North Korea publicly executed three men — shooting each one with 90 rounds from a machine gun — for attempting to flee to democratic South Korea, a witness and a resident who heard about the execution told Radio Free Asia.
Authorities then burned their corpses in front of horrified residents of the town, who were forced to watch, the sources said.
The three men, all in their 30s, had been caught in January when trying to escape to the South by boat.
Lost in fog on the sea, they thought they had crossed the border when they saw what they assumed was a South Korean fishing vessel. They called out for help, but it turned out to be a North Korean patrol boat that caught them in the act, and they were promptly arrested, the two sources told RFA Korean.
A North Korean navy ship, top right, patrols near fishing boats at South Korea-controlled Yeonpyeong island, May 31, 2009.(Byun Yeong Wook/AFP)
By publicly executing the men — and telling villagers they would face a similar fate — authorities sought to scare anyone who might be thinking about fleeing themselves, the sources said.
The incident reflects harsher punishment for escapees. In past years they would have been sent to reeducation camp for a maximum of 15 years. But now they will be killed by firing squad, with residents in the area forced to watch, the sources said.
The three men — two brothers surnamed Kim and their friend surnamed Ri — were from South Hwanghae province, which borders South Korea on the peninsula’s west coast.
A resident from the northwestern province of North Pyongan, who witnessed the execution while on a trip to South Hwanghae, described it in detail to RFA Korean, saying that it occurred in the the village of Songjong-ri in February, and the three men were tied to stakes.
“We witnessed the young men being dragged out with black cloths over their eyes and gagged, being shot dozens of times and their bodies being torn to pieces,” he said.
“Usually those who are to be executed are tied to the stake in three places: the neck, the torso, and the legs,” he said. “But this time, they were so weakened by severe torture that they had to be bound in six sections because they could not support their own bodies.”
He said authorities yelled, “Traitors to the nation must be punished!” as the executioners emptied the entirety of their 90 round-magazines into each man.
The execution was corroborated by another North Pyongan resident who heard about it from his friend from South Hwanghae –a witness himself — who had visited the northern province on business. He was told village authorities ordered everyone in nearby factories, farms and schools to attend.
“It was an attempt to instill fear in the residents that this is what happens when you try to escape,” the second source said. “Most of the residents gathered without knowing what was happening, and they were made to witness such a horrific sight.”
The first source said the authorities made of point of treating the dead men’s bodies with disrespect.
“They said, ‘There is no place to bury the bodies of defectors in in this land!’ and they burned their scattered remains,” the resident said.
Many children and young students in attendance were screaming in terror, and some residents collapsed and fainted, he said.
Botched escape
Since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War, more than 34,000 people have escaped North Korea and resettled in the South.
The most common route involves escaping first to China then avoiding captured and forcibly repatriated by Chinese authorities as they try to reach Southeast Asia. Once there, they can arrange with the help of a South Korean embassy to arrange a flight to Seoul.
Crossing directly into the South is rare. But the Kim brothers and their friend Ri had hoped to defy the odds.
According to the residents, prior to the execution the authorities announced that the trio had been planning their escape for months. They pooled their money to buy a small boat and set sail on the night of Jan. 6, hoping to cross the maritime border in waters west of the peninsula.
“Unfortunately they found themselves in a difficult situation where they could not see an inch in front of them because of the fog in the middle of the sea,” the second source said. “However, they blindly headed south, navigating with a compass.
As they continued southward, another vessel appeared within sight.
“They thought it was a South Korean fishing boat and shouted, ‘We are people who have escaped to South Korea! Please spare us!’”
But it was a North Korean patrol boat, and the three men were immediately arrested, he said.
“Now if anyone’s caught trying to go to South Korea, they will be executed in public without exception.”
Translated by Eugene Whong and Leejin J. Chung. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Kim Jieun for RFA Korean.
TAIPEI, Taiwan – North Korea test launched several ballistic missiles off its west coast on Monday as the U.S. and its ally, South Korea, began a major military exercise, said the South’s military.
South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, or JCS, said the missile firings, North Korea’s fifth this year, were detected from the North’s Hwanghae province but gave no further details such as how far they flew.
“Our military has strengthened surveillance and vigilance while maintaining full readiness in close coordination with the U.S,” said the JCS.
The launch came a few hours after the U.S. and South Korea launched an annual joining military exercise, called Freedom Shield, which North Korea denounced as a “dangerous provocative act.”
As part of this year’s exercise, the allies will stage 16 large-scale on-field drills, up from 10 last year, to strengthen their combined defense posture against North Korean threats and other challenges, including the regime’s growing military cooperation with Russia.
North Korea’s foreign ministry said the allies were “persistently staging the large-scale joint military exercises” despite North Korea’s repeated warnings, adding the “random exercise of strength will result in aggravated security crisis.”
“This is a dangerous provocative act of leading the acute situation on the Korean peninsula, which may spark off a physical conflict between the two sides by means of an accidental single shot, to the extreme point,” the ministry said in a statement said, as reported by the North’s state-run Korean Central News Agency, or KCNA
North Korea invariably responds with outrage to joint U.S. South Korean military exercises, condemning them as rehearsals for war, despite the allies’ insistence that they are purely defensive.
The North warned the allies would pay a “horrible price” for their joint exercise, a day after the drills were announced.
This year’s drills will not include any live-fire exercises after two South Korean jets last week accidentally dropped bombs on a South Korean civilian area, injuring 29 people.
Separately, North Korea’s state-run broadcaster reported on Saturday on the accidental bombing, saying it caused a “great uproar” in the South.
“An accident occurred in which puppet air force fighter jets, frenzied over invasion war exercises against our republic, dropped bombs on a civilian village and its surroundings in broad daylight, causing a great uproar in puppet South Korea,” said Korean Central Television.
Two KF-16 fighter jets “abnormally” dropped eight MK-82 bombs outside a training range in the South Korean city of Pocheon, some 40 kilometers (25 miles) north of Seoul, during live-fire drills on Thursday. Fifteen of those injured were civilians.
On Monday, the top South Korean Air Force commander issued a public apology calling it an accident that “should never have happened.”
“The Air Force, which should protect the lives and property of the people, inflicted harm to the people,” Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Lee Young-su said in a press briefing. “It was an accident that should never have happened, and one that should not recur.”
In an interim probe, the Air Force reaffirmed pilot error as the cause of the bombing, saying the pilot of the first aircraft missed at least three opportunities to prevent the accident after wrongly entering the target coordinates. The South Korean and U.S. militaries have halted all live fire exercises in South Korea until the investigation has finished and safety measures drawn up
Edited by Mike Firn.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Taejun Kang for RFA.
TAIPEI, Taiwan – Journalists from China’s state-run media outlets, CCTV and the People’s Daily, have returned to North Korea five years after their withdrawal due to the COVID-19 pandemic, said South Korea’s unification ministry.
North Korea has selectively opened its doors to foreign media, allowing a limited number of outlets to establish bureaus in its capital, Pyongyang.
Chinese, Russian, Japanese and a few Western agencies, such as AP and AFP, have been granted access under strict government oversight. During the COVID-19 pandemic, foreign journalists were asked to leave North Korea as part of its strict border control measures.
Chinese journalists entered North Korea on Feb. 27, said the South’s Ministry of Unification, which oversees inter-Korean relations, adding that journalists from AP and AFP had not returned to North Korea yet.
It is not clear whether Russian journalists had also returned to the North.
Separately, the Japan-based pro-Pyongyang newspaper Choson Sinbo also announced that its North Korean bureau had reopened.
“Our Pyongyang bureau has resumed operations after five years, ending the unfortunate period of temporary suspension caused by an unexpected malignant epidemic,” the paper announced on Friday.
The news comes as North Korea sends mixed signals about reopening its borders to foreigners.
Last week, North Korea closed its only gateway for foreign tourists. Weeks earlier it allowed visitors back in, which had suggested it was opening up for the first time since a COVID-19 ban on arrivals in 2020.
Some South Korean media outlets speculated that the decision to stop tourists coming in was driven by concerns over the uncontrolled spread of information.
Before last month, only Russians had been allowed into North Korea for limited group tours since September 2023.
The establishment of foreign media bureaus and the residency status of journalists are overseen by the North’s Korean Central News Agency and the Korean Central Broadcasting Committee.
These two agencies submit residency approval applications to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after obtaining approval from the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea.
Foreign media operating in North Korea often face criticism from the outside world over their lack of independent reporting due to the severe restrictions imposed by the regime.
Journalists are constantly monitored, their movements are heavily controlled, and they are often assigned government minders, limiting their ability to report freely.
Critics argue that foreign media bureaus in Pyongyang risk amplifying state propaganda rather than providing objective news, as they are pressured to align with the regime’s narratives.
South Korean public broadcaster, KBS, for example, expressed in 2021 interest in establishing a bureau in Pyongyang to enhance inter-Korean media cooperation and provide direct coverage from the North.
However, such initiatives faced public criticism in South Korea due to concerns about journalistic independence and potential compromises in reporting.
At that time, the then-opposition People’s Power Party also raised a concern that the operation of a bureau in Pyongyang might be used as a channel to funnel foreign funds to the North Korean government, accusing the government of “giving away” South Korean taxpayers money.
Edited by Mike Firn.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Taejun Kang for RFA.
North Korean troops train at a base designed to emulate the layout of Seoul and other major South Korean cities, a South Korean lawmaker said, citing testimony from North Korean prisoners of war in Ukraine.
If the testimony is true, it is an indication that North Korea has not given up on the possibility of invading the South, a South Korean ministry official said.
The POW’s testimony was revealed during an interview — broadcast on South Korean radio and simultaneously livestreamed on YouTube — with National Assemblyman Yu Yong-weon about his recent visit to Ukraine, where he met with two North Korean POWs.
North Korea has sent an estimated 12,000 soldiers to fight in Russia’s war against Ukraine, although neither Moscow or Pyongyang has publicly confirmed this.
During the interview, Yu said that one POW identified as Ri told him that the base was located in Koksan county, North Hwanghae province, just over 40 miles (65 kilometers) from the DMZ that divides North from South.
A North Korean soldier, right, identified as Ri, captured in Kursk and now at an unidentified detention center in Ukraine. Part of the image has been blurred by South Korean lawmaker Yu Yong-weon, left, who interviewed the soldier.(Yu Yong-weon)
“When you go to this training site, it is a Ministry of Defense training ground,” said Ri, according to an audio clip from their conversation played during the program. “The training ground has geographic shapes and buildings resembling those of Seoul’s Jongno-gu (a downtown district), Busan, Daegu, Jeonju, and Jeju island. … It’s in Koksan.”
