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  • Some Chinese social media users claimed that the United States proposed scammers in Myanmar be called “terrorists” at the United Nations, which was vetoed by China, citing information provided by Chinese AI chatbot Doubao.

    But the claim is false. The U.S. has never made such a proposal. Experts warn that AI responses are not always accurate.

    The claim was shared by an X user on Jan. 12 who said China rejected a U.S. proposal at the U.N. to label scammers in Myanmar as terrorists, following the recent high-profile abduction and subsequent rescue of Chinese actor Wang Xing.

    Wang was rescued after being lured to Thailand under the pretense of a film role and subsequently trafficked to a scam center in Myanmar. Following his return to China on Jan. 11, Wang revealed in a live stream that approximately 50 other Chinese victims were freed from the same facility.

    The X user cited a response from AI chatbot “Duobao” as evidence that the U.S. has proposed calling the scam operators “terrorists.”

    Duobao is an advanced artificial intelligence chatbot developed by ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok.

    Launched in August 2024, Doubao has rapidly become China’s most popular AI application, boasting 51 million monthly active users as of November 2024.

    An AI response was used as evidence that the U.S. had proposed at the U.N. to classify scammers in Myanmar as terrorists
    An AI response was used as evidence that the U.S. had proposed at the U.N. to classify scammers in Myanmar as terrorists
    (X)

    But the claim is false.

    Keyword searches found no official or credible reports to show that the U.S. made such a proposal at the U.N.

    A review of minutes of the U.N. Security Council meetings in 2024 also found no such discussion.

    Duobao response

    AFCL asked Doubao a question about the purported U.S. proposal.

    The AI chatbot responded: “There is currently no firm information confirming the U.S. made such a proposal nor that China or any other country vetoed it.”

    Doubao said there was no evidence that the U.S. had proposed designating the scammers in Myanmar as terrorists.
    Doubao said there was no evidence that the U.S. had proposed designating the scammers in Myanmar as terrorists.
    (Duobao)

    AI systems reflect the material used to “train” them, experts say.

    “Doubao is a large-scale language model trained using similar methods and facing similar problems as ChatGPT,” said Hsin-Min Wang, an information science researcher at Taiwan’s Academia Sinica.

    AFCL has previously reported that Chat GPT is not always credible, as it responds to prompts based on probability calculations after being trained with large amounts of online text.

    Ethan Tu, the founder of Taiwan AI Labs, previously told AFCL that AI learns the bias and ideas from the assorted texts of the collected corpus it is being fed for language training.

    “Its output reflects the cultural ideas found in the market it was trained in.”

    Translated by Shen Ke. Edited by Taejun Kang.

    Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) was established to counter disinformation in today’s complex media environment. We publish fact-checks, media-watches and in-depth reports that aim to sharpen and deepen our readers’ understanding of current affairs and public issues. If you like our content, you can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram and X.

    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Dong Zhe for Asia Fact Check Lab.


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  • Part of a three-story series on the fight for and rebuilding of Myanmar’s Kayah state following the 2021 coup. Read Part 1 here.

    DEMOSO, Kayah state, Myanmar – The officers of Station 8 in Myanmar’s southern Shan state pile out of their police car, a beat up minivan with bad brakes and a busted front light. Their mission: set up a checkpoint to search for yaba, a type of methamphetamine that’s become a scourge in Southeast Asia.

    Young and slight, this contingent from the new Karenni State Police, or KSP, looks more like students on an immersive career day than a group of no-nonsense cops. A few practice waving cars to the side of the road – striving to convey a confident authority but struggling to suppress embarrassed grins.

    KSP spokesperson Bo Bo is seen at his office in Mese, Kayah state, Myanmar, Oct. 26, 2024.
    KSP spokesperson Bo Bo is seen at his office in Mese, Kayah state, Myanmar, Oct. 26, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)

    After what locals say was years of abuse by the former police force run by Myanmar’s repressive military regime, a little humility isn’t a bad thing.

    “Before, civilians didn’t trust the police, so they didn’t come to see us,” says Bel Kyaw May, 29, the commander of Station 8 who, like a chaperone, patiently watches over his officers from the side of the road. “We’re more friendly.”

    The KSP was established in August 2021, six months into a civil war triggered by the Myanmar military coup.

    The importance of developing a rebel-backed police force in the midst of this ongoing conflict may not be immediately clear. But rebels and outside observers of Myanmar say that for the insurgency to succeed, its backers must not only beat better-armed government troops on the battlefield but assure a traumatized public that they can replace the services that have been lost in the fighting, including security.

