and other Islamist militant groups that operate in the West African Sahel.

    “The Burkina Faso military used one of the most accurate weapons in its arsenal to attack large groups of people, causing the loss of numerous civilian lives in violation of the laws of war,” said Ilaria Allegrozzi, senior Sahel researcher at Human Rights Watch, or HRW. “The Burkinabè government should urgently and impartially investigate these apparent war crimes, hold those responsible to account, and provide adequate support for the victims and their families.”

    Map of drone strikes
    Map: Human Rights Watch

    Burkina Faso’s government-controlled media said that all three attacks targeted and killed militants; none mentioned any civilian harm. Last August, for example, Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina, Burkina Faso’s government-run national television network, reported a “successful” airstrike on Islamist militants who were “preparing large-scale attacks.” After geolocating the strike site from the video, Human Rights Watch interviewed witnesses to the attack, which occurred during the weekly market day near the northern edge of the Bouro village. Survivors said that members of JNIM, which controls Bouro and the surrounding area, had arrived at the packed marketplace just before the strike.

    “The market was full of civilians when the drone hit,” a 25-year-old man told HRW, noting that people travel from “all over” the region to buy and sell animals there. HRW obtained a list of 28 people killed in the attack, compiled by survivors and confirmed by two local authorities, but witnesses said the death toll was far higher. “There were hundreds of people at the market at the time of the strike,” said a 45-year-old man. “We counted 70 dead, but we only identified 28 of them. The other bodies were unrecognizable.”

    The Burkinabè Embassy in Washington, D.C., did not respond to repeated requests from The Intercept to speak with the defense attaché or other officials.

    “Little or No Concern for Civilian Harm”

    The Burkinabè military conducted the strikes with Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones, which it acquired in 2022. At the time, Burkina Faso’s Ministry of Defense and Veterans Affairs defended the use of the country’s “limited financial resources” on drones and helicopters, touting their surveillance capabilities, the increased firepower they would provide, and their potential for “humanitarian actions for the benefit of our population.” Human Rights Watch documented casualties and damage consistent with the type of laser-guided bombs delivered by these drones.

    “The Burkina Faso military repeatedly carried out drone strikes in crowded areas with little or no concern for civilian harm,” Allegrozzi said, noting that governments that provide such weapons to Burkina Faso risk complicity in war crimes.

    Turkey isn’t alone in its support of the Burkinabè military. The United States has assisted Burkina Faso with counterterrorism aid since the 2000s, providing funds, weapons, equipment, and American advisers, as well as deploying commandos on low-profile combat missions. In that time, however, militant Islamist violence has skyrocketed. Across all of Africa, the State Department counted just 23 casualties from terrorist attacks in 2002 and 2003. Burkina Faso alone saw 6,130 deaths from terrorist attacks between July 2022 and July 2023, according to the Defense Department’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a Pentagon research institution.

    U.S.-trained Burkinabè military officers have also repeatedly overthrown the government, in 2014, 2015, and twice in 2022. Following military coups, U.S. law generally restricts countries from receiving military aid, but the U.S. has continued to provide training to Burkinabè forces, according to Gen. Michael Langley, the chief of Africa Command, or AFRICOM. Last year, for example, Burkinabè forces took part in Flintlock 2023, an annual exercise sponsored by U.S. Special Operations Command Africa. (Several past Flintlock attendees have overthrown the government, including Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who carried out one of the 2022 coups.)

    American assistance has continued despite widespread documentation of Burkinabè government atrocities and the “Leahy law,” which prohibits U.S. funding for foreign security forces implicated in gross violations of human rights. “The military has been credibly accused of various instances of human rights abuses and has been implicated in the extrajudicial killings of children by human rights organizations and journalists,” the Pentagon’s Africa Center noted in reference to Burkina Faso last year. A little over a month before Langley told members of the House Armed Services Committee about continued U.S. support for Burkina Faso, Burkinabè soldiers, accompanied by militia, arrested 16 men in the Ekeou village, at least nine of whom were later found executed, according to Human Rights Watch. In April 2023, less than a month after Langley’s admission, the Burkinabè military massacred at least 156 civilians, including 45 children, in the village of Karma. And state-backed militia reportedly killed at least 70 civilians in the Zaongo village last November.

    “As some U.S. military assistance still goes to Burkina Faso, under the Leahy law, the U.S. should be determining if human rights violations by members of Burkina’s junta are occurring and if the aid being provided follows U.S. law,” HRW’s Allegrozzi told The Intercept. “Human Rights Watch has repeatedly documented serious abuses perpetrated by Burkinabè security forces, including mass executions and enforced disappearances of hundreds of civilians.”

    Neither AFRICOM nor the State Department responded to detailed questions about the extent of U.S. support for Burkina Faso and reports of atrocities by Burkinabè forces.

    “People Were Screaming and Running”

    In late September 2023, Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina reported on a drone strike against supposed motorbike-riding Islamist militants who traveled from Mali to a compound in Burkina Faso’s Bidi village. Locals told Human Rights Watch, however, that the attack hit a funeral for a local woman, attended by more than 100 people, and that there were no fighters at the compound at the time.

    Left: two screenshots taken from a video posted on September 24, 2023 to Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina’s YouTube channel. It shows the activities before the strike on the compound. © 2023 Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina. Right: a satellite image shows the approximate distance between the motorbikes and the compound.
    Left: Two screenshots taken from a video posted on Sept. 24, 2023, to Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina’s YouTube channel. It shows the activities before the strike on the compound. © 2023 Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina. Right: A satellite image shows the approximate distance between the motorbikes and the compound.
    Satellite image: © 2024 Maxar Technologies. Source Google Earth. Analysis and Graphics © 2024 Human Rights Watch

    “It hit the tent where the old and wise men were sitting and praying for the old woman who died. The explosion was so strong and loud that the ground trembled and I fell,” a 54-year-old farmer who survived the attack told HRW. “People were screaming and running. Everyone was looking for his relatives and friends or fleeing. I saw many bodies on the ground, scattered, some torn into pieces.” Survivors said that 24 civilian men and a boy were killed, and 17 others were injured.

    On November 18, another Burkinabè drone strike hit a market in Mali. That evening, Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina reported that the Burkinabè military launched attacks on “terrorists,” hitting a “logistics base” for Islamist fighters. The video shows at least three munitions striking a crowded marketplace.

    Human Rights Watch used the video and accounts from survivors to identify Boulkessi, Mali — located in an area controlled by Islamist militants — as the site of the attack. Witnesses said that several armed JNIM fighters were present but that the overwhelming majority of those in the marketplace were civilians.

    “The market was beginning to fill up with lots of people, only men, mostly civilians. Women are not allowed to go to the market because of the Islamic law imposed by the jihadists,” a 21-year-old survivor told HRW. “At around 10 a.m., I didn’t see anything coming but a bomb that fell on us like an arrow, then another bomb, and a third one … I was wounded in the arm by shrapnel … I helped my comrades get out of the market despite my injury … unfortunately, one of us died along the way – he had been wounded in the stomach.” Survivors provided HRW with a list of the names of seven civilians killed and five wounded in the strike.

    Human Rights Watch did not receive a response to its allegations from the government of Burkina Faso.

    The post Drone Strikes in Burkina Faso Killed Scores of Civilians appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • The Nigerian military conducted an airstrike last month on a religious festival in the northern part of the country, killing scores of Nigerian civilians. Thirty minutes later, the military launched a second missile, killing dozens more, including people trying to rescue victims of the first strike.

    The December 3 attack killed more than 120 villagers celebrating Maulud, the birthday of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, according to Amnesty International. But in a press call ahead of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to Nigeria and several other African nations this week, a State Department official expressed annoyance when journalists asked about regional insecurity and coups, complaining that the press was not focusing on the “fun” aspects of the trip. She then challenged The Intercept’s characterization of the drone attack and defended Nigeria’s handling of the aftermath of the December airstrikes in the village of Tudun Biri.

    “I wouldn’t call it an attack,” Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee told The Intercept on the January 18 call. “The Nigerians have admitted it was an operational error that tragically killed people in Kaduna State.”

    “The one thing that is clear in this case is the fact that the military launched an attack which inadvertently killed innocent people,” Anietie Ewang, Human Rights Watch’s Nigeria researcher told The Intercept. “There should be less focus on semantics and more effort to ensure accountability and a stop to these unacceptable mistakes that have caused needless deaths, pain, and suffering.”

    Last month’s attacks were just the latest of hundreds of Nigerian airstrikes that have killed thousands of Nigerians, including a 2017 attack on a displaced persons camp in Rann, Nigeria, that killed more than 160 civilians, many of them children. In 2022, The Intercept exclusively revealed that the attack was referred to as an instance of “U.S.-Nigerian operations” in a formerly secret U.S. military document.

    While the drone that conducted the December 2023 attack was most likely a Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2, Nigeria has killed a growing number of civilians even as the United States has strengthened military ties with the West African nation and signed off on its purchase of attack aircraft and lethal munitions. The strike on Tudun Biri came just two days before a group of senators urged the Biden administration to ensure greater oversight of Israel’s use of U.S.-provided weapons in Gaza. The State Department did not answer questions about U.S. monitoring of American weapons transferred to Nigeria.

    “In addition to recognizing civilian harm when it happens, it’s also important that the U.S. push for accountability and justice for that harm — both in U.S. military operations and also in partner operations, like with the case in Nigeria,” Rep. Sara Jacobs, D-Calif., told The Intercept. “I have long emphasized the importance of upholding human rights in our security relationship with Nigeria and will continue to push the State Department on this issue.”

    “You Guys Are Bumming Me Out”

    Phee spoke with reporters on a conference call ahead of Blinken’s trip to Cabo Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Angola. The visit is his third overseas mission of 2024, following a 10-nation trip to the Middle East and a three-day sojourn to the World Economic Forum in Switzerland and amid ongoing crises in Ukraine, Gaza, and the Red Sea that have buffeted the Biden White House. The State Department emphasized that Blinken would “highlight how the United States has accelerated the U.S.-Africa partnership” regarding climate, food, and health security. During the press call, Phee took exception to repeated questions about turmoil in the West African Sahel that strayed from her “positive” messaging. “You guys are bumming me out because you’re not talking about any of the really fun and positive, forward-looking things we’ll be doing,” she said.

    Blinken will spend Tuesday and Wednesday in Nigeria, where he will meet with President Bola Tinubu and Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar to discuss economic opportunities, trade, and countering terrorism.

    Nigeria is West Africa’s economic leader and plays a major role in regional security issues, including responses to the coups and spiraling militant Islamist violence in the Sahel region. The country is also waging a long-running war against extremist militants and armed groups that it typically refers to as “bandits.”

    Between 2000 and 2022, the U.S. provided, facilitated, or approved more than $2 billion in security aid and weapons and equipment sales to Nigeria, according to a report by Brown University’s Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies, the Security Assistance Monitor at the Center for International Policy, and InterAction. Over that time, the U.S. also carried out more than 41,000 training courses for Nigerian military personnel.

    In 2021, the U.S. delivered to Nigeria 12 Super Tucano warplanes as part of a $593 million package, approved by the State Department in 2017 that also included bombs and rockets. Last May, as part of the sale, the U.S. completed a $38 million project to construct new facilities for those aircraft.

    In 2022, the State Department approved the sale to Nigeria of nearly $1 billion in AH-1Z attack helicopters and supporting munitions and equipment. “The proposed sale will better equip Nigeria to contribute to shared security objectives [and] promote regional stability,” reads a Defense Department press release.

    Last year, Reps. Jacobs and Chris Smith, R-N.J., called on the Biden administration to scuttle the nearly $1 billion attack helicopter deal. “We write to express our concern with current U.S. policy on and military support to Nigeria,” the lawmakers said, urging “a review of security assistance and cooperation programs in Nigeria, including a risk assessment of civilian casualties and abuses.” The Biden administration eventually held a classified briefing to address lawmakers’ questions, according to a source on Capitol Hill.

    “The United States and other countries providing security assistance to Nigeria must conduct thorough assessments of civilian harm risks and condition their assistance on thorough investigations into civilian harm incidents as well as concrete changes to rules of engagement and procedures that address the risks and gaps identified,” said Vianney Bisimwa, the regional director of the Sahel program at Center for Civilians in Conflict, or CIVIC.

    “A Propaganda Scheme”

    Phee lauded the Nigerian government’s response to the December 2023 drone strike. “They acted with transparency, immediately acknowledged the horrific accident. They set up a reparation process and a transparent investigation,” she told The Intercept. “So, they have, I think, responded to that tragedy in a constructive way that will contribute to rebuilding confidence of the Nigerian people and the security services.” Amnesty International reported, however, that the Nigerian military engaged in a cover-up and offered contradictory explanations for that attack — first claiming the airstrike was a mistake and then, as Amnesty put it, that “suspected bandits had embedded with civilians.”

    The Nigerian military has a long history of errant attacks on innocent people and has repeatedly denied responsibility for strikes and frequently been accused of covering up civilian deaths, including running what a 2023 investigation by Nigeria’s Premium Times called “a systemic propaganda scheme to keep the atrocities of its troops under wraps.”

    In addition to the December 2023 strike in Tudun Biri, an attack last January killed 39 civilians and injured at least six others. Witnesses and local officials said a December 2022 strike that targeted “bandits” killed at least 64 people, including civilians. An August 2022 attack that the Nigerian military said killed a Boko Haram commander actually left at least eight civilians dead. In February 2022, a reported Nigerian airstrike on a village in neighboring Niger killed at least 12 civilians. In September 2021, following an initial denial, the Nigerian Air Force admitted that it attacked a village, killing 10 civilians and injuring another 20. That April, a Nigerian military helicopter reportedly launched indiscriminate attacks on homes, farms, and a school. And the January 17, 2017, airstrike on a displaced persons camp in Rann, Nigeria — which a secret U.S. military investigation said involved the United States — killed more than 160 civilians and seriously wounded more than 120 people.

    In 2022, the Protection of Civilians in Conflict Caucus — of which Jacobs is a founder — called on Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to disclose details of the U.S. role in the 2017 airstrike on the displaced persons camp. That year, the Pentagon missed a 90-day deadline to provide answers and, last week, refused to say whether Austin ever provided the information. “As with all correspondences received, the Department responds to the authors of the letter as appropriate,” Pentagon spokesperson Lisa Lawrence told The Intercept. “I do not have anything further to share at this time.” 

    A source on Capitol Hill told The Intercept that the Biden administration briefed members of Congress on the 2017 attack but declined to provide details because the information was classified.

    A 2023 Reuters analysis of data compiled by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, a U.S.-based armed violence monitoring group, found that even outside Nigeria’s three northeastern states beset by its long-running war against Islamist militants, more than 2,600 people were killed in 248 airstrikes during the previous five years. Most victims were identified as “communal militia,” a catchall category that includes local self-defense forces, criminal gangs, and so-called bandits. An analysis by Action on Armed Violence, a U.K.-based organization that investigates civilian harm, counted 14 airstrikes that killed 399 civilians and injured 310 others between 2010 and 2023.

    “There has been a concerning pattern of deadly strikes in Nigeria and civilians have paid a heavy price. This cannot go on,” said CIVC’s Bisimwa. “Scrutiny into the conduct of military operations of Nigeria’s air force is a must.”

    Phee told The Intercept that Blinken would “definitely” speak to Tinubu about the strikes on Tudun Biri, noting that “promoting and protecting human rights” is “part of our ongoing dialogue” with Nigeria’s government. She went on to say that the State Department hosted a Nigerian delegation for four hours of discussion last week on such issues. “So, I’m certain,” she said, that “the Secretary will talk about it when he sees the president and the foreign minister.”

    The post Blinken Visits Nigeria as Questions Swirl About Civilian Deaths and U.S. Security Ties appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • Rep. Glenn Grothman, R-Wis., is an ardent critic of what he’s called the “deep state,” a name for the secret security state that became a bête noire of supporters of Donald Trump as investigations against the former president mounted.

    Now Grothman, along with a clutch of other Republicans, have emerged as unlikely champions of legislation to support the so-called deep state — by doling out money to former employees of the CIA’s covertly owned airline, Air America.

    The Air America Act — introduced by Grothman to the House of Representatives in October and Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., in the Senate — seeks to guarantee retirement benefits and official recognition for the 1,000 U.S. citizens who worked for the airline. Some would be included on the CIA’s “Wall of Stars,” which memorializes agency employees who died in the line of service.

    Hired as covert operatives, Air America employees were not provided standard government forms and are unable to prove their federal employment status, which is necessary to qualify for retirement benefits.

    “These patriots risked their lives,” Grothman said in a statement announcing the legislation, “fighting communism in the same way members of the Air Force did.” 

    Air America has been accused of running weapons and even, according to the historian Alfred McCoy, drugs in Southeast Asia — charges that the CIA and Air America veterans denied so vigorously that it set off a First Amendment battle between the agency and McCoy.

    “The whole point of Air America was to kill Communists.”

    During the Vietnam War, Air America played a vital but murky role in supporting CIA activities in Laos, a staging ground for operations against the North Vietnamese and, along with Cambodia, the site of an extensive, secret war led by the agency against Communists in both countries.

    If ever there was a time when the intelligence community resembled something like a “deep state” — an unaccountable security state made up of unelected officials — it would have been in the Vietnam years, before congressional investigations reined in the CIA. 

    Tim Weiner, author of the National Book Award-winning “Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA,” told The Intercept, “The whole point of Air America was to kill Communists.”

    Before Church

    Owned and operated by the CIA until 1976, Air America was used as cover for agency operations in the agency’s wild west days. Until 1975, when the late Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, set up his famous investigative committee, the intelligence community ran amok, facing few outside checks.

    “There was no congressional oversight of the CIA before the Church Committee,” said Weiner. “What would happen is that the director of central intelligence — Allen Dulles, for example — would come before Congress and talk to the chairman of the armed services committee and the chairman would say, ‘Y’all have everything you need?’ And Dulles would say, ‘Yes sir, it’s alright.’”

    With practically nonexistent oversight, this era saw some of the CIA’s worst scandals, from attempts to assassinate foreign leaders like Fidel Castro to involvement in coups. The period coincided with the heyday of Air America operations until its dissolution in 1976, the same year that the Church Committee established the House and Senate Intelligence committees.

    In 1990, an action movie titled “Air America” starring Mel Gibson and Robert Downey Jr. portrayed the airline as a cynical operation to smuggle heroin, an impression that persists in the popular imagination to this day. 

    “There were rogue Air America pilots, but the story that the CIA was smuggling dope for profit or political advantage is almost entirely a canard,” Weiner said.

    “Air America’s public image has fared poorly,” aviation historian William M. Leary wrote in the CIA-published journal Studies in Intelligence, lamenting the airline’s “bum rap,” which it attributes to the 1990 movie.

    That bum rap hasn’t taken hold in Congress, where a bipartisan group of 35 House members co-sponsored Grothman’s legislation. Rubio, the vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, introduced the Senate version of the bill with Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., the committee’s chair.

    “I’m proud to introduce this legislation,” Warner said of the bill in a press release, “to provide well-earned benefits and formally recognize the courage of Air Americans during the U.S. war effort in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.”

    The post Pensions for the “Deep State”: Republicans Push Benefits for Air America, the CIA’s Secret Vietnam-Era Airline appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • Israel’s unrelenting assault on the Gaza Strip is beginning to tip the Middle East into a wider regional conflict. In the past week, the Houthis in Yemen emerged as an unlikely power player, successfully disrupting global shipping in the name of Palestinians in Gaza and goading the U.S. into launching a series of airstrikes in a failed bid at deterrence.

    Over the past three months, the Houthis have attacked merchant ships passing through the Red Sea, an unexpected military intervention aimed at forcing Israel to end its U.S.-backed offensive in Gaza and allow aid into the besieged territory.

    The Houthis’ squeeze on the critical trade route is already impacting the global economy: Spooked shipping companies have diverted vessels toward more costly routes, with risk insurance premiums and global shipping prices rising. The effects of the attempted blockade could soon be seen in the costs of oil and consumer goods worldwide.

    The U.S. Navy, considered the security guarantor of maritime shipping routes across much of the world, was eventually pressured into action. Since last week, the U.S. launched five airstrikes on Houthi positions. The Houthis doubled down. They fired at passing ships with several more rounds of missiles and drones. The targets included U.S. commercial vessels and a U.S. Navy warship — signs that the rebels were only emboldened by the U.S. volley.

    During a White House press briefing on Thursday, President Joe Biden acknowledged that the airstrikes were not stopping the Houthis but said the U.S. would keep targeting the group anyway.

    With its decision to attack, the Biden administration appears to have opened itself up to a geopolitical checkmate by the Houthis. Escalating the strikes against the rebels will likely bring more shipping disruptions — potentially counterproductive to mitigating economic consequences — and risk a full-blown regional war. Negotiating or submitting to the demands of a nonstate militia group from one of the poorest countries in the world would be seen by many as a U.S. surrender and would boost the Houthis’ newfound popularity.

    Battle-hardened in a brutal civil war with a Saudi-backed Yemeni government-in-exile, the Houthis look unready to back down, even inviting the wider conflict.