Radio Free Asia looked at satellite photos of the Koksan area in North Korea’s North Hwanghae province for evidence of what Ri described.
In a photo taken by Google Earth on Nov. 25, 2022, the Koksan Training Base, located next to a mountain and surrounded by fields, has a headquarters, a barracks and what appears to be many buildings that private satellite imagery analyst Jacob Bogle told RFA Korean closely resembled Ri’s description.
Urban warfare training center(Paul Nelson/RFA)
Based on the satellite images, The entire base is approximately 3.5 kilometers (2 miles) long and 1.5 kilometers (1 mile) wide, with the model buildings spread over approximately 40 hectares (100 acres)
“The base complex is split up into 4 sections of MOUT across the area,” Bogle said, using the abbreviation for “military operations on urbanized terrain.”
“Most are simple, there may be around 5 structures that are two floors, but the vast majority are single-story structures, but some are as long as 36 meters (40 yards),” he said.
Satellite photo of North Korea’s Koksan Training Base, Nov. 25, 2022.(Google Earth image with analysis by Jacob Bogle)
Bogle said that about half of these buildings are likely unfinished, roofless structures, that are likely models for training purposes rather than actual buildings
Further analysis of historical satellite imagery reveals that a full-scale urban warfare training facility was established in earnest at Koksan Training Base in 2020.
Previously, there were only a few structures with only some outer walls, but since 2020, at least 72 mock buildings have been newly constructed.
In addition to the buildings, there are 33 model tanks, and 8 model fighter jets situated within the training ground, which appear to have remained in their current location for over 20 years.
“One key sign that the fighter jets and tanks aren’t real is that they never move,” said Bogle. “The fighter jets, for example, have been in the exact same position since 2003. These mockups are used to familiarize recruits with the overall appearance of DPRK and enemy equipment in basic training drills, and some are used as target practice.”
DPRK is the abbreviation of North Korea’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Looking forward in time, Google Earth photos from Aug. 14 and Sept. 28, 2024 show two rows of new structures, and evidence that dirt in the vacant lots has been disturbed.
“That can indicate ongoing drills on the site,” said Bogle. Referring to the new buildings he said that the low-res imagery made it difficult to determine what they were exactly, but their size and positioning suggest they are target structures.
Korean People’s Army special operations force train at a five-story building at a base, Sept. 11, 2014.(KCNA)
The Koksan Training Base is also believed to have been visited by the country’s leader Kim Jong Un in Sept. 2024, when state media reported that he gave onsite guidance to soldiers at a training ground.
NK news, a U.S. media outlet specializing in North Korea, analyzed a documentary video broadcast on the state-run Korean Central Television in January about the visit, and reported it likely took place in Koksan.
On Friday, during a press briefing by the South Korean Ministry of Unification, a reporter asked spokesperson Goo Byung-sam about Ri’s testimony and the satellite imagery in the Korean version of this report, which was published on Thursday.
The spokesperson said it was a military matter and that it would be inappropriate for the Ministry of Unification to comment.
“That said, if this report is true, it would be yet another piece of evidence that North Korea has not abandoned its ambitions of invading the South,” Goo said.
Translated by Claire S. Lee and Leejin J. Chung. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Jamin Anderson for RFA Korean.
Houses of Parliament (Cape Town, South Africa). Photograph Source: I, PhilippN – CC BY-SA 3.0
There is no discourse in South Africa more ancient, more unresolved, and more weaponised than that of land. The passage of the Expropriation Act in South Africa has set the air thick with tension, a moment that peels open the past to reveal its jagged edges. A history that never ended, only submerged beneath the language of legality and market transactions, is once again clawing at the present.
The land is not just dirt and fences—it is memory, survival, identity and belonging, resistance, dispossession of labour, the looting of minerals, and the establishment of racial capital. It is the primordial question—older than the Republic of itself.
On 23 January 2025, President Cyril Ramaphosa signed the controversial Expropriation Act 13 of 2024 into law. Like the screech of rusted gears grinding against time’s stubborn wheel, the Act has sent a raucous clatter through the nation and beyond—its champions hailing it as long-overdue justice for stolen land, its detractors warning of economic ruin, while distant powers, draped in their own self-interest, tighten their grip, their protests echoing not in the name of principle, but of privilege.
The Act, replacing its apartheid 1975 predecessor, is no mere legislative housekeeping. It is the state’s uneasy reckoning with a history of plunder—a tentative attempt to confront the theft that built South Africa’s economy, the dispossession that cemented its class hierarchies. Yet, as the ink dries, old ghosts stir. Who truly benefits? Who is left behind? And what of the landless, for whom restitution has remained a vanishing horizon, a promise deferred by bureaucracy and broken by politics?
At its core, the Act seeks to bring the law in step with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 108 of 1996, aligning the legal framework with the imperatives of land reform. It corrects the lingering contradictions between the outdated Expropriation Act and Section 25 of the democratic constitution, which speaks of expropriation in the public interest, the just terms of compensation, and the broader commitments of a nation still struggling to unshackle itself from its past. The Act echoes previous iterations—2015, 2018—bearing the scars of legislative battles, the residue of failed consultations. It insists: expropriation must not be arbitrary; compensation must be just.
Yet, as the legal scaffolding is erected, the fundamental question remains—does the law merely refine the mechanics of ownership, or does it reimagine justice itself?
As they moved eastward, they met fierce resistance from the Xhosa, who for a hundred years fought a series of wars against colonial encroachment. The Xhosa stood as one of the longest-lasting obstacles to settler domination, pushing back against British and Boer forces in a struggle that shaped the landscape of resistance. Yet, even as these wars raged, the British tightened their grip on the Cape, and tensions between white factions deepened—Boers, losing their cheap slave labour, trekked north to claim new territories, leaving a trail of blood and conflict.
Despite their divisions, settlers were bound by a shared imperative: the extraction of land and labour at the expense of the indigenous majority.
The discovery of minerals in the late 19th century marked a turning point, shifting South Africa from an agrarian society to an industrial economy fuelled by forced native labour. Capital’s hunger for wealth deepened racial segregation, culminating in the Anglo-Boer Wars, where white capital fought itself before ultimately uniting. In 1910, the Union of South Africa was formed, excluding native South Africans from political and economic power. This exclusion was cemented in 1913 with the passing of the Natives Land Act, which stripped natives of land ownership, confining them to impoverished reserves with the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 and into “tribal” boundaries called homelands by the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. The foundation for apartheid had been laid—not just through law, but through centuries of war, theft, and the relentless logic of capital.
The new Expropriation Act of 2024 attempts to pull South Africa’s legal framework closer to the constitutional imperatives of Section 25—the so-called property clause. The legal fiction of “just and equitable compensation” introduced in the Act is an attempt to balance constitutional propriety with the pressure of historical injustice. But whose justice? And what is equitable in a country where land was not bought but taken?
To date, land reform has largely been cosmetic, measured in hectares redistributed rather than in the dismantling of agricultural monopolies or capital structures. The state has danced cautiously around the issue, unwilling to provoke market unrest or dislodge the deeply entrenched privileges of the white agrarian elite. And so, the Expropriation Act emerges as both a promise and a limitation.
The Act permits expropriation in the “public interest,” a term rooted in the Constitution but destined to be contested in courts for years, entangling the process in legal bureaucracy. While the Act provides a framework for expropriation with and, in limited cases, without compensation, it does not fundamentally alter the state’s cautious approach to reclaiming large tracts of unused, unproductive, or speculatively held land. Instead, it remains tethered to negotiation, reinforcing a slow and measured redistribution. The Act acknowledges the rights of unregistered land occupiers, yet recognition alone does not guarantee security or restitution—leaving many still at the mercy of protracted legal and administrative processes.
As argued before, for the nearly 60% of South Africans living off-register in communal areas, informal settlements, or Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) houses, the Expropriation Act of 2024 offers little more than a symbolic gesture. Without title deeds, their claims to land are not legally secured, yet their histories and lived realities are deeply embedded in it. If expropriation is not accompanied by a robust land administration strategy that formalises tenure rights for the dispossessed, it risks becoming another performance of reform rather than a transformative intervention.
The Act’s recognition of unregistered land rights is a step forward, but recognition alone does not equate to protection. Unless the expropriation process is integrated with a comprehensive land administration system to document the rights of unregistered occupiers, those most vulnerable to dispossession will remain in legal limbo. The enactment of a Land Records Act, as recommended by the High-Level Panel Report on the Assessment of Key Legislation (2018) and the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform (2019), is essential to ensuring security of tenure.
Additionally, both panels proposed a National Land Reform Framework Act to establish clear legal principles for redistribution, restitution, and tenure reform. Rather than replacing existing laws, this framework would provide coherence by setting legal criteria for beneficiary selection, land acquisition, and equitable access. It would also introduce mechanisms for transparency, accountability, and alternative dispute resolution, including a Land Rights Protector. The Expropriation Act should not stand in isolation—it must align with these broader legislative efforts to ensure that land reform is not only legally sound but also meaningfully transformative.
Land, under capitalist relations, is not merely a resource—it is a commodity. Any attempt at expropriation without rupturing this logic is bound to be a compromised one. The Act, while acknowledging that compensation may, in certain instances, be set at nil, does not articulate a decisive framework for when and how this will occur, leaving these decisions to courts and policymakers. The absence of a robust redistributive mechanism means that expropriation may ultimately reinforce rather than disrupt market logic.
This is not mere conjecture. In countries like Zimbabwe and Venezuela, land reform initiatives were sabotaged by a combination of domestic elite resistance and international financial retaliation. In South Africa, capital has already signaled its intention to resist large-scale redistribution, with organizations such as AgriSA warning of economic collapse should expropriation be pursued aggressively. This fearmongering is not new. It echoes the same panic-driven narratives that were used to justify land theft in the first place.
Beyond South Africa’s borders, the passage of the Expropriation Act has triggered predictable reactions from Western powers. U.S. President Donald Trump, following a well-worn script of white minority protectionism, issued an executive order cutting aid to South Africa, claiming the law targets white farmers. The European Union has expressed “concern,” a diplomatic prelude to potential economic pressures. Additionally, the U.S. administration has threatened to revoke South Africa’s benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a trade agreement that facilitates tariff-free exports to the U.S. market. Yet, even as these forces decry land reform under the guise of defending property rights, Trump’s administration has quietly extended refugee status to white Afrikaners, framing them as victims of persecution. This move—granting asylum to the descendants of colonial settlers while barring refugees from war-torn Middle Eastern and African nations—reveals the racialised logic underpinning Western foreign policy. These responses are not about human rights or democracy. They are about the continued assertion of Western interests in the Middle East and Africa’s resources, protecting economic and racial hierarchies that long predate the Expropriation Act.