    An officer from KSP Station 8 motions for a motorcyclist to stop at a checkpoint in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    An officer from KSP Station 8 motions for a motorcyclist to stop at a checkpoint in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)

    “If you don’t do that, you run the risk of losing the support of the population, which in the case of the Karenni movement is really critical,” says Jason Tower, a Bangkok-based analyst at the United States Institute of Peace. Karenni is a catch-all for the various ethnic groups in Kayah.

    “The revolution isn’t going to end tomorrow.”

    The rebel effort to rebuild the governmental institutions, they say, can serve as a model for federal democracy and a showcase for how best to avoid the mistakes of the past, which included a Myanmar Police Force that was often an instrument of military repression.

    In other words, quite a lot is riding on the success of Bel Kyaw May and his bright-eyed recruits. “Now it’s revolutionary time,” he said through an interpreter. “Young people are asking, what can I do for the state?”

    Officers from KSP Station 8 prepare to set up a roadside checkpoint in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    Officers from KSP Station 8 prepare to set up a roadside checkpoint in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)
    A female officer with KSP Station 8 explains the checkpoint, in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    A female officer with KSP Station 8 explains the checkpoint, in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)
    KSP Station 8 officers look for narcotics at a roadside checkpoint in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    KSP Station 8 officers look for narcotics at a roadside checkpoint in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)
    Officers from KSP Station 8 examine travelers at a checkpoint in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    Officers from KSP Station 8 examine travelers at a checkpoint in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)
    A KSP Station 8 officer chats with a driver at a checkpoint in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    A KSP Station 8 officer chats with a driver at a checkpoint in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)

    Police as oppressors

    The challenges facing the rebels in general and the KSP in particular, however, are considerable. The biggest is a lack of resources. Insurgent leaders have created a nominal state government called the Interim Executive Council that raises revenue through fundraising, taxes and business levies.

    But 70% of what it collects goes to warfighting, with the remainder split among the KSP and health, education, humanitarian and other agencies in Kayah established by the council. That means that the KSP must try to deal with rising drug use and violence – consequences of the traumas of four years of war – on a shoestring budget.

    Bags of illicit drugs, including a mixture of methamphetamine and caffeine known as yaba, lie on a table at KSP Station 8 in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    Bags of illicit drugs, including a mixture of methamphetamine and caffeine known as yaba, lie on a table at KSP Station 8 in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)

    Bo Bo, the KSP’s chief spokesman, said the monthly allotments are only about 10% of what his force needs. There were 638 officers in the force as of August – 558 of whom were men and 180 of whom were women. Bo Bo estimates a few hundred more officers are still needed.

    The van that ferried the officers to the checkpoint is a 1996 Toyota Granvia that would have a hard time chasing down a scooter. There are more cops than guns and so few uniforms, most days officers stay in civilian clothes.

    They also aren’t regularly paid. Most live at the stations and give thanks to their constituents at every meal because that’s usually where their food comes from.

    “Our effectiveness is a little lower because we don’t have much manpower; we don’t have much money,” Bo Bo, who leads a station in Mese in southern Kayah state, told RFA.

    Officer Angelo Karlo holds a puppy at KSP Station 8 in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    Officer Angelo Karlo holds a puppy at KSP Station 8 in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)
    Bel Kyaw, commander of KSP Station 8, stands near fellow officers at the station in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    Bel Kyaw, commander of KSP Station 8, stands near fellow officers at the station in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)
    A detainee washes dishes at KSP Station 8 in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024. The station lacks funds to hire services, so detainees help with cooking and general cleaning.
    A detainee washes dishes at KSP Station 8 in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024. The station lacks funds to hire services, so detainees help with cooking and general cleaning.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)
    Officers at KSP Station 8 eat a meal provided by civilians in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    Officers at KSP Station 8 eat a meal provided by civilians in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)
    KSP Station 8 officers gather after making their morning pledge to serve the people in southern Shan state, Myanmar Nov.4, 2024.
    KSP Station 8 officers gather after making their morning pledge to serve the people in southern Shan state, Myanmar Nov.4, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)

    At the heart of the force are officers like Bo Bo and Bel Kyaw May, both of whom were members of the Myanmar Police Force but resigned after the coup to join a countrywide worker strike known as the Civil Disobedience Movement, or CDM, to pressure the junta to back down. More than 100 former MSP officers are now with the KSP.

    In earlier decades, the police force had been accused of harsh tactics, but, according to Tower, it had begun to reform after a previous military dictatorship agreed to share power in 2011.

    In the post-coup crackdown, bad habits resurfaced, as Myanmar Police Force officers busted up rallies and arrested protesters. But the coup also highlighted the fact that a number of officers, like Bo Bo and Bel Kyaw May, were more reform-minded.

