Category: Picks

  • Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei welcomes a group of artists and filmmakers while exchanging pleasantries and cracking a joke about reports a prominent filmmaker had received residency in Canada.

    “I hear you’ve been Canada-ized,” Khamenei says to the director in a documentary shown on state TV. He then pokes fun at another man who he says has been active since before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, good-naturedly calling him a “taghouti” — someone affiliated with the Pahlavi monarchy, which was ousted in the revolution.

    Khamenei is also shown carefully listening to his guests, who are sipping tea and nibbling on cookies. Some participants at the meeting later praise the “warm” and “friendly” atmosphere and claim they were able to speak their minds freely. Another added that meeting Khamenei had given them all hope.

    The scenes are part of a propaganda series called Informal that recently aired on state-controlled television and was shown on Iranian news sites.

    Informal also includes Khamenei meeting with veterans of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War who reminisce about the tragic conflict and the “martyrs” they served with.

    One man — who lost his arms in an explosion — says he was overwhelmed with emotion when Khamenei embraced him.

    The creators of Informal say it shows “informal and intimate” weekly meetings that Khamenei has held in recent years with cultural activists, artists, scientists, and others.

    Carefully Choreographed

    Informal is, in fact, very carefully choreographed to portray Khamenei — who has increasingly relied on his feared security apparatus to tighten his grip on power and silence dissenting voices — in a positive light as an all-caring leader for Iranians who understands the difficult issues in their lives.

    In the documentary, the uncompromising authoritarian leader who has ruled Iran for more than three decades says he reads reports from average Iranians “every day.”

    “Many of the reports [offer] criticism [about various issues] and we follow-up,” Khamenei claims.

    “It’s not as if we imagine that we are living in the paradise of the Islamic republic that was created in our minds, no. We definitely have issues in our work [that we must deal with],” he says, claiming that the “problems” and “deviations” in society do not harm the much-criticized clerical establishment as a whole.

    Ayatollah Khamenei underwent prostate surgery four years ago amid rumors he was in ill-health.

    Ayatollah Khamenei underwent prostate surgery four years ago amid rumors he was in ill-health.

    Participants in the meetings with Khamenei are reportedly handpicked from among supporters of the Islamic government and those close to the hard-line faction of the establishment, which Khamenei often sides with.

    In the propaganda video published ahead of the country’s June 2021 presidential vote, Khamenei also repeats his 2019 call for a young and ideologically committed president to be chosen amid growing media speculation that a “military” official could win the election on the heels of the hard-line takeover of parliament last year.

    That victory was largely engineered by the mass disqualification of thousands of hopeful candidates, mainly reformists and moderates.

    “God willing, we will move towards putting young people at the top of matters,” Khamenei says in response to a young activist who complains that the youth are not being given a chance in politics.

    Rising Dissent

    The videos seem to clearly be an effort to improve the image of Khamenei, whose legitimacy has been significantly damaged in recent years and also to help create a positive legacy for the 82-year-old, who underwent prostate surgery four years ago amid rumors he was in ill-health.

    Due to the deadly coronavirus pandemic that has hit Iran especially hard, the Iranian leader has in past months made very few public appearances while conducting most of his meetings with officials via videoconference.

    Criticism of Khamenei is a red line in the Islamic republic, yet in recent years a growing number of Iranians have openly challenged him, including anti-government protesters who have set his image on fire and called for his downfall. Other activists have publicly called for him to resign.

    The Informal series was broadcast amid increased public distrust with the clerical establishment, which in November 2019 used lethal force against demonstrators, slaughtering hundreds of people, including children.

    The dismal state of the country’s economy — which has been crushed by U.S. sanctions reimposed after U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from a 2015 nuclear deal — has resulted in increased public discontent.

    Following the deadly 2019 crackdown on protests sparked by a sudden, steep rise in the price of gasoline, opposition figure and former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Musavi compared Khamenei to the Shah of Iran who was toppled in 1979.

    Former Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hossein Musavi and his wife, Zahra Rahnavard, have been kept under house arrest since 2011. (file photo)

    Former Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hossein Musavi and his wife, Zahra Rahnavard, have been kept under house arrest since 2011. (file photo)

    “The killers of the year 1978 were the representatives of a nonreligious regime and the agents and shooters of November 2019 are the representatives of a religious government,” Musavi was quoted as saying by the opposition website Kalame. “Then the commander in chief was the shah and today, here, it is the supreme leader with absolute authority.”

    Musavi, his wife Zahra Rahnavad, and reformist cleric Mehdi Karrubi have been under house arrest since 2011 for publicly challenging Khamenei and criticizing human rights abuses after protesting what they said was a fraudulent presidential election.

    In a scene in the propaganda series, filmmaker Abdolhassan Barzideh — who appears to be carefully choosing his words — tells Khamenei that he feels the Iranian leader is closer to a certain segment of society.

    “Special figures and groups are around you [while] you’re expected to be the leader of all the people,” Barzideh said, adding that “I don’t feel you are sympathetic to each and every one of us and it is not implied that you love all the people.”

    It was a rare show of criticism.

    “Whether people know it or not, I love each of them and I pray for them,” said Khamenei, whose establishment has jailed scores of critics, activists, human rights defenders, and environmentalists and forced hundreds of others into exile. Khamenei then strangely added that he may be praying for some harder than he does for others.

    Iran’s supreme leader has in recent years reached out during election time to those who don’t support the Islamic establishment, imploring them to vote. Iranian authorities want to use elections as a top claim to their legitimacy.

    Barzideh told RFE/RL’s Radio Farda that he issued the critical comment hoping it would help bring some change.

    “If he can’t do something [to bring change] then no one can. That’s why I decided to speak up [during the meeting]. It remains to be seen whether it will be effective or not,” Barzideh said in a telephone interview.

    The propaganda documentary was released following the shock execution on December 12 of Ruhollah Zam, the administrator of the popular Amadnews channel that was accused of stirring up violence during protests that started in December 2017.

    It also follows the September execution of 27-year-old wrestler Navid Afkari, who was hanged after being convicted of killing a state worker during 2018 protests despite a public and international outcry for officials to halt his execution.

    Radio Farda broadcaster Babak Ghafouriazar contributed to this report.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Thousands of Iraqis converged on central Baghdad’s Tahrir Square on January 3 to mark the first anniversary of the twin assassinations in a U.S. airstrike of a top Iranian general and a leader of an Iraqi powerful Shi’ite militia.

    Last year’s U.S. drone strike near Baghdad airport killed Major General Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the elite Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes, the deputy head of Iraq’s Hashd al-Shaabi militia, along with several other Iran-allied militiamen.

    Many of the demonstrators were holding posters of Soleimani and al-Mohandes while some demanded the expulsion of U.S. troops from Iraq.

    Thousands of mourners marched on the highway leading to the Baghdad airport on the evening of January 2 to honor Soleimani and al-Mohandes and eight other men killed in the U.S. attack.

    The scene of the U.S. drone attack was turned into a shrine-like area sealed off by red ropes, with a photo of Soleimani and al-Muhandis in the middle, as mourners lit candles.

    The assassination of Soleimani had stoked fears of military conflict between the United States and Iran.

    Tensions between Washington and Tehran have escalated since U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018 and reimposed tough economic sanctions.

    At the time of Soleimani’s killing, Trump posted on Twitter that the Iranian had “killed or badly wounded thousands of Americans over an extended period of time and was plotting to kill many more.”

    Iran responded to the killing by launching a volley of missiles at bases in Iraq hosting U.S. troops.

    Security measures have been tightened in Iraq and security forces were deployed in great numbers. The Interior Ministry said on January 2 that a plan had been drawn up to safeguard the protests.

    Security measures were also stepped up in the vicinity of Baghdad’s Green Zone, home to foreign embassies and government offices.

    For weeks, U.S. officials have suggested Iran or allied Iraqi militia could carry out retaliatory attacks to mark the January 3 anniversary of Soleimani’s assassination.

    On January 2, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif urged Trump not to be “trapped” by an alleged Israeli plan to provoke a war through attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq.

    “New intelligence from Iraq indicate(s) that Israeli agent-provocateurs are plotting attacks against Americans — putting an outgoing Trump in a bind with a fake casus belli (act justifying war),” Zarif said on Twitter.

    “Be careful of a trap, @realDonaldTrump. Any fireworks will backfire badly, particularly against your same BFFs,” Zarif added.

    A day later, an Israeli official dismissed the allegation that his country was trying to trick the U.S. into waging war on Iran as “nonsense.”

    It was Israel that needed to be on alert for possible Iranian strikes on the one-year anniversary of Soleimani’s assassination, Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz said on Kan public radio on January 3.

    With reporting by dpa, Reuters, and AP

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Montenegrin President Milo Dukanovic has refused to approve amendments to a controversial law on religion that has been sharply criticized by ethnic Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church.

    Dukanovic sent the amendments back to parliament along with six other laws passed by the ruling coalition, his office said on January 2.

    A total of 41 deputies of the ruling coalition, which is composed of pro-Serb parties and is closely aligned with the Serbian Orthodox Church, in the 81-seat legislature backed amendments to the Law on Freedom of Religion in a vote on December 29 that was boycotted by the opposition.

    The president’s office claimed it was unclear if the required number of lawmakers had been present in parliament during the vote.

    Dukanovic heads the long-ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), which is now in opposition.

    If lawmakers vote for the amendments again, the president is obliged to sign them.

    Under Montenegro’s religion law adopted a year ago, religious communities must prove property ownership from before 1918.

    That is the year when predominantly Orthodox Christian Montenegro joined the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes — and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church was subsumed by the Serbian Orthodox Church, losing all of its property in the process.

    The Serbian Orthodox Church, its supporters, and pro-Serbian parties claimed the law could enable the Montenegrin government to impound church property, though officials deny that they intend to do this.

    The new government — which came to power after elections in August — said it would rewrite the law to ensure the properties stay in the hands of church, which is based in neighboring Serbia.

    Serbia and Montenegro were part of a federation until 2006, when Montenegro declared its independence.

    Montenegro is a member of NATO and aspires to join the European Union.

    With reporting by dpa

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • BORYSPIL, Ukraine — Apart from the international airport it hosts, rarely does this suburb 45 kilometers east of Kyiv make the national news. Yet Boryspil was in the headlines on October 28 after Anatoliy Fedorchuk died of complications linked to COVID-19 just three days after being elected to his fourth consecutive mayoral term and less than a month before his 61st birthday.

    “It was a shock to all of us at first…we thought he was in good health,” said Yaroslav Hodunok, who, serving as city council secretary at the time, took up the vacant post until mid-November.

    The mayor-elect’s death was a stark reminder to people in this nation of nearly 44 million that the coronavirus does not discriminate based on status.

    A city of nearly 62,000 people, Boryspil had recorded 2,619 confirmed coronavirus cases and 34 deaths from COVID-19 as of December 30, according to the Health Ministry’s Center for Public Health (CPH).

