Category: National Security

  • For the fourth time since 2007, an internal audit shows the Department of Homeland Security isn’t deactivating access cards in the hands of ex-employees, leaving its secure facilities vulnerable to intruders.

    A new report by Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General shows that the department is systemically failing to revoke tens of thousands of “personal identity verification” cards that allow staff to enter sensitive, secure facilities and access internal data networks, despite being warned about the problem for 15 years. The issue is made worse, the report continues, by the fact that Homeland Security’s internal record-keeping is so shoddy that it was impossible to determine how many ex-staffers have working access cards they aren’t supposed to.

    “DHS has not prioritized ensuring that PIV cards are terminated when individuals no longer require access.”

    Like many modern office workers, Homeland Security hands out office-unlocking keycards to its employees to make sure strangers can’t wander in off the street. And, like most workplaces, the department is supposed to follow a standard policy: When an employee is no longer an employee, for whatever reason, their card is to be promptly deactivated.

    Unlike most employers, though, Homeland Security is a component of the U.S. Intelligence Community, meaning these credit card-sized badges have a “grave potential for misuse if lost, stolen, or compromised,” according to the inspector general report. Unfortunately for the department — and potentially the homeland — the OIG’s latest audit found that’s exactly what’s happening, and on a vast scale.

    “DHS has not prioritized ensuring that PIV cards are terminated when individuals no longer require access,” the report says. “Without effective PIV card and security clearance management and monitoring, DHS cannot ensure only authorized individuals have access to its controlled electronic systems and facilities.”

    The December 20 report — based on interviews and firsthand analysis of the internal database Homeland Security is supposed to use to track its active personal identity verification cards and associated owners — says the department failed to deactivate nearly half of the cards it was supposed to within the recommended 18-hour window after termination. Some PIV cards remained improperly active for months, and over 36,000 may not have been deactivated at all. Those with cards that remain improperly activated include employees who were fired, retired, failed background checks, or died.

    While the cards also grant holders access to sensitive DHS data networks, the department claimed to the inspector general that the electronic network access keys embedded in the cards were deactivated, “preventing access to electronic systems.”

    On the PIV cards, the report’s conclusion is blunt: “We determined that unauthorized individuals could gain access to Department facilities.”

    The inspector general report found that Homeland Security’s failure to secure its borders was caused by a widespread disregard for its own rules.

    After being scolded for this exact same problem for the past 15 years, the department developed an array of software systems and procedures to catalog PIV ownership and revocation — which on paper would grant the department an instant bird’s-eye view of who has improper access to its facilities. The inspector general report, however, found the department still fails to use these systems and, when it does, they don’t really work.

    Despite the perennial nature of the access problem, compliance appears to have failed at the most basic level: “The revocation delays occurred because DHS did not have an adequate mechanism to ensure managers promptly notified security officials when cardholders separated from the Department,” the report reads.

    “Some DHS officials also told us they intentionally did not enter a revocation date after revoking PIV cards.”

    Department personnel told auditors the Identity Management System, which Homeland Security is supposed to use to track card status, has a serious flaw: “Some DHS officials also told us they intentionally did not enter a revocation date after revoking PIV cards because doing so caused reports to become too large, resulting in IDMS slowing down.”

    Given that the software used to track access card revocation apparently can’t track access card revocation without “slowing down,” the report notes, “it was impossible for DHS OIG to conclusively determine if DHS officials revoked PIV card access promptly or at all.”

    The auditors also found that Homeland Security may not have withdrawn employee security clearances, as required, for its over 53,000 former employees since 2021, again because the department isn’t using an internal database meant to track such activity.

    With the card and security clearance revocation issues taken together, the auditors identified a distinct threat — albeit somewhat muddled, owing to bad bookkeeping: “As a result, there is a risk that individuals who no longer require access to systems and facilities could circumvent controls and enter DHS buildings and controlled areas.”

    According to the report, the department disagrees with the Office of the Inspector General as to the magnitude of the problem, but not that the problem exists. In a response published in the report, the department says it will implement a series of reforms and improved record-keeping polices to make sure cards are deactivated when they’re supposed to be — just as it promised after a 2018 audit flagged the very same failures.

    The post Department of Homeland Security Can’t Even Secure Its Buildings Against People It Fired appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • Paul Blount started small. When he set up a semiconductor chip company in his basement in 2006, he was the only employee. He had spent a decade at the chip behemoth Hittite Microwave Corporation, and he saw room in the market for a boutique design outfit.

    About a decade later, a man named Haoyang Yu did almost exactly the same thing, setting up his own lean chip company, Tricon, in Lexington, Massachusetts, just 30 miles from Blount’s home. A tipster, whom Blount would later acknowledge was linked to his company, went to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, writing that their new competitor “smells a bit fishy.”

    The tipster said it was suspicious that no one in their orbit had heard of Yu. “None of us here know this person or this company and there is 100% no way that they could come up with this product line in 6 months,” wrote the tipster. Both Yu and Blount marketed tiny, mass-produced chips called monolithic microwave integrated circuits, or MMICS, which can be used in everything from cellphones to military radar systems. Some MMICs are under export controls, which means that they can only be sent to certain end users and destinations with a license from the Commerce Department. Without evidence, the tipster hinted that Tricon might be violating export control regulations. “They are most likely reselling someone else’s part and what makes me nervous is that at least one is 3A001.b.2.d part,” the tipster wrote, referring to an export control classification number covering certain MMIC chips.

    Yu, who also goes by Jack, was in fact no stranger to the industry. He had moved to Amherst in 2002 to study engineering at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. After graduation he stayed in New England, eventually settling in Lexington with his wife and two young children. He worked at Hittite after Blount left, staying on after the company was acquired by Analog Devices in 2014. The year Yu started Tricon, he left Analog to work as a software engineer at a company that counts MMIC makers among its clients. At one point, he had even visited Blount’s company, Custom MMIC, to demonstrate software to a group that included Blount.

    Nonetheless, the tip to the FBI set off a cascade of events that would upturn Yu’s world. Investigators came to see him as a national security threat, zeroing in on what they imagined were unsavory links to China, where Yu, now a U.S. citizen, was born. They mounted a secret camera on a pole outside his house and enlisted the local trash company to set aside his family’s garbage after collecting it so agents could covertly rifle through it. In May, after spending five nights in jail, three months with a clunky ankle bracelet tracking his movements, and over two and a half years in legal limbo, he stood trial for a slew of felonies, including export control violations, immigration fraud, and wire fraud. Prosecutors also accused Yu’s wife, Yanzhi Chen, of wire fraud after she refused to cooperate.

    Then, just as quickly as it had come together, the case against the couple seemed to unravel. The U.S. government largely failed to convince a Boston jury, which in June acquitted Yu on 18 of 19 counts. Shortly after the trial, U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts Rachael Rollins dropped all charges against Chen, saying in a statement that the decision was a result of a “continuing assessment of the evidence.”

    Early on in the investigation, a Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency agent labeled Haoyang Yu as a national security threat.

    Early on in the investigation, a Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency agent labeled Haoyang Yu as a national security threat.

    Screenshot: The Intercept/United States District Court


    Court documents reveal a series of missteps, including a confounding export control classification and a failed sting operation. The lone charge of which Yu was ultimately convicted, possessing stolen trade secrets, had no connection to China.

    “There were so many mistakes,” Chen told The Intercept recently. “We have had three very dark years.”

    What prosecutors did have was evidence that Yu had transferred prototype chip design files onto his Google Drive while working at Analog Devices, naming two of the files Pikachu and Dragonair after Pokémon characters. Analog later abandoned the prototypes, some of which Yu had worked with while at the company, and in all but one case, the jury was unconvinced that the designs constituted trade secrets.

    Yu’s lawyers contend that such a case would have normally been dealt with through a low-stakes civil lawsuit filed by Analog Devices. That didn’t happen, they argue, because of Yu’s ethnicity. “Yes, he had some files on his computer that should have been deleted,” said Yu’s attorney William Fick of Fick & Mark in his closing statement at trial. But for the U.S. government, “[i]f you are a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”

    “The root problem behind a specific set of cases remains: the way that our own government still sees foreignness as a threat.”

    Federal prosecutors, working closely with the FBI and large corporations, have brought dozens of cases over the last decade involving alleged technology theft by China. In 2018, amid rising tensions with Beijing, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions gave the crackdown a name: the China Initiative. The initiative was scrapped earlier this year, following concerns from the American Civil Liberties Union and Asian American advocacy groups that it entailed racial profiling, but the biases that contributed to the program’s downfall endure, activists say. “The root problem behind a specific set of cases remains: the way that our own government still sees foreignness as a threat,” said Aryani Ong, co-founder of Asian American Federal Employees for Nondiscrimination. FBI Director Christopher Wray said in January that the bureau has over 2,000 open investigations involving China and technology. And perhaps no technology is more pivotal to geopolitical strategy than semiconductor chips, which are essential components of electronic devices and important to breakthroughs in computing.

    “MMICs have cutting-edge military applications ranging from electronic warfare to signals intelligence to military communications,” said Emily de La Bruyère, a co-founder of Horizon Advisory, a consulting firm focused on China. “China and the U.S. are locked in a battle — not just for advanced semiconductor technology, but also for influence over the global semiconductor value chain.” In just the past few months, President Joe Biden signed into law the CHIPS Act, which is aimed at strengthening domestic semiconductor chip manufacturing, and the Commerce Department unveiled unprecedented new restrictions on the sale of semiconductor technology to entities within China. Last week, Reuters reported that the Chinese government was readying an infusion of 1 trillion yuan ($143 billion) into its semiconductor industry.

    Convictions in China Initiative and related cases have led to years of prison time. But many cases have fallen apart because prosecutors made inappropriate leaps, activists say.

    “We are deeply concerned that the Yu case is yet another continuation of biased targeting policies and practices,” said Jeremy Wu, founder of APA Justice Task Force, a group formed in the wake of several botched prosecutions of Chinese American scientists. “His case exemplifies another tragic ordeal.”

    For Yu and Chen, the ordeal is not yet over. For his sole conviction, Yu now faces up to 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. His lawyers are trying to get the charge thrown out ahead of sentencing, arguing that prosecutors inflated a workplace dispute into a national security threat and that the entire investigation was tainted by bias. A judge will soon rule on whether the government is selectively enforcing the law by targeting Yu for his ethnicity, in violation of the U.S. Constitution.

    Yu, his lawyers, and a spokesperson for the U.S. attorney’s office in Boston declined to comment for this story, citing ongoing legal proceedings. When asked about the case by phone, Blount declined to comment and quickly hung up.

    Haoyang Yu at Boston Veterans day parade 2022.

    Haoyang Yu at the Boston Veterans Parade in November 2022.

    Photo: Courtesy of Yanzhi Chen

    “We Make Business”

    Chen and Yu met online in the early aughts, when they were students pursuing graduate degrees in different parts of the United States. He was from the north of China, and she was from the south. He struck her as whip-smart and diligent, and after dating long-distance for a year, they married and settled in New England. They had two kids, and Chen stayed home to raise them while Yu worked as an engineer.

    In 2013, they moved to Lexington for its excellent public schools, buying a house on a quiet street near the town’s Great Meadow. They grew to love the historic Boston suburb, which two and a half centuries after the outbreak of the Revolutionary War is now a wealthy bedroom community with a large Asian American population. Chen volunteered at her kids’ school and for local groups, and at her urging, Yu ran unsuccessfully for a seat on Lexington’s Town Meeting.

    Initially, Chen told The Intercept, Yu’s goals for Tricon were modest. Yu registered the company in Chen’s name — a structure sometimes used to protect assets — and listed a box at a nearby UPS Store as the company’s mailing address. Business was slow. Chen advised him to focus on recouping his investment, not turning a profit. Since Yu was happiest when he was busy, she said she recommended the Town Meeting candidacy partly as a distraction.

    “I never expected it to bring so much trouble,” she said of Tricon.

    The investigation into Yu began in earnest a month after the complaint linked to Blount, when the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency received a second tip about Tricon. A DCSA agent compiled an internal report, which was later entered into the court record, describing the second tipster as a government contractor with a security clearance. The contractor speculated that Yu “could be using” the contractor’s “products pictures and datasheets to market for HIS own company.” The agent labeled the report as involving foreign intelligence, China, and a “person reasonably believed to be an officer or employee of, or otherwise acting on behalf of, a foreign power” — presumably, Yu.

    MMIC is often pronounced “mimic,” and copying competitors’ products is common in the chip industry, as are allegations of theft. Shortly before the tipster went to the FBI, Yu’s previous employer Analog Devices had accused three former employees of taking proprietary material upon leaving the company. That case took the form of a lawsuit against the former employees’ new workplace, Macom, and the matter was handled in civil court, with Analog paying its own legal fees. It quickly ended in a settlement.

    But Yu’s case was different. Because the U.S. government alleged that it involved a potential national security threat, four federal intelligence agencies conducted the sprawling 18-month investigation. And while Analog Devices provided information, federal prosecutors ultimately decided which charges to press, and U.S. taxpayers covered the ballooning investigative and legal costs.

    Agents from the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, Commerce Department, and U.S. Navy worked together to bring down a man they envisioned as a sophisticated technological spy.

    Agents from the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, Commerce Department, and U.S. Navy worked together to bring down a man they envisioned as a sophisticated technological spy. In addition to putting Yu under surveillance, they followed Chen around town as she drove their kids to and from sports practices and obtained a search warrant to comb through Yu’s email accounts.

    From the start, the U.S. government’s investigation didn’t go quite as planned. Early on, an undercover agent with DHS’s Homeland Security Investigations force wrote to Yu, posing as representative of a potential buyer named “XY Atallah” from Jordan. The agent asked about a chip with specifications close to those that fall under export controls. “If good price, we can make business,” he wrote. The agent repeated the stereotypical phrase in a follow-up email the next day: “We make business.”

    Yu suggested lower-frequency chips that could be legally exported to Jordan without a license. When the undercover agent posing as Atallah declined, insisting on the higher-frequency chip and saying he could pay upfront, Yu walked away from the deal. Agents also found emails that Yu had exchanged with a potential buyer in Spain. After the buyer asked about controlled chips, Yu noted that he did not have an export license for the products and asked if the buyer had a licensed representative in the United States — a legal way of moving the product overseas, provided that Spain was the final destination. That deal didn’t go through, either.

    Nor did the investigation uncover solid evidence of crimes involving China. In March 2019, an HSI agent alleged in an internal report that Yu had stolen designs and technical data from his former employer to produce his own MMIC chips and sell them to entities in China in violation of export control regulations. The agent also contended that Yu had consulted for a Chinese company, claiming that the payment was evidence of “additional export violations to China.” Eventually, though, the government dropped both allegations.

    The HSI agent also claimed that Tricon had illegally exported one chip without seeking an export license. But a semiconductor industry expert hired by Yu’s lawyers would later show that the relevant export control classification had only been issued at the request of an investigator after Yu came under scrutiny.

    Companies that suspect their technology or designs have been taken generally “want to set an example for their own employees,” said Matthew Brazil, a former export controls official and resident fellow at the Jamestown Foundation focused on Chinese intelligence operations, after reviewing some of the court documents in Yu’s case. “That’s often a corporate response. But it’s not clear where the espionage component was in this case.” (Yu was never charged with espionage, but the U.S. government has in the past charged export control violations in cases alleged to involve spying or technology transfer.)

    “It backfired because they turned non-criminal cases into criminal cases. And that never ends well.”

    One reason that investigators pressed the national security angle may have to do with timing. In November 2018, less than a year after Yu came under investigation, Sessions announced the China Initiative. Yu’s name does not appear on a list of sample initiative cases released by the Justice Department and last updated in November 2021, but the effort was clearly important for Andrew Lelling, the U.S. attorney in Boston at the time. He was one of a handful of federal prosecutors on the initiative’s steering committee. Lelling, who is now in private practice, declined to comment on this and several other issues.

    “If your name is tied to it, then you want to see it succeed,” said Robert Fisher, an attorney with Nixon Peabody in Boston who successfully defended a China Initiative case brought by Lelling’s office. The priority placed on China-related cases led to an uptick in flimsy charges around the country, Fisher said. “It backfired because they turned non-criminal cases into criminal cases. And that never ends well.”

    AP20023801013407

    Then-U.S. Attorney Andrew Lelling, center, speaks outside federal court on Jan. 23, 2020, in Boston.

    Photo: Charles Krupa/AP

    “You Lied to Us”

    Early one morning in June 2019, shortly before Yu’s family was scheduled to fly back to China to see relatives, Chen returned home from dropping off their children at school to find cars lining the street. Their house was swarming with agents and local police, around 20 officers in all.

    Agents from the Commerce Department and Homeland Security approached and asked her to get inside their vehicle, she said. In the car, according to a transcript of the interview, they drilled her about Tricon.

    Chen told the agents that her husband was an uptight engineer, always doing everything by the book. Although the business was in her name, she said that he only let her do basic tasks for the company, not because he had anything to hide but because he wanted them done perfectly. “He’s a control freak,” she said, adding that she had helped him mail chips to sites in Europe and the United States but that he insisted on packing all the materials himself. She said that she didn’t really understand MMIC technology.

    “Yeah, neither do I,” one of the agents admitted.

    Later in the interview, the other agent accused her of lying. “I don’t want to see you get in trouble for anything, you know, that you lied to us about,” he said.

    “I was so confused,” Chen told The Intercept. While she didn’t understand the technology he worked with, she did know that her husband’s business was little more than a side project.

    Meanwhile, inside their house, agents were rummaging through the family’s belongings as another pair of investigators from the Commerce Department and Homeland Security questioned Yu. When he asked whether he needed a lawyer, they brushed off the question. Over the course of the interview, Yu mentioned an attorney five more times. But instead of stopping so that he could contact one, the agents kept questioning him.

    When Yu declined to answer a query, musing that his remarks could be misinterpreted, one agent launched into a heated speech. “I appreciate that you want to try to protect yourself, but Haoyang, we’re past that. The question now is, are you willing to do the right thing?” The agent offered a sample confession: “Like, ‘Yes, I did it. I’m ashamed. I’m embarrassed. I shouldn’t have done it. I had financial problems and I was trying to do the best thing I could for my family and this is the way that I saw to get out of that. It was a terrible choice.’ Like — whatever.”

    But Yu stayed quiet.

    Inside the agents’ vehicle, Chen said she watched, stunned, as he was led away in handcuffs. “I didn’t know why they took my husband away,” she said. “It is a really weird feeling.”

    After the street cleared out, she walked into her house and surveyed the aftermath. The agents had taken their computers, cellphones, and papers printed with Chinese characters that had no connection to Yu’s business, she said, including notes on potential travel destinations and the addresses of her college classmates. In the kitchen, a chipmunk scurried across the floor. The back door had been left open during the raid, and the animal had found its way inside. She shooed it out and sat down to cry. Then she forced herself to get up and put the house in order before her kids arrived home from school.

    Later that day, Lelling’s office issued a press release describing Yu as “a Chinese born naturalized US citizen.” “Theft of trade secrets from American companies is a pervasive economic and national security threat,” Lelling was quoted as saying. The press release continued: “Yu is charged with a massive theft of proprietary trade secret information.”

    Singled Out?

    As the couple’s cases moved toward trial, Yu’s defense team hired a semiconductor expert, Manfred Schindler, a consultant who had worked with several leading chip companies. Schindler wrote in an affidavit that small outfits like Tricon were common in the MMIC industry, and that companies commonly reverse engineer one another’s chips. “[M]ultiple manufacturers commonly sell individual items with very similar or even identical designs and performance characteristics,” he wrote. (Schindler declined to comment, citing a confidentiality agreement with Yu’s lawyers.)

    More explosively, Schindler took issue with the export control category that the U.S. government said governed one of Tricon’s chips. At the time, three of the charges against Yu hinged on that classification. The designation was unusual, Schindler wrote, because chips with similar specifications — including the one that prosecutors alleged Yu had copied — typically do not trigger export controls. He determined that the U.S. government had introduced the designation at the request of an agent investigating Yu and had never publicized the rule. The rule seemed to have been tailor-made for Yu.

    Another setback came in January of this year, when the U.S. attorney’s office in Massachusetts dropped charges in a controversial China Initiative case against Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Gang Chen (no relation to Yanzhi Chen). He had been charged with wire fraud and accused of omitting affiliations with Chinese institutions on Department of Energy grant applications that he submitted electronically. Prosecutors abandoned the charges after determining that some of the alleged affiliations did not exist and that Chen had no obligation to declare the others. Gang Chen’s defenders alleged that he was the victim of blatant racism and bias; 170 MIT faculty members signed a statement in his defense. The Justice Department scrapped the China Initiative the following month.

    Rollins had inherited both the Gang Chen and Yu cases from Lelling. Yu’s lawyers hoped to get charges thrown out in his case as well.

    Instead, Rollins’s office went ahead with the prosecution. But by the time Yu stood trial, the allegations against him had changed. Prosecutors dropped the export control violation charges connected to the chip that Schindler had flagged after the Commerce Department reclassified it as not requiring a license. In a superseding indictment, they charged Yu with new export control violations, for sending two chip designs to a foundry, or chip factory, in Taiwan.

    Yu’s Tricon was what’s known as “fabless,” meaning the company didn’t fabricate the chips in-house. Instead, Yu designed chips which were then manufactured in foundries. In recent years, Commerce Department officials have grown more aggressive about how they interpret regulations with regard to the export of design files, but historically, companies including Analog Devices have at times not sought licenses for similar exports. “[Fabless] suppliers often use off-shore fabs and package houses, yet most US military contractors don’t seem to care about this,” the industry publication Microwaves 101 notes in an explainer on MMIC suppliers. “Go figure!”

    Using files found in Yu’s Google Drive and on devices seized from his home, prosecutors alleged that he had stolen the designs for “dozens” of chips from Analog Devices. And, in a sort of legal hall of mirrors, they tacked on charges that depended on other charges sticking. In his interview ahead of becoming a U.S. citizen in February 2017, Yu had asserted that he’d never committed or tried to commit a crime for which he had not been arrested. Prosecutors alleged that this was fraud because he had committed a crime: trade secrets theft, the crime they were charging him with.

    GettyImages-119892117-final

    A detail shot of the semiconductor chip that was developed for use in car radar systems. Photos taken at Analog Devices in Wilmington, Mass., on July 5, 2011.

    Photo: Yoon S. Byun/The Boston Globe via Getty Images

     “Why Are You Challenging Him?”

    The drama began even before the trial started, when a prosecutor tried to ensure that an Asian American man was not chosen for the jury. The judge questioned the prosecutor’s motive. The potential juror, the judge noted, “is Asian; why are you challenging him? I see no reason to challenge him.”

    When the prosecutor replied that the objection was based on the man’s profession, the judge asked what that was. Silence ensued. “You don’t even know what the profession is,” the judge admonished the prosecutor. (Court documents, which give only the man’s first name and last initial, reveal that he worked as a nurse and paraprofessional for a public school system.) The government ended up withdrawing the objection, and the man remained on the jury.

    As the trial got underway, prosecutors returned again and again to the Pokémon characters. “[N]o one names things after Pokémon characters at work when they intend to be found out,” said Assistant U.S. Attorney Amanda Beck. They accused Yu of adopting a fake name because, in his work with Tricon, he used the English name Jack. They emphasized his use of multiple email addresses, claiming that it was a signature of criminals violating export controls. They suggested it was odd that Yu had registered Tricon in his wife’s name rather than his own and used the address of a UPS store for the business rather than his home. And they called as a witness an employee of Win Semiconductors, the Taiwanese firm that had manufactured Yu’s chips, who testified that the designs Tricon had sent the firm appeared unoriginal.

    Then, halfway through the trial, Blount, Yu’s Boston-area competitor, took the stand. In 2020, he had sold Custom MMIC for a reported $96 million. He later started a new company, Kapabl Engineering. When cross-examined by the defense, Blount admitted that he had met Yu before, though he said he did not remember the encounter. He conceded that Kapabl Engineering was, like Tricon, registered in his wife’s name. Just as Tricon had a bare-bones website, Kapabl Engineering had a site that Blount conceded was “rudimentary.” And much as Tricon had sent designs to Taiwan to be manufactured without obtaining an export license, Custom MMIC had sent designs to France without a license until 2019, the year Yu was arrested.

    “Custom never got an export license to send the GDS to France?” asked Fick, Yu’s attorney, referring to a chip design file.

    “We did not, no,” Blount answered.

    “And is that because you were intentionally violating the law?” Fick asked.

    “No,” Blount said.

    Blount also admitted that he was connected to the tip to the FBI. “We brought this matter to the FBI back in 2017,” he said.

    The jury deliberated for five hours. After they largely cleared Yu of the charges, Rollins’s office boasted in a press release about the single charge that had stuck, calling it “the first-ever conviction following a criminal trial of this kind in the District of Massachusetts.” Few observers saw it as a win for the government, though. The trade publication Law360 recently listed the trial among a string of losses by the U.S. attorney’s office.

    “The verdict revealed this case for what it truly is: a trumped-up civil dispute between a multibillion-dollar, global technology company and its former employee concerning alleged trade secrets,” wrote Yu’s attorneys in a recent filing. “The government’s relentless pursuit of Mr. Yu was driven, at least in part, by its baseless and offensive assumption that he was a Chinese spy, secretly loyal to China and, thus, a danger to the national security of the United States.”

    If Yu had been white, his attorneys contend, the trade secrets spat might have been handled through a lawsuit in civil court, without the threat of prison time.

    Yu’s attorneys now argue that the law has been selectively enforced, and that the U.S. government gave too much weight to information provided by Blount and Analog Devices. If Yu had been white, they contend, the trade secrets spat might have been handled through a lawsuit in civil court, without the threat of prison time — as had happened when Analog Devices accused the three former employees of taking proprietary material to Macom. That lawsuit, in fact, involved data for several of the exact same Analog Devices products at issue in Yu’s case, with the difference that the Macom engineers were accused of stealing much more data than Yu, and that, according to Yu’s attorneys, one of them actually confessed to taking trade secrets.

    Proving that Yu was singled out will be a challenge. Traditionally, the burden of proof for a selective enforcement motion rests on the defense, and no lawyer has successfully argued it in a China Initiative or related case. But in November, Judge William G. Young reversed an earlier decision on the topic, ordering the U.S. government to turn over to the defense additional evidence connected to Yu’s prosecution.

    In one filing, Yu’s lawyers cited comments Lelling made to Science in 2020, in which they say he acknowledged that prosecutors were seeking out ethnic Chinese defendants. “[U]nfortunately, a lot of our targets are going to be Han Chinese,” Lelling said at the time. “If it were the French government targeting U.S. technology, we’d be looking for Frenchmen.’”

    In an email to The Intercept, Lelling took issue with that interpretation. “No one was targeting people based on ethnicity — we were looking for conduct,” he wrote.

    Chen’s hopes now center on the judge dismissing the case. But she is clear-eyed about Yu’s chances. “The success rate is very low,” she said, adding, “I don’t know why the government has invested so much on us. We are just normal people.”

    Meanwhile, in August, Analog Devices finally filed a civil lawsuit against Yu. By the time it winds through the courts, he may be in federal prison.

    The post A Competitor Put the FBI on Haoyang Yu’s Trail. The Investigation Didn’t Go as Planned. appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • Twitter executives have claimed for years that the company makes concerted efforts to detect and thwart government-backed covert propaganda campaigns on its platform.

    Behind the scenes, however, the social networking giant provided direct approval and internal protection to the U.S. military’s network of social media accounts and online personas, whitelisting a batch of accounts at the request of the government. The Pentagon has used this network, which includes U.S. government-generated news portals and memes, in an effort to shape opinion in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, and beyond.

    The accounts in question started out openly affiliated with the U.S. government. But then the Pentagon appeared to shift tactics and began concealing its affiliation with some of these accounts — a move toward the type of intentional platform manipulation that Twitter has publicly opposed. Though Twitter executives maintained awareness of the accounts, they did not shut them down, but let them remain active for years. Some remain active.

    The revelations are buried in the archives of Twitter’s emails and internal tools, to which The Intercept was granted access for a brief period last week alongside a handful of other writers and reporters. Following Elon Musk’s purchase of Twitter, the billionaire starting giving access to company documents, saying in a Twitter Space that “the general idea is to surface anything bad Twitter has done in the past.” The files, which included records generated under Musk’s ownership, provide unprecedented, if incomplete, insight into decision-making within a major social media company.

    Twitter did not provide unfettered access to company information; rather, for three days last week, they allowed me to make requests without restriction that were then fulfilled on my behalf by an attorney, meaning that the search results may not have been exhaustive. I did not agree to any conditions governing the use of the documents, and I made efforts to authenticate and contextualize the documents through further reporting. The redactions in the embedded documents in this story were done by The Intercept to protect privacy, not Twitter.

    The direct assistance Twitter provided to the Pentagon goes back at least five years.

    On July 26, 2017, Nathaniel Kahler, at the time an official working with U.S. Central Command — also known as CENTCOM, a division of the Defense Department — emailed a Twitter representative with the company’s public policy team, with a request to approve the verification of one account and “whitelist” a list of Arab-language accounts “we use to amplify certain messages.”

    “We’ve got some accounts that are not indexing on hashtags — perhaps they were flagged as bots,” wrote Kahler. “A few of these had built a real following and we hope to salvage.” Kahler added that he was happy to provide more paperwork from his office or SOCOM, the acronym for the U.S. Special Operations Command.

    Twitter at the time had built out an expanded abuse detection system aimed in part toward flagging malicious activity related to the Islamic State and other terror organizations operating in the Middle East. As an indirect consequence of these efforts, one former Twitter employee explained to The Intercept, accounts controlled by the military that were frequently engaging with extremist groups were being automatically flagged as spam. The former employee, who was involved with the whitelisting of CENTCOM accounts, spoke with The Intercept under condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly.

    In his email, Kahler sent a spreadsheet with 52 accounts. He asked for priority service for six of the accounts, including @yemencurrent, an account used to broadcast announcements about U.S. drone strikes in Yemen. Around the same time, @yemencurrent, which has since been deleted, had emphasized that U.S. drone strikes were “accurate” and killed terrorists, not civilians, and promoted the U.S. and Saudi-backed assault on Houthi rebels in that country.

    Other accounts on the list were focused on promoting U.S.-supported militias in Syria and anti-Iran messages in Iraq. One account discussed legal issues in Kuwait. Though many accounts remained focused on one topic area, others moved from topic to topic. For instance, @dala2el, one of the CENTCOM accounts, shifted from messaging around drone strikes in Yemen in 2017 to Syrian government-focused communications this year.

    On the same day that CENTCOM sent its request, members of Twitter’s site integrity team went into an internal company system used for managing the reach of various users and applied a special exemption tag to the accounts, internal logs show.

    One engineer, who asked not to be named because he was not authorized to speak to the media, said that he had never seen this type of tag before, but upon close inspection, said that the effect of the “whitelist” tag essentially gave the accounts the privileges of Twitter verification without a visible blue check. Twitter verification would have bestowed a number of advantages, such as invulnerability to algorithmic bots that flag accounts for spam or abuse, as well as other strikes that lead to decreased visibility or suspension.

    Kahler told Twitter that the accounts would all be “USG-attributed, Arabic-language accounts tweeting on relevant security issues.” That promise fell short, as many of the accounts subsequently deleted disclosures of affiliation with the U.S. government.

    The Internet Archive does not preserve the full history of every account, but The Intercept identified several accounts that initially listed themselves as U.S. government accounts in their bios, but, after being whitelisted, shed any disclosure that they were affiliated with the military and posed as ordinary users.

    This appears to align with a major report published in August by online security researchers affiliated with the Stanford Internet Observatory, which reported on thousands of accounts that they suspected to be part of a state-backed information operation, many of which used photorealistic human faces generated by artificial intelligence, a practice also known as “deep fakes.”

    The researchers connected these accounts with a vast online ecosystem that included “fake news” websites, meme accounts on Telegram and Facebook, and online personalities that echoed Pentagon messages often without disclosure of affiliation with the U.S. military. Some of the accounts accuse Iran of “threatening Iraq’s water security and flooding the country with crystal meth,” while others promoted allegations that Iran was harvesting the organs of Afghan refugees.

    The Stanford report did not definitively tie the sham accounts to CENTCOM or provide a complete list of Twitter accounts. But the emails obtained by The Intercept show that the creation of at least one of these accounts was directly affiliated with the Pentagon.

    “It’s deeply concerning if the Pentagon is working to shape public opinion about our military’s role abroad and even worse if private companies are helping to conceal it.”

    One of the accounts that Kahler asked to have whitelisted, @mktashif, was identified by the researchers as appearing to use a deep-fake photo to obscure its real identity. Initially, according to the Wayback Machine, @mktashif did disclose that it was a U.S. government account affiliated with CENTCOM, but at some point, this disclosure was deleted and the account’s photo was changed to the one Stanford identified as a deep fake.

    The new Twitter bio claimed that the account was an unbiased source of opinion and information, and, roughly translated from Arabic, “dedicated to serving Iraqis and Arabs.” The account, before it was suspended earlier this year, routinely tweeted messages denouncing Iran and other U.S. adversaries, including Houthi rebels in Yemen.

    Another CENTCOM account, @althughur, which posts anti-Iran and anti-ISIS content focused on an Iraqi audience, changed its Twitter bio from a CENTCOM affiliation to an Arabic phrase that simply reads “Euphrates pulse.”

    The former Twitter employee told The Intercept that they were surprised to learn of the Defense Department’s shifting tactics. “It sounds like DOD was doing something shady and definitely not in line with what they had presented to us at the time,” they said.

    Twitter and CENTCOM did not respond to requests for comment.

    “It’s deeply concerning if the Pentagon is working to shape public opinion about our military’s role abroad and even worse if private companies are helping to conceal it,” said Erik Sperling, the executive director of Just Foreign Policy, a nonprofit that works toward diplomatic solutions to foreign conflicts.

    “Congress and social media companies should investigate and take action to ensure that, at the very least, our citizens are fully informed when their tax money is being spent on putting a positive spin on our endless wars,” Sperling added.

    Nick Pickles, public policy director for Twitter speaks during a full committee hearing on "Mass Violence, Extremism, and Digital Responsibility" on September 18, 2019 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Olivier Douliery / AFP)        (Photo credit should read OLIVIER DOULIERY/AFP via Getty Images)

    Nick Pickles, public policy director for Twitter, speaks during a full committee hearing on “Mass Violence, Extremism, and Digital Responsibility,” in Washington, D.C., on Sept. 18, 2019.

    Photo: Olivier DoulieryAFP via Getty Images


    For many years, Twitter has pledged to shut down all state-backed disinformation and propaganda efforts, never making an explicit exception for the U.S. In 2020, Twitter spokesperson Nick Pickles, in a testimony before the House Intelligence Committee, said that the company was taking aggressive efforts to shut down “coordinated platform manipulation efforts” attributed to government agencies.

    “Combatting attempts to interfere in conversations on Twitter remains a top priority for the company, and we continue to invest heavily in our detection, disruption, and transparency efforts related to state-backed information operations. Our goal is to remove bad-faith actors and to advance public understanding of these critical topics,” said Pickles.

    In 2018, for instance, Twitter announced the mass suspension of accounts tied to Russian government-linked propaganda efforts. Two years later, the company boasted of shutting down almost 1,000 accounts for association with the Thai military. But rules on platform manipulation, it appears, have not been applied to American military efforts.

    The emails obtained by The Intercept show that not only did Twitter whitelist these accounts in 2017 explicitly at the behest of the military, but also that high-level officials at the company discussed the accounts as potentially problematic in the following years.

    In the summer of 2020, officials from Facebook reportedly identified fake accounts attributed to CENTCOM’s influence operation on its platform and warned the Pentagon that if Silicon Valley could easily out these accounts as inauthentic, so could foreign adversaries, according to a September report in the Washington Post.

    Twitter emails show that during that time in 2020, Facebook and Twitter executives were invited by the Pentagon’s top attorneys to attend classified briefings in a sensitive compartmented information facility, also known as a SCIF, used for highly sensitive meetings.

    “Facebook have had a series of 1:1 conversations between their senior legal leadership and DOD’s [general counsel] re: inauthentic activity,” wrote Yoel Roth, then the head of trust and safety at Twitter. “Per FB,” continued Roth, “DOD have indicated a strong desire to work with us to remove the activity — but are now refusing to discuss additional details or steps outside of a classified conversation.”

    Stacia Cardille, then an attorney with Twitter, noted in an email to her colleagues that the Pentagon may want to retroactively classify its social media activities “to obfuscate their activity in this space, and that this may represent an overclassification to avoid embarrassment.”

    Jim Baker, then the deputy general counsel of Twitter, in the same thread, wrote that the Pentagon appeared to have used “poor tradecraft” in setting up various Twitter accounts, sought to potentially cover its tracks, and was likely seeking a strategy for avoiding public knowledge that the accounts are “linked to each other or to DoD or the USG.” Baker speculated that in the meeting the “DoD might want to give us a timetable for shutting them down in a more prolonged way that will not compromise any ongoing operations or reveal their connections to DoD.”

    What was discussed at the classified meetings — which ultimately did take place, according to the Post — was not included in the Twitter emails provided to The Intercept, but many of the fake accounts remained active for at least another year. Some of the accounts on the CENTCOM list remain active even now — like this one, which includes affiliation with CENTCOM, and this one, which does not — while many were swept off the platform in a mass suspension on May 16.

    In a separate email sent in May 2020, Lisa Roman, then a vice president of the company in charge of global public policy, emailed William S. Castle, a Pentagon attorney, along with Roth, with an additional list of Defense Department Twitter accounts. “The first tab lists those accounts previously provided to us and the second, associated accounts that Twitter has discovered,” wrote Roman. It’s not clear from this single email what Roman is requesting – she references a phone call preceding the email — but she notes that the second tab of accounts — the ones that had not been explicitly provided to Twitter by the Pentagon — “may violate our Rules.” The attachment included a batch of accounts tweeting in Russian and Arabic about human rights violations committed by ISIS. Many accounts in both tabs were not openly identified as affiliated with the U.S. government.

    Twitter executives remained aware of the Defense Department’s special status. This past January, a Twitter executive recirculated the CENTCOM list of Twitter accounts originally whitelisted in 2017. The email simply read “FYI” and was directed to several Twitter officials, including Patrick Conlon, a former Defense Department intelligence analyst then working on the site integrity unit as Twitter’s global threat intelligence lead. Internal records also showed that the accounts that remained from Kahler’s original list are still whitelisted.

    Following the mass suspension of many of the accounts this past May, Twitter’s team worked to limit blowback from its involvement in the campaign.

    Shortly before publication of the Washington Post story in September, Katie Rosborough, then a communications specialist at Twitter, wrote to alert Twitter lawyers and lobbyists about the upcoming piece. “It’s a story that’s mostly focused on DoD and Facebook; however, there will be a couple lines that reference us alongside Facebook in that we reached out to them [DoD] for a meeting. We don’t think they’ll tie it to anything Mudge-related or name any Twitter employees. We declined to comment,” she wrote. (Mudge is a reference to Peiter Zatko, a Twitter whistleblower who filed a complaint with federal authorities in July, alleging lax security measures and penetration of the company by foreign agents.)

    After publication, the Twitter team congratulated one another because the story minimized Twitter’s role in the CENTCOM psyop campaign. Instead, the story largely revolved around the Pentagon’s decision to begin a review of its clandestine psychological operations on social media.

    “Thanks for doing all that you could to manage this one,” wrote Rebecca Hahn, another former Twitter communications official. “It didn’t seem to get too much traction beyond verge, cnn and wapo editors promoting.”

    The U.S. military and intelligence community have long pursued a strategy of fabricated online personas and third parties to amplify certain narratives in foreign countries, the idea being that an authentic-looking Persian-language news portal or a local Afghan woman would have greater organic influence than an official Pentagon press release.

    Military online propaganda efforts have largely been governed by a 2006 memorandum. The memo notes that the Defense Department’s internet activities should “openly acknowledge U.S. involvement” except in cases when a “Combatant Commander believes that it will not be possible due to operational considerations.” This method of nondisclosure, the memo states, is only authorized for operations in the “Global War on Terrorism, or when specified in other Secretary of Defense execute orders.”

    In 2019, lawmakers passed a measure known as Section 1631, a reference to a provision of the National Defense Authorization Act, further legally affirming clandestine psychological operations by the military in a bid to counter online disinformation campaigns by Russia, China, and other foreign adversaries.

    In 2008, the U.S. Special Operations Command opened a request for a service to provide “web-based influence products and tools in support of strategic and long-term U.S. Government goals and objectives.” The contract referred to the Trans-Regional Web Initiative, an effort to create online news sites designed to win hearts and minds in the battle to counter Russian influence in Central Asia and global Islamic terrorism. The contract was initially carried out by General Dynamics Information Technology, a subsidiary of the defense contractor General Dynamics, in connection with CENTCOM communication offices in the Washington, D.C., area and in Tampa, Florida.

    A program known as “WebOps,” run by a defense contractor known as Colsa Corp., was used to create fictitious online identities designed to counter online recruitment efforts by ISIS and other terrorist networks.

    The Intercept spoke to a former employee of a contractor — on the condition of anonymity for legal protection — engaged in these online propaganda networks for the Trans-Regional Web Initiative. He described a loose newsroom-style operation, employing former journalists, operating out of a generic suburban office building.

    “Generally what happens, at the time when I was there, CENTCOM will develop a list of messaging points that they want us to focus on,” said the contractor. “Basically, they would, we want you to focus on say, counterterrorism and a general framework that we want to talk about.”

    From there, he said, supervisors would help craft content that was distributed through a network of CENTCOM-controlled websites and social media accounts. As the contractors created content to support narratives from military command, they were instructed to tag each content item with a specific military objective. Generally, the contractor said, the news items he created were technically factual but always crafted in a way that closely reflected the Pentagon’s goals.

    “We had some pressure from CENTCOM to push stories,” he added, while noting that he worked at the sites years ago, before the transition to more covert operations. At the time, “we weren’t doing any of that black-hat stuff.”

    The post Twitter Aided the Pentagon in its Covert Online Propaganda Campaign appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • The Pentagon has exceeded a three-month time limit set by lawmakers to hand over an investigation into its role in the killing of more than 160 civilians in Nigeria in 2017.

    In September, the Protection of Civilians in Conflict Caucus called on Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III to disclose details of the U.S. role in the January 17, 2017, airstrike on a displaced persons camp in Rann, Nigeria. While the Nigerian air force expressed regret for carrying out the attack, which also seriously wounded more than 120 people, it was referred to as an instance of “U.S.-Nigerian operations” in a formerly secret U.S. military document first revealed by The Intercept in July.

