Australia should be more engaged in the Pacific, something the previous government failed to do sufficiently, says Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong.
Wong was in Wellington today to meet with her New Zealand counterpart, Nanaia Mahuta.
In late April, Wong criticised the Coalition for failing to intervene to stop the Solomon Islands-China deal, saying it was the “worst foreign policy blunder in the Pacific that Australia has seen since the end of World War II”.
She told RNZ Morning Report the criticism was not only of that deal, “it was of the government’s failure to engage sufficiently in the Pacific in the way that Australia should have been engaging.”
“Pacific security should be provided by the Pacific family. We do have concerns about the security of the Pacific being engaging in outside of the Pacific family, that is the position Australia has taken and I think it’s the position New Zealand has taken.”
Australia needed to listen more and do much better than the previous government on climate change, she said.
There were a lot of Pacific policies articulated by the Labor Party during the election and Wong said part of what she was doing in the Pacific was talking to people about these.
“Obviously there was quite a substantial Official Development Assistance (ODA) reduction under the previous government so during the election we outlined a policy for the Pacific, which did a few things, fundamentally it sought to draw on Australia’s proximity, we proposed a Pacific engagement visa, we proposed additional ODAs, we proposed addition maritime engagement, maritime support of Pacific defence force.
“So a whole range of policy measures which were about making sure Australia worked with the Pacific and Pacific nations … to deepen the partnership.”
Wong was also working on First Nations foreign policy and said it was something she wanted to speak to Nanaia Mahuta about.
“Her emphasis on indigenous foreign policy I think is really quite world leading.”
Asked about 501 deportees, Wong said she was familiar that the issue was of concern to New Zealand and both Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese had had discussions about this.
Australia would be retaining the 501 policy. “But we do recognise concerns have been raised, those deserve consideration.”
“I think that Prime Minister Ardern was very clear about the concerns in the meeting with Prime Minister Albanese and we’ve said we will consider them and we will work through them together in an orderly way.”
‘Sign of progress’ The phrase “Pacific family” seemed to be the new line from Australia and New Zealand, The Democracy Project geopolitical analyst Dr Geoffrey Miller told Morning Report.
“Which I think is a welcome change from the ‘backyard’ language that was used a couple of months ago. It’s about seeing Pacific countries as equals, as the sovereign nations that they most certainly are.
“It was offensive to those countries and I think it’s a sign of progress that New Zealand and Australia are using this ‘family’ language.”
It remained to be seen to what extent this was just rhetoric, he said.
Wong’s trip to New Zealand was her fifth overseas trip since coming into power, Miller said Nanaia Mahuta almost certainly needed to get out more.
“Her last trip overseas was in March to Fiji, you would have expected another one or two by now.”
This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.
Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s decision to embark on a diplomatic offensive to outflank China in the Pacific within days of being sworn in has yielded what appears to have been an early success.
Whether Wong’s intervention gave Pacific leaders pause about a wide-ranging economic and security pact with China or they would have baulked anyway, the fact is Australian diplomacy can claim a dividend.
In the process, the country appears to have a new foreign minister who will engage in more creative and activist foreign policy then her predecessor.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s extensive tour of the Pacific has been aimed at extending Beijing’s influence in the region at a moment when regional leaders had grown restive about Australia’s commitment to its immediate neighbourhood.
The Morrison government’s equivocation on climate has not sat well with leaders of the Pacific’s micro-states.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s tour of the Pacific has come at a time when regional leaders were unsure of Australia’s commitment to its neighbourhood. Image: AAP/AP
Wong’s mission appears to have succeeded on three important fronts:
it has reassured Pacific neighbours that a new Labor government will do more than pay lip service to their concerns about climate and other issues
Wong has made it clear Canberra will not be reticent in contesting Beijing’s influence in the region
her mission has enabled her to assert her own authority early over the foreign policy and security reach of her portfolio.
This latter aspect will be important in how and in what form Australia responds to Chinese overtures aimed at achieving a re-set in relations.
Labor governments have long managed the relationship well In one respect, the new Labor government has history on its side.
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canberra and Beijing.
All these years later, another Labor government has the opportunity to re-set Australia’s relations with the dominant regional player at a moment when the Indo-Pacific is undergoing profound change.
Few would reasonably argue against the proposition that a “re-set” is overdue after years of drift and ill-will under the Morrison government.
The question for Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and his national security team is how to proceed in a way that conforms with Australia’s national interest, is faithful to its values, and enables Canberra’s voice to be inserted in regional councils.