    Overall, COVID-19 has claimed more than 18,000 lives in Ukraine, according to the government. On December 24, Ukraine surpassed 1 million confirmed cases of the coronavirus.

    Many in Ukraine suspect the real figures could be higher, including Hodunok, who contends that official COVID-19 statistics are a “lie” that don’t reflect the real situation.

    Boryspil mayoral candidate Yaroslav Hodunok

    Boryspil mayoral candidate Yaroslav Hodunok

    The former opposition councilman and current mayoral candidate believes doctors in Ukraine are reluctant to test patients for the coronavirus. He said that he had COVID-19, but his physician didn’t have him tested because “I didn’t have the telltale symptoms.”

    His wife and child had tested positive for COVID-19 antibodies, but Hodunok said his “severely clogged sinuses and sudden problems sleeping” didn’t concern the doctor.

    “I still can’t fall asleep until around 3 a.m. and it feels like I’m sleeping awake,” he complained.

    Ukraine offers free coronavirus testing and Health Minister Maksym Stepanov on December 21 expanded the list of symptoms and criteria to include people who have had contact with infected patients. People do opt to get tested at private clinics, some because they fear they won’t meet the government criteria, others because they have private insurance that will cover the cost.

    Ukrainian lawyer and councilwoman Alyona Skichenko

    Ukrainian lawyer and councilwoman Alyona Skichenko

    Alyona Skichenko, a lawyer elected to the Boryspil district council in October, said her first test was free but she ended up paying the equivalent of $357 for a second test as well as vitamins and medicines after she was confirmed to have the coronavirus.

    Ukraine registered its first case on March 3 and shortly thereafter implemented strict lockdown measures for several months. Schools were closed as were eateries, gyms, and hair salons. Public transport, including the subway in Kyiv, was shut down or restricted. Hospitals reacted by establishing special wards and training health-care workers to treat COVID-19 patients.

    More should have been done, argued Olha Stefanyshyna, a national lawmaker who sits on the parliamentary health committee for the opposition Holos party. Speaking to RFE/RL, she noted “the Health Ministry had plans to test 75,000 people per day by October but is still averaging about 20,000-30,000.”

    Ukrainian lawmaker Olha Stefanyshyna (file photo)

    Ukrainian lawmaker Olha Stefanyshyna (file photo)

    She also slammed Ukraine’s contact-tracing strategy, a key component in containing the virus’s spread. “This strategy is a failure…tracing isn’t happening, Stefanyshyna said.

    Her colleague on the health committee, Lada Bulakh of the ruling Servant of the People party, did not respond to several RFE/RL requests for comment.

    Ukraine should triple to 100,000 the number of daily coronavirus tests to get a more accurate picture of the situation in the country, argued Pavlo Kovtonyuk, head of the Center for Health Economics at the Kyiv School of Economics.

    In a report published on December 24, he said Ukraine was showing an average positive test rate of 33 percent. This figure “is still five times higher than the one recommended by the World Health Organization for pandemic control,” Kovtonyuk said.

    Health Minister Stepanov explained that Ukrainians were reluctant to get tested and that’s why he expanded the criteria for administering them. He also said testing for antigens — molecules that can trigger an immune response — was being ramped up.

    By next year the objective “is to have no less than 1 million antigen tests conducted a month,” Stepanov said at a daily briefing on December 30.

    Equipment Shortages

    Another problem Ukraine faces as it struggles to curb the spread of COVID-19 is a lack of proper equipment.

    Masks, protective suits, and ventilators are in short supply, according to a November report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

    Kyiv has established a $2.4 billion COVID-19 fund, a measure that lawmaker Stefanyshyna praised. However, she and other lawmakers and critics from the Anticorruption Action Center have noted that the bulk of the money has gone toward the president’s nationwide road-construction project.

    The Finance Ministry said 59 percent of the fund had been allocated by November 7.

    According to the OECD November report, funds went “toward healthcare, social protection, ensuring law and order, supporting culture, tourism and the creative industries, as well as the construction and repair of roads.”

    Still, Stefanyshyna said the national government could have “coordinated” the distribution of medical equipment and supplies based on regional need and used its clout to purchase necessary equipment instead of leaving it to regional and local governments.

    Ukrainian Health Minister Maksym Stepanov (file photo)

    Ukrainian Health Minister Maksym Stepanov (file photo)

    About 70 percent of the 64,349 beds designated for COVID-19 patients are equipped with an oxygen supply, Stepanov said earlier in December. Forty-six percent of them were vacant.

    Yet, the strategy of having more beds “is dangerous,” Kovtonyuk told Bloomberg News, because they aren’t “an unlimited resource, and the number of beds does not mean that there’s always real help where it’s most needed.”

    “The health system is under exceptional strain,” Lotta Sylwander, the UNICEF representative in Ukraine, told Bloomberg. “It is going to get worse and worse.”

    Ukraine did not pre-order any of the three Western vaccines that are now being rolled out in the United States, the European Union, Canada, and Britain.

    Vaccine Rollout

    On December 30, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s office announced that it had concluded a contract to purchase 1.9 million vaccine doses from Sinovac Biotech, the biggest maker of vaccines in China. It expects clearance for the vaccine from the Chinese government in January and will send it for “prequalification” to the WHO in February, the Ukrainian presidential office said.

    As a lower income country, Ukraine also expects to receive eight million doses free to inoculate half as many citizens in the first quarter of 2021 through COVAX, a WHO-led effort for poorer countries.

    Stepanov has said half the population should be vaccinated in 2021, the vast majority will include medical front-line workers, first responders, the elderly, and people with underlying health conditions.

    At Boryspil’s intensive care hospital, its chief doctor, Oleksandr Shchur, told RFE/RL that until the vaccine arrives “people shouldn’t let their guard down…this virus is insidious and could spread like wildfire at any moment.”

    A laborer works on installing an oxygen cistern outside the Boryspil Multispecialty Intensive Hospital.

    A laborer works on installing an oxygen cistern outside the Boryspil Multispecialty Intensive Hospital.

    He acknowledged the city’s help in purchasing medical items and that the national government is helping more, especially in purchasing an oxygen cistern for the infectious ward.

    Shchur said 80 percent of the ward’s 40 beds for COVID-19 patients have oxygen supplies and that another 45 beds are in reserve.

    Ukrainian physician Oleksandr Shchur from Boryspil's intensive care hospital. (file photo)

    Ukrainian physician Oleksandr Shchur from Boryspil’s intensive care hospital. (file photo)

    To make up for the shortage of oxygen and ventilators, organizations like Svoyi in Kyiv have popped up to provide oxygen machines to patients undergoing care at home.

    “Some [patients] are people living with disabilities who can’t go to a hospital and others with mobility limitations,” said Iryna Koshkina, the executive director of Svoyi.

    The group loans the devices free of charge “for as long as patients need them — usually those who have less than 92 percent oxygen saturation” after which the filters get changed and are disinfected for further use.

    Starting off with 70 at the beginning of the year, Svoyi now distributes 250 concentrators. Some are loaned to patients who are discharged from hospitals yet still have trouble breathing, Koshkina added.

    Oxygen condensators stand in the main office of Svoyi, a nonprofit group that supplies oxygen to at-home COVID-19 patients free of charge in Kyiv and the surrounding area.

    Oxygen condensators stand in the main office of Svoyi, a nonprofit group that supplies oxygen to at-home COVID-19 patients free of charge in Kyiv and the surrounding area.

    The group has serviced more than 450 patients since mid-September when it started counting and Koshkina said similar endeavors exist in bigger cities like Odesa and Kharkiv.

    About 69 percent of personal incomes have been adversely affected by the disruption that the coronavirus has caused, numerous surveys have found. Women have felt most of the impact.

    “Almost a third of respondents reported losing their jobs, while over half spent their savings and cut their expenses on food,” UNICEF said regarding a nationwide poll of 2,000 people that it partly commissioned in June 2020. “People from rural areas, industrial workers, and households with unemployed members suffered the most.”

    Economy Minister Ihor Petrashko said in a televised briefing on December 29 that the country’s economy would shrink by 4.8 percent by the year’s end — or the equivalent of $146 billion.

    To mitigate the impact of a harder two-week lockdown starting on January 8, the government this month distributed $80 million in aid to 278,000 employees and small business owners, the Digitalization Ministry reported.

    Starting after Orthodox Christmas on January 7, stricter measures will be imposed nationwide, prohibiting indoor dining at eateries, and the closure of nonessential stores like fitness, entertainment, and shopping centers, hostels, and all schools, but not kindergartens.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Iran said on January 2 that it plans to enrich uranium up to 20 percent purity at its underground Fordow nuclear facility “as soon as possible,” a level far above limits set by an international nuclear accord.

    Ali Akbar Salehi, the U.S.-educated head of the civilian Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, offered a military analogy to describe his agency’s readiness to take the next step.

    “We are like soldiers and our fingers are on the triggers,” Salehi told Iranian state television. “The commander should command and we shoot. We are ready for this and will produce (20 percent enriched uranium) as soon as possible.”

    His comments on January 2 come a day after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that Tehran had revealed its intention in a letter to the UN nuclear watchdog.

    “Iran has informed the Agency that in order to comply with a legal act recently passed by the country’s parliament, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran intends to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) up to 20 percent at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant,” the IAEA said in a statement on January 1.

    The letter, submitted on December 31, “did not say when this enrichment activity would take place,” the IAEA said.

    Russia’s ambassador to the IAEA, Mikhail Ulyanov, said earlier on Twitter that IAEA chief Rafael Grossi had reported Iran’s letter to the agency’s board of governors.

    Iran currently enriches its uranium stockpile up to around 4.5 percent, which is above the 3.67 percent cap imposed by the 2015 nuclear deal but below the 90 percent purity considered weapons-grade.

    An increase to 20 percent would shorten Iran’s break-out time to a potential nuclear weapon, if it were to make a political decision to pursue a bomb. The Iran nuclear deal also prohibits Tehran from enrichment at the Fordow facility, buried deep in a mountain to protect against air strikes.

    Iran has gradually reduced its compliance with the accord since the United States unilaterally withdrew from the deal in 2018 and started imposing crippling sanctions on Iran.

    Following the assassination of top nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh on November 27, Iran’s parliament passed controversial legislation that ordered an immediate ramping up of the country’s uranium-enrichment program to 20 percent and an end to IAEA inspections.

    The government led by President Hassan Rohani has opposed the bill, saying it was detrimental to diplomatic efforts and no funds were allocated to implement the law.

    Some analysts have suggested that Iran could use parliament’s move to gain leverage in future talks with the United States.

    The remaining parties to the deal — China, France, Germany, Russia and Britain — said on December 21 that they were preparing for a possible return of the United States to the accord after President-elect Joe Biden takes office on January 20. Biden has said he will try to rejoin the deal, which was struck when he was vice president.