International finance capital is already tightening its grip, with investment ratings agencies hinting at further downgrades should expropriation proceed in ways deemed unfavourable to the market. The South African state, historically timid in the face of international economic leverage, may find itself retreating into a defensive crouch, reducing expropriation to an instrument of negotiation rather than transformation.
The Expropriation Act has reopened historical wounds, but it is not, in itself, a radical break. Its success or failure will depend on political will, legal battles, and grassroots mobilisation. The Landless People’s Movement, shack dwellers’ organisations, and rural activists have long articulated a vision of land reform that centres the dispossessed rather than the property-owning class. Will the state listen? Or will it once again privilege legal technicalities over substantive justice?
For expropriation to mean something beyond legalese, it must be tied to a broader transformation of land relations in South Africa. This means:
+ Implementing a National Land Reform Framework Act, as proposed by the High-Level Panel and Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform, to set clear criteria for redistribution and beneficiary selection.
+ Recognising and securing tenure rights for the millions who live without formal documentation of their land occupancy.
+ Creating mechanisms for community-driven expropriation, where citizens can initiate claims rather than relying solely on the state’s discretion.
+ Dismantling the commercial agrarian monopolies that continue to hoard vast tracts of land.
Expropriation cannot be reduced to a bureaucratic procedure, a sterile legal exercise bound by the logic of the market. It must be a rupture—a deliberate act of redress, dismantling centuries of theft and exclusion. The state stands at a threshold: waver in hesitation, or grasp the weight of history and reimagine South Africa’s land ownership beyond the margins of negotiation. But history is restless. The dispossessed will not wait in endless queues of policy revisions and court battles. The land is calling—not for half-measures, not for another paper revolution, but for a reckoning that answers the injustice written into the soil.
TAIPEI, Taiwan – The powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un warned on Tuesday of a “stepped-up action” against the U.S. as one of its aircraft carriers arrived in South Korea, saying the “hostile” U.S. policy justified the bolstering of the North’s nuclear forces.
The USS Carl Vinson, a Nimitz-class U.S. aircraft carrier, arrived at the southeastern city of Busan on Sunday, South Korea’s navy said, reaffirming the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence against North Korean threats.
The North Korean leader’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, said the arrival of the U.S. aircraft was an expression of Washington’s “most hostile and confrontational will.”
“The action-accompanied hostile policy toward the DPRK pursued by the U.S. at present is offering sufficient justification for the DPRK to indefinitely bolster up its nuclear war deterrent,” said Kim, as cited by the North’s state-run Korean Central News Agency, KCNA.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK, is North Korea’s official name.
“The DPRK is also planning to carefully examine the option for increasing the actions threatening the security of the enemy at the strategic level,” said Kim, adding that her country would be “naturally compelled to renew its records in the exercise of strategic deterrence” if the U.S. continued with its record-breaking shows of force.
South Korea denounced Kim’s remarks, saying she was attempting to justify North Korean military provocations.
“North Korea’s criticism of the deployment of a U.S. strategic asset to implement the U.S. extended deterrence pledge and combined South Korea-U.S. exercise ahead of the Freedom Shield exercise is merely sophistry to justify its nuclear and missile development and build excuse for provocations,” the ministry said in a statement on Tuesday, referring to annual military drills between the South and the U.S.
The North’s nuclear development could “never be accepted,” and the only way for it to survive was to “let go of its obsessions” with nuclear weapons, the ministry said.
“Should the North conduct provocation, using Seoul and Washington’s just and defensive military activities as pretext, it will be met with overwhelming retaliation,” added the South Korean ministry.
The nuclear-powered vessel of Carrier Strike Group 1 entered the naval base in Busan in the first visit by a U.S. aircraft carrier to South Korea since President Donald Trump returned to the White House in January.
The USS Carl Vinson, a US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, arrives at a South Korean naval base during its port visit in the southeastern port city of Busan on March 2, 2025.(Yonhap/AFP)
It was also accompanied by the guided missile cruiser USS Princeton and Aegis-equipped destroyer USS Sterett, according to the South’s navy.
The visit is part of efforts to implement an “ironclad” U.S. extended deterrence pledge, which Washington recently reaffirmed, and display the robust South Korea-U.S. combined defense posture against persistent North Korean threats, the South Korean navy said.
The allies would bolster their interoperability and hold friendly activities during the visit, it added.
The Carl Vinson last visited South Korea in November 2023, just hours before North Korea successfully placed its first military spy satellite into orbit after two failed attempts.
IAEA assessment
Kim Yo Jong’s remarks came a day after the chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, said there were signs that North Korea was operating uranium enrichment plants in two locations.
“There are indications that the uranium enrichment plants at Kangson and Yongbyon continue to operate, and there are indications that the light water reactor (LWR) at Yongbyon continues to operate,” said IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi during the agency’s Board of Governors meeting in Vienna on Monday.
“Additions to the support infrastructure have been observed adjacent to the LWR,” said Grossi, adding that North Korea’s further development of its nuclear program was a “clear” breach of U.N. Security Council resolutions.
The IAEA has also observed that the 5-megawatt nuclear reactor at the Yongbyon complex resumed in mid-October last year, following a shutdown of about 60 days, according to Grossi.
“This shutdown is assessed to be of sufficient length to refuel the reactor and start its seventh operational cycle,” he said.
“Strong indicators of preparations for a new reprocessing campaign, including the operation of the steam plant serving the Radiochemical Laboratory, have been observed.”
The laboratory is known as a key reprocessing facility to yield plutonium. To build a nuclear bomb, about 6 kilograms of plutonium is known to be required.
“The undeclared enrichment facilities at both Kangson and Yongbyon, combined with General Secretary Kim’s call for ‘overfulfilling the plan for producing weapons-grade nuclear materials,’ are of serious concern,” he added.
“The agency continues to maintain its enhanced readiness to play its essential role in verifying the DPRK’s nuclear program.”
Edited by Mike Firn.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Taejun Kang for RFA.
TAIPEI, Taiwan – South Korea’s main spy agency said North Korea had deployed more troops to Russia, with media reports estimating the number at more than 1,000.
As many as 12,000 North Korean soldiers are in Russia to fight Ukrainian forces who occupied parts of the Kursk region in August, according to Ukraine and the United States, although neither Pyongyang nor Moscow has acknowledged their presence.
“North Korea appears to have deployed some additional troops to support the Russian military. The exact scale is still being assessed,” South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, or NIS, said on Thursday.
The NIS added that it believed North Korean troops were redeployed to the Kursk front in the first week of February.
The spy agency said in January that North Korean troops in Kursk had not shown any sign of participating in combat since January, citing the large number of casualties as a possible reason.
“After scaling back about a month, North Korean troops were redeployed to the Kursk front in the first week of February,” said the NIS, without elaborating.
The NIS’s confirmation came a few hours after South Korean media outlets reported, citing unidentified military sources, that the North sent more than 1,000 additional troops to Russia between January and February.
The sources said, however, it was unclear whether the additional forces were sent to Kursk.
Ukraine said earlier that about 4,000 North Korean troops in Russia had been killed or wounded, with its leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy estimating that an additional 20,000 to 25,000 North Korean soldiers could be sent to Russia.
Separately, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in January that the North was accelerating preparations to send more troops to Russia amid an increasing number of casualties.
A Washington-based think tank reported in January that North Korean troops supporting Russia could be wiped out within three months if their high casualty rates persisted.
The Institute for the Study of War estimated that North Koreans had suffered about 92 casualties a day since early December 2024, with up to half of their forces in Russia’s Kursk wounded or killed.
President of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Seth Jones, also said that casualty rates among North Korean troops have been significant, possibly reaching 50%.
A Ukrainian newspaper reported that a contingent of North Korean soldiers was trapped in Nikolske, in Ukraine’s Donetsk region, and were running out of supplies and unable to break free. Their mass surrender looked increasingly likely, Euromaidan Press reported.
Donetsk in the east of Ukraine has been one of the most heavily contested regions in the Russia-Ukraine war.
While North Korea’s initial deployments were primarily to Russia’s Kursk region, there has been evidence suggesting they are also in Donetsk. Ukrainian officials have reported casualties among North Korean soldiers in Donetsk.
Euromaidan Press citing Ukrainian military sources, reported on Wednesday that the North Koreans trapped in Nikolske were struggling with exhaustion and a lack of coordination with Russians. It did not say how many North Koreans were trapped.
Ukrainian forces had blocked escape attempts, further tightening their hold on the encirclement, the news outlet added. Drone footage showed weakened soldiers struggling to move, indicating a large-scale surrender of North Korean troops is increasingly likely, it reported.
To rescue the stranded North Korean troops, Russian forces launched a two-pronged assault but faced overwhelming resistance. Logistical challenges and language barriers hindered their effectiveness, said the report, adding that this indicates Russia’s diminishing reserves.
Edited by Mike Firn.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Taejun Kang for RFA.
TAIPEI, Taiwan – A North Korean soldier captured in Russia’s Kursk region has reportedly expressed his desire to defect to South Korea, which has said it would accept him.
Legally, South Korea recognizes all North Koreans as citizens under its constitution. This means that any North Korean, including a prisoner of war, or POW, is entitled to South Korean nationality upon arrival.
However, the process is not as straightforward as simply crossing the border.
What would be the process?
Since the North Korean prisoner is in Ukraine, his transfer to South Korea would require diplomatic negotiations between Ukraine and South Korea. If Ukraine agrees to facilitate his departure, he could be transferred either through a third country or directly to South Korea. The South Korean government may also work with international organizations to ensure a smooth and legally compliant transfer.
Once in South Korea, the man, like all other North Koreans coming to the South, would undergo a vetting process by South Korea’s main spy agency, the National Intelligence Service.
He would first be taken to a secure facility, where intelligence officials would assess his background, potential security threats, and any valuable information he might have. This process can take several weeks or even months. If he is deemed to have no ill intent, he would be transferred to Hanawon, a resettlement center for North Korean defectors, where he would undergo training to adapt to South Korean society.
After this period, he would be integrated into South Korean society with government support, including financial assistance and job training.
An undated photo on Jan. 11, 2025 from the Telegram account of V_Zelenskiy_official shows an alleged soldier presented as North Korean detained by Ukrainian authorities at an undisclosed location in Ukraine, following his capture by the Ukrainian army. Part of the photo has been blurred by RFA.(V_Zelenskiy_official/Telegram/AFP)
Have there been similar cases?