    Shy and soft-spoken, Bo Bo said he had dreamed of being a scientist growing up but had gone to the police academy because it was free and offered steady employment after graduation. He was first assigned to a station in his home township but was soon transferred farther away because the military didn’t want its officers to have ties to local communities, he said.

    Debris litters the abandoned junta-run Mese police station in Kayah state, Myanmar, Oct. 26, 2024. It was overrun by rebels in June 2023.
    Debris litters the abandoned junta-run Mese police station in Kayah state, Myanmar, Oct. 26, 2024. It was overrun by rebels in June 2023.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)

    He said he quickly became disillusioned by the corruption he witnessed during those years. A friend once reported his bike was stolen but decided not to pursue the case when he learned that the required bribe was more than his bike was worth.

    Officers could be roused to work on serious offenses like murder or rape, but the outcome was often preordained, Bo Bo said.

    “True and false doesn’t count,” Bo Bo said. “If you had money, you win.”

    A police officer lights the cigarette of a detainee in a cell at KSP Station 8 in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    A police officer lights the cigarette of a detainee in a cell at KSP Station 8 in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)

    The success of the insurgents on the battlefield has given them a chance to reset the relationship between police and the communities they serve, the USIP’s Tower said.

    “Whereas in the past, the police were the oppressors of the communities,” he said. “There was no concept of the idea of community security or community policing.”

    Developing new habits

    Part of what fueled corruption in the Myanmar Police Force was the low-pay of the officers. KSP officers make even less. They often go weeks without pay. As a hedge against the type of graft that plagued the old force sprouting in the new one, recruits must complete courses that include instruction not only on police procedure but also on Karenni history and the principles of democracy and human rights that underlie the revolution here.

    And in the Kayah rebel government organizational chart, the KSP sits under civilian control, unlike the Myanmar State Police, which was overseen by the military.

    Officer “Sunday” is locked in a British colonial-era restraint at KSP Station 8 after reporting back to work a week late following his vacation, in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    Officer “Sunday” is locked in a British colonial-era restraint at KSP Station 8 after reporting back to work a week late following his vacation, in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.

    Still, there appeared to be a few hiccups in the operation when RFA visited. One detainee at Station 8 was being held with one ankle bound in an old fashioned British stockade, a holdover from colonial days. “Sunday” turned out to be a member of the police force. His crime? He said he’d be gone for one week but took two instead.

    Other detainees at the two stations RFA visited were teens who had been caught by their parents using drugs. Fearing they were losing control of their children, they had asked the KSP to put them in jail as a form of rehabilitation.

    Criminal suspects, meanwhile, can sit in jail for weeks without having their cases adjudicated because there are so few judges and attorneys in Kayah.

    KSP officer Yar Zar Tun comforts his wife, Zin Zin Aung, as surgeon Aung Ko Myint cleans wounds she received in a junta airstrike, at a hospital in Demoso, Kayah state, Nov. 5, 2024
    KSP officer Yar Zar Tun comforts his wife, Zin Zin Aung, as surgeon Aung Ko Myint cleans wounds she received in a junta airstrike, at a hospital in Demoso, Kayah state, Nov. 5, 2024
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)

    A dangerous job

    The other challenge the young officers of the KSP face are the not insignificant dangers of their jobs.

    Station 8 is located off the main road among terraced hills of yellow-green stalks of rice swaying in the wind. The picturesque setting, the youthful attractiveness of the officers, and the fact that they live at the station gives it a summer-camp vibe.

    But the risks are real, and the main benefit of Station 8’s setting is that it’s hidden. The military junta would likely bomb the station if it knew where it was. Station 2 to the south was bombed on Sept. 5, 2024. Among the injured was Zin Zin Aung, the wife of a KSP officer. Her five-month-old fetus didn’t survive the attack.

    KSP officers are also outgunned by local drug dealers, some of whom have ties to ethnic armies in the area.

    Poppies bloom in a field in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Oct. 29, 2024.
    Poppies bloom in a field in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Oct. 29, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)
    Partially harvested poppy seedpods are seen in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Oct. 29, 2024.
    Partially harvested poppy seedpods are seen in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Oct. 29, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)
    Farmers harvest the sap from poppy seedpods in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Oct. 29, 2024. “People come and buy our harvest. We don’t ask or don’t care who they are,
    Farmers harvest the sap from poppy seedpods in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Oct. 29, 2024. “People come and buy our harvest. We don’t ask or don’t care who they are,” said one farmer, who didn’t want to be named.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)
    Partially harvested poppy seedpods are seen in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Oct. 30, 2024. Myanmar is the world’s biggest exporter of the raw material used to make heroin and other opiates.
    Partially harvested poppy seedpods are seen in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Oct. 30, 2024. Myanmar is the world’s biggest exporter of the raw material used to make heroin and other opiates.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)
    A farmer harvests the sap from seedpods in a poppy field in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Oct. 29, 2024.
    A farmer harvests the sap from seedpods in a poppy field in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Oct. 29, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)
    A woman harvests sap from seedpods in a poppy field in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Oct. 30, 2024.
    A woman harvests sap from seedpods in a poppy field in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Oct. 30, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)

    Poppy fields cover the landscape in southern Shan, near the border with Kayah. In the chaos created by the war, Myanmar has become the number one exporter of opium in the world, according to the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime.