    Biden has suggested the United States would reenter the deal if Iran complies with the agreement, leaving other issues of concern such as Iran’s ballistic missiles and support for regional proxies to “follow on” agreements.

    Iran says its missile program and regional policies are off the table, and has said it would come back into compliance once the United States and the three European countries that signed the deal fulfill their end of the agreement by providing Tehran with the economic relief promised under the accord.

    Tehran has always denied pursuing nuclear weapons, saying its nuclear program was strictly for civilian purposes.

    With reporting by AFP and Reuters.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Kazakhstan has abolished the death penalty, making permanent a nearly two-decade freeze on capital punishment in the Central Asian country, a statement on the presidential website said on January 2.

    The statement said Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev had signed off on parliamentary ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – a document that obligates signatories to abolish the death penalty.

    Kazakhstan instituted an indefinite moratorium on capital punishment in 2003 but retained the death penalty for terrorism-related offenses.

    In 2016, the death penalty was imposed on a man who was convicted of a mass shooting in Almaty.

    Ruslan Kulikbaev had been the only person on death row in Kazakhstan. He will now serve a life sentence in prison.

    Toqaev announced that his country would join the protocol on the abolition of the death penalty in his speech at the 74th session of the UN General Assembly in December 2019.

    Russia, Tajikistan, and Belarus are now the only three countries in Europe and Central Asia which haven’t yet signed or ratified the Second Optional Protocol. Belarus is the only country in the region that still carries out executions.

    With reporting by AFP

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The waning days of 2020 were rife with portentous activity in Russia.

    The Investigative Committee announced a new criminal case against opposition leader Aleksei Navalny on large-scale fraud charges. The Justice Ministry added five individuals to its list of “foreign mass media performing the functions of a foreign agent” under controversial legislation that could potentially be enforced against almost anyone in the country. New restrictions were imposed on public demonstrations, and blocking streets was criminalized. Online defamation is now punishable by up to two years in prison. The government has taken on new authority to block foreign and domestic websites that it asserts are censoring Russian state-media content.

    Denis Volkov, director of the independent Levada Center pollster, says developments like these form “a general context of intensifying pressure by the authorities on the active portion of society.”

    The Kremlin’s actions, Carnegie Moscow Center analyst Andrei Kolesnikov adds, show that President Vladimir Putin’s government is feeling anxious in a changing social and political climate as it prepares for elections to the State Duma, the lower parliament house, that must be held by September. Those elections, in turn, are the last scheduled national political landmark before the end of Putin’s current presidential term in 2024.

    “A war is getting under way,” Kolesnikov told RFE/RL. “I’m afraid that [in 2021] it will seriously intensify. The situation could become much more confrontational. It is a very dangerous moment.”

    Voter Disenchantment

    Putin and the Kremlin-controlled United Russia party are in a weak position as the elections approach. The coronavirus pandemic and its attendant dislocations have accelerated social processes in Russia that have been observable for about the last three years. Putin’s own approval-disapproval ratings now are similar to what they were in the restive period of 2011-12, during which he returned to the Kremlin after Dmitry Medvedev’s one-term placeholder presidency.

    “Earlier we could speak confidently about the existence of a pro-Putin majority,” Kolesnikov said. “Now it is very hard to say whether it exists, whether it can be mobilized during the elections. Most likely, it is falling apart into several minorities whose members may not be democratically-minded but are unhappy with the current situation.”

    A Russian police officer detains a demonstrator during a protest in central Moscow earlier this year.

    A Russian police officer detains a demonstrator during a protest in central Moscow earlier this year.

    Primarily, the roots of the dissatisfaction are economic. Although Russia has weathered the pandemic better than many expected, the government forecasts real disposable income to fall by 3 percent in 2020, while outside economists say that figure is 1-2 percent too low. “Incomes were shrinking continuously in 2014-17 and, by the end of 2020, they will be 10 percent lower than in the ‘pre-Crimean’ year of 2013,” wrote RBC economics editor Ivan Tkachyov last month, referring to Russia’s seizure of the Ukrainian region of Crimea in 2014, which gave Putin a massive popularity boost.

    For the poorest Russians, the situation became so difficult that the government set retail price caps for some basic foods in December.

    Many voters were also disenchanted by the way the constitution was rewritten in the early part of the year in a process that they believed was driven by Putin’s personal interests rather than their good or even the country’s.

    “It was clear to everyone that the amendments to the constitution were adopted with one goal in mind – to secure the possibility [for Putin] to run for more presidential terms,” said Boris Grozovsky, an economics columnist and editor of the Events And Texts Telegram channel. “That is why it also ‘nullified’ Putin’s popularity and the legitimacy of the political regime. That is why immediately after the amendments, he had to significantly increase repressive measures both on the level of legislation and in practice.”

    Paradigm Shift?

    Either instinctively or by design, Putin seems to have shifted his political paradigm. And the clearest example of this shift is the fate of his Direct Line call-in program.

    For most of his two decades in power, Putin has held the annual, marathon Direct Line question-and-answer program in which he fielded carefully choreographed questions from average Russians on issues such as the availability of playgrounds, the notorious condition of Russian roads, shortages of medicines, or the plight of teachers or doctors.

    In later iterations of the program, regional and cabinet officials were forced to listen in as Putin heard the complaints and then were grilled by the president about why their region was experiencing such a problem. In some cases, the officials returned to screens later in the same broadcast to report, for instance, that road crews had been sent to fill in potholes or that a new playground had already magically appeared.

    In short, Putin positioned himself as the traditional Russian “good tsar,” who was ready to rain benefits on the people but who was prevented from doing so by “bad boyars,” or noblemen. This kind of populism played well among much of the Russian public, strongly reinforced by Kremlin-directed state media.

    In 2020, however, the Direct Line show was cancelled completely, although a few elements of it were incorporated into Putin’s end-of-the-year press conference with journalists on December 17. At that event, however, no cabinet ministers or regional officials appeared. Putin praised all levels of government for its handling of the coronavirus crisis.

    If anyone was to blame for the problems of average Russians, Putin both stated and implied, it was the CIA and other nefarious foreign influences that were determined to restrict Russia in every way. Such statements strongly overshadowed the tiny populist gesture that Putin threw in at the end of the four-hour program when he announced the government would give families 5,000 rubles ($67) for each child under the age of 7.

    “Looking at the recent press conference, I had the feeling that Putin was defending the bureaucratic system,” said Mikhail Kasyanov, who was prime minister during Putin’s first term, in 2000-04, and is now an opposition politician. “That is, he defended the power vertical that enables him to run the country.”

    “Populism is an effort to appeal to the people, to be on their side, to criticize officials and various bosses while promising citizens that things will be fixed,” he continued. “This time, Putin could not do that since his own negative rating among the majority of Russians is growing. Putin is no longer above the fray, above the bureaucrats.”

    Instead of this traditional populist-authoritarianism, “standard authoritarianism” has begun, Kasyanov said, adding that it “could develop into totalitarianism.”

    “If automatic systems for running the country are developed,” he said, “Putin won’t have to communicate with the public or meet with business leaders or political elites. He will simply sign little pieces of paper.”

    Analyst Kolesnikov agreed that Putin’s old populist approach no longer works as his long reign in power comes up against the growing discontent.

    “In this personalized political system, he has come to personify not only everything that is good, but everything that is bad as well,” he told RFE/RL. “And that is where the problems start.”

    Kremlin critic Aleksei Navalny gestures during a court hearing in Moscow in 2017.

    Kremlin critic Aleksei Navalny gestures during a court hearing in Moscow in 2017.

    Kremlin political consultants have not forgotten the wave of mass protests that swept Russia in 2011-13, driven mainly by anger over evidence of fraud benefitting United Russia in December 2011 parliamentary elections and dismay over Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012.

    “The people want change,” Kasyanov said. “This is clear. More than half of Russians want change. But the people sitting in the chairs of power fear such changes. They fear that they could go too far. I mean, street protests. We know that our leaders, if they listen to anything, only listen to street protests. We saw that in December 2011 and early 2012.”

    That is why the Kremlin has focused its attention on Navalny, Kasyanov said. Russian security agents allegedly attempted to poison Navalny at least three times in recent months, including a near-fatal poisoning with a Novichok-type nerve agent in the Siberian city of Tomsk in August.

    In addition, the authorities have opened a new fraud case — who is recuperating from the August poisoning in Germany — that analysts say is aimed at preventing Navalny from returning to Russia. If he does return, he could face prison in connection with the new case and with a previous conviction that he contends was based on fabricated charges.

    “Aleksei Navalny is definitely the leader of the street,” Kasyanov said. “When the political struggle intensifies in this way, when the authorities act repressively, then, of course, street protests become the main instrument of struggle against them. So the authorities are trying to remove the leader of any possible future mass protests.”

    With reporting by RFE/RL’s Russian Service and Current Time

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Iran has said it intends to enrich uranium to up to 20 percent purity, according to Russia’s ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

    Mikhail Ulyanov said on Twitter on January 1 that IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi “reported to the (IAEA) Board of Governors … about intention of #Tehran to start enrichment op to 20%.”

    A Vienna-based diplomat confirmed there had been an IAEA report to member states that included Iran’s intention, but declined to elaborate, according to Reuters.

    Iran currently enriches its uranium stockpile up to around 4.5 percent, which is above the 3.67 percent cap imposed by the 2015 nuclear deal but below the 90 percent purity considered weapons-grade.

    Iran has gradually reduced its compliance with the accord since the United States unilaterally withdrew from the deal in 2018 and started imposing crippling sanctions on Iran.

    The remaining parties to the deal said on December 21 they were preparing for a possible return of the United States to the accord after President-elect Joe Biden takes office on January 20. Biden has said he will try to rejoin the deal, which was struck when he was vice president.

    Biden has suggested the United States would reenter the deal if Iran complies with the agreement, leaving other issues of concern such as Iran’s ballistic missiles and support for regional proxies to “follow on” agreements.

    Iran says its missile program and regional policies are off the table and has said it would come back into compliance with the deal once the United States and the three European countries that signed the deal — Germany, France, and Britain — fulfill their end of the agreement by providing Tehran economic relief promised under the accord.

    Tehran has always denied pursuing nuclear weapons, saying its nuclear program was strictly for civilian purposes.

    With reporting by Reuters

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Photo: Savo Prelević (RFE/RL)

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The head of Iran’s judiciary has said that those who carried out the targeted killing of a top Iranian military commander one year ago are “not safe on Earth.”

    Ebrahim Raisi, speaking in Tehran on January 1, said that even U.S. President Donald Trump, who authorized the strike that killed Major General Qasem Soleimani near Baghdad on January 3, 2020, was not “immune from justice.”