There have been instances of captured North Korean soldiers defecting to South Korea, though such cases have been rare in recent years.
Historically, North Koreans captured during the Korean War had the choice to stay in South Korea, return to the North, or relocate to a third country. Many chose to remain in South Korea, while some resettled in other places such as Taiwan and the United States.
Beyond POWs, several high-profile North Koreans have defected to South Korea, including senior military officers, diplomats, and even a member of Kim Jong Un’s family.
Notable figures include Hwang Jang Yop in 1997, the highest-ranking North Korean official to defect, who was the architect of the North’s Juche ideology of self-reliance, and Thae Yong Ho in 2016, a former North Korean diplomat in the U.K. who defected to South Korea, later becoming a National Assembly member.
Kim Kuk Song, a senior North Korean intelligence officer who defected to the South in 2021, provided valuable insights into Pyongyang’s covert operations.
What happens if he arrives in South Korea?
While the South Korean government provides defectors with various forms of support for settlement, including financial aid, housing and job training, many struggle to adapt due to cultural differences, social discrimination, and economic hardship.
According to media reports, defectors often face difficulties finding stable employment and integrating into South Korean society, as they usually lack the necessary skills and networks to compete in the job market.
People lining up at a job fair for North Korean defectors in Seoul on Dec. 1, 2023.(Anthony Wallace/AFP)
Additionally, mental health issues, including post-traumatic stress disorder, are common due to the harsh conditions they endured in North Korea and during their escape.
Discrimination against North Korean defectors remains a significant issue in South Korea as well. Many South Koreans view defectors with skepticism, sometimes perceiving them as outsiders or even possible spies.
This prejudice makes it difficult for defectors to form social connections, find good jobs or be fully accepted in mainstream South Korean life.
Some defectors report being openly stigmatized in workplaces, schools, and even within their communities. The South Korean government has made efforts to address this discrimination through awareness campaigns and policy initiatives, but challenges persist.
How could South Korea use the POW for propaganda?
The prisoner’s background as a soldier sent to Russia makes him a unique case, and his defection could provide South Korea with intelligence on North Korea’s military cooperation with Russia, making him a valuable propaganda tool.
Historically, South Korea has leveraged high-profile defectors for propaganda purposes. When Hwang Jang Yop defected, he was frequently used to criticize the North Korean regime.
Likewise, Thae Yong Ho has been a vocal critic of Kim Jong Un’s leadership and has appeared on South Korean media and in political settings.
A portrait of deceased North Korean defector Hwang Jang Yop is hung on balloons as former North Korean defectors and anti-North Korean activists prepare to release them towards the North, near the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas in Paju, north of Seoul, Oct. 10, 2011.(Jo Yong-hak/Reuters)
The North Korean prisoner could be used to highlight North Korea’s human rights abuses, poor conditions within its military and any questions over the loyalty of its soldiers.
His testimony could be used in media campaigns, diplomatic discussions, and international forums to highlight North Korea’s involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Psychological warfare tactics, such as loudspeaker broadcasts at the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas or targeted online messaging, could spread his story.
He could also be encouraged to join human rights organizations, raising awareness of Pyongyang’s policies.
North Korea and Russia have not officially acknowledged that North Korean soldiers have been sent to fight in Ukraine. If North Korea refuses to recognize this, it may simply dismiss the defector’s case as South Korean propaganda. Pyongyang could claim that Seoul is spreading false information to undermine it, a tactic it has used in the past when high-profile defectors have revealed sensitive information.
If North Korea chooses to respond, it could label the POW a criminal or traitor, claiming he was abducted or coerced into defecting by South Korea. This has been North Korea’s standard approach to high-profile defectors.
For example, North Korea accused Thae Yong Ho of embezzlement and child molestation – charges widely believed to be fabricated. Similarly, Shin Dong Hyuk, a well-known defector who exposed North Korea’s brutal prison camps, was accused of being a liar and traitor, in an attempt to discredit him.
If the defecting prisoner had sensitive military information, North Korea might take drastic measures, such as increasing border security to prevent future defections or punishing the defector’s relatives who remain in the North. In extreme cases, North Korea has even carried out assassination attempts against high-profile defectors abroad, as was the case with Kim Jong Nam, the half-brother of Kim Jong Un, killed by exposure to a nerve agent in Malaysia in 2017.
Edited by Mike Firn.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Taejun Kang for RFA.
A photograph emerged in Chinese-language social media posts with a claim that it shows two Chinese ships, the Changsha 173 and the Yuncheng 571, shadowing Canada’s HMCS Ottawa in the South China Sea.
But the claim is false. The size and appearance of the three ships in the photo do not align with credible descriptions or verified images of the named vessels. AI detection tools show that the photo had likely been generated by AI.
“The Canadian ship HMCS Ottawa entered the South China Sea, and the Chinese Navy’s Changsha 173 and the Yuncheng 571 vessels quickly shadowed it for a welcoming,” the claim reads.
The claim was shared alongside a photo that shows two large vessels shadowing a smaller vessel.
Some X users claim that the photo shows Chinese warships shadowing a Canadian vessel in the South China Sea.(X)
The South China Sea is a strategically vital and resource-rich body of water in the western Pacific Ocean, bordered by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.
Covering approximately 3.5 million square kilometers, it serves as a key maritime trade route, carrying about one-third of global shipping traffic. The sea is also rich in fisheries, oil, and natural gas reserves, making it a focal point of economic and geopolitical interest.
It is highly contested due to overlapping territorial claims. China claims most of it, as illustrated by a “nine-dash line” on its maps, which includes parts of the exclusive economic zones of neighboring countries.
The region is a flash point for confrontations between various militaries and coast guard forces, triggering diplomatic tensions, involving not only regional countries but also external powers such as the United States, which conducts freedom of navigation operations to challenge China’s claims.
The same photo with similar claims was shared on X here, here and here.
But the claim is false.
Discrepancies
The Ottawa is 134 meters (440 feet) long and 16 meters (52 feet) wide.
While measurements for the Chinese vessels are unavailable, the U.S. Naval Institute estimates that the Yuncheng is about the same size as the Ottawa.
Meanwhile, Taiwanese navy estimates put the Changsha at 156 meters (511 feet) long and 17.5 meters (57 feet) wide, making it roughly 15% longer than the other two ships.
However, the ships in the photo appear disproportionate, with the two supposed Chinese vessels looking several times larger than the alleged Canadian ship.
The ships in the photo do not match the official measurements of the named vessels.(X, CCTV Military, Baidu and the Ottawa’s Facebook page. Annotations by AFCL)The ships in the photo do not match the official measurements of the named vessels.((X, CCTV Military, Baidu and the Ottawa’s Facebook page. Annotations by AFCL)The ships in the photo do not match the official measurements of the named vessels.(X, CCTV Military, Baidu and the Ottawa’s Facebook page. Annotations by AFCL)
The AI image detection software Hive found a 72.5% chance that the image was AI-generated, while a test with the different tool Sightengine placed this estimate at 98%.
AI detection tools Hive (left) and Sightengine (right) both judged that the image was likely AI-generated.(Hive and Sightengine)
January incident
Canadian broadcaster CTV reported on Jan. 9 and Jan. 10 that both the Changsha and the Yuncheng were seen in silhouette shadowing the Ottawa during its passage through the South China Sea.
A CTV journalist was reporting from the Ottawa during the incident.
While the two Chinese ships kept in sight for more than two days, the reports do not mention them trying to approach the Ottawa at close range.
Translated by Shen Ke. Edited by Taejun Kang.
Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) was established to counter disinformation in today’s complex media environment. We publish fact-checks, media-watches and in-depth reports that aim to sharpen and deepen our readers’ understanding of current affairs and public issues. If you like our content, you can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram and X.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Dong Zhe for Asia Fact Check Lab.
Tensions between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea have been making more headlines in 2025 after escalating alarmingly last year.
Some other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, meanwhile, are trying to maintain good relations with their big neighbor to the north, whose economic and political influence is only growing in importance, while protecting their interests in the disputed waterway.
Reporters from RFA and BenarNews, an RFA-affiliated news organization, look at how three countries on the South China Sea are approaching relations with China.
INDONESIA: Growing openness toward China
In November 2024, Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto, stunned South China Sea watchers with a sentence in a joint statement issued in China on his first overseas trip since becoming president.
Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, right, with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Nov. 9, 2024.(China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
The seemingly innocuous line explained that Jakarta and Beijing had reached an “important common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims” in the South China Sea.
But analysts were quick to point out that by acknowledging overlapping maritime boundaries, Prabowo and his officials had effectively acknowledged the legitimacy of China’s claims, something Indonesia had never done before.
Indonesia had always insisted that China’s so-called nine-dash line, which it uses on its maps to claim historic rights over most of the South China Sea, has no legal basis, as seen in a note verbale to the United Nations in May 2020.
Indonesia realized the mistake and issued a correction two days later, saying mutual recognition of differences and disputes does not equal accepting the other side’s legitimacy and China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea still lacked legal basis.
Muhammad Waffaa Kharisma, a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, in Jakarta said that nevertheless, there has been “a shift toward a closer relationship that could reduce Jakarta’s assertiveness in the South China Sea under President Prabowo Subianto.”
China is Indonesia’s largest trading partner and one of its biggest sources of foreign direct investment, and expanding economic ties have been a major factor in Jakarta’s decision-making.
This year, Indonesia became the first Southeast Asia member of the BRICS bloc led by China.
Raden Mokhamad Luthfi, a defense analyst at Al Azhar University Indonesia said that there was growing openness toward China, not just in trade and investment but also in security cooperation.
Prabowo’s dominant role in foreign policy appears to have sidelined Indonesia’s ministry of foreign affairs, he said.
“I am concerned that under Prabowo’s leadership, Indonesian diplomats may have less space to provide input and guidance on how the country’s foreign policy should be shaped,” Luthfi said.
Waffaa noted a sense that “Indonesia is increasingly practicing self-censorship when dealing with China.”
“One possible explanation is China’s proactive diplomatic approach, which includes strong responses, or even retaliatory measures, against criticism,” he said. “This makes Indonesia more cautious, possibly fearing economic repercussions and as a result, it has become difficult to openly address concerns over sovereignty and international law.”
Indonesia is one of the founding members of ASEAN and long served as its de-facto leader, playing a crucial role in mediating regional crises. Analysts warned that its leadership in the group on the South China Sea issue would wane if it stopped championing international legal norms.