    “Sometimes the drug dealers give a warning: We can kill you anytime,” Bel Kyaw May said.

    Behind horn-rimmed glasses and a serious expression, Shun Lai Yee Win, 20, acknowledged the risks she and her fellow officers face in a brief interview with RFA. She said she joined the KSP and Station 8 simply because she wanted to be part of the process of building a new, more just society.

    The old police force “was corrupt, always showing their power to civilians,” she said, before the officers set off to establish the checkpoint.

    Officers during a break at KSP Station 8 in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    Officers during a break at KSP Station 8 in southern Shan state, Myanmar, Nov. 4, 2024.
    (Gemunu Amarasinghe/RFA)

    Wiliam Tun, 28, who was among the civilians who were stopped, had the same opinion. “We were afraid of the military police,” he said. “They will put you in jail just to do it.”

    Asked if he minded being stopped and searched by the KSP officers, he shook his head no. He knew several from the community, he said.

    “These are all my friends.”

    Soe San Aung for RFA Burmese contributed reporting. Edited by Boer Deng and Abby Seiff.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Jim Snyder and Gemunu Amarasinghe for RFA.

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  • Traditional totalitarianism conjures images of jack-booted stormtroopers, death camps and gulags. In recent years a new variety of totalitarianism has emerged. Noted political theorist Sheldon Wolin calls it “the inversion of totalitarianism” and that it “represents the coming of age of corporate power and political demobilization of the citizenry. Unlike classical totalitarian systems which openly boasted of their intentions to force their societies in a preconceived totality, inverted totalitarianism is not expressly conceptualized as an ideology, nor is it objectified in public policy.” Corporations have de facto power and have carried out a slow-motion coup d’état. How to resist? Wolin says it starts at the local level.


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  • New Delhi, Feb 4, 2025—The Committee to Protect Journalists calls on the Indian government to end its weaponization of regulatory measures targeting independent journalism following a decision to revoke The Reporters’ Collective’s nonprofit status and the tax exempt status of The File.

    “Journalism is a public service. The Indian government should not abuse regulatory processes to target investigative journalism,” said Beh Lih Yi, CPJ’s Asia program coordinator. “The government must immediately reverse these orders against The Reporters’ Collective and The File, which could set a dangerous precedent for other non-profit media in India and severely undermine public interest journalism.”

    The Reporters’ Collective (TRC) said in a January 28 statement that the loss of its nonprofit status “severely impairs” its ability to do work and “worsens the conditions” for independent journalism in the country.

    The revocation of a nonprofit status means entities will be taxed as a commercial entity, subjecting donations to taxation, which could discourage potential funding. The tax could potentially be applied retrospectively. TRC is known for its investigative reporting on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ruling government, ranging from corruption, government accountability, to allegations of corporate cronyism, and unethical business practices against the Adani Group, one of India’s wealthiest conglomerates.

    The directive against TRC follows a disturbing pattern of financial and legal pressures on independent media. In December 2024, the Bengaluru-based Kannada website The File, which has conducted investigations into all political parties in the southwestern state of Karnataka, also faced a similar tax order, which was reviewed by CPJ. The order revoked its tax exemptions, deeming its activities commercially oriented despite its public interest reporting.`

    In February 2023, income tax authorities in India searched BBC offices in New Delhi and Mumbai as part of an income-tax investigation, weeks after the broadcaster aired a documentary critical of Modi.

    CPJ contacted the commissioner of Central Board of Direct Taxes and the exemption commissioner in Delhi and tax authorities in Bangalore about TRC and The File’s cases but did not receive responses.


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  • U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Sunday visited Panama to relay President Donald Trump’s concerns about alleged Chinese control of the Panama Canal and to repeat his threats to reassert U.S. control over the key trade route.

    After touring the canal and meeting with Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino, Rubio called China’s influence in the Panama Canal a “violation” of the treaty under which the United States handed over control of the waterway to Panama.

    “Absent immediate changes, it would require the United States to take measures necessary to protect its rights,” Rubio said according to a State Department statement.

    What have Trump and Mulino said?

    During his inaugural address on Jan. 20, Trump said that “China is operating the Panama Canal. And we didn’t give it to China. We gave it to Panama, and we’re taking it back.”