    “The Houthis absolutely want this conflict,” said Iona Craig, a journalist and political specialist focused on Yemen. “It is part of their ideology, whose anti-American element was formed during the period of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. They now very much see themselves as the defenders of Palestinians and the people of Gaza.”

    “The Houthis absolutely want this conflict. … They now very much see themselves as the defenders of Palestinians and the people of Gaza.”

    With the Houthis undeterred, the U.S. State Department took a different approach on Wednesday, designating the militia as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group, a partial reversal of its decision in 2021 to remove the Houthis from the more stringent Foreign Terrorist Organization list. The new designation makes the Houthis subject to economic and political sanctions but avoids the stricter rules of the FTO list. Humanitarian groups said harsher measures would impede aid to areas of Yemen that Houthis came to control during the civil war.

    Two hours after being redesignated as a terror group in the U.S., the Houthis targeted a U.S. carrier ship, and the U.S. responded with another round of strikes.

    “The Biden administration seems to be hoping that degrading Houthi capabilities will coerce them to stop, but that doesn’t appear to be working,” Daniel DePetris, a fellow at Defense Priorities, a foreign policy think tank based in Washington, told The Intercept. “Everyone is deterrable, and the Houthis are not lunatics. But the problem when dealing with nonstate actors is that it requires more force to get them to change their strategic calculus.”

    He added, “The Saudis also thought that they could beat the Houthis militarily without having to address any of the political demands that they were making.”

    Ragtag Rebels to Regional Aspirations

    Once a small, ragtag army, the Houthis learned to hit back against much more powerful militaries over years of civil war and foreign intervention — acquiring knowledge they appear to be putting into practice against the U.S.

    The Houthis, officially known as Ansarallah, emerged decades ago as a movement opposed to the perceived corruption of the Yemeni government. For the past several years, the group has been at war with the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and are currently in peace negotiations to end the conflict. The U.S. played a key role in the civil war, heavily arming — and for a time giving direct assistance to — an air campaign by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that inflicted huge civilian casualties. The onslaught failed to defeat the Houthis.

    The civil war became a training ground where the Houthis learned to outmaneuver vastly superior U.S.-made weapons — especially air power — in its current operation in the Red Sea. The rebels use inexpensive anti-ship missiles and small boats to attack the shipping vessels, utilizing the advantage of light and mobile forces that drive up costs and weaken the effectiveness of enemies’ attacks from the air.

    “The Houthis have a big force, but they rely on distributing their power broadly across the territory that they control. They rely more on being mobile than on heavy infrastructure,” said Baraa Shiban, a political analyst on Yemen and associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. “They have survived a long air campaign by two of the stronger militaries in the region, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and have adapted how to move and operate their forces accordingly.”

    The Houthis are often dismissed as mere proxies of Iran, part of a nexus of groups referred to as the “Axis of Resistance,” which includes Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Palestinian militants of Hamas. Analysts, however, say that while Iran does provide the Houthis with money, weapons, and military training, the Houthis operate with relative political independence.

    “It is robbing them of their agency when we say that the Houthis are merely stooges of Iran,” Hisham Al-Omeisy, senior adviser on Yemen with the European Institute of Peace, told The Intercept. “They have their own mindset, agenda, and ideology.”

    The civil war became a training ground where the Houthis learned to outmaneuver vastly superior U.S.-made weapons.

    In its most dramatic display of independence, the Houthis reportedly rebuffed Iranian efforts to stop them from taking the Yemeni capital of Sanaa in 2015, according to U.S. intelligence reports.

    The Houthis have long made confrontation with the U.S. and Israel a major plank of their ideology, expressed as a blend of Islamism, anti-imperialism, and overt antisemitism. Along with other Iran-backed groups, the Houthis reject most aspects of the U.S.-backed political order in the region and have made serious threats to the stability of U.S.-allied regimes like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

    “One of the main things people miss about the Houthis is that their end goal is not just Yemen. This is an expansionist group with regional ambitions,” said Al-Omeisy. “This conflict is a perfect opportunity for them to say that they are the real vanguard of the Arab nation, while other leaders are complicit in the suffering of the Palestinians.”

    Winning Hearts and Minds

    At the center of the unrest in the Red Sea is the crisis in Gaza, which has been devastated by Israeli attacks since the October 7 offensive by Hamas. Though Israeli troops are carrying out the war that has killed more than 24,000 Palestinians, the U.S. is the patron and enabler. The Biden administration continues to offer unblinking financial and diplomatic support to Israel, despite mounting accusations against the U.S. of complicity in genocide.

    The Houthis entered the fray almost immediately. In the days after Israel launched its retaliatory assault, the Houthis sent ballistic missiles toward Israel and began its attacks on the Red Sea shipping lanes.

    The Houthis have long been a polarizing force in Yemeni politics, but they have seized on anti-American sentiment in the Arab world and the seeming indifference of pro-U.S. regimes to the suffering in Gaza to elevate their geopolitical status. Not only are the Houthis distinguishing themselves as champions of the Palestinian cause, but they are also rehabilitating their reputation at home, where they have struggled to set up a functional government amid civil war. Houthi spokespeople have become fixtures on Arabic-language television stations, where they relish their role challenging the West over the plight of the Palestinians.

    Not only are the Houthis distinguishing themselves as champions of the Palestinian cause, but they are also rehabilitating their reputation at home.

    Anger toward the U.S. seems likely to grow in the region, as the Biden administration appears to be putting the global economy over Palestinian lives in its strikes on the Houthis.

    “The U.S. should consider that these actions in Gaza are enraging people throughout the region,” said Al-Omeisy. “The local perception is that when Palestinian blood was being shed the last three months, no one was bothered, but when the economic interests of the West were threatened, they immediately acted. This message fits right into Houthi rhetoric and is resonating very strongly in the region.”

    Their bid is working. Rather than weakening the Houthis, the U.S. airstrikes seem to be boosting the Houthis’ political standing throughout the Middle East, where analysts say public opinion of the U.S. has reached lows not seen since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Polls taken among Arabs in the region show widespread anger and disillusionment toward the U.S. since the start of the Gaza war, with far more favorable views of rival countries like China and Russia.

    “The Biden administration and U.S. policymakers have not yet grasped how high anti-Americanism is in the region, where it is at a level that we have not seen since the war in Iraq,” Shiban, of Royal United Services Institute, said. “Even if they claim that this is an Israeli operation and we have nothing to do with it, the Arab public does not buy it.”

    With the U.S. military now stuck in an exchange of attacks with the Houthis, experts say the Biden administration has no good options.

    “I don’t think that the U.S. is trying to engage in regime change in Yemen,” said DePetris, the Defense Priorities fellow, “but if this continues to snowball, that may end up being something that the administration may try to consider.”

    The post The Houthis May Have Checkmated Biden in Red Sea Standoff appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • Targeting intelligence — the information used to conduct airstrikes and fire long-range artillery weapons — has played a central role in Israel’s siege of Gaza. A document obtained through the Freedom of Information Act suggests that the U.S. Air Force sent officers specializing in this exact form of intelligence to Israel in late November.

    Since the start of Israel’s bombardment in retaliation for Hamas’s strike on October 7, Israel has dropped more than 29,000 bombs on the tiny Gaza Strip, according to a U.S. intelligence report last month. And for the first time in U.S. history, the Biden administration has been flying surveillance drone missions over Gaza since at least early November, ostensibly for hostage recovery by special forces. At the time the drones were revealed, U.S. Gen. Pat Ryder insisted that the special operations forces deployed to Israel to advise on hostage rescue were “not participating in [Israel Defense Forces] target development.”

    “I’ve directed my team to share intelligence and deploy additional experts from across the United States government to consult with and advise the Israeli counterparts on hostage recovery efforts,” said President Joe Biden three days after the Hamas attack. 

    But several weeks later, on November 21, the U.S. Air Force issued deployment guidelines for officers, including intelligence engagement officers, headed to Israel. Experts say that a team of targeting officers like this would be used to provide satellite intelligence to the Israelis for the purpose of offensive targeting. 

    “They’re probably targeting people, targeting officers,” Lawrence Cline, who served as an intelligence engagement officer in Iraq before retirement, told The Intercept. Targeting intelligence refers to the identification and characterization of enemy activities including missile and artillery launches, location of leadership and command and control centers, and key facilities. “What I can see is we’ve got a lot of global assets in terms of satellites and the like and the Israelis have a lot in terms of more localized radar coverage.”

    The deployment guidelines were issued by the Pentagon’s Air Force component command for the Middle East, Air Forces Central, on November 21. The document provides deployment instructions to air personnel sent to the country, including an “Air Defense Liaison Team” as well as “airmen assigned as the Intelligence Engagement Officer (IEO).” 

    Intelligence engagement officers, Cline explained, coordinate intelligence between the U.S. and partner militaries. When deployed in Iraq, Cline, who now works as an instructor for the Defense Department Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, recalled that he and other IEOs comprised a small team who spent “probably three quarters of our time working with the Iraqis, the other quarter checking in with headquarters,” adding that “it was sort of half and half a liaison and advising.”

    Asked about the airmen’s mission, the Defense Intelligence Agency referred questions to the Air Forces Central, which did not respond to a request for comment. Neither the Office of the Secretary of Defense nor Central Command responded to requests for comment. 

    The intelligence engagement process provides a low-profile mechanism through which the U.S. can coordinate with the Israeli military, a valuable tool amid the political sensitivity of the conflict.

    A U.S. Army primer defines intelligence engagement as a “powerful” tool that is useful “especially when U.S. policy might restrict our interaction,” as it “often does not require large budgets or footprints.” Experts say that may be the case here.

    Tyler McBrien, managing editor of Lawfare, a website specializing in national security law, said that there seems to be an “Israel exception” to the U.S. rules around military assistance. 

    Past presidents have issued several executive orders banning the U.S. government from carrying out or sponsoring assassinations abroad. This ban has been interpreted to include wartime targeting of civilians, according to a recent Foreign Affairs article by Brian Finucane, a former legal adviser for the State Department who now works for Crisis Group.

    And the so-called Leahy law, a set of budget amendments named for Sen. Patrick Leahy, requires the U.S. government to vet foreign military units for “gross violations of human rights” when providing training or aid to those units. Several progressive members of Congress have raised concerns that U.S. aid to Israel — both before and during the present war — violates that requirement.

    “For air advisory missions, which I imagine involve intelligence sharing and training, specific domestic legal restrictions such as the Leahy law and the assassination ban would likely come into play,” McBrien said. But the Leahy vetting process is “reversed” for Israel; rather than vetting Israeli military units beforehand, the U.S. State Department sends aid and then waits for reports of violations, according to a recent article by Josh Paul, who resigned from his post as a State Department political-military officer over his concerns with U.S. support for Israel.

    “As a general matter, U.S. officials who are providing support to another country during armed conflict would want to make sure they are not aiding and abetting war crimes,” Finucane told The Intercept. He emphasized that the same principle applies to weapons transfers and intelligence sharing.

    The Israeli military intentionally strikes Palestinian civilian infrastructure, known as “power targets,” in order to “create a shock,” according to an investigation by the Israeli news website +972 Magazine. Targets are generated using an artificial intelligence system known as “Habsora,” Hebrew for “gospel.”

    “Nothing happens by accident,” an Israeli military intelligence source told +972 Magazine. “When a 3-year-old girl is killed in a home in Gaza, it’s because someone in the army decided it wasn’t a big deal for her to be killed — that it was a price worth paying in order to hit [another] target. We are not Hamas. These are not random rockets. Everything is intentional. We know exactly how much collateral damage there is in every home.”

    The Biden administration has gone to great lengths to conceal the nature of its support for the Israeli military. The Pentagon quietly tapped a so-called Tiger Team to facilitate weapons assistance to Israel, as The Intercept has previously reported. The administration has also declined to reveal which weapons systems it’s providing Israel and at which quantities, insisting that the secrecy is necessary for security reasons. 

    “We’re being careful not to quantify or get into too much detail about what they’re getting — for their own operational security purposes, of course,” White House spokesperson John Kirby told reporters during a press briefing in October. 

    This contrasts with its support for Ukraine, about which it has been far more transparent. The administration has provided an itemized list of its weapons assistance to Ukraine, a country facing at least as much of a threat amid the invasion of Russia. The White House has never addressed the incongruity. Past administrations have also provided detailed public information about U.S. targeting support for the Saudi and Emirati military campaigns in Yemen, which U.S. officials claim was meant to reduce civilian casualties.

    The secrecy “may reflect the fact that the U.S. has interests that are in tension, the Biden administration has interests that are in tension,” Finucane said. “On the one hand, they want to publicly embrace Israel and support Israel, providing what seems to be unconditional support. On the other hand, they don’t want to be perceived as taking the country into another war in the Middle East.”

    The post Biden Admin Deployed Air Force Team to Israel to Assist with Targets, Document Suggests appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • Humzah Mashkoor had just cleared security at Denver International Airport when the FBI showed up. The agents had come to arrest the 18-year-old, who is diagnosed with a developmental disability, and charge him with terror-related crimes. At the time of the arrest, a relative later said in court, Mashkoor was reading “Diary of a Wimpy Kid,” a book written for elementary school children.

    Mashkoor had gone to the airport on December 18 to fly to Dubai, and from there to either Syria or Afghanistan, as part of his alleged plot to join the Islamic State. The trip had been spurred by over a year of online exchanges starting when Mashkoor was 16 years old with four people he believed were members of ISIS. According to the Justice Department’s criminal complaint, the four were actually undercover FBI agents. As a result of his conversations with the FBI, Mashkoor could face a lengthy sentence for attempting to provide material support to a terrorist organization.

    At an initial court hearing, family members said that Mashkoor, who had turned 18 just a few weeks prior to the arrest, had intellectual difficulties and been diagnosed with autism. Despite acknowledging Mashkoor’s family support and his young age, the judge ordered that he be detained while awaiting trial.

    “It’s not lost on this court that Mr. Mashkoor is a young man with possible mental illness and the diagnosis of high-functioning autism. It is clear he has a sea of familial support,” the judge said. “But based on this evidence, there’s no reasonable assurance here that the court can simply chalk all this up to the defendant simply being a young man.”

    Law enforcement agents first became aware of Mashkoor’s online activities in support of ISIS in November 2021. But instead of alerting his family, Mashkoor’s lawyers told The Intercept, FBI agents posing as ISIS members befriended him a year later and strung him along until he became a legal adult.

    “It is appalling that the government never once reached out to his parents, even while they were sending undercover agents to befriend him online starting when he was 16 years old,” said Joshua Herman, a defense attorney representing Mashkoor. “Almost all of the conduct he is alleged to have committed took place when he was a juvenile.”

    “It is appalling that the government never once reached out to his parents, even while they were sending undercover agents to befriend him online starting when he was 16 years old.”

    More details may emerge on the circumstances of Mashkoor’s ill-fated attempt to join ISIS, but the facts as laid out in the complaint are hallmarks of terrorism prosecutions based on FBI stings: a young man with developmental disabilities, already on the police’s radar due to mental health episodes and conflicts with family, groomed as a minor over a long period by a group of undercover FBI agents. Mashkoor’s case also follows a pattern of FBI sting operations in which a teenager is arrested shortly after their 18th birthday. As in similar cases, the court documents suggest that Mashkoor was limited in his ability to execute a terrorist plot on his own.

    “This case appears consistent with a common fact pattern seen in tens, if not hundreds, of terrorism-related cases in which the FBI has effectively manufactured terrorist prosecutions,” said Sahar Aziz, a national security expert and law professor at Rutgers University. “In this case, it was a 16-year-old kid who otherwise would have just sat in his relatives’ basement posting offensive content in a manner similar to a white supremacist or Proud Boy — people whom the FBI does not spend enormous resources to entrap just so they can get a high-profile press release.”

    Known to Police

    Mashkoor first came onto the authorities’ radar for social media posts around the time of his 16th birthday. According to the complaint, Mashkoor began posting in support of terrorism in November 2021, and a platform he used alerted the FBI of suspicious activity.

    In July 2022, local police were called to Mashkoor’s home after he allegedly assaulted a family member during a dispute. At the time, according to court filings, a relative told police about Mashkoor’s mental illness and autism diagnosis. Two months later, Mashkoor began communicating with an undercover FBI agent posing as a member of ISIS.

    That agent eventually introduced Mashkoor to three other FBI agents impersonating ISIS members. With their encouragement, Mashkoor developed a plan to support the terror group. Along with extensive discussions of what types of services he might provide ISIS, Mashkoor regularly confided in the agents about his boredom, family problems, hopes of getting married, and struggles with his mental health. He constantly referred to being a minor, complaining that being under 18 and subject to the monitoring of family members made it hard for him to travel or send funds, including cryptocurrency transactions that he could not figure out how to conduct.

    Mashkoor’s anxieties come through in the chats included in the indictment — most of which are limited to his sides of the conversations. At one point, he told an agent that he was considering finding a wife who might be willing to join him in Afghanistan, but he worried about the possibility of abandoning her if he was killed.

    Mashkoor went back and forth about whether he even wanted to join ISIS.

    Mashkoor also went back and forth about whether he even wanted to join ISIS. Throughout the chats with the undercover agents, Mashkoor expressed support for ISIS and fantasized about fighting with militants abroad. But he also shared doubts about joining the group as well as concerns that he lacked connections of his own in Afghanistan and Syria. In one message, he worried that “the brothers there might not support me in getting married and may just strap something on me and throw me out into the field.” He may, he suggested at one point, instead get a job and finish high school.

    In early December, Mashkoor failed to show up to a flight he had booked to Dubai. It’s unclear whether his apprehensions played a role; he told the FBI agents that he had come down with Covid.

    “The whole case demonstrates the low level of maturity and social skills often found in people who suffer from autism,” said Thomas Durkin, one of Mashkoor’s lawyers. “He is fantasizing and making up plans to go to Afghanistan that he could not possibly realize on his own.”

    In their conversations, agents warned Mashkoor that “life won’t be easy” after joining ISIS, while continuing to offer to help plan his journey. Despite second thoughts, Mashkoor eventually appeared to take the FBI up on their offer and went to the airport weeks after he turned 18.

    “Staying here even another second is torture and I’ve only been putting up an act to please those around me,” he had told one of the agents. “But what will any of it matter once I’m 18 and gone.”

    Security fencing outside the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) headquarters in Washington, D.C., US, on Monday, Aug. 22, 2022. The FBI has come under intense political criticism for executing a search warrant on Donald Trump's Mar-a-Lago home in Florida and is confronting threats that don't appear to be subsiding, including an armed man who attacked the bureau's Cincinnati field office. Photographer: Al Drago/Bloomberg via Getty Images
    Security fencing outside FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C., on Aug. 22, 2022.
    Photo: Al Drago/Bloomberg via Getty Images

    The FBI’s Terror Plan

    Throughout the period that he was under investigation, it’s unclear how much meaningful contact Mashkoor had with actual members of ISIS. When he originally came onto law enforcement’s radar, he was alleged to have been in communication with other supporters of the group, some of whom were later arrested in foreign countries.

    At one point during the investigation, he gave an undercover FBI agent contact information for someone he said he had found in an online ISIS publication. That individual, unnamed in court documents, solicited cryptocurrency from the undercover agents and appeared to offer them assurances that it was possible to travel to ISIS territories. In conversations with an agent, Mashkoor also alluded to an ISIS contact who had suggested he conduct an attack in the U.S., but Mashkoor said he preferred to travel abroad.

    But Mashkoor’s most substantive planning — the actions that landed him under a federal terrorism indictment — took place entirely with the group of undercover FBI agents who were in close contact with him over several months, testing the willingness of a vulnerable young man to commit a crime.

    “It’s clearly a waste of government resources,” said Aziz, the law professor. “If there was a serious terrorist threat in America, the FBI would not be spending its time entrapping a mentally ill minor.”

    The family member who went with Mashkoor to the Denver airport the day he was arrested had been unaware of his plans, according to court documents, and did not know why he was leaving the country. In one of his final conversations with an FBI agent, Mashkoor had worried about his upcoming trip and the toll it would have on his family. He asked the agent whether it would be permissible to leave behind a message for them. As he told another agent, he had tried “to think of something to say” to his father, but whenever he tried to convey that he was leaving for good, his “throat clenches and nothing comes out.”

    “My family know I am leaving but don’t know why and they are very sad and it’s been having a toll on my mental health,” Mashkoor told the agent. “I don’t know how to properly say my final goodbyes to them or how to convey the reasons why I left without compromising myself.”

    The post Undercover FBI Agents Helped Autistic Teen Plan Trip to Join ISIS appeared first on The Intercept.

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  • Rep. Sara Jacobs, D-Calif., has urged the Pentagon to immediately make amends to a Somali family following an investigation by The Intercept of a 2018 U.S. drone strike that killed a woman and her 4-year-old daughter.

    Her call for action follows a December open letter from two dozen human rights organizations – 14 Somali and 10 international groups — calling on Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to compensate the family for the deaths. The family is also seeking an explanation and an apology.