    Just days after the attack, U.S. Africa Command secretly commissioned Brig. Gen. Frank J. Stokes to undertake an “investigation to determine the facts and circumstances” of the airstrike while avoiding questions of wrongdoing or recommendations for disciplinary action, according to the document, which The Intercept obtained via the Freedom of Information Act. Stokes’s findings were never made public.

    The Protection of Civilians in Conflict Caucus — Reps. Sara Jacobs, D-Calif.; Jason Crow, D-Colo.; Ro Khanna, D-Calif.; Andy Kim, D-N.J.; and Tom Malinowski, D-N.J. — asked Austin to turn over the nearly six-year-old investigation and answer a series of questions concerning the attack and U.S.-Nigerian military operations within 90 days; that deadline expired almost two weeks ago.

    “The Pentagon’s failure to provide information and documents … to determine possible U.S. involvement in an airstrike that took many civilian lives in northeast Nigeria does not bode well for the U.S. government’s expressed commitment to transparency and accountability,” Anietie Ewang, Human Rights Watch’s Nigeria researcher told The Intercept. “It sends a worrisome message that, at minimum, the Defense Department is unwilling to engage on an issue affecting countless lives and may even reflect an attempt to evade responsibility.”

    In August, the Pentagon unveiled a Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, which provides a blueprint for improving how the U.S. military addresses civilian harm. The plan calls for a new emphasis on the “proactive release of information” and “transparency regarding [Defense Department] policies and processes for mitigating and responding to civilian harm” — but not until next year.

    The formerly secret AFRICOM document obtained by The Intercept, along with reporting by Nigerian journalists and interviews with experts, suggests that the U.S. may have launched this rare internal investigation because it secretly provided intelligence or other support to the Nigerian armed forces who carried out the deadly strike.

    Neither lawmakers nor the Pentagon were eager to comment on the missed deadline. Spokespersons for Crow, Jacobs, Kim, Khanna, and Malinowski declined to comment. Lt. Col. Phillip Ventura, a Pentagon spokesperson, was unable to answer questions about the status of the congressional request during a phone conversation last week and expressed pessimism about the prospect of providing anything substantive prior to publication. “I don’t think we’re going to get a lot of joy on this one,” he told The Intercept.

    In a statement sent to The Intercept after this article was published, Ventura wrote: “The Department of Defense is aware of the matter and addressing the concerns of Congress directly with them. As a Department, we have long-recognized the strategic and moral importance of mitigating harm to civilians — whether resulting from a U.S. military operation or an operation conducted by our allies and partners — and we will continue to improve by implementing the steps outlined in the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP), which Secretary Austin approved in August of this year.”

    A spokesperson for Rep. Sara Jacobs said Defense Department officials were “working on this request.” She would not elaborate further on the Pentagon’s response or lack thereof.

    “The congressional caucus should be persistent so that the necessary information comes to light,” Ewang told The Intercept.

    Update: December 20, 2022, 1:09 p.m. ET
    This story has been updated to include a statement from the Defense Department received after publication.

    The post Pentagon Failed to Respond to Lawmakers on U.S. Role in Deadly Nigeria Airstrike appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • The Biden administration declassified a new clue last week to the relationship between Lee Harvey Oswald and the Central Intelligence Agency. Among the intersections between Oswald and the CIA, his time as a young Marine at the Atsugi naval air facility in Japan in 1957 is high among them.

    Atsugi was a launching pad for U-2 spy flights over the Soviet Union and was also a hub of the CIA’s research into psychedelic drugs. “A CIA memo titled ‘Truth Drugs in Interrogation’ revealed the agency practice of dosing agents who were marked for dangerous overseas missions,” wrote author David Talbot in “The Devil’s Chessboard,” his 2015 biography of former CIA Director Allen Dulles.

    Talbot’s exploration of the link ended there: “Some chroniclers of Oswald’s life have suggested that he was one of the young marines on whom the CIA performed its acid tests.”

    A new document released in full last week relates directly to Oswald’s time at Atsugi, revealing details about the CIA’s response to testimony from a former agency accountant that the spy service had employed Oswald — who went on to be a gunman in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963.

    The CIA’s role in Kennedy’s assassination remains one of the great unsolved mysteries of American history. A majority of Americans believe the president was killed as part of a conspiracy that went beyond Oswald, and roughly a third believe the CIA or elements within the CIA had a hand in it.

    The CIA’s role in Kennedy’s assassination remains one of the great unsolved mysteries of American history.

    The main theory posits the assassination as a response to Kennedy’s firing of Dulles, a cloak-and-dagger powerbroker, following the failed CIA Bay of Pigs operation to unseat Fidel Castro’s Communist government in Cuba. Some believers of the theory also point to evidence Kennedy was souring on the Vietnam War or militarism in general. If Dulles did orchestrate a coup against Kennedy, it would be far from his first.

    A memorandum from 1978 reports that a finance clerk with the CIA, James Wilcott Jr., had informed a House panel exploring the assassination that “the CIA hired Lee Harvey Oswald when Oswald served in Atsugi.” The memo goes on to cast doubt on Wilcott’s claim, noting that he arrived in Tokyo in 1960, after Oswald had left the base, suggesting that Wilcott’s claim is based on “second hand” information.

    A version of the document was declassified by the Trump administration in 2017, though it redacted a portion of a note that runs along the bottom of it. That redaction obscured the name of a CIA official, Dan Nieschur, who fielded requests from congressional investigators in the 1970s and searched Oswald’s files. Jefferson Morley, editor of the Substack newsletter JFK Facts, said that inconsequential lifting of such redactions seems to be common in this latest document release, allowing the government to claim it is releasing thousands of documents, while most had largely already been in the public domain.

    The memo, written to a person identified only as “JHW,” explains that CIA official Russ Holmes “inherited the so-called Oswald files, but that he has assured me the Agency had no contact with Oswald.” The memo says that “contrary records” might be in “EA” — a likely reference to the CIA’s East Asia desk — and that they would be searched for and checked if found.” “He is after it,” the memo says of Holmes, who became legendary for his now-declassified CIA archive on the assassination.

    The new JFK files include a number of personnel records connected to Wilcott, whose testimony before the House committee in the late 1970s made news at the time.

    Oswald’s next few years make much more sense with a connection to the CIA than without them.

    After studying Russian while in the military — perhaps trained at the Army Language School in Monterey, California, according to Talbot, sourcing the claim to the Warren Commission chief counsel J. Lee Rankin — Oswald was discharged with a false claim of his mother’s ill health.

    Completely broke, with only $203 in his bank account, he took a boat to England nine days after his discharge. Then, according to his wife, Oswald took a military transport flight to Finland, staying at two of the nicest hotels in Helsinki.

    Oswald then took an overnight train from Helsinki to Moscow. Once there, he presented himself at the U.S. Embassy to announce he’d become a defector. Embassy staff later recalled that his defection speech sounded odd and rehearsed. He spent two and a half years in the Soviet Union and then, just as curiously as he’d defected, returned home to the United States.

    If the series of moves — from the discharge to the flight to the defection to the return — were made at the behest of the CIA, they make sense, with Oswald playing some type of role in the inscrutable world of spycraft. Absent an intelligence link, the tick-tock of Oswald’s post-military years would be situated somewhere between extraordinarily implausible to impossible to pull off.

    The CIA is known to have explored creative uses of psychedelics — and Dulles was specifically aware of these activities, even proposing some of the uses. On March 2, 1960, according to a declassified CIA report included in last week’s document release, the CIA director briefed Richard Nixon, then the vice president, on a proposal to deal with Fidel Castro and Cuba. The report, which appears to be another version of a previously declassified document, included plans for economic sabotage of cane production and interference with oil deliveries.

    A more innovative idea presented in the briefing, according to the CIA, appears to be a reference to dosing Castro with LSD, which the agency was at the time experimenting with. Nixon was told that the agency had “a drug, which if placed in Castro’s food, would make him behave in such an irrational manner that a public appearance could have very damaging results to him.”

    The CIA’s claim to have had no contact with Oswald is undercut by the fact that George de Mohrenschildt, a CIA asset, became close friends with Oswald in the months before the assassination. That spring, de Mohrenschildt traveled to New York, Philadelphia, and Washington. According to documents found in the newly declassified files, at the same time as his trip, the CIA’s Domestic Operations Division ran a search on de Mohrenschildt, “exact reason unknown,” according to two documents created by a CIA analyst included in last week’s declassification.

    The covert arm of the division was run at the time by E. Howard Hunt, a black ops specialist who confessed later in life to learning ahead of time of a conspiracy to assassinate Kennedy that involved high-level figures in the CIA.

    “It is interesting that Allen’s interest in de Mohrenschildt coincided with the earlier portion of this trip,” the memo concludes, referring to Gale Allen, a case officer with the CIA’s Domestic Operations Division at the time, “and the information would suggest that possibly Allen and de Mohrenschildt were possibly in the same environment in Washington, D.C., circa 26 April 1963.”

    In the wake of the latest document release, which also withheld countless additional documents, Fox News host Tucker Carlson reported that a source who reviewed the undisclosed records said they included evidence of CIA involvement in the assassination. Carlson said that he had invited his friend Mike Pompeo, the former CIA director who also withheld crucial documents, on to his show to respond. “Though he rarely turns down a televised interview, he refused to come,” Carlson said. “We hope he will reconsider.”

    The post Lee Harvey Oswald, the CIA, and LSD: New Clues in Newly Declassified Documents appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.


  • U.S. soldiers with the 82nd Airborne Division patrol at a coaltion checkpoint in Fallujah, Iraq, Nov. 20, 2003.

    U.S. soldiers with the 82nd Airborne Division patrol at a coalition checkpoint in Fallujah, Iraq, on Nov. 20, 2003.

    Photo: Anja Niedringhaus/AP


    If you need to unite a hundred bickering historians of the Middle East, you could ask them to identify the Iraqi city that suffered the greatest amount of violence at the hands of the U.S. military. They would all say “Fallujah.”

    Fallujah is where, just a few weeks after the fall of Baghdad in 2003, soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division opened fire on a crowd of civilian protesters and killed 17 of them; the U.S. military claimed that the first shots came from Iraqis, but there is no convincing evidence for that assertion and significant reporting to the contrary. Fallujah was a stronghold of the ousted dictator Saddam Hussein and for that reason, its residents fiercely opposed an unprovoked invasion that was, according to international law, flagrantly illegal.

    Those killings were the prelude to a torrent of violence and destruction in 2004. The bloodshed that year included the deaths of more than 1,000 civilians; the point-blank murder of prisoners; and the torture of inmates at Abu Ghraib prison, just 20 miles away. Fallujah’s punishment even extended beyond the brutal era of its U.S. occupation; in years after, there has been a spike in cancers, birth defects, and miscarriages, apparently due to America’s use of munitions with depleted uranium.

    “There must be a better name for this ship — one that does not evoke horrific scenes from an illegal and unjust war.”

    Instead of apologizing for what was done, the U.S. is choosing to celebrate it: The Pentagon announced this week that a $2.4 billion warship will be named the USS Fallujah. The commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. David Berger, made clear that the military has decided to double down on its fairy tale of Fallujah as an American triumph. “Under extraordinary odds, the Marines prevailed against a determined enemy who enjoyed all the advantages of defending an urban area,” he said in a press release about the naming. “The battle of Fallujah is, and will remain, imprinted in the minds of all Marines and serves as a reminder to our nation, and its foes, why our Marines call themselves the world’s finest.”

    The announcement noted that more than 100 U.S. and allied soldiers died in Fallujah but said nothing about the far larger toll of Iraqi civilians killed, the flattening of swathes of the city through extensive bombings, the apparent war crimes by U.S. forces, the health impacts on civilians that continue to this day — and the inconvenient fact that U.S. forces were unable to keep their hold on Fallujah for very long. For the Pentagon, it’s as if none of it mattered, or it didn’t happen.

    While the whitewashing is generating little pushback in the U.S., it is eliciting protests from Iraq and elsewhere.

    “The pain of defeat in Fallujah is haunting the U.S. military,” wrote Ahmed Mansour, an Al Jazeera journalist who reported from Fallujah during the fiercest fighting. “They want to turn the war crimes they committed there into a victory. … I was an eyewitness to the defeat of the Americans in the Battle of Fallujah.”

    I reached out to Muntader al-Zaidi, an Iraqi human rights activist who famously threw his shoe at President George W. Bush during a 2008 press conference in Baghdad. “It is insolent to consider the killing of innocent people as a victory,” Zaidi said. “Do you want to boast about forces that kill and hunt innocent people? I hope this ship will always remind you of the shame of the invasion and the humiliation of the occupation.”

    statement from the Council on American-Islamic Relations got straight to the point: “There must be a better name for this ship — one that does not evoke horrific scenes from an illegal and unjust war.”

    If you were an American in Iraq after the invasion, Fallujah was one of the most dangerous places you could visit. Based in Baghdad, I had to drive through Fallujah in an ordinary sedan in late 2003 to reach a nearby U.S. base where I had an embed. What I remember of that journey was the feeble disguise I donned (a red and white kaffiyeh over my brown hair); the way I slunk down in my seat as far as I could as we drove into the city; and the clenching in my gut as my car stopped in traffic and people could notice the Americans inside.

    I was fortunate; nobody spotted me or the blond photographer I was working with. But a few months later a two-vehicle convoy of heavily armed contractors from Blackwater, a private security company, was ambushed by rebel fighters on the main street where I was briefly stuck. Four Americans were killed and their mutilated bodies were hung over a bridge on the Euphrates River. The killings — and particularly the ghastly images widely published in the U.S. media — prompted the Pentagon to launch a series of revenge attacks against the city. It was an egregious over-reaction, especially because the slain Americans were not soldiers, they were well-paid mercenaries who, as a general rule, were regarded by Iraqis and U.S. troops alike as reckless, ill-behaved, and unprofessional. One of the worst massacres of the entire American occupation would take place in 2007 in Baghdad’s Nisour Square, where a convoy of Blackwater mercenaries opened fire on the cars around them and killed 17 civilians.

    There were two battles of Fallujah in 2004. The first was a U.S. invasion in the spring that ended with a partial seizure of the city and its handover to Iraqi authorities who soon ceded control back to the rebels. More than 800 Iraqis were killed in that battle, with more than 600 of them being civilians, half of whom were women and children, according to Iraq Body Count. Later that year, the second battle began when the U.S. military returned with an even greater number of forces and retook the entire city block by block in fighting that stretched from November to December.

    During the second battle, freelance journalist Kevin Sites, on assignment for NBC News, followed a squad of Marines into a mosque that contained a handful of injured Iraqi fighters who were disarmed and lying on the ground. Sites was filming and a Marine’s voice can be heard on the video saying, “He’s fucking faking he’s dead. He’s faking he’s fucking dead.” One of the Marines then fires his assault weapon into an Iraqi lying on the ground, after which a voice says, “Well, he’s dead now.” A military investigation subsequently determined that “the actions of the Marine in question were consistent with the established rules of engagement, the law of armed conflict, and the Marine’s inherent right of self-defense.”

    After the second battle, more than 700 bodies were recovered from the rubble, and 550 of them were women and children, according to the director of Fallujah’s hospital, who at the time said his count was partial because areas of the city remained unreachable for civilian rescuers. This toll made the second battle even more deadly for civilians than the first one. “It was really distressing picking up dead bodies from destroyed homes, especially children,” said Dr. Rafa’ah al-Iyssaue, in an article published in January 2005 by IRIN News, a United Nations-funded media outlet that specialized in humanitarian issues. “It is the most depressing situation I have ever been in since the war started.”


    A man suspected of involvement in attacks on coalition forces is questioned in the living room of his home during a raid by the 82nd Airborne Division near Fallujah, Iraq, Jan. 14, 2004.

    A man suspected of involvement in attacks on coalition forces is questioned in the living room of his home during a raid by the 82nd Airborne Division near Fallujah, Iraq, on Jan. 14, 2004.

    Photo: Julie Jacobson/AP


    History is inscribed in multiple ways, not just in books, movies, speeches, articles, and statues, but even on the transoms of warships. The U.S. military obviously wants to foment a historical narrative that acknowledges only the bravery of its soldiers rather than their crimes or their civilian victims. And yes, there was bravery by U.S. troops in Fallujah, so it’s not a total lie; they attacked an entrenched enemy, they fought hard, they protected each other, most of them didn’t commit war crimes, and some of them paid the price with their own blood. But that’s true for pretty much any army in any war; it could be said of some German soldiers in World War II (hello “Das Boot”).

    But it’s a lie if all you do is look at individual acts of bravery rather than the totality of what happened in a battle or war. I honestly can’t fathom how or why the Pentagon officials who decide such matters settled on “Fallujah” as the best name for this yet-to-be-constructed ship. Are they unaware of what happened? Are they aware but hoping to smother the truth? Are they counting on us to not care enough to say, “Excuse me, this is bullshit,” or do they want to remind the rest of the world at every port call that the U.S. is capable of destroying any city it chooses at any time of its choosing — a kind of floating “suck on this”? It could be any of that or all of that, who knows. The fog of war lingers long after the last bullets.

    While the names are designated by the Navy, it’s done under the authority of the president, so let the lobbying and protesting at the White House begin.

    This isn’t a done deal. The ship won’t be completed for at least several years, and names have been changed before christening and after entering service. While the names are designated by the Navy, it’s done under the authority of the president, so let the lobbying and protesting at the White House begin. Maybe there’s a chance of succeeding; President Joe Biden stood up to the generals who wanted to keep U.S. troops in Afghanistan forever, so perhaps he’ll tell them to get lost on this one too.

    If you step back from the narrow question of whether this ship should be named after Fallujah or Fresno, the larger truth is that it should not be built at all. The United States spends more on its military than the next nine countries combined. It’s a sickness that weakens the country by fueling the militarization of domestic policing while depriving Americans of the support they need for essentials like good schools and decent health care.

    So if you want to do the right thing for our soldiers and their dependents and their heirs, don’t name this ship the Fallujah, don’t build this ship, and don’t invade a country that has not attacked us. It shouldn’t be this hard.

    The post Not a Joke, the Pentagon Wants to Name a Warship the USS Fallujah appeared first on The Intercept.

  • US President Joe Biden being welcomed by Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on July 15, 2022.

    President Joe Biden being welcomed by Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on July 15, 2022.

    Photo: Royal Court of Saudi Arabia/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

    It’s hard to imagine what more Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman could do that would actually spur the Biden administration to use the full force of the presidency to oppose his murderous reign in Saudi Arabia. Ordering the execution and literal butchering of a Washington Post journalist certainly didn’t do it. Conducting mass executions of its own citizens? Old news. Waging a merciless scorched-earth campaign against the civilian population of a poor neighboring country? The U.S. continues to support that one. Let’s have another fist bump, old pal.

    Two years into Biden’s presidency, it is crystal clear that the Saudis have nothing significant to fear from the U.S. government. From a historical perspective, that is not in the least shocking. For decades, Democratic and Republican administrations have propped up the Saudi monarchy, lathering it with weapons sales and intelligence sharing, all while normalizing the draconian, antidemocratic grip on power held by the monarchy.

    When Donald Trump was president, a lot of Democrats were given political cover to finally come around to opposing the Saudi-led campaign of annihilation in Yemen. Trump was so cartoonishly cozy with MBS and the royals as their air war intensified and arms sales escalated that it became an almost irrelevant footnote that it was the Obama-Biden administration that gave the initial green light to the Saudi-led war in the first place. Or the fact that Barack Obama began bombing Yemen in December 2009 and continued to hit the country with drone strikes and cruise missile attacks throughout most of his presidency. In fact, by the time Obama left office, his administration had offered the Saudis more military support, $115 billion, than any in the history of the seven-decade U.S.-Saudi alliance.

    By 2019, particularly in the aftermath of journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s October 2018 murder, Yemen had become a Trump-made humanitarian disaster. That framing — which was bolstered by Trump’s garish public support for MBS after the murder — meant it was OK for more Democrats to oppose continued U.S. support for the Saudi’s brutal military campaign. A bipartisan war powers resolution aimed at doing that passed in 2019. Trump ultimately vetoed it, but it was nonetheless an achievement. Biden’s current national security adviser Jake Sullivan — along with Samantha Power, Colin Kahl, Susan Rice, and Wendy Sherman — signed a letter calling on Congress to override Trump’s veto.

    Enter the 2020 election.

    On the campaign trail, Biden pledged to continue the momentum and end U.S. bodyguarding of Saudi Arabia’s crimes, particularly after the execution of Khashoggi, a permanent U.S. resident, inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. If elected president, Biden said in a November 2019 Democratic primary debate, “I would make it very clear we were not going to in fact sell more weapons to them. We were going to in fact make them pay the price, and make them in fact the pariah that they are.” Biden asserted that there is “very little social redeeming value in the present government in Saudi Arabia.” As for the war in Yemen, Biden promised to “end the sale of material to the Saudis where they’re going in and murdering children.”

    Well, that was then and this is now. Politicians say stuff when they are running for office that they don’t really mean. In fact, sometimes they mean just the opposite.

    On Tuesday, the Biden White House went into legislative guerrilla battle mode to undermine support for the updated version of the war powers resolution that Trump vetoed. The resolution, introduced by Sen. Bernie Sanders, I-Vt., would have prohibited U.S. support for offensive Saudi operations in Yemen. Biden administration officials aggressively lobbied lawmakers to oppose the measure, and told them Biden “strongly opposed” it and that they would recommend he veto it should it pass. Sanders ultimately pulled the resolution, saying: “[T]he Biden administration agreed to continue working with my office on ending the war in Yemen. Let me be clear. If we do not reach agreement, I will, along with my colleagues, bring this resolution back for a vote in the near future and do everything possible to end this horrific conflict.” Make sure to check out the excellent reporting on this by Ryan Grim and Ken Klippenstein.

    Now, you might be forgiven for believing that there would be actual consequences for MBS and Saudi Arabia given Biden’s pledges as a candidate for president, particularly that business about making them a pariah. In fact, Biden made the same promise about another world leader in February when he launched a murderous war against a neighbor. “Putin’s aggression against Ukraine will end up costing Russia dearly, economically and strategically,” he said the day Russian forces began the attack on Ukraine. “We will make sure that Putin will be a pariah on the international stage.”

    It is, at times, tempting to imagine what would happen if Biden were to use even a modest fraction of the weight of American power in confronting Saudi Arabia that it has brought to bear on Russia. But doing so would be an exercise in fantasy. As president, Biden has greenlighted a series of U.S. weapons purchases by the Saudis, including $3 billion worth of Patriot missiles in August. These weapons deals, in the words of the administration, “will support U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives by helping to improve the security of a friendly country that continues to be an important force for political stability and economic growth in the Middle East.”

    Sanders says he is not giving up on the Yemen resolution and that the White House has indicated it will “work with us on crafting language that would be mutually acceptable.” Even if some form of a compromise is reached that allows a version of the resolution to pass, it will be a far cry from bringing any meaningful accountability for the crimes of the Saudi regime. And it will not result in any action vaguely resembling the promises Biden made as a candidate for president. The resolution is narrowly focused on ending U.S. support for explicitly “offensive” Saudi operations in Yemen.

    Former Michigan Rep. Justin Amash, a longtime opponent of U.S. policy on Saudi Arabia who left the Republican Party and became an independent, criticized Sanders for withdrawing the resolution. “Totally unacceptable. You know this is the game administrations and congressional leaders have been playing for years,” Amash tweeted. “They won’t respond to your gesture with anything but further delay and obfuscation. Biden wants it held until Rs control the House so they can block it for him.”

    In its talking points opposing the Sanders measure, obtained by The Intercept, the White House argues that its own strategy was already succeeding in deescalating the Yemen war: “The situation is still fragile, and our diplomatic efforts are ongoing. … A vote on this resolution risks undermining those efforts.”

    Some administration allies also argued that the language of Sanders’s resolution defining the term “hostilities” could set a precedent that potentially undermines the legal framework for U.S. military support to Ukraine. According to the definition in the resolution, the U.S. would be prohibited from “sharing intelligence for the purpose of enabling offensive coalition strikes” and “providing logistical support” for such strikes “by providing maintenance or transferring spare parts to coalition members flying warplanes engaged in anti-Houthi bombings in Yemen.” It also stated that neither military nor civilian personnel from the Defense Department would be permitted “to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of the Saudi-led coalition forces in hostilities against the Houthis in Yemen or in situations in which there exists an imminent threat that such coalition forces become engaged in such hostilities.”

    In his December 8 “War Powers Report” to Congress, Biden asserted that ongoing U.S. military support for the “Saudi-led Coalition” does not “involve United States Armed Forces in hostilities with the Houthis for the purposes of the War Powers Resolution.”

    What was notably absent from the White House talking points was any mention of Iran. Throughout both the Trump and Biden administrations, support for Saudi Arabia has been viewed in part through the lens of the U.S. effort to prepare for the possibility of future overt conflict, or even war, with Iran. In his War Powers Report last week, Biden stated that there are currently 2,755 U.S. military personnel deployed in Saudi Arabia “to protect United States forces and interests in the region against hostile action by Iran and Iran-backed groups.” In coordination with the Saudis, these forces “provide air and missile defense capabilities and support the operation of United States military aircraft.”

    With Tehran and Moscow developing closer ties in the midst of the Ukraine war, and Iran shipping drones and other munitions to Russia, the Biden administration may well be concerned about legally soldering any explicit limitations to its support for Riyadh. The U.S. also continues to wrestle with how to respond to Saudi maneuvers around global oil supply and pricing.

    The White House campaign this week to stop the Yemen resolution is taking place against the backdrop of the Biden administration intervening in a lawsuit against MBS for Khashoggi’s murder. On December 6, despite “the credible allegations of his involvement in Khashoggi’s murder,” a federal judge threw out the case because “the United States has informed the court that he is immune.” That move drew harsh words, even from some of Biden’s most passionate supporters in the Senate. Virginia Sen. Tim Kaine, who was Hillary Clinton’s running mate in 2016, charged that the Biden administration “has chosen to take the side of the party that our own intelligence agencies have concluded is responsible for the murder.” Kaine called it a “deliberate and callous decision” by the administration that “sends a horrific message to despots around the world.”

    The next time Joe Biden promises to make an international leader a pariah, he should clarify which of his interpretations of the word he means: the universally accepted definition or the one he has applied to MBS and Saudi Arabia, which has proven to mean the exact opposite.

    The post Joe Biden Can’t Quit the Saudi “Pariahs” appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • The White House and Sen. Bernie Sanders clashed Tuesday in the run-up to a Senate vote on the war powers resolution, put forward by the Vermont independent, banning U.S. support for Saudi-led offensive operations in its war on Yemen. By the evening, Sanders had agreed to withdraw his resolution, saying on the Senate floor he would enter negotiations with the White House on compromise language.

    “I’m not going to ask for a vote tonight,” Sanders concluded. “I look forward to working with the administration who is opposed to this resolution and see if we can come up with something that is strong and effective. If we do not, I will be back.”

    If it had happened, the vote may have been close, as advocates believed they had five to eight Republicans lined up to vote yes. But getting back, as Sanders said, will be a challenge, as Democrats lose control of the House of Representatives in early January. A growing block of House Republicans have become resistant to U.S. military adventures overseas, but current House Republican leadership has been opposed to curtailing U.S. support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen.

    On Tuesday morning, the White House privately circulated talking points making the case against the resolution, saying President Joe Biden’s aides would recommend a veto if it passed and that the administration was “strongly opposed” to it. The White House argued, in part, that a vote in favor is unnecessary because, significant hostilities have not yet resumed in Yemen despite a lapse in the ceasefire, and the vote would complicate diplomacy.

    Sanders — leaving a rally in support of sick days for rail workers, at which he called on the White House to take executive action on their behalf — said that he was aware of the administration’s efforts. “I’m dealing with this as we speak,” he said in the early afternoon.

    Questioned by the White House press corps, press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre initially declined to comment on the administration’s posture toward the resolution, but when confronted with the confirmation by Sanders, she acknowledged the administration was pushing its preferred approach. “We’re in touch with members of Congress on this. Thanks to our diplomacy which remains ongoing and delicate, the violence over nine months has effectively stopped,” she said, adding that the administration was wary of upsetting that balance.


    Jamal Benomar, formerly U.N. under-secretary-general who served as special envoy for Yemen until 2015, was critical of the White House’s claim that it was engaged in diplomacy, much less that the war powers resolution would imperil that. “There’s been no diplomatic progress whatsoever,” he told The Intercept. “There’s been no political process, no negotiations, or even a prospect of them. So an all-out war can resume at any time.”

    The administration’s opposition represents a reversal on the part of top Biden administration officials including Jake Sullivan, Samantha Power, Susan Rice, Wendy Sherman, and Colin Kahl, who signed a letter in 2019 calling on Congress to override then-President Donald Trump’s veto of the Yemen war powers resolution. Warning that the legislation represented “a constitutional matter facing Congress that may be unparalleled in its impact on millions of lives,” the letter argued that the war powers resolution would go beyond just alleviating Yemeni suffering and addressed a core constitutional question of checks and balances that affects all Americans. “The executive branch would be emboldened to launch and sustain unconstitutional wars” without the legislation, the letter said.

    Jean-Pierre’s reasoning — that a peace resolution would actually mean war — aligns with the talking points distributed by the White House, which were obtained by The Intercept.

    “The Administration strongly opposes the Yemen War Powers Resolution on a number of grounds, but the bottom line is that this resolution is unnecessary and would greatly complicate the intense and ongoing diplomacy to truly bring an end to the conflict,” the talking points read. “In 2019, diplomacy was absent and the war was raging. That is not the case now. Thanks to our diplomacy which remains ongoing and delicate, the violence over nearly nine months has effectively stopped.”

    A coalition of antiwar groups, in dueling counterpoints that were also circulated privately and obtained by The Intercept, argued that the question of timing and delicacy did not militate against the resolution:

    A UN-brokered truce in Yemen expired more than two months ago. The Saudis can resume airstrikes at any time. A previously announced end to U.S. “offensive support” did not prevent devastating and indiscriminate Saudi airstrikes in Yemen, which occurred as late as March 2022. Passing this legislation allows Congress to play a constructive role in the negotiation of an extension of the truce and a long-term peace.

    “There’s been a lull in the fighting, but since there was no concerted effort to move the political process forward, the lull is a temporary one and all sides are preparing for the worst,” Benomar, the former U.N. under-secretary-general said. He also warned that the situation is more volatile now than it was in the past and that subsequent fighting would likely be bloodier. “The situation is extremely fragile because Yemen has fragmented now and you have different areas of Yemen under the control of different warlords.”

    Biden’s own Yemen envoy, Tim Lenderking, has warned that a failure to reach a new peace agreement would precipitate a “return to war.” While a U.N.-brokered six-month ceasefire was agreed to earlier this year, it ended on October 2. On Monday, the UNICEF warned that 2.2 million Yemeni children are malnourished, with over 11,000 children having been killed or maimed in the war.

    The war began in 2015 under Saudi Arabia’s then-Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman — now crown prince and prime minister — pitting the richest country in the region against the poorest. MBS, as he’s known, told former CIA Director John Brennan that the military operation, initially codenamed Operation Decisive Storm, would “finish off the Houthis in a couple of months,” according to Brennan’s memoir. “I looked at him with a rather blank stare and wondered to myself what he had been smoking,” Brennan recalled.

    The White House also argued that the resolution should be rejected because it goes further than one passed in 2019. “I know that many of you supported a similar war powers resolution in 2019,” the talking points read. “But the circumstances now are significantly different. And the text of the resolution itself is also different.”

    The text of the resolution may be different, but the goal is the same, advocates of the resolution said:

    This legislation reflects the latest developments in the conflict and its directives have been adopted by the House of Representatives for three years in a row. Its operative text was endorsed in 2019 by Jake Sullivan, Ben Rhodes, Susan Rice, Samantha Power, Robert Malley, Wendy Sherman, and Colin Kahl. While midair refueling ended as a result of previous votes on war powers resolutions, offensive Saudi bombings in Yemen continued, including for more than a year after the Executive Branch announced an end to “offensive” support. S.J.Res.56 bans any U.S. logistical involvement in offensive Saudi-led coalition strikes in Yemen. Such involvement is operationally essential for the bombings. It differs from previous legislation only in that it is tailored to end future operational U.S. involvement in offensive Saudi airstrikes, ensuring that they cannot resume without affirmative authorization from Congress.

    The White House talking points do not explain how withdrawing U.S. support for the Saudi-led war would upset the diplomatic balance, but the argument makes up the bulk of their case against the resolution, according to the talking point:

    Here are the facts: The Yemen war was ongoing and escalating at the start of the Biden Administration through early this year. Hundreds were dying each month, the Yemeni people were experiencing a humanitarian catastrophe, and dozens of Houthi-launched missiles were flying at KSA.

    That violence has effectively stopped for a period now going on nine months, in no small part due to the robust diplomatic efforts by the United States.

    However, the situation is still fragile, and our diplomatic efforts are ongoing. The most intense diplomacy right now is directly between the Houthis and KSA, which is what we’ve always wanted — and they are making progress, but it’s far from done. A vote on this resolution risks undermining those efforts.

    Some advocates say the White House’s opposition to the war powers resolution represents a gift to MBS, which could embolden him. “Despite the catastrophic failure of Biden’s fist bump approach with MBS and the Saudi government, it seems that while MBS gets more brutal and emboldened, the administration doubles down on protecting him,” said Abdullah Alaoudh, research director for Saudi Arabia and the UAE at Democracy in the Arab World Now, referring to Biden’s controversial meeting with MBS in Jeddah this summer. “Now, they protected him legally in U.S. courts with a legal immunity request, protected him militarily with weapons and arms sales, and protected him politically with pressure on Congress to impede efforts to end the Yemen war.”

    Biden, who in his campaign vowed to make Saudi Arabia a “pariah” for the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, more recently said that “there will be consequences” after Riyadh cut oil production shortly before midterm elections — consequences which have yet to materialize.

    The resolution scrambled the partisan spectrum, with major players on both the right and left teaming up against the war. Advocates of the resolution said that Sen. Mike Lee, R-Utah, was prepared to vote yes, and Americans for Prosperity, Freedom Works, Concerned Veterans for America were pushing for a yes vote.

    Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., who serves as chair of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee with jurisdiction over the war, announced on Mehdi Hasan’s show Tuesday that he would be supporting the resolution, a major boost for supporters. (Late last year, Murphy supported a missile sale to Saudi Arabia to “defend” against the Houthis.)

    Murphy specifically cited the resolution’s restrictions on U.S. maintenance of the Saudi bomber fleet, saying it was appropriate that this resolution goes beyond the previous one. “I just think it’s time,” he told Hasan. “The Saudis have not shown a level of seriousness in ending this war despite the misery that has been visited upon Yemenis.”


    California Democratic Sen. Alex Padilla said during the day that he would be a no vote, and staffers for Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., indicated she would also vote no. She had been a yes in past years, though her Senate operation is known to be largely staff-driven at this point, which may change the calculus.

    Finally, some administration allies made the argument that the resolution’s definition of hostilities could set some type of precedent that could hamper support for Ukraine in its war against Russia’s invasion, though the resolution is clear that it is limited to Yemen and only applies to offensive operations.

    “The whole thing is just embarrassing for the Democrats,” said Dan Caldwell, vice president for foreign policy for the conservative group Stand Together, backed by the Koch organization, and a senior adviser to Concerned Veterans for America. “Even though this started under Obama, they were able to claim moral high ground on this issue during Trump. They just surrendered it again. The logical end of the Biden administration argument is that you need to starve Yemeni children to support Ukraine.”

    The coalition of groups backing the resolution said they expect Sanders to introduce the same language in the beginning of January, engage the administration in negotiations, but move forward alone if the White House continues in opposition.

    The post Bernie Sanders Pulls Yemen War Powers Resolution Amid Opposition From White House appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.


  • The B-21 Raider is unveiled during a ceremony at Northrop Grumman's Air Force Plant 42 in Palmdale, California, December 2, 2022. The high-tech stealth bomber can carry nuclear and conventional weapons and is designed to be able to fly without a crew on board and is on track to cost nearly $700 million per plane.

    The B-21 Raider is unveiled during a ceremony at Northrop Grumman’s Air Force Plant 42 in Palmdale, Calif., on Dec. 2, 2022. The high-tech stealth bomber can carry nuclear and conventional weapons; it’s designed to be able to fly without a crew on board and is on track to cost nearly $700 million per plane.

    Photo: Frederic J. Brown/AFP via Getty Images


    The dominant political story emanating from Washington, D.C., these days centers around the battles between the Trumpist movement and the bipartisan “adults in the room” caucus — the Democratic Party and fragments of the Republican Party consisting of lawmakers and politicians who have affirmed the legitimacy of President Joe Biden’s 2020 election victory. Often obscured by the media focus on this clash is the enduring influence of a long-standing faction of the U.S. power structure: the bipartisan war caucus. Throughout the Trump and Biden administrations, the U.S. has been on an escalating trajectory toward a new Cold War featuring the prime adversaries from the original, Russia and China. The ratcheted-up rhetoric from U.S. politicians — combined with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the tensions between China and Taiwan, and Beijing’s major advancements and investments in weapons systems and war technology — has heralded a bonanza for the defense industry.

    Congress will soon vote on a record-shattering $857 billion defense spending bill that authorizes $45 billion more than Biden requested. Included in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2023, finalized on December 6, is the establishment of a multiyear no-bid contract system through which Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, and other weapons manufacturers are being empowered to expand their “industrial base” and business. Lawmakers determined that “providing multi-year procurement authority for certain munitions programs is essential,” in part because it will “provide the defense industrial base with predictable production opportunities and firm contractual commitments” to “increase and expand defense industrial capacity.”

    The NDAA authorizes $800 million in new military aid to Ukraine, which is separate from the supplemental funding measures the U.S. has implemented since Russia’s invasion. The unprecedented flow of weapons to Ukraine has included a substantial transfer of weapons from the U.S. stockpile, amounting to approximately $10 billion worth of weapons. U.S. lawmakers have used this fact to push for expanding the scope of not only weapons procurements to “replenish” the arsenal, but also to maintain the pipeline of weapons to Ukraine and European-allied nations through at least the end of 2024. The defense industry position is that such multiyear acquisitions are preferable to emergency surge-demand scenarios, in part because such contracts allow for a long-term expansion of production facilities and increased workforce. It appears that Congress is heading in that direction.

    On November 30, the Pentagon announced that the U.S. Army had awarded a $1.2 billion contract to Raytheon to produce six National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems “in support of the efforts in Ukraine.” The estimated completion date was listed as November 2025. The next day, the Defense Department announced a $431 million contract for Lockheed to produce M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launchers to replenish those transferred to Kyiv. In November, Lockheed also received a $521 million contract to resupply the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems given to Ukraine.

    The lion’s share of major defense contracts goes to a handful of companies: Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman. The Pentagon routinely engages in no-bid contracts or awards contracts that are, by default, single-bid contracts. What lawmakers are seeking to do with the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, however, is to extend that practice to the refilling of weapons stockpiles. The legislation would empower the Pentagon to engage in no-bid contracts to replenish arms supplies if the weapons were transferred “in response to an armed attack by a foreign adversary of the United States.” While the legislation specifically refers to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it could also apply to officially designated adversaries such as China, Iran, Cuba, or North Korea. The NDAA authorizes more than $2.7 billion in new funds to “boost munitions production capacity.” Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante recently said the Pentagon has already put into contract $4 billion worth of deals “to replenish our inventories of equipment we have sent to Ukraine.”

    The war industry is clearly elated. “We spend a lot of money on some very exquisite large systems and we do not spend as much on the munitions necessary to support those,” said Raytheon’s CEO Gregory Hayes at the recent Reagan National Defense Forum. “We have not had a priority on fulfilling the war reserves that we need to fight a long-term battle.” Politico reported that discussions at the forum, which featured defense company CEOs, members of Congress, and U.S. military officials, identified China as the greatest “long-term threat.” But the China focus “was eclipsed by the need to kick into much higher gear to tackle a problem that many here didn’t imagine just a year ago: a hot proxy war with Russia in Ukraine that has sent the Pentagon and the defense industry scrambling.” Noting recent moves by Congress to increase munitions production, the U.S. Army’s top weapons buyer, Doug Bush, said, “I think we’re closer to a wartime mode, which has been something I’ve been working on to build.”

    In pushing their case for expanding the weapons acquisitions process, some lawmakers are striking somber notes about the danger of depleting the U.S. arsenal. “Our nation’s ability to defend itself should never suffer because of bureaucratic policies and red tape,” declared Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla. “As the United States continues to lead the global military aid response to Ukraine amid Putin’s unprovoked war, it has become increasingly critical that we simultaneously ensure the sustainment of our defensive weapons stockpile while also providing the materials our allies and partners need to defend themselves,” said Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H., who spearheaded the no-bid procurement legislation. Sen. Thom Tillis, R-N.C., asserted that the “lethal aid provided to Ukraine has diminished U.S. stockpiles and left defense contractors with uncertainty on timing and orders for backfill, negatively affecting their ability to quickly ramp up production.” Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, said the legislation would ensure that “helping our allies and partners doesn’t diminish our ability to protect ourselves.”

    There is no actual shortage of defensive weapons in the U.S.

    This rhetoric is largely a parlor game. There is no actual shortage of defensive weapons in the U.S. The “stockpile” is based on U.S. war-gaming theory and preparation for various imagined future wars and simultaneous campaigns. Ultimately, this NDAA would represent the latest narrative triumph for the hawks who falsely complained that Bill Clinton and the Democrats had gravely endangered America by “gutting” defense spending in the 1990s. Declaring war against the threats posed by nation states like Russia and China is a far better vehicle to sell large-scale defense spending than Osama bin Laden or the Islamic State group, in part because it justifies massive expenditures on the most expensive weapons systems.

    While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains a central focus, the appetite for countering China’s own expansive weapons and technology development is on track to grow for years to come. The 2023 NDAA expands military support for Taiwan with a five-year package worth up to $10 billion in financing to purchase U.S. weapons, as well as a contingency fund of up to $100 million a year through 2032 to maintain a munitions stockpile. It also provides for running “wargames that allow operational commands to improve joint and combined war planning for contingencies involving a well-equipped adversary in a counter-intervention campaign” and exercises that “develop the lethality and survivability of combined forces against” China. Under the NDAA, the Pentagon would develop a plan “to expedite military assistance to Taiwan in the event of a crisis or conflict.” All of this is aimed at maintaining “the capacity of the United States to resist a fait accompli that would jeopardize the security of the people on Taiwan” by deterring China from using force to “invade and seize control of Taiwan before the United States can respond effectively.”