    Soleimani headed the Quds Force, the foreign operations wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

    At the time of Soleimani’s killing in a U.S. drone strike, Trump posted on Twitter that the Iranian had “killed or badly wounded thousands of Americans over an extended period of time and was plotting to kill many more.”

    Iran responded to the killing by launching a volley of missiles at bases in Iraq hosting U.S. and other international troops a few days later.

    On January 1, Soleimani’s successor, Esmail Qaani, addressed those who carried out the drone strike, saying that “it’s even possible that there are people inside your home that will respond to your crime.”

    “American mischief will not deter the Quds Force from carrying on its resistance path,” Qaani said.

    On December 31, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif accused the United States of seeking a “pretext for war” because U.S. officials have suggested that Iran might carry out retaliatory attacks to mark the anniversary of Soleimani’s assassination.

    Tensions have been elevated between Iran and the United States since 2018 when Washington withdrew from an international agreement that aimed to restrict Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from sanctions.

    The Trump administration argued the agreement was “fatally flawed” because it did not address Iran’s ballistic-missile program or its support for regional groups that Washington considers terrorists.

    After withdrawing, the United States reimposed sanctions on Iran.

    With reporting by AFP and Reuters

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • In a year marked by tightened restrictions and unrest, Telegram sent a clear message to authoritarian governments who tried to keep it quiet in 2020. But as the app, which has earned a reputation as a free-speech platform, looks to spread the word in Iran and China, its popularity among messengers of violence and hate remains a concern.

    Telegram has emerged as an essential tool for opposition movements in places like Belarus and Iran and won a huge victory when the Russian authorities gave up on their effort to ban the app after two fruitless years during which senior officials continued to use it themselves.

    But protesters and open media are not the only ones who find sanctuary in a tool like Telegram. Terrorists, hate groups, and purveyors of gore also see the benefits of encrypted group chats that can reach large audiences without censorship.

    Not Under Your Thumb

    Nowhere was the hidden hand of Telegram more apparent in 2020 than in Belarus, where activists and opposition politicians relied on the platform to counter the authorities’ attempts to control the narrative in a crucial election year.

    Ahead of the August 9 vote pitting authoritarian incumbent Alyaksandr Lukashenka against a thinned pool of opposition candidates, the Belarusian authorities did their best to intimidate administrators of rogue Telegram channels.

    When three Telegram-based opposition bloggers were arrested in June, the rights watchdog Amnesty International decried the pressure against alternative sources of information.

    A quick perusal of some of the more sordid open channels on Telegram reveals that it is a place for violence, criminal activity, and abusers, regardless of what Europol says.

    “The Belarusian authorities are carrying out a full-scale purge of dissenting voices, using repressive laws to stifle criticism ahead of the elections,” said Aisha Jung, Amnesty International’s senior campaigner on Belarus.

    After Lukashenka claimed he had won a sixth straight term, triggering mass protests that continue to bring people onto the streets to contest the outcome, despite a violent police crackdown, it was the authorities who were crying foul.

    “You see: a square was drawn in a well-known channel on Sunday — go there. They went. They stood in this square,” Lukashenka said after attempts to block the websites of independent outlets drove the opposition-minded to Telegram. “They drew another one — go there, and then go to the Palace of Independence. This is how they manage.”

    In November, the state Investigative Committee was accusing the creators of the Poland-based Nexta channel on Telegram of organizing what it called “mass riots.” By the end of the month, the creators of the opposition-friendly news source had been added to the State Security Committee’s list of “persons involved in terrorist activities.”

    Claiming that up to 15 percent of the citizens of Minsk were using Telegram and generating 50,000 to 100,000 messages a day to coordinate actions through 1,000 channels, the deputy head of the presidential administration said that “these are huge figures, and we have no right to turn a blind eye to this.”

    But by then, even Lukashenka had long accepted the reality of Telegram’s power, using a newly created state Telegram channel to post videos in August of him brandishing an AK-47 and barking orders to security forces from his helicopter.

    As the authoritarian leader told friendly members of the press in September: “How can you stop these Telegram channels? Can you block them? No. Nobody can.”

    ‘If You Can’t Beat ‘Em…’

    Belarus was not the only one to grudgingly concede to Telegram this year. Russia too, after a two-year battle to ban the app, took the “if you can’t beat them, join them” approach.

    “Roskomnadzor is dropping its demands to restrict access to Telegram messenger in agreement with Russia’s Prosecutor-General’s Office,” the country’s communications regulator announced in June.

    Shortly afterward, the Communications Ministry admitted that it was “technically impossible” to block the messaging app.

    The ban, introduced after Telegram refused to comply with Russian demands that it hand over encryption keys to help fight terrorism, never really stuck anyway.

    Telegram founder Pavel Durov: "Over the course of the last two years, we had to regularly upgrade our ‘unblocking’ technology to stay ahead of the censors."

    Telegram founder Pavel Durov: “Over the course of the last two years, we had to regularly upgrade our ‘unblocking’ technology to stay ahead of the censors.”

    Despite official efforts to block it, courts, political heavyweights, and even the Russian Foreign Ministry had continued to use the platform. And according to Telegram founder Pavel Durov, use of the app had doubled since the ban, with 30 percent of its 400 million active users coming from Russia.

    The Russian entrepreneur had some experience defying the Kremlin, having created and headed the social-networking site VK before he was dismissed as CEO in 2014 after refusing orders to block Russian opposition leader Aleksei Navalny’s site and to hand over information about Maidan protesters in Ukraine.

    After Telegram was unblocked, Durov explained that “over the course of the last two years, we had to regularly upgrade our ‘unblocking’ technology to stay ahead of the censors.”

    The strategy included the formation of a “Digital Resistance” movement employing rotating proxy servers and other means of hiding traffic to circumvent censorship.

    “To put it simply, the ban didn’t work,” Durov said.

    Steps Taken, But Not Enough

    There was some merit to Russia citing the effort to fight terrorism as a reason for introducing the ban in the first place, considering that its initial demand for encryption keys stemmed from attempts to decipher comments authorities said were made on Telegram by a suicide bomber who killed 15 people in St. Petersburg in 2017.

    Going into 2020, Telegram was still dealing with such criticism, including that it was not doing enough to prevent extremist groups like Islamic State from disseminating information.

    Among the steps taken by Telegram were the introduction of an ISIS Watch feature that publishes daily updates on banned terrorist content and encouraging users to report extremist content.

    Europol even lauded Telegram’s actions, saying in late 2019 that “Telegram is no place for violence, criminal activity, and abusers. The company has put forth considerable effort to root out the abusers of the platform by both bolstering its technical capacity in countering malicious content and establishing close partnerships with international organizations such as Europol.”

    Those efforts, as well as Telegram’s role as a public-service beacon during the coronavirus pandemic, appear to have factored into the lifting of the digital blockade.

    But they didn’t end criticism that dangerous minds were still exploiting the app’s free-speech policies.

    Within hours, the manifesto of a gunman who killed nine people near Frankfurt, Germany, in February was being spread by right-wing extremist groups on Telegram.

    Within hours, the manifesto of a gunman who killed nine people near Frankfurt, Germany, in February was being spread by right-wing extremist groups on Telegram.

    A racially motivated shooting in February that left nine people dead in a town outside Frankfurt, Germany, sparked renewed concerns. Within hours of the attack, the perpetrator’s manifesto was being spread by right-wing extremist groups on Telegram.

    Scores of white nationalist groups, according to an analysis by Vice News, had made the switch to Telegram after they were kicked off mainstream social media like Facebook and Twitter.

    “Telegram makes a lot of sense for those groups: The app allows users to upload unlimited videos, images, audio clips, and other files, and its founder has repeatedly affirmed his commitment to protecting user data from third parties — including governments,” Vice News wrote.

    The Counter Extremism Project, an international policy organization formed to combat the growing threat from extremist ideologies, reported in May that it was still finding Islamic State propaganda on Telegram.

    In addition, the project said it had found “multiple white supremacist and neo-Nazi groups” on Telegram celebrating the shooting death in the United States of an unarmed black man, as well as encouraging mass shootings and violence against African Americans.

    What Did I Just Watch?

    A quick perusal of some of the more sordid open channels on Telegram reveals that it is a place for violence, criminal activity, and abusers, regardless of what Europol says.

    Multiple channels host full-length, uncensored videos showing the perpetrator of the 2019 Christchurch mosque shootings in New Zealand preparing for and carrying out the attacks in which 51 people were killed and 40 injured.

    Multiple videos of school shootings are available, and uncut videos of ordinary people being stabbed, shot, bludgeoned, or mutilated are ubiquitous.

    Compromising sex videos of Russian celebrities and politicians are there for the watching, as is a recent live-streamed incident in which a popular vlogger reportedly accepted money to lock his girlfriend outside in subzero temperatures, where she died.

    Amid the recent fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the breakaway territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, videos apparently taken by Azerbaijani soldiers and distributed on Telegram show executions, including beheadings, as well as other abuses of POWs. The videos prompted an investigation by the Council of Europe, Europe’s top human rights watchdog.

    Ihar Losik is the administrator of the Telegram-based Belarus Of The Brain channel and a media consultant for RFE/RL.

    Ihar Losik is the administrator of the Telegram-based Belarus Of The Brain channel and a media consultant for RFE/RL.

    Digital Resistance To Fight Another Day

    Now, as 2021 begins, the fight over Telegram is continuing — and expanding.

    In Belarus, the authorities continue to pursue charges against Telegram bloggers they accuse of fomenting unrest over the outcome of the August presidential vote. Among them is n mid-December, Losik announced that he had launched a hunger strike to protest his treatment and potential eight-year prison sentence.

    In Iran, the execution of activist and journalist Ruhollah Zam has sparked international outrage. Zam, who headed AmadNews — which had been suspended by Telegram in 2018 for publishing information about Molotov cocktails but was revived under a different name — was credited with helping inspire anti-government protests in 2017.

    And in China, where Telegram is banned, the app has seen a surge of millions of new users as other messaging platforms have suffered outages.

    Both Iran and China have come into focus among free-speech advocates in recent years, including efforts to develop technologies such as Signal and Tor that allow people to access the Internet and communicate privately.

    “We don’t want this technology to get rusty and obsolete. That is why we have decided to direct our anti-censorship resources into other places where Telegram is still banned by governments — places like Iran and China,” Durov wrote on his personal channel after Russia unblocked Telegram. “We ask the admins of the former proxy servers for Russian users to focus their efforts on these countries.”

    “The Digital Resistance movement doesn’t end with last week’s cease-fire in Russia,” Durov wrote in June. “It is just getting started — and going global.”

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The United Nations has condemned Iran for executing a man convicted of murder when he was 16 years old, saying the punishment violated international law.

    The UN human rights office in Geneva said Mohammad Hassan Rezaiee was executed on December 31.

    He was the fourth juvenile offender put to death in Iran this year, the office said.