    The April 1, 2018, attack in Somalia killed at least three, and possibly five, civilians, including 22-year-old Luul Dahir Mohamed and her 4-year-old daughter Mariam Shilow Muse. A U.S. military investigation acknowledged the deaths of a woman and child but concluded their identities might never be known. This reporter traveled to Somalia and spoke with seven of their relatives. For more than five years, the family has tried to contact the U.S. government, including through U.S. Africa Command’s online civilian casualty reporting portal, but never received a response.

    “I find it deeply troubling that after the Department of Defense confirmed that a U.S. drone strike killed civilians, Luul Dahir Mohamed and her daughter, Mariam Shilow Muse, in 2018, their family has reportedly yet to hear from DoD — even years later,” said Jacobs, a member of the House Armed Services Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, where she serves as ranking member of the subcommittee on Africa. “While the U.S. government can never fully take away their loved ones’ pain, acknowledgment and amends are needed to find peace and healing.”

    Jacobs’s call for reparations comes on the heels of the Pentagon’s late-December release of its long-awaited “Instruction on Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response,” or DoD-I, which established the Pentagon’s “policies, responsibilities, and procedures for mitigating and responding to civilian harm.”

    The document, mandated under the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, or NDAA, and approved by Austin, directs the military to “acknowledge civilian harm resulting from U.S. military operations and respond to individuals and communities affected by U.S. military operations” including “expressing condolences” and providing so-called ex gratia payments to next of kin.

    “We welcome this policy, which is both the first of its kind and long overdue. But like any policy, what’s on paper is just the first step,” said Annie Shiel, the U.S. advocacy director for the Center for Civilians in Conflict, one of the groups that authored the open letter about the Somalia strike. “The real measure of its success will be in implementation, and how or whether it delivers results for civilians – both by preventing a repetition of the devastating civilian harm caused by U.S. operations over the last twenty years, and by finally delivering answers and accountability to the many civilians harmed in those operations who are still waiting for acknowledgement from the U.S. government.”

    Although the DoD-I also mentions “ensur[ing] a free flow of information to media and the public” and the need for public affairs personnel to “provide timely and accurate responses to public inquiries and requests related to civilian harm,” the Pentagon did not respond to questions about the letter to Austin, the DoD-I, or Jacobs’s comments. Another set of questions about civilian harm, emailed to the Defense Department in September 2022, also have yet to be answered. “I have pressed for responses to your questions,” Pentagon spokesperson Lisa Lawrence wrote in an email late last month. “As with all queries, it takes time to coordinate.”

    In 2022, following increased scrutiny of the U.S. military’s killing of civilians; underreporting of noncombatant casualties; failures of accountability; and outright impunity in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, SomaliaSyriaYemen, and elsewhere, the Pentagon pledged reforms. The 36-page Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, known in Washington as the CHMR-AP, provides a blueprint for improving how the Pentagon addresses noncombatant deaths but lacks clear mechanisms for addressing past civilian harm. Jacobs — founder and co-chair of the Protection of Civilians in Conflict Caucus — has been one of the foremost elected officials pressing the Pentagon to take greater accountability for civilian casualties. Last July, she introduced the Civilian Harm Review and Reassessment Act, which would require the Defense Department to examine and reinvestigate past civilian casualty allegations, stretching back to 2011, and make amends if necessary. 

    The 2024 NDAA, passed late last year, included another provision, authored by Jacobs and Rep. Jason Crow, D-Colo., requiring the director of national intelligence to notify Congress if U.S. intelligence, used by a third party, results in civilian casualties. Jacobs’s efforts also led to a Government Accountability Office assessment of the effectiveness of civilian harm training including an evaluation of the efficacy of current methods. That report, due by March 1, is nearly complete according to Chuck Young, a GAO spokesperson.

    “After U.S. military operations have caused civilian harm, victims, survivors, and their families often face significant obstacles to getting answers and acknowledgment from the U.S. government, let alone amends for what happened,” Jacobs told The Intercept, referencing the April 2018 drone attack that killed Luul and Mariam. “I urge the Department of Defense to live up to its responsibility in the CHMR-AP to make amends for past civilian harm and immediately address this case.”

    The post Rep. Sara Jacobs Urges Pentagon to Make Amends to Family of Drone Strike Victims appeared first on The Intercept.

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  • Rep. Ilhan Omar is introducing two pieces of legislation to block U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, citing atrocities committed by both countries. The U.S. made high-profile sales to both countries in December, shoring up their offensive capabilities amid the possibility of a regional war and a growing risk of confrontation with Yemen’s Houthis.

    The Saudi bill is the Minnesota progressive’s latest attempt to hold the Saudi regime to account for its sordid human rights record. It would stop the sale of aircraft support, intelligence sensors, and other materiel relied upon by the Royal Saudi Air Force amid a blockade that has devastated Yemen’s population. In December, the State Department approved a $582 million sale to Saudi Arabia to renew its drone surveillance system.

    The UAE also recently escalated its involvement in the war on Yemen, leading to Houthi rocket attacks that have eroded the sense of security the Emirati states had cultivated. Omar’s measure would prohibit the sale of high explosive rockets, radar systems, and other military equipment to the UAE. In December, the State Department approved an $85 million sale of high explosive rockets and defense-related radar equipment to the UAE.

    The closely focused bills make no mention of regional dynamics. In a statement to The Intercept, Omar pointed to human rights abuses committed by both countries as the basis for the legislation. “These sales go directly against our values as well as the cause of peace and human rights,” Omar said in a statement to The Intercept. 

    President Joe Biden campaigned in 2020 on making Saudi Arabia a “pariah” for its murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, saying that there was “very little social redeeming value in the present government in Saudi Arabia.” Since becoming president, however, the Biden administration has authorized billions in weapons sales to the oil-rich monarchy. In 2021, Omar introduced similar legislation to block a $650 million sale of missiles and other weapons to the kingdom.

    “It is simply unconscionable to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia while they continue to kill and torture dissidents and support modern-day slavery,” Omar said. “Saudi Arabia executed over 170 people in the last year alone — including executions just for Twitter posts.”

    Last year, Saudi Arabia sentenced a retired teacher to death for posts on X critical of the Saudi royal family and calling for the release of imprisoned Islamic scholars. The year prior, Riyadh sentenced a 72-year-old dual U.S.-Saudi citizen to 16 years’ imprisonment for posts on X critical of the Saudi regime. Saudi Arabia also sentenced a Saudi Ph.D. student residing in the U.K. to 34 years’ imprisonment for simply following and retweeting activists critical of the regime.

    Though Saudi Arabia formally abolished slavery in 1962, its coercive treatment of migrant domestic workers has been described by Human Rights Watch as “clearly” amounting to “slavery.” The Biden administration acknowledges this, describing slavery without using the word “slavery”; the State Department’s most recent report on the country’s human rights practices stating that “forced labor occurred among migrant workers” and that Saudi law “does not prohibit or criminalize all forms of forced or compulsory labor.” 

    In 2013, U.S. law enforcement officials reportedly investigated a “possible case of modern slavery” at a Saudi diplomatic compound in Virginia involving two women from the Philippines. A State Department spokesperson said that the investigation was complicated by the possibility that suspects enjoyed diplomatic immunity, which has prevented prosecution in previous cases. A similar case in London involving a Filipina domestic worker exploited by a Saudi diplomat made its way to the U.K. Supreme Court, which ruled that diplomats cannot hide behind diplomatic immunity in slavery cases.

    Omar also condemned the UAE’s secret arms sales to Sudan. In September, a New York Times report revealed that the UAE was engaged in a sophisticated covert operation to supply weapons to the Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, a paramilitary linked to Russia’s Wagner Group that is carrying out ethnic cleansing in Darfur.

    “The United Arab Emirates have been violating the UN arms embargo in Darfur to support the RSF, which the State Department recently determined is committing war crimes and crimes against humanity,” Omar said. “They have also been arming the Ethiopian government, which has been accused of atrocities in Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia.”

    “Refugees International is shocked by today’s New York Times report,” Jeremy Konyndyk, a former top USAID official under the Biden administration, said of the news in a press release, adding that “the UAE has allied itself with the perpetrators of the 2003 Darfur genocide.”

    The post New Bills Aim to Block U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, UAE Amid Concerns of Regional Conflict appeared first on The Intercept.

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  • Weapons used by the Israel Defense Forces, security cabinet leaks, and stories about people held hostage by Hamas — these are some of the eight subjects the media are forbidden from reporting in Israel, according to a document obtained by The Intercept.

    The document, a censorship order issued by the Israeli military to the media as part of its war on Hamas, has not been previously reported. The memo, written in English, was an unusual move for the IDF’s censor, which has been part of the Israel military for more than seven decades.

    “I haven’t ever seen instructions like this sent from the censor aside from general notices broadly telling outlets to comply, and even then it was only sent to certain people,” said Michael Omer-Man, a former editor-in-chief of the Israel’s +972 Magazine and today the director of research for Israel–Palestine at Democracy in the Arab World Now, or DAWN, a U.S. advocacy group.

    Titled “Operation ‘Swords of Iron’ Israeli Chief Censor Directive to the Media,” the order is not dated, but its reference to Operation Swords of Iron — the name of Israel’s current military operation in Gaza — makes clear that it was issued sometime after Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel. The order is signed by the chief censor of the Israel Defense Forces, Brig. Gen. Kobi Mandelblit. (The Israeli Military Censor did not respond to a request for comment on the memo.)

    The document was provided to The Intercept by a source who himself was given a copy by the Israeli military. An identical document appears on the Israeli government’s website.

    “In light of the current security situation and the intensive media coverage, we wish to encourage you to submit to the Censorship all materials dealing with the activities of the Israeli Defense Forces (I.D.F.) and the Israeli security forces prior to their broadcast,” the order says. “Please update your staff of the content of this letter, with an emphasis on the news desk and field reporters.”

    The order enumerates eight topics the media are forbidden from reporting on without prior approval from the Israeli Military Censor. Some of the topics touch on hot-button political issues in Israel and internationally, such as potentially embarrassing revelations about weapons used by Israel or captured by Hamas, discussions of security cabinet meetings, and the Israeli hostages in Gaza — an issue that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been widely criticized for mishandling.

    The memo also bans reporting on details of military operations, Israeli intelligence, rocket attacks that hit sensitive locations in Israel, cyberattacks, and visits by senior military officials to the battlefield.

    Concerns about the politicization of the military censor are not merely hypothetical. Last month, the Israeli censor reportedly complained that Netanyahu was pressuring him to crack down on certain media outlets without legitimate reason. Netanyahu denied the charge.

    Self-Censorship and Secrecy

    The Israeli Military Censor is a unit located within the IDF’s Military Intelligence Directorate. The unit is commanded by the chief censor, a military officer appointed by the defense minister.

    Since Israel’s war on Hamas started, more than 6,500 new items were either completely censored or partially censored by the Israeli government, Guy Lurie, a research fellow at Jerusalem-based Israel Democracy Institute, told The Intercept.

    To put the figure in context, Lurie said it was about four times more than before the war started, citing a report in the Israeli outlet Shakuf based on freedom of information requests. The number of submissions to the censor, however, are significantly higher at this time of heightened conflict, so Lurie noted that news items are facing a normal level of censorship in light of the ratio to total submissions.

    The actual number new stories affected by the censor, however, can never be quantified. Because of a system of close relationships and a feeling for what to expect, Israeli journalists can censor themselves.

    “People self-censor, people do not even try to report the stories they know won’t get through,” Omer-Man said. “And that is really showing right now in how little regular Israelis are seeing in the press about what is happening in Gaza to Palestinians.”

    Chief Censor of the Israel Defense Forces, Brig. Gen. Kobi Mandelblit.
    Photo: IDF

    It is these kinds of unofficial censorship that give the censor in Israel its power, said experts.

    In a 2022, a State Department report on human rights in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories took on the military censor, singling out out two Arabic-language newspapers in occupied East Jerusalem. While noting that the IDF censor didn’t review the papers, the State Department said, “Editors and journalists from those publications, however, reported they engaged in self-censorship due to fear of retribution by Israeli authorities.”

    At one time, the censor had an Editors Committee composed of three members: one from the press, one from the military, and a publicly elected member who served as chair. Though the Editors Committee no longer officially exists, a similar, albeit informal body still maintains some sway.

    Though the law that mandates the censor gives it widespread powers, the censor maintains its respectability in Israel by being politically independent and exercising restraint, especially in comparison to other countries in the region.

    “People self-censor, people do not even try to report the stories they know won’t get through.”

    “If you look at the law that governs censorship, it’s really draconian in terms of the formal authorities the censor has,” Lurie told The Intercept. “But it’s mitigated by this informal arrangement.”

    Almost all of it happens in secret: Committee discussions are confidential, as are most communiques between media outlets and the censor.

    Asked why the processes are so secretive and why even the news organizations won’t speak out, one Western journalist based in Israel and Palestine, who asked for anonymity to avoid reprisals, had a blunt assessment: “Because it’s embarrassing.”

    Foreign Press and the Censor

    That the memo of directives for the current Israeli war on Gaza was in English suggests that it was intended for Western media. Foreign journalists working in Israel must obtain government permission, including a declaration that they will abide by the censor.

    “In order to get a visa as a journalist, you have to get approval from GPO” — Government Press Office — “and therefore you have to sign a document that says you will comply with the censor,” said Omer-Man. “That in itself is probably against the ethics guidelines at a bunch of papers.”

    Nonetheless, many journalists do sign the document. While The Associated Press, for instance, didn’t respond to The Intercept’s query about whether it cooperates with the military censor, the news wire has in the past reported on the issue, including admitting that it holds itself to the directive.

    “The Associated Press has agreed, like other organizations, to abide by the rules of the censor, which is a condition for receiving permission to operate as a media organization in Israel,” the agency wrote in a 2006 story. “Reporters are expected to censor themselves and not report any of the forbidden material.”

    Asked if it complied with guidance from Israel’s military censor and whether its compliance had changed since the onset of the war, Azhar AlFadl Miranda, the communications director for the Washington Post, told The Intercept in an email, “We aren’t able to share insight,” adding that “we don’t publicly discuss our editorial decisions.”

    The New York Times told The Intercept, “The New York Times reports independently on the full spectrum of this complex conflict. We do not submit coverage to the Israeli military censor.” (Reuters did not answer The Intercept’s questions.)

    Foreign press that cooperates with the censor is subject to the same system: Many stories don’t get passed through the censor, but certain issues merit submitting the stories.

    “They know that they need to pass onto the censor reports that they want to publish on certain subjects,” said Lurie. “There are subjects that the media know that they need to get the censor’s approval.”

    One of the things that makes the written, English-language censorship order unusual, however, is the order’s overt reference to the Hamas war. “I’ve never seen that for a specific war,” Lurie said.

    “There are subjects that the media know that they need to get the censor’s approval.”

    One subject known to be sensitive in Israel is the country’s covert nuclear arsenal. In 2004, BBC journalist Simon Wilson interviewed Mordechai Vanunu, a whistleblower on the nuclear program, who had just been released from prison. The Israeli censors demanded copies of the interview, but Wilson did not comply.

    Wilson was then barred from reentry, and the Israel government demanded an apology. Initially, the BBC refused to furnish one, but eventually the worldwide news giant folded.

    “He confirms that after the Vanunu interview he was contacted by the censors and was asked to give them the tapes. He did not do so. He regrets the difficulties this caused,” the BBC said in the apology. “He undertakes to obey the regulations in future and understands that any further violation will result in his visa being revoked.”

    The apology, like so much else of the censor’s work, was to have remained secret, according to a 2005 Guardian story, but the BBC accidentally posted it on its website, before quickly removing it.

    The post Exclusive: Israeli Military Censor Bans Reporting on These 8 Subjects appeared first on The Intercept.

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  • A lawsuit filed Wednesday says the U.S. government violated the First Amendment when it prevented a U.S.-based organization from hosting people sanctioned by the U.S. as speakers at a conference earlier this year. The suit, if successful, could have far-reaching implications for placing federal limits on freedom of speech when sanctioned or otherwise designated people or groups are involved.

    The complaint, filed by Columbia University’s Knight First Amendment Institute, argues that the decision made by the Office of Foreign Assets Control could have consequences for public discourse, including whether news outlets could publish interviews with individuals designated under U.S. sanctions law.

    For the lawyers bringing the suit, the current curtailment of speech based on sanctions amounts to the policing of thought. 

    “The question at the core of the case is what control the U.S. government has over the American mind and whether it can effectively insulate Americans from ideas and people who it decides are off-limits,” said Alex Abdo, litigation director of the Knight Institute. “That is an extraordinarily dangerous authority.”

    In January, the Foundation for Global Political Exchange, a U.S. nonprofit that organizes small-group discussions across the political spectrum in the Middle East, held an event in Beirut aimed at fostering political dialogue about Lebanon.

    The Foundation sought to include five influential political figures in Lebanon who were either sanctioned by the U.S. government or were members of a designated organization. Two of the potential speakers were members of the Lebanese Parliament, one was a senior representative of the sanctioned Palestinian militant group Hamas, and two others were members of Hezbollah, which the U.S. government considers a terrorist organization but remains a major political party within Lebanon.

    “The public gets to decide for itself which ideas to credit and which ones to reject. That is what the First Amendment is supposed to protect.”

    Out of prudence, the Foundation informed OFAC, the agency that regulates sanctions, that some of the participants were on the sanctions list or affiliated with sanctioned groups. The agency was categorical in its response: Any event held by Americans with designated individuals was prohibited and risked civil or criminal penalties. OFAC claimed that inviting any of the five people — even those who were members of sanctioned organizations but not themselves listed as individuals — would violate the law by giving them “a platform for them to speak” that would provide a “service,” according to the lawsuit. (OFAC did not immediately respond to a request for comment.)

    The lawsuit argues that OFAC has no legal authority to prevent Americans from engaging in conversation with people on the sanctions list. The Foundation’s event was specifically protected by legal and regulatory exemptions on the exchange of information and ideas, it claims.

    “OFAC is assuming the authority to control whom Americans get to hear from and by extension what views Americans hold,” Anna Diakun, a staff attorney at the Knight Institute, told The Intercept. “But the public gets to decide for itself which ideas to credit and which ones to reject. That is what the First Amendment is supposed to protect.”

    OFAC is part of the U.S. Treasury Department and administers and regulates sanctions against individuals and organizations abroad. U.S. sanctions often shift based on political conditions. Given the Foundation’s mission to promote political dialogue, particularly in conflict-stricken regions, the decision to restrict the event in Beirut could be at odds with U.S. political goals, the suit argues.

    “While the government sometimes has legitimate interests in imposing sanctions on groups that are hostile to the United States or engaged in human rights abuses,” the complaint states, “prohibiting the Foundation from engaging in political dialogue with designated individuals undermines rather than serves those interests.”

    On its face, the case deals with the specific situation of an American organization hosting people on the U.S. sanctions list at events. But the lawsuit argues that OFAC’s decision could be applied to political speech more broadly, making it effectively illegal for Americans to speak with people out of favor with the U.S. government, including restricting journalists from publishing interviews with sanctioned individuals, which is often necessary when reporting on conflicts abroad.

    “OFAC legal theory would allow it to criminalize journalists who want to engage with ideas and individuals that the U.S. government disfavors,” Abdo said. “That is a tool of autocracy, not democracy where people get to decide which ideas to engage with.”

    The post Barring Speakers Under U.S. Sanctions Puts Ideas Off-Limits, Say Free Speech Advocates appeared first on The Intercept.

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  • Dozens of prominent investors and business leaders traveled to Israel this week to show solidarity with Israel amid its war on Hamas, according to documents from the junket obtained by The Intercept.

    The trip included top officials from private equity firms like Bain Capital; leaders from the tech industry, like a Patreon executive; and a managing director at the endowment investment firm of Harvard University, a school riven by political clashes around the Israeli war on Gaza.

    “In every war there are multiple fronts. The attendees of this mission are here to help counter the war’s economic disruption.”

    The documents, which include an itinerary and list of attendees, provide details about the weeklong meeting taking place in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, called the Israel Tech Mission. Beginning on Sunday, the meeting includes panels like “Tech in the Trenches: Supporting an ecosystem during wartime.”

    Participants will hold meetings with top Israeli officials, like President Isaac Herzog, along with opposition leader and former military chief of staff Benny Gantz, who joined Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s war cabinet after the October 7 attack.

    Shoring up investor confidence would be welcome news in Israel. The Israeli stock exchange — whose chair Tech Mission participants are slated to meet with on Thursday — suffered billions in losses after the Hamas attack on October 7, though it has gradually recovered. The market losses came in the wake of the reported withdrawal from Israel of some foreign investors when the country was roiled by Netanyahu’s controversial attempt to roll back judicial independence.

    The Israel Tech Mission is explicit in its support for the Israeli war effort.

    “In every war there are multiple fronts,” Ron Miasnik, a co-organizer of the Israel Tech Mission who invests for Bain Capital, told the Israeli business website CTech. “The attendees of this mission are here to help counter the war’s economic disruption. We are focused on supporting and helping rebuild Israel’s world-class tech industry.”