    In response, Mulino said on Jan. 22 that the canal is “is and will continue to be Panama’s.”

    “Panama is moving forward. Panama is not distracted by these kinds of statements,” Mulino said at the Davos Forum in Switzerland. “Over time, we have been an ally and friend of the United States; partners in large part in important benefits, not only through the Canal, but also participants, being the main user of the Canal, transporting goods to and from the United States.”

    “One cannot ignore public international law,” he said. “So, I think that does not concern me, because that is strictly impossible in law.”

    Does China control the Panama Canal?

    The United States invaded Panama in 1989, overthrowing then-President Manuel Noriega –- a one-time U.S. ally who was later targeted for his role as an international drug kingpin. The canal was handed over to Panama in 1999 under a treaty signed by President Jimmy Carter in 1977.

    Any nation is allowed to use the transoceanic waterway, which lifts massive cargo vessels above sea level through a series of interconnected locks and back down again, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

    Beijing says it has no control over the running of the canal, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning told journalists on Jan. 22.

    “We agree with Panamanian President Mulino that Panama’s sovereignty and independence are not negotiable and the canal is not directly or indirectly controlled by any major power,” Mao told a regular news conference in Beijing.

    “China does not participate in the management and operation of the canal and never interferes in canal affairs,” she said. “We always respect Panama’s sovereignty over the canal and recognize the canal as a permanently neutral international waterway.”

    However, Panama granted a concession to operate the ports of Balboa and Cristobal, on the Pacific and Atlantic sides of the Canal, to Hutchison-Whampoa in 1996, which is owned by Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-shing and has since been merged into his CK Hutchison Holdings.

    The U.S. government has previously said it does not believe that the concession represented a threat to the canal.

    “Several entities of the U.S. Government, including the Federal Maritime Commission and the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have researched this issue extensively and have not uncovered any evidence to support a conclusion that the People’s Republic of China will be in a position to control Canal operations,” according to the Department of State FAQ on the canal.

    The neutrality of the Canal and its operations are guaranteed by the Neutrality Treaty and associated protocols, to which 36 other countries are party, it said.

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    What is the extent of Chinese influence in Panama?

    While attempts by Chinese state-owned enterprises to acquire ports in Latin America have been largely unsuccessful, Li Ka-shing’s expansion in the region has been unimpeded.

    In 2017, Panama severed diplomatic ties with democratic Taiwan and established relations with the People’s Republic of China, becoming the first Latin American country to join President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road global supply chain and infrastructure program.

    The move paved the way for Chinese companies — both private and state-owned — to plow hundreds of millions of dollars into a new cruise terminal and a bridge across the canal.

    Li, probably Hong Kong’s most famous businessman, has been courted by Beijing since the 1997 handover of Hong Kong to Chinese rule. He has close connections to the highest levels of leadership, and has been received by past Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.

    The U.S. investigation into Li’s Panama Canal concession in 1999 concluded that it was largely safe from Chinese influence because of Hong Kong’s status as a separate trading jurisdiction from the rest of China.

    That separate status — called into question as China stepped up its political control over the city in the wake of mass popular protests — was officially revoked under the last Trump administration through an executive order in July 2020, which said the city was “no longer sufficiently autonomous to justify differential treatment in relation to the People’s Republic of China.”

    So what is Li Ka-shing’s international role?

    In 1991, when Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-shing’s CK Hutchison acquired Britain’s biggest seaport at Felixstowe, the city’s rags-to-riches tycoon was just getting started.

    Now, he heads a multinational cargo port empire with operations in 53 ports in 24 countries in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.

    Li Ka-shing leaves a press conference in Hong Kong on March 16, 2018.
    Li Ka-shing leaves a press conference in Hong Kong on March 16, 2018.
    (ANTHONY WALLACE, Anthony Wallac/AFP)

    Experts say Li is trusted both by Beijing and the wider international community, and that his ventures are seen as a way for China to bring influence to bear, but without making it too obvious.

    While not all of Li’s corporate investments can be seen as a disguised form of Chinese diplomacy, many of his Latin American ventures are ports in highly strategic locations, often in countries that initially lacked diplomatic ties with Beijing, according to Hong Kong political scientist Simon Shen.

    Many of the countries Li invests in once recognized the Republic of China on Taiwan rather than the People’s Republic of China. Yet the pace of his investments slowed once Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou — who advocates warm ties with Beijing — took power.

    Investments made by Li haven’t typically set off many alarm bells in the corridors of Western governments; CK Hutchison has won contracts that a Chinese state-owned enterprise could only dream of.

    But according to Shen, complaints were emerging in U.S. right-wing media of Chinese influence in the Panama Canal as early as 2011.