Indonesian navy personnel welcome British Royal Navy’s HMS Spey, in Jakarta on Jan. 15, 2025.(BAY ISMOYO/AFP)
Indonesia has repeatedly said that it is not a party to territorial disputes in the South China Sea. But its law enforcement agencies have had to deal with encroachment and illegal fishing, including by Chinese vessels in the waters off the Natuna islands.
A major question now is whether warming relations will keep encroachments at bay.
MALAYSIA: Aligning with China’s preferences?
Malaysia’s leaders have always seen China as an important neighbor and partner with which they have to navigate a complex relationship.
The two countries established a comprehensive partnership in 2013 and China is Malaysia’s top economic partner, with trade worth more than US$200 billion in 2022. In comparison, Malaysia-U.S. trade was US$73 billion in the same year.
Since coming to power in 2022, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has made it clear that fostering good ties with China is one of his priorities.
Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim speaks at a World Economic Forum meeting in Switzerland, Jan. 22, 2025.(Yves Herman/Reuters)
Regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Malaysia’s long-standing policy has been to protect its sovereignty via international law. Malaysia has never recognized China’s nine-dash line and even ordered the removal of a scene from an animated movie that showed it.
Yet some of the prime minister’s comments have stirred controversy.
In March 2024, in a speech at the Australian National University in Canberra, Anwar said that countries needed to put themselves in China’s shoes and trying to block its economic and technological advancement would only bring grievances.
In November, after meeting President Xi Jinping in Beijing, Anwar said that Malaysia was “ready to negotiate” on the South China Sea, suggesting bilateral negotiations over conflicting claims in the waters off the coast of Sabah and Sarawak in East Malaysia.
At the World Economic Forum in Switzerland in January, once again the Malaysian leader stated that China should not be singled out for the tensions in the South China Sea, striking a clear pro-Beijing tone.
“Malaysia’s desire to exclude other countries, such as Australia, Japan and the United States, from South China Sea disputes aligns with China’s preferences,” wrote Euan Graham, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
“It also helps China’s behind-the-scenes efforts to influence negotiations with ASEAN on a code of conduct for the South China Sea,” Graham added.
China and ASEAN have been discussing the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea for years but have yet to reach a final agreement.
In February, during a trip to Brunei, Anwar called for the code to be completed “as soon as possible” to address escalating tensions in the waterway. Malaysia is the ASEAN chair this year.
“I believe Malaysia prefers to settle the issue among the stakeholders through dialogue and engagement without any intervention from outside,” said Lee Pei May, assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the International Islamic University Malaysia.
“If there is intervention from outside powers, I believe the situation would be chaotic,” Lee said. “The U.S., U.K. and other powers, they are not directly related to the dispute so they are considered outside powers.”
The U.S. and its regional allies, for their part, argue that they are also Pacific nations, and have interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Malaysia’s offshore patrol vessel KD Terengganu takes part in the AMAN-25 exercise off the coast of Karachi, Pakistan, on Feb. 10, 2025.(Asif Hassan/AFP)
Some analysts said that the Anwar administration, despite being criticized for its seemingly pro-Beijing stance, had not compromised Malaysia’s claims in the South China Sea.
“To be sure, Malaysia has adopted a very different approach to the South China Sea dispute than either Vietnam or the Philippines,” said Ian Storey, a senior fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.
Anwar’s policy still “allows Malaysia to maintain close ties with China while asserting its territorial claims and protecting its sovereign rights,” he said.
Foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said that China opposed construction on “illegally occupied islands and reefs,” referring to the features that Vietnam began reclaiming in the 2020s.
It is not a secret that Vietnam wants to strengthen defenses against China’s dominance in the Spratly islands and the island building has received strong support from the Vietnamese public as the sign of a refusal to compromise on sovereignty.
“If you listen to leaders’ speeches on both sides, Vietnam-China relations appear to be warm and flourishing,” said Dinh Kim Phuc, a South China Sea researcher. “But Hanoi’s developments in the South China Sea show that they don’t really trust each other very much.”
A supply vessel sprays water near the Lan Tay gas platform, operated by Rosneft Vietnam, in the South China Sea off Vietnam on April 29, 2018.(Maxim Shemetov/Reuters)
With China’s first public protest against the island building, it seems that an “informal understanding” with Vietnam is over, noted Bill Hayton, an associate fellow at the British think tank Chatham House. This tacit compromise meant that for a few years Vietnam did not look for oil and gas inside China’s nine-dash line and China said nothing about Vietnam’s island building, Hayton said.
There may be several explanations for China’s objection but analysts believe Vietnam’s expanding ties with the United States is a major factor.
Looking at overseas trips by Vietnam’s leaders, including the new Communist Party chief To Lam, Vietnam also seems to “emphasize the values of ASEAN and the West” in its strategic thinking, according to Phuc.
Vietnam has been reported as wanting to elevate ties with fellow ASEAN members Indonesia and Singapore to comprehensive strategic partnerships, the highest level of bilateral relations, this year.
But that doesn’t mean that a decoupling from China would happen any time soon, analysts say, as Vietnam’s economy depends greatly on Chinese trade and investment.
On the same day that China criticized Vietnam’s “illegal occupation” in the South China Sea, Vietnam’s parliament approved a multi-billion-dollar railway running from the Chinese border to the South China Sea. Part of the funding is expected to come from China, despite some public unease about the potential debt.
Gestures by General Secretary To and other leaders that can be seen as “pro-West” or “anti-China” are deemed as “merely populist” byDang Dinh Manh, a Vietnamese dissident lawyer now living in the U.S.
“They need to appease the general domestic public, which is increasingly nationalistic,” Manh said, adding that in his opinion the Hanoi leadership needed to appease China, too, and how to strike a balance can be “a serious task”, especially when it comes to sovereignty in the South China Sea.
Edited by Mike Firn
Pizaro Gozali Idrus in Jakarta and Iman Muttaqin Yusof in Kuala Lumpur contributed to this article.
BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated news organization.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA and BenarNews Staff.
China on Wednesday voiced opposition to Vietnam’s recent developments in the Spratly archipelago in a rare public protest.
Foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said that the Nansha Qundao are China’s inherent territory, referring to the group of islands and reefs known internationally as the Spratlys.
Hanoi has been reclaiming several features within the Spratlys, and is building a 3000-meter (10,000-foot) airstrip on one of them, Barque Canada Reef.
Guo said that the Barque Canada Reef, or Bai Jiao in Chinese, “is a part of the Nansha Qundao and China always opposes relevant countries conducting construction activities on illegally-occupied islands and reefs.”
The reef is actually a rock under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, and Vietnam first took possession of it in 1987. It has undergone development at a fast pace since 2021 and the total landfill area more than doubled in one year to nearly 250 hectares (620 acres), as of October 2024.
The Washington-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, or AMTI, said that between November 2023 and June 2024, Hanoi created a record 280 hectares (690 acres) of new land across 10 of 27 features it occupies in the Spratly archipelago.
Beijing until now has stayed quiet as China was the first country in the region that built up artificial islands in the South China Sea and militarized them.
By 2021, when Vietnam began its island building program, China had already completed the construction of its “Big Three” artificial islands in the South China Sea – Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi reefs – and equipped them with runways and military facilities.
Hanoi’s overall dredging and landfill in the South China Sea is roughly half of China’s, according to AMTI.
Vietnam’s ‘Look West’ policy
The Vietnamese government has said little about its work at the features apart from it is intended to protect them and provide typhoon shelter to fishermen.
Vietnam has not responded to the Chinese spokesperson’s rebuke but a Vietnamese analyst said that China’s first known public and official protest may stem from Beijing’s disapproval of the Vietnamese leadership’s ‘look West’ policies.
Hanoi and Washington in 2023 established a comprehensive strategic partnership, on par with Beijing’s partnership with Hanoi.
The new general secretary of the ruling Vietnamese communist party, To Lam, has repeatedly expressed his willingness to develop a strong relationship and cooperation with the United States, said Hoang Viet, a South China Sea analyst.
Lam has recently also made an unprecedented visit to a war cemetery, where thousands of soldiers who lost their lives fighting invading Chinese troops between 1979-1989 were buried.
“The Chinese must not be pleased with such a visit by Vietnam’s party chief,” said Viet, adding that the protest over Vietnam’s island building revealed that the China-Vietnam relationship, “although it appears close and strong on the outside, has deep cracks inside.”
Another Vietnamese analyst told RFA that in his opinion, “Vietnam is aware of the risks brought by its activities in the South China Sea in relation to China.”
“I hope that the leaders in Hanoi will be wise enough not to be caught up in the middle of the U.S.-China strategic competition,” said Dinh Kim Phuc.
“But they should be firm and decisive when it comes to Vietnam’s sovereignty in the South China Sea,” he added.
Edited by Mike Firn.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Staff.
CPJ joined 102 other non-governmental organizations in a joint letter urging the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to maintain its calls for accountability in South Sudan amid the country’s ongoing and widespread human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, “egregious violations of women’s and girls’ rights” and the persistence of “localized conflict and intercommunal violence.”
The letter noted that the National Security Service (NSS) intelligence agency has been responsible for attacks on human rights defenders and journalists, including editor Emmanuel Monychol Akop, who has been in NSS custody since November 2024. South Sudanese authorities have failed to fully implement a 2018 peace agreement, signed following years of civil war, and postponed general elections, the first since South Sudan’s 2011 independence.
During its upcoming February 24- April 4 session, the UNHRC should adopt a strong resolution addressing human rights in South Sudan and UN’s Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan’s mandate, the letter urges. The Commission’s mandate, tasked to “collect and preserve evidence of, and clarify responsibility for alleged gross violations and abuses of human rights and related crimes,” in South Sudan, expires in April.
North Korean state television began airing matches from two major European football leagues last month, but notably absent are games involving South Korean players, a study by a Washington-based think tank revealed.
Broadcasts of the English Premier League and the UEFA Champions League — the yearly tournament for Europe’s best teams — is delayed by several months, but is still quite popular with North Korean viewers, said the report by the Stimson Center’s 38 North project.
State TV is rife with propaganda, but sports is “one of the few moments each day when state TV is not trying to send an overt or underlying message to its viewers,” 38 North said.
“There wasn’t really any intention to the research except that we thought it was interesting,” Martyn Williams, who co-authored the report, told RFA Korean. “We just saw a lot of football on KCTV. It’s the main international sport they broadcast.”
Football and circuses to distract the masses
Sports became more important during the pandemic, during which Korean Central Television, or KCTV, had to double its output as people were spending more time at home, the report said.
That meant that an extra hour was slotted for sports, especially soccer, and the trend has continued.
The football matches are shown an average of four months after they were played — the English Premier League, or EPL, season began in August, and the Champions League began in September.