    According to an online application for the trip, a screenshot of which was obtained by The Intercept, attendees on the trip will have to pay their own way. “Attendees will organize their own travel,” the application says. “Participants will cover their own trip cost.”

    Israel Defense Forces and Right-Wing Politicians

    On the trip, the delegation will spend time with Israel’s senior political leadership as well as military figures. The online trip application says attendees will “receive confidential military and political briefings from former Israeli Prime Minister Nafatali Bennett, as well as current Members of Knesset and senior military leaders.”

    The group, according to the itinerary, is scheduled to meet with Israel Defense Forces, or IDF, soldiers on Tuesday before taking part in a “solidarity tech reception” drawing on figures as diverse as the Israeli NBA player and venture capitalist Omri Casspi to the CEO of Goldman Sachs Israel. (In response to a request for comment, Goldman Sach’s U.K. office said it had not heard back from its Israeli office.)

    The Israel Tech Mission appears to have been organized by Itrek, a nonprofit based in New York whose logo appears on the itinerary and list of attendees. Itrek sponsors weeklong “Israel Treks” to build “appreciation for Israel among present and future leaders” so they can understand its “complex reality,” according to the group’s website. (Itrek did not respond to a request for comment.)

    Israel boasts a robust tech sector. While pro-Israel figures have long touted the country’s reputation as a “start-up nation,” criticisms have emerged in recent years pointing to the role of Israel’s defense sector in creating talent and funding research that becomes the locus of tech projects — effectively profiting off Israel’s occupation of Palestine. The cyber specialists of the Israeli army’s Unit 8200, for instance, are known for creating successful start-ups, sometimes involved in security work and even alleged rights abuses.

    Close relationships between Israel’s security state, its tech sector, and the U.S. technology community are common. Tesla CEO Elon Musk met with Netanyahu and top IDF officials last month to discuss “the security aspects of artificial intelligence,” according to a readout of the conversation. The Israeli–Palestinian magazine +972 reported last month that advances in artificial intelligence have allowed the Israeli military to generate targets more rapidly than ever before.

    Israel Tech Mission attendees, for their part, are looking to support Israel’s tech sector.

    “After October 7th, we feel it is critical for venture capital and technology business leaders to stand with Israel,” David Siegel, CEO of Meetup and co-organizer of the mission, said in a press release. “Our trip was oversubscribed for attendees. The technology community recognizes the heightened need for support as many Israeli entrepreneurs and their workforces are on the front lines as reservists.”

    Harvard’s Massive Endowment

    The attendee list for the Israel Tech Mission includes a diverse roster of investors and business leaders. Among those listed are top officials at companies working in stock trading such as Vstock Transfer, a stock transfer firm, and TIFIN, a financial technology investment firm that employs artificial intelligence. Investors from private equity funds like Apollo Global Management and Entrepreneur Partners are also slated to participate.

    The attendee list also includes business officials like Ariel Boyman, a vice president at Mastercard; Steve Miller, chief financial officer at the glasses retailer Warby Parker; Michael Kohen, who leads the autonomy and automation platform at John Deere; and Jeffrey Swartz, the former CEO of Timberland. (Vstock, TIFIN, Apollo, Entrepreneur Partners, Mastercard, Warby Parker, John Deere, and Swartz did not immediately respond to a request for comment.)

    Also listed as an attendee is Adam Goldstein, managing director at Harvard Management Company, which helps oversee Harvard University’s over $50 billion endowment — the largest on Earth. The endowment investment fund has been accused in the past of investing nearly $200 million in companies that profit off Israel’s illegal settlements in the occupied Palestinian West Bank. (The Harvard Management Company did not immediately respond to a request for comment.)

    Elite Ivy League colleges have become a flash point in the U.S. debate about Israel’s war on Gaza. Harvard has faced a backlash from donors. Billionaire investor Bill Ackman, for instance, has become a strident critic of pro-Palestine students and what he says is the school’s lackluster response to them — a battle fueled by years of resentment. And Harvard President Claudine Gay has faced, and resisted, calls to resign because of her response to pro-Palestinian activism and alleged antisemitism on campus.

    In recent years, the movement for boycott, divestment, and sanctions against Israel has gained steam at the university. Last year, the student newspaper, the Harvard Crimson, faced a backlash for its endorsement of the BDS campaign — which, if successful, would see Goldstein’s Harvard Management Company divest from Israel.

    While Israel Tech Mission delegates are looking to boost the tech sector in Israel, the Israeli war on Gaza is also being used as a pitch for tech firms like NSO Group to improve their image back in the United States. The company was blacklisted by the U.S. when its phone-hacking software Pegasus was shown to be involved in rights abuses.

    Lobbyists in Washington working for the company, which has faced cash shortages, have been using the Israeli war on Gaza to refurbish the company’s reputation. In November, the NSO lobbyists wrote to the U.S. State Department to make the case for “the importance of cyber intelligence technology in the wake of the grave security threats posed by the recent Hamas terrorist attacks in Israel and their aftermath.”

    The post Harvard Endowment Investor and Other Business Leaders Take a Solidarity Trip to Israel appeared first on The Intercept.

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  • Two Dozen human rights organizations called on the Pentagon Monday to make amends to a Somali family following an investigation by The Intercept of a 2018 U.S. drone strike that killed a woman and her 4-year-old daughter.

    The 14 Somali groups and 10 international organizations devoted to the protection of civilians urged Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III to take immediate action. The family is seeking an explanation, an apology, and compensation.

    “New reporting illustrates how in multiple cases of civilian harm in Somalia confirmed by the U.S. government, civilian victims, survivors, and their families have yet to receive answers, acknowledgement, and amends despite their sustained efforts to reach authorities over several years,” reads the open letter, which was shared with The Intercept.

    The April 1, 2018, attack in Somalia killed at least three, and possibly five, civilians, including 22-year-old Luul Dahir Mohamed and her 4-year-old daughter Mariam Shilow Muse. A U.S. military investigation acknowledged the deaths of a woman and child but concluded their identities might never be known. This reporter traveled to Somalia and spoke with seven of their relatives. “They know innocent people were killed, but they’ve never told us a reason or apologized. No one has been held accountable,” said Abdi Dahir Mohammed, one of Luul’s brothers. “We’ve been hurt — and humiliated.”

    The Pentagon’s inquiry found that the Americans who conducted the strike were confused and inexperienced and that they argued about basic details, like how many passengers were in the targeted vehicle, according to a report obtained by The Intercept under the Freedom of Information Act after multiple requests, appeals, and a lawsuit. The U.S. task force members mistook a woman and a child for an adult male and killed Luul and Mariam in a follow-up strike as they ran from the truck in which they had hitched a ride to visit relatives. Despite this, the investigation — by the unit that conducted the attack — concluded that standard operating procedures and the rules of engagement were followed. No one was ever held accountable for the deaths.

    The human rights advocates’ letter asks Austin to “take immediate steps to address the requests of families whose loved ones were killed or injured by U.S. airstrikes in Somalia” after the U.S. military ignored repeated attempts by another of Luul’s brothers, 38-year-old Abubakar Dahir Mohamed, to contact U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM.

    “For more than five years, we have tried to make sure the identities of Luul and Mariam are known to the U.S.,” Abubakar wrote in a recent op-ed for The Continent. “I now know that the U.S. military has admitted not only to killing Luul and Mariam, but doing so even after they survived the first strike. It killed them as Luul fled the car. … The U.S. has said this in its reports, and individual officers have spoken to journalists. But it has never said this to us. No one has contacted us at all.”

    Congress appropriates millions of dollars annually for the Defense Department to compensate families of civilians killed or injured in U.S. attacks, but the Pentagon has shown an aversion to confronting its mistakes and rarely makes compensation payments, even in cases as clear cut as this one.

    “The U.S. response thus far stands in stark contrast to this administration’s stated priorities of mitigating, responding to, and learning from civilian harm,” reads the letter. “We urge the Department of Defense to urgently make long-overdue amends in consultation with Abubakar’s family and their representatives, including condolence payments and an explanation for why their demands appear to have been ignored until now.”

    When asked if Luul’s family deserves compensation and if an apology and amends would be offered, the Office of the Secretary of Defense replied, “We do not have anything to provide for you on this right now.” AFRICOM also failed to answer The Intercept’s questions about contacting Luul’s family and providing compensation.

    Last year, in response to increasing public reporting on America’s killing of civilians; underreporting of noncombatant casualties; failures of accountability; and outright impunity in Afghanistan, LibyaIraq, SomaliaSyriaYemen, and elsewhere, the Pentagon pledged reforms. The 36-page Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, known in Washington as the CHMR-AP, provides a blueprint for improving how the Pentagon addresses noncombatant deaths, but lacks mechanisms for addressing past civilian harm. 

    “Although the CHMR-AP does not specifically provide for a re-examination of past incidents, nothing in the CHMR-AP prevents review of incidents in light of new information and appropriate reconsideration of past assessments and decisions under the improved processes and practices that the CHMR-AP seeks to establish,” Pentagon spokesperson Lisa Lawrence wrote in an email response to The Intercept’s questions.

    “Making good on the Defense Department’s commitments to improve how the U.S. prevents and responds to civilian harm must include reckoning with the harms of the last 20-plus years of U.S. operations,” said Annie Shiel, U.S. advocacy director of the Center for Civilians in Conflict, one of the signatories of the letter. “The U.S. has at its disposal at least $3 million annually to make condolence payments to civilian victims and survivors — payments that we know provide both tangible assistance and symbolic meaning for families grieving and rebuilding from unimaginable loss. In this case and in others in Somalia and around the world, the U.S. owes it to survivors to make amends in whatever way is most meaningful for them — be that a formal apology, answers about what happened to their loved ones and why, condolence payments, or other assistance.” 

    The letter was also signed by Airwars, Amnesty International USA, the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars (USA), Caddalaad Doon, Coalition of Somali Human Rights Defenders, Columbia Law School Human Rights Institute, Hiraan Women Development and Family Care, Human Rights Watch, Juba Aid for Peace and Development Organization, Jubaland Youth Leaders, Kalkal Human Rights Development Organization, Marginalized Community Advocacy Network, PAX, People’s Aspiration and Human Rights Organization, Reprieve US, Resilience Hope Foundation, Somali Awareness and Social Development Organization, Somali Legal Action Network, Victim Advocates International, Waamo, Women and Child Support Organization, Youth Initiative and Human Rights Advocacy, and Zomia Center. In addition to the 2018 strike investigated by The Intercept, the letter mentions several other cases in which U.S. attacks in Somalia harmed civilians, including a 2020 drone strike that killed a teenage girl as she was sitting down to dinner with her family. Her relatives have also been trying for years to contact the U.S. in search of an explanation but have received no response, the letter says.

    Advocates say that the deaths of Luul and Mariam provide the Pentagon with a unique opportunity to make good on long-standing promises to improve its mitigation of civilian harm and learn from past mistakes. A drone pilot and analyst, who served in Somalia the year Luul and Mariam were killed and spoke on the condition of anonymity, said the attack was no anomaly. “When I went to Africa, it seemed like no one was paying attention. It was like, ‘We can do whatever we want,’” he told The Intercept. When he counted the civilians he knew the U.S. had killed and compared that tally with publicly announced figures, he said, “the numbers just didn’t add up.”

    “Our clients in this case began attempting to contact AFRICOM and the DoD in the immediate days after Luul and Mariam were killed and have followed every procedure these institutions have made available,” said Clare Brown, the deputy director of Victim Advocates International, an organization that supports victims of serious international crimes, including war crimes, and is now representing Luul’s family. “We are in the process of compiling a case which we intend to transmit to the U.S. through every possible portal, in the hope of finally getting a response. The family has the same ask they have been making for the past five and a half years — for both compensation and to be told, face to face, what happened to their sister and her daughter on that day in April 2018.”

    Luul’s family was traumatized by the airstrike and has suffered for more than half a decade. Her brothers say their elderly father — who died earlier this month — never recovered from his daughter’s sudden death. Luul’s 6-year-old son, Mohamed Shilow Muse, constantly asks why Luul left him and is terrified of being alone. If he sees or hears a drone, he hides beneath a tree.

    “Since the strike, our family has been broken apart. It has been more than five years since it happened, but we have not been able to move on,” Abubakar wrote. “But in all that time, even as we have contacted [the U.S. government] in every way we know how, we have never been able to even start a process of getting justice. The U.S. has never even acknowledged our existence.”

    The post Advocates Demand Compensation for U.S. Drone Strike Victims in Somalia appeared first on The Intercept.

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  • How’s the backyard, Jason? Is there somewhere we can talk?”

    It was May 20, 2020, at the height of the pandemic, and an FBI SWAT team had raided the house Jason Fong shared with his parents in Orange County, California. Fong, a 24-year-old Chinese American who, until recently, had been a U.S. Marine Corps reservist, sat handcuffed in the back of a police cruiser outside.

    “Just a couple of chairs at the back table,” he told the Irvine police detective and FBI agent questioning him.

    Fong led the two lawmen to the backyard, where all three sat at a table near the pool. A body camera worn by FBI Special Agent Thuan Ngo recorded the conversation. Fong, still handcuffed, wore a blue button-down shirt and a white face mask. The family dog wandered around, happily wagging its tail.

    “How long have you had this dog?” the detective, Michael Moore, asked.

    “Since I was 16,” Fong answered.

    Moore read Fong his Miranda rights; Ngo advised him that making a false statement to a federal agent is a felony.

    “Let’s back up a little bit,” Moore said. “What are some big changes that have occurred in your life? You converted to Islam?”

    “Yeah,” Fong answered.

    The detective asked Fong how he became a Muslim, how many guns he owned, and how he used social media.

    “I followed a couple of pages that were just mainly Muslim, like, shitposting, kinda just like —”

    “Muslim what?” Ngo interrupted, apparently stumped by the word “shitposting.” “I’m sorry?”

    “Kind of just, like, meme pages,” Fong answered. “A lot of them make jokes about stupid stuff, like extremism and all that stuff — things I do not condone. … They make memes about extremism in a joking manner.”

    Fong described how he communicated with like-minded people on the internet, mostly in the joking or ironic ways of the extremely online. “It’s just satire,” he said, adding that he tried to dissuade anyone who appeared to take a genuine interest in extremist ideologies and groups.

    But the federal agent kept pushing. He asked if anyone Fong knew via the chat group claimed to support terrorists. He asked for usernames.

    “You’re saying you don’t support any of these groups, right?” Ngo asked.

    “I do not,” Fong said.

    “You don’t believe in any of these groups at all?”

    “I don’t.”

    Fong’s case represents a new and increasingly common form of terrorism sting conducted primarily online, in which federal investigators and prosecutors must navigate the often obscure boundary between protected speech and evidence of crime.

    The detective and the FBI agent knew more than they were letting on that day in 2020. Hundreds of pages of New York Police Department and FBI internal reports, months’ worth of chat logs, and hours of recordings obtained by The Intercept reveal how the investigation of Fong began thousands of miles away in an NYPD intelligence unit. These internal documents and recordings also demonstrate how the FBI is coopting local law enforcement resources in its ever-expanding search for potential terrorists. Neither the NYPD nor the FBI responded to a list of questions from The Intercept.

    Since February 2020, when the NYPD first introduced an undercover employee to Fong in a private group chat, the FBI had been secretly monitoring his online activity. Fong’s supposed chat group friends included at least two government agents — one from the NYPD and another from the FBI. As violent crime spiked in New York City during the pandemic, a division of America’s largest and oldest municipal police department was catfishing a California man who had no connections to New York and no plans to travel there.

    Jason Fong prays with "Daniel," a New York Police Department undercover employee, in a California hotel room during the pandemic.
    Jason Fong prays with “Daniel,” an undercover NYPD employee, in a California hotel room during the pandemic.
    Screenshot from NYPD undercover video

    Following the backyard interrogation, the Justice Department charged Fong with four counts of providing material support to terrorists, alleging that he shared in the group chat military training documents he’d found online and believed could be used to aid Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, a Syrian militant group, and that he tried to raise money for Hamas by sharing a website for Al Qassam Brigades, the Hamas militant wing responsible for the October 7 attack in Israel. 

    “This looks pretty terrible because it’s in a group full of Muslims,” Fong said of the evidence in his case. “Muslims, guns, bombs — automatically you have the word-picture association of terrorists, right? But go on an average Discord Christian server and see how many people justify the carpet-bombing of Gaza. Or go and look at any pro-Zionist group chat and see all the heinous things they say about people there. I’m sure that most of them are not serious.”

    A Secret Life Online

    Fong had been interested in firearms and military techniques since he was a teenager. He joined the Marine Corps as a reservist in 2014, right out of high school, signing his papers at a strip mall military recruiting office in Santa Ana, California.

    His job assignment in the Marine Corps found him. Based on aptitude tests, Fong became an avionics maintenance technician for unmanned aerial vehicles, “UAVs” in military parlance — or drones. “I didn’t exactly hate my job as a UAV avionics maintenance technician, but I just didn’t really have much passion for it,” Fong told The Intercept, sitting in the living room of the house the FBI had raided three years earlier. “I didn’t feel like I joined the military to do this.”

    As a sergeant, Fong applied multiple times to join the ranks of counterintelligence officers. He didn’t get the jobs because of background check concerns, he was told. “For some undisclosed reason, I could not actually be qualified for the job,” Fong said. He applied for other positions: Marine reconnaissance, Special Operations Command, anything that could be considered, in his words, “hardcore stuff.” Denied, denied, denied. The Marines appeared to want Fong where he was: fixing drones.

    Diagnosed with autism, Fong has an impressive knack for languages. He grew up speaking English and Mandarin Chinese, and he began learning Russian on his own time while in the Marines, with the help of a pen pal in the predominantly Muslim region of Tatarstan. He’d visited her in 2017, to practice his Russian and see the country, and to this day, he wonders whether that compromised his military background checks.

    By 2019, Fong wanted out of the Marines. “I pretty much spent my time just looking for civilian work,” he said. Fong had worked various jobs — as a personal trainer, an unarmed security guard, and a safety official at a shooting range — while he continued to live in his parents’ home in Orange County. And no matter where he was, he was always online, exploring his various curiosities.

    “I spent a lot of time on social media, very mobile online life,” Fong said. “And that’s when I kind of got acquainted with people of the boogaloo movement. And these people, they started out as libertarians, and then they kind of degenerated into anti-state anarchy. But, I mean, we had a lot of things in common: [strong feelings about] constitutional rights, firearms especially, free speech, and fighting against tyranny.”

    The so-called boogaloo movement refers to a loosely linked group of people who subscribe to an antigovernment ideology heavily invested in memes, guns, and the prospect of imminent civil war. In headline-grabbing cases, some adherents have been involved in murder, illegal firearms possession, violent plots, and even an FBI sting centering on a supposed conspiracy to support Hamas. But most so-called boogaloo boys are preppers with unimpressive levels of ambition, juvenile senses of humor, and fast internet connections.

    Fong was intrigued by the boogaloo, whose members he followed on Instagram, but he struggled to take them seriously. “It’s just an online community of gun enthusiasts,” Fong said. “I wouldn’t really even describe them as an organized movement.”

    The boogaloo followers Fong met online encouraged him not to reenlist in the Marine Corps: Don’t support the military-industrial complex, they told him. And Fong agreed. He knew he needed a change. “My life was rinse, wash, repeat,” he said. But the boogaloo boys couldn’t constrain Fong’s intellectual wanderings. “I dissociated, unfollowed all the pages,” he said.

    Meme Streak

    As 2019 gave way to 2020, and the coronavirus began to spread globally, Fong was spending even more time online, including following Russian-language accounts. He started noticing Instagram accounts that promoted Islam but had the same meme-oriented humor he’d enjoyed in the boogaloo movement. “It’s the same kind of humor but just different audiences, different subjects,” he said. The memes on the Instagram accounts had a common theme: poking fun at the idea that all Muslims are terrorists.

    Fong had been raised in Chinese Christian churches, but he’d long been curious about Islam, and in January 2020, he converted and began attending a mosque in Southern California — a decision his parents couldn’t understand.

    After interacting with the commentators on Islam-focused Instagram pages, Fong received an invitation to a private group of about 30 people; he was then invited into a subset of that group, which operated on WhatsApp. “So what happened was, a disagreement occurred,” Fong recalled. The more moderate members of the group, including Fong, were apoplectic that other members had shared in the chat propaganda videos from the Islamic State group, or ISIS.

    The disagreements turned into arguments. Fong told the group that he was enlisted as a reservist in the Marines, prompting others to say that he couldn’t be a true Muslim. “They were calling me a heretic just for having served,” he said. Eventually, the group disbanded.

    Fong focused his energies on a new meme-oriented Instagram page about Islam, which eventually birthed a new chat group on Signal. Fong, the administrator of this new group, called it “Mujahideen in America.” He wanted the group’s discussions to involve Islam, guns, and training.

    “We’re going to go over here to talk about self-defense,” Fong, who went by the username asian_ghazi, said, describing what he viewed as topics for the group chat. “Boogaloo stuff, like kind of guerrilla tactics, but mostly for hypothetical scenarios, mostly self-defense, weapons safety, firearms.”