Wong has, for some time, been sketching out a more creative foreign policy approach — evident in her Pacific initiative — that will seek to expand Australia’s regional relationships and, where appropriate, take the lead in alignment with the country’s national interest.
In this sense, the joint communique on December 21 1972, signalling the establishment of diplomatic relations between Australia and the People’s Republic of China, makes interesting reading.
Unlike Richard Nixon’s Shanghai communique of 1972, which fudged the Taiwan issue, the Whitlam government document is explicit.
The Australian government recognises the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China, acknowledges the position of the Chinese Government that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China, and has decided to remove its official representation from Taiwan before 25 January, 1973.
Albanese and his security policy team can be sure this document will not be gathering dust in a Chinese Foreign Ministry archive.
China’s attachment to anniversaries is one of the more notable features of its diplomacy. These occasions may be used for political purposes, but history weighs heavily on Beijing’s foreign policy calculations.
Albanese government should jump on the promise of a thaw When Prime Minister Li Keqiang promptly sent a congratulatory message to Albanese on the latter’s success in the recent election, Labor’s historic shift towards Beijing back in 1972 will not have been overlooked.
The wording of Li’s message was pointed. It said, in part, that China was:
ready to work with the Australian side to review the past, face the future, uphold principles of mutual respect, mutual benefit.
Beijing talks a lot about “mutual respect” and “mutual benefit”. These are phrases that are, more often that not, designed to deflect criticism of China’s human rights abuses and other bad behaviour.
But taken together with overtures for a “re-set” by the new Chinese ambassador in Canberra, Xiao Qian, Beijing has clearly decided it is in China’s interests to turn the page on a sour period between the countries.
Asked at his press conference after the conclusion of Quad talks in Tokyo about his response to the conciliatory message from Li, Albanese simply said:
I welcome that. And we will respond appropriately in time when I return to Australia.
In other responses to questions about troubled relations with China, the new prime minister has said it is up to Beijing to start removing sanctions on Australian exports.
These Albanese responses are prudent. There is no point in rushing to acknowledge such overtures. However, he would be making a mistake if he seeks to prolong what has the makings of a thaw.
He might remind himself that virtually all of Australia’s western allies, including America, have working relations with Beijing that enable officials to engage in a constructive dialogue, despite differences.
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s responses to China so far have been prudent. Image: Lukas Coch/AAP
Australia’s first ambassador to China, Stephen Fitzgerald, has some wise counsel for the new government in Canberra about how to better manage relations with Beijing.
Australia under a Labor government must now return to diplomacy, talking with the PRC, for which it is ready and putting away the megaphone of gratuitous criticism, insult and condemnation which were the hallmarks of Morrison’s China policy. If we do this, there will be many issues on which we can have constructive engagement.
One of these issues can — and should — be the continued detention in China of two Australian citizens, the journalist Cheng Lei and the democratic activist Yang Hengjun. Progress towards their release should be a condition of improved relations, along with removal of punitive tariffs on imports of such items as wine and barley.
Finally, Albanese’s security policy team should pay particular attention to US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s landmark foreign policy speech delivered to the Asia Society in Washington on May 26.
In that speech, Blinken laid down guidelines for the conduct of relations with Beijing in a world whose foundations are shifting. His words bear repeating as a template for Canberra’s own interactions with Beijing.
We are not looking for conflict or a new Cold War […] We don’t seek to block China from its role as a major power […] But we will defend [the international order] and make it possible for all countries – including the United States and China – to coexist and co-operate.
Blinken’s attempts to define a workable China policy should be regarded in the same vein as another important statement delivered 17 years ago by then Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in New York. In that speech, Zoellick said:
We now need to encourage China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system.
Blinken’s and Zoellick’s interventions, two decades apart, are important guardrails for a constructive relationship with China.
If the coming election goes to Australia’s Labor party, Penny Wong is very likely to become Foreign Minister. So when she speaks, people across the region prick up their ears.
Without the least disrespect to her recent forebears, she could be one of the most acute, incisive and insightful FMs in recent history.
Whether she’ll be any more effective than them is another matter.
Australia has a long tradition of placing prominent front-benchers into the role, and then pointedly ignoring their efforts, their advice and their warnings. It’s as if government leaders find their greatest rival and send them trotting off around the globe, more to keep them from making mischief at home than to achieve anything noteworthy while they’re gone.
In Australia, it seems, foreign policy is domestic policy done outdoors.
If she achieves nothing more, Wong would be well served to look closely at the people supporting her, and to spend considerable effort re-organising and in fact re-inventing DFAT.
Its disconnection from other departments, especially Defence and PMO, has created an internal culture that spends more time feeding on itself than actually helping produce a persuasive or coherent foreign policy.