    “The execution of child offenders is categorically prohibited under international law and Iran is under the obligation to abide by this prohibition,” UN rights office spokeswoman Ravina Shamdasani said in a statement.

    The UN high commissioner for human rights, Michelle Bachelet, “strongly condemns the killing,” she added.

    Shamdasani said the office was “dismayed that the execution had taken place despite” its efforts to engage with Tehran on the case.

    “There are deeply troubling allegations that forced confessions extracted through torture were used in the conviction of Mr. Rezaiee,” Shamdasani said, along with “numerous other serious concerns about violations of his fair-trial rights.”

    Iran regularly forces confessions from prisoners, often under duress or torture, rights groups say.

    Amnesty International said Rezaiee was arrested in 2007 in connection with the fatal stabbing of a man in a brawl and had spent more than 12 years on death row.

    Iran is among a handful of countries that execute juvenile offenders.

    Amnesty International said it is aware of at least 90 cases of people in Iran currently on death row for crimes that took place when they were under 18. The rights organization said the real number is likely to be far higher.

    Rights groups have called on Iranian authorities to urgently amend Article 91 of the 2013 Islamic Penal Code to abolish the death penalty for crimes committed by people under 18 in line with Iran’s international obligations.

    Iran is one of the world’s leading executioners. Amnesty International said in April that at least 251 people were executed by Iranian authorities in 2019.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • To receive Steve Gutterman’s Week In Russia each week via e-mail, subscribe by clicking here.

    In the Soviet era, and particularly during dictator Josef Stalin’s purges, one of the many fears was of a knock on the door when no guests were expected. Night or day, it could mean that agents of the state had come for you — and that you could be arrested, condemned in a cursory trial, and sent to the gulag.

    In a bizarre reversal of sorts, one that may be emblematic of this particular moment in the long era of President Vladimir Putin, a Kremlin opponent was arrested after knocking on a door — or ringing a doorbell, to be precise.

    Lyubov Sobol, a lawyer and ally of Putin’s most prominent foe, Aleksei Navalny, was detained after ringing the bell at the apartment of a man whom a report by the open-source research group Bellingcat and its partners identified as a Federal Security Service (FSB) officer allegedly involved in Navalny’s poisoning with a nerve agent in the Siberian city of Omsk in August.

    Sobol was fined and released — two associates who were at Konstantin Kudryavtsev’s door with her on December 21 were jailed for a week — but was detained again on December 25. This time, she was held for 48 hours and accused of trespassing “with the use or threat of violence” — and could be sentenced to five years in prison if tried and convicted.

    Sobol says there was no violence or threat of violence, and there is no public evidence of any.

    Her own apartment was subjected to more than a knock on the door: Black-clad, helmeted law enforcement officers broke an outer door and searched her apartment shortly after 7 a.m., seizing computers and phones, she and an associate said.

    The prospect of a prison term for ringing a doorbell was far from the only outlandish development in a busy, bizarre few weeks of the continuing showdown between Navalny and Putin, which started more than a decade ago.

    ‘Enemies’ And ‘Agents’

    Sobol probably wouldn’t have been at that door had Navalny not managed to reach a man he says was Kudryavtsev in a phone call from Berlin, where the opposition politician is recuperating after the August 20 poisoning with what German and other authorities say was a variant of the Soviet-developed nerve agent Novichok, and — by posing as a superior in the Russian law enforcement hierarchy — elicited an apparent confession of involvement.

    That phone call and the Bellingcat report were among several developments that have embarrassed the Kremlin — or seemingly should have, given that they have exposed alleged corruption among people close to Putin or revealed other information that, for many audiences, appears to cast him in an unenviable light.

    The case against Sobol is also far from the only sign of what Kremlin critics, rights groups, and foreign governments suspect is a stepped-up Kremlin effort to silence dissent and quash civil society ahead of parliamentary elections in 2021 and later a decision by Putin — or the announcement of a decision already made — to secure reelection in 2024 or not.

    The authoritarian moves come at a time when the economy is struggling, Putin’s popularity is weaker than it once was, and the coronavirus continues to hit hard amid resistance among Russians to a vaunted vaccine. The government all but admitted this week that the real death toll from COVID-19 is more than three times higher than the official figure of about 57,000.

    The measures include a slew of new laws strengthening Putin and tightening the Kremlin’s control over politics, further restricting public gatherings, and broadening the state’s ability to target journalists, activists, and others — pretty much anyone, in fact — by branding them “foreign agents,” a term that has echoes of the Soviet-era concept of “enemies of the people.”

    While 2020 has been trashed worldwide as terrible year, a grim meme making the rounds suggests that the next one may not be better, at least in terms of rights and freedoms in Russia.

    “Don’t buy a 2021 calendar — just get out your old one from 1937,” it goes, referring to the darkest year of Stalin’s Great Terror. “They’re exactly the same.”

    ‘Like Trotsky For Stalin’

    Reaching back to the same era for an analogy, Russian political analyst Andrei Kolesnikov said that Navalny — despite Putin’s refusal to utter his name — is clearly being cast by the Kremlin as Public Enemy No. 1 some 80 years later.

    “Navalny is the main foe, of course,” Kolesnikov, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center, told RFE/RL’s Russian Service on December 28.

    “Navalny for Putin is like [Leon] Trotsky was for Stalin,” he said, referring to the fellow revolutionary and rival for power who was expelled from the Soviet Union after Stalin’s rise and assassinated in exile in Mexico City, in 1940, by an agent of Stalin’s NKVD secret police — a precursor of the FSB.

    Almost exactly a decade ago, former Russian oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky had his sentence lengthened to 14 years at a second trial.

    Almost exactly a decade ago, former Russian oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky had his sentence lengthened to 14 years at a second trial.

    The continuing struggle between Putin and Navalny also contains echoes of Putin’s rivalry with Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the oil tycoon whose prosecution and imprisonment defined much of the first 15 years of the Putin era. A key part of it was the dismantling of Khodorkovsky’s huge oil company, Yukos, whose assets soon ended up making Rosneft, the state producer headed by a close Putin ally, Russia’s largest.

    Three years after that, in December 2013, Khodorkovsky was pardoned by Putin — who said he was acting out of “principles of humanity” because the jailed tycoon’s mother was ill — and swiftly released from a remote northern prison and flown out of the country. He has not returned to Russia, where he could face further prosecution, and has remained a vocal foe of Putin.

    Fast forward another seven years, to December 29, 2020. The Russian Investigative Committee — also headed by a Putin ally — announced new fraud allegations against Navalny, accusing him of stealing hundreds of millions of rubles donated to the organization that has been his platform for investigations into alleged corruption by members of the ruling elite.

    ‘They’re Going All In’

    The announcement came eight days after Navalny released a video — which had more than 20 million views in less than a week — about his phone call with the purported FSB operative allegedly involved in his poisoning.

    Like Khodorkovsky, Navalny has been tried and convicted twice on financial-crimes charges he contends were fabricated. He has been jailed many times for organizing protests but never imprisoned for a long period, as he was given suspended sentences in both big cases.

    Navalny, who blames Putin for his poisoning, contended that the new allegations were the Kremlin’s revenge against him for surviving and for seeking to exposing those who were behind it, saying he had predicted Putin’s government would “try to jail me for not dying and then looking for my [would-be] killers.”

    The Investigative Committee claims Navalny spent more than 350 million rubles ($4.8 million) of the money donated to his Anti-Corruption Foundation acquiring personal items and vacationing abroad — allegations that seem aimed to suggest to Russians that he is, at best, no better than those in Putin’s circle whose wildly expensive real estate and lavish lifestyles he has sought to expose.

    The new case — as well as a claim by the authorities that Navalny has violated the terms of his suspended sentence in one of the previous convictions — are also widely seen as an effort by Putin’s government to ensure that Navalny, 44, never returns to Russia.

    “After the unsuccessful poisoning[,] keeping Navalny abroad is the second-best thing that the Kremlin could hope to achieve and they’re going all-in,” U.S.-based political analyst András Tóth-Czifra wrote on Twitter on December 29.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The United States has reportedly flown two B-52 bombers over the Persian Gulf in the third such show of force in recent months, presumably meant to deter Iran from attacking U.S. or allied targets in the region.

    The U.S. bombers carried out a round-trip, 30-hour mission from Minot Air Force Base, in North Dakota, to the Middle East that ended on December 30.

    “The United States continues to deploy combat-ready capabilities into the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility to deter any potential adversary, and make clear that we are ready and able to respond to any aggression directed at Americans or our interests,” General Kenneth McKenzie, chief of U.S. Central Command, said in a statement on December 30.

    He added: “We do not seek conflict, but no one should underestimate our ability to defend our forces or to act decisively in response to any attack.”

    The U.S. Air Force has carried out two similar missions in the past 45 days.

    The mission reflects increasing concern in Washington that Iran could order further military retaliation for the U.S. killing of top Iranian military commander General Qasem Soleimani in neighboring Iraq in January.

    Days after the air strike that killed Soleimani, Iran launched a ballistic-missile attack on a military base housing international troops in Iraq that caused brain-concussion injuries to some 100 U.S. troops.

    Adding to U.S. concerns was a rocket attack last week on the U.S. Embassy compound in Baghdad by Iranian-backed Shi’ite militias.

    Nobody was killed in the attack, but U.S. President Donald Trump said Tehran was on notice.

    “Some friendly health advice to Iran: If one American is killed, I will hold Iran responsible. Think it over, Trump tweeted on December 23.

    The United States has reduced the number of staff at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

    With reporting by AP and The Washington Post

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • PETROPAVLOVSK-KAMCHATSKY, Russia — Back in 2012, Valery Karpenko had good news for the more than 300,000 residents of Kamchatka, one of Russia’s remotest regions, famous for its pristine nature, active volcanoes, and poor government services, including health care.

    With local TV cameras filming, Karpenko, then deputy chairman of the regional government, could hardly contain his enthusiasm as he spoke of the new medical center that would soon rise up in Petropavlovsk, capital of the region in Russia’s Far East. It would replace a crumbling hodgepodge of structures built in the Soviet era: the sole full-service, state-run hospital on the peninsula jutting down between the Pacific Ocean and Sea of Okhotsk.

    “There has been no facility like it in the entire Far East, let alone Kamchatka,” Karpenko boasted, adding the new complex would be equipped with cutting-edge “German technology,” staffed by top-notch talent — doctors, nurses, and other personnel, some trained abroad. Elderly women “walking the corridors with buckets handing out food,” would be replaced by a slick catering unit, Karpenko vowed.

    Nine years and counting, but no new hospital looks to be coming anytime soon.

    Nine years and counting, but no new hospital looks to be coming anytime soon.