    Since taking office, Biden has stewarded the multi-administration expansion of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. In September, he approved a new round of more than $1 billion in weapons, the largest authorization Biden has made since taking office. In its October 12 National Security Strategy, the White House claimed that “Russia’s strategic limitations have been exposed following its war of aggression against Ukraine” and designated China as “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective.” It asserted that China “presents America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge.” While noting that “Russia poses an immediate and ongoing threat to the regional security order in Europe and it is a source of disruption and instability globally,” the White House report said Russia “lacks the across the spectrum capabilities of” China.

    “This Isn’t Just Another Airplane”

    On the evening of Friday, December 2, in a ceremony attended by senior U.S. officials, members of Congress, and industry executives, Northrop Grumman unveiled the Pentagon’s next-generation nuclear-capable strategic bomber, the B-21 Raider. The first new stealth bomber produced in more than 30 years, the Raider “will form the backbone of the future Air Force bomber force.” The $700 million bat-winged aircraft will be capable of both manned and unmanned operations, and a first flight is scheduled for 2023. The Pentagon reportedly plans to build at least 100 of the warplanes, with an estimated cost of $32 billion, including research and development, through 2027.

    Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin spoke with an almost religious reverence for the nuclear bomber as a large tarp was pulled from its body in a sort of baptismal ceremony at Air Force Plant 42 in Palmdale, California. “This isn’t just another airplane. It’s not just another acquisition. It is a symbol and a source of the fighting spirit that President Reagan spoke of,” Austin said. “It’s the embodiment of America’s determination to defend the republic that we all love.” He declared that “50 years of advances in low-observable technology have gone into this aircraft. Even the most sophisticated air defense systems will struggle to detect a B-21 in the sky,” adding, “This bomber will be able to defend our country with new weapons that haven’t even been invented yet.”


    24 July 2022, Poland, Rzeszow: MIM-104 Patriot short-range anti-aircraft missile systems for defense against aircraft, cruise missiles and medium-range tactical ballistic missiles are located at Rzeszow Airport. Photo by: Christophe Gateau/picture-alliance/dpa/AP Images

    MIM-104 Patriot short-range anti-aircraft missile systems produced by Raytheon, located at Rzeszow Airport, close to the Ukraine border on July 24, 2022 in Poland.

    Photo: Christophe Gateau/picture-alliance/dpa/AP


    Russian President Vladimir Putin should be given some scraps of credit for aiding the U.S. war party. His decision to invade Ukraine helped obliterate the (admittedly paltry) roadblocks to even more massive payouts to war corporations. For many D.C. politicians, the Ukraine war is not just the U.S. coming to the aid of a victim of aggression by a U.S. adversary; the endeavor also emits a strong scent of domestic political dynamics involving Donald Trump and the allegations that his 2016 election was part of a Russian Manchurian candidate operation. With Republicans taking control of the House of Representatives in January, it seems that all these factors will begin to converge in a carnival of congressional hearings. Presumptive House Speaker Kevin McCarthy has pledged to bring oversight to Ukraine expenditures. But when pressed, he has made clear that his promise to end the “blank check” for Ukraine does not alter his fundamental support for arming and aiding Kyiv.

    For months, Trumpist political figures in the House, led by Georgia Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, have been pushing legislation to “audit” the Ukraine aid spending. While it is difficult to take Greene seriously for a volcanic flow of reasons, including her own purchase of as much as $15,000 in Lockheed Martin stock two days before the Russian invasion in February, there is a reasonable case to make for investigating the money being spent, the weapons flowing to Kyiv, and who is ultimately benefiting. “As of early November, U.S. monitors had performed just two in-person inspections since the war began in February — accounting for about 10 percent of the 22,000 U.S.-provided weapons,” according to the Washington Post. The Biden administration, the paper reported, has said it does not want to send inspectors to the front lines in Ukraine because the inspectors would likely require armed guards, potentially creating “a situation that risks being interpreted by the Kremlin as direct American involvement in the war.”

    On Tuesday, Greene’s resolution, which would have required the Biden administration to hand over all documents related to Ukraine spending within 14 days, failed to pass the Democrat-controlled House Foreign Affairs Committee. Democrats, who united to block the proposal, portrayed the resolution as undermining the war effort against Russia. “This is not the time for us to be divided,” said New York Rep. Gregory Meeks, the Democratic chair of the committee. “We’ve held together with NATO and the E.U. and our allies. Let’s not fall into this trap.” While the loudest opponents of Ukraine aid on Capitol Hill have been far-right Republicans — many but not all aligned with Trump — Greene’s resolution showed that more mainstream Republicans are getting on board the audit train ahead of January when the GOP takes control of the House. Most Republicans support Biden’s Ukraine weapons transfers, with some saying they would back a Ukraine audit “because it did not claw back any current or future funding for Ukraine.”

    Rep. Jason Crow, D-Colo., a supporter of the Ukraine war cause, led a successful bipartisan effort to include some oversight provisions in the NDAA. The bill would require the Pentagon’s inspector general to report to Congress any and all efforts to oversee and track the weapons and other aid delivered to Ukraine. The Senate Armed Services Committee described the authority in the bill as requiring “a report on the framework the Inspectors General have adopted to oversee U.S. assistance to Ukraine and whether there are any gaps in oversight or funding for such activities.” It requires the inspector general by next March to present congressional defense committees “with a comprehensive briefing on the status and findings of Inspector General oversight, reviews, audits, and inspections of the activities conducted by the Department of Defense responds [sic] to Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine.”

    Throughout the year, Republican Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky has been pushing for a special inspector general to oversee Ukraine spending and temporarily delayed a Ukraine spending measure in May to prove his point. “You shouldn’t shove all $40 billion out the door without any oversight,” Paul said. “And having a special inspector general, we did it in Afghanistan — it didn’t stop all the waste — it at least makes the thieves think twice about stealing the money.” In May, 57 House Republicans and 11 Senate Republicans voted against the Ukraine spending bill. No Democrats voted against the measure.

    The Biden White House has shown no sign of pumping the brakes on Ukraine spending and arms transfers. Biden also has made clear he intends to push ahead with the aggressive U.S. military buildup in preparation for future conflict with China, a position with widespread backing across the aisle. With a divided Congress, the 2024 elections looming, and the Trump question hovering over it all, a lot of the Democrats’ legislative agenda will be tough to implement after the new year. But the short and long-term future looks bright for the Russia and China hawks, the defense industry, and its Democratic and Republican patrons on Capitol Hill. On these matters, bipartisanship remains alive and well. The House could vote on the NDAA as soon as this week, and the Senate is expected to swiftly follow suit to get the bill to Biden’s desk.

    The post The War Caucus Always Wins appeared first on The Intercept.

  • Trust Lab was founded by a team of well-credentialed Big Tech alumni who came together in 2021 with a mission: Make online content moderation more transparent, accountable, and trustworthy. A year later, the company announced a “strategic partnership” with the CIA’s venture capital firm.

    Trust Lab’s basic pitch is simple: Globe-spanning internet platforms like Facebook and YouTube so thoroughly and consistently botch their content moderation efforts that decisions about what speech to delete ought to be turned over to completely independent outside firms — firms like Trust Lab. In a June 2021 blog post, Trust Lab co-founder Tom Siegel described content moderation as “the Big Problem that Big Tech cannot solve.” The contention that Trust Lab can solve the unsolvable appears to have caught the attention of In-Q-Tel, a venture capital firm tasked with securing technology for the CIA’s thorniest challenges, not those of the global internet.

    “I’m suspicious of startups pitching the status quo as innovation.”

    The quiet October 29 announcement of the partnership is light on details, stating that Trust Lab and In-Q-Tel — which invests in and collaborates with firms it believes will advance the mission of the CIA — will work on “a long-term project that will help identify harmful content and actors in order to safeguard the internet.” Key terms like “harmful” and “safeguard” are unexplained, but the press release goes on to say that the company will work toward “pinpointing many types of online harmful content, including toxicity and misinformation.”

    Though Trust Lab’s stated mission is sympathetic and grounded in reality — online content moderation is genuinely broken — it’s difficult to imagine how aligning the startup with the CIA is compatible with Siegel’s goal of bringing greater transparency and integrity to internet governance. What would it mean, for instance, to incubate counter-misinformation technology for an agency with a vast history of perpetuating misinformation? Placing the company within the CIA’s tech pipeline also raises questions about Trust Lab’s view of who or what might be a “harmful” online, a nebulous concept that will no doubt mean something very different to the U.S. intelligence community than it means elsewhere in the internet-using world.

    No matter how provocative an In-Q-Tel deal may be, much of what Trust Lab is peddling sounds similar to what the likes of Facebook and YouTube already attempt in-house: deploying a mix of human and unspecified “machine learning” capabilities to detect and counter whatever is determined to be “harmful” content.

    “I’m suspicious of startups pitching the status quo as innovation,” Ángel Díaz, a law professor at the University of Southern California and scholar of content moderation, wrote in a message to The Intercept. “There is little separating Trust Lab’s vision of content moderation from the tech giants’. They both want to expand use of automation, better transparency reports, and expanded partnerships with the government.”

    How precisely Trust Lab will address the CIA’s needs is unclear. Neither In-Q-Tel nor the company responded to multiple requests for comment. They have not explained what sort of “harmful actors” Trust Lab might help the intelligence community “prevent” from spreading online content, as the October press release said.

    Though details about what exactly Trust Lab sells or how its software product works are scant, the company appears to be in the business of social media analytics, algorithmically monitoring social media platforms on behalf of clients and alerting them to the proliferation of hot-button buzzwords. In a Bloomberg profile of Trust Lab, Siegel, who previously ran content moderation policy at Google, suggested that a federal internet safety agency would be preferable to Big Tech’s current approach to moderation, which consists mostly of opaque algorithms and thousands of outsourced contractors poring over posts and timelines. In his blog post, Siegel urges greater democratic oversight of online content: “Governments in the free world have side-stepped their responsibility to keep their citizens safe online.”

    Even if Siegel’s vision of something like an Environmental Protection Agency for the web remains a pipe dream, Trust Lab’s murky partnership with In-Q-Tel suggests a step toward greater governmental oversight of online speech, albeit very much not in the democratic vein outlined in his blog post. “Our technology platform will allow IQT’s partners to see, on a single dashboard, malicious content that might go viral and gain prominence around the world,” Siegel is quoted as stating in the October press release, which omitted any information about the financial terms of the partnership.

    Unlike typical venture capital firms, In-Q-Tel’s “partners” are the CIA and the broader U.S. intelligence community — entities not historically known for exemplifying Trust Lab’s corporate tenets of transparency, democratization, and truthfulness. Although In-Q-Tel is structured as an independent 501(c)3 nonprofit, its sole, explicit mission is to advance the interests and increase the capabilities of the CIA and fellow spy agencies.

    Former CIA Director George Tenet, who spearheaded the creation of In-Q-Tel in 1999, described the CIA’s direct relationship with In-Q-Tel in plain terms: “CIA identifies pressing problems, and In-Q-Tel provides the technology to address them.” An official history of In-Q-Tel published on the CIA website says, “In-Q-Tel’s mission is to foster the development of new and emerging information technologies and pursue research and development (R&D) that produce solutions to some of the most difficult IT problems facing the CIA.”

    Siegel has previously written that internet speech policy must be a “global priority,” but an In-Q-Tel partnership suggests some fealty to Western priorities, said Díaz — a fealty that could fail to take account of how these moderation policies affect billions of people in the non-Western world.

    “Partnerships with Western governments perpetuate a racialized vision of which communities pose a threat and which are simply exercising their freedom of speech,” said Díaz. “Trust Lab’s mission statement, which purports to differentiate between ‘free world governments’ and ‘oppressive’ ones, is a worrying preview of what we can expect. What happens when a ‘free’ government treats discussion of anti-Black racism as foreign misinformation, or when social justice activists are labeled as ‘racially motived violent extremists’?”

    The post CIA Venture Capital Arm Partners With Ex-Googler’s Startup to “Safeguard the Internet” appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • In mid-November, the Biden administration recommended to a U.S. judge that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman be granted immunity in a lawsuit over the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The White House immediately sought to distance itself from the decision, insisting that it was an administrative matter handled by the State Department, not the executive office. For its part, the State Department insists the ruling  was a consequence of legal precedent. It had nothing to do with the “merits of the case,” State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel said nearly a dozen times in a single press conference.

    “This — again, not to sound like a broken record, but this has nothing to do with the merits of the case,” he said. “And this designation stems from the fact that [MBS] is a head of government, which is consistent, long-standing international law, and they have no bearings on the bilateral relationship, on our views of the relationship, and no bearings on the merits of the case as well.”

    Given the deference that courts are supposed to show to the government in such cases, the ruling means that the judge is all but certain to dismiss the lawsuit, which seeks to hold the de facto Saudi ruler responsible for Khashoggi’s gruesome murder.

    In the weeks before the decision, however, the White House’s National Security Council privately met with Democracy in the Arab World Now, or DAWN — an advocacy group founded by Khashoggi and a plaintiff in the lawsuit against MBS — expressly to discuss the immunity question.

    The NSC, multiple DAWN staffers told The Intercept, went so far as to ask the group to write a memo making the argument for denying immunity — suggesting that White House officials were, along with State, weighing the merits of the case.

    Two sources close to members of the Saudi royal family and administration confirmed to The Intercept that Saudi had asked that the Biden administration grant MBS immunity, a request first reported by the Wall Street Journal back in March. At the same time, the U.S. wanted the kingdom to turn up oil production.

    In July, Judge John Bates asked the Biden administration for a formal determination on whether to grant Khashoggi the immunity typically reserved for heads of state in the lawsuit, bringing the issue to the fore as the Biden administration once again was planning a trip to the Gulf to request oil. MBS was then given the title of prime minister of Saudi Arabia in late September, a move that required a special exception to the kingdom’s basic law, which stipulates that only the king is prime minister.

    In October, according to email correspondence between the NSC and DAWN, DAWN requested a meeting with the NSC to discuss “a few time-sensative [sic] updates for you about our lawsuit and Saudi Arabia.” The NSC agreed and indicated they “may be joined by colleagues from the NSC’s legal office and Middle East office.”

    The October 17 meeting ultimately included three senior NSC officials, one of whom is a high-level intelligence official in the administration as well as a human rights official, according to the DAWN staffers, who requested anonymity to speak about a private meeting. The meeting culminated, the sources said, in the NSC requesting a memo from DAWN, which was subsequently emailed.

    The request for sovereign immunity was a “ploy,” DAWN wrote, laying out a simple argument: Head of state immunity is typically reserved for a country’s leader, which in the case of Saudi Arabia is its king, Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud — MBS’s father. King Salman, senior to Crown Prince Mohammed, is head of state. There can’t be two heads of state.

    Adrienne Watson, the spokesperson for the National Security Council, confirmed that NSC staff met with staff of DAWN. “Meeting with human rights NGOs is standard practice under the Biden Administration and such meetings occur on a regular basis,” Watson said in an email to The Intercept. “At no time did NSC staff solicit advice on immunity, a legal question that was before the State Department.”

    But the sources said that in the meeting, the NSC appeared divided on the question.

    The NSC “was sympathetic” and said they thought DAWN’s case “was strongly argued,” said one person knowledgeable about the meeting.

    “They were pushing many of [DAWN’s] arguments but in the end, Brett McGurk won the day,” said another, referring to Biden’s Middle East envoy.

    Past reporting hints at a split within the NSC, a White House agency staffed with Cabinet officials and senior national security advisers, over Middle East policy. Many see McGurk as too soft on the Saudis. McGurk has been a reliable proponent of warm relations with Saudi Arabia under every presidential administration going back to that of George W. Bush.

    The immunity designation drew swift condemnation from many, including even top Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, called it “a denial of justice to appease a reckless and dangerous murderer.”

    Immunity was something even the Trump administration was not willing to grant to MBS. Though former President Donald Trump was much friendlier with the Saudis, his administration declined to do so in a lawsuit filed against MBS by a former top Saudi counterterrorism official, Saad al Jabri, who accused him of sending a hit team to assassinate him in 2018.

    The Biden administration’s insistence that it is merely adhering to legal precedent also elides the fact that the administration has discretion in who it recognizes as a head of state.

    A recent State Department press conference made this clear. When a member of the press asked if the administration recognized Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, Patel, the spokesperson, replied that “We do not” recognize Maduro as the head of state of Venezuela. Trump withdrew that designation and recognized opposition figure Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s president in 2019, and the Biden administration has followed suit — though last week the U.S. lifted sanctions on Venezuela to permit oil exports.

    “So Bashar Assad would get the similar immunity?” the journalist also asked, referring to Syria’s president, who has presided over countless atrocities during the Syrian civil war.

    “I suspect not,” replied Patel.

    The post The Biden Administration Says Legal Immunity for Saudi Crown Prince Was Unavoidable. Privately, They Weren’t So Sure. appeared first on The Intercept.

  • Gen. Mark Milley, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently offered some matter-of-fact observations about the immense human suffering and death caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and placed the responsibility for ending the war squarely on Moscow’s shoulders. “There’s one guy that can stop it — and his name is Vladimir Putin,” Milley said. “He needs to stop it.”

    But then Milley crossed what he most certainly never imagined to be a tripwire when he said, “And they need to get to the negotiating table.”

    The general cited the multiyear death toll of 20 million during World War I — caused, he said, by the failure to negotiate an earlier end to the war — and went on to suggest that it would be better for the war in Ukraine to end soon in negotiation rather than continue on indefinitely.

    “There has to be a mutual recognition that military victory is probably — in the true sense of the word — is maybe not achievable through military means, and therefore you have to turn to other means,” Milley said during the November 9 event at the Economic Club of New York. Referring to recent Russian setbacks at the hands of Ukrainian forces and the coming winter, Milley went on: “When there’s an opportunity to negotiate, when peace can be achieved, seize it. Seize the moment.”

    Milley clearly did not think he had said anything controversial. A day later, he was making similar points during an interview on CNBC. “We’ve seen the Ukrainian military fight the Russian military to a standstill,” Milley said. “What the future holds is not known with any degree of certainty, but we think there are some possibilities here for some diplomatic solutions.”

    But as snippets of Milley’s remarks in New York started to spread, the White House began fielding angry calls from Ukrainian officials protesting Milley’s comments and asking if they indicated that the U.S. might be getting soft in its support for Ukraine’s stated goal of militarily expelling Russia from its territory. Or if the White House did not believe that Ukraine could win the war.

    As the Biden administration “scrambled” to “clean up Milley remarks” and “handle Ukraine’s feelings,” Milley defended his assessment in a press briefing at the Pentagon alongside Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. “The probability of a Ukrainian military victory defined as kicking the Russians out of all of Ukraine to include what they define or what the claim is Crimea, the probability of that happening anytime soon is not high, militarily,” Milley said in response to a reporter’s question on November 16. “There may be a political solution where, politically, the Russians withdraw, that’s possible.” He added: “You want to negotiate from a position of strength. Russia right now is on its back.”

    This made some Russia hawks apoplectic. In an essay for The Atlantic titled, “Cut the Baloney Realism: Russia’s war on Ukraine need not end in negotiation,” Eliot A. Cohen, a former adviser to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, asserted that “the argument for diplomacy now is wrongheaded,” writing: “The calls for negotiations, like the strategically inane revelations of our fears of escalation — inane because they practically invite the Russians to get inside our head and rattle us — are dangerous.” Instead, Cohen declared, it is “time to pass the ammunition and to stop talking about talking,” suggesting that Ukraine should be given top-tier U.S. drones and advanced fighter aircraft like F-16s as well as “a tank fleet superior to that of Russia.”

    In a column for the Wall Street Journal, former Pentagon official Seth Cropsey suggested that Milley should be replaced and said his comments on Ukraine were part of a track record of being soft on China and “apparently resisting then-President Trump’s desire to strike the [Iranian] regime in the final months of his term.” Like Cohen, Cropsey — who served under Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush — also argued for increasing weapons shipments to Ukraine. “U.S. interests would be better served by providing Ukraine with support to retake more territory from Russia and declaring Ukrainian victory the aim of U.S. policy,” he wrote. “At some point there might be negotiations in which Russia gains something. Yet these talks should be undertaken only when Ukraine has a superior position.”

    Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, former commander of U.S. Army Europe, told Politico that he believed Ukraine would expel Russian forces from the country by summer. “People should get their heads around the idea that Ukraine is going to defeat Russia on the battlefield, the old fashioned way. They have irreversible momentum,” he said. “Now is the time to put the pedal to the metal.”

    Conceding the massive, unprecedented U.S. military shipments and other support to Ukraine, it is undeniable that President Joe Biden has at key points treaded cautiously in his stance toward Moscow. He and other U.S. officials have consistently said they do not want to risk direct military conflict with Russia. The president recently won some praise from the Kremlin for the “measured and more professional response” to his handling of the missile that landed in Poland killing two people on November 15. While major news organizations reported that it was a Russian attack, Biden urged caution and refuted the claims, which turned out to be false. The White House has also stopped several weapons transfers to Ukraine — in some cases on grounds that misuse of the weapons against Russia could lead to further escalation. At times, the White House has sought assurances from Ukraine that it would not use long-range U.S. weapons “to attack Russian territory.” Biden has also slow-walked a decision on whether to give Gray Eagle weaponized drones to Ukraine, despite mounting pressure from the industry, a bipartisan group of lawmakers, and Kyiv.

    Biden isn’t dovish on Russia. But the administration has its own calculus for how it wants this war to proceed, and frequently games out how it might end.

    None of that indicates that Biden is dovish on Russia — he isn’t. But the administration has its own calculus for how it wants this war to proceed, and frequently games out how it might end. Some news reports have described “a broad sense” within the Pentagon that winter will provide an opportunity to reach a political settlement, while senior national security officials, including national security adviser Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Anthony Blinken have opposed pushing Ukraine to negotiate. “One official explained that the State Department is on the opposite side of the pole from Milley,” according to CNN. “That dynamic has led to a unique situation where military brass are more fervently pushing for diplomacy than U.S. diplomats.” Milley’s public remarks offered a glimpse into the informed analysis of one powerful camp within the administration. “Milley is much more willing to just say what he thinks,” one U.S. official said. “I’m sure they sometimes wish he wouldn’t always say the quiet part out loud.”

    Despite some moments of narrow strategic restraint from the White House, Biden and virtually the entirety of established political power across the U.S. government is unified in the project of flooding Ukraine with weapons and other military support. Milley, it must be noted, has been a major proponent of heavily arming Ukraine and has advocated continuing to do so indefinitely. Biden currently has a request before Congress for nearly $40 billion in new aid to Ukraine, and the military component of his proposal would, with the swipe of a pen, more than double the entire U.S. expenditure since the invasion began in February.

    There is legislation pending in Congress that indicates that the U.S. government believes the Ukraine war may continue for years. On October 11, the Senate Armed Services Committee submitted its amended draft of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2023. Nestled within the draft is a provision that would establish an “emergency” multiyear plan to award massive defense contracts to Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, BAE Systems, and other war corporations to produce weapons for Ukraine and to “replenish” U.S. stockpiles as well as those of “foreign allies and partners.” An amendment, spearheaded by New Hampshire Democratic Sen. Jeanne Shaheen and co-sponsored by Texas Republican Sen. John Cornyn, would allow the Pentagon to award noncompetitive no-bid contracts to arms manufacturers under the plan.

    Congress is “supportive of this. They’re going to give us multiyear authority, and they’re going to give us funding to really put into the industrial base — and I’m talking billions of dollars into the industrial base — to fund these production lines,” said the Pentagon’s chief weapons buyer, Bill LaPlante, in remarks reported by Defense News. “That, I predict, is going to happen, and it’s happening now. And then people will have to say: ‘I guess they were serious about it.’ But we have not done that since the Cold War.”

    Among the weapons that would be preauthorized for procurement by the Pentagon, according to the legislation, are: 100,000 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, 30,000 Hellfire missiles, 36,000 Joint Air-to-Ground missiles, and 700 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems — all manufactured by Lockheed Martin. The list also includes a staggering stream of other missiles, rockets, and ammunition.

    It is often said that in war there are no winners. But that has never really been true, certainly not in modern U.S. wars. From Vietnam to Korea, and Iraq to Afghanistan, the winner has always been the same. That victor also prevailed in the Cold War and will most certainly do so again throughout this new cold war that is being rapidly ushered into existence. The winner is the war industry.

    That a powerful U.S. general would suggest that it might be better for the war to end through negotiation rather than prolonging the bloodbath, with Ukrainian civilians paying the highest price, is not an earth-shattering development. But the response to Milley’s expression of that sentiment, combined with the ever-intensifying preparations for a protracted war in which the U.S. is the premiere arms dealer, should spur a discussion over whose interests are being served right now.

    Perhaps more significant than Milley’s comments about negotiations was his assessment that a victory for Ukraine is likely unachievable on a purely military level. Already, some European officials are warning that the appetite in their countries to continue the war in Ukraine is waning and that “the double hit of trade disruption from U.S. subsidies and high energy prices risks turning public opinion against both the war effort and the transatlantic alliance.” As one senior European Union official told Politico, “The fact is, if you look at it soberly, the country that is most profiting from this war is the U.S. because they are selling more gas and at higher prices, and because they are selling more weapons.”

    The NDAA now before Congress is a reminder of the prescience exhibited by President Dwight Eisenhower in his January 1967 farewell address. “This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience,” Eisenhower said. “We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications.” Eisenhower warned that “we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.”

    The post War Industry Looking Forward to “Multiyear Authority” in Ukraine appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • It was 2002, and Justin Rose was on a losing streak. The 20-year-old South Boston native had washed out of the University of Maine after just one semester, held a string of terrible jobs, and had just gone through a bad breakup with a girlfriend. He was hawking cellphones at the Emerald Square Mall in North Attleboro, Massachusetts, when a Marine walked into his store. Rose went into his standard pitch but lost the sale. The Marine Corps recruiter did not. Three weeks later, Rose shipped out to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot in Parris Island, South Carolina, for basic training.

    The war in Afghanistan was about to enter its third year, and the war in Iraq was looming on the horizon. “I’ll see you in a couple years,” Rose told his parents. He’d be on active duty, a rifleman, and probably see service overseas. At least that’s what the recruiter told him. “It turned out, I was actually a communications guy in the Marine Corps Reserves,” Rose recalled. “So I came home 13 weeks later.”

    A few years would pass before Rose shipped out for his first deployment, arriving in October 2005 at Camp Lemonnier in the sun-bleached nation of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa. His unit had been cobbled together from Marines based, like him, in Massachusetts. The rest hailed from California and Kansas. One of those Midwestern Marines was Jase Derek Stanton.

    As part of the Third Provisional Security Company, Rose and his fellow Marines manned the guard towers and entry control points for the largest American outpost on the African continent. They had only been in-country for about a month when one of the Marine reservists from Kansas got drunk, vomited several times, and passed out on the ground outside his quarters. The next thing that Marine recalled, according to a summary in court documents, was waking up to find his pants pulled down and Stanton on top of him, touching his penis. The Marine shoved Stanton away and returned to his own quarters, but didn’t report the assault. A few weeks later, he would wake up to find Stanton assaulting him again. This time, he reported it. But that didn’t stop Stanton, who was acquitted at court martial. And neither did the Marines.

    On New Year’s Eve 2005, Justin Rose headed to Camp Lemonnier’s cantina for celebratory $2.50 beers with his fellow Marines before heading back to his “hooch” around 1:30 a.m. Sometime after daybreak, Rose woke up to find someone stroking his penis. Disoriented for a moment, he lept down from his raised bunk and gave chase as a man dressed in red dashed out of his quarters and into another tent. He found Stanton, dressed in red, feigning sleep in his bed; Rose was certain Stanton was the attacker. So Rose did what he had been trained to do. He went to his team leader, a young corporal, and reported the assault. The first question he heard was: “Are you sure you’re not making this up?”

    U.S. Marines with Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island stand at attention for morning colors before a sexual assault awareness and prevention 5k race held aboard Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, S.C., April 25, 2012. The Marines, sailors and civilians of Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island participated in a 5k race in observance of sexual assault awareness and prevention month.

    U.S. Marines stand at attention before a sexual assault awareness and prevention 5k race held aboard the Marine Corps Recruit Depot in Parris Island, S.C., on April 25, 2012.

    Photo: U.S. Marines

    Stigma and Shame

    Serving in the U.S. armed forces is dangerous, especially for women. Despite being a minority, making up only 16.5 percent of the military, nearly 1 in 4 U.S. servicewomen reports being sexually assaulted — a rate far higher than that of men. Years of analysis of the issue, handwringing, and incremental reforms have failed to stem what has been called an “epidemic.”

    But sexual assault of men in the military is also widespread and vastly underreported. Each day, on average, more than 45 men in the armed forces are sexually assaulted, according to the latest Pentagon estimates. For women, it is 53 per day, according to a September 2022 Pentagon report that uses a new euphemism “unwanted sexual contact” as a “proxy measure for sexual assault.” Nearly 40 percent of veterans who report to the Department of Veterans Affairs, or VA, that they have experienced military sexual trauma, or MST — sexual assault or sexual harassment — are men.

    Men, civilian or military, are less likely to report sexual assault, to identify experiences they have had as abusive, and to seek formal treatment for such harms. A 2018 study of active-duty, reserve, and National Guard personnel noted an overall lack of awareness of sexual assault of men in the military, an inclination to blame or marginalize male victims, and substantial barriers to reporting sexual assault — including stigma, a lack of confidence in leadership, and feeling “trapped” by the physical confines of deployment. The 2022 Pentagon report found that about 90 percent of men in the military did not report a sexual assault they experienced in 2021; about 71 percent of women failed to report such an attack. “Underreporting of MST,” according to a 2019 study by researchers from the VA’s Rocky Mountain Mental Illness Research, Education, and Clinical Center in Colorado, “may derive from men’s concerns about stigma, shame, rape myths, lack of past empathic response to disclosures of MST, and the perceived implications of reporting MST for one’s masculinity and sexuality.” For these same reasons, they noted, male MST survivors are at “elevated risk for a vast array of adverse health outcomes.” The trauma of sexual assault can, for example, result in depression, anxiety, nightmares, flashbacks, post-traumatic stress disorder, anger management issues, self-blame, and low self-esteem, among other ill effects.

    A decade ago, most veterans who submitted compensation claims for sexual assaults during their military service were denied benefits by the VA. In the years since, the VA has granted claims for military sexual trauma at an increasing rate. More than 103,000 veterans, of all genders, are now formally recognized by the VA as having been sexually traumatized during their service.

    From 2011 to 2021, the total number of MST claims filed by men skyrocketed more than 119 percent, from 1,352 to 2,969, according to statistics provided to The Intercept by the VA. By the end of June, more than 2,550 male veterans had filed claims in 2022, almost double the number in 2011 and already 85 percent of last year’s total.

    Over the last decade, the number of claims granted by the VA has grown from just 27.8 percent of all claims submitted for compensation by men in 2011 to 68.5 percent last year. Despite the precipitous growth, male claims have consistently been rejected at a higher rate than those of women, and the grant rate has lagged an average of 13 percent below that of women. The VA had no answer for the disparity, telling The Intercept via email that “it would be speculative to provide an explanation as to any difference in the grant rate.”

    Triangle, Virginia -- Friday, November 18, 2022Justin Rose, a former Marine, holds a ‘challenge coin’ he received while deployed to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti in 2005. During that deployment, Rose was sexually assaulted by another Marine.CREDIT: Alyssa Schukar for The Intercept

    Justin Rose holds a challenge coin he received while deployed to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti in 2005.

    Photo: Alyssa Schukar for The Intercept

    Trust Betrayed

    After being assaulted, Justin Rose was made to recount the details again and again, to his squad leader, his platoon sergeant, Jase Stanton’s squad leader, and a chaplain. The trust he placed in his noncommissioned officers to keep his story quiet was quickly betrayed as word spread across the camp. Rose was branded the Marine who had been groped and hadn’t done anything about it. He became the target of jokes and tried laughing along, but inside he was in agony and began questioning himself. Why hadn’t he done anything about it? Why hadn’t he kicked Stanton’s ass? He did the right thing, on paper at least, but it didn’t feel right. “A real Marine would have fought back,” he later wrote. He began to blame himself for his assault and his failure to react as others — and even he — expected. “My inaction that night crippled me, and I had no way to fix it,” he recalled.

    Rose returned stateside, remained on active duty, and was promoted to corporal before being called to testify at Stanton’s court martial. But before the trial, he was contacted by Stanton’s military attorney who grilled him about his drinking at the cantina and how close a look he got of his fleeing assaulter. “When you’re in the Marines and an officer calls, you just answer the questions. In hindsight, now that I’ve been a company commander and have been involved with court martial hearings, I realize that was probably improper,” Rose told The Intercept.

    “My inaction that night crippled me, and I had no way to fix it.”

    The defense dissected his testimony, twisted it around, and used it to attack his credibility. Rose recalled that the defense counsel said his drinking of three beers at the cantina, hours earlier, had clouded his mind; that he had failed to get a clear look at the man who assaulted him; and that his failure to confront Stanton called into doubt whether the assault even occurred. Rose and four fellow Marines who provided evidence against Stanton were instead accused of colluding to ruin his career.

    “The main consensus was that we were trying to conspire against Stanton for cultural and social differences,” Rose told The Intercept. “He was a Midwesterner from a religious background, and we were from the Northeast and not accustomed to his kind of Christian fundamentalism.” The military judge ruled in Stanton’s favor and he walked free.

    The Intercept requested a copy of the court martial record from the Navy, the legal authority for the case, but no records were ever found. (The Office of the Judge Advocate General only maintains records of trials in which the accused was awarded a punitive discharge or at least one year of confinement.) The Intercept was able to confirm Stanton’s acquittal through legal records from a subsequent trial he was involved in. For additional details, The Intercept relied on interviews with Rose as well as court documents that included a 2018 appellate brief from the Kansas Court of Appeals and a judge’s memorandum opinion from that same year.

    “By the time it was over,” Rose later wrote, “the Marine Corps had failed me three times: It had failed to take my claims seriously; then made my attacker out to be the victim and me the criminal; and finally failed to provide adequate support and resources in the aftermath of my assault — whether through access to sexual-assault counseling or something as simple as believing my story.”

    Rose had had enough. He found that he couldn’t wear the same uniform as the man who had assaulted him and the many others who allowed Stanton to get away with it. “The military justice system said that I was a liar for something that I had no reason to lie about. If I was going to lie about anything, it certainly wouldn’t be that I was sexually assaulted and didn’t do anything about it,” he said. “It ended up being the reason that I left the Marine Corps. It shook my confidence in myself. It was a point of self-doubt. It was a point of shame.”

    In 2007, the same year he left the Marines, Rose joined the Massachusetts National Guard. He would deploy to Afghanistan in 2011, where he saw combat and suffered a traumatic brain injury while serving as a Security Forces platoon leader for a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Uruzgan Province.

    Stanton served in the Marines for several more years before leaving the corps and getting involved in Kansas politics. He worked as the campaign manager for Republican congressional candidate John Rysavy and as a field coordinator for the Republican senatorial campaign of Todd Tiahrt, a 16-year member of the U.S. House of Representatives. In 2010, Rysavy lost his primary, capturing just 2 percent of the Republican vote. In 2014, Tiahrt lost in the Republican primary, failing in a bid to reclaim his House seat from Mike Pompeo, who was later become U.S. Secretary of State.

    Politics was not, however, Stanton’s only pursuit.

    String of Assaults

    Over the next decade, Stanton would be implicated in a string of sexual assaults. In 2007, after he had been acquitted at court martial, Stanton’s reserve unit — based out of Kansas City, Missouri — took part in one of its monthly weekend trainings. One night, according to court records obtained by The Intercept, he and other Marines went out drinking and after the bar closed, headed back to their base to sleep. Stanton attempted, multiple times, to grope two of the men. One of them, after repeatedly telling Stanton to stop, threatened to hurt him and later reported the incident, according to court documents.

    In Johnson County, Kansas, in July 2008, Stanton attended a farewell party for a member of the military being deployed to the Middle East. One party-goer drank heavily and passed out, after which Stanton laid him out on a couch, pulled off his pants, and performed oral sex on him, according to the court records obtained by The Intercept. After a friend of the victim contacted the police, Stanton was charged with aggravated sodomy and aggravated sexual battery and resigned from Tiahrt’s campaign.

    During the investigation, the Johnson County prosecutor contacted Rose and interviewed him about his assault by Stanton, though Rose was never called to testify. In the end, Stanton was convicted but served no prison time. Instead, he was given probation and required to register as a sex offender — but failed to properly do so.

    While Rose and others had information about Stanton’s past that they shared with civilian authorities, the civilian world had no formal record of Stanton’s military legal proceedings. As the deputy attorney of nearby Riley County, Kansas, Bethany Fields prosecutes major crimes like murder, rape, and other forms of sexual assault, but she had no documentation on Stanton. “The military court martial proceeding didn’t follow him into civilian life, so there was no way for local law enforcement to know about it,” she told The Intercept. She also failed to find any records of Stanton’s court martial for the assaults at Camp Lemonnier.

    Stanton’s probation meant that he was facing prison time if he was convicted again, but after failing to provide full information when registering as a sex offender, he disappeared from the radar of the criminal justice system until resurfacing a few years later in Fields’s Riley County.

    “The military court martial proceeding didn’t follow him into civilian life, so there was no way for local law enforcement to know about it.”

    On June 7, 2015, two soldiers, one 19 years old and the other 22, from the Army post at Fort Riley, were drinking at Tubby’s, a sports bar in Manhattan, Kansas, where they met Stanton. At closing time, the men went back to Stanton’s home where he poured shots and fixed them mixed drinks. The teenager passed out and woke to find Stanton “was sitting on top of him and was sodomizing him,” according to court documents. He scrambled to his feet and fled to the bathroom. When he emerged, he saw his friend passed out with his pants and underwear pulled down to his knees. The 19-year-old soldier pulled his friend’s pants up and attempted to contact his superiors and then family members, but couldn’t reach either. He then called the Army’s Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention hotline and arranged to meet with a SHARP representative at a nearby Starbucks. The teenage soldier was unable to wake his friend and left him at Stanton’s home. Both victims went to the hospital separately and received sexual assault examinations that revealed “a foreign DNA profile that matched Stanton.”

    Stanton later texted a friend that he had a “three-way while that moron Boston kid [the 22-year-old] was asleep in the living room.” At trial, Stanton explained that he meant that he, according to summary documents, “messed around” with a friend and the teenage soldier, even though he had initially told a police detective that he had not had sexual intercourse with the teen. Arrested on June 9, 2015, Stanton was charged in Riley County with aggravated criminal sodomy.

    A decade after being assaulted by Stanton at Camp Lemonnier, a decade after being doubted by the Marine Corps and accused of lying at court martial, a decade after Stanton had walked free, a detective from Kansas — where testimony about prior acts of sexual misconduct is admissible in court — called Rose to say that he was building a case against Stanton.

    At trial, Stanton testified that he and the teenager had engaged in consensual oral and anal sex. The teenager countered that he had been unconscious. “At no point did I knowingly or intentionally hurt anyone,” Stanton maintained.

    The 22-year-old victim did not appear at the trial — but Rose did. Then an Army captain with a wife and 2-year-old child, he flew to Kansas to tell his story once more. It was his 34th birthday.

    This time, Rose’s testimony along with the victims of the 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2015 assaults was enough to sway the judge, who noted a distinct pattern. “They involved alcohol, they involved partying, usually asleep or perhaps passed out. … Most of them were in the military,” observed Judge Meryl D. Wilson.

    “It’s very troubling — this is not the first time you had taken advantage of someone,” said Wilson. “The sad things about these situations is it doesn’t just impact you.” Wilson found Stanton was guilty of one count of aggravated criminal sodomy for his assault of the teenage soldier and sentenced him to 49 years in prison. He was also sentenced to 18 years (to be served concurrently) for failing to properly register as a sex offender in Kansas.

    The National Museum of the Marine Corps in Triangle, Va., on Nov. 18, 2022.

    Photo: Alyssa Schukar for The Intercept

    Pentagon Dysfunction

    Last July, an investigation by The Intercept found that sexual assault of U.S. military personnel in Africa was far more common and widespread than the Pentagon reported to Congress.

    The Pentagon’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office compiles annual reports that claim to include all allegations of sexual assault involving U.S. military personnel. Between 2010 and 2020, the Pentagon listed just 73 cases of sexual assault in the U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM, area of operations. Yet criminal investigation files, obtained by The Intercept via the Freedom of Information Act, show that military criminal investigators logged at least 158 allegations of sexual offenses in Africa during that same period.

    The case files revealed that these charges of sexual misconduct involving U.S. military personnel occurred in at least 22 countries in Africa, including 13 nations that do not appear in the annual Department of Defense reports. Some of the allegations accuse members of the military, while others recount attacks on U.S. personnel by civilians on or near U.S. outposts. For 2006, the year that Justin Rose reported his assault by Jase Stanton, the Defense Department’s official annual report doesn’t even offer a breakdown of such attacks by country.

    A March 2020 report by a military advisory committee lamented the “difficulty in obtaining, uniform, accurate, and complete information on sexual offense cases across the military.” Last November, The American Prospect reported that Pentagon officials were long aware that the military’s system for reporting sexual assaults was dysfunctional, leading to underestimates of the scale of the problem. This may help explain the wide discrepancy between the Pentagon’s annual figures and the AFRICOM files obtained by The Intercept. Earlier this year, in a letter to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, Reps. Katie Porter, D-Calif., and Jackie Speier, D-Calif., took the Pentagon to task for its failures in tracking sexual assault. “Poor data management makes it difficult for DoD leadership to understand the scope of the problem or respond effectively,” they wrote.

    The Pentagon notes that survivors of sexual assault are often reluctant to come forward for a variety of reasons, including a desire to move on, maintain privacy, and avoid feelings of shame. Yet troops say that even when they do speak out, they often face a military culture and command structure that doesn’t take their allegations seriously and a military justice system that provides little accountability. Just 225 of 5,640 eligible cases went to court martial and only 50 of those resulted in convictions for nonconsensual sexual offenses, according to 2020 statistics. That conviction rate represents 0.88 percent of the cases.

    This year, President Joe Biden signed an executive order making sexual harassment, for the first time, a crime under U.S. military law.