Ensuring foreign policy’s primacy at the cabinet table is a big ask, but it will be for naught if the department can’t deliver. There are significant structural matters to be dealt with.
‘Worst failure of foreign policy in the Pacific’: Labor launches scathing attack on government over Solomon Islands-China pact https://t.co/efbU2tM6Iu
Rolling development and aid into the department was a significant regression that hampered both sides. Volumes can be written about the need to distinguish development assistance from foreign policy, and many of them could be focused on the Pacific islands region.
The two are mostly complementary (mostly), but they must also be discrete from one another.
It’s far more complicated than this, but suffice it to say that development aid prioritises the recipient’s needs, while foreign relations generally prioritise national concerns. The moment you invert either side of that equation, you lose.
Exempli gratia: Solomon Islands.
It’s well known that Australia spent billions shoring up Solomon Islands’ security and administrative capacity. Surely after all that aid, they can expect the government to stay onside in geopolitical matters?
Applying the admittedly simplistic filter from the para above, the answer is an obvious no.
Aid is not a substitute for actual foreign relations, and foreign relations is definitely not just aid.
So is Penny Wong correct when she calls the CN/SI defence agreement a massive strategic setback? Sure.
Is she right to call Pacific Affairs Minister Zed Seselja “a junior woodchuck”, sent in a last minute attempt to dissuade Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare from signing the agreement?
The idea of a minister responsible for the complex, wildly diverse patchwork of nations spanning such a vast space has value. But in terms of resources and policy heft, Seselja rides at the back of the posse on a mule.
There are good reasons to devote an entire office to Pacific affairs. There are also blindingly good reasons to keep the Foreign Minister as the primary point of contact on matters of foreign policy.
That means the role—and yes, the existence—of the Pacific Affairs ministry needs a ground-up reconsideration. Notionally, it fulfills a critical role. But how?
It’s fair to say that Wong is more insightful than those who describe Solomon Islands as a fly-speck in the Pacific, or a Little Cuba (whatever the F that means). But in the past, Labor’s shown little insight into the actual value and purpose of foreign policy.
For the better part of four decades, neither Australian party was fussed at all about the fact that there had been few if any official visits between leaders. Prime Ministers regularly blew off Pacific Islands Forum meetings.
In Vanuatu’s case, the first ever prime ministerial visit to Canberra was in 2018. Why aren’t such meetings annual events?
Australia is rightly proud of its pre-eminence in development assistance in the Pacific islands. But that never was, and never will be, a substitute for diplomatic engagement. And you can’t have that without a functioning diplomatic corps whose presence is felt equally in Canberra and in foreign capitals.
But even that’s not enough. Penny Wong has yet to show in concrete terms how she plans to address what could accurately be called the greatest strategic foreign policy failure since WWII: Leaving Australia alone to guard the shop.
In 2003, George W. Bush was rightly vilified for characterising Australia’s role in the region as America’s Sheriff.
But the Americans weren’t the only ones who walked away, leaving Australia alone to engage with the region. The UK and the EU (minus France in their patch) rolled back their diplomatic presence substantially.
Even New Zealand agreed to restrict its engagement in large areas in deference to its neighbour. The most enduring presence was provided by organisations without any meaningful foreign policy role: UN development agencies and multilateral financial institutions.
Since the beginning of the War on Terror, there has been a consistent and often deliberate draw-down on the capital provided by democratic institutions, multilateral foreign policy, and indeed any collective course-setting among nations.
Post Cold-War democratic momentum has been squandered on an increasingly transactional approach to engagement that’s begun to look alarmingly like the spheres of influence that appeal so much to Putin and Xi.
This hasn’t happened in the Pacific islands alone. The UN has become an appendix in the global body politic, one cut away from complete irrelevance. ASEAN and APEC are struggling just as hard to find relevance, let alone purpose, as the Pacific Islands Forum or the Melanesian Spearhead Group.
Australia has “led” in the Pacific islands region by being the largest aid donor, blithely assuming that all the other kids in the region want to be like it. But that “leadership” masks a massive gap in actual influence in shaping the agenda in a region that’s larger and more diverse than any other in the world.
The data’s there if people want it. This isn’t a particularly contentious… er, contention, if you’re among the far-too-small group of people who actually live in and care about the future of the region.
In a regional dynamic defined and dominated by transactional bilateralism, China holds all the aces. The only hope anyone has of slowing its growth in the region is through meaningful multilateralism that treats Pacific island countries as actual nations with national pride and individual priorities. Instead of silencing them, their voices should be amplified and defended, not by Australia alone, but by every other democratic nation with the means and the will to do so.