    Fong had curated the group’s membership. There was Daniel, a Russian speaker Fong first met in the WhatsApp group that had fractured. There was also James, a teenager and recent convert to Islam who shared Fong’s ironic sense of humor. James had brought someone named Moussa into the group.

    Moussa, pushy and boisterous, started to bring up terrorist groups in the chat. Daniel joined in, giving his opinions about Islamist movements in Chechnya and other parts of Russia.

    “Their talks about this kind of stuff would be here and there,” Fong said.

    Fong didn’t know what to do. Should he kick these guys out? He’d already seen one internet group fall apart. But he struggled to tell if this discussion went beyond harmless intellectual curiosity and debate.

    Daniel and Moussa weren’t who they claimed to be. Daniel was working undercover for the NYPD. Moussa was an FBI informant, known in the bureau’s parlance as a “confidential human source.” They’d been tasked to find and secretly investigate potential terrorists online.

    UNITED STATES -October 13: Members of the NYPD counter terrorism unit deploy during a pro-Palestinian march Friday,  Oct. 13, Manhattan, New York. (Photo by Barry Williams for NY Daily News via Getty Images)
    Members of the NYPD counter terrorism unit deploy during a Palestinian solidarity march on Oct. 13, 2023, in Manhattan.
    Photo: Barry Williams/Getty Images

    “Online Covert Employee”

    Terrorism stings in the post-9/11 era, intended to catch would-be violent actors before they harm anyone, once played out exclusively in the real world: An FBI informant would meet a loudmouth at a mosque and offer that person a bomb, resulting in a high-profile arrest and raising questions about whether the FBI had manufactured the crime.

    As the world moved online, so did sting operations. Instead of finding targets at mosques and engaging in conversations at coffee shops, counterterrorism agents now often pose as extremists online to lure in their targets. It’s catfishing, but under the color of law.

    In 2018, a Tennessee woman named Georgianna Giampietro chatted online with two undercover FBI agents who claimed to be a married couple looking for help traveling to Syria to join a terrorist group. Giampietro offered instructions on how to avoid law enforcement detection and provided a Telegram username for an alleged contact in Syria. She pleaded guilty to material support charges and is serving a five-and-a-half-year sentence, even though the agents never intended to travel to Syria. Cases like Giampietro’s are increasingly common, with examples of FBI agents and informants posing online as supporters or members of ISIS and other terrorist groups.

    But the FBI isn’t the only agency trying to catfish terrorists. The NYPD’s Counterterrorism and Intelligence Bureau, which earned a reputation as one of the most aggressive and wide-ranging law enforcement agencies of the post-9/11 era, has also evolved from crawling mosques to crawling the internet.

    In early 2016, the NYPD launched an online investigation of Muslim cleric Abdullah el-Faisal, who was living more than 1,500 miles away in Jamaica. A detective sent Faisal a flattering message. That message blossomed into an online relationship, spanning nearly two years, which resulted in Faisal sharing ISIS propaganda and encouraging the undercover detective to travel to Syria. Faisal was extradited from Jamaica, convicted at trial in New York state court, and sentenced to 18 years in prison. The NYPD has also monitored the online activities of Muslim organizations in the northeastern U.S. and built online cases for the Justice Department against terrorism suspects in the U.S. as well as militants based overseas, such as a former Brooklynite who went to Syria to be a weapons trainer for ISIS.

    The NYPD’s online activities are as much about capturing federal funding as they are about netting alleged terrorists. The department’s Counterterrorism and Intelligence Bureau receives more than $160 million annually from the federal government, most of it in the form of Department of Homeland Security grants. This partnership is part of the decadeslong, nationwide effort to expand collaboration and intelligence-sharing among law enforcement agencies. “Law enforcement in this country can no longer be content with merely focusing on activity in their own jurisdictions,” John Miller, then the NYPD’s deputy commissioner, told a House committee in 2019.

    The NYPD’s online activities are as much about capturing federal funding as they are about netting alleged terrorists.

    The investigation of Fong began on February 24, 2020, with a memo that circulated in the NYPD’s Counterterrorism and Intelligence Bureau. The memo described how an NYPD officer known as “OCE 1,” for “online covert employee 1,” had been added to Fong’s chat group. OCE 1 was “Daniel,” who spoke Russian like a native, according to NYPD recordings, but who had little trace of an accent when he spoke English.

    Within days, according to reports obtained by The Intercept, the NYPD told the FBI about its nascent online investigation. The bureau promptly opened its own case, using Daniel, the NYPD undercover employee, as a proxy. NYPD and FBI records show the information went one way: from the NYPD to the FBI.

    The FBI reports include screenshots of messages and pictures that Fong had sent to the private Signal group, including from his trip to Tatarstan in 2017. In one picture, Fong stands on a snow-covered street wearing a black ushanka, a Russian fur hat, with a Soviet-style red star.

    From the outside, Fong appeared to fit a profile that has long concerned FBI counterterrorism officials: U.S. military service members drifting toward extremism. When the FBI first acknowledged this concern in 2009, officials said they viewed the military as a potential pipeline to far-right violent extremist groups. But the bureau didn’t exclude the prospect that U.S.-trained service members could become Islamist extremists, like Nidal Hassan, a U.S. Army major who killed 13 and injured more than 30 others in the Fort Hood mass shooting, also in 2009.

    Fong had used guns since his teens, knew how to modify firearms, and had recently converted to Islam. The messages Daniel was providing to the NYPD, and Moussa to the FBI, also appeared to suggest that Fong had an anti-government ideology. In a screenshot of messages included in one FBI report obtained by The Intercept, Fong wrote:

    Fuck getting [a gun] registered

    Fuck the government

    Fuck President Trump

    Fuck the Feds

    Fong also posted audio and video recordings to the group. Some were ordinary, such as complaints about being stuck at work. “I’m really, really ticked off because I couldn’t pray salah at all today,” Fong said in one recording, referring to the obligatory five daily prayers performed by Muslims.

    Other recordings reviewed by The Intercept appeared potentially ominous. In one video, Fong set up his phone to record in his messy bedroom. “So, this is an AR-15-pattern rifle,” he said, showing his firearm to the camera. Fong had built the rifle himself, using individual parts to create a “ghost gun” that wasn’t legally registered. He had two magazines taped together in a so-called jungle clip, a military-style setup that speeds reloading. “So, the first lesson we’re going to learn is, how exactly do we clear a weapon?” Fong said. He then provided a one-minute tutorial on the proper handling of a rifle.

    As with the meaning of a meme, Fong’s motivations were often hard to pinpoint. Was the video meant to be a useful tutorial, like hundreds of others available on YouTube? Or was it intended as training for people Fong believed to be violent extremists?

    Many of Fong’s messages to the group were ambiguous in this way. In the group chat, for example, someone wrote: “Some dude got drunk last night and went on a bender and tried to kill cops …”

    Fong replied: “I mean, I’d rather kill cops while I’m sober.”

    In another instance, Fong included in the group chat instructions for making explosives with nitric acid that he’d copied from a website. “I really want to experiment with this without 1. Getting arrested 2. Getting my arms blown off,” Fong wrote.

    On a different day, Fong posted: “I planned on dying here violently initially.” But then he followed that message immediately with: “Still not opposed to it lmao.”

    Laughing my ass off — was it all just a joke to Fong? Or was the ambiguity an intentional cover for violent aspirations?

    “No Need to Blow Them Up”

    In March 2020, two months before the FBI and local police showed up at Fong’s house, James, the other young convert in the group, appeared to post a joking message of his own: “Me and the boys blowing up Keesler AFB near me,” he wrote, followed by a black flag emoji. Keesler Air Force Base is in Biloxi, Mississippi.

    Fong replied to the message with another joke. “No need to blow them up,” he wrote. “Just yank the nerds off their computers and they’ll die of anxiety.”

    Despite Fong’s reply, the FBI and NYPD assumed that Fong was somehow trying to aid extremists and terrorist groups. That assumption was bolstered, in the government’s view, by documents Fong shared with the group, including tactical instruction manuals that could be found online. “Take it, save it, study it,” he told the group, referring to military tactical instructions for entering a building.

    Fong sent various other documents he found online, including a tutorial on how to make bombs. He never specifically plotted or encouraged violence, but Moussa had previously told Fong in the chat that he aspired to join the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham terrorist group in Syria. Moussa then introduced into the group a man who claimed to be a Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham representative. This fictional terrorist, who was an undercover FBI agent, asked Fong for help in putting together a bomb. Instead of helping with the bomb, Fong removed Moussa and his friend from the group.

    But some of Fong’s other actions weren’t as exculpatory.

    In one message, Fong posted a link to a website run by Al Qassam Brigades, the militant Hamas wing. “This is a cause I am sure we can all get behind,” he wrote. Fong also posted a video tutorial showing how to donate to Al Qassam Brigades using bitcoin. Fong wrote in a message that he thought the group should learn about cryptocurrencies so as to “potentially give [donations] to groups we support anonymously.” But there is no evidence that Fong gave money to Hamas or explicitly encouraged donations from members of the group.

    In April 2020, Daniel, the NYPD employee, flew to California. He told Fong that he was traveling on business, which was true. The investigators were taking their online probe into the real world, trying to position Fong to say something less ambiguous about supporting terrorists.

    Fong met Daniel in his hotel room, since much of California was shut down during the pandemic. They prayed together in the room and ate takeout as a hidden camera recorded the meeting. Fong wore a long-sleeved shirt and skullcap. Daniel, his face blurred in the video, wore a black T-shirt and tracksuit pants. Their conversation went back and forth between Russian and English. They talked about the pandemic, Bill Gates, the economy, the Chechen war, and the Prophet Muhammed’s teachings about diet and exercise. Fong told Daniel that he admired Ibn al-Khattab, a well-known Salafi jihadist who’d fought in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Dagestan, and Chechnya until he was murdered by Russian security services in 2002.

    Their conversation then turned to going overseas. Fong told Daniel that he was interested in learning more about Malhama Tactical, a private military contractor that became known as the “Blackwater of the Syrian jihad.”

    “Well, first of all, Moussa is the one who told me about Malhama, you know?” Fong said, referring to the FBI’s informant. “I didn’t really know much about them.”

    Malhama Tactical supported forces opposed to both the Syrian government and ISIS. While not a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, the military contractor was closely aligned with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which is designated as a terrorist group. Fong expressed interest in working with Malhama Tactical.

    “You will train Malhama brothers?” Daniel asked Fong, according to a transcript translated from Russian by the FBI and obtained by The Intercept.

    “I would want to work with Malhama, I think, and then fight with the group Ajnad al-Kavkaz,” Fong said, referring to a Chechen group active in Syria and Ukraine. “That’s what I would, like, ideally do if I go there.” Fong said he was particularly interested in fighting with the Chechen group in Ukraine, against the Russians.

    “If I go there” — that was the context of Fong’s conversations with the undercover NYPD employee. It was a lot of talk and speculation. And it was as far as investigators could entice Fong to go.

    The next month, the FBI and local police arrived at Fong’s parents’ home. The FBI agent asked Fong if he knew anyone who’d expressed interest in joining a terrorist group. Fong said that he didn’t. He also asked Fong if he’d ever met in person with anyone from the chat group. Fong claimed he hadn’t.

    The FBI knew those claims weren’t true.

    Illustration: Ryan Inzana for The Intercept
    Illustration: Ryan Inzana for The Intercept

    False Statements

    Fong’s arrest in 2020 was big news in Southern California, where the press reported breathlessly on an FBI raid involving confiscated guns and allegations that a U.S. Marine had supported terrorists. The government claimed Fong had aided Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham by uploading documents about military tactics and bombmaking to the group chat and accused him of supporting Hamas by sharing a link to a website for the Al Qassam Brigades.

    That the apparent “terrorists” Fong allegedly aided were government agents — Daniel with the NYPD and Moussa with the FBI — was irrelevant, according to the government. Under federal conspiracy laws, defendants need only believe that the person with whom they are conspiring is affiliated with a terrorist group.

    But how much of Fong’s online activity could be considered First Amendment-protected speech remains an open question. The materials he shared with the group were available elsewhere online, and his precise purpose for sharing them was unclear. What’s more, while he’d appeared to suggest that he supported Hamas, he didn’t take any specific actions beyond sharing a website and a video tutorial.

    Fong’s criminal trial began in January and quickly veered into the absurd. U.S. District Judge David O. Carter allowed Moussa, the FBI informant, who was paid $46,000 for his work on the case, to alter his appearance when he testified. Prosecutors had asked for what they termed “light disguise (such as changing their facial hair, hairstyle, or dress style),” to protect his identity. In addition, the judge ordered that the public be removed from the courtroom while the informant was on the stand. The jury was not supposed to know about the disguise or that the public was not allowed into the courtroom.

    In the middle of the informant’s testimony, Los Angeles billionaire Isaac Larian — whose company developed Bratz dolls — wandered into the courtroom unmolested to say hello to Carter, who had presided over a 2011 trade secrets trial involving Bratz dolls and Mattel’s Barbies. Larian’s entrance startled Carter, who exclaimed that the courtroom should have been closed — exactly what the jury wasn’t supposed to know. Carter granted defense lawyers’ request for a mistrial.

    Rather than retry the case, the Justice Department offered Fong a deal: Prosecutors would drop the material support charges if he’d plead guilty to a single count of making false statements to a federal agent. That charge had not been part of the Justice Department’s original indictment, and Fong knew that his panicked statements in his parents’ backyard had been recorded. “I couldn’t beat that charge,” Fong said. “They had me.”

    Fong agreed to plead guilty, admitting that he’d failed to snitch to the FBI on Moussa, the bureau’s own informant.

    In November, Fong was sentenced to three years and 10 months in prison — the net result of a four-month partnership between the FBI and the NYPD to nab a young man in California who, as even he admits, was guilty of an increasingly common offense: being a jackass on the internet.

    The post The Hamas Terrorist Who Wasn’t appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • A groundbreaking Centers for Disease Control and Prevention initiative to support harm-reduction groups across the country fell apart this month after the program came under the control of a federal contractor that has done no public health work for the government.

    The National Harm Reduction Technical Assistance Center, or TA Center, was founded in 2019 as a coalition of harm-reduction groups partnered with the CDC to offer training, funding, and guidance to those working to reduce overdose deaths. Its success rested on the deep experience and the trust community members had for the three main partner organizations, which included the National Alliance of State and Territorial AIDS Directors, or NASTAD; the National Harm Reduction Coalition, or NHRC; the University of Washington’s Supporting Harm Reduction Programs; and a handful of other groups.

    This month, the TA Center ceased functioning as it had for more than three years: Instead of a partnership, the project would be administered as a federal contract. And the CDC gave the sole-source contract to the Florida-based firm H2 PCI, a relatively new federal contractor with close links to the defense industry and the murky world of military special operations.

    H2 PCI entered negotiations with the primary partners in the center to make them subcontractors but did not send proposed subcontracts to the groups until early November. Rushed by deadlines, those talks broke down in late November, according to Laura Guzman, executive director of NHRC.

    As the H2 PCI contract went into effect on December 1, the primary partner organizations that had made the TA Center a success parted ways with the project, Guzman told The Intercept.

    “From the beginning, it was clear that they had zero experience in the public health field and absolutely zero experience in harm reduction,” Guzman said. “It would be really challenging to work with a contractor who has zero understanding of our world.”

    Advocates fear the takeover could wash away the years of painstaking work of building up the TA Center and sever its vital connection to on-the-ground harm reduction providers, making it harder for them to serve the people who rely on them for clean needles, naloxone, and other services, according to Maya Doe-Simkins, a veteran harm reductionist who has worked closely with the program.

    “This will have lethal implications.”

    “This will have lethal implications,” Doe-Simkins said. “I mean, people’s jobs are important, but in communities, it’s also an issue of life and death.”

    The project broke down because of what harm-reduction experts said was the CDC’s mismanagement of the process to transition the TA Center to H2 PCI, an unwillingness from CDC brass to address the groups’ concerns about the firm, and what the partners considered H2 PCI’s unworkable subcontract requirements, according to numerous sources formerly involved in the TA Center, including Guzman and others who spoke to The Intercept on condition of anonymity because they still collaborate with the CDC on other public health projects.

    The sources expressed concerns about the upstart H2 PCI’s lack of experience doing health work with the federal government. “From the beginning, we asked point-blank: ‘Do you have public health expertise?’” said Guzman. “And the answer was ‘no.’ Definitely logistics and communications, but really absolutely foreign to our world of nonprofit capacity building.”

    The sources also questioned H2 PCI’s close ties to Advanced C4 Solutions, or AC4S, a larger defense contractor that has done more than half a billion dollars in federal contracts.

    In a statement to The Intercept, Norm Abdallah, the CEO of both H2 PCI and AC4S, praised his firm’s track record and directed further questions to the CDC. “We have built a reputation for being able to deliver a superlative work product and we are excited to undertake the work that CDC has entrusted us to do,” he wrote.

    The CDC did not respond to multiple requests for comment, including a detailed list of questions sent by The Intercept to the press office and more than half a dozen division heads and staffers working on the TA Center.

    The implosion of the TA Center has already resulted in layoffs and resignations at two of the primary partner organizations, while other partners are scrambling to retain their employees with funding from other sources. The Washington-based Faces and Voices of Recovery, whose approach is based on recovery rather than harm reduction, is the only group still listed by the CDC as a partner for H2 PCI’s TA Center; until recently, the site featured six groups. (Faces and Voices did not respond to a request for comment.)

    To many of the harm-reduction veterans who previously worked on the TA Center, the saga is a realization beyond even their worst fears of a feeding frenzy by private firms clamoring for a piece of the action amid an increase in federal funding and a flood of opioid settlement money earmarked for harm reduction.

    “We’ve seen a bunch of what I would call ‘harm-reduction colonialism,’” said Timothy Santamour, a harm-reduction activist in Florida. “It’s no longer a fear, it’s an actuality.”

    Newfound Distrust

    At its core, harm reduction is best understood as a set of practices and ideas centered around a two-pronged mission of reducing the negative consequences of drug use — access to syringes, naloxone, and other lifesaving public health services —while simultaneously advocating for the rights and dignity of people who use drugs.

    The influence of harm reduction in public health has expanded rapidly in recent years, bolstered by a growing body of scientific evidence proving its efficacy. At the same time, to meet increased demand, the number of service providers has exploded as drug users, families that suffered overdoses, and community activists joined existing providers in fighting against the ravages of the opioid crisis.

    When Santamour, a co-founder of the Florida Harm Reduction Collective, began laying the groundwork for his organization in late 2019 and early 2020, the TA Center played a key role in helping him get the operation off the ground, in large part due to the trust its partner organizations enjoyed in the community.

    “How quickly we’ve been able to grow in Florida and to have an impact, that has really been because of NASTAD and NHRC,” he said. “We would not have been able to do that on our own so quickly.”

    The partners who made up the TA Center were originally funded by the CDC through a cooperative agreement, a funding mechanism whose main difference from a traditional contract consists of a higher degree of collaborative work between the funding agency and the partners. The original cooperative agreement was set to expire in 2022 but was extended twice and was supposed to run through December 1.

    According to sources previously involved in the TA Center who spoke with The Intercept, the CDC informed the partner organizations in the spring of 2023 that the TA Center would be moving from a cooperative agreement to a contract. The federal officials gave the impression that the new contractor would function merely as a “pass-through,” essentially an added layer of bureaucracy with no substantial role in the operation of the TA Center.

    It was not until late September that the partners learned that H2 PCI had been selected for the contract. Tensions flared, the sources said, when the CDC informed the partner organizations that H2 PCI would not be operating as a pass-through; instead, it would be required to receive at least 51 percent of the contract award and would therefore be taking an active role in running the TA Center.

    With the December 1 deadline fast approaching, H2 PCI finally offered subcontracts to the partners in early November. The subcontract contained several unworkable provisions, said Guzman, the head of the former partner organization NHRC. For one, there was a nondisclosure provision. While the TA Center had created an information pipeline flowing back to the CDC, now all information with the federal agency would be sent through and vetted by H2 PCI. What’s worse, partner groups feared they wouldn’t be able to discuss aspects of their TA Center work with other groups without clearing it with H2 PCI.

    “We are a convener of people, and we are constantly sharing information,” Guzman said. “So with providers, we couldn’t do anything without their approval.”

    “The CDC has proven itself to not be a friend or a partner in harm reduction.”

    The partner organizations also bristled at the H2 PCI subcontract’s lack of a termination clause, meaning they would not be able to exit the arrangement. The CDC contract contained the possibility for four years of renewal, and H2 PCI’s subcontracts bound the partner organizations to stay on board so long as TA Center money kept flowing.

    “This was a unilateral contract that we could not undo,” said Guzman, echoing other partner organizations’ complaints. “I’ve been in the nonprofit world for 30-plus years, and I have never entered into any contract, even smaller contracts, with anybody where it’s not mutual.”

    “Their answer was, ‘This is standard practice in our business,’” Guzman said. “And of course that’s where I think we pretty much live in two very different worlds.”