    The effects of poor accountability and shame surrounding sexual assault while on active duty can continue far beyond one’s period of military service. “Despite successes in ensuring access to care for men who experienced MST, ongoing stigma related to experiencing sexual trauma in men also may be a barrier to seeking care,” Randal Noller, a VA spokesperson, told The Intercept. “We are looking at every avenue to help address this concern and inform men who experienced MST that VA believes them, that they are not alone, and we are here to help.”

    Last year, in the face of increasing congressional pressure, Austin recommended that decisions to prosecute cases of sexual assault be taken out of the chain of command. In December 2021, Congress passed significant military justice reform that did so, which may prevent retaliation and lead more survivors to report sexual offenses. This year, President Joe Biden also signed an executive order making sexual harassment, for the first time, a crime under U.S. military law.

    Triangle, Virginia -- Friday, November 18, 2022Justin Rose, a former Marine, poses for a portrait outside of the National Museum of the Marine Corps in Triangle, Virginia. While deployed to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti in 2005, Rose was sexually assaulted by another Marine.CREDIT: Alyssa Schukar for The Intercept

    Justin Rose stands outside of the National Museum of the Marine Corps in Triangle, Va., on Nov. 18, 2022.

    Photo: Alyssa Schukar for The Intercept

    “Changes Will Happen”

    Today, Jase Stanton is incarcerated at the El Dorado Correctional Facility in Kansas. Barring parole board intervention or credit for “good time,” his earliest release date is January 1, 2059 — 53 years to the day that he assaulted Justin Rose.

    Stanton did not reply to text messages sent via an app that allows communications with inmates or to a letter sent to him by The Intercept.

    “In the years since then, I came to realize that it wasn’t the assault that had the most enduring effect on me,” Rose said. “It was people’s refusal to believe that one man would assault another man. It was the mockery from leaders that I had trusted and the implication that, if it had happened, I must have done something to invite it.”

    Rose, now a major in the Army Reserve, still grapples with feelings that, somehow, he remains at fault. “There is guilt on my behalf. I didn’t present a convincing enough case,” he said of his testimony at Stanton’s 2006 court martial. “And these two soldiers down at Fort Riley paid for it. What he did to them was substantially worse than what he did to me, and that’s a shitty feeling — that I didn’t do anything to help them.”

    But Bethany Fields, the Riley County prosecutor, credits Rose’s willingness to testify in 2015 as having a major influence on Stanton’s conviction and lengthy prison sentence. “The case got delayed a couple times, so we had to call and tell the earlier victims that the dates had changed, but Justin stuck with me. That was huge,” she said. “In this case, the issue was consent. We had DNA, so there was no question that the act happened. The issue was whether or not the victim consented. Because we had Justin and others come in and say, ‘This happened to me and I didn’t consent,’ ‘I saw him do this and that person didn’t consent’; because we had all these other people who said they had been sleeping or drinking or passed out and didn’t consent, it made for a much stronger case.”

    Fields believes that testifying about these traumas will help to hasten change. “The more the word gets out about this type of assault, the more that people are willing to talk about this, the more people speak out,” she said, “the more changes will happen and the less victims we will have in the future.”

    Rose said that he’s seen a shift in military culture since his assault at Camp Lemonnier — and that it’s been driven by survivors.

    “There was a perception, as a male sexual assault victim, that you wanted it. And if you didn’t, you could have fought back harder. And that creates a culture of silence,” he said. “Today, you see a lot more people being open about their stories. People are willing to come forward. They’re not ashamed of what has happened to them. And because of that, things are changing.”

    The post In U.S. Military, Sexual Assault Against Men Is Vastly Underreported appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • A bipartisan group of U.S. senators has intensified pressure on the Biden administration to give Ukraine a top-tier U.S. drone capable of firing four Hellfire missiles or eight Stinger munitions. The 16 senators, led by Iowa Republican Sen. Joni Ernst and West Virginia Democrat Sen. Joe Manchin, called the Gray Eagle MQ-1C “the Ukrainian government’s highest-priority military equipment transfer request” of unmanned aerial systems and said it would have “the potential to drive the strategic course of the war in Ukraine’s favor.”

    Despite aggressive lobbying from the drone industry, the Gray Eagle’s manufacturer General Atomics, the Ukrainian government, and a slew of U.S. lawmakers, the Biden administration and Pentagon have so far declined to approve the transfer of the drones. They have cited concerns about exporting sensitive components on the drone, including a Raytheon-manufactured targeting and surveillance system. While the U.S. has exported previous generations of weaponized drones to its allies, it has never approved a foreign sale of the Gray Eagle.

    In their November 22 letter, the senators — including Republicans Lindsey Graham and Chuck Grassley as well as Democrats Richard Blumenthal and Mark Kelly — wrote, “Most importantly, armed [drones] could find and attack Russian warships in the Black Sea, breaking its coercive blockade and alleviate dual pressures on the Ukrainian economy and global food prices.” The senators asserted, “A Russian victory over Ukraine would significantly damage American security and prosperity.”

    As The Intercept noted on November 18, the proliferation of drone warfare in Ukraine has been fueled by both sides — with Russia utilizing Iranian-made Shahed drones in swarm attacks against Ukrainian targets, including civilian infrastructure. The U.S. and other NATO countries have given Kyiv some 2,500 Switchblade and Phoenix Ghost “suicide” drones, which effectively function as small, remote-controlled cruise missiles. Ukraine has also been using larger Turkish-manufactured Bayraktar TB-2 drones, which are a cheaper and less powerful version of the premiere U.S. drones used widely in “counterterrorism” operations in the Middle East and Africa.

    President Joe Biden has repeatedly indicated that he does not want to unnecessarily increase U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine, and the White House has sought to calibrate its actions in support of Ukraine in part based on how Russian President Vladimir Putin will perceive them. Already, Russian officials routinely state that they are not just fighting Kyiv’s forces, but also U.S. and NATO infrastructure. On November 9, the Wall Street Journal reported that Biden was concerned the transfer of the Gray Eagles “could escalate the conflict and signal to Moscow that the U.S. was providing weapons that could target positions inside Russia.”

    There are indications that the U.S. is considering modifying some of the components on the Gray Eagle and swapping them out for less sensitive technologies in order to move forward with supplying the drones to Ukraine. In their letter, the senators noted that AGM-114 Hellfire missiles “have been reviewed and exported to over twenty-five U.S. partners.” Last week, a Pentagon spokesperson said that “nothing has been ruled out.” The senators asked the White House to respond to their letter no later than November 30.

    The post Democratic and Republican Senators Demand Transfer of Gray Eagle Drone to Ukraine appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • The FBI sting had elements of a B-movie production. Federal agents used a car chop shop in Seattle that was an FBI front, placed a prayer rug and a copy of the Quran inside the office, and designated it the scene for the final bust. The FBI’s informant was a registered sex offender named Robert Childs, who had told agents that his friend Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif had a vague plan for a terrorist attack on a military base in Washington state. The FBI furnished Childs with weapons, including assault rifles and grenades.

    At the chop shop, Childs met with Abdul-Latif and his friend Walli Mujahidh, who had a mental illness, and showed them the weapons he’d acquired for their supposed attack. The guns and grenades had been disabled, and hidden FBI cameras captured Abdul-Latif and Mujahidh holding rifles, even though neither man knew how to use them. “He didn’t even understand how to work the breech,” Childs would later tell me, referring to Abdul-Latif’s inability to load the firearm.

    Suddenly, FBI agents, dressed in tactical uniforms, tossed in a smoke grenade and charged toward the men; they handcuffed Childs as part of the show.

    “When the feds rushed in, I knew it was Robert Childs,” Abdul-Latif later told me. “I knew he’d set us up.” As Abdul-Latif saw it, Childs had manipulated and betrayed him for money. The FBI, meanwhile, described Childs as valiant. “But for the courage of the cooperating witness, and the efforts of multiple agencies working long and intense hours, the subjects might have been able to carry out their brutal plan,” Laura Laughlin, then the FBI’s special agent-in-charge in Seattle, said in a 2011 press release. The Seattle Post-Intelligencer later described Childs as “the unlikely hero” of the bust.

    After years of talking to both men and sorting through conflicting claims, I can finally explain the origins of this high-profile case that the FBI and the Justice Department have misrepresented to the public and the courts. The FBI hired a convicted sex offender as an informant, even as a rape kit with his DNA sat untested on a shelf. They paid him $90,000 to set up his friend and his friend’s mentally ill buddy in a terrorism plot concocted from nothing more than an over-the-top statement by Abdul-Latif, landing both Abdul-Latif and Mujahidh in prison. A decade later, Childs is in prison as well, serving a life sentence for the crime documented by the rape kit that the Seattle Police Department left untested for 13 years.

    Last winter, with nothing left to lose, Childs contacted Abdul-Latif and me to come clean about the FBI terrorism sting he’d helped engineer.

    Z8A4593-FBI

    The FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C., on Oct. 24, 2019.

    Photo: Elise Swain/ The Intercept

    “We’re Not Here By Accident”

    I never expected to be caught in the middle of a strained relationship between two old friends convicted on terrorism and rape charges, respectively. It just happened, in the slowly discomforting way it can when you spend years researching a story.

    In 2015, I flew to Key West to meet with Childs for the first time. He’d moved to Florida because his cover had been blown in Seattle. After the sting targeting Abdul-Latif, Childs kept working as a police informant. He grew his hair out into dreadlocks and, as part of a police surveillance operation, joined the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army, a left-wing activist group whose members dress like clowns during protests.

    Activists in Seattle soon linked him to Abdul-Latif’s case and posted pictures of Childs on social media, warning others that he worked for the FBI. I only knew that Childs had moved to Florida because he was arrested there following a complaint that he had rung up five transactions totaling more than $800 on a stolen credit card. Police in Key West investigating the complaint discovered that Childs had not registered as a sex offender in Florida and arrested him. Childs told the cops that “he was hiding from a previous case he worked with detectives in Seattle,” according to the police report.

    Childs and I met at a pizzeria on Stock Island, just east of Key West. At the time, he was homeless and camping in a wooded area near the ocean. He wore an ankle monitor — the result of his charge for not registering as a sex offender — and had both ears pierced, a soul patch under his bottom lip, and his long, sun-bleached dreadlocks tied up in a knot. He’d go to a local Burger King nearly every day to charge his ankle monitor and use his phone to access the free internet.

    When we talked then, he parroted the Justice Department’s official account of what had happened in Seattle: He’d gone to the police because Abdul-Latif had talked about a terrorist attack, and what he’d done to set up his friend was heroic. I asked him about one of the questions that has hung over Abdul-Latif’s case: Why did Childs and his handler, a Seattle detective assigned to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, delete their text messages following Abdul-Latif’s arrest? Childs told me that he’d chosen to wipe his entire phone because he had pornography on the device that would have violated his release terms as a sex offender; he wasn’t trying to hide evidence from Abdul-Latif when he deleted his data, he told me, but rather evidence strictly related to himself. Childs also assured me that his police handler wouldn’t have deleted anything relevant to Abdul-Latif’s case.

    At the time, Childs wasn’t happy with the FBI. He said that federal agents hadn’t lived up to their promises, including, he claimed, to expunge his criminal record that included sex crimes. “I have no trust for them,” he said. Still, he maintained that his work for the bureau was legitimate: He’d helped stop a would-be terrorist by ratting out his friend.

    After our meeting, I continued to track Childs on Florida’s sex offender registry. Not long after we met in the Keys, he moved to Okeechobee, a small town in the southern part of the state named after the enormous freshwater lake it sits above. Okeechobee is an impoverished corner of Florida that few tourists or even locals visit — a good place to disappear. But Abdul-Latif had found Childs’s address there and wrote him a letter from prison, begging him to tell the truth about what had happened during the sting. “I wanted to come clean and confess,” Childs told me a few months ago. But, concerned about what could happen to him, he ignored the letter.

    “I wanted to come clean and confess,” Childs told me. But, concerned about what could happen to him, he ignored Abdul-Latif’s letter.

    Ultimately, even in Okeechobee, the world came looking for Childs. The rape kit of a 12-year-old girl — which had collected dust on a shelf in Seattle since 2006 — was tested in 2019. DNA from the rape kit, found on the victim’s underwear, was a match for Childs.

    On February 21, 2019, the Okeechobee County Sheriff’s Office arrested Childs on a warrant from Washington state. During an interrogation, detectives showed Childs a picture of the victim and explained that his DNA matched the sample recovered from the rape kit.

    “We’re not here by accident,” Detective Ted Van Deman told Childs. “Did you rape this young lady?”

    “No,” Childs responded.

    “No?”

    “I did not,” Childs said.

    Childs told the detectives that he believed the girl must have seen a picture of him in the news media and confused him with her rapist. He explained to detectives that his name and photo had been used in a TED Talk I had given about FBI stings in 2015. “There was an author who had me on TED Talks — not me personally, but his interpretation of everything that happened in the terror case,” Childs said. “My name publicly out there. My picture publicly out there.”

    ted-talk

    A slide from Trevor Aaronson’s TED Talk in 2015 shows a photo of Robert Childs, center, with Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif, left, and Walli Mujahidh, right.

    Photos: Obtained by Trevor Aaronson

    Childs was extradited from Florida to Washington state, where he was convicted at trial and, in January, sentenced to life in prison. He continues to maintain that he did not rape the girl.

    In his prison cell, Childs sat down and wrote a letter to his onetime friend, incarcerated 1,000 miles away in a federal facility in southern California. The letter was a confession.

    “Abdul-Latif may have had some hardline ideology and radical speech, but he was never in any place to be a terrorist,” Childs wrote. “If I had not been encouraged to ‘turn him in’ or threatened to keep him on course, he would not be in prison now and no attack would have ever been perpetrated by him. He’s in prison because I was too coward to tell the truth.”

    In the letter, Childs also admitted that he’d wiped his phone back then not to delete pornography, but because it contained text messages between him and his handler in which he discussed his view that Abdul-Latif was no threat to anyone. Childs also explained that he was coming forward now, as he embarked on a life sentence, because he no longer feared the FBI. “I have tried to relay this information before,” Childs wrote in his letter, “but was always cut off and threatened with losing my freedom as well.”

    Childs added: “The so-called plot to attack the [Military Entrance Processing Station] location was created by me, approved by my handler, and then fed to Abdul-Latif to make it look like he came up with it himself.”

    His confession has reopened Abdul-Latif’s case. In March, a federal judge appointed a lawyer to investigate the claims and file an appeal on Abdul-Latif’s behalf.

    The missing text messages, which Childs now claims he destroyed on orders from Samuel DeJesus, the Seattle detective working with the FBI, were central to Abdul-Latif’s case. Abdul-Latif had planned to question the government about why the texts had not been retained. But on the eve of a hearing about those messages, Abdul-Latif took a plea deal to avoid a possible life term in prison. U.S. District Judge James Robart called the government’s investigation “at best sloppy.” Had Childs’s information about the text messages been available then, Abdul-Latif now says, he wouldn’t have taken the plea.

    Abdul-Latif and Childs cannot call each other, since they are both incarcerated and prisoners are only allowed to make outbound calls. So earlier this year, I became the middleman between these estranged friends, with Abdul-Latif and Childs both agreeing that our conversations would be the on the record.

    Abdul-Latif-Walli

    FBI surveillance cameras captured Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh handling the assault rifles Robert Childs provided to them. Moments later, FBI agents arrested the two men.

    Photo: Obtained by The Intercept

    “We’ll Just Kill Him Right Away”

    Born in California as Joseph Anthony Davis, Abdul-Latif served a brief stint in the U.S. Navy. In his mid-20s, he was arrested and convicted of armed robbery for sticking up a convenience store with a toy gun. Abdul-Latif converted to Islam and settled in Seattle, where he met Childs at a local mosque.

    Childs grew up in Indiana and, at 16, moved out West. In October 1994, Childs, then 18 years old, was reported to local police for raping a 14-year-old girl he’d met at an arcade. “It’ll be all right,” Childs allegedly told the girl as he assaulted her, according to the police report. He was convicted and spent six months in jail. In 1996, when he was 20, Childs met a 15-year-old girl at a Seattle mall. Childs and the girl fondled each other in a park, and the girl’s mother filed a police report; Childs pleaded guilty to child molestation and registered as a sex offender. In prison, Childs became a Muslim. “It made sense to me at the time,” Childs told me of his conversion.

    He returned to Seattle, where he married, started a cleaning business, and attended a local mosque. On occasion, Childs hired Abdul-Latif to work shifts at his business.

    Abdul-Latif would stare into the camera, offering the type of anti-American religious rants that seemed engineered to catch the attention of FBI counterterrorism agents.

    In 2007, with his marriage falling apart, Childs decided he wanted to fight for Islam. He thought at the time that being a part of the mujahedeen was the “highest plane” available in life. So he sold his cleaning business to Abdul-Latif and flew to Turkey. Both Abdul-Latif and Childs would later claim that they were cheated in this transaction; as a result, the two men stopped communicating for a time.

    But Childs never reached the “highest plane.” In Turkey, he befriended a German Christian missionary, Tilman Geske, who was murdered along with two Christian Turks in the office of a Bible publishing company on April 18, 2007. A note left behind read: “This should serve as a lesson to the enemies of our religion. We did it for our country.” The five murderers were Muslims who told a court that their victims were involved in “harmful activities” that dishonored Islam. Geske’s grisly murder shook Childs, and he abandoned his ambitions to fight for Islam.

    In 2011, Childs returned to Seattle, where Abdul-Latif was still running the cleaning business. By this time, Abdul-Latif was married and had a small child, and he devoted his free time to making YouTube videos that promoted Islam, a form of proselytization known in Arabic as dawah. With his shaved head, unkempt, jet-black beard, and rectangular eyeglasses, Abdul-Latif would stare into the camera, offering the type of anti-American religious rants that seemed engineered to catch the attention of FBI counterterrorism agents. “Look what happened in Iraq, Muslims,” Abdul-Latif said in one video. “Weapons of mass destruction, they never found any. Now they’re trying to take the natural resources of the Muslims from that country. And instead of standing up and at least saying no, we just say, ‘OK, it’s all right. I got my job. I got my apartment.’ And that’s it. When a Muslim gets killed, it should affect us emotionally.” Abdul-Latif would often praise Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born imam who was at the time a popular propagandist for Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda terrorist network. (Al-Awlaki was killed in a 2011 drone strike ordered by President Barack Obama.)

    youtube-screenshot

    Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif would post videos to YouTube about his religious faith and political views.

    Screenshot: The Intercept

    Abdul-Latif was recording dawah videos regularly and had just filed for bankruptcy protection in the hopes of cleaning up his finances when Childs returned to Seattle. The two ran into each other at the mosque where they had first met. Childs and Abdul-Latif hadn’t spoken in years, but that evening, they forgave each other for the business disagreement and Abdul-Latif invited Childs to dinner. “His wife was making fried chicken,” Childs remembered, “and I really liked her fried chicken.”

    After dinner, Abdul-Latif and Childs walked outside and into the parking lot of Abdul-Latif’s apartment complex. Abdul-Latif saw Childs’s vehicle — an enormous, gas-guzzling 1980s-era Chevrolet Suburban. Abdul-Latif came up with a nickname for the vehicle on the spot: “The Tank.” “We could take this truck and just ram through the gates at Fort Lewis,” Childs remembered Abdul-Latif telling him that night. Fort Lewis, now known as Joint Base Lewis-McChord, is a large U.S. military installation in Tacoma, Washington.

    According to the Justice Department, Childs, concerned about this comment, reported Abdul-Latif to the Seattle police. DeJesus, a local detective working in partnership with federal counterterrorism agents, brought in the FBI, and federal agents enlisted Childs as an informant. He joined more than 15,000 others, many of them criminals and conmen motivated by money. Childs was not just a convicted sex offender when the FBI signed him up; a rape kit on a nearby shelf would have proven that he had sexually assaulted the 12-year-old girl just a few years before.

    Over the next few weeks, the FBI paid Childs tens of thousands of dollars to buddy up to Abdul-Latif and see if he would move from talk to action. Abdul-Latif and Childs eventually came up with the idea to attack Seattle’s Military Entrance Processing Station, or MEPS, where new enlistees would first report for duty. It was a soft target: a federal building with just one security guard in the lobby. “We’ll just kill him right away,” Abdul-Latif said of the guard, according to FBI recordings. Abdul-Latif and Childs recruited a third man, Mujahidh, a friend of Abdul-Latif’s in Los Angeles who had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, a mental illness that can cause an unmooring from reality. Mujahidh, also known as Frederick Domingue Jr., traveled to Seattle by bus. Neither Abdul-Latif nor Mujahidh had firearms, so Childs offered to provide assault rifles, ammunition, and grenades — thousands of dollars’ worth of military-grade weaponry that Childs told Abdul-Latif he’d sell them for just $800. Abdul-Latif’s knowledge of guns was so limited that he had no idea he was getting the arms deal of the century.

    On June 22, 2011, having been secretly recorded by the FBI discussing their plot, Abdul-Latif and Mujahidh met Childs at the chop shop. They inspected the weapons. FBI agents charged into the building and cuffed them.

    Such stings have become the FBI’s primary counterterrorism tool. Since 9/11, more than 350 accused terrorists with alleged links to international groups like the Islamic State or Al Qaeda have been caught up in terrorism stings, yielding a near perfect record of convictions for the Justice Department. Federal prosecutors filed terrorism charges against Abdul-Latif and Mujahidh, including counts of conspiracy to murder U.S. government employees and conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction. Mujahidh agreed to plead guilty within months of the indictment and was sentenced to 17 years in prison. “This defendant was a cold-hearted, enthusiastic partner in this murderous scheme,” then-U.S. Attorney Jenny Durkan said in a statement at the time.

    Of Abdul-Latif, who received an 18-year sentence, Durkan said: “He targeted young men and women solely because they wanted to serve our country. His goal: to inspire others with a message of hate.”

    As an FBI informant, Robert Childs provided Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh with weapons for a supposed attack targeting this federal building that houses the Seattle Military Processing Center, Seattle, Wash., 2011.

    As an FBI informant, Robert Childs provided Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh with weapons for a supposed attack targeting the federal building that houses the Seattle Military Processing Center, in Seattle, in 2011.

    Photo: Elaine Thompson/AP

    “I Can’t Do This Anymore”

    I don’t recall when I started communicating with Abdul-Latif, but it had to have been at least eight years ago, after he’d pleaded guilty.

    At the time, I was reporting on Russell Dennison, an American who joined ISIS in Syria. Abdul-Latif and Dennison had met online, and FBI records indicated that the bureau began surveilling Abdul-Latif following a single phone conversation with Dennison — months before Childs went to the FBI with his tip. Based on that, I knew the story the FBI and the Justice Department had told the public and the courts — that Childs had spurred the investigation of Abdul-Latif — was not true.

    What’s more, records from the Seattle Police Department and the FBI suggested that a complicated series of events had preceded Childs’s recruitment as an informant. In a June 2011 report, DeJesus, the Seattle detective, wrote that another paid informant had introduced Childs to DeJesus. But the other informant’s relationship with the Seattle Police Department and the FBI wasn’t fully explained in the records. Abdul-Latif had never met this other informant. I had tried to figure out what role this mysterious man had played in the investigation of Abdul-Latif, but I always came up empty.

    Abdul-Latif called me one afternoon last year, his voice somber. “I can’t do this anymore,” he told me, explaining that he couldn’t take the emotional ups and downs that came with the horizonal prospect that I might find something that could reopen his case. “I need to accept and be at peace with the fact that I will in prison for another few years.” (Abdul-Latif is scheduled to be released in October 2026.)

    I respected Abdul-Latif’s position, and I’d reached a similar conclusion: I needed to accept that I wouldn’t get to the bottom of his case, at least not any time soon.

    “I’ll keep in touch,” I told Abdul-Latif, which, if I’m being honest now, I said more out of politeness than sincerity.

    Then late last year, months after Abdul-Latif had called me to say goodbye, I read about Childs’s rape conviction.

    In July 2006, a 12-year-old girl had run away from home and traveled to Seattle. On the night of the city’s annual torchlight parade, the girl was out on the streets, asking people for help finding her mother. She then asked a man if she could use his cellphone. According to a statement she’d later give police, the man grabbed her by the neck, pulled her into a secluded area, and sexually assaulted her.

    The victim’s rape kit sat on a shelf in Seattle until a $3 million grant from the Justice Department funded the examination of more than 6,500 rape kits in Washington state, some dating back as far as 1982. Until a new state law took effect in 2015, individual police officers investigating sexual assault cases in Washington had discretion to decide whether a rape kit should be tested, creating a backlog that stretched back several decades. Untested rape kits are a national problem, with more than 100,000 moldering on shelves.

    The Justice Department grant funded the testing of the 12-year-old girl’s rape kit from 2006. The kit contained DNA belonging to Childs, who was 30 years old at the time of the crime.

    A Seattle police detective recorded an interview with the victim in 2019, following the testing of the rape kit and the positive match for Childs. “I remember trying to fight him off a little bit,” she said, then softly wept.

    interrogation

    Robert Childs is interrogated following a rape kit test matching his DNA, in Okeechobee, Florida, on Feb. 21, 2019.

    Video: Seattle Police Department; Screenshot: The Intercept

    “I Did Manipulate Him”

    In the months after Childs wrote his letter, I spoke regularly to him and Abdul-Latif. Childs was in a Seattle detention facility and Abdul-Latif in a federal prison in southern California. Childs told me that his goal now is to help Abdul-Latif overturn his conviction, and he agreed not only to talk to me, but also to Abdul-Latif’s lawyers. “He wasn’t serious about it,” Childs told me of Abdul-Latif’s interest in terrorism. “He was just talking.”

    Childs explained that after he returned to Seattle, he ran into another friend he’d met in prison following his child molestation conviction. Childs said he was envious of this person when they reconnected. “He had two cars at that time. He had a house he was renting. Never once did I ever see him go to work,” Childs said. “He was always available to just hang out, always hanging out, smoking weed, cigarettes, going out drinking. Just basically partying it up and never working.”

    Childs asked his old prison friend how he afforded his lifestyle. The man told Childs that he was an informant for the Seattle police. He explained that cops will pay for information, Childs recalled. That’s when Childs told him what Abdul-Latif had said to him: “We could take this truck and just ram through the gates at Fort Lewis.”

    “Even when I told him, I was like, ‘Dude, this guy is not serious. They’re gonna laugh at this,’” Childs recalled.

    “Well, you make it sound believable,” Childs remembered his friend telling him. “You make it sound like you were afraid for your life.”

    Childs’s friend was persuasive, appealing to his desire for quick cash. “He’s the one that actually convinced me to turn this into something that it wasn’t, because we could make money from it,” Childs said.

    The other informant brought Childs to the Seattle Police Department. They met with DeJesus, who took Childs to the FBI. “This is a career maker,” Childs recalled DeJesus saying of the case.

    Seattle police records and text messages provided as evidence in Abdul-Latif’s case support what Childs is now saying. DeJesus wrote a police report explaining that another Seattle detective, who was overseeing Child’s friend’s work as an informant, introduced him to Childs. DeJesus recorded a statement from Childs and then turned over the recording to the FBI. Later, Childs’s friend texted Childs that his Seattle police handler gave him $1,000 for making the introduction. “Also, he’s going to try to get me some cigs tomorrow inshallah,” he wrote, referring to cigarettes and using an Arabic expression meaning “God willing.”

    But, as my reporting on Russell Dennison, the American ISIS fighter, indicated, it wasn’t Childs who’d first brought Abdul-Latif to the FBI’s attention. Childs told me that FBI agents had told him that they’d been surveilling Abdul-Latif and had become frustrated that they couldn’t move the case forward. I was able to confirm independently that the FBI had even sent another informant to meet Abdul-Latif, but nothing came of the encounters. “They made a comment to me that they had been watching him for a while,” Childs recalled, “and now they can get him with my help.”

    And they got him. FBI agents burst into the car chop shop, where Abdul-Latif and Mujahidh were holding disabled rifles. “Get down!” the agent yelled. Another FBI agent tackled Childs. “I need you to struggle,” Childs remembers the agent telling him. So Childs put on a show, hoping Abdul-Latif wouldn’t realize that he’d set him up.

    I asked Childs if, in that moment, he regretted what he’d done. “There’s regret,” he told me. “There’s fear that he’s going to know that I was behind it, which apparently he did.”

    After the arrests, Childs said that DeJesus instructed him to wipe his phone to get rid of any text messages. “Make sure there is nothing on your phone that can hurt the case,” Childs said DeJesus told him.

    “I took that as an order to wipe my phone before it was collected,” Childs said. “In order to protect everyone, I claimed that I had a bunch of porn on it that could have gotten me in trouble.”

    In court filings, the Justice Department acknowledged that DeJesus deleted his text messages. It was DeJesus’s standard practice to delete text messages following an arrest, according to the government, and he did not remember that the FBI had asked him to preserve them.

    “There was no terror plot. It didn’t exist. It was created by the FBI and, well, me.”

    The FBI and the Seattle Police Department declined to comment on Childs’s confession. DeJesus has left the Seattle police and could not be reached.

    Emily Langlie, a spokesperson for the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Seattle, said the government “did not seek to obscure or minimize” the missing text messages during its prosecution of Abdul-Latif.

    “As proven by hours of recordings, and as Mr. Abdul-Latif admitted under oath in his plea agreement, his plan was to storm a military processing center and massacre the unarmed recruits with automatic weapons,” Langlie said. “A fundamental reality of criminal investigations is that law enforcement does not get to choose its informants. Prosecutors would never have asked a jury to convict Mr. Abdul-Latif based on the word of Robert Childs. Instead, the United States built a case based on independent evidence, such as the hours of recordings from Mr. Abdul-Latif himself.”

    Childs said he quickly blew through the tens of thousands of dollars he’d earned from the terrorism bust. He bought a boat, stereo equipment, drugs, and visits with sex workers. “It went fast,” he said of the money.

    “I did manipulate him,” Childs told me, referring to Abdul-Latif. “There was no terror plot. It didn’t exist. It was created by the FBI and, well, me.”

    Abdul-Latif’s new court-appointed lawyer is working to obtain a recorded statement from Childs. “I’m looking at the possibility of filing a motion based on newly discovered evidence — that recently Robert Childs has come forward and indicated that he entrapped Abdul-Latif into committing the crimes that he pled guilty to,” Gilbert Levy said in one of our conversations. Levy is poring over Abdul-Latif’s case to find evidence that might corroborate the new details from Childs, whom Levy described as “a recidivist sex offender and not necessarily the most credible witness that’s ever come down the pike.”

    Abdul-Latif calls me regularly again now; he’s concerned that Childs will lose his nerve and refuse to provide a statement under oath. I’ve told him what Childs has consistently told me: that he wants to help Abdul-Latif and make amends for what he did.

    I don’t know if Abdul-Latif will have his conviction overturned or his sentence vacated. I suspect neither is likely, just as it’s unlikely that any of the people involved in his case will face questions about their actions, or any sort of accountability, more than a decade later.

    In the end, Abdul-Latif’s case did go down as a “career maker.” After his arrest, one of the FBI agents involved was promoted to a supervisor position and Childs’s police handler was named “detective of the year.”

    As for the U.S. attorney whose office prosecuted the case? Jenny Durkan was elected the 56th mayor of Seattle, only to leave office amid controversy involving missing text messages of her own.

    The post A Criminal Ratted Out His Friend to the FBI. Now He’s Trying to Make Amends. appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • Jack Smith, the prosecutor named as special counsel to oversee investigations related to former President Donald Trump, at The Hague, Nov. 10, 2020.

    Jack Smith, the prosecutor named as special counsel to oversee investigations related to former President Donald Trump, at The Hague on Nov. 10, 2020.

    Photo: Peter Dejong/AP

    Jack Smith came after me. If he goes after Donald Trump with the same unrelenting ferocity, Trump will be in trouble.

    On Friday, Smith was appointed special counsel to handle two ongoing criminal investigations of Trump: the Mar-a-Lago documents case and the inquiry into Trump’s efforts to overturn the 2020 presidential election, including his role in the January 6, 2021, insurrection at the U.S. Capitol. Attorney General Merrick Garland chose Smith to oversee both cases to avoid accusations of political bias, following Trump’s announcement last week that he plans to run for president in 2024. Trump’s early announcement was clearly an effort to insulate himself from criminal prosecution, and Garland’s countermove seems designed to frustrate the ex-president’s attempt to use the political system for his personal legal benefit.

    Most recently a war crimes prosecutor at The Hague, Smith is a longtime federal prosecutor known for his aggressiveness. “I was described by Steve Bannon (and, sigh, many others) as a pit bull,” former Justice Department lawyer Andrew Weissmann, who worked on special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation of Trump and Russia, tweeted. “Jack Smith makes me look like a golden retriever puppy.”

    Unfortunately, I have firsthand experience with Smith’s aggressiveness. He was part of the Justice Department team that turned my life upside down by trying, for seven years, to force me to reveal confidential sources that I’d used to report on a botched CIA operation.

    The Justice Department first subpoenaed me in January 2008 to try to get me to reveal my sources and continued to target me until January 2015. The Justice Department kept coming at me, even though the federal judge in my case repeatedly ruled against them and sided with me. Each time the judge quashed one of their subpoenas, I thought I was finally done — but then the prosecutors would issue another one. It was excruciating.

    Still, I refused to reveal my sources, and the Justice Department finally gave in. I won the battle in 2015, but only after the case went to the Supreme Court, and only after then-Attorney General Eric Holder ordered the prosecutors to back off because he was getting so much bad press for seeking to jail a reporter for refusing to disclose his confidential sources.

    I know that the prosecution team was angered by Holder’s order to give up; they wanted to keep coming after me.

    Smith was involved in the leak prosecution of Jeffrey Sterling, a former CIA officer, who was accused of being a source about the ill-fated CIA operation. Justice Department prosecutors have repeatedly targeted low-level officials, like former NSA contractor Reality Winner, in leak investigations and have sought draconian sentences against them. By contrast, they have shown extraordinary leniency toward high-ranking officials, like former CIA Director David Petraeus, caught up in similar investigations, many of whom have been let off with the legal equivalent of a slap on the wrist.

    With the Mar-a-Lago documents investigation, Smith must decide whether to prosecute Trump on the same kind of criminal charges that have been widely used in previous cases involving alleged leaks of classified information.

    Will Jack Smith give Trump the kid-glove treatment that other high-ranking officials have so long enjoyed?

    The question for Smith is whether he will seek heavy charges against Trump, like he and the Justice Department sought in the Sterling case and against many other low-level officials in the past, or will he give Trump the kid-glove treatment that other high-ranking officials have so long enjoyed?

    His decision on the Mar-a-Lago case will show whether Smith really is an aggressive prosecutor — or just aggressive against the powerless.

    Of course, Smith could decide not to prosecute Trump in the documents case because he has come to believe that the laws governing the handling of classified information are too strict, and that no one, including low-ranking whistleblowers, should face serious penalties in such cases. But such a massive change of heart by a career prosecutor is highly unlikely.

    Smith will have a major advantage over Robert Mueller, the special counsel in the long-running Trump-Russia case, in that he is stepping into investigations that are already well underway and staffed with teams of career Justice Department prosecutors and FBI agents. It should be much easier for him to quickly make decisions than it was for Mueller.

    The documents case is a straightforward matter involving the theft and mishandling of classified documents, as well as efforts to obstruct the federal investigation into their disappearance. The evidence appears conclusive that Trump illegally stole classified documents after his presidency, and then tried to block the investigation into the documents by hiding them, lying about them, and getting others to lie on his behalf as well.

    The biggest obstacle to a quick resolution of the documents case is Trump’s ongoing campaign to claim that he has a special legal status as a former president that precludes his prosecution in the case. He and his lawyers have, at various times, claimed both executive privilege and attorney-client privilege to try to block the government’s access to documents seized at Mar-a-Lago during a court-authorized FBI raid in August. He has also said that he owns the documents outright, and that he has the right to keep documents from his time as president.

    But while Trump has won some favorable rulings from a federal district judge he appointed, prosecutors have already been able to reverse some of the lower court’s rulings. On Tuesday, prosecutors sought a ruling from a federal appeals court that would end the role of a “special master” appointed by the district judge to review documents in the case. Thus it may not be long before the legal maneuverings sputter out, and Smith will have to make a decision on whether to prosecute.

    The case involving Trump’s efforts to illegally overturn the 2020 election, culminating with the January 6 insurrection, is more complex than the documents case — yet it is still far less complicated than the Trump-Russia investigation.

    The Trump-Russia case was about whether Russia interfered in the 2016 election to help Trump win — and whether Trump or anyone in his circle collaborated with Moscow in its meddling. Trump’s efforts to obstruct the investigation also became a major focus for Mueller. But such a sprawling probe, involving a foreign country, was too much for Mueller; he never moved aggressively to get information out of Russia. Ultimately, he pulled his punches, and was unwilling to indict a sitting president.

    By contrast, Smith won’t have to get information out of a foreign adversary to prove his case in connection with the 2020 election — and he won’t have to worry about indicting a president who is still in office.

    The main question for Smith in the case will be how to narrow the investigation’s focus to bring an indictment of Trump under one or more specific criminal laws. Until now, prosecutors have focused on the role Trump and others played in arranging to have fake presidential electors put forward from key states, thus overturning Joe Biden’s victory in the Electoral College.

    But Smith could broaden the investigation to include Trump’s involvement in the January 6 insurrection. Already, the Justice Department has brought seditious conspiracy cases against right-wing militia leaders involved in the insurrection; jury deliberations have begun in the sedition case against Oath Keepers leader Stewart Rhodes and four others.

    If he is truly aggressive, Smith could seek similar charges against Donald Trump.

    The post I Experienced Jack Smith’s Zeal Firsthand. Will Trump Get the Same Treatment? appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • On a rainy Saturday morning in May, Hayanuddin Afghan, a former member of a CIA-backed militia that was once his country’s most brutal and effective anti-Taliban force, welcomed me to his new home in a hilly neighborhood of Pittsburgh.

    He invited me in through the kitchen, where his wife, who was pregnant with their fourth child, was baking traditional Afghan bread with flour from Aldi’s. The trip downtown to buy groceries was among the greatest challenges of Hayanuddin’s new life in Pittsburgh. It involved hauling heavy bags back home on foot and in multiple city buses, whose schedules were unknowable since he didn’t speak English and had not downloaded the relevant app.

    “It is difficult to descend from a very strong position to a very weak position,” Hayanuddin told me. In Afghanistan, “we had value. It was our country, and we were making sense for that country. But now, even our generals and commanders, everyone is in the same position.”

    In Afghanistan, it was impossible to talk at any length to members of the secretive commando forces known as the Zero Units. They hunted the Taliban in night raids and were widely accused of killing civilians, including children. But last September, Hayanuddin and his Zero Unit comrades were the beneficiaries of the most successful aspect of the Biden administration’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan: the CIA’s rescue of its allied militias. Their arrival in the U.S. over the last year has cracked open one of the war’s blackest boxes.

    My conversations with Hayanuddin and several other militia members yielded new details about the command structure, operations, and final days of shadowy units that were nominally overseen by the Afghan intelligence service but were in fact built, trained, and in many cases fully controlled by the CIA. Their fighters hold clues to many of the war’s mysteries, including how U.S. intelligence engineered and oversaw years of deadly night raids that contributed to the Taliban’s ultimate victory, and how a secret deal between longtime enemies may have hastened the lightning collapse of the Afghan security forces last August.

    Celebrated as heroes by their American handlers and some Afghans who oppose the Taliban, militiamen like Hayanuddin were feared and detested by many rural Afghans, who bore the brunt of their harrowing raids. While hundreds of Zero Unit members and their closest relatives made it to the U.S., they left behind extended families who have suffered abuse, imprisonment, and death threats under the new government.

    The CIA did not respond to detailed questions about its role in overseeing, evacuating, and resettling Zero Unit members and whether the agency would do more to help militiamen and their families left behind in Afghanistan. “The United States made a commitment to the people who worked for us that we would create a concrete pathway to U.S. citizenship for those who gave so much to assist us over the years,” an agency spokesperson told me in an email. “It will take time, but we never forget [our] partners and are committed to helping those who assisted us. We are continuing to work closely with the State Department and other US government agencies on this effort.”

    “With regard to allegations of human rights abuses,” the email continued, “the U.S. takes these claims very seriously, and we take extraordinary measures, beyond the minimum legal requirements to reduce civilian casualties in armed conflict and strengthen accountability for the actions of partners. A false narrative [exists] about these forces that has persisted over the years due to a systematic propaganda campaign by the Taliban.”

    Hayanuddin said that he and his comrades took care to avoid harming bystanders during their raids, even using loudspeakers to warn women to stay inside or shelter in basements before the fighting began. “For me, it was like a holy war,” he said. “I was there to target bad guys.” But he also described lingering feelings of rage, guilt, and remorse, and connected his struggle in Pittsburgh to his past. At one point, he wondered aloud if he was being punished.

    “Sometimes I can’t control my anger and my anxiety,” he told me. “My heart is so sad, like someone is squeezing it very hard. I don’t know why. Maybe because of what happened back home or what is happening here.”

    Reversal of Fortune

    I met Hayanuddin last spring, at an Afghan New Year’s celebration in a park in Pittsburgh, where we had both recently settled as refugees. I had worked for the New York Times in Kabul for five years and made many trips to the front lines to report on the Afghan security forces, including in the days before the Taliban captured the Afghan capital last August. I was evacuated with other Times staffers to Houston, where I lived in a hotel for several months before getting a job as a visual journalist at the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review and moving north.

    At first, Hayanuddin didn’t want to talk to me. But after several attempts, he grew more comfortable, in part because he thought he was talking about an episode of the war that was closed, and in part because we were both exiles from the same place, trying to start new lives in Pittsburgh while still longing for home.

    Hayanuddin had served six years with a unit known as 03, fighting the Taliban across Afghanistan’s southern deserts from his base in a compound previously occupied by the one-eyed former Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar. U.S. special operators had commandeered the property when they arrived in Kandahar in 2001 and turned it into a redoubt for American and Afghan intelligence forces. With hundreds of other Zero Unit fighters, Hayanuddin crossed shifting front lines in the final days of the war to get to Kabul’s CIA-controlled Eagle Base. From there, he was airlifted to the Hamid Karzai International Airport, where he briefly worked security before being handed $8,000 in cash — half a year’s salary — and flown with his wife and three young children to Fort Dix.