If we can’t respect the equal standing of nations, we can’t protect their integrity.
Scott Morrison may indeed be one of the worst exemplars of this blithe disregard for actual foreign policy engagement. He’s certainly won few friends with his world-class foot-dragging on climate change. America’s suddenly renewed interest in the region is an indication that they’ve woken up to the Bush administration’s mistakes.
It’s also clear they don’t trust Australia to play Sheriff any more. Kurt Campbell’s upcoming visit to the region is just the latest in a series of increasingly high profile tours of the region.
So yes, Penny Wong is justified in saying that China’s advances in the Pacific derive at least in part from Australia’s lack of a coherent and effective foreign policy.
But foreign policy is not made at home. It’s not Australia’s interests alone that matter. And subjugating Pacific nations in compacts of free association isn’t a substitute for actual policy making.
Pacific island nations will not defend Australia’s national interests unless they share those interests. The only way that Australia—and the world—can be assured they do is by actively listening, and by incorporating Pacific voices into the fabric of a renewed and revitalised global family.
Dan McGarry was previously media director at Vanuatu Daily Post/Buzz FM96. The Village Explainer is his semi-regular newsletter containing analysis and insight focusing on under-reported aspects of Pacific societies, politics and economics. His articles are republished by Asia Pacific Report with permission.
The draft security agreement between China and Solomon Islands circulating on social media raises important questions about how the Australian government and national security community understand power dynamics in the Pacific Islands.
In Australian debates, the term “influence” is oftenused to characterise the assumed consequences of China’s increasingly visible presence in the Pacific.
There’s an assumption China generates influence primarily from its economic statecraft. This includes its concessional loans, aid and investment by state-owned enterprises (which partly manifests in Beijing’s involvement of Pacific Islands in its Belt and Road Initiative).
On its face, the leaked draft seemingly proves Chinese spending “bought” enough influence to get the Solomon Islands government to consider this agreement. But such an interpretation misses two key issues.
Senior Australian government ministers have expressed concern about a draft security agreement between China and the Solomon Islands https://t.co/yFnyCKsJxE
The role of domestic politics First, the draft agreement is primarily about Solomon Islands domestic politics — not just geopolitics.
As explained by Dr Tarcisius Kabutaulaka after the November 2021 riots in Honiara, geopolitical considerations intersect with, and can be used to, advance longstanding domestic issues.
These include uneven and unequal development, frustrated decentralisation, and unresolved grievances arising from prior conflicts.
Power in the Pacific is complex. It is not just politicians in the national government who matter in domestic and foreign policy-making.
Take, for example, the activism of Malaita provincial Governor Derek Suidani, who pursued relations with Taiwan after Solomon Islands switched diplomatic recognition to China in 2019. This highlights the important role sub-national actors can play in the both domestic and foreign policy arenas.
Neither Solomon Islanders (nor other Pacific peoples) are “passive dupes” to Chinese influence or unaware of geopolitical challenges — and opportunities. Some do, however, face resource and constitutional constraints when resisting influence attempts.
Australia’s current policy settings are not working The second key issue is that Australia’s current policy settings are not working — if their success is measured by advancing Australia’s strategic interests.
Australia is by far the Pacific’s largest aid donor and has been on a spending spree under its “Pacific Step-up” initiative.
Australia spent billions leading the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), as well as significant bilateral programMEs to the country. Yet Australia has not been able to head off Honiara considering the security agreement with China.
Perhaps Canberra has not sought to influence Solomon Islands on this matter. But given Australia’s longstanding anxieties about potentially hostile powers establishing a presence in the region, this is unlikely.
Home Affairs Minister Karen Andrews has already commented in response to the leaked draft that:
This is our neighbourhood and we are very concerned of any activity that is taking place in the Pacific Islands.
The rumours (subsequently denied) that China was in talks to establish a military base in Vanuatu, and China’s attempt to lease Tulagi Island in Solomon Islands had already intensified Australia’s anxieties.
Such concerns partly motivated the government’s investment in the Pacific Step-up.
Article 1 provides that Solomon Islands may request China to “send police, police, military personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces to Solomon Islands” in circumstances ranging from maintaining social order to unspecified “other tasks agreed upon by the Parties”.
Even more concerningly for Solomon Islands’ sovereignty, Article 1 also provides that
relevant forces of China can be used to protect the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects in Solomon Islands.
It remains unclear what authority the Solomon Islands government would maintain once it consents to Beijing’s deployment of “relevant forces” to protect Chinese nationals.
