{"id":4598,"date":"2021-01-03T20:54:09","date_gmt":"2021-01-03T20:54:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.radiofree.org\/?p=145694"},"modified":"2021-01-03T20:54:09","modified_gmt":"2021-01-03T20:54:09","slug":"china-enters-2021-a-stronger-more-influential-power-and-australia-may-feel-the-squeeze-even-more","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/radiofree.asia\/2021\/01\/03\/china-enters-2021-a-stronger-more-influential-power-and-australia-may-feel-the-squeeze-even-more\/","title":{"rendered":"China enters 2021 a stronger, more influential power \u2014 and Australia may feel the squeeze even more"},"content":{"rendered":"

ANALYSIS:<\/strong> By James Laurenceson<\/a>, University of Technology Sydney<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n

Great power competition in the Asia-Pacific region has been building for years. But covid-19 has turbo-charged the shifts taking place and China has finished 2020 in a significantly stronger position compared with the US than when the year started.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, Canberra\u2019s relations with Beijing continue to deteriorate<\/a> and there\u2019s little reason to be optimistic that a sudden, positive turnaround will be seen in 2021.<\/p>\n

As competition rather than cooperation has become the dominant frame through which both Beijing and Washington view their bilateral relationship, each is increasingly sensitive to evidence that other countries in the Asia-Pacific region are supporting their opponent.<\/p>\n

The fundamental driver of China\u2019s hostility towards Australia in 2020 stems from its assessment<\/a> that Australia\u2019s leaders have reneged on earlier commitments to never direct the country\u2019s security alliance with the US against China.<\/p>\n

Prime Minister Scott Morrison has appealed<\/a> for Australia and other middle and smaller powers to be granted \u201cgreater latitude\u201d in how they manoeuvre between the US and China in the future.<\/p>\n

But the University of Sydney\u2019s James Curran cautions<\/a> against unrealistic expectations:<\/p>\n

\n

Great powers simply don\u2019t dole out strategic space to others.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

China\u2019s power on an upwards trajectory<\/strong>
At the end of 2019, China\u2019s GDP stood<\/a> at US$14.3 trillion. This was two-thirds that of the US GDP of $21.3 trillion.<\/p>\n

The fallout from covid-19 has accelerated the trend in China\u2019s favour. The International Monetary Fund\u2019s latest growth forecasts<\/a> suggest China\u2019s economy will jump from two-thirds to three-quarters the size of the US by the end of 2021.<\/p>\n

And when cost differences are accounted for and the two economies are measured in terms of their respective purchasing power, China\u2019s GDP is actually already 10 percent larger<\/a> than the US.<\/p>\n

Retail sales grew by 5 percent in China in November, compared to the same month last year, as the country\u2019s economy continues its strong recovery. Image: The Conversation\/Yang Jianzheng\/AP<\/p>\n

According to the Lowy Institute\u2019s \u201cAsia Power Index<\/a>\u201d, which tracks power in the economic, military, diplomatic and cultural domains, the US still comes out on top, but its lead over China has been cut in half since 2018. This mainly reflected losses by the US rather than gains by China.<\/p>\n

And even before covid-19 hit, a survey of business, media and civil society leaders in Southeast Asia showed<\/a> that Beijing was considered vastly more influential than Washington in the region, though this increasing power was viewed with apprehension.<\/p>\n

Nearly half said they had little to no confidence in the US as a strategic partner or provider of regional security.<\/p>\n

And when asked if the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was forced to align itself with either the US or China, a majority in seven of the 10 ASEAN member countries chose China.<\/p>\n

\n

@NAR : Interesting survey by @ISEAS<\/a>. #Vietnam<\/a> shows most positive perception towards US against China. Meanwhile, 7 among 10 ASEAN countries are in favour of China. pic.twitter.com\/8VrO1UOqoL<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2014 Van Trang (@Van_Trang_N) January 16, 2020<\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The past year has also delivered dividends for China\u2019s leaders domestically, with most citizens giving them high marks<\/a> for their handling of the public health crisis, despite some initial anger over the government\u2019s early attempts to cover up the severity of the pandemic.<\/p>\n

This reinforces already high levels of overall trust<\/a> in the central government.<\/p>\n

The contrast with the US in this regard is stark. In May, a cross-country survey revealed that 95 percent of Chinese respondents had trust<\/a> in their government, compared with just 48 percent in the US.<\/p>\n

Yet, China\u2019s leaders still seem insecure<\/strong>
All of these \u201cwins\u201d would naturally provide impetus for China\u2019s international behaviour to become more confident and assertive.<\/p>\n

But President Xi Jinping\u2019s worldview is another factor. In September, Xi exhorted<\/a> Communist Party cadres to \u201cmaintain a fighting spirit and strengthen their ability to struggle\u201d. The word \u201cstruggle\u201d appeared more than another 50 times in the same speech.<\/p>\n