    Those concerns have now become mainstream under the Trump administration.

    What does this mean for Hong Kong?

    Hong Kong’s shift from an international free port to a city that is increasingly run along mainland Chinese lines has led to a change in attitudes to the activities of its business community.

    “Hong Kong isn’t the city it was back in the day — it is a Chinese port,” Taiwanese national security research Shih Chien-yu told RFA Cantonese in a recent interview. “Naturally, other countries are going to have doubts.”

    According to Hong Kong entrepreneur Herbert Chow, the ongoing crackdown on political dissent in Hong Kong is coming back to bite its companies, which are now more likely to be viewed as Chinese.

    He said China should consider making some concessions, including releasing jailed media tycoon Jimmy Lai, to boost the city’s international image.

    “So many Hong Kong businesses have gone to Southeast Asia now to put down roots and break away from the politically sensitive connection to China,” Chow said.

    CK Hutchison was invited to respond to this article, but hadn’t replied by the time of writing.

    Translated and edited by Luisetta Mudie.

    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Ha Syut.

  • Part of a three-story series to mark the fourth anniversary of Myanmar’s 2021 coup, looking at how the military treats its own soldiers.

    The 2021 coup that plunged Myanmar into civil war has been a disaster for its military. It has lost control of much of the country, and thousands of soldiers have been killed or wounded in the face of rebel advances.

    That’s also made it one of the riskiest places on Earth to enlist as a soldier – one where life insurance sounds like a sensible idea to those on the front line and a risky business for those offering it.

    Not so Myanmar, where members of the armed forces are required to take out life insurance provided by a company run by the son of army chief and coup leader Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing.

    The scheme is operated by Aung Myint Moh Min Insurance, or AMMMI, established in June 2013, when Myanmar opened up life insurance to the private sector. The company, however, is believed to be a subsidiary of Myanmar Economic Corporation, one of the military’s two sprawling business conglomerates.

    Aung Pyae Sone, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing's son, left, and Aung Myint Moh Min Insurance Company in Yangon in 2018.
    Aung Pyae Sone, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing’s son, left, and Aung Myint Moh Min Insurance Company in Yangon in 2018.
    (Justice For Myanmar via X and Google Maps)

    A U.N. report in 2019 said the top general’s only son Aung Pyae Sone, 40, holds a “significant stake” in AMMMI. The U.S. government sanctioned Aung Pyae Sone in March 2021 for profiting from his connection to the coup leader. His business interests extend to telecommunications, real estate and the health sector.

    Families of soldiers killed in the past year tell Radio Free Asia that they have been unable to get a payout from the life insurance that the U.N. report described as “required” for all personnel in the Tatmadaw, as the military is known in Myanmar. AMMMI also offers policies to government employees and the public.

    RFA contacted the company for comment. It said that life insurance payouts are processed within a few days of a policyholder’s death.

    Myanmar military chief Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw on June 10, 2017, at a donations event for victims of the military transport plane crash in the Andaman Sea.
    Myanmar military chief Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw on June 10, 2017, at a donations event for victims of the military transport plane crash in the Andaman Sea.
    (Aung Htet/AFP)

    “It should surprise nobody that control of the military life insurance policies for Myanmar’s army rests with the son of Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. Corruption in Myanmar’s military flows from the top down,” said political analyst Jonah Blank from the Rand Corporation, a think tank partially funded by the U.S. government.

    “Corruption permeates every rank, with profits flowing straight to the top,” he told RFA.

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    ‘We protect the family’

    Former Maj. Tin Lin Aung, who defected from the military after the coup, said a service member starts paying premiums with their first paycheck, and the policy’s beneficiary is their spouse or other nominated family members.

    Ei Ei Aung, an independent online insurance agent, said that when life insurance was operated by state-run Myanma Insurance soldiers would be fully covered in the event of their death as soon as they submitted their first premium.

    Things became more flaky when Aung Myint Moh Min Insurance, whose motto is “We Protect the Family,” took control.

    Rescue workers carry a body at Sanhlan village in Dawei on June 8, 2017, after a Myanmar military plane crashed in the Andaman Sea off southern Myanmar.
    Rescue workers carry a body at Sanhlan village in Dawei on June 8, 2017, after a Myanmar military plane crashed in the Andaman Sea off southern Myanmar.
    (Ye Aung Thu/AFP)

    The first high-profile sign of the company’s unwillingness to pay out came in 2017, when a military transport plane crashed in bad weather offshore near the southern city of Dawei killing 122 people.

    It was one of the worst aviation disasters in the nation’s history. Among the dead was a captain travelling to see his wife, who was about to give birth.