    All three primary partner organizations expressed their concerns about the subcontracts to the CDC, to no avail. “We heard over and over that this was a done deal,” Guzman said.

    Two of the partner organizations officially rejected the subcontracts on December 1, and H2 PCI rescinded their proposed contract from a third organization. Last week, NASTAD, NHRC, and the University of Washington team were officially removed from the TA Center.

    As news of the TA Center’s partial implosion began filtering out last week, it was already threatening to undo much of the progress that the CDC has made to build connections with the harm-reduction movement.

    “It’s going to be pretty hard for them to recover from this, because nobody’s going to trust them,” said Santamour. “The CDC has proven itself to not be a friend or a partner in harm reduction.”

    SAN FRANCISCO, CA - FEBRUARY 3: A drug user looks at the package of narcan she was handed by Paul Harkin, director of harm reduction at GLIDE who was walking the streets to handout narcan, fentanyl detection packets and tinfoil to those drug users in need as a part of outreach on the streets of San Francisco .  (Photo by Nick Otto for the Washington Post)
    Handouts of Narcan, fentanyl detection packets, and foil are given to drug users in need as a part of outreach on the streets of San Francisco on Feb. 3, 2023.
    Photo: Nick Otto for the Washington Post

    Jointly Owned Subsidiary

    It is not entirely clear how or why the CDC selected H2 PCI to operate the TA Center, but records show the company won the $3.8 million annual contract thanks in large part to its status as a Native-owned “disadvantaged small business.” The designation makes companies eligible for no-bid contracts set aside as part of federal efforts to expand opportunities to marginalized communities.

    H2 PCI is a jointly owned subsidiary of two Native groups — Hui Huliau, a Native Hawaiian organization, and the Alabama-based Poarch Band of Creek Indians — that do business with the Defense Department and other agencies through a raft of holding companies.

    Incorporated in 2021, H2 PCI’s only other federal contracts are for supplying furniture and performing construction at State Department buildings in Cameroon and Zimbabwe. It won both public tenders in a no-bid process like the TA Center contract. Because contracts set aside for Native- and minority-owned businesses are not competitive, the contract officer selecting the entity must justify its appropriateness for the work entailed in the contract — though the justifications in the case of H2 PCI and the TA Center have not been made public.

    H2 PCI shares an address and a CEO with the more well-established firm Advanced C4 Solutions, which is also owned by Hui Huliau. Over the years, it has received hundreds of millions of dollars in federal contracts for services. For the State Department, the company had a contract during the winding down of the Afghanistan war and various transport tasks in Syria, Libya, and other hotspots. A 2014 State Department email released by WikiLeaks describes AC4S doing private security work in Yemen. The company’s website says its customers include federal intelligence, defense, and security agencies, including a host of Defense Department agencies doing work like bolstering “the War fighter’s Information Dominance objectives.”

    “The industry practices that they prefer have nothing to do with our industry practices. The mechanism of contracting was very, very, very different from the way that we operate.”

    Abdallah, the CEO of both H2 PCI and AC4S, is described in a company biography as having “over 20 years of experience in Joint, Special Operations and Air Force Combat Communications as well as Air Traffic Control support,” as well as being a “cyber operations officer” in the U.S. Air Force Reserve.

    In promotional materials available on the website of the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, H2 PCI is described as offering “tactical global logistics and construction,” with no mention made of public health or harm reduction.

    In early conversations with the partner organizations of the TA Center, according to people with knowledge of the conversations, Abdallah and other members of H2 PCI pointed to their extensive work coordinating logistics in challenging locales as a selling point for its ability to take on the mission of coordinating technical assistance.

    Guzman, the former TA Center partner organization head, said the background in a different industry made a big difference in the failed subcontract negotiations.

    “The industry practices that they prefer have nothing to do with our industry practices,” she said. “The mechanism of contracting was very, very, very different from the way that we operate; not just the nature of the contract, but also because it is the key to success to be collaborative.”

    Fighting the Overdose Crisis

    Driven in large part by the contamination of black-market drugs with synthetic opioids like fentanyl and its analogues, overdoses have become the leading cause of accidental death in the United States, killing 106,699 people in 2021, the last year for which statistics are available. In response, there has been an explosion in the number of groups providing syringes, the overdose-reversal drug naloxone, and other lifesaving services to people who use drugs.  

    The TA Center was formed in 2019 and in some of the darkest days of the ongoing epidemic dispensed tailored help through its partner organizations.

    With funding from the CDC and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, the TA Center has, in its four years of operation, responded to more than 1,700 requests for assistance, helping hundreds of local organizations get off the ground, remain afloat, and navigate the often Byzantine rules of local health departments.

    The TA Center was the flagship program funneling CDC resources and assistance directly to local harm reductionists. It had become a critical lifeline for front-line public health activists, who are often cash-strapped and frequently labor under intensely hostile and isolating conditions, according to Doe-Simkins, who co-founded Remedy Alliance, which helps supply providers with free and low-cost naloxone.

    “Folks were working in really hostile, scary environments, and it is very isolating to be running an underground syringe-service program,” she said. “And the TA Center connected those folks to each other, which was such a really deep comfort for people who are doing some of the most groundbreaking public health work in this country.”

    The post A Defense-Linked Contractor Took Over a Successful CDC Anti-Overdose Initiative. It Imploded in a Day. appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • Unlike any other point in history, hackers, whistleblowers, and archivists now routinely make off with terabytes of data from governments, corporations, and extremist groups. These datasets often contain gold mines of revelations in the public interest and in many cases are freely available for anyone to download. 

    Revelations based on leaked datasets can change the course of history. In 1971, Daniel Ellsberg’s leak of military documents known as the Pentagon Papers led to the end of the Vietnam War. The same year, an underground activist group called the Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI broke into a Federal Bureau of Investigation field office, stole secret documents, and leaked them to the media. This dataset mentioned COINTELPRO. NBC reporter Carl Stern used Freedom of Information Act requests to publicly reveal that COINTELPRO was a secret FBI operation devoted to surveilling, infiltrating, and discrediting left-wing political groups. This stolen FBI dataset also led to the creation of the Church Committee, a Senate committee that investigated these abuses and reined them in. 

    Huge data leaks like these used to be rare, but today they’re increasingly common. More recently, Chelsea Manning’s 2010 leaks of Iraq and Afghanistan documents helped spark the Arab Spring, documents and emails stolen by Russian military hackers helped elect Donald Trump as U.S. president in 2016, and the Panama Papers and Paradise Papers exposed how the rich and powerful use offshore shell companies for tax evasion.

    Yet these digital tomes can prove extremely difficult to analyze or interpret, and few people today have the skills to do so. I spent the last two years writing the book “Hacks, Leaks, and Revelations: The Art of Analyzing Hacked and Leaked Data” to teach journalists, researchers, and activists the technologies and coding skills required to do just this. While these topics are technical, my book doesn’t assume any prior knowledge: all you need is a computer, an internet connection, and the will to learn. Throughout the book, you’ll download and analyze real datasets — including those from police departments, fascist groups, militias, a Russian ransomware gang, and social networks — as practice. Throughout, you’ll engage head-on with the dumpster fire that is 21st-century current events: the rise of neofascism and the rejection of objective reality, the extreme partisan divide, and an internet overflowing with misinformation.

    My book officially comes out January 9, but it’s shipping today if you order it from the publisher here. Add the code INTERCEPT25 for a special 25 percent discount.

    The following is a lightly edited excerpt from the first chapter of “Hacks, Leaks, and Revelations” about a crucial and often underappreciated part of working with leaked data: how to verify that it’s authentic.

    Photo: Micah Lee

    You can’t believe everything you read on the internet, and juicy documents or datasets that anonymous people send you are no exception. Disinformation is prevalent.

    How you go about verifying that a dataset is authentic completely depends on what the data is. You have to approach the problem on a case-by-case basis. The best way to verify a dataset is to use open source intelligence (OSINT), or publicly available information that anyone with enough skill can find. 

    This might mean scouring social media accounts, consulting the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine, inspecting metadata of public images or documents, paying services for historical domain name registration data, or viewing other types of public records. If your dataset includes a database taken from a website, for instance, you might be able to compare information in that database with publicly available information on the website itself to confirm that they match. (Michael Bazzell also has great resources on the tools and techniques of OSINT.)

    Below, I share two examples of authenticating data from my own experience: one about a dataset from the anti-vaccine group America’s Frontline Doctors, and another about leaked chat logs from a WikiLeaks Twitter group. 

    In my work at The Intercept, I encounter datasets so frequently I feel like I’m drowning in data, and I simply ignore most of them because it’s impossible for me to investigate them all. Unfortunately, this often means that no one will report on them, and their secrets will remain hidden forever. I hope “Hacks, Leaks, and Revelations” helps to change that. 

    The America’s Frontline Doctors Dataset

    In late 2021, in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, an anonymous hacker sent me hundreds of thousands of patient and prescription records from telehealth companies working with America’s Frontline Doctors (AFLDS). AFLDS is a far-right anti-vaccine group that misleads people about Covid-19 vaccine safety and tricks patients into paying millions of dollars for drugs like ivermectin and hydroxychloroquine, which are ineffective at preventing or treating the virus. The group was initially formed to help Donald Trump’s 2020 reelection campaign, and the group’s leader, Simone Gold, was arrested for storming the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. In 2022, she served two months in prison for her role in the attack.

    My source told me that they got the data by writing a program that made thousands of web requests to a website run by one of the telehealth companies, Cadence Health. Each request returned data about a different patient. To see whether that was true, I made an account on the Cadence Health website myself. Everything looked legitimate to me. The information I had about each of the 255,000 patients was the exact information I was asked to provide when I created my account on the service, and various category names and IDs in the dataset matched what I could see on the website. But how could I be confident that the patient data itself was real, that these people weren’t just made up?

    I wrote a simple Python script to loop through the 72,000 patients (those who had paid for fake health care) and put each of their email addresses in a text file. I then cross-referenced these email addresses with a totally separate dataset containing personal identifying information from members of Gab, a social network popular among fascists, anti-democracy activists, and anti-vaxxers. In early 2021, a hacktivist who went by the name “JaXpArO and My Little Anonymous Revival Project” had hacked Gab and made off with 65GB of data, including about 38,000 Gab users’ email addresses. Thinking there might be overlap between AFLDS and Gab users, I wrote another simple Python program that compared the email addresses from each group and showed me all of the addresses that were in both lists. There were several.

    Armed with this information, I started scouring the public Gab timelines of users whose email addresses had appeared in both datasets, looking for posts about AFLDS. Using this technique, I found multiple AFLDS patients who posted about their experience on Gab, leading me to believe that the data was authentic. For example, according to consultation notes from the hacked dataset, one patient created an account on the telehealth site and four days later had a telehealth consultation. About a month after that, they posted to Gab saying, “Front line doctors finally came through with HCQ/Zinc delivery” (HCQ is an abbreviation for hydroxychloroquine).

    Having a number of examples like this gave us confidence that the dataset of patient records was, in fact, legitimate. You can read our AFLDS reporting at The Intercept — which led to a congressional investigation into the group — here.

    The WikiLeaks Twitter Group Chat

    In late 2017, journalist Julia Ioffe published a revelation in The Atlantic: WikiLeaks had slid into Donald Trump Jr.’s Twitter DMs. Among other things, before the 2016 election, WikiLeaks suggested to Trump Jr. that even if his father lost the election, he shouldn’t concede. “Hi Don,” the verified @wikileaks Twitter account wrote, “if your father ‘loses’ we think it is much more interesting if he DOES NOT conceed [sic] and spends time CHALLENGING the media and other types of rigging that occurred—as he has implied that he might do.”

    A long-term WikiLeaks volunteer who went by the pseudonym Hazelpress started a private Twitter group with WikiLeaks and its biggest supporters in mid-2015. After watching the group become more right-wing, conspiratorial, and unethical, and specifically after learning about WikiLeaks’ secret DMs with Trump Jr., Hazelpress decided to blow the whistle on the whistleblowing group itself. She has since publicly come forward as Mary-Emma Holly, an artist who spent years as a volunteer legal researcher for WikiLeaks.

    To carry out the WikiLeaks leak, Holly logged in to her Twitter account, made it private, unfollowed everyone, and deleted all of her tweets. She also deleted all of her DMs except for the private WikiLeaks Twitter group and changed her Twitter username. Using the Firefox web browser, she then went to the DM conversation — which contained 11,000 messages and had been going on for two-and-a-half years — and saw the latest messages in the group. She scrolled up, waited for Twitter to load more messages, scrolled up again, and kept doing this for four hours until she reached the very first message in the group. She then used Firefox’s Save Page As function to save an HTML version of the webpage, as well as a folder full of resources like images that were posted in the group.

    Now that she had a local, offline copy of all the messages in the DM group, Holly leaked it to the media. In early 2018, she sent a Signal message to the phone number listed on The Intercept’s tips page. At that time, I happened to be the one checking Signal for incoming tips. Using OnionShare — software that I developed for this purpose — she sent me an encrypted and compressed file, along with the password to decrypt it. After extracting it, I found a 37MB HTML file — so big that it made my web browser unresponsive when I tried opening it and which I later split into separate files to make it easier to work with — and a folder with 82MB of resources.

    How could I verify the authenticity of such a huge HTML file? If I could somehow access the same data directly from Twitter’s servers, that would do it; only an insider at Twitter would be in a position to create fake DMs that show up on Twitter’s website, and even that would be extremely challenging. When I explained this to Holly (who, at the time, I still knew only as Hazelpress), she gave me her Twitter username and password. She had already deleted all the other information from that account. With her consent, I logged in to Twitter with her credentials, went to her DMs, and found the Twitter group in question. It immediately looked like it contained the same messages as the HTML file, and I confirmed that the verified account @wikileaks frequently posted to the group.

    Following these steps made me extremely confident in the authenticity of the dataset, but I decided to take verification one step further. Could I download a separate copy of the Twitter group myself in order to compare it with the version Holly had sent me? I searched around and found DMArchiver, a Python program that could do just that. Using this program, along with Holly’s username and password, I downloaded a text version of all of the DMs in the Twitter group. It took only a few minutes to run this tool, rather than four hours of scrolling up in a web browser.

    Note: After this investigation, the DMArchiver program stopped working due to changes on Twitter’s end, and today the project is abandoned. However, if you’re faced with a similar challenge in a future investigation, search for a tool that might work for you. 

    The output from DMArchiver, a 1.7MB text file, was much easier to work with compared to the enormous HTML file, and it also included exact time stamps. Here’s a snippet of the text version:

    [2015-11-19 13:46:39] <WikiLeaks> We believe it would be much better for GOP to win.

    [2015-11-19 13:47:28] <WikiLeaks> Dems+Media+liberals woudl then form a block to reign in their worst qualities.

    [2015-11-19 13:48:22] <WikiLeaks> With Hillary in charge, GOP will be pushing for her worst qualities., dems+media+neoliberals will be mute.

    [2015-11-19 13:50:18] <WikiLeaks> She’s a bright, well connected, sadistic sociopath.

    I could view the HTML version in a web browser to see it exactly as it had originally looked on Twitter, which was also useful for taking screenshots to include in our final report.

    A screenshot of the leaked HTML file.

    Along with the talented reporter Cora Currier, I started the long process of reading all 11,000 chat messages, paying closest attention to the 10 percent of them from the @wikileaks account — which was presumably controlled by Julian Assange, WikiLeaks’s editor — and picking out everything in the public interest. We discovered the following details:

    • Assange expressed a desire for Republicans to win the 2016 presidential election.
    • Assange and his supporters were intensely focused on discrediting two Swedish women who had accused him of rape and molestation, as well as discrediting their lawyers. Assange and his defenders spent weeks discussing ways to sabotage articles about his rape case that feminist journalists were writing.
    • After Associated Press journalist Raphael Satter wrote a story about harm caused when WikiLeaks publishes personal identifiable information, Assange called him a “rat” and said that “he’s Jewish and engaged in the ((())) issue,” referring to an antisemitic neo-Nazi meme. He then told his supporters to “bog him down. Get him to show his bias.”

    You can read our reporting on this dataset at The Intercept. After The Intercept published this article, Assange and his supporters also targeted me personally with antisemitic abuse, and Russia Today, the state-run TV station, ran a segment about me. 

    The techniques you can use to authenticate datasets vary greatly depending on the situation. Sometimes you can rely on OSINT, sometimes you can rely on help from your source, and sometimes you’ll need to come up with an entirely different method.

    Regardless, it’s important to explain in your published report, at least briefly, what makes you confident in the data. If you can’t authenticate it but still want to publish your report in case it’s real — or in case others can authenticate it — make that clear. When in doubt, err on the side of transparency.

    My book, “Hacks, Leaks, and Revelations,” officially comes out on January 9, but it’s shipping today if you order it from the publisher here. Add the code INTERCEPT25 for a special 25 percent discount.

    The post How to Authenticate Large Datasets appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • The Pentagon is working to expedite weapons exports to Israel by deploying a so-called Tiger Team of experts to facilitate the transfers, according to procurement records reviewed by The Intercept. Some of the arms sales will be carried out through a new Army initiative designed specifically for the provision of weapons to Israel.

    The Israel-specific program, called the Israel Significant Initiatives Group, is located within the Army’s Defense Exports and Cooperation office, which oversees policy for U.S. arms sales.

    The Tiger Team meets daily with the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, or DSCA, which executes U.S. arms sales, to overcome barriers to arms sales to Israel. The “tiger team,” a crisis rapid response team involving a diverse set of experts, is supposed to examine potential bottlenecks and delays in weapons transfers and offer advice for alleviating the issues.

    The existence of both the Tiger Team and the Israel Significant Initiatives Group have not been previously reported.

    “As implementer of the vast majority of both State and Defense Department security assistance, DSCA sits at the center of our arms transfers to Israel,” said Josh Paul, a former director for the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which oversees U.S. arms transfers. He said the creation of a Tiger Team is a policy choice by President Joe Biden to get weapons to Israel as fast as possible.

    “This shows that at all levels of government, from policy to implementation, the Biden Administration is doing all it can to rush arms to Israel despite President Biden’s recent explicit statement that Israel’s bombing of Gaza is ‘indiscriminate,’ and despite extensive reporting that the arms we are providing are causing massive civilian casualties,” said Paul, who resigned from the State Department in protest of the Biden administration’s ongoing weapons assistance to Israel. “This will not be a proud moment for the Biden Administration, the State Department – or for DSCA.”

    The Defense Department did not respond to multiple requests for comment about the Tiger Team and the Israel Significant Initiatives Group.

    According to a source familiar with the Tiger Team, who asked for anonymity to discuss sensitive deliberations, the group of experts has raised harm to civilians in Gaza as a potential issue with U.S. weapons sales to Israel.

    “The Tiger Team is looking at issues of civilian harm, and is raising those issues, but is being met with absolute lack of interest and direction from the top to keep the process moving,” the source said.

    “The Tiger Team is looking at issues of civilian harm, and is raising those issues, but is being met with absolute lack of interest.”

    Both the Tiger Team and the Israel Significant Initiatives Group are using defense contractors to staff up. Reference to the Tiger Team appears in a job posting by the Hoplite Group.

    “In response to the 7 October 2023 attacks by Hamas on Israel, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency has served as the implementer of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process with Israel,” the job listing says. “There is a desire to generate real-time Lessons Learned to assess major bottlenecks, anticipate major hurdles to overcome, and analyze the limits of FMS support to Partner Nations.”

    Another defense contractor, Sigmatech, listed a position for an “operations support specialist” to work on the Israel Significant Initiatives Group. The listing has since been removed.

    The White House convened a Tiger Team in preparation for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, according to the Washington Post. After the invasion, the Tiger Team reportedly developed contingency plans for how to respond in the event that Russian President Vladimir Putin resorted to chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

    According to Paul, the new Tiger Team for Israel shows that the arms sales system, already supercharged after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, is still not fast enough for the administration.

    “The assembling of a Tiger Team demonstrates that the Biden administration believes that all of the existing mechanisms of arms transfer — mechanisms which have proved their extreme ability to expedite arms transfers to Ukraine for the past two years — do not work fast enough,” Paul said.

    The Defense Exports and Cooperation office has previously touted its work providing security assistance to allied countries. Over the past year, for example, it has posted copies of several Defense Department press releases detailing security assistance to Ukraine, as well as other partner countries like Colombia and the Philippines. 

    “U.S. Sends Ukraine $400 Million in Military Equipment,” a March press release is titled. The release includes a picture of a tank unit billowing smoke from its howitzers. Another press release, from December of last year, detailed a security package to Ukraine, right down to the specific numbers of munitions like artillery, tank, and mortar rounds. 

    When it comes to Israel, the Defense Exports and Cooperation office has not posted a single press release this year. Secrecy has been a hallmark of the Biden administration’s weapons transfers to Israel, as The Intercept has previously reported.

    White House spokesperson John Kirby acknowledged the secrecy in October. “We’re being careful not to quantify or get into too much detail about what they’re getting — for their own operational security purposes, of course,” he told reporters. 