    Fast forward nearly nine years to the end of 2020, and the people of Kamchatka are still waiting for the promised medical center. At the site, steel girders welded together to form building frames rise up from cement amid overgrown, brown fields fenced in only on one side. Karpenko is long gone from his post, his unfulfilled promises perhaps the least of his worries: He now faces a possible 12-year prison term on bribery charges linked to the project.

    Allegations that local officials have long stuffed their own pockets with money allocated for the hospital have circulated for years among locals and contractors on the project, many of whom were never paid for their work. Given the scale of the scandal, the Kremlin has from time to time intervened, vowing to jump-start construction. In August, President Vladimir Putin dispatched Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin to Kamchatka, more than 6,000 kilometers east of Moscow, on the latest such mission.

    “I’m shocked by the inaction and the negligence over the years regarding construction of the hospital,” Mishustin said during a visit to the dilapidated Kamchatka Regional Hospital as he met doctors to discuss the postponement-plagued project, vowing Kremlin pressure to get things moving.

    ‘Doctors Are Expendable Here’

    Skeptics say even a new hospital will only be a band aid on the deeper problems that ail health care in Kamchatka.

    Andrei Kubanov, a surgeon who worked at the regional hospital, said not only are doctors and nurses less than eager to move to faraway Kamchatka, but fear the climate in the health-care profession, where any criticism can result in termination. Kubanov himself was dismissed earlier this year for allegedly taking too much time to recuperate from an illness. He claims it had all to do with his outspokenness about alleged corruption at the hospital.

    Kamchatka's old hospital is not able to cope with the pandemic, locals and former personnel say.

    Kamchatka’s old hospital is not able to cope with the pandemic, locals and former personnel say.

    Kubanov, who a court found had been dismissed unjustly, said the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed all that’s wrong with health care in the region.

    “In the ambulatory unit alone, 110 [staff members] were officially listed as ill [with coronavirus], but the whole department has only 300 people and that includes the cleaners. Who went out on calls?” Kubanov told the Siberian Desk of RFE/RL’s Russian Service recently. “Then five doctors in the region died from the coronavirus. That is a huge number for Kamchatka. We had an incident when the urologist was left on duty with COVID patients. He was there one, two days and almost died of dehydration. I myself brought him water and food.”

    “He said: ‘What can I do? They’d fire me if I didn’t.’ They treat doctors like they’re expendable here,” added Kubanov, who now heads a private medical clinic in Kamchatka.

    Where Did The Money Go?

    In April, Putin accepted the resignation of Kamchatka Governor Vladimir Ilyukhin and appointed Vladimir Solodov as acting governor. Solodov, of the ruling United Russia party, then won an election in September to remove the “acting” from his title.

    Ilyukhin was one of three regional leaders to resign at the time amid calls by Putin for the country’s far-flung areas to do more to curb the spread of coronavirus. Some analysts say Putin, who has declined to institute nationwide lockdown measures, exploited the coronavirus crisis to rid himself of leaders he was tired of.

    In early August, Solodov complained to Putin about the shortage of doctors and low hospital-bed capacity in the region. He also said Kamchatka would need 8.4 billion rubles ($115 million) to complete construction of the hospital complex in Petropavlovsk.

    Later that month, Mishustin visited Kamchatka where he had no answer as to how or where past funding for the hospital had vanished. “The government went over in detail, in fact, the history on the allocation of funds, the planning process…after 13 years of promises and money put into the construction of new infrastructure, for some reason it just disappeared,” Mishustin said in Kamchatka on August 14.

    Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin gives a thumbs up during a welcome ceremony at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky city airport in August, but had no answers about where the funds for a new hospital had gone.

    Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin gives a thumbs up during a welcome ceremony at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky city airport in August, but had no answers about where the funds for a new hospital had gone.

    Aleksandr, who said he worked for a company involved in construction at the site, said the company didn’t get paid for much of the work it did. “We managed the site in 2011 and 2012 — it was preparatory work. We built the entire drainage system under the current structure, prepared building platforms…. Our contract was for 200 million rubles, and we received an advance,” recounted Aleksandr, who requested anonymity for fear of reprisals.

    “After that, however, I had to sue to get the rest for the work. And this was what happened to almost all subcontractors. Two firms even went bankrupt,” he told the Siberian Desk of RFE/RL’s Russian Service.

    How alleged graft has crippled the project may be best illustrated by the case of Karpenko, who resigned from his post in December 2018 and faced bribery charges two months later.

    He and his accomplices were accused of conniving with a businessman to sell a building to the city for 46 million rubles ($625,000) — double its assessed market value. Money used in the purchase allegedly came from funds allocated for hospital construction. Karpenko, who still awaits trial, faces 12 years in prison if found guilty.

    ‘They Just Changed The Billboard’

    Few debate the need for a new hospital in Kamchatka. The old complex comprises 11 buildings erected between the 1950s and 1970s. In 2003, the complex was deemed an earthquake risk. Plus, the fact buildings are scattered pell-mell makes the logistics of care complicated.

    The Kamchatka Health Ministry now says the new regional hospital will be completed by 2023 and it has established a new directorate to oversee the project. But there is no concrete construction timetable and the ministry did not respond to queries from RFE/RL for details on how the project will proceed.

    Given the past problems, few locals in Petropavlovsk appear hopeful they will see any new facility soon.

    “What hospital? There is no health care on Kamchatka,” Yelena Golovachenko said. “And if there is any, then it’s not much. And a new hospital won’t solve anything. And when will it be completed? That’s the question. The girders have been standing for many years, money for its construction is handed out every year. It’s not hard to guess where all those millions have gone — everyone steals.”

    “People here have two choices: they can go to the mainland for treatment, or travel somewhere else,” she said.

    Others complain about the lack and level of current services.

    “We need specialists, but they don’t come here, and the equipment is outdated. If you go to the employment bureau, most of the vacancies are for doctors. And those specialists that are here end up working at private clinics. Getting an appointment to see an in-demand specialist can take months,” said another local resident, Anna Bryukhanova.

    Meanwhile, at the construction site, nothing seems to have changed except for a new billboard with photos of what should one day stand there.

    “I drove by recently, just out of curiosity after the election of a new governor — nothing has changed,” Kubanov said. “I honestly wasn’t surprised. They changed the billboard about the project as if they only started construction in 2020, although plans were made back in 2011.”

    Written by Tony Wesolowsky based on reporting by Yekaterina Vasyukova of the Siberia Desk of RFE/RL’s Russian Service

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Ever glanced at a map of the world and stopped to wonder why some countries have seemingly nonsensical shapes? You can find the answers — or some of them, anyway — in our ongoing Mad Maps series.

    Episode 1: The Bizarre ‘Border Salad’ of Central Asia’s Ferghana Valley

    The crazy national boundaries of Tajiksitan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan in the Ferghana Valley have the power to spark violence. Who made them so complicated? Here’s a hint: Stalin had quite a bit to do with it.

    Episode 2: Why Does India Have A ‘Chicken Neck’?

    We look at how India ended up with a strange-looking, inconvenient “chicken neck,” thanks to the British Empire:

    Episode 3: Those Crazy Panhandles And What A Pain They Can Be

    Some of the wackiest-looking borders around the world contain so-called panhandles — for example, Namibia’s huge “landing strip” sticking out of its northeast corner. In this episode, we look at how and why many of the world’s panhandles were created, and what a headache they can be:

    Episode 4: How Kaliningrad Became A Part Of Russia

    Seventy-five years have passed since the German city of Koenigsberg and the surrounding area became Kaliningrad, now an odd piece of Russia disconnected from the rest of the country. So how did a German region become a Russian exclave, and what role does it play for Russia today?

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Iran says it has allocated $150,000 for the families of each of the 176 victims of a Ukrainian passenger plane that was downed in Iranian airspace nearly a year ago.

    The Iranian government said in statement on December 30 that it had approved the payment of “$150,000 or the equivalent in euros as soon as possible to the families and survivors of each of the victims” of the crash.

    Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 crashed shortly after taking off from Tehran’s main airport on January 8, killing all on board, including many Canadian citizens and permanent residents.

    Iran admitted days later that its forces accidentally shot down the Kyiv-bound plane after firing two missiles amid heightened tensions with the United States.

    Iranian Roads and Urban Development Minister Mohammad Eslami told reporters on December 30 that Iran’s final report on the crash had been sent to countries involved in investigating it — Ukraine, the United States, France, Canada, Sweden, Britain, and Germany.

    Earlier this month, an independent Canadian report accused Iran of not conducting its investigation properly and said that many questions remain unanswered.

    “The party responsible for the situation is investigating itself, largely in secret. That does not inspire confidence or trust,” said the report, written by the Canadian government’s special counsel on the tragedy.

    Iranian officials said the country never sought to hide the details about the air disaster or to violate the rights of the victims’ families.

    Flight 752 was downed the same night that Iran launched a ballistic-missile attack that targeted U.S. soldiers in Iraq. Tehran’s air defenses were on high alert in case of retaliation.

    Iran’s missile attack was in response to a U.S. drone strike that killed the powerful commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Major General Qasem Soleimani, in Baghdad five days earlier.

    With reporting by Reuters

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • MOSCOW — Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed into law legislation that human rights watchdogs and opposition politicians have said will undermine democratic processes.

    The legislation, which came into force on December 30, included a series of amendments to the controversial law on “foreign agents” to allow individuals and public entities to be recognized as “foreign agents” if they are considered to be engaged in political activities “in the interests of a foreign state.”

    Among those individuals Russia has for the first time branded as “foreign agents” are three journalists who contribute to RFE/RL. Organizations that have received the label will be required to report their activities and face financial audits.

    Grounds for being recognized as a “foreign agent” could be holding rallies or political debates, providing opinions on state policies, actions promoting a certain outcome in an election or referendum, or participation as an electoral observer or in political parties if they are done in the interest of a foreign entity.

    Amnesty International has slammed the proposed legislation, saying it would “drastically limit and damage the work not only of civil society organizations that receive funds from outside Russia but many other groups as well.”

    Critics say the “foreign agent” law, originally passed in 2012 and since expanded through amendments, has been arbitrarily applied to target Russian civil society organizations, human rights defenders, and political activists.

    Putin also signed a bill allowing media regulator Roskomnadzor to partially or fully restrict or slow access to foreign websites that “discriminate against Russian media.”

    The legislation is expected to affect major social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The approval of COVID-19 vaccines has raised hopes that the “new normal” of a post-pandemic world will start to emerge in 2021.

    But international rights groups say civil society must be able to return to its “normal” pre-pandemic role to prevent a permanent expansion of overreaching government power.

    They argue that civil society must provide checks and balances to ensure the rollback of temporary, emergency public-health measures imposed — and sometimes misused — during 2020.

    Transparency International has long warned about “worrying signs that the pandemic will leave in its wake increased authoritarianism and weakened rule of law.”

    “The COVID-19 crisis has offered corrupt and authoritarian leaders a dangerous combination of public distraction and reduced oversight,” the global anti-corruption group says.