    “Aung Myint Moh Min Company claimed that only 30% of the premium had been paid and therefore refused to pay the full life insurance amount. They offered to refund only the amount that had been paid,” Tin Ling Aung said.

    When a colleague of the dead captain shared online a photo of the rejection letter from the insurer, it was widely circulated, drawing attention to how the scheme operated, and reportedly causing trouble for the captain’s colleague who was redeployed to the frontline.

    Little information

    There is scant public information about the company, but a university thesis supported by the AMMMI and submitted to Yangon University’s Economics Department in 2019 outlined the company’s revenue stream and payouts in its first five years of operation.

    The thesis, “Customer Perception on Life Insurance Service of Aung Myint Moh Min Insurance,” written by Min Aung, showed that army personnel life insurance was by far its biggest earner and that claim payouts in 2018-19 amounted to less than 7% of premiums paid.

    10,000 kyat banknotes currently in use in Myanmar.
    10,000 kyat banknotes currently in use in Myanmar.
    (RFA)

    Aung Myint Moh Min has a variety of policies catering for different ranks. Payouts on maturation of a policy or the death of the policyholder start as low as $110. Those cost the equivalent of $1.55 to $2.65 per month, depending on the lifespan of the policy. There are policies offering higher payouts with higher monthly premiums.

    RFA could not find publicly available financial information about the current operations of AMMMI, but if the number of military personnel is estimated at 130,000 and each person contributed $2 a month in premiums, the Aung Myint Moh Min Insurance company would be raking in more than $3 million a year in life insurance premiums.

    Concerns over the life insurance have intensified in the past four years since the coup, as conflict has escalated across Myanmar, and the military’s casualties have mounted.

    Insurance agent Ei Ei Aung told RFA there are many ways the company avoids paying out.

    “In the military, there are numerous cases where families of deceased soldiers fail to claim compensation,” she said.

    “This may be due to family members being unaware of the soldier’s death, lack of notification from responsible superiors, or insufficient communication. As a result, many compensation claims go unprocessed and are ultimately lost,” she said.

    Graphic by Amanda Weisbrod
    Graphic by Amanda Weisbrod
    (RFA)

    Documents lost

    One widow, Hla Khin, told RFA about her attempts to secure a military pension or life insurance payment for her husband, Sgt. Min Din who died in a battle in Shan state in June. She discovered after her husband died that applications for any benefit had to be made in person where the soldier last served. The battalion in which he had served suffered major losses.

    “There was nobody in Battalion 501 as many people died. Almost all documents have been lost as some office staff moved out, some died and some are still missing,” she said.

    Six months after Min Din was killed, the paperwork has now been filed. Hla Khin is waiting for a response.

    Tin Lin Aung describes how the process works.

    “If an entire battalion is captured by resistance forces, there are significant challenges. For single soldiers, their parents can still apply for the insurance, but this is little more than a hope because, in many cases, the battalion’s office and records are gone, and the military commander responsible for the claim may also have been captured. In such cases, Aung Myint Moh Min Company seizes the life insurance for the entire battalion,” he said.

    The firm would also have pocketed the payments of the thousands of soldiers who have defected. Two opposition-aligned groups, People’s Embrace and People’s Goal, estimate that nearly 15,000 soldiers and police have defected – at the risk of the death penalty if caught – in the past two years.

    Capt. Zin Yaw defected from the military a month after the February 2021 coup. He provided RFA with a copy of his August 2020 pay slip, which shows the 25,000 kyat ($5.55) deduction for life insurance taken from his pay.

    In 2017, he redeemed his first life insurance policy after it reached maturity. He got nothing out from the next policy he took out because he defected. He also confirmed that families of fallen soldiers are being denied money.

    “If they couldn’t show photos and any proof of the death, then both the army and the insurance company put them on the missing list, not in the dead list,” he said.

    Ei Ei Aung said that claims have to be made within one month of death, although it can take much longer for families to get word that a soldier has died. If there’s no notification after a year, any claim for compensation is forfeited.

    Aung Myint Moh Min Insurance Company deducted a 25,000 Myanmar kyat ($11.93) monthly premium for life insurance from a captain's August salary in 2020. Capt. Zin Yaw, who left the Burmese military in 2021, provided this document to RFA.
    Aung Myint Moh Min Insurance Company deducted a 25,000 Myanmar kyat ($11.93) monthly premium for life insurance from a captain’s August salary in 2020. Capt. Zin Yaw, who left the Burmese military in 2021, provided this document to RFA.
    (Zin Yaw)

    Missing out

    Relatives of Min Khant Kyaw, a 23-year-old from Ayeyarwady region, learned from authorities in November of his death in the military, without saying how, when or where he died. It was the first time the family had learned he was even in the military. Now they say they don’t know how to claim any benefits for him as they have no idea which unit he fought in.