Tottenham Hotspur’s South Korean striker Son Heung-Min, center, and Aston Villa’s French midfielder Boubacar Kamara, right, fight for the ball during the English FA Cup fourth round football match between Aston Villa and Tottenham Hotspur in Birmingham, England, Feb. 9, 2025.(Justin Tallis/AFP)
The apparent ban on airing matches with South Korean players means that North Korean fans won’t see matches featuring South Korean national team captain Son Heung-min, who also captains the Premier League club Tottenham Hotspur.
The report revealed that coverage of last year’s EPL left out Hwang Hee-chan and the Wolverhampton Wanderers, and Kim Ji-soo, who plays for Brentford.
In the Champions League, it remains to be seen if the French side Paris Saint-Germain and Lee Kang-in will be broadcast because of the delay, but KCTV coverage of last year’s Champions League featured the team only in its losing effort against Germany’s Borussia Dortmund in the semifinal.
Premier League preference
The report said that in 2022, matches from the EPL, Germany’s Bundesliga, Spain’s La Liga, France’s Ligue 1, and Italy’s Serie A were aired, but the following year, KCTV settled on the Premier League, the FIFA World Cup, and the UEFA Champions League.
Matches are shortened from 90 minutes to 60 minutes and are aired right before the 5 p.m. news bulletin, it said.
The report noted that only 21 of the Premier League’s 380 matches last season were aired, and six teams were not shown at all.
“It is perhaps not a coincidence that three of those teams—Brentford, Spurs and Wolves—were not broadcast, as they have South Korean players in their teams,” it said.
World Cup whiteout
38 North said political messages still do make their way into football coverage, however.
For example, in KCTV’s matches of the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar, South Korea was not shown until it was eliminated in a 4-1 drubbing to Brazil.
A North Korean broadcast of the women’s football match between South Korea and North Korea at the 2022 Asian Games, which were held in 2023 due to COVID, shows graphics that label the South Korean team as “puppets.”(Korean Central Television via 38 North)
In a quarterfinal match between North and South Korea’s women’s sides at the 2022 Asian Games in Hangzhou, China, which were postponed to 2023 because of COVID, KCTV graphics labeled the South Korean team as “puppets,” a derogatory term that implies that South Korea is a puppet state controlled by the United States.
In North Korea, there exist certain taboos about openly supporting athletes from the South, according to Lee Hyunseung of the U.S.-based Global Peace Foundation, who escaped from North Korea in 2014.
Lee said that when he was young he watched Italian and Spanish soccer matches on KCTV.
“At the time, I had no idea about Korean players like Park Ji-sung , Ahn Jung-hwan , and Seol Ki-hyeon who were playing in European leagues,” he told RFA Korean, referring to players who became household names in the South as part of the national team that unexpectedly advanced to the semifinals in the 2002 FIFA World Cup.
“It was only after I went to study abroad in China that I was able to watch their matches,” he said.
He said that North Koreans tend to cheer for South Korean players on European teams despite the taboos.
“That is why the North Korean regime is very concerned about this,” said Lee. “They must never show that South Korea is better than North Korea . They are afraid of that because it weakens the North Korean regime.”
Translated by Eugene Whong. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By Jamin Anderson for RFA Korean.
Watch Part 2 of our interview with reporter Chris McGreal, who was Johannesburg correspondent for The Guardian during the last years of apartheid through 2002. His new pieces for The Guardian are headlined “What does Elon Musk believe?” and “How the roots of the ‘PayPal mafia’ extend to apartheid South Africa.” Elon Musk was born in 1971 in Johannesburg, and McGreal discusses Musk’s grandfather, Joshua Haldeman, who immigrated to South Africa in 1950 when apartheid became “in many ways reminiscent of the Nazi Nuremberg laws against Jews in the 1930s. They have very similar echoes in stripping Black people of the right to work in certain places, their movements, controlling them, confining them to areas.” McGreal also responds to a new report from Semafor that the South African government is examining how Musk’s companies can invest in the country without complying with the nation’s Black empowerment rules.
This content originally appeared on Democracy Now! Audio and was authored by Democracy Now!.
President Trump’s targeting of South Africa is clearly tied to his influential adviser Elon Musk and a coterie of wealthy U.S. oligarchs, “all of whom in some way or other grew up in South Africa as children.” These men are known as the “PayPal Mafia” due to their involvement in the founding of the financial tech company PayPal, explains reporter Chris McGreal. McGreal, a former South Africa correspondent for The Guardian, outlines Musk’s pro-apartheid and neo-Nazi family history, which appears to form the basis of his adherence to a right-wing ideology that believes white South Africans “are the victims of the end of apartheid” and at risk of a “white genocide.”
This content originally appeared on Democracy Now! and was authored by Democracy Now!.
Vietnam’s island reclamation activities in the South China Sea made headlines in 2024 with a record area of land created and several airstrips planned on the new islands.
The Washington-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, or AMTI, said that between November 2023 and June 2024, Hanoi created 280 hectares (692 acres) of new land across 10 of 27 features it occupies in the Spratly archipelago.
“Three years from when it first began, Vietnam is still surprising observers with the ever-increasing scope of its dredging and landfill in the Spratly Islands,” the think tank said.
Hanoi’s island building program stemmed from a Communist Party resolution in 2007 on maritime strategy toward the year 2020, according to Carlyle Thayer, a Vietnam expert at the University of New South Wales in Australia.
The resolution set out an integrated strategy to develop coastal areas, an exclusive economic zone, and 27 land features in the South China Sea with the objective that this area would contribute between 53% and 55% of the gross domestic product by 2020, Thayer said.
China has built an airfield, buildings and other structures on the Spratly Islands’ Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea, Oct. 25, 2022.(Ezra Acayan/Getty Images)
It was only in 2021 that Vietnam began a modest program of landfill and infrastructure construction on its features in the Spratly Islands, Thayer said.
By that time, China had completed the construction of its “Big Three” artificial islands in the South China Sea – Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi reefs – and equipped them with runways and military facilities.
The island-building program focuses mainly on the so-called integrated marine economy, the analyst told Radio Free Asia, noting that there are only modest defenses such as pillboxes, trenches and gun emplacements on the newly developed features.
Risk of tension
Vietnam has long been wary of causing tension with China but its increasing assertiveness had led to a re-think in Hanoi.
“Vietnam has not placed major weapon systems on its land features that would threaten China’s artificial islands,” Thayer said.
“But no doubt the rise in Chinese aggressiveness against the Philippines after the election of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. reinforced Vietnam’s determination not to leave its island features in the Spratlys exposed.”
“Vietnamese occupation also serves to deny China the opportunity to occupy these features as China did when it took control of unoccupied Mischief Reef belonging to the Philippines in 1984,” he added.
(AFP)
Carl Schuster, a retired U.S. navy captain based in Hawaii, said that on the surface, Vietnam and China appeared to have strong, positive relations but “at its roots, the relationship is one of distrust and for Vietnam, pragmatism.”
“Vietnam has noticed that the PRC is most aggressive around undefended or uninhabited islands and islets,” Schuster said, referring to China by its official name the People’s Republic of China.
“Hanoi therefore sees expanding, hardening and expanding the garrisons on its own islands as a means of deterring PRC aggression.”
Yet Vietnam’s island building activities have been met with criticism from some neighboring countries.
Malaysia sent a rare letter of complaint to Vietnam in October 2024 over its development of an airstrip on Barque Canada reef – a feature that Malaysia also claims in the South China Sea.
Vietnam has built an airstrip on Barque Canada Reef in South China Sea, seen Feb. 2, 2025.(Planet Labs)
In July 2023, the pro-China Manila Times published two reports on what it called “Vietnam’s militarization of the South China Sea,” citing leaked masterplans on island development from the Vietnamese defense ministry.
Shortly after the publication, a group of Filipinos staged a protest in front of the Vietnamese embassy in Manila, vandalizing the Vietnamese flag. The incident did not escalate but soured the usually friendly relationship between the two neighbors.
Reasonable response
The Southeast Asian bloc ASEAN has long been negotiating with China on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea and the consensus is to observe the status quo in the disputed waterway and maintain peace.
Azmi Hassan, a senior fellow at Malaysia’s Nusantara Academy for Strategic Research, explained that status quo means “there shouldn’t be any new reclamation, especially in the Spratly or Paracel Islands as new reclamation could create some instability.”
“But in the case of Vietnam, it’s very difficult to stop them because the Chinese have been doing it for many years and China has the longest airstrip and the biggest reclamation on Mischief Reef,” Hassan said.
Philippine Coast Guard personnel maneuver their rigid hull inflatable boat next to a Vietnamese coast guard ship during a joint exercise off Bataan in the South China Sea on Aug. 9, 2024.(Ted Aljibe/AFP)
Malaysia also built an airstrip on Pulau Layang-Layang, known internationally as Swallow Reef, which is claimed by several countries including Vietnam.
“So it’s very hard to criticize Vietnam because Malaysia has done it, China has done it, and the Philippines has been doing it for quite some time,” the analyst said.
Greg Poling, AMTI’s director, told RFA that in his opinion, Hanoi’s goal with the development of features in the South China Sea “appears to be to allow it to better patrol its exclusive economic zone by sea and air in the face of China’s persistent presence.”
“That seems a reasonable and proportionate response,” he said.
The U.S. government has taken no public position on the issue but the Obama administration did push for a construction freeze by all parties, Poling said.
Then-U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter visited Hanoi in June 2015 and discussed the issue during a meeting with his Vietnamese counterpart, Phung Quang Thanh and, according to the transcript of a press briefing.
Carter was told that “the government of Vietnam is considering … a permanent halt to reclamation and further militarization” of the new islands.
“But that was when the prime goal was to stop China’s island building,” Poling said. “Obviously that didn’t work so now I think the U.S. and other parties understand that Vietnam is not likely to agree to unilaterally restrain itself when China has already done it.”
In 2015, Vietnam still insisted that it was only carrying out activities “to enhance and to consolidate the islands that are under our sovereignty.”
In the late Gen. Phung Quang Thanh’s words: “We do not expand those islands, we just consolidate to prevent the soil erosion because of the waves, to improve the livelihood of our people and of our personnel who are working and living there.”
“And for the submerged features, we have built small houses and buildings, which can accommodate only three people, and we do not expand those features. And the scope and the characteristics of those features are just civilian in nature,” Thanh told Carter.
Bad investment?
Fast forward 10 years, and Vietnam has reclaimed a total area of about half of what China has built up and among the 10 largest features in the Spratlys, five are being developed by Hanoi with an unknown, but no doubt massive budget.