Article 4 is equally vague. It states specific details regarding Chinese missions, including “jurisdiction, privilege and immunity […] shall be negotiated separately”.
The agreement also raises questions about the transparency of agreements Beijing makes and their consequences for democracy in its partner states.
According to Article 5,
without the written consent of the other party, neither party shall disclose the cooperation information to a third party.
This implies the Solomon Islands government is legally bound not to inform its own people and their democratically elected representatives about activities under the agreement without the Chinese approval.
The version circulating on social media may prove to be an early draft. Its leak is likely a bargaining tactic aimed at pursuing multiple agendas with multiple actors – including Australia.
Australian High Commissioner Lachlan Strahan met yesterday with Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare and announced Australia will extend its assistance force until December 2023.
It will build a national radio network, construct a second patrol boat outpost, and provide SI$130 million (A$21.5 million) in budget support.
A draft security cooperation agreement could allow China to deploy police and military personnel in Solomon Islands.https://t.co/EkcrFaHEqV
Playing whack-a-mole While the timing was likely coincidental, it highlights an emerging dynamic in Australia’s Pacific policy: playing whack-a-mole by seeking to directly counter Chinese moves through economic statecraft.
That China has been able to persuade Solomon Islands to consider an intrusive security agreement raises questions about our understanding of how power and influence are exercised in the Pacific.
If influence is taken to result in concrete behavioural changes (such as entering into a bilateral security agreement), and if Australia is going to “compete” with China on spending, you’d need to ask, for example: how much “influence” does an infrastructure project buy?
This understanding of power, however, is insufficient. Instead, a more nuanced approach is required.
Influence is exercised not only by national governments, but also by a variety of non-state actors, including sub-national and community groups.
And targets of influence-seekers can exercise their agency. See, for example, how various actors in Solomon Islands are leveraging Australia, China and Taiwan’s overtures to the country.
We must also consider how power affects the political norms and values guiding governing elites and non-state actors, potentially reshaping their identities and interests.
The draft security agreement may come to nothing — but it should provide a wake-up call to Australia and its partners.
Old assumptions about how power and influence are exercised in the Pacific need urgent re-examination — as does our assumption that explicitly “competing” with China advances either our interests or those of the Pacific.
The Australian prime minister, Scott Morrison, has confirmed his country’s officials will not attend the Beijing Winter Olympics, joining the US in a diplomatic boycott of next year’s Games and prompting accusations from Beijing of political posturing.
Morrison told reporters in Sydney it was “not surprising”, given the deterioration in the diplomatic relationship between Australia and China, that officials would not attend next year’s winter Games.
The Morrison government is considering citing Covid restrictions as a reason for officials to stay away from the Beijing Winter Olympics, as calls grow for Australia to follow the US in a diplomatic boycott.
Guardian Australia understands while an announcement could be made soon, the government is unlikely to take as strong a position as the Biden administration, which blasted China over “ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity”.
Chinese authorities must answer serious concerns about the tennis star Peng Shuai’s welfare, the Australian government has said.
The intervention comes as human rights activists and an independent senator step up calls for Australia to join a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics over broader allegations of rights abuses against Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang.
Human rights groups say revelations that Australia sat on its hands after learning of Indonesian military atrocities against West Papuan demonstrators are “deeply disturbing” and should prompt an independent investigation.
A newly released unredacted intelligence report, shared with the Guardian, shows the Australian government had compelling evidence that the Indonesian military fired live rounds indiscriminately into a group of unarmed West Papuan demonstrators on the island of Biak on 6 July 1998.
The Australian government’s newly appointed adviser on resettling Afghan nationals has predicted the “residual trauma” among those fleeing Taliban-controlled Afghanistan will be “amongst the highest levels of any groups we’ve ever resettled”.
Paris Aristotle, the co-chair of an advisory panel announced on Monday, also said he welcomed signals from the government that it was open to taking more than the 3,000 Afghan nationals it initially pledged to accommodate by June next year.
The Australian government’s newly appointed adviser on resettling Afghan nationals has predicted the “residual trauma” among those fleeing Taliban-controlled Afghanistan will be “amongst the highest levels of any groups we’ve ever resettled”.
Paris Aristotle, the co-chair of an advisory panel announced on Monday, also said he welcomed signals from the government that it was open to taking more than the 3,000 Afghan nationals it initially pledged to accommodate by June next year.
The Morrison government faces growing pressure to tighten Australia’s customs laws after the Senate passed a bill to ban anyone from importing products made using forced labour.
On Monday the Senate passed a bill proposed by the independent senator, Rex Patrick, but for the measure to come into effect it would also have to clear the government-controlled lower house.