    At 37, with a seventh-grade education, Hayanuddin, along with his comrades, is facing a reversal of fortune that is humiliating, infuriating, and utterly intractable. After almost two decades as an American proxy — from guarding U.S. bases to killing Afghans in partnership with the world’s most powerful intelligence agency — he has landed, as a poor and vulnerable refugee, in a three-bedroom apartment with flowered curtains he had to harangue the resettlement agency to install in keeping with Pashtun culture, which dictates that a woman must be shielded from the eyes of passing strangers.

    The Zero Units, also known as Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams, were born soon after the first U.S. military and intelligence operatives arrived in Afghanistan in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Formed in 2002, they operated entirely under U.S. control until 2012, Gen. Yasin Zia, Afghanistan’s former chief of Army staff, told me in August from London, where he leads an anti-Taliban resistance force. “The government of Afghanistan had no interference in these units,” said Zia, who spent many years in senior roles in the U.S.-backed Afghan government, including as deputy director of the Afghan intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security, which nominally oversaw the units in recent years.

    The first of what would become the Zero Units operated in eastern Afghanistan, in a mountainous area along the Pakistani border where the Taliban and other militants often sought refuge between attacks on U.S., NATO, and Afghan government forces. That militia, known as the Khost Protection Force, or KPF, covered the southeastern region of the country. Later, the CIA created and trained at least three more units: 01, which operated in Kabul, Logar, and Wardak provinces in central Afghanistan; 02, based in Jalalabad, which fought in the east; and Hayanuddin’s unit, 03, based in Kandahar and fighting across the south.

    In 2010, under pressure from then-Afghan President Hamid Karzai, U.S. officials agreed to transfer oversight of the Zero Units to NDS “physically, but not technically,” Zia said. “We had the names and ranks of members of Zero Units,” he told me. “But their salary was paid by Americans, their targets were given by Americans, and until the end the Americans were with these units.”

    “Their salary was paid by Americans, their targets were given by Americans, and until the end the Americans were with these units.”

    As the Obama administration transitioned from combat operations to a counterterrorism and advisory mission in Afghanistan after 2011, the U.S. handed control of several Zero Units over to the Karzai government, Zia said. But the CIA retained control of other key units, including the Kabul-based 01; the KPF; and Hayanuddin’s 03.

    The units targeted the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Al Qaeda, but they were not accountable to the Afghan government — not even to the president. In 2019, Afghanistan’s then-national security adviser, Hamdullah Mohib, responded to allegations of extrajudicial killings by 01 — including massacres of children in madrassas — by noting that the unit operated “in partnership with the CIA.”

    Hayanuddin had a front-row seat to the shambolic American withdrawal from Afghanistan, and now he can describe what he saw and heard in the war’s final months. The Zero Units were built to work in tandem with U.S. air support, but in August 2020, a year before the government of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani collapsed, U.S. forces began to radically scale back their air support for his unit, Hayanuddin said.

    “Our American advisers left our bases for Kabul, and the choppers that would wait in our base on the edge of Kandahar City left with them,” he recalled. “Our commanders would only report to Americans about our operations, and the Americans would just say, ‘Go ahead.’ We were not working as closely as we used to.”

    When the Americans took away their planes, the Afghans’ missions grew much more treacherous. “The American surveillance aircraft would tell us how many people were inside a building and how many of them were armed, and what weapons they have,” Hayanuddin said. “But those details were not there anymore.”

    With U.S. air support gone and the fledgling Afghan Air Force unable to provide comparable intelligence, more Zero Unit members got hurt. The planes that had once ferried them to field hospitals in minutes were gone too. In February 2020, when U.S. drones and other aircraft circled over their operations, one of Hayanuddin’s comrades, Akmal, was blown up by a roadside bomb. The Americans airlifted him to a military hospital and he survived, Hayanuddin said, though he lost both his legs. But eight months later, another unit member, Shahidullah, was shot twice in the abdomen. This time, there was no airlift, and Hayanuddin’s unit was stuck in enemy territory. Shahidullah died on the spot.

    After President Joe Biden took office in January 2021, the CIA gave the NDS a year’s budget for the Zero Units and said the agency would no longer support them, Zia told The Intercept from London. But the final Zero Units were not transferred to Afghan control, he said, until after Biden announced the full U.S. withdrawal in April 2021 and the last American forces and intelligence operatives began to leave.

    A member of the Taliban Badri 313 military unit stands besides damaged vehicles kept near the destroyed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) base in Deh Sabz district northeast of Kabul on September 6, 2021 after the US pulled all its troops out of the country. -  (Photo by Aamir QURESHI / AFP) (Photo by AAMIR QURESHI/AFP via Getty Images)

    Members of the Taliban give a tour of the destroyed CIA-operated Eagle Base in Deh Sabz district, northeast of Kabul, on Sept. 6, 2021.

    Photo: Aamir Qureshi/AFP via Getty Images

    “Like Committing Suicide”

    The Zero Units were designed to capture and kill in targeted raids, not to fight on battlefields. They were widely known as among the most effective elite units in the Afghan security forces, and last summer, as the U.S. military pulled out and the Taliban advanced, many in the Ghani government and the Afghan military looked to them for salvation.

    “I am not sure if our commanders got some money in bribes from provincial officials or the government in Kabul,” Hayanuddin said. “But they started turning a blind eye to our standards and sending us to several missions a day and making us suffer heavy casualties.”

    Sometimes seven or eight unit members were killed each month, he said, an unprecedented rate for the elite unit. “Once, I remember that all our unit members started crying and protesting because of being overused. Our commanders never listened to that. They would still force us to go to operations all over the south.”

    As casualties rose and the war intensified, the morale of Zero Unit members cratered, an Afghan doctor who fought for 02 told me. Like Hayanuddin, the doctor was evacuated last summer; he asked me not to use his name for fear of repercussions now that he and his family are in the United States.

    When his commander would ask militia members to go on operations, the doctor told me, some would faint. They would say that “going to an operation is like committing suicide,” he recalled, “as there is no air support and not enough weapons and equipment.”

    Rumors that U.S.-Taliban peace talks in Qatar had yielded an agreement to essentially give Afghanistan to the Taliban didn’t help. “The Taliban would send tribal elders to different security forces and tell them that it was decided in Doha that the province where they are stationed should be handed over to the Taliban, so better you don’t fight and avoid the casualties,” the doctor said. “The security forces would accept that and give up fighting.”

    The Afghan security forces couldn’t keep up with the losses. In May 2021 alone, more than 400 pro-government forces were killed. Afghans were no longer willing to join the security forces because the job had become too dangerous.

    “We had very smart people in our unit,” Hayanuddin said. “I remember that on a single day, one of our guys, without proper equipment, cleared nearly 30 roadside bombs” in Maiwand District, a Taliban stronghold west of Kandahar. Fighters with 03 repeatedly forced the Taliban out of Kandahar’s Arghandab District in the spring of 2021, he said, but when the regular Afghan army and police took over, the Taliban surged back.

    Both Hayanuddin and the doctor from 02 suspect that the Afghan security forces largely surrendered the south not because they were defeated on the battlefield but as part of a political deal. They were not alone in thinking this. In the summer of 2021, the Taliban took control of dozens of Afghan police outposts in the districts surrounding Kandahar.

    “It was a political deal which led to a wave of collapse of hundreds of outposts first in the south of the country.”

    “The leadership of the Afghan security forces asked ground forces in many provinces across the country to stop fighting. We have seen videos on social media that soldiers were crying when they were told to leave their outposts and drop their weapons,” Mirza Mohammad Yarmand, a former Afghan deputy interior minister and military analyst, told me. “This means that it was a political deal which led to a wave of collapse of hundreds of outposts first in the south of the country.”

    Soldiers who insisted on fighting found their supply lines cut and didn’t get the support they needed, Yarmand said, adding that when Afghan forces in the northern province of Takhar wanted to stand their ground, they were given a choice: surrender to the Taliban or drive to the mountains of Panjshir, where the last forces resisting the Taliban were holed up.

    Near Kandahar, Hayanuddin’s unit ran into police officers trying to flee. “They said their outpost was captured by the Taliban,” he recalled. “We took them with us, and there was no Taliban in their outpost. When we asked why, they said their tribal elder told them to leave the outpost to the Taliban. This is only one example, but it happened many times.”

    In June 2021, 03 was deployed from one front line to another as district after district fell to the insurgents. By the end of that month, nearly half of Afghanistan’s districts were under Taliban control.

    As the fighting intensified, other Afghan security forces pinned their hopes on the Zero Units. On August 4, 2021, I was with the Afghan National Police Counter Resistance Unit outside Sarposa Prison, one of the main front lines in Kandahar. The fighting picked up on one edge of the city just as the police machine gun stopped working. I asked Shafiqullah Kaliwal, a unit commander, what they were going to do.

    “The 03 will come,” he told me, “and they will push back the Taliban to their original outposts.”

    The next day, Kaliwal told me that 03 had indeed come to their rescue and forced the Taliban to retreat. But when the Zero Unit moved on, the Taliban quickly recaptured the territory.

    Zia confirmed that the pressure on Zero Units was unsustainable. In the last four months of the war in Kandahar, Zia said, “the casualties of Zero Units were very high. It was not comparable to the past 20 years of war. The reason for that was that they were not used professionally.”

    A Taliban flag flies at a square in the city of Ghazni, Afghanistan, after fighting between Taliban and Afghan security forces Thursday, Aug. 12, 2021. The Taliban captured the provincial capital near Kabul on Thursday, the 10th the insurgents have taken over a weeklong blitz across Afghanistan as the U.S. and NATO prepare to withdraw entirely from the country after decades of war. (AP Photo/Gulabuddin Amiri)

    A Taliban flag flies at a square in the city of Ghazni, Afghanistan, after the Taliban captured the provincial capital, on Aug. 12, 2021.

    Photo: Gulabuddin Amiri/AP

    A Secret Deal

    One of the many mysteries of the war’s final days was how the Zero Units managed to make their way through Taliban-held territory to Kabul, where they were evacuated to the United States and other countries. An apparent agreement between the Taliban and the U.S. helps explain their unlikely escape.

    On August 11, 2021, one of the main government lines of defense in Kandahar City collapsed to the Taliban. Hayanuddin was on leave at the time, but the next day, he said, his comrades in 03 and other security forces drove to Kandahar Air Field, which by then was in Taliban territory. There, they spent two days waiting to be flown to Kabul.

    On August 14, the Taliban captured Jalalabad City, the provincial capital of Nangarhar Province, where Hayanuddin was spending his leave with his family. Terrified, he and his younger brother, who had also served in 03, stayed up all night, trying to contact Hayanuddin’s commander for orders. When they finally reached the commander, he told them to get to Kabul. The next morning, they climbed into a taxi and set off on an anxious two-hour journey through territory now controlled by their enemies. If anyone identified them, they thought, they would be killed.

    But the trip was far easier than they’d expected as, one after another, the Taliban fighters manning checkpoints let them pass. “We didn’t know what was happening,” Hayanuddin told me. “They were our enemy. We were intensively fighting just a day before the collapse, but now we were staying in their territory or driving through it. We thought we were taking a big risk, but now as I think about it, it seems the Taliban didn’t want to attack us as part of their deal with the U.S.”

    It wasn’t just a few guys in taxis who managed to cross Taliban checkpoints with ease. On August 15, the day Kabul fell to the Taliban, the doctor from 02 told me that he drove from Jalalabad to Kabul with his fellow unit members in a convoy of hundreds of military vehicles packed with weapons and equipment. The doctor thought they would have to fight their way through the checkpoints, but each time, the Taliban soldiers called their commanders and waved him and the other Afghan militiamen through.

    The Taliban allowed Zero Unit members to safely cross their front lines in the final days of the war because they had agreed with the U.S. government to do so.

    The Taliban allowed Zero Unit members to safely cross their front lines in the final days of the war because they had agreed with the U.S. government to do so, according to the doctor from 02 and two former Afghan intelligence officials, who asked not to be named because they feared repercussions from the Taliban for speaking to a journalist. The U.S. evacuation plan depended on Zero Unit members working security at the Kabul airport, and the Americans had told those fighters to get passports shortly before the republic collapsed, Zia, the former senior security official, said.

    The CIA declined to comment. The Taliban did not respond to repeated requests for comment.

    Hayanuddin and his brother made it safely to Eagle Base, the Kabul headquarters of the CIA and 01, where they spent three nights. One by one, the Zero Units boarded Chinook helicopters and left the base for the Kabul airport: first 01, then 02, and then Hayanuddin’s unit, 03.

    Hayanuddin spent five nights in the airport, providing security for the evacuation of thousands of desperate Afghans. In those days and later, Zero Unit members were accused of firing over the heads of crowds and beating Afghan civilians who were trying to leave. Hayanuddin denied mistreating people at the airport, but my own encounter with a Zero Unit fighter on August 19 suggests there is truth to the charges. As I made my way through crowds in front of the airport terminal, trying to reach my American colleague and the U.S. Marines, a member of the Zero Units stopped me. I explained who I was and where I was going, but the fighter ordered me to sit down. If I didn’t, he said, he would shoot me with dozens of bullets, and no one would question him.

    At last, it was Hayanuddin’s turn to call his family to join him on a flight to the U.S., via Abu Dhabi and Germany. Like many Afghans, Hayanuddin was married to two women. He had moved one of his wives, who he asked me not to name, to Nangarhar with their three kids several months before the collapse, and one of his brothers managed to escort them to Kabul to meet Hayanuddin at the airport. But Hayanuddin’s other wife was still in his home province of Kunar with their four children when the republic fell.

    “My first wife, who was in Kunar, couldn’t make it to Kabul,” he told me, “because there was no one to accompany her.”

    Hayanuddin also left his parents and siblings behind, including the brother who had served alongside him in 03. The Americans refused to evacuate him, Hayanuddin said, because he had left the unit a year before the Taliban took control.

    Thankful, but Angry

    In Pittsburgh, Hayanuddin and several other Zero Unit members found work at a halal grocery. One of them was Khan Wali Momand, a former school principal who started working for 02 in Jalalabad as a security guard in 2017. Momand now lives with his wife and children in Section 8 housing in Duquesne, a Pittsburgh suburb. When I met him, he was unloading boxes; he has since gotten a different job at another local grocery store, which he prefers because it doesn’t involve as much heavy lifting.

    Momand started working with 02 through his brother, Inayatullah, who he says served 16 years with the unit but left just days before the government collapsed because his wife was ill. Like Hayanuddin’s brother, Inayatullah was left behind when the Taliban took over, and he and Momand’s other relatives immediately became targets for retribution. Inayatullah went into hiding, and when I spoke to Momand this spring, he was consumed by grief and worry. “Every time I receive a call from home,” Momand told me, “I think it will be bad news.”

    This spring, members of the Taliban kidnapped two of Momand’s teenage nephews and held them for five days in an attempt to force the family to hand over Inayatullah. The nephews were released after tribal elders in the area promised to help the Taliban find Inayatullah. He has applied for a Special Immigrant Visa to come to the United States, Momand said, but has not heard back.

    “We were so loyal to Americans that we wouldn’t leave their bags behind in the battlefield, but now they are leaving behind my brother, who helped them for 16 years,” Momand told me. “It happened many times during missions with 02 that an American adviser or soldier would get shot, and we would risk our life to take them out of the battlefield. Look at our level of loyalty and their level of loyalty.”

    Momand is deeply conflicted over his role in the war. When he began working with the Americans five years ago, he drew the enmity of the Taliban and many acquaintances. In his conservative village, he had a hard time defending his decision and explaining how helping the Americans would benefit his country. Now he wonders whether he made the right choice — whether it was worth it, given the price he and his family have paid. He’s an outsider in Duquesne and may never be able to go back to Afghanistan. Did he join 02 for the wrong reasons, he wonders, or was he used? Did he betray his country, his people, after all?

    Momand said he is grateful to Biden. “He hasn’t left us to the Taliban. If I had been left behind in Afghanistan, my whole family and I would have been killed by now,” he said. “But there is no one in the U.S. to rescue me from the tough situation here.”

    As our conversation drew to a close, Momand’s anger flared. He had told his story many times, he said, to workers from resettlement agencies and other relief organizations. “Everyone comes here and asks about my problems and the problems of my family, but I don’t see any outcome of telling these stories,” he said. “Do you enjoy hearing my painful life story?”

    MFA_7333-es_2

    Hayanuddin reviews a document he received through the U.S. Postal Service, a new concept for him, as his son looks on in their home in Pittsburgh.

    Photo: Fahim Abed for The Intercept

    Only in the Darkness

    At Hayanuddin’s house that rainy May morning, an oilcloth was spread over the living room carpet, and we sat around it while his wife and 9-year-old daughter, Simina, brought out loaves of hot fresh bread, eggs, warm yogurt, and a giant thermos of sweet, milky black tea.

    As we ate, Hayanuddin kept an eye on his phone. At 9 a.m., an alarm sounded, and Simina brought him a pair of white athletic socks, a jacket, and an umbrella. Back in Afghanistan, his American advisers had stressed the need for punctuality, often arriving 15 minutes early for meetings with their Afghan counterparts. He feared that if he were late to work, he’d get fired. And he needed this job.

    He took home about $1,600 a month after taxes, he told me. The resettlement agency was covering the first three months of rent on his apartment in Pittsburgh; after that, he’d have to spend $1,500 a month, nearly his entire paycheck, on rent and utilities. He was getting food stamps, but the family budget was tight.

    His house was about five miles from the halal grocery, an easy 15-minute drive. But the bus ride, including a transfer downtown, could take more than an hour. On this day, he would work for nine hours, arriving home between 9 and 10 p.m. The family, including the children, would eat a late dinner together. After that, they’d call Afghanistan, so Hayanuddin and his wife could talk to their parents, and the parents could speak to their grandchildren.

    It was his father, Hayanuddin says, who had convinced him to go to the U.S. last year. “If the Taliban come and they behead you in front of us or shoot you in the head in front of us, that would be a very big trauma for us for our whole life,” his father told him last August. “So if you want to spare us that pain, you should leave.”

    He sometimes regrets it. “We didn’t voluntarily come here, and it is not easy here,” he told me. “That’s the everyday struggle. And then you have a family that is staring at you and hoping that you will fix everything.”

    At 9:20 a.m., Hayanuddin pulled on a black jacket and headed out to the bus stop, a wooden pole with a metal sign at the edge of a busy road. He hunched his shoulders against the rain and took a drag on his Marlboro Red. The resettlement agency gave him transit cards, but when they ran out, he’d have to spend his own money on bus fare.

    Back in Afghanistan, he drove heavy military vehicles over mountainous terrain wearing night vision goggles. But in Pittsburgh, he couldn’t get a driver’s license. The test was offered in Urdu and Arabic, but not Persian or Pashto, Afghanistan’s two main languages, and at the time, translators were not allowed. (Several months later, after the local Afghan community complained, the DMV added a test in Persian.)

    “If I would stand in a bus stop in Afghanistan, I would just wave to a taxi and they would stop and take me to where I wanted to go,” he said. “There is no country as good as Afghanistan around the world, if only it were safe enough to live in.”

    After 15 minutes, the bus arrived. Hayanuddin, thoroughly soaked, donned a surgical mask, climbed the steps, and settled into an empty seat. As the bus heaved along the twisting roads, heading downtown, he surveyed the other passengers.

    “Only poor people like me are using the bus,” he noted.

    Back at his apartment, he’d shown me a stack of military ID cards and commendations from the Americans he’d worked with, each signed by a different soldier or officer, praising his service and making promises they couldn’t keep.

    “Your exemplary actions demonstrate your overall commitment to not only safeguard your Village, your District, and Province from those who inflict harm upon the innocent, but also to ensure a better future for all current and future Afghan citizens,” read one certificate, signed by “Master Sergeant Scott” and “Commander Josh” of Special Forces unit ODA 3115.

    “His expertise, unfaltering dedication to duty and work ethic have far exceeded my expectations and he is an inspiration for all who work with him,” said another, marked QSF — for Qandahar Strike Force — National Security Unit 03 and dated March 2021. “Over the past 6 years, He has demonstrated his total loyalty to his unit. His service to the country is a shining example for all his fellows’ unit around him and he demonstrates an unfailing commitment to a free and prosperous Afghanistan.” It was signed by “Mac,” a U.S. adviser.

    “Mr. Ayanudin will be a great asset to the SRF-03,” read a commendation from 2015, “and will make a significant contribution to a free and prosperous Afghanistan.”

    What to make, now, of those papers, those words?

    More than an hour after leaving his house, Hayanuddin disembarked on a desolate street corner and walked a block to the halal grocery, a sprawling brick warehouse complex with murals paraphrasing Martin Luther King Jr.: “Only in the darkness can you see the stars.”

    Inside, he traded his jacket for a white apron and reappeared behind the meat counter, where he used a mechanized blade to slice chicken breasts.

    The post The Evacuation of the CIA’s Afghan Proxies Has Opened One of the War’s Blackest Boxes appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • It’s been a grand two years for the war industry. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the perceived scent of Vladimir Putin’s blood emanating from the Kremlin, and hyped-up tensions with China have all converged to accelerate the already fierce pace of U.S. military spending, weapons sales and defense contracts. The appetite for more powerful armaments and advanced technologies, engulfed in an atmosphere of insatiable “must-have” thinking in Washington, D.C., has heralded a new golden age for the manufacturers of war. At times, Congress has allocated billions of dollars more in defense authorizations than the record-shattering budgets requested by the president. In addition to direct sales for Ukraine, the war industry is getting showered with contracts to replace the weapons that the Pentagon is transferring from its own stockpiles to Kyiv. The White House this week officially requested nearly $40 billion in new aid to Ukraine to fight its war against Russia’s invasion, which would — in a single piece of legislation — double the total amount of overt military aid allocated to Kyiv by the U.S. since Joe Biden took office. It is no coincidence that the defense industry is on track to spend less money lobbying the federal government than at any point since the initial years of the Iraq war. Business is booming.

    It is no coincidence that the defense industry is on track to spend less money lobbying the federal government than at any point since the initial years of the Iraq war.

    The flow of weapons and other military aid to Ukraine has widespread bipartisan support on Capitol Hill, though some top Republicans have indicated that they are going to exert more scrutiny over the spending once they take control of the House of Representatives next year. There has been almost no dissent within the Democratic Party on the administration’s stance. The kerfuffle in October over the withdrawn letter from the Congressional Progressive Caucus to Biden “that attempted to gingerly open a conversation about a potential diplomatic end to Russia’s war on Ukraine” dramatized how little room there is within the party for alternative views.

    Since Russia launched its invasion in February, the only consequential debates on support for Ukraine have revolved around whether the U.S. and NATO should get more directly involved in confronting Moscow (which Biden has consistently rejected) and, in specific cases, whether the U.S. should give Ukraine sensitive defense technology and weapons systems. The Ukraine war has presented the defense industry the opportunity to have its latest innovations tested on a real battlefield against a powerful nation-state, with the added perceived geopolitical bonus of significantly degrading the war capabilities and stockpiles of Russia, a country the U.S. has, once again, declared its arch-nemesis. At the same time, the Pentagon has expressed clear reservations about how high up the proprietary defense technology chain this trend should extend.

    “There needs to be an assessment, as the U.S. has increased the kinds of weapons it’s providing [Ukraine]: Will it appreciatively change the situation on the battlefield in the Ukrainian’s favor and are the risks to that in terms of Putin’s perceptions manageable?” said Matt Duss, a longtime foreign policy adviser to Sen. Bernie Sanders who is now a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace. “If the answer to both of those questions is yes, then they [Ukraine] will probably get them.” Duss added that he thinks “the Biden people have been smart about how Putin interprets U.S. actions.”

    Over the past several months, a quiet battle has been simmering in Washington over whether the Biden administration should permit Ukraine to purchase what would be the most sophisticated weaponized drone deployed to date in the war against Russia’s invasion, the MQ-1C Gray Eagle. Capable of firing four high-powered Hellfire missiles or eight Stinger munitions, the unofficial successor to the widely used Predator drone has been deployed in U.S. counterterrorism missions in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Africa, particularly under presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump. Unlike the Predator and Reaper drones, the U.S. has never approved the export of the Gray Eagle, even to its allies. It would require sign-off from a number of government bodies, including regulators at the State and Defense Departments.

    In addition to its substantial weapons payload, the Gray Eagle has sophisticated reconnaissance and intelligence technology and can remain airborne for more than 24 hours. This has made it an ideal weapon for sustained monitoring of structures that are believed to house “high-value targets” or for conducting long-range attacks in undeclared war zones or “denied areas” without the need to use warplanes, sea-launched cruise missiles, or ground troops.

    But the war in Ukraine is being fought in stark contrast to the “targeted killing” operations utilized in the so-called war on terrorism where the U.S. was engaged in asymmetric warfare, mostly against non-nation-state actors. Both Ukraine and Russia possess and regularly utilize weaponized drones in battle, though the models they possess are several tiers below the quality and lethality of the premiere systems used repeatedly by the U.S. in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. Ukraine has used Turkish-made Bayraktar drones, which are a much cheaper and far more vulnerable version of the top-level U.S. drones, such as Reapers, Predators, and Gray Eagles. While the Bayraktar’s capabilities and potential firepower are inferior to its U.S. analogs, Ukraine has used the drone to great effect against Russian forces, particularly early in the conflict against logistical supply routes and artillery positions.

    Neither Russia nor Ukraine is using drones to conduct operations that even vaguely resemble the much-vaunted (and often highly exaggerated U.S. claims of) “surgical” strikes against individual “high-value targets.” Russia, in particular, is using drones indiscriminately and has employed swarms of single-use “kamikaze” drones that detonate when the drone, packed with explosives, crashes into a target or structure. In September, Russia began deploying Iranian-made Shahed-136 single-use drones to conduct such attacks against Ukrainian targets, including civilian infrastructure. Ukrainian President Voldomyr Zelenskyy recently claimed that Moscow secretly purchased from Iran as many as 2,400 of the drones, which cost $20,000 each and fly low enough to evade most radar systems. He offered no evidence to support the alleged number of drones, saying it was “according to our intelligence.” In contrast, John Kirby, the communications coordinator for the U.S. National Security Council, alleged on October 21 that Russia has acquired “dozens of [unmanned aerial vehicles] so far” from Iran “and will likely continue to receive additional shipments in the future.” Iran has acknowledged selling Moscow the drones, though it claims they were not equipped with munitions and were delivered before the invasion. Iran denies that it has continued to supply them. The U.S. Treasury Department recently announced new sanctions against Iranian and Emirati businesses it claims are involved with the alleged shipments.

    Defense analysts have speculated that Russia turned to Tehran for drones because its own supply had been severely degraded by Ukrainian attacks and because it has not invested in developing sophisticated weapons systems like those used by the U.S. “Despite previously seeking to become a significant drone power, Moscow has been sluggish to prioritize its UAVs development,” noted Francesco Salesio Schiavi in a recent report for the Italian Institute for International Political Studies. Schiavi wrote: “In eight months of active combat, the Russian UAVs fleet has been decimated by Ukrainian countermeasures, and its reserves of expensive long-range cruise missiles have declined sharply. The reconstruction of these arsenals will probably take years for Moscow to reach pre-war levels again, especially given the restrictions placed on Russian access to foreign-made, high-tech components necessary for this purpose. At this stage, Tehran’s support represents an ideal interim solution for rapidly deploying relatively cheap UAVs until new supplies or a new generation of missiles and combat drones are available to the Kremlin.”

    The U.S. has provided Ukraine with its own versions of the kamikaze drones. The Switchblade, which has been used by the U.S. Army and Marines, can fit in a backpack and is capable of small-scale attacks against personnel, vehicles, and small aircraft. Ukraine has received 700 Switchblades, which are essentially a small remote-controlled missile, modeled after the Javelin surface-to-air warhead. The U.S. has also delivered at least 1,800 Phoenix Ghost “suicide” drones to Ukraine, which function similarly to the Switchblades. In addition to small weaponized drones, Washington has provided Kyiv with Puma and ScanEagle drones for surveillance and reconnaissance. Ukraine has also used U.S.-supplied underwater sea drones in attacks on Russian naval vessels.

    While the Shahed-136 drones can only carry 80 to 90 pounds of explosives, the $10 million Gray Eagle is a far more expensive and sophisticated system capable of repeated use at far greater range than any unmanned system in the Ukraine war. It could theoretically enable Ukraine to conduct strikes deep into Russian territory. The Gray Eagle’s manufacturer, General Atomics, has made no secret of its desire to send the drones to Ukraine. “If you think HIMARS [the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System] changed things, put some Gray Eagles in the air and see what happens next,” said General Atomics spokesperson C. Mark Brinkley. “No one wants to see the significant gains made by the Ukrainians erode due to inaction.”

    The Biden administration and the Pentagon have, to date, declined to authorize the sale of the drones to Ukraine, citing concerns that if one was to go down, its sophisticated technology, including the Multi-Spectral Targeting System manufactured by Raytheon, could fall into Russian hands. The Biden administration also has expressed concerns that Russia’s air defenses are more advanced than what the drones have faced in the U.S. counterterrorism operations where the targets are not soldiers of a massive and well-funded nation-state. General Atomics said it had offered detailed responses to “repeated concerns about technology transfer” from the Pentagon. Among these was a proposal to retrofit the Gray Eagles by swapping out some technological systems for less sensitive ones before Ukraine takes possession. The company also said it has laid out “options for increased battlefield survivability.”

    Over the summer, it appeared that the White House was leaning toward authorizing the sale of four Gray Eagles, with Reuters reporting on June 1 that the administration had actually signed off on the transfer and “intends to notify Congress of the potential sale to Ukraine in the coming days with a public announcement expected after that.” But two weeks later, the Pentagon’s Defense Technology Security Administration, the body responsible for reviewing foreign weapons sales for potential risks to U.S. security, halted the process over concerns about compromising sensitive technology.

    The Biden administration and the Pentagon have declined to authorize the sale of Gray Eagle drones to Ukraine, citing concerns that if one was to go down, its sophisticated technology could fall into Russian hands.

    On September 21, a bipartisan group of 17 lawmakers, including House Intelligence Committee Chair Adam Schiff, wrote to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin urging him to expedite the transfer of the Gray Eagles to Kyiv. “There continue to be delays in delivering Gray Eagle systems to Ukraine despite urgent requests from Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Oleksii Reznikov and ambassador to the U.S. Oksana Markarova,” they asserted. “While important, thorough risk assessments and mitigation should not come at the expense of Ukrainian lives.” The lawmakers, led by Democrats Marcy Kaptur and Mike Quigley and Republicans Brian Fitzpatrick and Andy Harris, argued that “Ukraine could better confront Russian threats” with armed drones “like the MQ-1C Gray Eagle or the MQ-9A Reaper.” General Atomics has also aggressively lobbied for the drones to be given to Ukraine, with its spokesperson denouncing what he called an “endless wait-and-see response” from the administration. General Atomics said it had offered to train Ukrainian personnel on how to operate the drones at no cost to U.S. taxpayers.

    For its part, Ukraine has continued to press its case with the White House; its defense minister wrote a letter on November 2 reiterating Kyiv’s desire to buy four of the drones. On November 9, the Wall Street Journal reported that the administration was not budging, saying the White House was concerned that the sale of the drones “could escalate the conflict and signal to Moscow that the U.S. was providing weapons that could target positions inside Russia.” This stance is reminiscent of that taken by the White House in March when Ukraine sought to obtain as many as 28 MiG-29 warplanes from Poland, and the White House vacillated before ultimately killing the deal.

    Several members of Congress, General Atomics, and the Ukrainian government continue to lobby the Biden administration to change course, and their only hope appears to rest on whether the White House would allow the sales to proceed with a modified version of the Gray Eagle. “There are specific and very technical tweaks and neutering that can be done to these that may make it possible in the nearer term,” an unnamed congressional official told CNN on November 14. “But those things take time and are fairly complex.” The administration has indicated that the final word will come from Austin.

    Mary Ellen O’Connell, an international law professor at the University of Notre Dame, said the Pentagon’s stance on the risks to its technology is “yet another indication of U.S. foreign and security policy stuck in Cold War thinking. It’s also another example of post-Cold War disinterest in international law.” The U.S. “advantage or edge in military might and weapons technology depends on staying ahead of competitors. That never happens,” she added. “China has a far larger standing military. Every military now has drones. The Russians will get the MQ-1C technology whether the U.S. provides it to Ukraine or not. Weapons technology does not remain secret — it just fuels arms races.” China recently exhibited its new Wing Loong-3 drone, which it is marketing as a competitor to the Gray Eagle. State media outlets in China have reported that the drone can carry up to 16 missiles and other munitions. The U.S. drone industry has lamented what some analysts charge is a de facto U.S. policy of ceding the export market to China, Turkey, and other drone merchants.

    “Weapons technology does not remain secret — it just fuels arms races.”

    New York Times reporter Lara Jakes recently published a deep dive into how “Ukraine has become a testing ground for state-of-the-art weapons and information systems, and new ways to use them, that Western political officials and military commanders predict could shape warfare for generations to come.” Jakes quoted the remarks of Ukraine’s vice prime minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, at an October NATO conference in Virginia. “Ukraine is the best test ground, as we have the opportunity to test all hypotheses in battle and introduce revolutionary change in military tech and modern warfare,” Fedorov said. “In the last two weeks, we have been convinced once again the wars of the future will be about maximum drones and minimal humans.” In his video address, Fedorov called drones “a game changer of ongoing war,” adding that “by massively using them, Ukraine can win faster and save more lives of our people.” He highlighted Ukraine’s initiative, “Army of Drones,” announced in July, with an aim “to secure the entire frontline of 2,470 kilometers with [surveillance] drones.”

    Drone warfare has come a long way since the United States launched a Hellfire missile from a CIA Predator drone in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, the first night of “Operation Enduring Freedom.” While that strike, intended to hit Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, failed, it holds a place in history as the opening salvo in what swiftly became a global race to develop and deploy weaponized drones. A month later, on November 2, 2001, the CIA conducted its first drone strike outside a declared battlefield, hitting a vehicle in Yemen and killing six suspected Al Qaeda members, one of whom was a U.S. citizen. Today, more than three dozen countries are in possession of armed drones, and they have been used widely in several conflicts. Azerbaijan made extensive use of them in its 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war against Armenia, and Syria has used them against Kurdish rebels in Syria. The Islamic State has also used its own improvised drones in Iraq and Syria.

    At the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States opened a spigot through which billions of dollars in lethal military hardware and assistance has been funneled to Kyiv. Russian officials often say they are not just fighting Ukraine’s forces but also “NATO infrastructure.” Since Biden took office, the U.S. has given Ukraine nearly $19 billion in overt military aid, including tanks, drones, remote-controlled boats, radar systems, surveillance technology, a vast supply of guns and ammunition, and virtually every other tool of modern warfare. The Biden administration has, broadly speaking, received widespread support for its Ukraine stance with congressional opposition to the massive military aid packages largely relegated to a few dozen lawmakers, mostly Trump-aligned Republicans.

    On Tuesday, the White House requested more than $37 billion in additional support for Ukraine, more than $21 billion of it earmarked for military and intelligence operations. “Together, with strong, bipartisan support in the Congress, we have provided significant assistance that has been critical to Ukraine’s success on the battlefield — and we cannot let that support run dry,” the administration wrote to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi on November 15. If passed, the package would more than double the total military aid to Ukraine since February. Biden may try to push it through during the lame-duck session before Republicans assume control of the House. GOP leader Kevin McCarthy has pledged to end the “blank-check” policy toward Ukraine, which he later said meant that the Republicans would impose greater oversight and accountability for the expenditures.

    “Defense spending is somewhere where austerity just seems never to apply. We can’t seem to pay for Americans’ education, we can’t get people health care. Yet a constantly escalating defense budget goes through every year with relatively little turbulence. That itself is a condemnation of our political system,” said Duss, the former Sanders adviser. A longtime critic of U.S. militarism, Duss has nonetheless been an outspoken proponent of sending military aid to Ukraine. He said he recognizes “the policy I support continues to enrich defense contractors, enriches the military-industrial complex,” but added, “I think the goal of reforming that military industrial complex and weakening its power over our politics, that project continues in the longer term even though the policy I support in the shorter term is essentially paying them off.”

    While the Biden administration has dramatically scaled back U.S. drone attacks in comparison to Obama and Trump, it continues to use them in so-called targeted strikes. There have been at least 12 drone strikes in Somalia in 2022 alone. Early in his presidency, Biden authorized a strike in Afghanistan that wiped out a civilian family in Kabul on August 29, 2021. He also used a drone strike to assassinate Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in July.

    The administration recently concluded a review of lethal counterterrorism operations, including drone strikes, and reportedly reversed several of the Trump-era changes that loosened rules for conducting such attacks. While the document has not been made public, the New York Times reported that Biden largely returned to the Obama-era structures for assessing potential civilian consequences of strikes and implemented a requirement that Biden personally approve the adding of alleged terror targets on the U.S. kill list.

    The post Will Biden Sell Advanced Drones to Ukraine? appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, right, walk to the Oval Office, Wednesday, Nov. 17, 2004, in Washington.

    President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney walk to the Oval Office, on Nov. 17, 2004, in Washington, D.C.

    Photo: Ron Edmonds/AP


    On Wednesday, as the eyes of the U.S. public were focused on Tuesday’s midterm election results, a U.S. government panel quietly released a newly declassified summary of an Oval Office joint interview conducted with President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney about the September 11 attacks. The interview, carried out by members of the 9/11 Commission, was not recorded and the summary document constitutes the only known official record of the meeting. The meeting took place on April 29, 2004.

    “The President and Vice President were seated in chairs in front of the fireplace. The President’s demeanor throughout was relaxed. He answered questions without notes,” according to the document drafted by the commission’s Executive Director Philip Zelikow. “The portrait of Washington was over the fireplace, which was flanked by busts of Lincoln and Churchill. Paintings of southwestern landscapes are on the wall. It was a beautiful spring day.” The document, whose declassification was first reported by the Wall Street Journal, is not an official transcript but is described as “a memorandum for the record.” It was authorized for release by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel.

    One of the most striking aspects of the declassified document is the apparent absence of even a glimmer of self-awareness by Bush about the significance of the death and destruction he was unleashing with his global war. The interview took place just as a massive insurgency was erupting in Iraq against a U.S. occupation that would kill thousands of U.S. soldiers and tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians. While the document is a rough transcript and summary, Bush comes off as almost childishly simplistic in his insights and analysis. The lack of any sensitive information contained within the document should spur questions as to why it took more than 18 years to be made public.

    While the document is a rough transcript and summary, Bush comes off as almost childishly simplistic in his insights and analysis.

    The declassified document does not contain any groundbreaking revelations, but it does offer some new texture to the internal events immediately following the attacks. That morning, after the first plane had hit the World Trade Center, Bush was reading “The Pet Goat” with second grade students at Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota County, Florida. Bush told the commissioners that he had seen the first plane hit but thought it was an accident. “He recalled that he and others thought the building had been hit by a twin engine plane. He remembered thinking, what a terrible pilot.” Soon after the second plane hit the south tower of the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m., chief of staff Andy Card approached Bush as he sat listening to the students reciting more passages from “The Pet Goat” and informed him that it appeared the U.S. was under attack.

    The commissioners asked the commander-in-chief why he continued to sit in the classroom. “He was trying to absorb the news. He remembered a child, or someone, reading. He remembered watching the press pool and noticing them talking on their phones. He realized the country was watching his behavior. He had to send the right signals. He wanted to collect his thoughts,” according to the notes. “He felt he should project calm and strength, until he could understand better what was happening.” Bush “thought it was important to keep his body language calm in the face of danger. As the president, he was conscious that ‘people react off me.’”

    Perhaps the most interesting passages from the document relate to the extent to which Cheney was empowered to effectively take command authority that morning. Bush said he was pressured to get on Air Force One, so he “made some quick remarks and blasted out of there.” Cheney, he recalled, urged him, “Don’t come home.” Cheney “told him that Washington was under attack. He strongly recommended that the President delay his return to Washington. There was no telling how much more the threat might be. The President agreed, reluctantly.” Once Cheney was at the helm inside the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, an underground bunker beneath the East Wing of the White House, he and Bush discussed the “rules of engagement” for the evolving situation, including confronting other potential hijacked aircraft. “Yes, engage the enemy. You have the authority to shoot down an airplane,” Bush reportedly told Cheney. “The President understood this from his experience in the Texas Air National Guard,” according to the notes. “He had been trained to shoot down planes. He understood generally how this worked — one plane would lock on, one would ID. He understood the consequences for the pilot, how a pilot might feel to get the order to shoot down a US airliner. It would be tough.”

    The document describes a chaotic scene with communications equipment failing and Bush being overwhelmed with rumors and reports about other potential targets, including Air Force One and his private ranch in Crawford, Texas. Bush “had heard of the fog of war. That day he saw it, firsthand. He wanted to go back to D.C.” Instead, Bush was flown to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana while Cheney ran things from the bunker under the White House. The document states that during this period, the secure phone line between Bush and Cheney kept failing. Bush also tried to reach Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld but said that “they couldn’t find him.” Bush “was very frustrated about not being able to make contact with different people.” He also complained that “there was not good television on” Air Force One. He was eventually moved to Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, Nebraska, where he had better secure communications equipment. Bush would spend some nine hours aboard Air Force One that day and did not return to the White House until 7 p.m.

    Cheney, according to the document, gave direct authorization to the military to shoot down civilian aircraft after being presented with intelligence that the planes had been hijacked. “Then they heard that an aircraft was down in Pennsylvania. The Vice President thought we’d shot it down. It took a while to sort this out. In the next half hour there were two or three occasions like this: a report of an incoming, would he reiterate authorization? Yes. In every case, though, the problem was resolved without shots being fired.” According to the declassified notes, there were five reports of additional hijackings that all turned out to be false. When one of the commissioners pressed Cheney about apparent discrepancies in the timeline of when exactly Bush gave the vice president authority to direct the shooting down of U.S. civilian planes, “The President said: Look, he didn’t give orders without my permission.”

    One of the 9/11 commissioners “asked if the President or the Vice President had been involved in permitting planes carrying Saudi nationals to leave after 9/11. No, the President said. He had no idea about this until he read about it in the papers.” Cheney, the document noted, “also gave a negative answer,” but added that his answer was “hard to hear.”