The island building program, however, has been received positively by the Vietnamese public.
Pearson Reef on March 23, 2022 and Feb. 5, 2025.(RFA/Planet Labs)
Photos and video clips from the now popular Bai Thuyen Chai, Dao Tien Nu and Phan Vinh – or Barque Canada, Tennent and Pearson reefs respectively – have been shared and admired by millions of social media users as proof of Vietnamese military might and economic success even if the construction comes at a big environmental cost.
South China Sea researcher Dinh Kim Phuc told RFA Vietnamese that despite the environmental damage, Vietnam’s actions “must happen” and are necessary for “strategic defense” as long as China does not quit its expansionist ambitions.
However, some experts have warned against the effectiveness of such artificial islands from a military standpoint.
“Like Chinese-built islands, Vietnamese built islands are, by nature, small areas of land that are difficult to defend against modern land-attack missile capabilities, and given their low altitude, they are at the mercy of salt water corrosion of structures and systems ashore,” said Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst in defense strategy and capability at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
“So as with Chinese experience, the Vietnamese will also struggle to base military capabilities on these islands for extended periods of time,” Davis told RFA.
“In the longer term, they are also going to be vulnerable to the effects of climate change – most notably, sea level rise, which could quickly swamp a low-level landmass and see it become unusable.”
“These challenges are why I don’t worry too much about those Chinese-built bases in the South China Sea, as I think Beijing has made a bad investment there,” the analyst added.
AMTI’s Poling said rising sea levels and storm surge would threaten all the islands “but it is something that both China and Vietnam are likely able to cope with by continually refilling the islands and building up higher sea walls.”
MANILA — American and Philippine warplanes flew together in a coordinated patrol and drill above the South China Sea, in the allies’ first joint maneuvers over contested waters since U.S. President Donald Trump returned to office, Filipino officials said.
The exercise, where Philippine FA-50 fighter jets flew alongside U.S. B-1 bombers in skies above the waterway, including the hotly disputed Scarborough Shoal, drew a rebuke from China. Beijing said it threatened regional peace and stability.
It was the first time B-1 bombers were used for joint maneuvers in the South China Sea, the Philippine military said. The one-day exercise, staged on Tuesday, reflected the strong relations between the two longtime treaty allies, officials said.
Some security experts had said earlier that President Trump might pay less attention to Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines, which has been working to shore up international support against China in the South China Sea.
“It’s the first exercise under the current administration of the U.S. government,” Rear Adm. Roy Vincent Trinidad, the Philippine Navy spokesman for the West Philippine Sea, told a press briefing Tuesday.
The exercise involved two B-1 bombers attached to the U.S. Pacific Air Forces and three FA-50s from the Philippine Air Force, Col. Maria Consuelo Castillo, the PAF spokeswoman, told the same press briefing.
The B-1 is a more advanced version of the B-52 bomber, which the U.S. Air Force had deployed in previous training missions over the South China Sea, military officials said.
“This exercise is a crucial step in enhancing our interoperability, improving air domain awareness and agile combat employment and supporting our shared bilateral air objectives,” Castillo said.
Filipino officials said the exercise was not a direct response to recent Chinese military and coast guard activities in the South China Sea, where tensions have been high lately between Manila and Beijing.
Scarborough Shoal, which is claimed by both countries, lies within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone but has been under de facto Chinese control since 2012.
China: ‘On high alert’
In response, Beijing said the joint exercise was a threat to peace and stability in the waterway.
“[T]he Philippines has been colluding with countries outside the region to organize the so-called ‘joint patrols’ to deliberately undermine peace and stability in the South China Sea,” a spokesperson for China’s military said on Tuesday.
Beijing said it had also conducted a routine patrol in the airspace above Scarborough Shoal on Tuesday.
China’s air force units would remain “on high alert to resolutely defend China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests,” the spokesperson said.
Castillo said the PAF were prepared for radio challenges from China during the staging of the joint exercise, even though it proceeded “regardless of the action of other foreign actors.” As of press time, there were no reports of any such challenges.
However, there were no scenarios where the airplanes simulated dogfights, Castillo said.
“[There’s] no bombing exercise,” she said.
Under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the Philippines and the United States are compelled to come to each other’s aid in times of external attacks. Under Trump’s predecessor, Joe Biden, Washington said that the scenario included armed attacks in the South China Sea.
China lays claim to almost the entire South China Sea, but its claims overlap with those of the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan. Over the past few months, Manila and Beijing have faced off in a series of confrontations at sea.
A map showing islands and reefs held by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Taiwan in the South China Sea.(AFP)
In related news, the Philippine military accused three Chinese Navy vessels of violating rules on innocent passage during their transit in Philippine waters.
The Chinese ships – a frigate, cruiser and replenishment oiler – were first monitored in the West Philippine Sea on Monday. The West Philippine Sea is Manila’s name for South China Sea waters that lie within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.
The ships traveled southward and moved at a speed of six knots (11.1 kph), passing through Basilan Channel, towards Indonesia.
They were tracked by the Philippine Navy and Air Force aircraft, the military said, adding that radio challenges were also issued against the Chinese ships.
As of Tuesday morning, Trinidad said the Chinese vessels were about 120 nautical miles south of Basilan. “They are moving out of our exclusive economic zone,” he said.
During the radio challenges, the Chinese vessels said they were exercising freedom of navigation and innocent passage, according to Trinidad.
A spokesperson for China’s military also said on Monday that the passage complied with “international law and practice.”
“The violation was that the travel through our archipelagic waters was not expeditious,” Trinidad said. “They could have traveled at a faster speed. There were instances in the central part of Sulu Sea that they slowed down to five to six knots.”
Trinidad said the Chinese vessels were likely on the way to Indonesia to take part in an upcoming military exercise, dubbed Komodo, which would involve at least 37 countries.
Apart from Indonesia and China, some of the countries involved in the Komodo exercise this month are the Philippines, the United States, Japan, Australia, France, India, the United Kingdom, and South Korea.
BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated online news organization.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Jason Gutierrez for BenarNews.
TAIPEI, Taiwan – China was “ramping up” its efforts to suppress Taiwan in South Africa, the democratic island said, after the South African government again demanded Taiwan’s liaison office in the capital Pretoria be relocated.
The Taipei Liaison Office, established after South Africa severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in January 1998, has functioned as a de facto embassy but without official diplomatic status.
“The South African government sent another letter to the Taipei Liaison Office in the Republic of South Africa demanding that it leave the capital city of Pretoria before the end of March,” said Taiwan’s foreign ministry in a statement.
“China is ramping up efforts to suppress Taiwan in South Africa,” the ministry added, citing the case of Ivan Meyer, chairman of South Africa’s second-largest political party, the Democratic Alliance, who was sanctioned by China for visiting Taiwan.
“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterates that the Taiwan government remains steadfast in its refusal to accept the South African government’s unilateral violation of their bilateral agreement and that it will continue communicating with South Africa on the principles of parity and dignity.” the ministry added in its statement on Sunday.
Neither South Africa nor China had responded to Taiwan’s statement at time of publication.
South Africa-China ties
South Africa adheres to the One China policy, recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China, including Taiwan as part of its territory.
Diplomatic ties between South Africa and China have strengthened significantly since the establishment of formal relations in 1998, with China becoming South Africa’s largest trading partner.
As a member of the BRICS, an intergovernmental organization consisting of 10 countries, including South Africa, it collaborates with China on economic, political, and developmental initiatives, aligning with Beijing on global governance reforms.
In October 2024, South Africa said that it had asked Taiwan to move the office out of Pretoria. Taiwan said the request was made under pressure from China.
“Relocating what will be rebranded as Trade Offices both in Taipei and in Johannesburg … will be a true reflection of the non-political and non-diplomatic nature of the relationship between the Republic of South Africa and Taiwan,” South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation said at the time.
The relocation would align with the “standard diplomatic practice” as South Africa officially cut political and diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1997, the department added.
China welcomed South Africa’s request that Taiwan relocate its office, saying it “appreciated South Africa’s correct decision.”
Taiwan, which China asserts has no right to independent diplomatic relations, maintains formal ties with only a dozen countries, mostly smaller and less developed nations.
Taiwan’s government firmly rejects Beijing’s sovereignty claims, insisting that China has no authority to represent or speak on its behalf in international affairs.
Edited by Taejun Kang.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Alan Lu for RFA.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversaw the successful test of a cruise missile system, North Korea’s state media reported, as it accused the United States and South Korea of provocations and vowed the “toughest counteraction” to defend itself.
The underwater-to-surface strategic cruise guided weapons traveled for 1,500 kilometers between 7,507 and 7,511 seconds in the Saturday test before “precisely” hitting targets, the North’s KCNA news agency reported.
“The test was conducted as a link in the whole chain of efforts for carrying out the plan for building up the defence capability of the country, aimed at improving the effectiveness of the strategic deterrence against the potential enemies in conformity with the changing regional security environment,” KCNA reported.
Kim was cited as noting that the North armed forces were perfecting ”the means of war deterrence.”
On Sunday, North Korea accused the United States and South Korea of “staging serious military provocations” with their military exercises.
“The U.S. and the ROK will never evade the responsibility for the aggravation of regional situation to be entailed by an increase in the visibility of military provocations”, a senior foreign ministry official said in a statement, referring to South Korea by the initials of its official name, the Republic of Korea.
“The DPRK Foreign Ministry is closely watching the military provocations of the U.S. and the ROK escalating the tension on the Korean peninsula and seriously warns them that such moves will entail a reflective counteraction,” the official said, referring to North Korea by the initials of its official name, the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea.
“The DPRK will not permit the imbalance of strength imposed by the military nexus between the U.S. and the ROK and take the toughest counteraction to defend the sovereign right, security and interests of the state and thoroughly ensure peace and stability in the region.”
The inauguration of President Donald Trump has led to speculation about an improvement in ties between the old foes.
During his first term, Trump embarked on unprecedented but ultimately unsuccessful engagement with North Korea to try to get it to abandon its nuclear weapons in exchange for sanctions relief and he has suggested he would be open to a new effort.
Last week, North Korea reiterated that it had no intention of giving up its nuclear program, blaming the United States for creating tensions.
North Korea has drawn closer to Russia since Trump’s first term and has sent large volumes of arms and ammunition, as well as some 12,000 soldiers, to help Russia in its war against Ukraine. Neither Russia nor North Korea has acknowledged the North Korean support.
Edited by RFA Staff.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Staff.
MANILA – Philippine authorities suspended a scientific survey in the disputed South China Sea after its fisheries vessels faced “harassment” from China’s coast guard and navy.