    Shortly after the October 7 Hamas surprise attack against Israel, the White House asked Congress to remove key restrictions on Israel’s ability to access U.S. weapons stockpiles in the country, as The Intercept reported last month. The White House request sought to “allow for the transfer of all categories of defense articles” from the stockpiles, as well as to remove requirements that such weapons be obsolete or surplus in nature.

    In other instances of weapons sales to Israel, the administration has cut out Congress entirely. Last week, the Biden administration bypassed Congress to authorize the sale of 13,000 tank shells to Israel.

    The post Pentagon Taps “Tiger Team” to Rush Weapons to Israel appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • As one of his final foreign policy acts as president, in January 2021 Donald Trump added Cuba to the list of “State Sponsors of Terror,” reversing the Obama administration’s 2015 determination that the designation was no longer appropriate. 

    The incoming Biden administration pledged to Congress it would start the process of overturning Trump’s redesignation, which by statute requires a six-month review process. Yet in a private briefing last week on Capitol Hill, State Department official Eric Jacobstein stunned members of Congress by telling them that the department has not even begun the review process, according to three sources in the room.

    In the briefing, Rep. Jim McGovern, D-Mass., inquired as to the status of the review. In order to remove Cuba from the list, statute requires at least a six-month review period. The news that the State Department had not even launched the review came as a surprise to McGovern and others in the room, and meant that the delisting couldn’t occur before mid-2024 at the earliest. McGovern pressed Jacobstein, noting that Congress had previously been assured that a review was underway. Jacobstein, according to sources in the room, said that perhaps there had been some misunderstanding around a different review of sanctions policies that State was undertaking. 

    “I don’t think they were prepared to respond to how upset members were,” said one Democrat, who was granted anonymity to discuss the private meeting. “They were furious.” 

    Vedant Patel, a spokesperson for the State Department, declined to comment on a closed-door meeting in Congress, and additionally declined to directly confirm or deny whether a review was ongoing. “We’re not going to comment on the deliberative process as it relates to the status of any designation,” said Patel. “Any review of Cuba’s status on the SST list — should one ever happen — would be based on the law and criteria established by Congress.”

    McGovern, however, had already been told that such a review was ongoing, according to multiple sources who heard directly from McGovern about the State Department’s messaging. 

    Biden’s refusal to even review Cuba’s status marks a strong rebuke of one of the Obama administration’s signature foreign policy achievements, the move toward normalizing relations with Cuba. 

    The Trump administration’s rationale for redesignating Cuba as a sponsor of terror relied heavily on the country having hosted representatives from FARC and ELN, two armed guerrilla movements designated by the U.S. as terror groups. But in October 2022, Colombian President Gustavo Petro, in a joint press conference with Secretary of State Antony Blinken, noted that Colombia itself, in cooperation with the Obama administration, had asked Cuba to host the FARC and ELN members as part of peace talks. The move by the Trump administration was “an injustice,” he said, and ought to be undone. “It is not us [Colombia] who must correct it, but it does need to be corrected,” added Petro, himself a onetime guerrilla.

    “When it comes to Cuba,” Blinken said at the press conference, “and when it comes to the state sponsor of terrorism designation, we have clear laws, clear criteria, clear requirements, and we will continue as necessary to revisit those to see if Cuba continues to merit that designation.” Blinken’s public claim — “we will continue as necessary to revisit” the designation — coupled with private assurances from the State Department left members of Congress certain that a review was underway. 

    Blinken was also asked about Cuba’s status in a hearing in March 2023 and said that Cuba had yet to meet the requirements to be removed from the list. “In both of these instances the Secretary was reiterating what we’ve said previously — should there be rescission of the SST status, it would need to be consistent with specific statutory criteria for rescinding a SST determination,” Patel said.

    The terror designation makes it difficult for Cubans to do international business, crushing an already fragile economy. The U.S. hard-line approach to Cuba has coincided with a surge in desperate migration, with Cubans now making up a substantial portion of the migrants arriving at the southern border. Nearly 425,000 Cubans have fled for the United States in fiscal years 2022 and 2023, shattering previous records. Instead of moving to stem the flow by focusing on root causes in Cuba, the Biden White House has been signaling support in recent days for Republican-backed border policies. 

    Hopes for a shift on Cuba policy have not just been fueled by the State Department’s misleading pledges about a review, but also by a semi-public moment picked up by a hot mic ahead of the previous State of the Union, in which Biden approached New Jersey Sen. Bob Menendez, one of the chamber’s leading Cuba hawks, and told him the two needed to chat. “Bob, I gotta talk to you about Cuba,” Biden told him. Menendez has since been indicted as an alleged intelligence asset of Egypt, and there is no indication the two have talked about Cuba. 

    The post State Department Stuns Congress, Saying Biden Is Not Even Reviewing Trump’s Terror Designation of Cuba appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • Twenty-six-year-old U.S. Army infantry veteran Thomas Latham is one of countless young people on TikTok, but he’s used it for a different purpose than most: recruiting veterans to staff secret U.S. military bases in Israel. 

    “Being a contractor is lit, in America this view would be $4,000 a month,” says the superimposed text on a TikTok post by Latham. His phone camera pans across the view from a high-rise in the Israeli town of Beersheba. In 2017, the Israeli military celebrated the construction of a U.S. military base in the town — a presence the Pentagon tried to downplay. 

    The video is one among many on Latham’s feed, where he frequently extolls life as a military contractor. Latham regularly posts job opportunities to help veterans trying to find work after the military, he said in an interview with The Intercept. At first, the TikTok posts came as part of his work as a recruiter for the private security contractor Triple Canopy. Since leaving Triple Canopy, he’s recruited for other firms, too, but sometimes he just posts.

    Thanks to the job listings and other commentary, Latham’s TikTok account provides a rare glimpse into the secretive world of national security contracting.

    “People like me because I don’t gatekeep information.”

    “I think what makes it work so well is it’s an industry clouded in mystery,” Latham told The Intercept. “People like me because I don’t gatekeep information.”

    Amid all the self-serving talk in the military contracting world about service and honor, Latham’s honesty stands out, especially when it comes to companies’ real motive: their bottom line. “Private defense companies after seeing another conflict on European soil,” says the text on one TikTok, as a camera zooms in on a tuxedo-clad man opening his arms and grinning.

    “Private contracting, regardless in which realm — you need conflict you need things to guard. You need things to protect,” Latham said. “Without anything going on, contracts are not going to pay as much.”

    For critics of U.S. defense spending, however, the contracts speak to a bloated military budget that outsources its own security, creating a windfall for private security firms to do what used to be a government job.

    “It really speaks to our priorities that the Pentagon has divested from essential functions like base security,” said Julia Gledhill, an analyst at the Project on Government Oversight’s Center for Defense Information, who noted that defense priorities seemed to be tailored to contractors.

    Latham worked as a recruiter for Triple Canopy until March, before taking up a recruiting contract for a smaller firm, which he declined to identify. (Though Latham still posts contracting opportunities, he said he now works for the U.S. Forest Service.)

    Many job listings of the sort posted by Latham require government security clearances, meaning that potential candidates will frequently be military veterans or those who have already worked in the private security world. Both communities, and the significant overlap between them, can be insular and are known for informal sharing networks.

    “As mysterious as the defense industry is, I managed to open a gate for Triple Canopy,” Latham wrote in a LinkedIn post, “to a direct market of qualified individuals.”

    A TikTok Thomas Latham posted from Beersheba, Israel  on March 14, 2023.
    Photo: The Intercept

    Younger Recruits

    With companies needing to reach a younger candidate pool for contracting gigs, Latham is at the vanguard of recruiting. He is using TikTok, the China-based social media giant that allows for sharing short, often informally made video clips, as a new vein for tapping into the networks of qualified potential applicants. TikTok is especially popular among young users who, like Latham, peruse and post on the platform to engage with everything from entertainment to news.

    William Hartung, an expert on defense contracting with the Quincy Institute, said companies like Triple Canopy may be taking the novel approach to expand their reach among candidates. He said, “It may be as simple as seeking platforms where they are more likely to reach younger potential recruits.”

    After leaving the army in 2021, Latham was approached by Triple Canopy about a job in Kuwait. He was so excited, he took to TikTok to post a 15-second video letting people know how much they could make working there. The post quickly went viral. Triple Canopy took note — and offered him the recruiter job. (Constellis, which owns Triple Canopy, did not respond to multiple requests for comment.)

    “The reason why I got into this was to help veterans land jobs in a field that they’re already familiar with,” Latham said. “I understand how it is to be a veteran, how hard it is to find a job in a bunch of different industries you never really fit in.”

    The golden age of private security contracting, Latham said, was during the Iraq War. In the era following the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration sought to privatize its global war effort, handing companies contracts for everything from logistics to providing security. In the first 10 years of the Iraq War, the U.S. spent nearly $140 billion on contracts with businesses, private security contractors among them.

    The most notorious of the private security firms was Blackwater, which massacred 17 Iraqi civilians in a single notorious incident and kicked off a national discussion about contractor accountability — and a lengthy legal fight.

    In one TikTok post referencing the Iraq era, Latham makes light of a 2014 merger between Triple Canopy and Academi, Blackwater’s successor. A TikTok user asked Latham in a comment, “Isn’t Academi formerly known as Blackwater?” Latham refers to the firm in a response as “a company that shall not be named.” He cracks, “I’m unsure; I’ve never heard of that company before and neither have you.”

    Whatever the companies’ names, the post-September 11 wars were a windfall for the industry — and for the cohort of veterans and other security personnel who found new, if sometimes dangerous, employment. At the height of the security contractor boom, Marine veterans could make as much as $200,000 a year.

    “I’ve met people that were veterans. They were like, ‘Yo, dude, I have no money, I have nothing.’ Now they’re making money that they would never even imagine.”

    “I’ve met people that were veterans. They were like, ‘Yo, dude, I have no money, I have nothing.’ Now they’re making money that they would never even imagine,” Latham said. “You kind of feel good after being a part of that.”

    Hartung said the jobs offer veterans opportunities to make an income that might not otherwise be available to them. “Many veterans struggle to find adequately paying jobs when they leave the service, especially those with families to support,” he said. “Working as a private security contractor can be relatively well paying, and it uses skills that ex-military personnel learned during their time of service.”

    As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wound down, fewer employment opportunities became available, though Latham said newer conflicts might change that. In January, he posted a listing on TikTok for a Triple Canopy gig in Germany, where the Pentagon’s European Command runs much of its effort to support Ukraine’s defense against the Russian invasion.

    A screenshot of a TikTok Thomas Latham posted on July 13, 2023.
    Photo: The Intercept

    “A Lot More in Play With Particularly Israel”

    “Ever since Hamas invaded Israel,” Latham said in a TikTok two days after the attack, “there’s been chatter about if we’re gonna get out there and expand within Israel.” The chatter, he explained, was coming from “a lot of my buddies in the private sector.” In the TikTok, Latham superimposes himself in front of a screengrab of a contract listing for a security detail in Jerusalem. The job listing doesn’t disclose who the work is for, and Latham, using his expertise, sorts through some possibilities.

    He says in passing that “there are contracts that have dropped” to support U.S. Special Operations Forces, the military’s secretive elite units, which the Pentagon has acknowledged are operating in Israel.

    Latham concludes that the job listing is likely for a position with SOC, a Virginia-based security firm, to work for WPS — or World Protective Service, which does security for the U.S. State Department around the globe. After naming a few of the listing’s requirements, he said, “So it just makes sense that it’s a WPS contract and it’s SOC’s WPS contract — if I was a betting man.”

    “There’s a lot more in play with particularly Israel that not a lot of people know about. We have military bases there.”

    The video is typical, with Latham explaining to both potential security recruits and laypeople about how the contracting jobs work, but also delving into the geopolitics that drive the industry. The short video about the Israel posting offers Latham’s explanation why assignments are cropping up there in the aftermath of the Hamas attack: because U.S. installations there were “taken completely off guard by all this.”

    “There’s a lot more in play with particularly Israel that not a lot of people know about,” Latham says. “We have military bases there, multiple military bases there.”

    Latham is referring to the web of bases the U.S. quietly maintains in Israel. In August, the Pentagon awarded a $38.5 million contract to build facilities for housing troops at a secret base in Israel, The Intercept recently reported.

    Other bases include weapons stockpiles the U.S. military has maintained in the country since the 1980s, originally intended for use by the U.S. in the event of a regional war but which Israel has increasingly drawn on for its own purposes over the years. (President Joe Biden recently asked Congress to remove nearly all restrictions on Israel’s ability to access the stockpiles, as The Intercept reported last month.)

    Last year, the U.S. Army awarded Triple Canopy a $21 million contract for armed security guards at an undisclosed and not previously reported communications site in Israel, according to procurement records. The work requires a secret-level security clearance.

    Latham’s TikTok account, with some 17,000 followers, appears to drive significant numbers of people to private security job opportunities. Data Latham posted on engagement with links on his social media postings show over 1,000 people clicking through to each one of three security job postings in Israel, Kuwait, and Germany — the countries he has said he recruits for.

    The conflict between compensation and undesirable locations is a recurring theme in Latham’s posts.

    “When you thought you were done with international contracts, yet the offer though,” another TikTok is captioned. 

    “6 figures take home is cool and all, but what’s the living conditions lol?” a user replies. “A tent for 175k? Nah.”

    The post TikTok Influencer Recruiting for Secret U.S. Bases in Israel appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • Henry Kissinger, national security adviser and secretary of state under two presidents and longtime éminence grise of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, died on November 29 at his home in Connecticut. He was 100 years old.

    Kissinger helped to prolong the Vietnam War and expand that conflict into neutral Cambodia; facilitated genocides in Cambodia, East Timor, and Bangladesh; accelerated civil wars in southern Africa; and supported coups and death squads throughout Latin America. He had the blood of at least 3 million people on his hands, according to his biographer Greg Grandin. 

    There were “few people who have had a hand in as much death and destruction, as much human suffering, in so many places around the world as Henry Kissinger,” said veteran war crimes prosecutor Reed Brody.

    A 2023 investigation by The Intercept found that Kissinger — perhaps the most powerful national security adviser in American history and the chief architect of U.S. war policy in Southeast Asia from 1969 to 1975 — was responsible for more civilian deaths in Cambodia than was previously known, according to an exclusive archive of U.S. military documents and interviews with Cambodian survivors and American witnesses.

    The Intercept disclosed previously unpublished, unreported, and under-appreciated evidence of hundreds of civilian casualties that were kept secret during the war and remained almost entirely unknown to the American people. Kissinger bore significant responsibility for attacks in Cambodia that killed as many as 150,000 civilians — up to six times more noncombatants than the United States has killed in airstrikes since 9/11, according to experts.

    Born Heinz Alfred Kissinger in Fürth, Germany, on May 27, 1923, he immigrated to the United States in 1938, among a wave of Jews fleeing Nazi oppression. Kissinger became a U.S. citizen in 1943 and served in the U.S. Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps during World War II. After graduating summa cum laude from Harvard College in 1950, he earned an M.A. in 1952 and a Ph.D. two years later. He then joined the Harvard faculty, with appointments in the Department of Government and at the Center for International Affairs. While teaching at Harvard, he was a consultant for the administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson before serving as national security adviser from 1969 to 1975 and secretary of state from 1973 to 1977 under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. A proponent of realpolitik, Kissinger greatly influenced U.S. foreign policy while serving in government and, in the decades that followed, counseled U.S. presidents and sat on numerous corporate and government advisory boards while authoring a small library of bestselling books on history and diplomacy.

    Kissinger married Ann Fleischer in 1949; the two were divorced in 1964. In 1974, he married Nancy Maginnes. He is survived by his wife, two children from his first marriage, Elizabeth and David, and five grandchildren.

    As National Security Adviser, Kissinger played a key role in prolonging the U.S. wars in Southeast Asia, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of American troops and hundreds of thousands of Cambodians, Laotians, and Vietnamese. During his tenure, the United States dropped 9 billion pounds of munitions on Indochina.

    In 1973, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to Kissinger and his North Vietnamese counterpart Le Duc Tho “for jointly having negotiated a cease fire in Vietnam in 1973.”

    “There is no other comparable honor,” Kissinger would later write of the prize he received for an agreement to end a war he encouraged and extended, a pact that not only failed to stop that conflict but also was almost immediately violated by all parties. Documents released in 2023 show that the prize — among the most controversial in the award’s history — was given despite the understanding that the war was unlikely to end due to the truce.

    Tho refused the award. He said that the U.S. had breached the agreement and aided and encouraged its South Vietnamese allies to do the same, while also casting the deal as an American capitulation. “During the last 18 years, the United States undertook a war of aggression against Vietnam,” he wrote. “American imperialism has been defeated.”

    North Vietnam and its revolutionary allies in South Vietnam would topple the U.S.-backed government in Saigon two years later, in 1975. That same year, due in large part to Nixon and Kissinger’s expansion of the war into the tiny, neutral nation of Cambodia, the American-backed military regime there fell to the genocidal Khmer Rouge, whose campaign of overwork, torture, and murder then killed 2 million people, roughly 20 percent of the population. Kissinger almost immediately sought to make common cause with the génocidaires. “You should also tell the Cambodians that we will be friends with them. They are murderous thugs, but we won’t let that stand in our way. We are prepared to improve relations with them,” he told Thailand’s foreign minister.

    As secretary of state and national security adviser, Kissinger spearheaded efforts to improve relations with the former Soviet Union and “opened” the People’s Republic of China to the West for the first time since Mao Zedong came to power in 1949. Kissinger also supported genocidal militaries in Pakistan and Indonesia. In the former, Nixon and his national security adviser backed a dictator who — according to CIA estimates — slaughtered hundreds of thousands of civilians; in the latter, Ford and Kissinger gave President Suharto the go-ahead for an invasion of East Timor that resulted in about 200,000 deaths — around a quarter of the entire population.

    In Latin America, Nixon and Kissinger plotted to overturn the democratic election of Chile’s socialist president Salvador Allende. This included Kissinger’s supervision of covert operations — such as the botched kidnapping of Chilean Gen. René Schneider that ended in Schneider’s murder — to destabilize Chile and prompt a military coup. “You did a great service to the West in overthrowing Allende,” Kissinger later told Gen. Augusto Pinochet, the leader of the military junta that went on to kill thousands of Chileans. In Argentina, Kissinger gave another green light, this time to a terror campaign of torture, forced disappearances, and murder by a military junta that overthrew President Isabel Perón. During a June 1976 meeting, Kissinger told the junta’s foreign minister, César Augusto Guzzetti: “If there are things that have to be done, you should do them quickly.” The so-called Dirty War that followed would claim the lives of an estimated 30,000 Argentine civilians.

    Kissinger’s diplomacy also stoked a war in Angola and prolonged apartheid in South Africa. In the Middle East, he sold out the Kurds in Iraq and, wrote Grandin, “left that region in chaos, setting the stage for crises that continue to afflict humanity.”

    Through a combination of raw ambition, media manipulation, and an uncanny ability to obscure the truth and avoid scandal, Kissinger transformed himself from a college professor and bureaucrat into the most celebrated American diplomat of the 20th century and a bona fide celebrity. Hailed as the “Playboy of the Western Wing” and the “sex symbol of the Nixon administration,” he was photographed with starlets and became a fodder for the gossip columns. While dozens of his White House colleagues were laid low by myriad Watergate crimes, which cost Nixon his job in 1974, Kissinger skirted the scandal and emerged a media darling.

    “We were half-convinced that nothing was beyond the capacity of this remarkable man,” ABC News’s Ted Koppel said in a 1974 documentary, describing Kissinger as “the most admired man in America.” There was, however, another side to the public figure often praised for his wit and geniality, according to Carolyn Eisenberg, author of “Never Lose: Nixon, Kissinger and the Illusion of National Security,” who spent a decade reading Kissinger’s White House telephone transcripts and listening to tapes of his unvarnished conversations. “He had a disturbed personality and was unbelievably adolescent. He admitted he was egotistical, but he was far beyond that,” she told The Intercept. “He was, in many respects, very much stuck at age 14. His opportunism was boundless. His need to be important, to be a celebrity, was gigantic.”

    “He was, in many respects, very much stuck at age 14. His opportunism was boundless. His need to be important, to be a celebrity, was gigantic.”

    Kissinger was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom — America’s highest civilian award — in 1977. In 1982, he founded Kissinger Associates, an international consulting group that became a revolving door refuge for top national security officials looking to cash in on their government service. The firm leveraged their and Kissinger’s reputations and contacts to help huge multinational corporations, banks, and financial institutions — including American Express, Anheuser-Busch, Coca-Cola, Heinz, Fiat, Volvo, Ericsson, and Daewoo — broker deals with governments. “A big part of Henry Kissinger’s legacy is the corruption of American foreign policymaking,” Matt Duss, a former adviser to Sen. Bernie Sanders, told Vox in 2023. “It is blurring the line, if not outright erasing the line, between the making of foreign policy and corporate interests.”

    Kissinger counseled every U.S. president from Nixon through Donald Trump and served as a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1984 to 1990 and the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board from 2001 to 2016. After being tapped to head the 9/11 Commission, families of victims raised questions about potential conflicts of interest due to Kissinger’s financial ties with governments that could be implicated in the commission’s work. Kissinger quit rather than hand over a list of his consultancy’s clients.