Women in media in Kabul tell of trying to destroy traces of their identity as they brace for Taliban retribution
When president Ashraf Ghani slipped out of Afghanistan with no warning, he took with him any glimpse of hope left for the nation’s women – especially those who are educated and outspoken.
Aaisha* is that and more. As a prominent news anchor and political talk show host, she has watched her life’s efforts crumble in what felt like seconds.
Proposed amendments allow government to sanction individuals for ‘gross human rights violations’ or serious corruption
Foreign government officials could face sanctions for “gross human rights violations” while corrupt business people could be banned from travelling to Australia and have their assets and bank accounts frozen.
New sanctions powers – announced by the Morrison government on Thursday and expected to be presented to parliament by the end of the year – will allow Australia to target “perpetrators of egregious acts of international concern”.
A call from a Pacific island neighbour to phase out coal power is one of 55 recommendations the Morrison government has rejected ahead of a UN session focusing on Australia’s human rights record.
Australia rebuffed the Marshall Islands’ request to phase out coal-fired power in order to limit global heating to 1.5C, as the climate crisis is increasingly framed as a threat to human rights.
Committee of Liberal, Nationals, Labor and Greens MPs urge government to consider sanctions after hundreds of deaths in Myanmar
The Morrison government faces increased pressure from within its own ranks to expand sanctions against Myanmar’s military leaders and to offer permanent residency to citizens who wish to remain in Australia.
Myanmar security forces have killed hundreds of civilians amid protests in the wake of the 1 February coup but the Australian government has held off ratcheting up sanctions against the top generals, arguing the junta is largely resistant to international pressure.
Embassy in Canberra silent in response to requests to disclose whereabouts of Osama al-Hasani
Australia’s foreign affairs minister has contacted her Saudi Arabian counterpart to raise the plight of a dual national extradited from Morocco amid mounting concerns about his detention.
The Saudi Arabian embassy in Canberra remains silent in response to requests to disclose the whereabouts of Osama al-Hasani, 42, even after human rights advocates raised fears for his welfare.
Almost 400 organisations say Morrison government’s decision not to impose sanctions is disappointing and emboldens military junta
Democracy campaigners defying the military junta in Myanmar have pleaded with Australia to sanction the generals who engineered February’s coup and the businesses that sustain the military regime.
Nearly 400 civil society organisations inside Myanmar have written an open letter to the foreign minister, Marise Payne, condemning Australia’s “shameful inaction” and urging it to impose new sanctions to de-legitimise the military regime and squeeze its sources of foreign funding.
Fresh doubts have been raised over an alleged criminal case in Saudi Arabia against Osama al-Hasani
Saudi Arabian authorities must urgently reveal the location of the Australian citizen who was extradited to the country, human rights advocates say, amid fresh doubts over the alleged criminal case against him.
Osama al-Hasani, 42, was transferred from Morocco to Saudi Arabia at 2.45am on 13 March, just hours after United Nations officials sent an urgent letter asking authorities not to deport him over fears he would face torture there, according to Human Rights Watch.
Penny Wong calls for Australia to consider targeted sanctions on foreign entities directly profiting from forced Uyghur labour
The Morrison government must explain whether it sees human rights abuses in China’s Xinjiang region as a case of genocide, the federal opposition says.
Labor’s foreign affairs spokesperson, Penny Wong, also called on the government to “consider targeted sanctions on foreign companies, officials and other entities known to be directly profiting from Uyghur forced labour and other human rights abuses”.
Former Australian PM says world ‘radically underestimating’ how quickly junta violence could deteriorate to tens of thousands of deaths and a refugee crisis
The world is “radically underestimating” how badly the situation in Myanmar could deteriorate, with the prospect of thousands of deaths and an exodus of refugees, the former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd has warned.
Rudd raised the alarm as he called for an urgent meeting of the UN security council, arguing the international community had a “responsibility to protect” the people of Myanmar from “mass atrocities” by the country’s military.
Foreign affairs minister says the government has grave concerns about repression of protest since ousting of Aung San Suu Kyi
Australia has suspended military cooperation with Myanmar and redirected aid to non-government organisations in response to escalating violence in the wake of last month’s military coup.
The foreign affairs minister, Marise Payne, says the government has raised grave concerns about the increasingly bloody repression of protest since the ousting of democratically elected Aung San Suu Kyi on 1 February.
Independent Rex Patrick moves after similar parliamentary motions passed in Canada and the Netherlands
An Australian senator will seek support from fellow upper house members to recognise China’s treatment of the Uighur Muslim minority as genocide, after similar parliamentary motions passed in Canada and the Netherlands.
