{"id":1549995,"date":"2024-03-12T15:14:48","date_gmt":"2024-03-12T15:14:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/jacobin.com\/2024\/03\/us-foreign-aid-destabilize-haiti\/"},"modified":"2024-03-13T22:08:52","modified_gmt":"2024-03-13T22:08:52","slug":"how-us-foreign-aid-has-helped-destabilize-haiti","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/radiofree.asia\/2024\/03\/12\/how-us-foreign-aid-has-helped-destabilize-haiti\/","title":{"rendered":"How US \u201cForeign Aid\u201d Has Helped Destabilize Haiti"},"content":{"rendered":"\n \n\n\n\n

A surge of gang violence in Haiti has now led to the resignation of Prime Minister Ariel Henry. Through its heavy-handed use of foreign aid to intervene in Haitian politics, the US government bears significant responsibility for Haiti\u2019s ongoing instability.<\/h3>\n\n\n
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\n Prime Minister Ariel Henry attends a ceremony in honor of late Haitian president Jovenel Mo\u00efse in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on July 20, 2021.(Valerie Baeriswyl \/ AFP via Getty Images)\n <\/figcaption> \n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n\n \n

The 2010 earthquake in Haiti meant a devastating loss of life, shelter, and livelihood. More than two hundred thousand people in the country died, 1.5 million became homeless, and upward of $7 billion worth of damage was incurred across the affected area. The massive scale of the earthquake\u2019s destruction was met by an influx of foreign aid. In the United States, fundraising for the crisis reached unprecedented proportions, with some sources estimating that nearly half of all US families donated to the relief efforts.<\/p>\n

Much of this money, however, did not go to feeding, sheltering, and supporting the financial recovery of Haitians. The US Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, distributed 130 tons of genetically modified seeds \u2014 donated by chemical giant Monsanto \u2014 in a costly relief program aimed at rural farmers. Haitian farmers, however, didn\u2019t need foreign seeds: they needed money. And for a fraction of the cost of the USAID program, foreign donors could have purchased all necessary food aid from local rice producers, jumpstarting the rural economy.<\/p>\n

In his new book<\/a>, Aid State: Elite Panic, Disaster Capitalism, and the Battle to Control Haiti<\/em>, Jake Johnston offers a century-long history of aid in Haiti. He shows that the Haitian earthquake, far from a singular disaster, was an inflection point in the history of a country whose experience of occupation and foreign interference has often been cloaked in the guise of aid. Arguing forcefully against the US-style intervention that has prioritized \u201cstability\u201d measures, he makes the case that Haiti needs self-determination to thrive.<\/p>\n

In the wake of a surge of gang violence in Haiti earlier this month \u2014 leading to the just-announced resignation<\/a> of Prime Minister Ariel Henry \u2014 Cal Turner and Sara Van Horn spoke with Johnston for Jacobin<\/em> about the origins of the current crisis, the fine line between aid and occupation, and the present and future prospects for autonomy for the Haitian state.<\/p>\n\n \n\n \n \n \n

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Sara Van Horn<\/dt>\n \n

Can you talk about US interventions in the immediate aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti?<\/p>\n<\/dd>\n <\/dl>\n \n

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Jake Johnston<\/dt>\n \n

The initial response from the United States and across the world was heavily militarized. The priority was neutralizing potential national security threats: the waves of migrants leaving Haiti and trying to enter the United States, and the fifty thousand endangered US citizens living in Haiti.<\/p>\n

The primary concerns were limiting that migration and evacuating American citizens, which required pushing as many military assets as possible into the region. There were big carriers and boats off the shores of Haiti and thousands of troops coming in.<\/p>\n

But most of them never actually set foot in Haiti: they stayed offshore, which was as much about stopping people from leaving Haiti as it was about providing anything for the people that were still there. Low-flying planes would broadcast in Creole: \u201cIf you’re thinking about leaving the country, don’t do it. We’re going to send you right back.\u201d That’s where US resources were going.<\/p>\n

Despite the US\u2019s militarized approach, what happened after the earthquake was not an outbreak of violence; it was Haitians coming together to help themselves. The first responders were not foreigners. The first responders were Haitians helping their neighbors and their communities \u2014 bringing food from rural communities into Port-au-Prince, for example. Foreign interventions can often disrupt those local mutual aid formations.<\/p>\n<\/dd>\n <\/dl>\n \n

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Cal Turner<\/dt>\n \n

In the book, you talk about how vulnerability to natural disasters and outcomes of disaster response are heavily determined by politics and history. Could you talk about aid for natural disasters more generally? How does it work, and where does it fall short?<\/p>\n<\/dd>\n <\/dl>\n \n

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Jake Johnston<\/dt>\n \n

There are many ways that foreign assistance can enter a country. There is official bilateral assistance: the type of money that comes from donor governments through agencies like USAID. There is also a broader humanitarian space driven by private donations. Finally, there is a mechanism of aid through big development banks, like the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.<\/p>\n

Aid after the earthquake largely bypassed the Haitian government and local institutions and went to foreign NGOs \u2014 many of whom did not have a prior presence in the country \u2014 and US development companies. When we think about humanitarian assistance, we often think about NGOs, but the reality is that bilateral aid is dominated by for-profit companies. It’s been outsourced over the last few decades, and the functions of USAID are now managed and run by private contractors that operate for profit. These were the biggest players that received US government funding after the earthquake.<\/p>\n