The Lowy Institute\u2019s Richard McGregor says<\/a> this reflects Xi\u2019s view that China is in an<\/p>\n

\n

existential struggle against an implacable enemy dead-set on destroying China.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

China\u2019s diplomats had already been primed to embrace<\/a> a \u201cfighting spirit\u201d in a speech delivered by Foreign Minister Wang Yi last November.<\/p>\n

All of this has meant that rather than projecting a self-assured poise, China\u2019s international behaviour has frequently veered in the direction of bullying fuelled by insecurity.<\/p>\n

Australia has been on the front lines of this treatment \u2014 dialogue on the leader and ministerial level has been refused<\/a>, exports have been targeted<\/a> and propaganda campaigns have been deployed<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Beijing\u2019s intransigence has predictably led to the strengthening of coalitions like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue<\/a> (comprised of the US, Australia, Japan and India), as well as deeper conversations<\/a> among Japan, India and Australia about how to build greater resilience into supply chains that are currently heavily exposed to China.<\/p>\n

\"DefenceChina warned Australia and Japan will \u2018pay a corresponding price\u201d if a new defence pact signed between the countries threatens its security. Image: The Conversation\/Eugene Hoshiko\/AP<\/p>\n

Greater use of carrots than sticks<\/strong>
There is some evidence China is beginning to recognise its over-the-top behaviour is counterproductive, at least towards some countries, and make greater use of carrots rather than sticks.<\/p>\n

Its \u201cvaccine diplomacy\u201d in Southeast Asia is a case in point<\/a>.
<\/em><\/p>\n

Covid-19 has hit Indonesia particularly hard<\/a>, hit with more than 600,000 total cases so far. But just last week, Jakarta received<\/a> 1.2 million doses of a vaccine manufactured by a Chinese pharmaceutical company, Sinovac.<\/p>\n

China is touting this effort a \u201cHealth Silk Road<\/a>\u201d, with pledges to provide billions in aid and loans to mostly developing countries to help them recover from the pandemic.<\/p>\n

\"SinovacBoxes containing coronavirus vaccines made by Sinovac arriving last week at a facility in Indonesia. Image: The Conversation\/Indonesian Presidential Palace\/AP<\/p>\n

Australia won\u2019t have much latitude with a stronger China<\/strong>
In the case of Australia, however, China is unlikely to put the stick down any time soon.<\/p>\n

As Dirk van der Klay, a research fellow at ANU, explains<\/a>, painting a stark contrast between Southeast Asia and Australia serves the purpose of reminding the region of the benefits of staying in Beijing\u2019s good books \u2014 as well as the costs of crossing it.<\/p>\n

While countries like the US, Britain and France have at least offered Australia some rhetorical support in its China predicament, Australia\u2019s most significant Southeast Asian neighbours have been notably quiet<\/a>.<\/p>\n

With China\u2019s relative power set to grow further in 2021, Canberra might feel even more uncomfortable. But as former senior Singaporean diplomat, Bilahari Kausikan, remarked<\/a> in October, Australia is \u201cnot in a unique position\u201d as \u201calmost everybody\u201d in the region faces the same challenge of managing relations with China and the US to maximise their economic and security interests.<\/p>\n

Australia\u2019s unfortunate distinction is that because its relations with China have already sunk to such depths, it has less ability to negotiate a path between the two great powers.<\/p>\n

Elevating partnerships with countries like Japan, India and Indonesia offers one way forward, but alongside this needs to be a pragmatic strategy for getting the China relationship at least back on an even keel.<\/p>\n

Tokyo, New Delhi and Jakarta have all had serious challenges with Beijing, but their relations never fell to the depths of the current China-Australia tensions. These countries might offer some useful advice here, too.\"The<\/p>\n

Dr James Laurenceson<\/a> is director and professor, Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI), University of Technology Sydney<\/a><\/em>. This article is republished from The Conversation<\/a> under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

\"Print<\/a><\/div>\n\n

This post was originally published on Radio Free<\/a>. <\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

ANALYSIS: By James Laurenceson, University of Technology Sydney Great power competition in the Asia-Pacific region has been building for years. But covid-19 has turbo-charged the shifts taking place\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":400,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[789,1207,175,1208,190,814,1209,1150,5,1210,207,4,12,14],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/radiofree.asia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4598"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/radiofree.asia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/radiofree.asia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/radiofree.asia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/400"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/radiofree.asia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4598"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/radiofree.asia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4598\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4599,"href":"https:\/\/radiofree.asia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4598\/revisions\/4599"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/radiofree.asia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4598"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/radiofree.asia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4598"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/radiofree.asia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4598"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}