The proposed motion – placed on the Senate’s notice paper for 15 March – looms as a test for the major parties at a time when Australia should join the international community in taking a stand, according to the South Australian independent senator Rex Patrick.
Supporters of businessman Osama AlHasani say he is expected to face court on Wednesday, and that they view the case as political
Australian consular officials say they are seeking to help an Australian citizen who has been detained in Morocco, as human rights activists raised fears the man may be extradited to Saudi Arabia.
Supporters of the businessman Dr Osama AlHasani – a dual Australian and Saudi citizen – said he was expected to face court in Morocco on Wednesday, having been detained shortly after he arrived there on 8 February.
We call you to participate in our tweeting campaign with the hashtag #DontDeportOsamaAlHasani and in Arabic with #لاترحلوا_اسامة_الحسني.. The issue is really urgent and there is threat upon his life. We reassert that he has no relation to any political opposition activity. pic.twitter.com/z7FL32nnzT
Australia is facing growing calls to suspend military cooperation with Myanmar and impose targeted sanctions on top military generals after its army seized power in a coup and detained civilian leaders.
Labor joined calls on Tuesday for the Morrison government to review Australia’s military links and send a “clear signal to Myanmar’s military leaders that their actions are a direct attack on Myanmar’s democratic transition and stability”.
Human rights session calls on Canberra to raise age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 14 as China attacks Australia over ‘baseless charges’
Australia has come under international pressure to reduce the number of children in detention, with more than 30 countries using a UN human rights session to call on authorities to raise the age of criminal responsibility.
Amid ongoing tensions between China and Australia, Beijing’s representative took the opportunity on Wednesday evening to demand that Canberra “stop using false information to make baseless charges against other countries for political purposes”.
Nations question delay in raising age of criminal responsibility to 14 and response to Uluru statement
The Australian government is to be challenged over the country’s lack of progress in reducing rates of Indigenous incarceration at a UN hearing this week.
Sweden and Uruguay have submitted questions in advance about the overrepresentation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in Australian prisons, while Germany wants to know why Australia has delayed a push to raise the age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 14 years.
Great power competition in the Asia-Pacific region has been building for years. But covid-19 has turbo-charged the shifts taking place and China has finished 2020 in a significantly stronger position compared with the US than when the year started.
Meanwhile, Canberra’s relations with Beijing continue to deteriorate and there’s little reason to be optimistic that a sudden, positive turnaround will be seen in 2021.
As competition rather than cooperation has become the dominant frame through which both Beijing and Washington view their bilateral relationship, each is increasingly sensitive to evidence that other countries in the Asia-Pacific region are supporting their opponent.
The fundamental driver of China’s hostility towards Australia in 2020 stems from its assessment that Australia’s leaders have reneged on earlier commitments to never direct the country’s security alliance with the US against China.
Prime Minister Scott Morrison has appealed for Australia and other middle and smaller powers to be granted “greater latitude” in how they manoeuvre between the US and China in the future.
But the University of Sydney’s James Curran cautions against unrealistic expectations:
Great powers simply don’t dole out strategic space to others.
China’s power on an upwards trajectory At the end of 2019, China’s GDP stood at US$14.3 trillion. This was two-thirds that of the US GDP of $21.3 trillion.
The fallout from covid-19 has accelerated the trend in China’s favour. The International Monetary Fund’s latest growth forecasts suggest China’s economy will jump from two-thirds to three-quarters the size of the US by the end of 2021.
And when cost differences are accounted for and the two economies are measured in terms of their respective purchasing power, China’s GDP is actually already 10 percent larger than the US.
Retail sales grew by 5 percent in China in November, compared to the same month last year, as the country’s economy continues its strong recovery. Image: The Conversation/Yang Jianzheng/AP
According to the Lowy Institute’s “Asia Power Index”, which tracks power in the economic, military, diplomatic and cultural domains, the US still comes out on top, but its lead over China has been cut in half since 2018. This mainly reflected losses by the US rather than gains by China.
And even before covid-19 hit, a survey of business, media and civil society leaders in Southeast Asia showed that Beijing was considered vastly more influential than Washington in the region, though this increasing power was viewed with apprehension.
Nearly half said they had little to no confidence in the US as a strategic partner or provider of regional security.
And when asked if the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was forced to align itself with either the US or China, a majority in seven of the 10 ASEAN member countries chose China.