    Several 9/11 commissioners raised the issue of the infamous Presidential Daily Briefing from August 6, 2001, titled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US.” That document cites foreign intelligence indicating that Osama bin Laden “wanted to hijack US aircraft” in an effort to free Islamic extremist prisoners held by the U.S. on terror convictions. It also stated that the FBI had information “that indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.” Bush repeatedly rejected the notion that he had received any “actionable intelligence” and said it was just a “general assessment,” and that he had personally requested information that ultimately led to the production of that specific briefing. “It reaches the conclusion that Bin Ladin wants to attack us,” Bush told the commissioners. “Yeah, the President commented, he’s trying to do that. So is al Qaeda.” Bush claimed that none of the briefings he received “was commenting on a threat in America. There was no actionable intelligence on such a threat — not one.” Bush told the commissioners that CIA Director George Tenet told him, “The threat was overseas — that was what George said.” Bush “said he thought that if there had been a serious concern in August [2001], he would have known about it.”

    The declassified document also contains some reflections from Bush and Cheney on the initial stages of the so-called war on terror. Bush complained that U.S. allies were reluctant to join in the global assassination program implemented after 9/11. “On bringing terrorists to justice, their approach was not as tough as ours. Foreign governments were less willing to kill them, to go after them in the remote places of the world. Our own agencies, the President said, were pretty darn robust.”

    Cheney also decried congressional oversight of covert operations, particularly those run by the CIA, saying it had weakened the agency. “The standards that had been applied to the intelligence community had left them inclined to be risk averse. The penalties were high for getting involved in actions that might later be judged to be inappropriate,” the notes read. Cheney “mentioned the example of having nasty people on the CIA payroll. The officials then try to be careful; they don’t take things on.” Throughout his political career, Cheney was notorious for despising congressional oversight of U.S. covert operations. Five days after 9/11, he said on NBC’s “Meet the Press,” “We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will. We’ve got to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies.”

    When asked how the U.S. could “make the country less vulnerable to attack,” Bush “said they were trying to kill a lot of the enemy. They are killers. We had to kill them before they kill us.”

    The document also describes some of the White House efforts to cajole Muslim nations, like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, into supporting a much wider U.S. war. The Saudis, Bush asserted, were “unhappy” with the U.S. position on Israel, and “Pakistan was too close to the Taliban. They had to change Pakistan’s behavior. But the country was smothered in congressional sanctions; there were no carrots they could use. After 9/11 this changed.” In the case of both nations, the document notes that following alleged Al Qaeda attacks against them, they fell more in line with the White House’s wishes. “The enemy helped give us an opportunity,” according to the document. In Pakistan there were two assassination attempts on President Pervez Musharraf in December 2003. “That helped him change some more.” In Saudi Arabia, Al Qaeda took responsibility for the May 2003 bombing of a series of residential compounds in Riyadh, including one operated by the U.S. private military contractor Vinnell Corporation. “After that, the Saudis were better warfighters.”

    When asked how the U.S. could “make the country less vulnerable to attack,” Bush “said they were trying to kill a lot of the enemy. They are killers. We had to kill them before they kill us.”

    In an unusual admission, the document states that Bush acknowledged that the U.S. economic sanctions on Iraq were “recruiting terrorists. Their propaganda with reports of starving Iraqi children were hurting us.”

    Bush also told the commissioners that working with Vladimir Putin, who had assumed the presidency in Russia in 2000, “was important,” especially to facilitate the use by U.S. military and intelligence of bases in central Asia, including Uzbekistan, to stage its operations in Afghanistan. “He spoke with Putin about this in the summer of 2001. He remembered Putin complaining about Pakistan — and about Saudi Arabia — being safe havens for the terrorists, urging the need to find the source of these problems.” Developing a better relationship with Putin and Russia, Bush said, “would make it easier for the U.S. to base activity in the ‘Stans.’ This was hard for Russia historically, to accept.”

    The document describes a lengthy discussion on why the U.S. did not actively try to kill bin Laden before 9/11. Bill Clinton did sign a presidential finding to kill bin Laden and authorized a missile attack against a suspected Al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan in 1998 following the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Without directly criticizing Clinton, Bush decried the launching of cruise missiles in an effort to assassinate bin Laden. Bush “said he was concerned about an empty response that Bin Ladin and others would use to propaganda advantage,” according to the notes. “If that had been ineffective, the enemy would have used it to show their ability to thwart U.S. technology and military might.” Bush “said you must use ground forces for a job like this.”

    As the commissioners questioned Bush about why he did not authorize military activity to kill bin Laden in the months before 9/11, Bush mentioned that he had recently spoken with British Prime Minister Tony Blair who observed that “they were being criticized for not launching a preemptive attack against Afghanistan. And they were criticized for preemptively attacking Iraq.” Blair allegedly told Bush that if the president had said “before 9/11 that he wanted to put forces in Afghanistan, he — Blair — would have been floored. ‘I would have looked at you like a nut,’ Blair said. There was an appetite for a ‘throat slit’ (killing Bin Ladin), not a war footing.” With no apparent sense of the lethal irony present, Bush told the commissioners, “A president can’t force preemptive war without a cause. The country didn’t like war. ‘I don’t like it either,’ the President said.”

    According to the document, the commissioners discussed 9/11 “conspiracy theories” with Bush, and the president said he had seen some, including ones that “were worse than anything he had seen coming out of even the John Birch Society in Midland, Texas.” Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste told Bush that the commission “wanted to deal with as many of these conspiracy themes as possible. Their goal was to make the country safer.”

    The post U.S. Government Quietly Declassifies Post-9/11 Interview with Bush and Cheney appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.


  • The U.S. Capitol building can be seen past American and Ukrainian flags that were hung on the light posts lining Pennsylvania Avenue ahead of U.S. President Joe Biden's first State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress on March 1, 2022 in Washington, DC. According to Administration officials, President Biden spoke on the phone with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky earlier today about assisting with the country's defense against Russia and how to hold Russia accountable. President Biden is set to give his first official State of the Union Address at the United States Capitol later tonight where he will speak on his domestic agenda. (Photo by Samuel Corum/Getty Images)

    The U.S. Capitol can be seen past American and Ukrainian flags, in Washington, D.C., on March 1, 2022.

    Photo: Samuel Corum/Getty Images


    The central question looming over the 2022 midterm elections is whether the Republican Party is morphing into a fascistic organization that wants to end the messy business of elections, voting, and democracy and create a right-wing autocracy instead. Ever since Donald Trump’s efforts to overturn the 2020 presidential election, culminating in the January 6 insurrection and followed by Republican efforts to downplay the coup attempt, it has become increasingly difficult to tell the difference between the Republican mainstream and the party’s extremist fringe.

    If the Republicans prevail and gain control of Congress, one of the first tests of their true intentions will come when they must decide whether to support continued U.S. military aid to Ukraine in its defense against this year’s brutal Russian invasion.

    In a Republican-controlled Congress, votes on aid to Ukraine are likely to reveal a sharp divide between traditional, hawkish Republicans who oppose the Russian invasion and have supported the Biden administration’s military aid to Ukraine, and the new and growing faction of the Christian evangelical movement known as Christian nationalists, many of whom admire Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and want to cut off American support for Ukraine. Votes on Ukraine will serve as a barometer of whether traditional Republicans still have any influence, and whether they have the will to stand up to the rise of extremism within their ranks.

    Christian nationalists represent a frightening dynamic within the Republican Party. They are theocrats who don’t believe in the separation of church and state and who argue that the United States was founded as a “Christian” nation and needs to return to those origins. They despise Western secularist culture; fear white demographic decline; and deeply resent feminism, homosexuality, abortion rights, and even individualism, which they see as a modern concept at odds with a more traditional, hierarchal society.

    Christian nationalists now dominate the extreme right of the Republican Party, and they have come to believe that Putin is a warrior for Christian fundamentalism and that his invasion of Ukraine is one step in his campaign to crush the global woke left.

    The intra-party fight over aid to Ukraine could be the first battle in a long war for control over the Republican Party’s foreign policy.

    Christian nationalists see Putin as the leader in a powerful right-wing counterattack against liberal secularism and as a protector of their Christian faith. Putin has encouraged this support from Christian nationalists in the United States and other Western nations by co-opting the Russian Orthodox Church and waging a culture war inside Russia, notably with anti-gay and other supposedly “pro-family” measures.

    Now, many in the Christian nationalist wing of the Republican Party openly want Putin to crush Ukraine’s pro-Western government and win the war. They willingly accept Russian disinformation and often parrot Moscow’s lies about Ukraine.

    Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene is one of the loudest voices of Christian nationalism in Congress, and one of the few who doesn’t shy away from the term in public. Earlier this year, she spoke at an event held by a white nationalist group where many in the crowd chanted, “Putin! Putin!”

    Last week, Greene told a rally in Iowa that Congress would cut off funding for Ukraine if Republicans gain control. “Under Republicans, not another penny will go to Ukraine.”

    Meanwhile, Wendy Rogers, an Arizona state senator, tweeted in February that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was a “globalist puppet for Soros and the Clintons.”

    Throughout this year’s campaign, a number of Republican congressional candidates have expressed opposition to continued military support for Ukraine as a kind of political dog whistle to Christian nationalists, signaling that they are on their side without openly advocating for Putin’s victory in Ukraine.

    “I gotta be honest with you, I don’t really care what happens to Ukraine one way or the other,” J.D. Vance, a Republican candidate for Senate in Ohio, said earlier this year. (He later dialed that back, saying, “Vladimir Putin is the bad guy in this situation,” while claiming that “we cannot fund a long-term military conflict that I think ultimately has diminishing returns for our own country.”)

    Former President Donald Trump now recognizes the growing power of the Christian nationalist wing of the Republican Party and has been using pro-Putin, anti-Ukraine rhetoric at his rallies and elsewhere. He’s claimed that Putin has been “smart” in his invasion of Ukraine.

    “So Putin is now saying it’s independent, a large section of Ukraine. I said, ‘How smart is that?’ And he’s gonna go in and be a peacekeeper. That’s the strongest peace force,” Trump said.

    Along with Trump, Fox News pundit Tucker Carlson has also been using pro-Putin, anti-Ukraine talking points, providing a platform for Russian disinformation during the U.S. election campaign. A feedback loop has developed between Carlson and Putin: Carlson will parrot Russian propaganda on Fox News, and then government-controlled Russian television will show that Carlson has repeated those lies.

    Republican congressional leaders, trying to hold together their fragile coalition of traditional Republicans and Christian evangelicals, have not been forthcoming about why so many of their candidates now oppose aid to Ukraine. They don’t want to talk about the rising power of Christian nationalism within the Republican Party.

    Instead, they suggest that the opposition to continued aid for Ukraine stems from growing American isolationism, budgetary constraints, and the possibility of a recession next year.

    House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy has argued that aid to Ukraine will be slashed in a Republican-controlled House because the government can’t afford to spend billions of dollars on it when there are so many economic problems at home. He said in a recent interview that “I think people are going to be sitting in a recession and they’re not going to write a blank check to Ukraine. They just won’t do it. … It’s not a free blank check. And then there’s the things [the Biden administration] is not doing domestically. Not doing the border and people begin to weigh that.”

    Representing the hawkish, traditional wing of the Republican Party, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell quickly sought to counter McCarthy’s warning about cutting off aid to Ukraine by insisting that a Republican-controlled Senate would actually demand even more military support for Ukraine than the Biden administration has provided. He said a Republican Senate would seek to ensure the “timely delivery of needed weapons and greater allied assistance to Ukraine.”

    The debate over Ukraine between McCarthy and McConnell will likely lead to a series of bitter fights in the House and Senate, with the White House caught between them.

    The intra-party fight over aid to Ukraine could be the first battle in a long war for control over the Republican Party’s foreign policy. It could also help determine whether anything will stop the Republican Party’s descent into fascism.

    It is clear which side Moscow is supporting. In a recent tweet, Julia Davis, who runs the Russian Media Monitor, linked to a video of Russian state television explaining why “they’re rooting for MAGA Republicans in the midterms.”

    The post Midterms Will Determine Republicans’ Stance on Ukraine — and America appeared first on The Intercept.


  • Merrick Garland, US attorney general, speaks during a news conference at the Department of Justice in Washington, DC, US, on Monday, Oct. 24, 2022. 13 individuals have been charged, including members of the People's Republic of China (PRC), for alleged efforts to unlawfully exert influence in the United States for the benefit of the government of the PRC, according to the Justice Department. Photographer: Al Drago/Bloomberg via Getty Images

    Attorney General Merrick Garland speaks at the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., on Oct. 24, 2022.

    Photo: Al Drago/Bloomberg via Getty Images

    In the movie “Pirates of the Caribbean,” the pirates swear by a supposedly ironclad set of rules that determine how they conduct their pirating, thieving, and killing.

    But it turns out that there are loopholes in the so-called Pirate’s Code.

    “The code is more what you’d call guidelines than actual rules,” pirate Hector Barbossa explains, as he violates it.

    I was thinking about Barbossa’s great line when I read Attorney General Merrick Garland’s new media guidelines, laying out when the Justice Department can go after journalists to identify their sources during criminal investigations into leaks of classified information.

    Since the new policy was announced last month, Garland has been praised by media experts and journalists for imposing tight new restrictions on the government’s ability to target reporters in leak investigations.

    This is a watershed moment,” said Bruce Brown, executive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. “The new policy marks a historic shift in protecting the rights of news organizations reporting on stories of critical public importance.”

    Fred Ryan, the publisher of the Washington Post, added that “the new protections for the news media … deserve recognition and gratitude.”

    But Garland’s new policy includes plenty of vague language that could still make it relatively easy for eager prosecutors to go after reporters’ sources. In fact, Garland issued the policy even as the Justice Department is seeking to prosecute Julian Assange, the WikiLeaks founder; the Assange case suggests that there are already loopholes built into Garland’s new guidelines.

    Worse, the policy lacks the force of law, and can be changed or ignored by the next attorney general.

    Skepticism is warranted when it comes to the Justice Department and its media guidelines. After all, Garland felt compelled to issue the latest set of guidelines because the earlier ones, issued in 2015 by Eric Holder, the Obama administration’s attorney general, offered only paper-thin protections for journalists.

    Holder’s guidelines were also met with effusive praise from journalists when they were issued. But they didn’t impose any real limits on prosecutors’ ability to go after journalists. (I had firsthand experience with Eric Holder’s Justice Department; the Obama administration threatened to put me in prison for refusing to reveal my sources.)

    After Trump attacked journalists and vowed to go after leakers during the 2016 campaign, his first attorney general, Jeff Sessions, said he would review Holder’s guidelines to see if adjustments were needed. But the Holder guidelines were so weak that they allowed the Trump administration to target whistleblowers and journalists at a blistering pace. They were still in place when the Trump Justice Department secretly obtained the phone records of reporters for the Washington Post, the New York Times, and CNN.

    It wasn’t until several months after coming into office in 2021 that the Biden administration publicly disclosed that the reporters’ records had been seized by Trump’s DOJ, raising questions about why the Biden administration had kept the matter secret. Garland then came under pressure to develop new media guidelines. A draft of those guidelines was issued in July 2021, and the final version was released on October 26.

    On paper, Garland’s guidelines look much better than Holder’s. They are worded more strongly and seem to include fewer exceptions to limits on subpoenaing reporters or seeking their records. “The [Justice] Department recognizes the important national interest in protecting journalists from compelled disclosure of information revealing their sources, sources they need to apprise the American people of the workings of their government,” the Garland guidelines state. “For this reason, with the exception of certain circumstances set out below, the Department of Justice will not use compulsory legal process for the purpose of obtaining information from or records of members of the news media acting within the scope of newsgathering.”

    One new and important provision in the Garland guidelines appears to ban prosecutors from targeting reporters over the processes they use to gather classified information. The guidelines state that the Justice Department now defines “newsgathering” as including “the mere receipt, possession, or publication by a member of the news media of government information, including classified information, as well as establishing a means of receiving such information, including from an anonymous or confidential source.” While that language will certainly be open to interpretation in specific cases, it seems designed to protect investigative reporters from being targeted by the government for talking with and helping their sources figure out how to provide classified information. The Justice Department has previously threatened to either subpoena or prosecute reporters based on whether the government believed that the reporters had coached or aided their sources in handing over classified information.


    A supporter of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange holds a placard as opposite the Houses of Parliament, in London, on October 8, 2022, during a demonstration to protest against the detention of Assange. - A UK court on issued on April 20, 2022 a formal order to extradite the WikiLeaks founder to face trial in the United States over the publication of secret files relating to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. (Photo by Niklas HALLE'N / AFP) (Photo by NIKLAS HALLE'N/AFP via Getty Images)

    A supporter of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange protests opposite the Houses of Parliament, in London, on October 8, 2022.

    Still, the Garland guidelines come with potential loopholes — what the guidelines call exceptions in “certain circumstances.” The Justice Department can still go after reporters “when necessary to prevent an imminent or concrete risk of death or serious bodily harm, including terrorist acts, kidnappings, specified offenses against a minor, or incapacitation or destruction of critical infrastructure, in which case the authorization of the Attorney General is required.”

    Those exceptions could be defined strictly or loosely, depending on the attorney general and the national climate. For example, after the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington, there were many false alarms about possible follow-up attacks on bridges, airports, and other targets that were considered “critical infrastructure”; another period of that kind of fearmongering could easily see a new crackdown on the press.

    The guidelines also state that the protected “newsgathering” process does not include “criminal acts committed in the course of obtaining information or using information, such as: breaking and entering; theft; unlawfully accessing a computer or computer system; unlawful surveillance or wiretapping; bribery; extortion; fraud; insider trading; or aiding or abetting or conspiring to engage in such criminal activities, with the requisite criminal intent.”

    Garland’s definition of acceptable newsgathering activities is likely to be tested when Assange is prosecuted. Assange was originally charged during the Trump administration for conspiring to leak classified documents; prosecutors focused on the process by which Chelsea Manning, a former Army intelligence analyst, obtained U.S. military reports and State Department cables and conveyed them to WikiLeaks. Many of those documents were also shared with major news organizations, which published stories about them. That prompted a debate, which has never been fully resolved, about whether Assange is a journalist.

    Assange is now in prison in Britain and is facing extradition to the United States, where the Biden administration plans to prosecute him under the Espionage Act. He has not been charged in connection with the role that WikiLeaks played in Russia’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

    That is a charge that could be leveled against any reporter covering national security.

    The indictment says that Assange and WikiLeaks “repeatedly sought, obtained, and disseminated information that the United States classified due to the serious risk that unauthorized disclosure could harm the national security of the United States.” That is a charge that could be leveled against any reporter covering national security. The Assange prosecution thus conflicts with the new Garland guidelines, which clearly state that the Justice Department will not target journalists for the processes they use in obtaining and publishing classified information. To make an exception of Assange, the Biden administration will have to explicitly make the case that Assange is not a journalist.

    Of course, the Garland media guidelines will not provide much protection for reporters if Donald Trump ever returns to power. Trump has made it clear that he will try to crush press freedom in America if he is elected president again; at a recent rally in Texas, he insinuated that reporters should be raped in prison to force them to reveal their sources.

    The post New Justice Department Media Rules Won’t Help if Trump Wins Again appeared first on The Intercept.

  • The United States has fought more than a dozen “secret wars” over the last two decades, according to a new report from the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University’s School of Law. Through a combination of ground combat, airstrikes, and operations by U.S. proxy forces, these conflicts have raged from Africa to the Middle East to Asia, often completely unknown to the American people and with minimal congressional oversight.

    “This proliferation of secret war is a relatively recent phenomenon, and it is undemocratic and dangerous,” wrote Katherine Yon Ebright, counsel in the Brennan Center’s Liberty and National Security Program. “The conduct of undisclosed hostilities in unreported countries contravenes our constitutional design. It invites military escalation that is unforeseeable to the public, to Congress, and even to the diplomats charged with managing U.S. foreign relations.”

    These clandestine conflicts have been enabled by the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, enacted in the wake of the September 11 attacks, as well as the covert action statute, which allows secret, unattributed operations, primarily conducted by the CIA. The United States has also relied on a set of obscure security cooperation authorities that The Intercept has previously investigated, including in an exposé earlier this year that revealed the existence of unreported U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Ebright documents so-called 127e programs, known by their legal designation, in those countries and 12 others: Afghanistan, Cameroon, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, and Tunisia, as well as a country in the Asia-Pacific region that has not yet been publicly identified.

    The 127e authority, which allows U.S. commandos to employ local surrogates on U.S.-directed missions, targeting U.S. enemies to achieve U.S. aims, is just one of three low-profile efforts analyzed in the Brennan Center report. Another, 10 U.S. Code § 333, often referred to as the “global train-and-equip authority,” allows the Pentagon to provide training and gear to foreign forces anywhere in the world.  The far murkier 1202 authority allows the Defense Department to offer support to foreign surrogates taking part in irregular warfare aimed at near-peer competitors like China and Russia.

    The report, released Thursday, offers the most complete analysis yet of the legal underpinnings, congressional confusion, and Pentagon obfuscation surrounding these efforts and explains how and why the Defense Department has been able to conduct under-the-table conflicts for the last 20 years.

    “The Brennan Center’s report underscores the need to shine a light on our defense activities that have been cloaked in secrecy for too long. At the bare minimum, the public and Congress need to know where and why we’re sending our service members into harm’s way,” Rep. Sara Jacobs, D-Calif., a member of the House Armed Services Committee, told The Intercept. “I hope this report strengthens the urgency of Congress taking back its war powers, eliminating existing loopholes in security cooperation programs, and ensuring our strategies match our values, goals, and commitment to our service members.”

    “Congress’s understanding of U.S. war-making is often no better than the public record,” writes Ebright. “The Department of Defense’s diplomatic counterparts in the Department of State also struggle to understand and gain insight into the reach of U.S. hostilities. Where congressional oversight falters, so too does oversight within the executive branch.”

    Ebright’s analysis is particularly illuminating in the case of Somalia, where the United States developed two key proxy forces, the Danab Brigade and the Puntland Security Force. The CIA began building the Puntland Security Force in 2002 to battle the Al Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabab and later the Islamic State in Somalia, or ISS. The force was transferred to U.S. military control around 2012 and went on to fight alongside U.S. Special Operations forces for a decade. “In Puntland, we built that capability, training them at the tactical level and in how to support themselves and follow a good counterinsurgency strategy against al-Shabab,” Don Bolduc, the former chief of Special Operations Command Africa and now the Republican candidate for Senate in New Hampshire, told The Intercept in a 2019 interview.

    Ebright notes that the proxy fighters were “largely independent of the Somali government, despite being an elite armed brigade and one of Somalia’s most capable special operations units. And their relationship with U.S. forces was long kept secret, with U.S. officials disavowing the presence of military advisers in Somalia until 2014.”

    More troubling, her analysis suggests that for a significant period of time, there was no clear legal basis for the U.S. military to fight alongside and direct these forces. The Obama administration designated al-Shabab an associated force of Al Qaeda and thus, a legitimate target under the 2001 AUMF in 2016. That administration did the same for the Islamic State in 2014, but ISS has never been publicly identified as an ISIS-associated force by any administration. This means that the Pentagon developed and fought alongside the Puntland Security Force from 2012 and the Danab Brigade from 2011 — under the 127e and 333 security cooperation authorities — before the AUMF was judged to authorize hostilities against al-Shabab and ISIS, much less ISS.

    “The Department of Defense is unequivocal that it does not treat § 333 and 127e as authorizations for use of military force. The reality is not so clear,” writes Ebright. “After all, U.S. forces have used these authorities to create, control, and at times engage in combat alongside groups like the Puntland Security Force and Danab Brigade.”

    Over the last 20 years, presidents have consistently claimed broad rights to act in self-defense, not only of U.S. forces but also for partners like the Puntland Security Force and Danab Brigade, which, Ebright notes, potentially allows the U.S. to fight remote adversaries in the absence of any congressional authorization.

    Rep. Jacobs said it was difficult to assure the military community in her San Diego district “that we’re doing everything we can to keep them safe when Congress has such little information, let alone oversight over when, where, and how we’re using military force. Attempts to avoid scrutiny from Congress – and Congress’s own abdication of our war powers – is central to how we ended up in forever wars, the spike in civilian casualties, and failed strategies that waste taxpayer dollars and fuel the very conflicts we’re trying to solve.”

    Expansive definitions of collective self-defense of proxies are also especially worrisome in regard to the 1202 authority, which requires even less oversight than 333 and 127e and is “used to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals” taking part in irregular warfare. While patterned after 127e, 1202 is aimed not at regional terrorist groups like al-Shabab and ISS but at “rogue states,” such as Iran or North Korea, or near-peer adversaries like Russia and China. “The executive branch’s broad interpretation of its use of force authorities, when combined with 1202, can lead to combat, which Congress hasn’t approved, against powerful states,” Ebright told The Intercept. “For the 1202 authority to have so little oversight when the risks it carries — when you’re running proxy forces against powerful, even nuclear-armed states — is a major mistake.”

    The report offers suggestions for improving congressional and public oversight, enforcing the balance of war powers within the government, and preventing hostilities unauthorized by Congress. “Repealing §§ 333, 127e, and 1202 would return the balance of power to where it stood before the war on terror,” Ebright writes, forcing the Pentagon to convince Congress that building foreign proxies abroad is in the United States’s national security interest. This is critical given that working by, with, and through foreign surrogates and allies is key to the Pentagon’s global vision, according to the Biden administration’s recently released National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.

    “Both of those documents underscore that the DOD views security cooperation as the future of its approach,” Ebright told The Intercept. “Meanwhile, on Capitol Hill and in the broader public, we don’t have conversations about what this means, to the detriment of voters understanding where we’re at war and how this is going to affect military involvement and entrenchment abroad.”

    The post New Report Sheds Light on Pentagon’s Secret Wars Playbook appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • The federal government remains committed to the defence science research agency promised ahead of the election, despite no mention of it in last week’s budget. In April, Labor announced it would establish the Advanced Strategic Research Agency (ASRA) and pledged $1.2 billion in funding to the agency over 10 years. ASRA is intended to fund…

    The post New defence research agency missing from Budget appeared first on InnovationAus.com.

    This post was originally published on InnovationAus.com.

  • The children were running around the yard playing games next to the family car, when Ashwaq Abdel Kareem heard the roar of a jet plane that foretold an airstrike.

    It was near midnight on June 1, 2015. Ashwaq, her husband, and five children were in the backyard of their half-built house in the northern Iraqi town of Hawija. The night sweltered with an oven-like dry heat during an Iraqi summer in which temperatures could soar to 120 degrees in the daytime. Hawija was under ISIS occupation, which meant the entire town had been cut off from electricity, in addition to the general brutality of political rule by the radical group. There was no escape from the temperature except to go outside where a breeze might cool the air.

    Far above Ashwaq and her family, a Dutch F-16 fighter jet released a bomb that whistled down to hit a car-bomb factory in the center of Hawija’s industrial district. The F-16’s mission was coordinated by the U.S.-led coalition fighting ISIS and was planned by the U.S. military. From 2014 to the present day, between 8,000 and 13,000 civilians have died as a result of bombing by the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, according to the monitoring organization Airwars; the coalition only acknowledges the deaths of 1,417 civilians. At the height of the bombing in 2017, as the coalition bombed tightly packed urban areas like Mosul, at least 9,000 civilians died, according to The Associated Press. Yet only one civilian received compensation, although the U.S. military did distribute a limited number of condolence or “ex gratia” payments — which are voluntary payments and not an admission of legal liability — reportedly to the families of around 14 victims.

    ISIS had stored an estimated 18,000 kilograms of explosives in the factory, which stood in the midst of a crowded neighborhood. Even though the strike targeted a bomb-making factory, Pentagon planners did not factor in the casualties that could be caused by the secondary detonations. When the bomb hit the factory, night turned into day. Residents of Hawija likened it to a nuclear explosion. The earth rippled and waves of shrapnel flew through the air, tearing into people’s flesh. Buildings collapsed into rubble. The air turned yellow from the fire and chemicals, and the midnight sky lit up as though it were the middle of the afternoon. Fifty kilometers away, in the city of Kirkuk, people said they felt the ground shake, according to a report on the bombing by the Dutch monitoring organization PAX.

    Ashwaq’s home shuddered, the windows shattered, and bricks and masonry crashed to the ground. The pressure and the heat caused the gasoline in the family car to catch fire, and the vehicle exploded just as Ashwaq’s children ran past. The flaming gas from the car struck her 4-year-old son Omar across the face and lit his head on fire like the tip of a match. Omar’s father, Ahmed Abdallah al-Jamili, says he has the image of his son running, his head aflame, engraved in his mind. He and Ashwaq both thought that Omar would die. The couple rushed the child to the nearest hospital in a neighbor’s car. They could barely see as they drove streets fogged with acrid chemical smoke from still-raging fires.

    The explosion killed at least 85 people, but the actual number is likely much higher, though impossible to verify. ISIS controlled the hospital and often refused to treat people who were not ISIS sympathizers, let alone issue death certificates. Additionally, Hawija was a way station for people who had been displaced by the war took as they fled ISIS territory to Kurdistan. Many internally displaced families had gathered in the industrial area, and uncounted people were killed when the factory was hit. Their deaths were not recorded because there was no one to identify them. PAX — which has done extensive research into the bombing — recently uncovered the existence of two mass graves, but they were unable to visit the sites and verify the number of bodies.

    Even as it slowly became clear that the U.S. coalition was responsible for what happened, the needs of the victims and survivors were placed last because, for the countries responsible for the carnage, the most important priority was avoiding accountability. Families were forced to hear vague mentions of aid without ever being consulted about what they actually wanted and needed. Now, seven years later, a visit to Hawija shows how the crumbs of help that were eventually promised have apparently not been delivered to any useful extent for the victims.

    28,8,2022, Hawija, Iraq

Local workers rebuild the shops that got destroyed after the Dutch airstrikes in 2015 in Hawija. The project managed by IOM after the Netherlands government compensated Hawija.

In June 2015, a bomb dropped by a Dutch F-16 jet hit a car bomb factory in the town of Hawija near Kirkuk, killing at least 70 civilians. It took the Netherlands four years to admit its involvement in the tragic incident.
Photo: Hawre Khalid for The Intercept

    Local workers rebuild the shops that got destroyed after the 2015 Dutch airstrikes in Hawija, Iraq, on Aug. 28, 2022.

    Photo: Hawre Khalid for The Intercept

    A “Voluntary” Contribution

    Two weeks after the bombing, then-Dutch Defense Minister Jeanine Hennis Plasschaert received a classified report from U.S. Central Command that assessed early casualty estimates of 70 civilians as “credible.” A few weeks after that, Plasschaert told the Dutch Parliament that “as far as known at the moment, the Netherlands had not been involved in any instances of civilian casualties caused by airstrikes in Iraq.”

    For more than four years, the Dutch government obfuscated its involvement in the bombing until finally Dutch journalists brought the issue to light. The resulting scandal almost toppled the government and forced Plasschaert to resign, although she quickly recovered; she is currently the head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. (A spokesperson for UNAMI told The Intercept that Plasschaert was not available to speak on the bombing.)

    Facing pressure from Parliament and growing public anger, the Dutch Ministry of Defense agreed to provide a fund of 4.4 million euros to Hawija as a “voluntary contribution.” The words were chosen carefully. The Dutch government refuses to use the term “compensation.” Sascha Louwhoff, a coordinating spokesperson for the Dutch Ministry of Defense, explained that if they had issued direct payments to survivors, the Dutch would be opening themselves up to legal responsibility for the bombing. She stated that the Ministry of Defense had no intention of issuing an apology. As she put it, “We are not accountable.”

    The Dutch government divided the fund between the United Nations Development Fund and the International Organization for Migration to invest in “‘electricity supplies, economic activities, job opportunities, and water supplies.” UNDP received $1,757,546 and IOM received $3,604,730. Even though the Dutch government had avoided providing compensation to individual people, its fund turned Hawija into one of the few cases where a coalition member offered compensation to a town that had been damaged.

    But this money does not seem to have reached the survivors who need it the most — and has riven Hawija as accusations of corruption divide the community.

    Following the Money

    Not long ago, I drove to Hawija with Tawfan al-Harbi, the head of al-Ghad: a local NGO that partnered with PAX, the Dutch group, to produce a comprehensive report on the aftermath of the strike, based on interviews with hundreds of survivors. Driving from al-Ghad’s Kirkuk office to Hawija, al-Harbi spoke in a steady stream, with regular interruptions from his constantly ringing mobile phone. He is a bouncy middle-aged man who, despite the 110-degree heat, wore a dapper navy and amber pinstriped suit with a matching amber ring and watch. He pointed to different areas that had been under ISIS control, some of which still suffer periodic small-scale attacks from the remnants of the organization. Al-Harbi was deeply unimpressed with the UNDP and IOM projects, which he said had produced minimal results for the budget they were given.

    “The international organizations are like a big box. Money goes to guards, hotels, and a very small part goes to the people affected,” he said.

    The outskirts of Hawija burst with rich green crops and low tangled brush. The town neighbors a river, and prior to the ISIS occupation, it was a center for agricultural production. Much of its economy also focused on its industrial neighborhood, which was home to factories, car repair shops, and local businesses. The PAX report estimates that the loss of privately owned businesses, possessions, and houses as a result of the bombing comes to around $11 million.

    “The international organizations are like a big box. Money goes to guards, hotels, and a very small part goes to the people affected.”

    Despite the UNDP and IOM projects, all it takes is driving around the town to understand that after seven years, Hawija is still deeply scarred by the bombing. Entering the town, a stretch of road is unpaved dirt, while another stretch is freshly laid asphalt, a half-finished lopsidedness that repeats throughout much of the town. A freshly built shop stands next to an empty lot filled with rubble remaining from when the neighborhood was obliterated by bombings during the war.

    UNDP and IOM told The Intercept in a joint statement in August that the UNDP project had excavated and installed electricity poles and transformers. They added that they anticipated installing an electrical substation in October. IOM’s project consists of clearing rubble, creating jobs through cash-for-work programs, and rehabilitating shops; IOM said in a separate statement to The Intercept that 259 shops had been rehabilitated, six agricultural projects had gone ahead with clearance from local authorities, and 400 individuals had participated in cash-for-work activities. Both organizations stated they had operated in consultation with the community, but none of the survivors who spoke with The Intercept said they had been consulted. This is consistent with PAX’s report, which sampled a much larger group of survivors who said they had never been consulted on how the funds should be distributed.

    The remains of the industrial neighborhood are a mix of activity and vast stretches of lots filled with jagged concrete debris. Workers in yellow hard hats hide from the sun in the shade of one building. They are working on the IOM project, although only a few of them are from the areas affected by the bombing; the salaries paid by IOM are not going to the families who were bombed.

    The salaries paid by IOM are not going to the families who were bombed.

    Another group of men slap mortar onto gray bricks as they build a fresh wall of a shop; they were commissioned by the shop owner but think he got some of his funding from an NGO, though they are not sure which one. This mixture of funding sources seemed to be common in the industrial zone where some shops had been rebuilt on private funds, some appeared to be using IOM’s money, and some appeared to be halfway in between.

    An engineer working at what appeared to be UNDP’s electrical project complained that UNDP and the governorate were fighting, and as a result work was slow. He pointed to a building on the site, a low concrete rectangle, and complained that UNDP had vastly overpaid for its construction. These types of claims are hard to verify but are frequently heard in Hawija, where accusations that the NGOs are misappropriating funds flew swiftly from most of the people I interviewed.

    Hawija’s mayor is Sabhan Khalaf al-Jubory, a neat man with a salt-and-pepper mustache. In an interview at his office, he said he had only one demand of the Dutch government: that they discontinue working through UNDP or IOM. He accused UNDP of being party to a corruption scandal and IOM of never informing local authorities about their projects. (In an emailed statement, Zena Ali-Ahmad, the UNDP’s resident representative in Iraq, said, “UNDP Iraq is not aware of any instances of corruption associated with this project.”) Airing his grievances, al-Jubory spoke in a resigned tone that evoked the frustration of knowing that this meeting with an international reporter, hardly his first, would most likely not result in any tangible change for the victims of the bombing. He explained that he understands the Dutch government does not want to take legal responsibility for the bombing, but at the same time, he asked that their funding go directly to the survivors.

    “Do a project for the families of the people who were killed without taking responsibility,” he said. He agrees with survivors who say cancer cases soared following the bombing, which they suspect is due to the chemicals released by the explosives. “Many people have cancer,” he noted. “Many people need to leave Iraq to get treatments.”

    Saba Azeem, a project leader at PAX and lead researcher on the group’s Hawija report, noted that over the course of PAX’s investigation, they had not observed tangible benefits from the UNDP and IOM projects for the survivors of the bombing. But the Dutch, she realizes, are not willing to consider direct support to the survivors. “If they do take on the responsibility or say they are sorry, that could be admitting guilt, and therefore, I think that would lead to a bigger legal issue,” Azeem noted.

    28,8,2022, Hawija, Iraq

A young man passes by the spot where the bomb landed by the Dutch airstrike in 2015 in Hawija. 

In June 2015, a bomb dropped by a Dutch F-16 jet hit a car bomb factory in the town of Hawija near Kirkuk, killing at least 70 civilians. It took the Netherlands four years to admit its involvement in the tragic incident.
Photo: Hawre Khalid for The Intercept

    A young man passes by the spot where a Dutch airstrike hit in 2015 in Hawija, Iraq, on Aug. 8, 2022.

    Photo: Hawre Khalid for The Intercept

    U.S. Intelligence

    The strike was planned by the United States military and depended on U.S. intelligence. The targeting of the factory was even approved by Lt. Gen. James Terry, the commander of the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, according to an Army investigation in 2015. A key problem, however, is that prior to the strike, the U.S. military conducted a “collateral damage estimate,” or CDE, that did not account for damage that might be caused by a secondary explosion.

    Late last year, the New York Times published a tranche of military records obtained via the Freedom of Information Act that included a detailed military appraisal of the Hawija strike after it had taken place. An article by The Intercept’s Nick Turse revealed that an intelligence official wrote in the appraisal that CDE methodology “does not account for secondary explosions.” That was the case with the CDE for Hawija — even though, according to Airwars, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs had estimated, before the coalition’s attack, that the bomb factory contained around 18,060 kilograms of explosives. As The Intercept reported, when the U.S. Navy detonated a similar amount of explosives in a military test, they registered a 3.9 magnitude equivalent to a small earthquake.


    “I do not think that anyone could have predicted the magnitude of the explosion and its effects in the surrounding neighborhood,” a coalition official wrote in the military documents. “Secondary effects are impossible to estimate with any level of accuracy, especially without knowing the quantity and type (s) of explosive material present at the site.”

    Despite its involvement, the United States has not offered an apology or individual compensation. This is consistent with U.S. policy that has made compensation for civilians extremely rare. The only legal way for civilians to pursue compensation in the U.S. has been through the Foreign Claims Act, but that excludes compensation for death or injury during combat, making victims of the Hawija bombing ineligible. The only other option would be for civilians to receive voluntary ex gratia payments, but the Pentagon has viewed those payments as a strategic tactic to improve relations between U.S. troops and local communities. As the number of ground troops in Iraq have decreased, so have the ex gratia statements. In 2020, the Pentagon did not issue a single ex gratia payment. The ex gratia policy is now changing to allow for broader payments, but the changes do not apply to harm caused in the past.

    This leaves civilians who suffered long-term injuries that require expensive treatment they cannot receive in Iraq with no legal route to pursue compensation from the U.S.

    28,8,2022, Hawija, Iraq

A portrait of Omer Ahmed whose one of the victim of the Dutch airstrike during the war against ISIS. 

In June 2015, a bomb dropped by a Dutch F-16 jet hit a car bomb factory in the town of Hawija near Kirkuk, killing at least 70 civilians. It took the Netherlands four years to admit its involvement in the tragic incident.
Photo: Hawre Khalid for The Intercept

    Omer Ahmed, now 11 years old, sits on the couch at his family’s home on Aug. 28, 2022, in Hawija, Iraq.

    Photo: Hawre Khalid for The Intercept

    Escaping Hawija

    When Ashwaq and her husband arrived at the hospital with their son, the halls were crowded with the injured and the dead. In some ways, they were lucky: Omar’s injuries were so severe that even though the hospital was under ISIS control, it agreed to treat him. Many others were turned away at the door because they had not sworn allegiance to the organization; they were forced to sew up wounds at home or to seek treatment from local pharmacists who were far out of their depth.

    The doctors at the hospital did not have the ability or resources to treat Omar properly. Ashwaq and Ahmed begged permission from the ISIS occupiers to leave Hawija so they could get Omar’s injuries treated at a better hospital. They were refused. Twice before, Ashwaq had attempted to escape the town with the children, and each time she had been forced back. (Ahmed stayed behind because men were executed if they were discovered leaving). Fear for Omar’s life forced the family to take desperate measures. They paid a smuggler to get them out of the town. They walked through until they managed to cross into government-controlled territory.

    But by the time they got to the hospital in Kirkuk, doctors told them it was too late; Omar should have been treated immediately after the burn to avoid permanent damage and scarring. Omar is now 11, and his face is a mask that twists with white swirling scars. Other children bully him. At school, they called him Abu Tashwy, which translates roughly to the “disfigured guy.” He has stopped going to school to avoid the humiliation.

    Ashwaq and Ahmed cannot afford the many operations Omar would need to treat his burns. “I see him and I also become sad,” Ashwaq told me. “I see him and say God willing there will come a day where his face is normal.”

    I met Ashwaq and Ahmed in their home, where they served us water and sweet black tea. It quickly became clear that they were accustomed to reciting their story to a parade of foreigners; they had spoken to NGO researchers, Dutch journalists, and Dutch officials. We talked in their home’s yellow-tiled entrance hall, only a few minutes away from the industrial zone by car. The family sat on thin cushions placed around the edges of the mostly bare room, and the other children came in and out, playing with each other as their parents spoke. Omar sat next to his mother, not saying a word.

    Ashwaq wore a pale blue dress scattered with pink cherry blossoms. She has thick eyebrows, a heavy gaze, and an air of exhausted resignation mixed with a dogged desire to help Omar. She recounted her story readily, but she also made clear that she has no expectations that her telling of it will result in any benefit to her or to Omar.

    “In the beginning, I believed,” she said, “They said to go to this place, and I believed them.” The “they” she refers to appears to be an amorphous combination of NGOs that promised they could help. “But I lost hope, I don’t have any hope remaining. They said they would give me support. Lies. It was lies.”

    Ahmed said he has not seen a single benefit from the Dutch fund and neither have any of the families he knows who were affected by the bombing. He said he was never consulted about the fund by any representatives of the Dutch government. A thin, bespectacled man in a light white robe who speaks in a quiet, careful voice, Ahmed attended a conference in Erbil hosted by al-Ghad where he said he met representatives from the Dutch government and spoke to them about how he desperately needed treatment for his son. Referring to the fund of 4 million euros, the Dutch representatives told him that they had already compensated Hawija.