    “Corruption thrives when democratic institutions such as a free press and an independent judiciary are undermined; when citizens’ right to protest, join associations, or engage in initiatives to monitor government spending is limited,” Transparency International says.

    Protesters clash with police in front of Serbia's National Assembly building in Belgrade on July 8 during a demonstration against a weekend curfew announced to combat a resurgence of COVID-19 infections.

    Protesters clash with police in front of Serbia’s National Assembly building in Belgrade on July 8 during a demonstration against a weekend curfew announced to combat a resurgence of COVID-19 infections.

    says authoritarianism in theory, as well as authoritarian regimes in practice, were “already gaining ground” before the pandemic.

    Hamid says some aspects of the post-pandemic era — such as COVID-19 tracing schemes and increased surveillance — can create “authoritarian temptations” for those in charge of governments.

    “During — and after — the pandemic, governments are likely to use long, protracted crises to undermine domestic opposition and curtail civil liberties,” Hamid concludes in a Brookings report called Reopening The World.

    The intent to suppress on the part of the government can provoke an unusually intense desire to expose its mistakes on the part of the press, the legislative branch, and civil society.”

    But despite those dangers, Hamid remains cautiously optimistic about political freedoms recovering in a post-pandemic world.

    In due time, he says, the removal of emergency restrictions will help “political parties, protesters, and grassroots movements to communicate their platforms and grievances to larger audiences.”

    “Democratic governments may try to suppress information and spin or downplay crises as well — as the Trump administration did — but they rarely get away with it,” Hamid concludes.

    “If anything, the intent to suppress on the part of the government can provoke an unusually intense desire to expose its mistakes on the part of the press, the legislative branch, and civil society,” he says.

    In countries from Russia to Turkmenistan, authoritarian tendencies under the guise of pandemic control have included the use of emergency health measures to crack down on political opposition figures and to limit the freedom of the press.

    They also have included attempts by authorities to restrict the ability of civic organizations to scrutinize and constrain the expansion of executive power.

    Crackdown In Baku

    Actions taken by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s government are a case in point.

    In March, Baku imposed tough new punishments for those convicted of “violating anti-epidemic, sanitary-hygienic, or lockdown” rules.

    The new criminal law imposed a fine of about $3,000 and up to three years in prison for violations such as failing to wear a mask in public.

    Those convicted of spreading the virus face up to five years in prison.

    A police officer inspects a woman's documents under the gaze of an Azerbaijani soldier in Baku in July during the coronavirus pandemic. Azerbaijan deployed troops to help police ensure a tight coronavirus lockdown in the capital and several major cities.

    A police officer inspects a woman’s documents under the gaze of an Azerbaijani soldier in Baku in July during the coronavirus pandemic. Azerbaijan deployed troops to help police ensure a tight coronavirus lockdown in the capital and several major cities.

    Human Rights Watch (HRW) warned that Baku’s criminal punishments for spreading COVID are “not a legitimate or proportionate response to the threat posed by the virus.”

    The U.S.-based rights group says it is all too easy for such laws to be misused to “target marginalized populations, minorities, or dissidents.”

    During the summer — amid public dissatisfaction about the lack of a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with neighboring Armenia — Aliyev also faced dissent over rampant corruption, economic mismanagement, and his handling of the pandemic.

    Aliyev’s response was to launch a crackdown in July widely seen as an attempt to eliminate his political rivals and pro-democracy advocates once and for all.

    A Washington Post editorial said Aliyev had “blown a gasket” with a “tantrum” that threatened to “obliterate what remains of independent political forces in Azerbaijan.”

    More than 120 opposition figures and supporters were rounded up in July by Aliyev’s security forces — mostly from the opposition Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (AXFP).

    Two opposition figures among those arrested were charged with violating Azerbaijan’s emergency COVID measures — Mehdi Ibrahimov, the son of AXFP Deputy Chairman Mammad Ibrahim, and AXFP member Mahammad Imanli.

    HRW says its own review of pretrial court documents concluded that Imanli was “falsely accused” of spreading COVID-19 and endangering lives by not wearing a mask in public.

    Ibrahimov’s arrest was based on a claim by police that he took part in an unauthorized street demonstration while infected with the coronavirus.

    But Ibrahimov’s lawyer says COVID tests taken after his arrest in July show he was not infected.

    In fact, he said, the charges of violating public-health rules were only filed against Ibrahimov after he was detained and authorities discovered he was the son of a prominent opposition leader.

    Belarusian Borders

    Critics accuse Belarus’s authoritarian ruler, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, of using COVID-19 restrictions to suppress mass demonstrations against his regime.

    To be sure, the use of politically related COVID-19 measures is seen as just one tool in Minsk’s broader strategy of intensified police crackdowns.

    The rights group Vyasna said in December that more than 900 politically motivated criminal cases were opened in 2020 against Belarusian opposition candidates and their teams, activists, and protesters.

    The ongoing, daily demonstrations pose the biggest threat to Lukashenka’s 26-year grasp on power — fueled by allegations of electoral fraud after he was declared the landslide winner of a sixth term in a highly disputed August 9 presidential election.

    While Minsk downplayed the threat posed by COVID-19 for months, Lukashenka has repeatedly accused the opposition and hundreds of thousands of protesters on the streets of being foreign-backed puppets.

    A Belarusian border guard wears a face mask and gloves to protect herself from the coronavirus early in the pandemic. Belarus closed off its borders to foreigners on November 1.

    A Belarusian border guard wears a face mask and gloves to protect herself from the coronavirus early in the pandemic. Belarus closed off its borders to foreigners on November 1.

    On November 1, after months of brutal police crackdowns failed to halt the anti-government demonstrations, Belarus closed off its borders to foreigners.

    The State Border Committee said the restrictions were necessary to “prevent the spread of infection caused by COVID-19.”

    In December, authorities expanded the border ban to prevent Belarusians and permanent residents from leaving the country — ostensibly because of the pandemic.

    Lukashenka’s own behavior on COVID-19 bolstered allegations the border closures are a politically motivated attempt to restrain the domestic opposition.

    In late November, Lukashenka completely disregarded safety protocols during a visit to a COVID-19 hospital ward — wearing neither gloves nor a mask when he shook hands with a medic in full protective gear.

    Opposition leader Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who left Belarus under pressure after she tried to file a formal complaint about the official election tally, says the border restrictions show Lukashenka is “in a panic.”

    Russia’s Surveillance State

    In Moscow, experts say the pandemic has tested the limitations of Russia’s surveillance state.

    Russia’s State Duma in late March approved legislation allowing Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin to declare a state of emergency across the country and establish mandatory public health rules.

    It also approved a penalty of up to five years in prison for those who “knowingly” disseminate false information during “natural and man-made emergencies.”

    The legislation called for those breaking COVID-19 measures to be imprisoned for up to seven years.

    In April, President Vladimir Putin tasked local governments with the responsibility of adopting COVID-19 restrictions.

    Experts say that turned some Russian regions into testing grounds for how much increased surveillance and control Russians will stand for.

    It also protected the Kremlin from political backlash over concerns that expanded government powers to control COVID-19 could become permanent in post-pandemic Russia.

    Meanwhile, Moscow took steps to control the free flow of information about Russia’s response to the pandemic.

    “It is staggering that the Russian authorities appear to fear criticism more than the deadly COVID-19 pandemic,” Amnesty International’s Russia director, Natalia Zviagina, said.

    “They justify the arrest and detention of Anastasia Vasilyeva on the pretext that she and her fellow medics violated travel restrictions,” Zviagina said. “In fact, they were attempting to deliver vital protective equipment to medics at a local hospital.”

    Anastasia Vasilyeva, a Russian doctor who heads a medical workers union, was arrested in April after she exposed shortcomings in the health system’s preparations to fight COVID-19.

    Anastasia Vasilyeva, a Russian doctor who heads a medical workers union, was arrested in April after she exposed shortcomings in the health system’s preparations to fight COVID-19.

    Zviagina concludes that by putting Vasilyeva in jail, Russian authorities exposed “their true motive.”

    “They are willing to punish health professionals who dare contradict the official Russian narrative and expose flaws in the public health system,” she said.

    The State Duma also launched reviews and crackdowns in 2020 on reporting by foreign media organizations — including RFE/RL — about the way Russia has handled COVID.

    Human Rights Watch said police “falsely claimed” protesters violated COVID-19 measures — “yet kept most of the detained protesters in overcrowded, poorly ventilated police vehicles.”

    In July, police in Moscow detained dozens of journalists during a protest against Russia’s growing restrictions on media and freedom of expression.

    In several cases, Human Rights Watch said police “falsely claimed” protesters violated COVID-19 public health measures — “yet kept most of the detained protesters in overcrowded, poorly ventilated police vehicles where they could not practice social distancing.”

    HRW Russia researcher Damelya Aitkozhina says those cases “have taken the repression to a new level.”

    Aitkhozhina says authorities in Moscow “detained peaceful protesters under the abusive and restrictive rules on public assembly and under the guise of protecting public health, while exposing them to risk of infection in custody.”

    Rights activists say local authorities in some Russian regions also used COVID-19 measures as an excuse to crack down on protesters.

    In late April, authorities in North Ossetia detained dozens of demonstrators from a crowd of about 2,000 people who’d gathered in Vladikavkaz to demand the resignation of regional leader Vyacheslav Bitarov.

    Thirteen were charged with defying Russia’s COVID-19 measures and spreading “fake information” about the pandemic.

    In Russia’s Far East city of Khabarovsk, authorities used COVID-19 measures to try to discourage mass protests against the arrest of a popular regional governor on decades-old charges of complicity in murder.

    Demonstrators say the charges were fabricated by the governor’s local political opponents with help from the Kremlin.

    While municipal authorities in Khabarovsk warned about the risks of COVID-19 at the protests, police taped off gathering places for the demonstrations — claiming the move was necessary for COVID-19 disinfection.

    But the crowds gathered anyway — reflecting discontent with Putin’s rule and public anger at what residents say is disrespect from Moscow about their choice for a governor.

    Demo Restrictions In Kazakhstan

    Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev signed legislation in late May that tightened government control over the right of citizens to gather for protests.

    Going into effect during the first wave of the global COVID-19 outbreak, the new law defines how many people can attend a demonstration and where protests can take place.

    Critics say the new restrictions and bureaucratic hurdles include the need for “permission” from authorities before protests can legally take place in Kazakhstan — with officials being given many reasons to refuse permission.

    RFE/RL also has reported on how authorities in Kazakhstan used the coronavirus as an excuse to clamp down on civil rights activists who criticized the new public protest law.

    Kazakh and international human rights activists say the legislation contradicts international standards and contains numerous obstacles to free assembly.

    Information Control In Uzbekistan

    Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev has been praised by international rights groups since he came to power in late 2016 for his slight easing of authoritarian restrictions imposed by his predecessor, the late Islam Karimov.