    In his 2001 book-length indictment, “The Trial of Henry Kissinger,” Christopher Hitchens called for Kissinger’s prosecution “for war crimes, for crimes against humanity, and for offenses against common or customary or international law, including conspiracy to commit murder, kidnap, and torture” from Argentina, Bangladesh, Chile and East Timor to Cambodia, Laos, Uruguay, and Vietnam.

    Kissinger ducked questions about the bombing of Cambodia, muddied the truth in public comments, and spent half his life lying about his role in the killings there. In the early 2000s, Kissinger was sought for questioning in connection with human rights abuses by former South American military dictatorships, but he evaded investigators, once declining to appear before a court in France and bolting from Paris after receiving a summons. He was never charged or prosecuted for deaths for which he bore responsibility.

    “Much of the world considered Kissinger to be a war criminal, but who would have dared put the handcuffs on an American secretary of state?” asked Brody, who brought historic legal cases against Pinochet, Chadian dictator Hissène Habré, and others. “Kissinger was not once even questioned by a court about any of his alleged crimes, much less prosecuted.”

    Kissinger continued to win coveted awards, and hobnobbed with the rich and famous at black-tie White House dinners, Hamptons galas, and other invitation-only events. By the 2010s, the Republican diplomat had become a darling of mainstream Democrats and remained so until his death. Hillary Clinton called Kissinger “a friend” and said she “relied on his counsel” while serving as secretary of state under President Barack Obama. Samantha Power, who built her reputation and career on human rights advocacy and went on to serve as the Obama administration’s ambassador to the U.N. and the Biden administration’s head of the U.S. Agency for International Development, befriended Kissinger before receiving the American Academy of Berlin’s Henry A. Kissinger Prize from Kissinger himself. Biden’s secretary of state, Antony Blinken, also had a long, cordial relationship with his distant predecessor.

    Kissinger was repeatedly feted for his 100th birthday in May 2023. A black-tie gala at the New York Public Library was attended by Blinken; Power; Biden’s CIA director, William J. Burns; disgraced former CIA director and four-star Gen. David Petraeus; fashion designer Diane von Furstenberg; New England Patriots owner Robert Kraft; former New York City Mayor Mike Bloomberg; former Google CEO Eric Schmidt; and the Catholic Archbishop of New York Timothy M. Dolan, among other luminaries.

    To mark Kissinger’s centenary, Koppel — who became Kissinger’s friend following the 1974 documentary — conducted a sympathetic interview for CBS News that nonetheless broached the charges that dogged Kissinger for decades. “There are people at our broadcast who are questioning the legitimacy of even doing an interview with you. They feel that strongly about what they consider, I’ll put it in language they would use, your criminality,” said Koppel.

    “That’s a reflection of their ignorance,” Kissinger replied.

    When Koppel brought up the bombing of Cambodia, Kissinger got angry. “Come on. We have been bombing with drones and all kinds of weapons every guerilla unit that we were opposing,” he shot back. “It’s been the same in every administration that I’ve been part of.”

    “The consequences in Cambodia were particularly —”

    “Come on now.”

    “No, no, no, were particularly —”

    “This is a program you’re doing because I’m gonna be 100 years old,” Kissinger growled. “And you’re picking a topic of something that happened 60 years ago. You have to know that it was a necessary step. Now, the younger generation feels that if they can raise their emotions, they don’t have to think. If they think, they won’t ask that question.”

    When The Intercept asked that question about Cambodia — in a more pointed manner — 13 years earlier, Kissinger offered the same dismissive retorts and flashed the same fury. “Oh, come on!” he exclaimed. “What are you trying to prove?” Pressed on the mass deaths of Cambodians resulting from his policies, the senior statesman long praised for his charm, intellect, and erudition told this reporter to “play with it.”

    “The covert justifications for illegally bombing Cambodia became the framework for the justifications of drone strikes and forever war.”

    Kissinger’s legacy extends beyond the corpses, trauma, and suffering of the victims he left behind. His policies, Grandin told The Intercept, set the stage for the civilian carnage of the U.S. war on terror from Afghanistan to Iraq, Syria to Somalia, and beyond. “You can trace a line from the bombing of Cambodia to the present,” said Grandin, author of “Kissinger’s Shadow.” “The covert justifications for illegally bombing Cambodia became the framework for the justifications of drone strikes and forever war. It’s a perfect expression of American militarism’s unbroken circle.”

    Brody, the war crimes prosecutor, says that even with Kissinger’s death, some measure of justice is still possible.

    “It’s too late, of course, to put Kissinger in the dock now, but we can still have a reckoning [with] his role in atrocities abroad,” Brody told The Intercept. “Indeed, his death ought to trigger a full airing of U.S. support for abuses around the world during the Cold War and since, maybe even a truth commission, to establish an historical record, promote a measure of accountability, and if the United States were ready to apologize or acknowledge our misdeeds — as we have done in places like Guatemala and Iran — to foster a kind of reconciliation with the countries whose people suffered the abuses.”

    The post Henry Kissinger, Top U.S. Diplomat Responsible for Millions of Deaths, Dies at 100 appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • On Wednesday, the Justice Department announced it had filed charges against a man allegedly working for the Indian government to orchestrate the assassination of a U.S. citizen earlier this year. An Indian government official allegedly instructed Nikhil Gupta, an Indian national, to coordinate the murder of a Sikh separatist living in New York. 

    The indictment alleges that Gupta, after being recruited by the Indian government official, hired a hitman and paid him a $15,000 advance to carry out the murder this past summer. The hitman was actually an undercover agent for the Drug Enforcement Administration. According to a report on the indictment in the Washington Post, the intended target of the killing was Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, general counsel for the New York-based Sikh activist group Sikhs for Justice. In the DEA’s press release, Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen said investigators had “foiled and exposed a dangerous plot to assassinate a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil.”

    “India showed a clear disregard for the rule of law when its government orchestrated the killing of an American activist on U.S. soil.”

    The alleged assassination plot against Pannun was in the works around the same time as the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Canadian citizen who was also a leader in the Sikh separatist movement. Nijjar was murdered outside Vancouver in June; the Canadian government has alleged the involvement of Indian intelligence in his death. 

    The Indian government has come under scrutiny over an alleged transnational assassination program targeting its opponents in foreign countries. In addition to the murder of Nijjar, The Intercept has also reported on alleged FBI warnings to Sikhs in the U.S. as well as alleged plots by India to assassinate Sikh activists in Pakistan. Both the Nijjar killing and the Gupta plot came ahead of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s trip to the U.S. in June

    “India showed a clear disregard for the rule of law when its government orchestrated the killing of an American activist on U.S. soil, coinciding with Modi’s White House visit,” said Pritpal Singh, a coordinator for the American Sikh Caucus Committee who was among the Sikh American activists who were contacted by the FBI after Nijjar’s killing.

    The details in the indictment reveal a murder-for-hire plot gone awry. Gupta, 52, described as being tied to the international weapons and narcotics trade, was alleged to have worked as a co-conspirator to an Indian government official with a background in security and intelligence. Along with others based in India and elsewhere, Gupta helped plan the murder of Pannun over his advocacy for an independent Sikh state and criticisms of the Indian government. In return, the government official indicated he would help secure the dismissal of criminal charges against Gupta in India, including during a meeting in New Delhi to discuss the plot. The Indian government official provided Gupta with details about Pannun, including his address, associated phone numbers, and his daily routine, which Gupta then gave to the DEA agent working undercover as a hitman. 

    According to the indictment, the Indian government official told Gupta that he was targeting multiple people in the U.S. In communications, the Indian official told Gupta that he had a “target in New York” as well as another target in California. Gupta replied: ”We will hit our all Targets.” The indictment also indicated that Pannun was surveilled in New York using a cellphone application that tracks GPS coordinates and enables the user to take photographs. The Indian official allegedly agreed to pay $100,000 for the murder of Pannun, with a $15,000 advance paid to the undercover agent around June 9, according to the indictment. Nijjar was fatally shot less than 10 days later outside a Sikh temple in the Vancouver suburbs. 

    According to the indictment, Gupta instructed the DEA hitman to kill Pannun “as soon as possible,” but not when high-level meetings were expected to take place between U.S. and Indian officials. Modi was scheduled to visit the U.S. on an official trip between June 21 and 23. On June 18, the day of Nijjar’s murder, the Indian government official sent Gupta a video of the Sikh leader slumped dead in his car. The next day, Gupta allegedly contacted the undercover DEA agent to tell them that Nijjar, like Pannun, had also been targeted for his opposition to the Indian government, telling the agent, “We have so many targets.”

    Gupta also allegedly promised “more jobs, more jobs” to the hitman, referring to more assassinations that would be carried out in the future. In a video call with the DEA agent, roughly a week before the killing of Nijjar, Gupta and a group of men dressed in business attire and seated in a conference room allegedly told the agent, “We are all counting on you.” 

    There is mounting evidence that India is running a transnational targeted killing program against dissidents. Documents reported by The Intercept last week alleged that India’s Research and Analysis Wing was coordinating the murders of individuals in Pakistan, using local criminal networks and assets based in the United Arab Emirates and Afghanistan. A slew of Sikh and Kashmiri separatists in Pakistan have been killed over the past few years, the pace of which has picked up in recent months. Such killings may be taking place in the West as well. In addition to Nijjar, in recent years a number of Sikh activists have died in mysterious circumstances in the United Kingdom and Canada, prompting accusations from family members and others of Indian government involvement.

    According to the indictment, Gupta was arrested in the Czech Republic in late June. He is charged with murder-for-hire and conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire. Gupta is currently “in jail waiting to answer to these charges,” according to the U.S. Attorney’s Office press release.

    The accusations against Gupta expand the scope of what is publicly known about India’s alleged assassination campaign in Western countries. 

    “These revelations are deeply unsettling and have shocked our community,” said Singh. “The Indian rogue regime must be held accountable, and the perpetrators must face justice.”

    The post India Accidentally Hired a DEA Agent to Kill Sikh American Activist, Federal Prosecutors Say appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • U.S. military outposts in Iraq and Syria are plagued by thefts of weapons and equipment, according to exclusive documents obtained by The Intercept that show militias and criminal gangs are systematically targeting U.S. forces.

    Military investigations launched earlier this year found that “multiple sensitive weapons and equipment” — including guided missile launch systems as well as drones — have been stolen in Iraq. This follows hundreds of thousands of dollars in military gear that were purloined from U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria between 2020 and 2022, as reported earlier this year by The Intercept.

    America’s bases in Iraq and Syria ostensibly exist to conduct “counter-ISIS missions,” but experts say they are used primarily as a check against Iran. Since the October outbreak of the conflict between Israel and Hamas, these bases have come under regular rocket and drone attacks as part of an undeclared war between the U.S. and Iran and its surrogate militias.

    The U.S. has increasingly responded to those attacks. In Syria, the U.S. launched “precision strikes” on a “training facility and a safe house” allegedly used by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The U.S. has since employed an AC-130 gunship against an “Iranian-backed militia vehicle and a number of Iranian-backed militia personnel” at an undisclosed location, following a ballistic missile attack on Al Asad Air Base in Western Iraq. “The President has no higher priority than the safety of U.S. personnel,” said Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, justifying U.S. strikes.

    But the criminal investigation documents obtained by The Intercept demonstrate that the U.S. cannot even secure its equipment, much less protect its troops.

    “We don’t tend to think nearly critically enough about the ripple effects of such an expansive U.S. military footprint,” Stephanie Savell, co-director of Brown University’s Costs of War Project, told The Intercept. “The so-called war on terror isn’t over — it’s just morphed. And we can understand these weapons thefts as just one of the many political costs of that ongoing campaign.”

    Details about the thefts in Iraq, which were never made public by the military, are found in criminal investigations files obtained via the Freedom of Information Act.

    In February, military investigators were notified that 13 commercial drones, valued at about $162,500, were stolen from a U.S. facility in Erbil, Iraq, sometime last year. The agents identified no suspects, and no leads are mentioned in the file.

    In February, military investigators were notified that 13 commercial drones were stolen from a U.S. facility in Erbil, Iraq.

    A separate investigation discovered that “multiple sensitive weapons and equipment” including targeting sight and launcher units for Javelin missiles — a shoulder-fired guided missile that locks on its targets — were stolen at or en route to Forward Operating Base Union III in Baghdad, Iraq. The loss to the U.S. government was estimated at almost $480,000.

    Investigators did not believe the thefts were an inside job. “No known U.S. personnel were involved,” according to a criminal investigations file. The investigators instead refer to locals as the likely suspects. “Iraqi criminal organizations and militia groups target convoys and containers for weapons and equipment,” the document stated. “Further there have been systemic issues with U.S. containers being pilfered by these groups and local nationals outside of Union III, due to the lack of security.”

    Earlier this year, The Intercept revealed at least four significant thefts and one loss of U.S. weapons and equipment in Iraq and Syria from 2020 to 2022, including 40mm high-explosive grenades, armor-piercing rounds, specialized field artillery tools and equipment, and unspecified “weapons systems.” Two of the incidents took place at bases in Syria, and three were in Iraq. None of those thefts occurred at Forward Operating Base Union III.

    Just how many thefts have occurred is unknown — perhaps even to the Pentagon. After more than two months, both Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve, which oversees America’s war in Iraq and Syria, and its parent organization, U.S. Central Command, failed to respond to any of The Intercept’s questions about weapons thefts in Iraq and Syria.

    Earlier this year, the task force admitted that it does not know the extent of the problem: A spokesperson said the task force has no record of any thefts from U.S. forces. “[W]e do not have the requested information,” Capt. Kevin T. Livingston, then CJTF-OIR’s director of public affairs, told The Intercept when asked if any weapons, ammunition, or equipment were stolen in the last five years.

    The thefts and losses uncovered by The Intercept are just the latest weapons accountability woes to afflict the U.S. military in Iraq and Syria. A 2017 investigation by the Pentagon’s inspector general found $20 million of weapons in Kuwait and Iraq were “vulnerable to loss or theft.” A 2020 audit discovered that Special Operations Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve, the main unit that works with America’s Syrian allies, did not properly account for $715.8 million of equipment purchased for those local surrogates.

    Groups like Amnesty International and Conflict Armament Research also found that a substantial portion of the Islamic State group’s arsenal was composed of U.S.-made or U.S.-purchased weapons and ammunition captured, stolen, or otherwise obtained from the Iraqi Army and Syrian fighters. 

    Losses of weapons and ammunition are significant — and the military has taken pains to prevent them in the past. When the U.S. withdrew forces from an outpost near Kobani, Syria, in 2019, it conducted airstrikes on ammunition that was left behind. The military also destroyed equipment and ammunition during the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. Still, within weeks of the U.S. defeat, American-made pistols, rifles, grenades, binoculars, and night-vision goggles flooded weapons shops there. Others were exported to Pakistan.

    Since the outbreak of Israel’s war on Gaza, it’s become ever more apparent that U.S. bases in the Middle East serve as magnets for attack, although far-flung outposts have been periodically targeted in other conflict zones. In 2019, for example, the terrorist group al-Shabab assaulted a U.S. base in Baledogle, Somalia. The next year, the same group raided a longtime American outpost in Kenya, killing three Americans and wounding two others.

    In recent weeks, America’s bases in Iraq and Syria have sometimes come under persistent attack, including as many as four strikes by drones and rockets in a 24-hour period. U.S. forces have been attacked more than 70 times — 36 times in Iraq, 37 in Syria — since October 17. More than 60 U.S. personnel have been wounded, according to Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh.

    The investigation files obtained by The Intercept offer evidence that U.S. military bases also provide tempting targets for criminals. Earlier this year, The Intercept reported on a daring daylight armed robbery of military contractors less than a mile from the entrance of Air Base 201, a large U.S. drone outpost in Niger. In 2013, a U.S. Special Operations compound in Libya was looted of hundreds of weapons along with armored vehicles. And a 2021 Associated Press investigation found that at least 1,900 military weapons were lost or stolen during the 2010s — from bases stretching from Afghanistan to North Carolina — and that some were then used in violent crimes.

    The post Missiles and Drones Among Weapons Stolen From U.S. in Iraq and Syria appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • The White House has requested the removal of restrictions on all categories of weapons and ammunition Israel is allowed to access from U.S. weapons stockpiles stored in Israel itself.

    The move to lift restrictions was included in the White House’s supplemental budget request, sent to the Senate on October 20. “This request would,” the proposed budget says, “allow for the transfer of all categories of defense articles.”

    The request pertains to little-known weapons stockpiles in Israel that the Pentagon established for use in regional conflicts, but which Israel has been permitted to access in limited circumstances — the very limits President Joe Biden is seeking to remove.

    “If enacted, the amendments would create a two-step around restrictions on U.S. weapons transfers to Israel.”

    “If enacted, the amendments would create a two-step around restrictions on U.S. weapons transfers to Israel,” said John Ramming Chappell, a legal fellow with the Center for Civilians in Conflict.

    Created in the 1980s to supply the U.S. in case of a regional war, the War Reserve Stockpile Allies-Israel, or WRSA-I, is the largest node in a network of what are effectively foreign U.S. weapons caches. Highly regulated for security, the stockpiles are governed by a set of strict requirements. Under circumstances laid out in these requirements, Israel has been able to draw on the stockpile, purchasing the weapons at little cost if it uses the effective subsidy of U.S. military aid.

    With the WRSA-I, Biden is looking to lift virtually all the meaningful restrictions on the stockpile and the transfer of its arms to Israel, with plans to remove limitations to obsolete or surplus weapons, waive an annual spending cap on replenishing the stockpile, remove weapon-specific restrictions, and curtail congressional oversight. All of the changes in the Biden budget plan would be permanent, except for lifting the spending cap, which is limited to the 2024 fiscal year.

    The changes would come in an arms-trade relationship that is already shrouded in secrecy, as The Intercept recently reported. Whereas the administration has provided pages of detailed lists of weapons provided to Ukraine, for instance, its disclosure about arms provided to Israel could fit in a single, short sentence. Last week, Bloomberg obtained a leaked list of weapons provided to Israel, revealing that they include thousands of Hellfire missiles — the same kind being used extensively by Israel in Gaza.

    The effect of lifting the restrictions on transfers to Israel — such as eliminating the requirement that the weapons be part of a surplus — could harm U.S. interests by diminishing American preparedness for its own conflicts in the region, said Josh Paul, a former official who served in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

    Paul, who resigned over U.S. arms assistance to Israel, told The Intercept, “By dropping the requirement that such articles be declared excess, it would also increase the existing strain on U.S. military readiness in order to provide more arms to Israel.”

    “Undermine Oversight and Accountability”

    The U.S. government is only supposed to spend $200 million per fiscal year restocking the WRSA-I — about half the total cap for all U.S. stockpiles round the globe. The White House request, however, would waive the limit on U.S. contributions to the stockpile in Israel. That would allow the stockpile to be continuously replenished.

    “The President’s emergency supplemental funding request,” Paul said, “would essentially create a free-flowing pipeline to provide any defense articles to Israel by the simple act of placing them in the WRSA-I stockpile, or other stockpiles intended for Israel.”

    The U.S. currently requires that Israel grant certain concessions in exchange for certain types of arms assistance from the Pentagon, but the White House request would remove this condition as well.

    Finally, the White House request would also reduce congressional oversight of U.S. arms transfers by reducing the length of advance notice made to Congress before a weapons transfers. Under current law, there must be 30 days prior notice, but the Biden budget request would allow this to be shortened in “extraordinary” circumstances.

    “It will make it much harder for Congress or the public to monitor U.S. arms transfers to Israel.”

    “The Biden administration’s supplemental budget request would further undermine oversight and accountability even as U.S. support enables an Israeli campaign that has killed thousands of children,” said Chappell, of Center for Civilians in Conflict.

    The House has already passed legislation reflecting the White House’s request last month, and it now stands before the Senate.

    “Taken as a package,” said William Hartung, an arms expert at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, “it is extraordinary, and it will make it much harder for Congress or the public to monitor U.S. arms transfers to Israel, even as the Israeli government has engaged in massive attacks on civilians, some of which constitute war crimes.”

    The post Joe Biden Moves to Lift Nearly Every Restriction on Israel’s Access to U.S. Weapons Stockpile appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • The Department of Defense relies on hundreds, if not thousands, of weapons and products such as uniforms, batteries, and microelectronics that contain PFAS, a family of chemicals linked to serious health conditions. Now, as regulators propose restrictions on their use or manufacturing, Pentagon officials have told Congress that eliminating the chemicals would undermine military readiness. PFAS…

    Source

    This post was originally published on Latest – Truthout.

  • The Department of Defense relies on hundreds, if not thousands, of weapons and products such as uniforms, batteries, and microelectronics that contain PFAS, a family of chemicals linked to serious health conditions. Now, as regulators propose restrictions on their use or manufacturing, Pentagon officials have told Congress that eliminating the chemicals would undermine military readiness. PFAS…

    Source

    This post was originally published on Latest – Truthout.