    28,8,2022, Hawija, Iraq

A portrait of Yusra Yasser Khalaf 20 years old whose one of the victim by the Dutch airstrike in 2015 in Hawija during the war against ISIS.

In June 2015, a bomb dropped by a Dutch F-16 jet hit a car bomb factory in the town of Hawija near Kirkuk, killing at least 70 civilians. It took the Netherlands four years to admit its involvement in the tragic incident.
Photo: Hawre Khalid for The Intercept

    Yusra Khalaf, 20, was only 12 when a Dutch bomb struck her family’s home, permanently damaging her right arm.

    Photo: Hawre Khalid for The Intercept

    Chemical Injuries

    I met with other families in Hawija. All had the same complaint. Foreigners had come and recorded their names and stories, but they had not benefited from the money reportedly flowing into their town. No one had consulted them about how the money would be used, and they believed that it must be disappearing into corrupt pockets.

    Yusra Khalaf, 20, was only 12 when the bomb struck. She was sleeping in her family’s entrance hall near the window, and when it shattered, it sent a sharp piece of shrapnel straight into her arm. She tried to go to the hospital but was turned away at the door; her mother had to sew her wound at home. As it healed, her arm began to swell and turn a purpled blue; she does not know what caused the aftereffects, but she suspects chemicals from the bombing.

    Her father, Yasser Khalaf Hamed, 47, wore a gray dishdasha and smoked steadily. Yusra wore pink robe and spoke in a soft voice. Her injured arm is swollen and mottled with blue veins; she said that it is heavy and she can barely move it. Like Omar, she suffers from bullying at her school. Even while talking about her injury, she tries to hide her arm within her sleeve until she is directly asked about it. Her father worries this is causing a delay in her studies. “If only they would stop talking about her,” he says. “Her younger sister graduated, and she’s still in school.”

    They still live in the house where the bomb struck. Yusra speaks to me feet from where she was sleeping when she was injured. She says she did not want to return to this house.

    Ashwaq and Ahmed did receive a small benefit from the coverage their case has received, but not from the Dutch government. Citizens crowdfunded Omar’s treatment and gathered around 7,000 euros. It’s not enough for the estimated cost of his operations, but it’s a start. Yet in order to get the treatment, they need a visa to the Netherlands, and although they applied months ago, they have heard nothing. They wait in limbo, holding on to the slimmest hope that even if they cannot get compensation, the Dutch government will at least grant them a visa. Their expectations are low.

    In the meantime, the long-term effects of the bombing stay with them. It’s not just the physical injuries. Ashwaq says she still shakes with fear when she hears planes flying overhead. On the way to her house, I passed an old man standing in the road, apparently lost. It was Omar’s grandfather, who has never recovered.

    The post How a Rare Effort to Compensate Iraqi Airstrike Victims Failed appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.


  • WASHINGTON, DC - MAY 25: (NY & NJ NEWSPAPERS OUT) Special Counsel John Durham, who then-United States Attorney General William Barr appointed in 2019 after the release of the Mueller report to probe the origins of the Trump-Russia investigation, departs after his trial recessed for the day at the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on May 25, 2022 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Ron Sachs/Consolidated News Pictures/Getty Images)

    Special counsel John Durham departs after prosecutors rested their case against Hillary Clinton campaign lawyer Michael Sussman at the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on May 25, 2022, in Washington, D.C. Sussman was ultimately acquitted.

    Photo: Ron Sachs/Consolidated News Pictures/Getty Images

    For three years, John Durham has essentially been the Justice Department’s Special Counsel in Charge of Owning the Libs.

    His long-running inquiry into the government’s performance during the Trump-Russia investigation has often seemed designed to get shoutouts from Donald Trump and Tucker Carlson and to go viral on right-wing social media.

    John Durham has used the criminal justice system to try to score political points. What he has not done is search for the truth.

    Durham has developed and launched just two prosecutions in connection with his probe of the Justice Department and FBI’s handling of the Trump-Russia case. Remarkably, neither targeted officials from the Justice Department or the FBI. He still lost both cases.

    It is rare for a federal prosecutor to go 0-2, but Durham never really seemed to care about making his cases stick. He targeted people outside the government to stage trials that seemed designed to help prove his pro-Trump bona fides. He chose targets affiliated with what Trump and his supporters have claimed were the evil forces behind the Mueller investigation: the Hillary Clinton campaign and the so-called Steele dossier. Durham prosecuted a lawyer associated with Clinton’s 2016 campaign and a Russian-born informant for Christopher Steele, the retired British intelligence officer who authored the dossier.

    In the process, Durham tried to treat a federal courtroom like a cable news studio, where he could verbally attack the Justice Department and the FBI without actually prosecuting any government officials.

    During his most recent case, he harshly criticized two FBI officials on the stand — both his own witnesses and ostensibly friendly to the prosecution. Durham called them to testify and then turned on them, to the detriment of his own case.

    Durham is a Trump administration holdover, a federal prosecutor appointed in 2019 by former Attorney General William Barr to investigate how the Trump-Russia inquiry originated and was conducted. Barr appointed Durham to satisfy the former president, who has constantly complained that he was the victim of a witch hunt by the so-called deep state. In 2020, Barr gave Durham special counsel status, meaning the Biden administration couldn’t fire him.

    Durham’s investigation has now lasted about twice as long as the original Trump-Russia inquiry conducted by special counsel Robert Mueller. Like Trump and many pro-Trump pundits, Durham has focused mainly on the Steele dossier, an inflammatory collection of unsubstantiated tips and leads about possible ties between Trump and Russia that was written in the heat of the 2016 presidential campaign. Trump and Durham have tried to shift public attention to the Steele dossier because it was a mess.

    But that is a red herring. The Steele dossier was not behind the FBI’s decision to open the Trump-Russia investigation, nor was it the basis for any allegations included in Mueller’s final report.

    While he was collecting information about Trump and Russia, Steele worked with Fusion GPS, a Washington-based private investigation firm, which in turn had been hired by a law firm working with Clinton’s presidential campaign. Steele also had a long-standing relationship with the FBI; years earlier, he had given the bureau information during its criminal investigation of FIFA, the world soccer organization.

    Steele shared the information he was collecting on Trump and Russia with both Fusion GPS and the FBI. But Justice Department Inspector General Michael Horowitz concluded in a 2019 report that the FBI officials involved in the decision to open the original Trump-Russia investigation “did not become aware of Steele’s election reporting until weeks later and we therefore determined that Steele’s reports played no role” in the decision to launch the investigation. The inspector general also found no evidence of political bias in the way in which the FBI conducted the Trump-Russia investigation.

    In May 2016, an Australian diplomat met in London with George Papadopoulos, a junior foreign policy adviser to the Trump campaign; Papadopoulos told him that the Russians had derogatory information on Clinton, including thousands of emails from Clinton and the Democrats. After the emails were published by WikiLeaks and the press, Australian officials told their U.S. counterparts what Papadopoulos had said to the diplomat. That — along with the prior discovery by U.S. intelligence that Russia was seeking to interfere in the campaign — prompted the FBI to open its Trump-Russia investigation in July 2016.

    Nevertheless, by focusing on the flawed dossier, Trump and Durham hoped to muddy the waters and discredit the Justice Department’s probe.

    There are several facts that have made it easier for Trump and Durham to conflate the Steele dossier and the Trump-Russia investigation. The FBI used information from Steele in its October 2016 application to a court to obtain a secret warrant to wiretap Carter Page, a Trump adviser. (That was discovered by Horowitz, the Justice Department inspector general, not Durham.)

    In addition, FBI Director James Comey privately briefed Trump on the salacious Steele dossier after the election, angering Trump and offering a compelling lure to the U.S. press. BuzzFeed News published the dossier in January 2017. Such intense focus on the dossier aided Trump and his supporters in their efforts to link Steele’s work with the Mueller investigation.

    In his first prosecution, Durham charged Michael Sussmann, a lawyer who was working for Clinton’s presidential campaign, with lying to the FBI when he shared leads with the bureau about Trump and Russia in September 2016. The lie, according to Durham, involved Sussman telling the FBI that he had come on his own. Durham argued that by concealing his ties to the Clinton campaign, Sussmann was hiding a political agenda.

    But a jury acquitted Sussmann, unanimously, and seemed to agree that Durham had badly overreached by bringing the case in the first place.

    Durham’s second prosecution targeted Igor Danchenko, a researcher on Russian issues who was a key source for the Steele dossier, and who had also been an informant for the FBI. Durham also charged Danchenko with lying to the FBI about whether he had talked to a Democratic lobbyist and the former head of the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce. But Durham’s case was undercut when two FBI officials called to testify; both said that Danchenko had been a valuable informant. A jury acquitted Danchenko last week. Again, the jury seemed to agree that Durham had overreached.

    Durham’s only other accomplishment in three years came in 2020, when he cut a plea deal with an FBI lawyer, Kevin Clinesmith, who acknowledged that he had altered an email used in an application to surveil Carter Page. But Horowitz, the inspector general, had discovered that problem when he conducted his own investigation, and he made the criminal referral.

    With no further prosecutions lined up, Durham’s courtroom antics are likely over. But his final report will doubtless offer Trump loyalists plenty of red meat.

    Considering that it has taken Durham three years to lose two cases, however, it is not clear how long he will take to write and publish his final report. He may want to wait until Donald Trump is back in the White House.

    The post John Durham Was Trump’s Answer to Robert Mueller. His Investigation Went Nowhere. appeared first on The Intercept.

  • The documentary “Jihad Rehab” opens with a series of testimonies from former Guantánamo Bay prisoners. One former detainee, wearing a red headdress and seated on a living room sofa, says, “The American government did bad, bad, bad things against us, and at least I am honest with what I did.” He goes on to describe explosives training he says he received at an Al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan. The film then introduces a small group of other former Guantánamo detainees, all Yemeni, who are now part of a government rehabilitation program for accused former terrorists in Saudi Arabia. They, too, appear to discuss frankly to their past involvement in militancy.

    The controversy around “Jihad Rehab” began before many people would have a chance to see those opening minutes of the film. The announcement that it would be screened at Sundance Film Festival this year triggered objections among some Muslim American filmmakers, who expressed concerns about its content and how it was produced. Sundance would eventually apologize for screening the film, leading other prestigious film festivals to rescind their invitations.

    The fallout at Sundance and the rescinded invitations kicked off a fierce debate that was, initially, limited to a small community of documentary filmmakers and Guantánamo Bay activists. But it has since exploded to national attention.

    A recent front-page New York Times article about the subject framed the controversy as a culture war issue centered around the identity of the filmmaker, Meg Smaker, and whether she, as a white American woman, had the perspective necessary to produce a film about the lives of Arab Muslim former prisoners. A recent segment on the MSNBC show “Morning Joe” about the film echoed this characterization of the controversy, introducing it to viewers as a battle over race and free speech in the United States. The Foundation Against Intolerance and Racism, a free-speech advocacy organization focused on the culture war over what some refer to as “wokeness,” has also spoken out in support of the film and organized a screening for it this summer in Los Angeles.

    If the dispute about “Jihad Rehab” were just a case of “white lady bad,” it could be seen as “woke” excess, left-wing identity politics run amok. The full story is a bit more complex. While Smaker’s identity and the notion of authorship have been part of the debate over the film, particularly on social media, they were not the entirety of the public and private discussions over “Jihad Rehab.” Nor were they the focus of the early questions raised to Sundance Film Festival.

    Those questions initially came in the form of an email sent to Sundance last December by a group of six Muslim American filmmakers, including Assia Boundaoui, creator of the award-winning documentary “The Feeling of Being Watched,” after the film was announced in the lineup for the January festival. Boundaoui shared the email — sent after some signatories had viewed excerpts of the film, but not its entirety — with The Intercept. It raised three broad concerns, none of them having to do with identity politics. The authors questioned the movie’s title, the scope of Saudi government involvement in its production, and possible bias in the framing of its subjects.

    The email asked Sundance to provide a private viewing of the film for the signatories, before concluding on a note of dismay that the festival would screen “Jihad Rehab” at all.

    “We are thoroughly disappointed by Sundance’s decision to include this film in the program and to further amplify it by inclusion in the Documentary competition,” the letter says. “We expect that if the film is screened and platformed by Sundance as planned, there will be a much larger public outcry.”

    A Saudi man walks past the Mohammed bin Nayef Center for Counseling and Advice, a rehab centre for jihadists, on October 4, 2017, in the Saudi capital Riyadh. / AFP PHOTO / FAYEZ NURELDINE        (Photo credit should read FAYEZ NURELDINE/AFP via Getty Images)

    A Saudi man walks past the Mohammed bin Naif Counseling and Care Center on Oct. 4, 2017, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

    Photo: AFP via Getty Images

    Beginning to End

    “Jihad Rehab” is a hard film to watch, emotionally, due to its subject matter, but also literally since it has now been pulled from circulation after the controversy. Part of the difficulty assessing the debate about the film is that it has gone through a few small but important changes since its original release at Sundance. The Intercept viewed both the original theatrical cut of the movie and its current form.

    Most obviously, the film now has a more sensitive title: “The Unredacted.” But other smaller modifications were made that correspond with objections raised to the original production. The original theatrical release included a sequence that introduced the prisoners along with a stylized “rap sheet” of allegations from the U.S. government. These allegations, which were used to justify the men’s detentions at Guantánamo, appeared to be presented as plain fact in this critical scene. Yet, as years of legal proceedings at the prison have made clear, such allegations were frequently overblown or even fabricated.

    Following the Sundance premiere, and private screenings where the filmmakers received feedback, asterisks were added to the lists of allegations stating that the former prisoners had never been charged or convicted of any crimes during their years in custody.

    The portrayal of the men in the film is complex. The opening scenes, with their sinister characterization of the former detainees, gradually give way to a more compassionate narrative. Smaker has said this narrative arc reflected the evolution of her own relationship with the former prisoners, which she says became more mutually sympathetic over the course of three years of filming.

    The film shows the former prisoners before and after their release from the Saudi-run rehabilitation program, as they attempt to rebuild ordinary lives. Some get married and raise children, while others struggle with financial problems, loneliness, and ostracism over their pasts. The testimonies and snapshots of former prisoners’ lives are interspersed with captivating street scenes of Saudi Arabia and artistic renditions of the detainees’ experience in custody, as they narrate their hopes and fears for the future.

    Some of the men profiled appear to speak frankly about past involvement in militancy. They describe things that they feel guilty about, such as training with Al Qaeda, or that they maintain was morally justified, such as fighting against Serbian ethnonationalists during the Bosnian genocide. One can understand from listening to these stories that joining a militant group over the past few decades was intended, for some, as means of fighting injustice rather than perpetrating it. The viewer is left with a sense of moral complexity.

    Over two hours of runtime, the subjects appear to warm to the filmmaker and speak more freely about their lives. Yet it’s hard to ever know with certainty what’s going on in the minds of former terrorism detainees, who, as critics have pointed out, live in an authoritarian country under intense surveillance, as they share their accounts with the camera.

    Under Saudi’s Thumb

    “Jihad Rehab” deals with a sensitive subject — the plight of former Guantánamo Bay prisoners ­— and, rather than the identity of the filmmaker, that is what seems to have touched a nerve with most critics. In March, an open letter about the movie from a larger group of filmmakers again raised questions about the issue of informed consent when making a film about former Guantánamo prisoners, even adding specifically that their concern about the movie was not primarily about authorship.

    Smaker did take steps to be sensitive to the communities at hand: The film had input from a religious scholar for sensitivity and was screened prior to release with Yemeni and Muslim American community organizations. She told The Intercept that she intended to make the film to “understand the men that I had heard so much about for so many years, but never heard directly from. They had been labeled the worst of the worst by our government and popular media, but that is where the story seemed to end. I wanted to understand these men on a more nuanced and human level — their motivations, their personalities, their backgrounds.”

    “I lived with these men for years; they live in fear in Saudi Arabia every day.”

    Yet “Jihad Rehab” found critics among perhaps the most relevant constituency: former detainees at Guantánamo Bay. In July, the U.K.-based activist group CAGE, which advocates on behalf of terrorism detainees, and which has been at the center of controversy over some of its past advocacy, issued a public letter about the film. The signatories, former Guantánamo prisoners involved in CAGE, raised issues about “power asymmetries and possible coercion” in its production.

    Mansoor Adayfi, an activist with the group, was one of those who signed. Adayfi, who spent 14 years at Guantánamo and suffered torture at the hands of guards, pointed to the cooperation of the Saudi government in making the film as a major concern. “I lived with these men for years, they live in fear in Saudi Arabia every day,” Adayfi said on a call from Serbia, where he now resides. “She was talking to people who spent years being tortured and given no chance to clear their names. But when you look at how the film is made, it seems to give some kind of legitimacy to Guantánamo.”

    BELGRADE, SERBIA - SEPTEMBER 8: Mansoor Adayfi, former Guantanamo detainee from Yemen, reacts from a pain in his neck as he reads the Quran at a park near his apartment in Belgrade, Serbia, Wednesday, September 8, 2021. Adayfi said was harassed  by locals at the park multiple times before. (Photo by Salwan Georges/The Washington Post via Getty Images)

    Mansoor Adayfi relaxes and reads at a park near his apartment in Belgrade, Serbia, on Sept. 8, 2021.

    Photo: Salwan Georges/The Washington Post via Getty Images

    Adayfi, who wrote a memoir of his time in Guantánamo, said that the film appears to accept the framing of former detainees as admitted terrorists, a characterization that he and others dispute. He fears that the film will contribute to stigmatization that has prevented many former Guantánamo detainees from regaining normal lives upon release.

    “The U.S. government treated us as the worst of the worst, then we came out of Guantánamo and didn’t even have time to process our trauma from that experience,” he said. “We thought maybe we had left it behind us, but it seems like people are going to be punishing us for the rest of our lives.”

    “Jihad Rehab” contains some scenes that critics have said could potentially cause problems for subjects of the film in conservative Saudi Arabia, including one where a subject smokes shisha in an apartment with sexualized images on the walls and later appears to be on his way to buy drugs. Another detainee changes their mind about participation and withdraws partway through the film. A subject revoking consent to participate midway through often means that the footage taken before then can still be used. When dealing with people in a uniquely vulnerable position, however, the ethics become harder to gauge.

    Part of the difficulty with evaluating aspects of the film is the unique legal gray zone that former prisoners inhabit after release from Guantánamo Bay — unlike almost any other prisoners in the world, and certainly distinct from people released from custody for crimes in United States. Previous reports, including in The Intercept, have documented former Guantánamo detainees who have simply disappeared upon saying or doing something to unexpectedly displease their host countries. Many others have suffered at the hands of their hosts. Adayfi experiences ongoing abuse and harassment from Serbian authorities since being placed there in 2016.

    Dealing with former Guantánamo Bay prisoners living in Saudi Arabia presents a particular challenge, since they lack any semblance of political or due process rights in the kingdom. The former detainees’ stays at the “rehab” facility were a condition imposed for their release from Guantánamo, which also required them to make admissions of past alleged wrongdoing. CAGE has claimed, based on communications with two of the film’s subjects, that they “were denied the power to share anything other than what comported with the Saudi state’s official narrative.”

    Smaker denied reports in the press and from CAGE that former detainees have asked to be removed from the film following its release out of concerns for their safety. She said she went through a rigorous process of obtaining consent during filming and has been in communication with former detainees since the film premiered at Sundance. After the controversy over the film took hold, Smaker completed an ethics review at the request of Sundance, which concluded that the film met standards of safety for their protection.

    The voices of the former detainees themselves are notably absent in the public fight over the documentary; it’s not even clear whether they have seen the film at all. Their absence itself seems emblematic of the political and ethical challenge of producing a documentary like “Jihad Rehab.” As another condition of their release in Saudi Arabia, former Guantánamo prisoners have strict controls on their ability to communicate publicly, which, save for representations of their views from CAGE, has rendered them unable to weigh in on the debate raging over a film in which they are the stars.

    Yemenis wearing orange jumpsuits, similar to those worn by prisoners at the US detention centre in Guantanamo Bay, hold a protest demanding the release of inmates on hunger strike, on April 16, 2013  outside the US embassy in Sanaa.  Attorneys representing inmates at the prison have said most of the estimated 130 detainees at Guantanamo's Camp Six wing, which houses "low-value" prisoners, were on hunger strike. AFP PHOTO/MOHAMMED HUWAIS        (Photo credit should read MOHAMMED HUWAIS/AFP via Getty Images)

    A girl holds a photo of Abu Ghanim, a Yemeni man featured in Meg Smaker’s documentary, during a protest to demand Yemenis imprisoned at Guantánamo Bay, on April 16, 2013, outside the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa, Yemen.

    Photo: Mohammed Huwais/AFP via Getty Images

    War on Terror Legacy

    After the September 11 attacks, Guantánamo Bay became a global symbol of the U.S. government’s draconian retaliation, including the use of extrajudicial detention and torture. Although it was promoted to the American people as a place to hold hardened terrorists, U.S. government officials later admitted that many, if not most, of the people held at the prison over the years were innocent of involvement in terrorism.

    Several dozen prisoners continue to live in a state of legal purgatory inside the facility, while many others, released after being picked up in a wave of mass detentions based on flimsy accusations, have been denied the chance to rebuild normal lives or mend their reputations. Though it discusses the use of torture at Guantánamo Bay, including sexual violence, the film does not engage with this broader legacy of abuses.

    “Believe me, no one cares if Meg is Black or white, or a man or a woman. I don’t even understand how this is being made out as a debate about a person’s race.”

    The response to the film has differed depending on the audience. In her appearance on “Morning Joe,” Smaker said that she has received positive responses from U.S. military veterans, for whom the film depicted people they had considered enemies in a more sympathetic light. She told The Intercept that she was seeking to challenge the “simplistic narrative” that terrorism could be understood purely through reference to the perpetrator’s religion, as was widely assumed in the years after 9/11.

    A documentary about former terrorism detainees in Saudi Arabia raises inevitable hard questions about research ethics, consent, and security. It also offers interesting insights into the human condition, including the inner lives of men who have been cast simplistically as enemies in the eyes of many Americans. Those important discussions about the film, which kicked off nearly a year ago, have now been effectively sidelined to slot it into an ongoing debate in the U.S. over identity politics.

    Regardless of what happens with the film, whose future is still in question, the reductive depiction of the controversy in the press as merely another episode in an ongoing U.S. culture war has mystified some critics, including former detainees for whom Guantánamo Bay remains a personal issue.

    “Believe me, no one cares if Meg is Black or white, or a man or a woman,” said Adayfi, the former Guantánamo prisoner. “I don’t even understand how this is being made out as a debate about a person’s race. It’s just childish.”

    The post Did a Woke Mob Cancel the “Jihad Rehab” Doc? Here’s the Real Story. appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.

  • In September, a video surfaced online apparently showing Yevgeny Prigozhin, a wealthy businessman and close associate of Vladimir Putin, speaking to a group of incarcerated men in the yard of a Russian prison. Prigozhin was encouraging them to join the Wagner Group, the infamous mercenary organization he founded, and fight in Ukraine as a way out of prison.

    The video signaled Prigozhin’s first apparent confirmation that he does, in fact, control Wagner. While Prigozhin had been known for years for his connection to the group, he had until recently always denied that he controlled its fighters, who have deployed in support of Russian campaigns in half a dozen conflicts around the world, where many have been accused of human rights abuses that include torture, rape, and the mass killing of civilians. More videos confirming Prigozhin’s role at the helm of Wagner have since emerged, and for the first time he acknowledged founding the group in a statement issued last month through one of his companies.

    Wagner got its start during the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and as evidence of its mercenaries’ abuses mounted, Prigozhin fiercely fought off reports of his links to them, often enlisting the help of attorneys to do so. Now, a cache of hacked emails and documents reviewed by The Intercept details for the first time the behind-the-scenes relationship between Prigozhin’s legal team in Russia and several British and U.S. law firms that worked on his behalf to contest sanctions; defend him against U.S. prosecution; discredit journalists investigating his shadowy businesses; and sue Eliot Higgins, the founder of the investigative website Bellingcat.

    Earlier this year, Higgins’s attorneys took action against the British firm that sued him for defamation on behalf of Prigozhin. In a complaint to the U.K. Solicitors Regulation Authority, Higgins accused the firm, Discreet Law LLP, of filing a so-called SLAPP, or Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation: litigation intended to intimidate or censor critics into silence by saddling them with the costs of defending themselves in court. Higgins told The Intercept that the hacked emails further reinforce his position.

    “We always knew this was a SLAPP action and a possible abuse of process. It now appears that Prigozhin and, worse, his lawyers knew as well, but went ahead with it anyway,” Higgins wrote in a statement to The Intercept after reviewing the emails. “It seems this was a calculated effort by Prigozhin, aided by his lawyers, to quash the free press as part of a cynical PR campaign to challenge international sanctions.”

    While reliance on foreign law firms is hardly unusual or illegal for an oligarch with global business interests, the emails and documents paint the most detailed picture yet of how a well-known but secretive figure — dubbed as “Putin’s chef” by the Western media because of his catering company’s business relationship with the Kremlin — worked with lawyers to clean up his worsening reputation as a Russian warlord. As he faced intensifying scrutiny in recent years, and as his businesses came under pressure following sanctions, Prigozhin relied on the services of at least four U.S. and U.K.-based firms, according to the documents.

    The emails paint Prigozhin as a man fixated on challenging the narrative that had formed around him — even though he has come to embrace that narrative in the aftermath of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine that Russia launched in February. In a failed effort to contest sanctions, some of Prigozhin’s attorneys sought to discredit the growing body of reporting that connected him to the Wagner Group, which he believed to be the basis for the sanctions against him.

    But while surrounding himself with teams of legal advisors, Prigozhin at times sought to do things his own way. The hacked documents, for instance, include a lengthy draft letter Prigozhin wrote to former President Donald Trump urging him to appoint former special counsel Robert Mueller to prosecute one of his companies, which U.S. officials had accused of election interference, so that Prigozhin could personally face Mueller in court and clear his name. (Prosecutors later dropped the case.) That draft letter, which appears to ultimately not have been sent, stated that it was written against the advice of Prigozhin’s U.S. attorneys.

    The documents and emails were unearthed in a series of hacks against over 50 Russian companies and government agencies after this year’s invasion, in what appears to be the largest cumulative hack of a nation-state to have ever taken place. The companies hacked included a top Russian law firm that represents Prigozhin: Capital Legal Services, which has offices in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Helsinki, Finland. The identities of the hackers are not known. The CLS files were hacked by activists associated with Anonymous, but The Intercept was not able to speak with the people behind that hack.


    The Intercept made repeated attempts, by email and phone, to speak with Prigozhin’s attorneys at CLS, but they did not respond. Attorneys with four other firms that exchanged emails with CLS did respond to requests for comment and did not dispute the authenticity of the hacked emails. The Intercept found no digital evidence of tampering or forgery in the emails.

    The collective files of the hacks — more than 13 terabytes in all — were provided to Distributed Denial of Secrets, a transparency collective that has published the raw documents on its website. Due to the amount of hacked material and the complexity of organizing it, there has been relatively little reporting on the voluminous files published by DDoSecrets. But several months ago, The Intercept and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project formed a consortium of news organizations to investigate the documents, which The Intercept and OCCRP indexed into searchable databases. This story is among the first to be published by a member of the consortium.

    LYMAN, UKRAINE - OCTOBER 05: A view of destroyed armored vehicles and tanks belonging to Russian forces after Russian forces withdrawn from the city of Lyman in the Donetsk region (Donetsk Oblast), Ukraine on October 05, 202. Russian troops withdrawn from Krasny Port due to threat of siege as Kyiv had said that thousands of Russian soldiers were encircled by Ukrainian forces in the city of Lyman in the Donetsk region. (Photo by Metin Aktas/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

    A view of destroyed Russian tanks after Russian forces withdrew from the city of Lyman in the Donetsk region, Ukraine, on Oct. 5, 2022.

    Photo: Metin Aktas/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

    Embracing Wagner

    As Putin’s invasion of Ukraine escalated into a monthslong conflict with tens of thousands of casualties, the Wagner Group played a symbolic and at times strategic role supporting Putin’s war with thousands of mercenaries.

    European officials believe that upward of 20,000 mercenaries were deployed in support of Russia’s war in the first months of the invasion, including fighters Wagner had recruited in Syria and Libya, where it has long operated. Wagner mercenaries are believed to have been behind a series of so-called false flag attacks in eastern Ukraine before the invasion, intended to give Russia a pretext to attack. Since the invasion, Ukrainian officials have accused Wagner mercenaries of committing war crimes, alongside Russian soldiers, that include the killing of civilians in Bucha. Wagner mercenaries have also faced losses in Ukraine, including after U.S.-provided rockets hit one of the group’s bases in the Luhansk region in August. As Putin has sought to replenish the ranks of Russia’s military, Prigozhin appears to have done the same with Wagner’s, including by recruiting in Russian prisons.

    Prigozhin had long been known to U.S. and European officials, who have investigated his activities, including interfering in the 2016 U.S. election by funding a troll factory, the Internet Research Agency. In 2018, he was indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy in relation to the election interference; prosecutors dropped the case two years later, weeks before it was supposed to go to trial. Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Prigozhin was under sanctions in the U.S. over that interference, and in Europe over Wagner’s involvement in the conflict in Libya. Along with his mother, wife, and children, Prigozhin faced additional sanctions as a result of the invasion.


    Yet until recently, Prigozhin had always denied any involvement with Wagner — and even the group’s existence. The emails reviewed by The Intercept offer new details about the lengths to which his lawyers took those denials, considering lawsuits against an array of publications that reported on his or his mercenaries’ exploits, and seeking to challenge reports that connected him to Wagner.

    Prigozhin’s calculus seems to have abruptly changed as Russia’s war in Ukraine faltered this year, leading to recriminations inside the Kremlin and jockeying for power among Russian elites. As Putin faces growing internal criticism over his disastrous war, Prigozhin has positioned himself as a hard-liner and a critic of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. And as the war in Ukraine has raised his global profile, Prigozhin seems to have bet on embracing his connection to Wagner, rather than continuing to deny it.

    Jack Margolin, former program director of the conflict finance and irregular threats program at C4ADS — a group of analysts who have researched Wagner’s activities extensively — noted a significant shift in the way Russian media covered Prigozhin since the start of the war.

    “State media started acknowledging Wagner’s role, Prigozhin was reportedly awarded this ‘Hero of Russia’ title, and the space opened up for him to really capitalize on the success that Wagner’s had in Ukraine,” Margolin said, referring to reporting by several publications which was not confirmed by the Kremlin. “That’s not to say that Wagner has been instrumental and necessarily across the board has been this sort of game changer,” he added. “But it has been very important in Russia’s ability to staff its invasion.”

    Margolin said that prior to the war in Ukraine, Prigozhin’s insistence on distancing himself from Wagner suggested that his businesses were being hurt by sanctions. “If he’s putting a lot of time and energy into engaging Western law firms to try and undo that [narrative], I think that that points to some kind of real effect on his bottom line,” Margolin observed.

    Russia-Wagner-PMC-Ukraine

    A photo released by the Security Service of Ukraine purportedly shows Russian Wagner Group mercenaries in Syria.

    Photo: SBU

    Targeting Journalists

    The emails reviewed by The Intercept include communications between Prigozhin’s representatives at Capital Legal Services, one of the targets of the hack, and European and American law firms with which he did business. Some 360,000 emails from CLS were in the hacked data, including several emails between CLS and the British firm Discreet Law, which Prigozhin’s representatives hired to file a defamation lawsuit against Higgins, the Bellingcat founder. Bellingcat was one of the first publications outside Russia to expose Prigozhin’s connections to the Kremlin, earning him the unwanted attention of sanctions officials. The emails between CLS and Discreet Law pull back the curtain on legal strategies that fostered a regulatory complaint against Discreet Law that the lawsuit was aimed at stifling reporting on Prigozhin. Some British legislators had previously criticized U.K. law firms for aiding powerful clients’ efforts to silence critics, with one British member of Parliament calling them “amoral lawyers” carrying out “legalised intimidation.”

    Prigozhin retained Discreet Law to sue Higgins personally, rather than his publication, after Bellingcat published a multipart investigation in 2020 about him and his businesses, and Higgins shared the coverage in a series of Twitter posts. Prigozhin’s links to the Kremlin had been documented for years by Russian media, but the Bellingcat reports raised Prigozhin’s profile for Western audiences, detailing the extent to which the disinformation, political interference, and military operations to which he was connected were “tightly integrated with Russia’s Defense Ministry and its intelligence arm, the GRU,” according to Bellingcat.

    In March, a month into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Discreet Law sought to withdraw from representing Prigozhin, and in May, the court dismissed Prigozhin’s claim against Higgins after he failed to find another firm to represent him. In a press release issued through his company, Prigozhin wrote that his lawyers were “forced to withdraw from the court case” because of a public pressure campaign against “English lawyers who work with Russian clients.” He claimed that finding alternate representation had become “objectively impossible.”

    In a statement issued in May, Higgins’s attorney, Matthew Jury, welcomed the court’s decision to dismiss Prigozhin’s lawsuit, which had been filed in 2021, but warned against the harm done by firms enabling clients like him to silence essential reporting. “The current war in Ukraine highlights the immense importance of the work of organisations like Bellingcat,” Jury said. “We cannot continue to allow the UK Courts and lawyers to be used to stifle genuine public debate and criticism of those in power.”

    Giselle Daverat, a spokesperson for Discreet Law, wrote in a statement to The Intercept, “It is public knowledge that this firm acted for Mr Prigozhin in defamation proceedings against Mr Higgins before we withdrew from the proceedings.”

    “As you will appreciate, as lawyers we cannot comment on the affairs of any of our former clients,” Daverat added. “Communications between lawyers about a client’s case are also confidential and may be subject to legal professional privilege.”

    DSCF9218-1

    Prigozhin hired Discreet Law to sue journalist Eliot Higgins, after Bellingcat published a multipart investigation in 2020 about Prigozhin and his businesses.

    Photo: Courtesy Elliot Higgins

    The documents reviewed by The Intercept show that before seeking to drop Prigozhin, attorneys at Discreet Law had strategized with their client on how to target Higgins without running afoul of protocol. In one email, dated August 13, 2021, Discreet Law attorney Andrew Stephenson cautioned Prigozhin’s representatives at CLS, the Russian law firm, that their client’s desire to quickly publicize the lawsuit before Higgins had been notified would be “a public relations disaster in the west” and potentially an “abuse of the process.”

    “I warned of the risk that a court might regard the claim against Eliot Higgins in England, rather than Bellingcat in the Netherlands, as an abuse,” Stephenson stated in the email, referencing the decision to personally target Higgins by filing suit in the U.K., where he lives and where bringing defamation suits has historically been easier, rather than in the Netherlands, where Bellingcat is registered. “Let us not do anything to increase this risk.”

    “I warned of the risk that a court might regard the claim against Eliot Higgins in England, rather than Bellingcat in the Netherlands, as an abuse.”

    Discreet Law’s attorneys had previously discussed the possibility of bringing suit in the Netherlands, but Prigozhin’s lawyers in Russia decided not to pursue that option. Instead, the attorneys focused on finding a jurisdictional basis to bring the lawsuit in the U.K., and began monitoring Higgins’s Twitter account for tweets he published from there. Higgins’s tweets, which embedded Bellingcat’s reporting, provided the jurisdictional basis for the lawsuit. “As discussed on the call, we will review the social media posts in the UK in order to, first, try to establish stronger evidence of jurisdiction for the English Courts,” Edward Miller, another attorney at Discreet Law, wrote in an email dated July 12, 2021. “I will shortly be sharing the results of our search for posts of the offending article by Mr Higgins on his personal Twitter account,” he wrote again three days later.

    The emails also reveal that an anonymous Twitter account was created in July 2021 to monitor and take screenshots of Higgins’s posts and track those who liked or retweeted them. The account only follows Higgins, not Bellingcat, suggesting that the founder was the only target. While most screenshots of Higgins’s tweets are taken from the fake account, some came from a different Twitter account connected to the firm Gherson Solicitors LLP, an immigration law firm founded by Roger Gherson, who is also a founding partner at Discreet Law and was included in communications with CLS.

    In other emails, Discreet Law attorneys further discuss Higgins, at one point recommending investigating his personal assets should Prigozhin win the defamation case against him, forcing Higgins to pay damages. “We will, of course, need to investigate Mr Higgin’s [sic] asset position to try, as best as possible, to ascertain whether he has sufficient assets to meet any order for damages as well as costs,” Miller wrote in an email to CLS’s Pavel Karpunin, to which Karpunin responded, “It will be difficult to justify the material damage. … The client prefers making accent on public rebuttal of the article since it is one of the reasons for his sanction designation.”

    Stephenson, the Discreet Law attorney, had once represented the late Boris Berezovsky, who helped propel Putin to power before falling out with him and becoming a fierce critic of his government; Berezovsky, who was fighting extradition to Russia, ultimately won asylum in the U.K. amid allegations that his rivals were trying to assassinate him there. Gherson, Discreet Law’s founder, advised the international team that has successfully defended Ukrainian oligarch Dmytro Firtash against extradition to the U.S., where he is wanted on corruption charges, in a case that took on political connotations.

    Tracking the BBC

    Discreet Law was not the only foreign law firm advising Prigozhin or one of the companies he controls. Other emails show communications between CLS and the U.K. firms Brick Court Chambers and Phillips Lewis Smith Ltd, which advised Prigozhin’s attorneys as they sought to appeal European sanctions against him, as well as the U.S.-based firm Reed Smith LLP, with which Prigozhin’s attorneys discussed U.S. sanctions. Prigozhin’s representatives discussed the possibility of bringing additional defamation claims with Phillips Lewis Smith. According to the hacked emails, an attorney at the firm and Prigozhin’s CLS attorneys also discussed communications with an editor at the British newspaper The Telegraph, and they discussed tracking coverage by the BBC. Separately, Prigozhin’s representatives in Russia also discussed with Discreet Law the potential of suing the BBC, at one point inquiring about options for “a successful defamation claim in UK against BBC” in response to an investigation published in August 2021 detailing Wagner’s activities in Libya.

    “The article is carefully worded, and includes denials from Yevgeny Prigozhin of his involvement with Wagner,” Stephenson, of Discreet Law, wrote to CLS at the time. “My immediate impression is that it is very likely that prior to publication the article and research material will have been vetted by the BBC lawyers. … If you would like to discuss this, a conference call can be arranged.”

    At one point, Prigozhin’s representatives raised the possibility of bringing additional defamation claims, in both the U.K. and the U.S., against other outlets that reported on Prigozhin, including the think tanks Foreign Policy Research Institute and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

    “Kindly comment on the Steps below that I will discuss with the DP tomorrow in an in-person meeting seeking to agree a path forward,” CLS’s Karpunin wrote to attorneys with Brick Court Chambers and Phillips Lewis Smith on July 14, 2021, using a shorthand for “Designated Person,” an apparent reference to Prigozhin. Karpunin went on to list a series of agenda items, including “Launch court challenges in UK / US against at least 3 articles (FPRI, Bellingcat, Carnegie) on grounds of defamation or as advised by local counsel.”

    Maya Lester, an attorney at Brick Court Chambers who exchanged several emails with Prigozhin’s attorneys in Russia, and who was listed as one of Prigozhin’s representatives in a draft application against EU sanctions exchanged by CLS attorneys, wrote in an email to The Intercept that Prigozhin “is not my client and I do not represent him in relation to any application against EU sanctions or otherwise.” She added that rules of confidentiality and legal professional privilege prevented her from commenting on cases but said that she had “no involvement” in the draft document that listed her as a representative of Prigozhin.

    Martin Lewis, the director at Phillips Lewis Smith, wrote in an email to The Intercept that confidentiality obligations prevented him from commenting on Prigozhin’s case before the European Court but noted that “Mr Prigozhin changed his representation in those proceedings by the time of the Hearing” (which Prigozhin ultimately lost).

    Jack Margolin, of C4ADS, noted that these communications were well in line with Prigozhin’s long history targeting journalists — especially Russian ones — who reported on his activities.

    “There’s a legal side of this, and there’s also just the harassment and completely extra-legal activity that his networks have undertaken against journalists,” Margolin said, citing among other examples, Wagner’s suspected role in the assassination of three Russian journalists who were investigating the group’s activities in Central African Republic. “He’s one of the people that’s probably the scariest for Russian journalists to be working on.”

    “Law firms end up acting effectively as agents of foreign actors.”

    While everyone has a right to defend themselves against libel and to appeal sanctions, Margolin added that Western law firms’ willingness to work with the man in charge of a mercenary network accused of widespread human rights abuses raises questions. “I think that it can create a dynamic that we’ve seen time and time again in the United States, where law firms end up acting effectively as agents of foreign actors,” Margolin noted.

    “I would say that given Prigozhin’s activities prior even to the invasion of Ukraine, from an ethical standpoint, it’d be very hard to justify trying to defend such an individual,” he added.

    In this video grab taken from a video released by the Libyan National Army shows Yevgeny Prigozhin, second right, attending a meeting Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Gen. Valery Gerasimov, chief of staff of Russia's armed with Libyan National Army head Khalifa Hifter, in Moscow, Russia, on Wednesday, Nov. 7, 2018. A Russian newspaper says video released by the self-styled Libyan National Army shows a businessman allegedly linked to a private contractor that sent mercenaries to Syria at a meeting with the head of the Libyan army and top Russian military officials. (Libyan National Army via AP)

    Yevgeny Prigozhin, second from the right, attends a meeting with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Gen. Valery Gerasimov, in Moscow on Nov. 7, 2018.

    Photo: Libyan National Army via AP

    Owning the Narrative

    In the emails, Prigozhin’s attorneys paint their client as occasionally difficult and impatient, fixated with media coverage of himself and particularly preoccupied with “reputation management.” Prigozhin seemed especially concerned with media coverage that he believed formed the basis for the sanctions imposed against him.

    The desire to take charge of the narrative surrounding him appears to have put Prigozhin’s lawyers in Russia at odds with his U.K. attorneys on more than one occasion. His representatives clashed with Discreet Law over his impatience to make public statements about the lawsuit against Higgins, with Pavel Karpunin of CLS noting that he would be “highly disappointed if he can say nothing.”

    “We understand that you would prefer the client remain silent until the claim is served but that may not be possible,” Karpunin wrote on August 13, 2021.