@NAR : Interesting survey by @ISEAS. #Vietnam shows most positive perception towards US against China. Meanwhile, 7 among 10 ASEAN countries are in favour of China. pic.twitter.com/8VrO1UOqoL
The past year has also delivered dividends for China’s leaders domestically, with most citizens giving them high marks for their handling of the public health crisis, despite some initial anger over the government’s early attempts to cover up the severity of the pandemic.
The contrast with the US in this regard is stark. In May, a cross-country survey revealed that 95 percent of Chinese respondents had trust in their government, compared with just 48 percent in the US.
Yet, China’s leaders still seem insecure All of these “wins” would naturally provide impetus for China’s international behaviour to become more confident and assertive.
But President Xi Jinping’s worldview is another factor. In September, Xi exhorted Communist Party cadres to “maintain a fighting spirit and strengthen their ability to struggle”. The word “struggle” appeared more than another 50 times in the same speech.
The Lowy Institute’s Richard McGregor says this reflects Xi’s view that China is in an
existential struggle against an implacable enemy dead-set on destroying China.
China’s diplomats had already been primed to embrace a “fighting spirit” in a speech delivered by Foreign Minister Wang Yi last November.
All of this has meant that rather than projecting a self-assured poise, China’s international behaviour has frequently veered in the direction of bullying fuelled by insecurity.
Australia has been on the front lines of this treatment — dialogue on the leader and ministerial level has been refused, exports have been targeted and propaganda campaigns have been deployed.
Beijing’s intransigence has predictably led to the strengthening of coalitions like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (comprised of the US, Australia, Japan and India), as well as deeper conversations among Japan, India and Australia about how to build greater resilience into supply chains that are currently heavily exposed to China.
China warned Australia and Japan will ‘pay a corresponding price” if a new defence pact signed between the countries threatens its security. Image: The Conversation/Eugene Hoshiko/AP
Greater use of carrots than sticks There is some evidence China is beginning to recognise its over-the-top behaviour is counterproductive, at least towards some countries, and make greater use of carrots rather than sticks.
Its “vaccine diplomacy” in Southeast Asia is a case in point.
Covid-19 has hit Indonesia particularly hard, hit with more than 600,000 total cases so far. But just last week, Jakarta received 1.2 million doses of a vaccine manufactured by a Chinese pharmaceutical company, Sinovac.
China is touting this effort a “Health Silk Road”, with pledges to provide billions in aid and loans to mostly developing countries to help them recover from the pandemic.
Boxes containing coronavirus vaccines made by Sinovac arriving last week at a facility in Indonesia. Image: The Conversation/Indonesian Presidential Palace/AP
Australia won’t have much latitude with a stronger China In the case of Australia, however, China is unlikely to put the stick down any time soon.
As Dirk van der Klay, a research fellow at ANU, explains, painting a stark contrast between Southeast Asia and Australia serves the purpose of reminding the region of the benefits of staying in Beijing’s good books — as well as the costs of crossing it.
While countries like the US, Britain and France have at least offered Australia some rhetorical support in its China predicament, Australia’s most significant Southeast Asian neighbours have been notably quiet.
With China’s relative power set to grow further in 2021, Canberra might feel even more uncomfortable. But as former senior Singaporean diplomat, Bilahari Kausikan, remarked in October, Australia is “not in a unique position” as “almost everybody” in the region faces the same challenge of managing relations with China and the US to maximise their economic and security interests.
Australia’s unfortunate distinction is that because its relations with China have already sunk to such depths, it has less ability to negotiate a path between the two great powers.
Elevating partnerships with countries like Japan, India and Indonesia offers one way forward, but alongside this needs to be a pragmatic strategy for getting the China relationship at least back on an even keel.
Tokyo, New Delhi and Jakarta have all had serious challenges with Beijing, but their relations never fell to the depths of the current China-Australia tensions. These countries might offer some useful advice here, too.
Yang’s refusal to confess despite ongoing interrogation causes ‘real difficulties for the confession-based legal system’, his friend says
The trial of Australian writer Yang Hengjun, who has been detained in Beijing since January 2019, has been delayed by three months, according to his former teacher and a supporter Feng Chongyi.
The 55-year-old pro-democracy blogger, who was detained at Guangzhou airport after arriving from New York, faces a lengthy jail sentence after Chinese authorities charged him with endangering national security by joining or accepting a mission from an unidentified espionage organisation.
China warned Australia and Japan will ‘pay a corresponding price” if a new defence pact signed between the countries threatens its security. Image: The Conversation/Eugene Hoshiko/AP
Boxes containing coronavirus vaccines made by Sinovac arriving last week at a facility in Indonesia. Image: The Conversation/Indonesian Presidential Palace/AP