    “The key issue is that the person connected to the deceased must be aware of the death and notify the insurance company,” Ei Ei Aung said.

    “If a death goes unreported, the family of the deceased misses out on significant rights as well. As a result, even though it is undeniable that these people have died, many do not receive the benefits they are due.”

    This is not the only benefit that the junta or its associates are accused of pocketing.

    Former and current soldiers told RFA that deductions from their salaries were made to buy shares in the two military-run conglomerates, Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation, which have interests in everything from banking to mining and tobacco, and tourism, and are a direct source of revenue for the military. In 2020, Amnesty International released documents showing that MEHL had funneled up to $18 billion in dividends to the military.

    According to military defector Capt. Lin Htet, soldiers are coerced into buying shares according to a sliding scale according to rank, requiring payments of between 1.5 million and 5 million kyats ($110 and $330).

    Capt. Zin Yaw, another defector, said the practice has been that if foot soldiers can’t come up with the full amount on the spot, deductions are taken from their pay.

    Before the coup, annual dividends were paid to soldiers in September each year, but defectors and serving soldiers have told RFA dividend payouts became sporadic after the coup and stopped altogether in 2023.

    “I left the army in 2023,” said Lin Htet. “From 2021 to 2023, MEHL paid us the benefit very late. Sometimes, they pretended to forget to pay it. They paid us six months late.”

    Currently serving warrant officer Soe Maung’s experience has been similar.

    He was told he had to buy 1.5 million kyats in shares. He didn’t have the money to pay outright, so he paid in monthly installments of 10,000 kyats. He said that after 2021, there was a year-and-a-half delay in getting dividends that used to be paid regularly at the end of the fiscal year.

    The names of many RFA quoted in this story have been changed to protect their identity and their family’s safety.

    Additional reporting by RFA Burmese. Edited by Mat Pennington.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Aye Aye Mon and Ginny Stein for RFA Burmese.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • This content originally appeared on Human Rights Watch and was authored by Human Rights Watch.

  • TAIPEI, Taiwan – North Korea condemned U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio for calling it a “rogue state” in its first direct criticism of the Trump administration, about a week after the U.S. president suggested he might try to revive contacts with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

    Rubio referred to North Korea and Iran as “rogue states” in a Jan. 30 interview while discussing foreign policy challenges. He emphasized the importance of addressing the threats posed by those countries, highlighting their destabilizing activities and the need for a robust U.S. response.

    A North Korea foreign ministry spokesperson dismissed Rubio’s comments and said U.S. hostility was incessant.

    “It is necessary to mention how absurd and illogical it is that the most depraved state in the world brands another country a rogue state,” the North Korean spokesperson said, as cited by the state-run Korean Central News Agency, or KCNA, on Monday.

    “The hostile words and deeds of the person who is in charge of the U.S. foreign policy served as an occasion of confirming once again the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK which remains unchanged.

    “We will never tolerate any provocation of the U.S., which has always been hostile to the DPRK and will be hostile to it in the future, too, but will take tough counteraction corresponding to it as usual.”

    The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK, is North Korea’s official name.

    It marked the North’s first public criticism of the new U.S. administration since Donald Trump returned to the White House last month.

    Trump launched an unprecedented diplomatic effort on North Korea during his first term, meeting Kim three times, but in the end making no progress on persuading him to give up his nuclear and missile programmes in exchange for relief on sanctions.

    Trump mentioned his effort on North Korea during his presidential campaign but it had until Monday refrained from making direct comments about him or his government.

    South Korea’s unification ministry said the North was responding quickly to measures and remarks from the new Trump administration, following a pledge on the “toughest” response to the U.S. in a key party meeting at the end of last year.

    “To be clear, the one that undermines international rules and threatens the peace of the international community is North Korea itself,” said the South Korean ministry spokesperson, Koo Byoung-sam.

    “South Korea, the U.S. and the international community share the goal of completely denuclearizing North Korea.”

    North Korea’s remarks came about a week after Trump was asked in an interview if he planned to “reach out” to the North Korean leader.

    “I will, yeah. He liked me,” Trump said.

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    In a sign that Trump might intend to revive his diplomatic effort on North Korea, he has picked as a senior White House official an aide, William Beau Harrison, who was involved in planning summits with Kim in Singapore in 2018 and in Vietnam in 2019.

    Trump met Kim for a third time on the heavily fortified border between the two Koreas later in 2019 when Trump became the first U.S. president to set foot on North Korean soil.

    But the meetings led to no progress on efforts to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear and missile programs.

    Edited by Mike Firn.


    This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by Taejun Kang for RFA.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.