    “I will inform the client that it is necessary to refrain from any public information regarding the Claim Form,” Karpunin ultimately agreed, after the attorneys said that they had a four-month window between filing the initial claim and the time when Higgins had to be notified and the lawsuit could be publicized. “However, I am sure that he will not accept that the Particulars of Claim will be prepared and served within 4 months period. He is very impatient regarding the potential time losses and requests the publically [sic] visible result as soon as possible. Let us consider how it is possible to accelerate the process and prepare and serve the Particulars within a shorter period.”

    Emails between Prigozhin’s representative and attorney Martin Lewis of Phillips Lewis Smith, in relation to communications with The Telegraph, also suggest a certain frustration. “Do you want to hand it off in some way or do you want the DP simply to start writing to The Telegraph without cc’ing you?” Karpunin writes to Lewis at one point, once again referring to Prigozhin with an acronym for “Designated Person.” Lewis replies by complaining of “many hours of unpaid work on the DP’s affairs.”

    “Media and reputation management is not our area of expertise and to undertake it and for no payment, exposes the DP as I have pointed out, to legal jeopardy not only in that regard, but also in his public administrative law procedures,” Lewis adds. “My suggestion is that we are copied in to advance drafts of the DP’s exchanges with the Telegraph and which I can review under the cloak of professional privilege on the grounds of making sure that nothing is said which compromises the public administrative law procedures. This will require a consequential variation of the [Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation] Licence, but I am content to eat a certain amount of time pending that.” (The Telegraph did not respond to The Intercept’s request for comment.)

    In reference to that email, Lewis noted in a statement to The Intercept that his firm provides representation in relation to sanctions under licenses that “provide detailed approved work streams which are tightly drawn in their scope.” He added, “As such, work not covered by a Licence can be undertaken but not paid for and there are satellite exchanges that fall into this category in every case, but with the focus at all times remaining on promoting the overriding objective of the retainer.”

    CLS also discussed European sanctions against Prigozhin with Brick Court Chambers. In a set of emails exchanged with an attorney at the firm and Lewis of Phillips Lewis Smith, Vladislav Zabrodin, CLS’s founder and managing partner, acknowledges the U.K. attorneys’ argument that litigating the “existence of Wagner Group” is irrelevant to Prigozhin’s claim in opposition to sanctions. “At the same time, it is important here to note the context,” Zabrodin writes, stating that the EU Council has acknowledged that the Wagner Group does not exist as a single legal entity registered under that name.

    “This is extremely important to the DP, as he has maintained since the very first press reports on Wagner Group appeared in the Russian press several years ago and has made extraordinary efforts to get the press to report on this fact,” Zabrodin adds. “An official EU document acknowledging this will build on a momentum forming in the West in which the narrative construct of ‘Wagner Group’ is being deconstructed and abandoned.”

    “At this point it is not clear what the ‘Wagner Group’ narrative will be replaced by so we should consider ourselves fortunate to have an opportunity to attack it officially at the same time it is collapsing on its own.”

    Zabrodin goes on to cite a Foreign Policy article headlined “Russia’s Wagner Group Doesn’t Actually Exist” as evidence that media discourse around Wagner was beginning to shift. “At this point it is not clear what the ‘Wagner Group’ narrative will be replaced by so we should consider ourselves fortunate to have an opportunity to attack it officially at the same time it is collapsing on its own,” he concludes. “The Foreign Policy article linked above which explicitly confirms the DP’s consistent position throughout the pleadings before the [EU] Court and administrative correspondence with the [EU] Council: the Wagner Group is a mere narrative construct that makes it easier for Western media, politicians and experts to discuss a phenomenon (Russian-speaking international mercenaries) about which no reliable public information is available.”

    In the same email, Zabrodin also introduces another argument on behalf of Prigozhin: that EU sanctions against Prigozhin served U.S. interests.

    “The primary reason that since the beginning we have suggested in the pleadings that the Council is acting at the behest of the US is not because we think this is a winning legal argument, but because (i) this is something that the DP sincerely believes and (ii) we believe that the Europeans become highly annoyed when presented with evidence that they are subservient to the US,” Zabrodin writes. “Therefore we consider the time and effort spent by the Council addressing this issue to be a tactical victory that elevates a legal nonissue into a real issue in the mind of the Court.”

    Reframing the narrative about Wagner by seeking to discredit media organizations reporting on the group was an essential element of Prigozhin’s legal strategy. In a draft application against EU sanctions, attached to some of the emails reviewed by The Intercept, Prigozhin’s attorneys contest EU sanctions over Wagner’s involvement in Libya primarily by dismissing the work of several media outlets that reported on it, including the BBC, Reuters, and Al Jazeera. In the draft, the attorneys question reporting on Wagner by a “student intern” at the Foreign Policy Research Institute; suggest that reporting by the BBC and Reuters, based on a “leaked UN Panel of Experts Report” is “second hand”; and argue that Al Jazeera, which is owned by the government of Qatar, is not a credible source. “Qatar’s hands are not clean and since Qatar owns and operates Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera’s hands are likewise unclean in the situation in Libya,” they write.

    Prigozhin’s appeal failed. In June, the General Court, the EU’s second highest court, upheld the sanctions against Prigozhin, ruling that “the evidence pack contained sufficient details, accompanied by credible information, that the activities of Wagner Group, which were sufficiently identified, threatened peace, security and stability in Libya.”

    Letter to Trump

    At times, despite surrounding himself with teams of international lawyers to protect his interests, Prigozhin seems to have preferred to take matters in his own hands.

    Among the documents reviewed by The Intercept is what appears to be a draft letter Prigozhin addressed to former President Donald Trump, as well as former Attorney General William Barr, former Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, and several other U.S. officials. Russian and English versions of the letter, stripped of metadata, were attached in emails by Prigozhin’s team at CLS, including some specifically instructing recipients to remove the metadata from the attachments. The Intercept could not determine whether a final draft of the letter was ever sent to its intended recipients, but three of the U.S. officials listed as recipients on the draft, including Barr, told The Intercept that they do not remember receiving it — suggesting that Prigozhin might have ultimately decided against sending it. A spokesperson for Trump did not respond to a request for comment.

    The four-page letter, Prigozhin notes in a postscript, was “written and delivered against the advice of Concord’s able counsel, Eric Dubelier and Kate Seikaly.” The attorneys represented Prigozhin in the U.S. after special counsel Mueller filed criminal charges in 2018, accusing Prigozhin and Concord, the company he controls, of conspiracy to defraud the United States for their alleged role in election interference in the 2016 election. Dubelier, a U.S.-based attorney who with Seikaly defended Concord against federal prosecution, wrote in an email to The Intercept that Prigozhin “is not our client nor has he ever been our client.” He did not address additional questions or comment on the scores of emails he exchanged with Prigozhin’s attorneys at CLS.

    In the draft letter, dated April 23, 2019, Prigozhin asks Trump to reappoint Mueller as a federal prosecutor so he can personally prosecute Concord, giving Prigozhin a chance to face him in court.

    “[F]or some reason the press insists on calling me ‘Putin’s Chef,’ and not ‘Bush’s Chef.’”

    “You have been led to believe, in great part due to Mr. Mueller’s accusations against me and my company, that I am of the same mind as Osama bin Laden or El Chapo, both villains that Mr. Mueller has insultingly compared me to in federal court,” Prigozhin writes, in a letter whose combative style is in line with Prigozhin’s frequent statements on Russian social media. “I will not hide that this is first and foremost a matter of personal honor for me. I built my restaurant and catering businesses from the ground up, with my own blood and sweat, like many American entrepreneurs.”

    Prigozhin goes on to lament that his “business and brand” have suffered due to the sanctions imposed against him and Mueller’s indictment. He also writes about the reputation he has acquired in the West and takes particular issue with the way the press have covered him. “I had the honor of serving President George W. Bush at my New Island restaurant in 2002,” he writes, “but for some reason the press insists on calling me ‘Putin’s Chef,’ and not ‘Bush’s Chef.’”

    Putin-Bush-Prigozhin

    Yevgeny Prigozhin walks toward a seated Vladimir Putin, center left, and George W. Bush, far right, on board the SS New Island on May 25, 2002.

    Photo: Kremlin

    While Prigozhin’s U.S.-based counsel appeared to be opposed to the letter, his team at CLS helped translate it, deliberating in some detail on English phrases like “Constitution be damned.” In the English draft, Prigozhin concludes by expressing a wish to face Mueller in court, where, he writes, “if American justice as devised by the Founding Fathers is still alive, we will prevail.”

    That line seems to have been a suggestion from Kyle Davis, an attorney at CLS. “Think about changing которое мы выиграем to в котором мы победим,” Davis wrote in one of several emails about the draft translation, “‘prevail’ is a bit more fancy than just ‘win’.”

    The post Inside the Aggressive Legal War to Shield the Founder of Russia’s Wagner Group appeared first on The Intercept.

    This post was originally published on The Intercept.


  • WASHINGTON, DC - October 13: Members of committee watch a video footage of Former President Donald Trump during the last scheduled hearing of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack at Canon Office Building on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC on October 13, 2022. (Photo by Shuran Huang for The Washington Post via Getty Images)

    Committee members watch video footage of former President Donald Trump during the last scheduled hearing of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on U.S. Capitol, in Washington, D.C., on Oct. 13, 2022.

    Photo: Shuran Huang/Getty Images


    Weeks like last week explain why Donald Trump is so eager to regain power. He wants to avoid accountability for his dangerous actions, which still threaten to turn America into a right-wing autocracy.

    Last week was a particularly trying one for Trump. He faced a blizzard of bad news, on multiple fronts, underscoring his exposure now that he is just a regular citizen and not president.

    The highlight came on Thursday, when the House January 6 committee held its last public hearing before the midterm elections in November. Committee members made the case that Trump himself brought on the January 6 insurrection aimed at stopping Congress from certifying Joe Biden as president. The committee’s vice chair, Rep. Liz Cheney, R-Wyo., called Trump the “central player” of January 6.

    During the hearing, the committee revealed evidence that Trump incited the insurrection, even though he had privately acknowledged that he knew he’d lost. The committee aired testimony from a former Trump White House aide who recalled going into the Oval Office a week after the November, 2020 election, and finding Trump watching television. “Can you believe I lost to this fucking guy?” Trump asked the aide, referring to Biden.

    The panel voted unanimously to subpoena Trump to testify. But that was just the beginning of Trump’s very bad week.

    While the House hearing was underway on Thursday, the Supreme Court, which Trump had packed with three ultraconservative justices, and which he might thus have expected to be sympathetic to his cause, ruled against him. The court rejected a key Trump appeal of a lower-court ruling, part of his broader legal strategy to stop the Justice Department and the FBI from using the classified documents found during a court-authorized search of his Mar-a-Lago home in August. Trump wants the government to be forced to return the documents to him, which he apparently thinks would stop the Justice Department’s ongoing criminal investigation in connection with the documents; the Supreme Court’s terse order effectively rejected that notion.

    The ruling followed press reports Wednesday that a Trump employee has told the FBI that, as government officials sought to retrieve thousands of documents that Trump was keeping at Mar-a-Lago, Trump personally ordered the employee to move the boxes containing the documents to his residence. Security camera footage of the employee moving the boxes appears to corroborate his story. Such testimony could be damning evidence in an obstruction of justice case against Trump.

    Other legal problems for Trump surfaced elsewhere last week. Marc Short, the chief of staff for former Vice President Mike Pence, testified Thursday before a federal grand jury in Washington in connection with the Justice Department’s criminal investigation into efforts to overturn the 2020 election. Trump had sought to block Short’s testimony, invoking executive privilege, but a judge rejected that claim. The ruling could ultimately make it easier for federal prosecutors to get other former top Trump administration officials to testify before the grand jury.

    The former president’s legal problems continued in New York, where Attorney General Letitia James asked a judge on Thursday to prevent Trump’s company from selling or moving assets without court approval. James wants to stop Trump from trying to shield his money from the possible penalties he may face as a result of the lawsuit she filed in September against Trump, three of his children, and their family business. In that suit, James accused them of engaging in a prolonged fraud by falsifying the value of company assets. Her office has also referred the evidence gathered in her civil lawsuit to federal prosecutors for a criminal investigation.

    Finally, in yet another courtroom back in Washington, Trump’s long-standing efforts to discredit the FBI’s investigation into alleged collusion between his 2016 presidential campaign and the Kremlin took another damaging hit this week. While Trump was still president, then-U.S. Attorney General William Barr appointed John Durham as special prosecutor to investigate the origins of the FBI’s Trump-Russia investigation. The appointment was Barr’s gift to Trump; Durham’s mission was to search for wrongdoing in the way the investigation was opened and conducted.

    But while Durham has stayed on as a special prosecutor long after the end of the Trump administration, his attempts to prove that the Trump-Russia case was a politicized bad faith effort to undermine Trump have largely failed. He has had only two cases that have led to charges, and the first one fell apart in May, when Michael Sussmann, a lawyer with ties to Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign, was acquitted on charges of lying to the FBI for sharing a tip about Trump and Russia.

    This week, his last remaining case, against FBI informant Igor Danchenko, has taken a series of damaging hits. Durham charged Danchenko with lying to the FBI about issues related to the Trump-Russia investigation, particularly the so-called Steele dossier, a collection of rumors and tips about possible ties between Trump and Russia compiled by former British intelligence officer Christopher Steele. Danchenko was a source for Steele, while also serving as an FBI informant.

    But the FBI agents who Durham brought in to testify have undermined Durham’s case and defended Danchenko. They have said that he was a valuable informant, and one testified that the Steele dossier had nothing to do with the opening of Crossfire Hurricane, the code name for the FBI’s Trump-Russia investigation. On Friday, the judge in the case dismissed one of the charges brought against Danchenko, damaging Durham’s prosecution even further.

    A few more weeks like this one might bankrupt Trump or land him in prison — or he might just officially announce that he’s running for president in 2024.

    The post Trump’s Bad Week May Hasten His Ruin — or Simply Stoke His Hubris appeared first on The Intercept.

  • In late July, Tahir Ashraf Bhatti, an Indian police official with a checkered history of alleged human rights abuses, tweeted a photo of himself in the U.S. He had come to Houston, according to the tweet, to attend an FBI training.

    Back home, Bhatti, a top cop for criminal investigations in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, ran a detention site where civilians have reportedly been interrogated and tortured for what they’ve posted on social media. Now he was sharing on Twitter a photo of himself standing in front of an unclassified FBI slide presentation titled “Operation Catch Me If You Can.”

    “Continuous learning is the minimum requirement for success in any field,” he wrote in the tweet. A few days later, he posted a photo holding a souvenir FBI badge and wrote: “Appreciation is for now, gratitude is forever. Thank you @FBI.”


    Until last year, Bhatti oversaw the regional police’s anti-terror unit, which has been accused of torture and extrajudicial killings, including while he was chief. Bhatti was also the top official at the cyber unit, which critics have alleged uses intimidation and violence against Kashmiris in custody in retribution for social media posts critical of the Indian government.

    Bhatti himself has been accused of assaulting a social media user, according to past reporting by The Intercept, who said he was taken to Cargo, a notorious detention facility in Kashmir, after posting a tweet mocking Bhatti. Bhatti, in response to queries at the time, denied the allegations against him, as well as claims that people were abused by him or forces under his command for expressing their political views online.

    The FBI’s provision of training to Bhatti raises tough questions around the U.S.’s security relationship with India. In particular, the move to train Bhatti may run afoul of two statutory provisions known as the “Leahy laws” that prevent the U.S. government from providing assistance to foreign security forces known to commit human rights abuses.

    “The U.S. government claims that this partnership is founded on shared values, including commitments to democracy, global institutions, and multilateral organizations,” said Haley Duschinski, a professor of anthropology at Ohio University whose research specializes in militarization and impunity in South Asia, with a focus on Kashmir, “but these words ring completely hollow in light of India’s refusal to fulfill its obligations under international human rights law.”

    The Houston division of the FBI declined to comment for this story. Bhatti did not respond to a request for comment.

    The U.S. considers India a major partner in its military and national security operations, grounded in a “shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific,” according to a State Department website. The two countries established a defense relationship after the end of the Cold War and grew closer under the George W. Bush administration on the basis of combating the shared threat of jihadist terrorism.

    Over the past decade, the United States has sold over $4 billion in arms to the Indian government. The U.S. and India have also cooperated on counterterrorism, including to target Pakistan-based terrorist organizations that have carried out attacks in India. The U.S. also increasingly sees India as an important security partner in confronting China.

    Because of this close relationship, political will in the United States to raise human rights issues with an ally like India has often been lacking, said Ria Chakrabarty, the policy director at Hindus for Human Rights. Chakrabarty advocated for conditioning U.S. aid to India on human rights grounds in a recent article in Foreign Policy magazine.

    “There is always a narrative in D.C. that you have to walk a thin line between having a closer relationship with India and raising human rights concerns there. It is based on a fear that going too hard on India over human rights might anger the government such that they may not cooperate with the U.S. against China,” she said. “The U.S. cannot be afraid to raise human rights issues with India out of fear of China, because India will calculate that it has an interest in containing China regardless.”

    Chakrabarty said that a Leahy law review of cooperation with Indian security forces is warranted in light of ongoing reports of human rights abuses. In a statement, Rep. Ilhan Omar, D-Minn., who has been vocal in Congress about India’s rights violations in Kashmir, called on the FBI to provide transparency about its engagement with Bhatti, as well as Kashmir police forces more broadly.

    “This individual is credibly accused of some of the worst human rights abuses in Kashmir, including alleged torture of journalists and citizen dissidents. It is my sincere hope that U.S. agencies are in no way cooperating or training serious human rights violations and suppression in Kashmir,” Omar said. “The FBI owes Congress — and the public — an explanation as to what if any involvement they have with Ashraf and the Jammu & Kashmir Police.”

    The FBI conducts training for foreign law enforcement through several partnership programs. Indian police and commandos have received FBI training in the U.S. during the post-9/11 global war on terrorism.

    A Kashmiri journalist living in exile in the West said that any support Bhatti or his unit receive from the U.S. today would inevitably be used to further suppress free speech in the region.

    “The FBI has the capacity to safely carry out advanced investigations in the United States,” said the journalist, who asked for anonymity for fear of retaliation against family members in Kashmir. “But when they train Kashmiri police in the same tactics, there is no doubt that those powers will end up being used against Kashmiri civilians.”


    The crackdown against journalists, activists, and civil society in India and Kashmir has been justified as a counterterrorism measure, but human rights activists say it has become a catch-all term used by the Indian government to target dissenters. The justification has been routinely deployed to support policies enacted in Kashmir.

    A recent report by Amnesty International documents “drastically intensified” repression in Kashmir since the 2019 abrogation of the region’s special status, including the use of anti-terrorism laws to target academics, journalists, activists, and lawyers seen as critical of the Indian government.

    “There is an environment now where there is no space for protest.”

    “There is an environment now where there is no space for protest. If there are abuses which any journalists choose to report, a series of things can happen: Their homes can be raided, they can be taken in for questioning, they can be blocked from traveling, or then they can be arrested,” said Meenakshi Ganguly, South Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Counterterrorism and sedition laws are now deployed routinely against activists, even though there is not much evidence for the charges produced.”

    There is also a documented history of human rights violations by Indian security forces in Kashmir, including torture, mass killings, and widespread use of sexual violence as a “counterinsurgency tactic,” according to Human Rights Watch. Since Kashmir’s local autonomy was revoked in 2019, repression has increased and local reporting has been all but snuffed out by security forces, turning the region into what Duschinski, the Kashmir expert, described as an “information black hole.”

    Bhatti himself has taken a hands-on approach to suppressing Kashmiris’ speech. As head of the cyber unit, he reportedly surveilled local media outlets and, on numerous occasions, has been accused of abusing members of the press during interrogations.

    In 2020, the same year The Intercept reported on Bhatti and the cyber unit, a Kashmiri journalist named Auqib Javeed was brought to the Cargo detention facility after publishing a story about police intimidation of Kashmiri social media users. Javeed was assaulted by a police officer and then taken to Bhatti’s office where he was “berated and verbally abused” over his reporting, he said. Bhatti was also involved with the detention of a photojournalist, Masrat Zahra, that year over her posts that were critical of the Indian government — an incident that generated media attention due to parallels with some of Bhatti’s own past online criticism of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

    The Kashmiri journalist living in the West told The Intercept they were also held at Cargo by security forces under Bhatti’s command. They described Bhatti as a notorious figure among local journalists, known for threats, abuse, and intimidation.

    “As head of the police cyber force unit, Ashraf has gone hard against people in Kashmir who have publicly criticized the government. The police have sought to teach people a lesson and put fear down their spines so that they won’t speak out in future,” the journalist said. “Ashraf is someone who has been willing to go all the way to please his bosses, and that means targeting anyone who voices an opinion against the Indian state.”

    Another Kashmiri journalist who asked for anonymity for fear of retaliation from Bhatti and forces under his command expressed disappointment that the FBI would host Bhatti despite the well-known public allegations against him.

    “We hoped that with the Biden administration there would be more focus on human rights, but that hasn’t been the case,” the journalist said. “We don’t have any expectation of justice from India, but we are surprised that institutions in the United States like the FBI that talk about defending journalists and human rights would host someone like Tahir Ashraf for training.”

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  • When Russian forces seized Crimea in 2014, paving the way for President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula, a large number of world leaders and international organizations condemned the invasion as illegal. But Putin and other senior Russian officials were never prosecuted in any court of international law for the crime of aggression: the use of armed force against another country without defensive necessity.

    Eight years later, Russia did it again, invading mainland Ukraine in February. Last week, Putin declared the annexation of four regions over which his forces have partial control. The invasion and the recent annexation are illegal under international law — as was the invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014. These actions threaten not only Ukraine but also the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that form the basis for the peaceful coexistence of nations. Yet whether these acts of aggression will be prosecuted this time around remains in question. That’s because prosecuting the crime of aggression would not put a lowly soldier or mid-level officer on the stand, but Russia’s highest ranking military and political officials, all the way to Putin himself.

    Over the last eight months, evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity by Russian forces has piled up. Some officials, including U.S. President Joe Biden, have gone as far as to call Russia’s actions in Ukraine “genocide” — a claim some experts have disputed. Investigations into these alleged crimes are well underway, by Ukrainian prosecutors, foreign countries, international organizations, and the International Criminal Court, among others. But whether anyone will prosecute those chiefly responsible for the aggression itself, and under which jurisdiction, is still unclear.

    “It’s a question on everyone’s mind,” said Nathaniel Raymond, a human rights investigator who is analyzing evidence of Russian atrocities in Ukraine as part of a Yale School of Public Health initiative supported by the U.S. State Department. “What is more important? Is it catching the colonel-level in charge of the artillery assault on Mariupol, or is it Putin?”

    “None of this would be happening if Russia had not invaded,” echoed Philippe Sands, a prominent international law specialist. “The danger that we face is that in five years’ time, we will have three or four trials of low-grade, useless sorts of characters that are totally irrelevant, and the top people just get off scot-free.”

    The International Criminal Court’s involvement in Ukraine has garnered the support of countries long hostile to the court, including the United States, which — like Russia and Ukraine — is not a member party of the ICC. Dozens of countries have pledged support and some $20 million for the court’s effort in Ukraine. While little is known about the scope of the ICC’s investigation, the court has jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity but cannot prosecute the crime of aggression against nationals of a nonmember state or without a referral from the United Nations Security Council. Russia, which holds veto power on the council, would certainly stand in the way.

    But other countries, including the U.S., may also not look favorably on the prospect of prosecuting Putin for the crime of aggression, for fear of setting a precedent that could boomerang against them.

    “The big elephant in the room in Ukraine is Iraq.”

    “They don’t want to deal with the crime of aggression because they know that if it’s used against Russia, a permanent member of the Security Council, today, it might be used against them tomorrow,” said Sands. “The big elephant in the room in Ukraine is Iraq, which was also a manifestly illegal war and produced a very different response in Britain and in the United States.”

    In practice, that renders the ICC powerless to prosecute the crime that many Ukrainians and observers argue has enabled all others. “The crime of aggression is the mother crime. If there wasn’t this unprovoked war and aggression, there would be no further crimes, no war crimes, or crimes against humanity,” Tetiana Pechonchyk, head of the Ukrainian human rights group Zmina, told The Intercept. “But in the existing framework of the international accountability mechanism, there is no accountability for the crime of aggression.”

    EDITORS NOTE: Graphic content / Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Britain's Karim Khan, visits a mass grave in Bucha, on the outskirts of Kyiv, on April 13, 2022, amid Russia's military invasion launched on Ukraine. - A visit by the International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor to Bucha -- the Kyiv suburb now synonymous with scores of atrocities against civilians discovered in areas abandoned by Russian forces -- came as the new front of the war shifts eastward, with new allegations of crimes inflicted on locals. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP) (Photo by FADEL SENNA/AFP via Getty Images)

    Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Karim Khan, visits a mass grave in Bucha, on the outskirts of Kyiv, on April 13, 2022, amid Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine.

    Photo: Fadel Senna/AFP via Getty Images

    A Leadership Crime

    In the current context, there is no international body with the authority to hold individual perpetrators criminally responsible for the crime of aggression in Ukraine. The International Court of Justice, the official court of the U.N., handles disputes between states, rather than individuals, and Russia has ignored the court’s rulings in the past. That’s why Ukrainian authorities have intensified calls for a special tribunal to prosecute Russian aggression. They have long been supported by dozens of Ukrainian civil society groups, and by a growing chorus of international experts, who have drafted proposals outlining what that tribunal might look like.

    “We need to have a real focus on individuals at the higher military and political echelons,” Wayne Jordash, an international humanitarian law attorney with years of experience in international courts and tribunals, told The Intercept.

    The crime of aggression is a “leadership crime,” Sands agreed. “It’s the only crime that takes us straight to the top table: the decision-makers, the people who participated in the decision to launch the war. We’re talking about 20 people max, and the proof is very straightforward.”

    A handful of countries have so far voiced their support for such a tribunal, and Ukrainian officials have been lobbying to get more on board. The body could be established through the U.N. — with a vote in the General Assembly, which consists of all members of the U.N., authorizing the secretary-general to work with Ukrainian authorities to set up a special tribunal. In March, 140 nations voted in favor of a resolution denouncing Russian “aggression,” theoretically paving the way for more concrete action. Or the tribunal could be established through a regional framework at the European level. So far, a number of resolutions, including from the European Parliament and the Council of Europe, have backed the establishment of a special tribunal, but broader political consensus is needed to translate those statements into action.

    Unlike the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity, which is based on the review of expansive amounts of evidence and witness testimony and can take years to complete, the crime of aggression is, technically speaking, a relatively quick one for building a case. “The crime of aggression is obvious; the evidence is on the surface,” said Pechonchyk, the Ukrainian human rights activist. “The process would be quick, but we need the consensus, and we need the resources.”

    Still, prosecuting the crime of aggression is an untested endeavor — as well as potentially a politically unpopular one. Since the time of the Nuremberg Trials and Tokyo War Crimes Trial after World War II, when aggression was known as “crimes against peace,” there’s been no attempt by an international body to prosecute it.

    There have, of course, been instances of aggression. As the United States and its allies prepared to invade Iraq in 2003, a number of international bodies denounced them. The International Court of Justice expressed “its deep dismay that a small number of states are poised to launch an outright illegal invasion of Iraq, which amounts to a war of aggression,” and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan later called the invasion “illegal” and a violation of the U.N. charter.

    But there were no international mechanisms in place with the jurisdiction to prosecute the leaders of that invasion — and even less political appetite for attempting to create them. As the war in Iraq continued, leading to widespread abuses and killings that had the hallmarks of war crimes, calls to hold accountable those responsible, including President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, were mostly relegated to activist and anti-war circles. Prosecuting some prominent figures today over the crime of aggression when others were not prosecuted in the past would inevitably raise legitimate questions of consistency and bias. But experts argue that reversing the pattern of nonprosecution is more important than ever, to set a precedent that could help deter future aggression.

    “It’s a crime invented in ’45 that has had a long shelf life. … My feeling is that if this is not prosecuted as a crime of aggression, then the crime of aggression is basically dead,” said Sands. “I don’t for a moment want to understate the horrors of Bucha and Mariupol. Of course they must be investigated, and the people who perpetrated them must be found and subjected to some form of justice, absolutely. But that’s a sideshow. There’s only one real issue, and that is the small cast of characters and the finances that supported this war.”

    A Special Tribunal?

    Details about what a special tribunal would look like, under whose mandate it would operate, and which other crimes it would tackle are unclear at the moment. It’s also unclear whether the tribunal would replace ongoing local and international investigations, or work alongside them.

    Some experts have argued that existing courts and mechanisms should be fully supported before new ones are set up. The U.S. and its key Western allies have hesitated to take a position.

    A spokesperson for the State Department wrote in an email to The Intercept that the administration is “carefully reviewing a proposal for a special tribunal.” The spokesperson added, “We are absolutely committed to bringing those who are responsible to justice.”

    A spokesperson for the U.K. Foreign Office did not address questions about British support for a special tribunal, emphasizing instead support for war crimes investigations. The spokesperson referred The Intercept to a statement made by Foreign Secretary James Cleverly at a recent meeting of the U.N. Security Council. “We must make clear to President Putin that his attack on the Ukrainian people must stop, that there can be no impunity for those perpetrating atrocities and that he must withdraw from Ukraine and restore regional and global stability,” Cleverly said then.

    A spokesperson for the French Embassy in Washington, responding to questions about the potential of a special tribunal, referred The Intercept to a recent statement of support for the ICC, “the only permanent criminal court that is universal in scope.” The statement noted that support for the ICC came in addition to support for “Ukrainian courts.” And a spokesperson for the German Embassy in Washington wrote to The Intercept, “We support the investigations of the ICC chief investigator politically, financially and with experts.”

    The prospect of a special tribunal has particularly raised the concern of the ICC’s prosecutor general, Karim Khan, who has been struggling to restore the court’s legitimacy after years of criticism — most notably, that the court for a long time only prosecuted Africans. In more recent years, the court has launched a number of new inquiries, including into alleged Israeli crimes in Palestine and British crimes in Iraq. (The U.K. is a founding member of the ICC, which gave the court jurisdictions in this case, but because neither Iraq nor the U.S. are members, the court couldn’t investigate U.S. crimes there.) Both those investigations have faced fierce opposition, contributing to a perception that the ICC cannot take on the world’s most powerful countries. As The Intercept previously reported, the U.S. also went to great lengths to derail an ICC investigation of its crimes and those committed by its allies in Afghanistan, further contributing to that view.

    “The ICC prosecutor is fighting a battle to be relevant and effective and show that ICC prosecution is a viable investigative and prosecutorial model of operating in light of its long history of not being those things,” said Jordash, the humanitarian law attorney, adding that regional tribunals tend to redirect resources from other accountability processes, including local prosecutions and truth and reconciliation initiatives. “A new tribunal obviously would overlap with any investigations by the ICC prosecutor. … There’s a risk that if that’s not explained properly, that funding will suddenly float to the new court, and the energy that the ICC prosecutor meets will be sort of depleted.” As Sands noted, “He’s worried it will distract and take attention away and take money away.”

    A spokesperson for the ICC prosecutor did not respond to a request for comment.

    A Lot of Noise

    The ICC first opened an inquiry in Ukraine in 2014, after receiving permission from Ukrainian authorities to do so. It formally launched an expanded investigation this year. So far, little detail is available about the focus of the court’s work in Ukraine, and others engaged in similar efforts, like a multicountry, joint investigation team, have also revealed little about their investigations.

    “I think there’s a lot of noise, and not that much has been translated yet into discernible action on the ground in Ukraine, or translated into real support for the Ukrainian prosecution,” said Jordash. “Despite a lot of the rhetoric that we hear from both international actors and also some national actors, they’re at the very beginning. Building viable cases against those further from the ground and up the chain of command in the political and military sphere really hasn’t begun in earnest yet. … Frankly, I think there’s a sort of lack of understanding as to the need, and how to do that.”

    Regional prosecutors in Ukraine have struggled to tackle the overwhelming amount of evidence they and others are gathering. In Bucha, when Russian forces first retreated, local police found themselves handling evidence of mass torture and killings. Six months ago, Ukraine had no forensic teams specialized in mass graves, said Raymond, the human rights investigator. “We are looking at a retrofit, in the middle of a war, of an entire law enforcement community.”

    That’s where the international community comes in. The investigation and prosecution of war crimes is a highly specialized area of expertise. Successful documentation and prosecution is a complex endeavor that requires the coordination of a number of players, noted Jordash. “You need the effective collaboration of civil society, professional investigators at the local level, and international experts. … Instead of the frenzied documentation, which is what we have now, what we need is to see more collaboration and more openness and more cooperation.”

    Horror in Izium

    When Ukrainian soldiers wrestled back control of the eastern city of Izium in September, they found a devastated city and hundreds of dead bodies, including more than 440 in a mass grave.

    The scale of the horror was even greater than already shocking evidence that had emerged when Russian troops retreated from other parts of the country months earlier. “This tragedy is even worse than the tragedy in Bucha,” said Anton Gerashchenko, an adviser to Ukraine’s minister of internal affairs, referring to the city near Kyiv that up until the Izium discovery was the emblem for atrocities perpetrated by Russian forces. Many quickly pointed to more horrors likely to remain undiscovered, in cities and villages that are still under Russian control.

    As dozens of Ukrainian investigators, dressed in hospital gowns and carrying shovels, began to exhume the desiccated bodies, questions that for months had preoccupied Ukrainian and foreign officials, as well as local and international human rights groups, came to the forefront once again: What would justice for the dead in Izium and their loved ones look like? How would both those materially responsible and those who gave them orders be held accountable? And whose job was it to deliver that justice?

    Ukraine’s prosecutor general, faced with the enormous task of documenting the abuses in the midst of an active conflict, said last month that his office had gathered evidence of more than 34,000 potential war crimes — a colossal figure no law enforcement authority can realistically be expected to fully investigate, let alone prosecute. While some experts caution that not all those crimes may meet the legal definition of war crime, they recognized the scale of the evidence is staggering.

    Alongside Ukrainian officials, the gathering of evidence and testimony has been conducted by several local civil society groups, international human rights organizations with teams on the ground, and a growing number of open source intelligence groups documenting the abuses remotely. Several countries have launched their own investigations, primarily relying on interviews with Ukrainian refugees within their borders. Additionally, monitors with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or OSCE, have documented abuses in Ukraine since 2014. There is a U.N.-led Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine and a U.N. Human Rights Monitoring Mission.

    Some of the people working on documentation efforts in Ukraine have referred to the ever-growing list of groups and institutions involved as a bit of a “circus.” Others cautioned that the effort risked turning into an unhelpful competition for funding and access. But there is plenty of work to be done, they also pointed out, and many groups have begun to tackle issues of cooperation, transparency, and burden-sharing. “We have many different actors, but on the other hand, we have a tremendous scale of disaster,” said Pechonchyk. Still, she added, “All of this is important only to convince other nations that something terrible is happening in Ukraine, but that’s all that it is. It won’t stop Russia.”

    IZIUM, UKRAINE – SEPTEMBER 23: An elderly woman reacts near exhumed grave of her grandson at the site of a mass burial in a forest during exhumation on September 23, 2022 in Izium, Ukraine. Her grandson Danylo,19, died on May 4 as a result of Russian shelling. In total, investigators and experts found 447 bodies of the dead: 425 civilians, including 5 children, and 22 servicemen of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Most of the bodies have signs of violent death, at least 30 of the dead were tortured. (Photo by Oleksandra Novosel/Suspilne Ukraine/JSC "UA:PBC"/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)

    An elderly woman reacts near the exhumed grave of her grandson at the site of a mass burial on Sept. 23, 2022, in Izium, Ukraine. Her grandson Danylo, 19, died on May 4 during Russian shelling.

    Photo: Oleksandra Novosel/Global Images Ukraine via Getty

    The Cost of Impunity

    While the most recent invasion has brought scores of foreign investigators to Ukraine, civil society groups there had been engaged in the same documentation effort since 2014, with far less international interest and support.

    “No one was listening to us seriously,” said Pechonchyk, “so Russia used these years to pump up its war machine and prepare this new aggression, and now we are paying with the lives of our people. Now some of the things we have been saying all these years have become more clear for other democratic governments, but unfortunately, for us it’s too late.”

    What’s at stake in Ukraine, she added, is not only justice for Ukrainians but also the credibility of the very apparatus of international accountability. The failure of existing mechanisms to stop the war is the reason why she and other human rights activists have joined Ukrainian authorities in calling on the international community to support Ukraine’s military. “As human rights defenders, as lawyers, and people who believed in these principles, that means that justice is useless,” she said.

    “What we need today is weapons,” echoed Oleksandra Matviichuk, a Ukrainian human rights attorney and head of the Center for Civil Liberties, a prominent human rights group which on Friday was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. “Maybe it’s weird to hear that from a human rights lawyer, but I’ll be very honest with you: I have spent 20 years defending human rights, and now I have no legal instrument which has worked in this situation.”

    When Russia launched its invasion, Matviichuk’s group, which had been monitoring Russian offenses since the invasion of Crimea, relied on volunteers across the country to document abuses, including some operating underground from areas under Russian control. The volunteers used a simple questionnaire to gather information, and recorded video or audio testimonies of victims and witnesses, with contact information for trained investigators to follow up. “We received a lot of stories, very quickly,” said Matviichuk. “We have documented more than 18,000 crimes — and this is just the tip of the iceberg because Russia uses war crimes as a method of war.”

    But while her group is assembling an ambitious record, she often interrogates herself about the purpose of it all.

    “We’re not historians, we’re not doing this for the national archives. We do it for future justice,” she said. “The question is, who will deliver justice for hundreds of thousands of victims?” Widely available technology had made gathering documentation more accessible, but what to do with that vast amount of evidence remained less clear. “In the 21st century, because of technology, we have a lot of ways to document war crimes,” she said. “What is still lacking in the 21st century is an effective mechanism to bring perpetrators to justice.”

    The failure to bring perpetrators to justice emboldens them to carry out greater abuses, she and others noted. “All this which we have observed in Ukraine is the result of total impunity,” she said, listing a number of countries in which Russian forces have been accused of widespread abuses. “In Chechnya, in Moldova, in Georgia, in Mali, in Libya, in Syria — and they have never been punished.”

    In Syria, in particular, Russian forces were repeatedly accused of war crimes, including over their role in the monthlong bombing of Aleppo in 2016, which killed more than 440 civilians. Russia supported the violent regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad throughout Syria’s decadelong war, at first with military aid and later through direct military intervention, including the deployment of hundreds of mercenaries. Human Rights Watch noted that some of the same tactics Russia deployed in Syria — like the indiscriminate use of airstrikes, deliberate targeting of medical facilities, and use of weapons such as cluster munitions — offered a “playbook” for its subsequent actions in Ukraine. Russian crimes in Syria received far less attention and calls for accountability than similar crimes in Ukraine are now prompting. But accountability matters precisely because its absence inevitably yields more abuses, rights observers stress.

    Ibrahim Olabi, a human rights attorney with the group Guernica 37 whose advocacy has focused on Syria and who is now advising Ukrainian groups doing similar work, noted that the abuses Russia committed in Ukraine have reminded the world of those it also committed in Syria. 

    “While some called out double standards, I personally am happy with how the world responded to Ukraine for a number of reasons, including that it has exposed a big perpetrator that we have a problem with in Syria,” he told The Intercept. “Syria keeps getting mentioned by Ukrainians. They’ll say, ‘You let Russia off the hook in Syria, and now look what they did to us.’”

    While the scale and horror of the abuses in Ukraine have plenty of precedent in other conflicts, the amount of evidence rapidly emerging from there — and the level of international insistence on accountability — mark a significant departure from the ways the world has responded to other conflicts.

    “The amount of digital, remotely collectible evidence of alleged gross violations in Ukraine is unheralded in terms of its volume, its temporal cadence. How often it’s available — and the diversity of sources, ranging from commercial UAVs, to call detail record data, to unencrypted communications, to imagery — we’ve never had this much, this often,” said Raymond, the human rights investigator. “The second thing is, we’ve never had this much focus in terms of resources, support from donor governments and the private sector, multiple types of institutions, to collect it and act on it.”

    For those like him, who have been documenting war crimes in conflicts that have received far less sympathy than Ukraine, the sudden influx of support has been poignant. “I have this sort of whiplash on a daily basis,” he said. “You can’t tell the story of Ukraine without talking about the fundamental disparity in political will and in resources.”

    That disparity comes from the fact that the conflict in Ukraine has been highly televised, he suggested, that there is a more clearly identified adversary, and that the narrative of the conflict speaks to European and American audiences more directly. “There’s this broader narrative, ‘Syria, that’s not about the future of NATO and American freedom, it’s people killing each other,’” he said. “This relates to American interests in a way that’s constantly reinforced. If you talk to someone on the street and ask them in a double-blind survey, ‘How much do you care about Syria going to an international tribunal?’ They’ll say, ‘Maybe, I guess so, I don’t really know.’ If you ask them about Ukraine, you will overwhelmingly get, ‘Oh yeah, let’s get Putin.’”

    That’s why those seeking accountability for the crimes committed in Ukraine should also focus on another fundamental question, Raymond stressed: “How do we make Ukraine a precedent that can apply to other places where accountability is needed, so it’s not just a one-off?”

    “How do we make Ukraine a precedent that can apply to other places where accountability is needed, so it’s not just a one-off?”

    He and others caution that the international legal system is only one avenue toward justice. Even with large amounts of evidence, prosecutions are no guarantee of a conviction, and there are risks to investing in trials as the only way to achieve accountability. “Justice matters even when you don’t know whether it’s going to succeed. You just have to do it. It’s a practice,” said Raymond.

    “Courts are one element of the fight against impunity; the fight against impunity is an ongoing process involving many forums and activities,” echoed Olabi, who also cautioned that in the context of a prosecution, the accused would have legal arguments in their defense. “If you argue aggression, one may respond that the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO could be seen as provocation. If you notice Putin’s speech when he first announced the invasion, he referred to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the right to self-defense. That’s his argument: that what he’s doing is not aggression, it’s collective self-defense. It’s a super weak argument, but it shows you the importance of law as a tool, that even a lawless actor is willing to refer to it.”

    Delivering justice through a framework — whether the ICC’s or a special tribunal’s — whose authority is not recognized by all implicated parties would also raise a new set of questions, including about the viability of international enforcement mechanisms. But prosecuting the crime of aggression, regardless of the outcome in court, and even though Russia is not the first country to have been accused of it, would set a precedent the international community has not yet attempted.

    “Ukraine is a chance,” said Matviichuk. “Ukraine’s lessons can save people’s lives in other countries.”

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