Vessels from the Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) were going to Sandy Cay for a marine scientific survey and sand sampling on Friday, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) said in a statement on Saturday.
“During the mission, the BFAR vessels encountered aggressive maneuvers from three Chinese Coast Guard vessels 4106, 5103 and 4202,” PCG said, calling the incident a “blatant disregard” of the 1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs).
Sandy Cay is a group of cays – or low reefs – two nautical miles (3.7 km) from Philippines-occupied Thitu island, known as Pag-asa island in the Philippines.
Four smaller boats deployed by the China Coast Guard (CCG) also harassed the Philippine bureau’s two inflatable boats, the Philippine Coast Guard said.
“Compounding the situation, a People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) helicopter, identified by tail number 24, hovered at an unsafe altitude above the BFAR RHIBs, creating hazardous conditions due to the propeller wash,” the Philippine Coast Guard said.
In a statement, the China Coast Guard said it expelled the Philippine vessels for unlawfully intruding into its waters.
China has “indisputable sovereignty” over the disputed waters and that it will continue to protect its maritime rights and interests, China Coast Guard spokesperson Liu Dejun said on Saturday.
Philippine authorities suspended the operation following the incident, the Philippine Coast Guard said.
The Philippine foreign affairs department is expected to file another diplomatic protest against China over the encounter, Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Eduardo De Vega said.
Edited by BenarNews Staff.
BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated news organization.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by BenarNews staff.
A Cambodian migrant worker in South Korea said on Friday that his passport was recently revoked after he used Facebook to criticize the Cambodian government.
Buth Vichai told Radio Free Asia that he learned of the passport cancellation from a Phnom Penh government official. His current passport will expire in July, he said.
“I am happy to be an illegal immigrant in another country, and I will not bow my head to respect or apologize to this scoundrel regime,” he said.
It was unclear which of Buth Vichai’s online comments led to the cancellation. RFA couldn’t immediately reach Foreign Ministry spokesman Chum Sounry, government spokesman Pen Bona and deputy Interior Ministry spokesman Touch Sokha for comment on Friday.
Buth Vichai said the move was an attempt to intimidate him and other Cambodian activists who live outside the country.
In August, overseas Cambodians living in South Korea, Japan, France, Canada and Australia held protests against Cambodia’s economic cooperation agreement with Vietnam and Laos. The demonstrations angered Senate President Hun Sen and led to a widespread crackdown.
Article 33 of the Cambodian Constitution states that Cambodian citizens cannot be deprived of their citizenship or deported to any foreign country except by mutual agreement.
Cambodian workers participate in an online interview in a shipping container that is used as their home in Pocheon, South Korea on Feb. 8, 2021.(Ahn Young-joon/AP)
Governments in countries that follow the rule of law can be expected to respect and protect the rights of individuals, said Soeng Senkaruna of the Cambodian Democracy Organization in Australia.
“Indeed, governments in liberal countries are very careful in all their actions regarding any issue,” he said. “If it is just criticism of the government. I understand that liberal countries, especially South Korea, do not arrest them just for passport issues.”
Last year, Cambodian officials canceled the passport of Nuon Toeun, a Cambodian domestic worker in Malaysia who posted critical comments about Hun Sen on Facebook. She was soon deported to Cambodia and charged with incitement.
Draft law on Khmer Rouge comments
Meanwhile, Cambodia’s Cabinet has approved a draft law that would allow for the prosecution of individuals who minimize or deny the existence of crimes committed during the period when the Khmer Rouge ruled Cambodia.
The crime would carry a punishment of between one and five years in prison and would allow for fines from 10 million riel (US$2,480) to 50 million riel (US$12,420).
The Khmer Rouge regime was responsible for the deaths of more than 1 million people from starvation, overwork or mass executions between 1975 and 1979.
“The law aims to record the history so that people will remember the painful history that happened in Cambodia,” the Council of Ministers said in a statement on Friday.
People leave Phnom Penh after Khmer Rouge forces seized the Cambodian capital April 17, 1975.(Agence Khmere de Presse/AFP)
The draft law now goes to the National Assembly for review and approval.
It was unclear what prompted the measure, which was initiated by Hun Sen in May 2024.
Some of the comments read: “Vietnam sacrificed its blood for peace in Cambodia,” and “Don’t forget tens of thousands of Vietnamese volunteers who were killed in Cambodia.”
Hun Sen was a Khmer Rouge commander who fled to Vietnam in 1977 amid internal purges. He later rose to power in a government installed by Vietnam after its forces invaded in late 1978 and quickly ousted the Khmer Rouge regime.
Vietnamese forces remained in Cambodia for the next decade battling Khmer Rouge guerrillas based in sanctuaries on the Thai border.
Hun Sen said in May that he suspected the reason for the critical comments was probably the Funan Techo canal project, which was proposed and approved when he was prime minister.
The project has raised concerns in Vietnam as its Mekong River delta, home to 17.4 million people, is downstream and could be severely affected.
Translated by Yun Samean. Edited by Matt Reed.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by RFA Khmer.
Nairobi, January 24, 2025– The Committee to Protect Journalists calls on South Sudanese authorities to reverse its social media ban and to ensure that the public has open and reliable internet access, which is essential for news gathering amid unrest in the country.
“Blocking social media access is a blanket act of censorship and a disproportionate response to unrest that makes it difficult for journalists to do their jobs and robs the public of the diverse sources of news,” said CPJ Africa program coordinator, Muthoki Mumo. “South Sudanese authorities should immediately lift this social media suspension.”
On January 22, South Sudan’s telecommunications regulator, the National Communication Authority, directed all internet service providers to “block access to all social media accounts” for a “minimum of 30 days” and a “maximum of 90 days,” according to a copy of the authority’s letter reviewed by CPJ as well as multiplemediareports.
The Authority said it issued its suspension orders to stop the social media spread of footage showing the killings of South Sudanese nationals in neighbouring Sudan, which triggered violent protests in South Sudan, including “revenge” killings of Sudanese nationals. Authorities in Juba on January 17 imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew in response to the unrest.
On the evening of January 22, at least two telecom providers – Zain South Sudan and MTN South Sudan – published notices on Facebook warning users that TikTok and Facebook would no longer be accessible. In the afternoon of January 23, CPJ spoke to two South Sudanese journalists and two South Sudanese human rights defenders who said that Facebook and TikTok were inaccessible without the use of a virtual private network (VPN), a encryption tool that can bypass censorship.
“We journalists are using VPNs to work. What we don’t know is whether our audience is receiving [our news],” said Mariak Bol, editor-in-chief of Hot in Juba, a news site that alsopublishes content on Facebook.
In a press briefing on January 23, the Authority’s director general Napoleon Adok Gai said that there was a possibility that the social media ban would be lifted within 72 hours, according to media reports.
Reached via telephone, South Sudan’s information minister Michael Makuei declined to comment. Calls to the National Communication Authority were not immediately answered.
MANILA — Visiting Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya said his government hoped to impress upon incoming U.S. leader Donald Trump how important the South China Sea issue is to peace in Asia.
Iwaya visited Manila on Wednesday as part of a high-profile diplomatic push by Tokyo in Southeast Asian countries that border the strategic waterway. Last week, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba traveled to Malaysia and Indonesia to promote deeper defense and economic ties.
In Manila, Foreign Minister Iwaya met with his Filipino counterpart, Enrique Manalo.
Overlapping claims in the South China Sea “is a legitimate concern for the international community because it directly links to regional peace and stability,” Iwaya told a press briefing afterward.
“Southeast Asia is located at a strategic pivot in the Indo-Pacific and is a world growth center, thus partnership with Southeast Asia is vital for regional peace and stability,” Iwaya said through an interpreter.
“We will approach the next U.S. administration to convey that constructive commitment of the United States in this region is important, also for the United States itself.”
The South China Sea, which is potentially mineral-rich and a crucial corridor for international shipping, has become one of the most perilous geopolitical hot spots in recent years. China claims almost the entire waterway while the Philippines, as well as Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Taiwan have overlapping claims to parts of it.
Over the past few months, Manila and Beijing have faced off in high-stakes confrontations in the disputed waters.
Iwaya said he was expected to attend Trump’s inauguration in Washington on Jan. 20, during which he would seek to build momentum on a trilateral arrangement that the Philippines and Japan forged with the outgoing Biden administration.
Iwaya said Tokyo “strongly opposes any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo by force” in the South China Sea, where an increasingly bold China has been intruding into the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.
China has maintained its claim in the sea region, saying that the activities of its coast guard vessels there were lawful and “fully justified.”
Manalo, the Philippines’ top diplomat, said Chinese and Philippine officials were set to discuss their dispute in their latest bilateral meeting in the Chinese city of Xiamen on Thursday.
Both sides are likely to discuss recent developments in the waterway, including the presence of China’s biggest coast guard ship – and the world’s largest – at the contested Scarborough Shoal.
During the news briefing on Wednesday, Manalo said that Manila and Tokyo had made “significant strides” in defense and security cooperation.
Japan does not have territorial claims that overlap with China’s expansive ones in the South China Sea, but Tokyo faces a separate territorial challenge from Beijing in the East China Sea.
“As neighbors, we face similar challenges in our common pursuit of regional peace and stability. Thus, we are working together to improve resilience and enhance adaptive capacity in the face of the evolving geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific region,” Manalo said.
Last month, the Philippine Senate ratified a so-called Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with Japan, allowing the two allied nations to deploy troops on each other’s soil for military exercises.
U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris (left) visits a fishing community in Tagburos village on Palawan island, a frontline territory in the Philippines’ dispute with Beijing over the South China Sea, Nov. 22, 2022.(Jason Gutierrez/BenarNews)
Also on Wednesday, in an exit telephone call to Marcos, outgoing U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris emphasized the need for the two countries to carry on with their alliance after the presidential transfer of power and “in the face of provocations from the People’s Republic of China.”
She noted that Washington “must stand with the Philippines in the face of such provocations and the enduring nature of the U.S. defense commitments to the Philippines,” her office said in a statement.
Marcos and Harris had enjoyed a close working relationship and met six times during her term. In November 2022, the American vice president visited Palawan, the Philippine island on the frontline of Manila’s territorial dispute with Beijing in the South China Sea.
The U.S. and the Philippines are bound by a 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty that calls on both nations to come to each other’s aid in times of aggression by a third party.
The Biden administration has indicated it would help the Philippines defend itself in the event of an armed attack “anywhere in the South China Sea.”
Jeoffrey Maitem in Manila contributed to this report.
BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated online news organization.
This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Jason Gutierrez for BenarNews.
(AFP)