    But the COVID-19 crisis has spawned a battle between emerging independent media outlets and the state body that oversees the press in Uzbekistan — the Agency for Information and Mass Communications (AIMC).

    Officials in Tashkent initially claimed Uzbekistan was doing well in combating COVID-19. But by the summer, some media outlets were questioning that government narrative.

    They began to delve deeply into details about the spread of the pandemic and its human costs within the country.

    AIMC Director Asadjon Khodjaev in late November threatened “serious legal consequences” about such reporting — raising concerns that COVID-19 could be pushing Uzbekistan back toward more authoritarian press controls, much like the conditions that existed under Karimov.

    Kyrgyz Upheaval

    Before the pandemic, Kyrgyzstan was considered by the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders as Central Asia’s most open country for the media. But Kyrgyzstan’s relative openness has been eroded by lockdowns and curfews imposed since a state of emergency was declared on March 22.

    Most independent media outlets have had difficulty getting accreditation or permits allowing their journalists to move freely in Bishkek or other areas restricted under the public health emergency.

    Violent political protests erupted after Kyrgyzstan’s controversial parliamentary elections on October 4 — which were carried out despite the complications posed by the COVID-19 control measures.

    The political tensions led to the downfall of President Sooronbai Jeenbekov’s government, plans to hold new elections, and the declaration of a state of emergency in Bishkek that included a ban on public demonstrations.

    Pascaline della Faille, an analyst for the Credendo group of European credit insurance companies, concludes that social tensions contributing to the political upheaval were heightened by the pandemic.

    She says those tensions included complaints about the country’s poor health system, an economy hit hard by COVID-19 containment measures, and a sharp drop in remittances from Kyrgyz citizens who work abroad.

    Turkmenistan Is Ridiculed

    One of the world’s most tightly controlled authoritarian states, Turkmenistan has never had a good record on press freedom or transparency.

    Not surprisingly, then, President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov’s claim that he has prevented a single COVID-19 infection from happening in his country has been the target of global ridicule rather than admiration.

    Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov

    Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov

    Ashgabat’s continued insistence that the coronavirus does not exist in Turkmenistan is seen as a sign of Berdymukhammedov’s authoritarian dominance rather than any credible public health policies.

    In early August, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that Berdymukhammedov had agreed to give WHO experts access to try to verify his claim about the absence of COVID-19 in his country.

    Hans Kluge, WHO’s regional director for Europe and Central Asia, said Berdymukhammedov had “agreed” for a WHO team “to sample independently COVID-19 tests in country” and take them to WHO reference laboratories in other countries.

    But after more than four months, Berdymukhammedov has still not kept his promise.

    Meanwhile, Turkmenistan’s state television broadcasts perpetuate Berdymukhammedov’s cult of personality by showing him opening new “state-of the-art” medical facilities in Ashgabat and other big cities.

    Privately, Turkmen citizens tell RFE/RL that they don’t believe the hype.

    They say they avoid hospitals when they become ill because facilities are too expensive for impoverished ordinary citizens and state facilities often have little to offer them.

    Patients at several regional hospitals in Turkmenistan told RFE/RL they’ve had to provide their own food, medicine, and even firewood to heat their hospital rooms.

    Still, in a former Soviet republic known for brutal crackdowns on critics and dissent, nobody openly criticizes Turkmenistan’s health officials about the dire situation in hospitals out of fear of reprisals.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • As part of an occasional series on how the end-of-year holidays are celebrated in our broadcast region, we talked to Irina Lagunina from RFE/RL’s Russian Service about seasonal traditions in her country.

    Western visitors to Russia at this time of year may be surprised to discover that the locals usually refer to the seasonally decorated conifers you see everywhere as “New Year firs” or “New Year spruces.”

    So why would they call them this when they’re commonly known as Christmas trees in many other places?

    According to Irina Lagunina from RFE/RL’s Russian Service, it’s largely a quirky legacy of the country’s Soviet past.

    “It was really weird because, after the socialist revolution, the Bolsheviks actually banned not just the festivities of the Christmas season — this wonderful season of the year — but also the Christmas tree, which was considered to be a religious symbol,” she says.

    “They decided that, since the main ideology is atheism, the Christmas tree should be banned. And that remained up until the mid-1930s when the New Year and the Christmas tree were kind of rehabilitated.”

    When the Christmas tree was “rehabilitated” amid much fanfare in 1935, the official atheist ethos of the time ensured that it would primarily be associated with New Year celebrations and its Christian connotations were jettisoned.

    The New Year spruce at the Kremlin in 1978

    The New Year spruce at the Kremlin in 1978

    It’s something that has endured to this day and the unveiling of the “New Year spruce” at the Kremlin every year is still a big event for thousands of children, although it is no longer decorated with a big Soviet star.

    In a way, it’s perhaps fitting that the tree is still firmly associated with New Year’s rather than Christmas, as “Novy God” (New Year) has long been the focal point of the festive season in Russia.

    Moscow municipal workers used cranes to erect the traditional New Year spruce on Red Square in late November.

    Moscow municipal workers used cranes to erect the traditional New Year spruce on Red Square in late November.

    Like many other Orthodox believers, most Russians typically celebrate Christmas Day on January 7. But for many, the day itself is quite low-key compared to other festivities that are observed in the country at this time of year.

    “For those who celebrate it in Russia right now, Christmas is a purely religious event,” says Lagunina. “Believers go to the churches — the churches are actually full these days — but there is still no kind of notion and tradition of family gathering on this day or having something special.”

    People light candles during Christmas midnight Mass at Moscow's Cathedral of Christ the Savior on January 6.

    People light candles during Christmas midnight Mass at Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior on January 6.

    According to Lagunina, the main day of celebration “is actually not Christmas, but New Year.”

    “It’s all about New Year,” she says. “This comes first in the Orthodox calendar, so Christmas is basically the next seven days, [but] the main festivity is New Year’s night, and that’s when Russians prepare the dinner of the year, the main celebration for family, unity, and so forth.”

    Although Lagunina says New Year in Russia is “like everywhere else in the world, with a lot of champagne and a lot of fireworks,” it is also the centerpiece of a wider tapestry of formal and informal celebrations that are observed at this time of year.

    Decorated Russia Lights Up As Holidays Approach

    Decorated Russia Lights Up As Holidays Approach Photo Gallery:

    Decorated Russia Lights Up As Holidays Approach

    Russians are preparing for the holidays with ornamented seasonal trees, festive decorations, and light displays.

    “Well, in Russia right now, of course, there is a reason to celebrate everything,” she says. “Russians start to celebrate with the Western Christmas, then New Year, Orthodox Christmas…. Basically, it’s three weeks of festivities. You cannot get sober during this time!”

    One of the most famous traditions observed during this period is not for the fainthearted.

    “Ice swimming is a big deal in Russia,” says Lagunina, referring to the many hardy souls who brave the freezing waters of their local lakes and rivers for a bracing dip on January 19 to celebrate the Epiphany.

    A Russian Orthodox priest takes an Epiphany dip in the icy waters of the Gulf of Finland outside St. Petersburg.

    A Russian Orthodox priest takes an Epiphany dip in the icy waters of the Gulf of Finland outside St. Petersburg.

    Amid all the festivities, however, New Year is always seen as the big event when people get together with close friends and relatives.

    Gifts are exchanged and copious amounts of food and drink are often consumed.

    Many families also take the time to watch The Irony Of Fate, a Trading Places kind of musical comedy that has been broadcast on state TV every New Year’s Day since 1976 and is now a firmly established tradition.

    But it is frequently the food that is at the heart of New Year proceedings.

    Lagunina says her seasonal table usually includes typical Russian fare, such as “pirozhki” pastries with various fillings and “kholodets” — cold stewed meat in aspic. Stuffed duck is also a very common dish on this day and “a regular middle-class family” might even have “a little bit of red caviar, sometimes salted salmon,” the main idea being that the choice of food on offer is “the best of what you can imagine.”

    Irina Lagunina's New Year's table: Top row (left to right): seledka pod shuboi (a salad of pickled herring "in a fur coat"), pirozhki pastries (often stuffed with meat, mushrooms, cabbage, and even jam), and pickled cabbage. Center: vinegret (Russian beetroot salad) and Salad Olivier (Russian salad). Bottom row: kholodets, seledka (pickled herring with marinated onion), and salted mushrooms.

    Irina Lagunina’s New Year’s table: Top row (left to right): seledka pod shuboi (a salad of pickled herring “in a fur coat”), pirozhki pastries (often stuffed with meat, mushrooms, cabbage, and even jam), and pickled cabbage. Center: vinegret (Russian beetroot salad) and Salad Olivier (Russian salad). Bottom row: kholodets, seledka (pickled herring with marinated onion), and salted mushrooms.

    No New Year’s feast is complete, however, without a typical Russian salad or “Salad Olivier,” which according to legend was first invented by a French chef of that name while he was working in tsarist Russia.

    Lagunina says a Salad Olivier is one of the “absolute must-have dishes on the table” at New Year. She puts the dish’s popularity down to its versatility, which allows it to be easily adapted for anyone observing a strict pre-Christmas fast.

    “Olivier is made of peas, potatoes, carrots, pickles, ham, and mayonnaise, but the ham can be replaced,” she says. “Depending on how strong a believer you are, it can be replaced with chicken, crabmeat, fish, practically everything…. So it’s this kind of multicultural, multireligious, suitable-for-everybody dish, and you can even make it for vegetarians without any meat or chicken.”

    How To Make Salad Olivier

    Ingredients

    1 small can of peas (100 grams)

    1 large or two small potatoes, peeled and boiled

    1 large boiled carrot

    4 hard-boiled eggs

    10 salted pickles (Irina makes these herself at home, but they can be shop-bought)

    2 slices of sweet onion, finely chopped

    200 grams (about 1/2 pound) of ham (common alternatives include a Mortadella type of sausage, crabmeat, boiled beef tongue, or fish. Irina has chosen “Doktorskaya kolbasa or “Doctor’s sausage,” a lunch meat that has been popular in Russia since Soviet times.)

    Method

    “Like all Russian salads, all the items should be the size of the smallest ingredient that cannot be divided,” says Lagunina. “The peas are the smallest undividable element, so everything you cut should be the size of a pea [at most]. That’s the basis of all Russian salads.”

    As everything should be cut into pea-sized cubes, Lagunina uses a potato slicer for this purpose.

    “This tool is very popular not only in Russia but also in the Czech Republic, Austria, and all other places where they make potato salad,” she says.

    Lagunina is in favor of breaking with tradition and grating the carrots even smaller, however, as cutting them into cubes gives the salad “an overwhelming taste.”

    Like the carrots, Lagunina also prefers to cut the eggs smaller than the peas, as they help “cement the salad.”

    Once all the ingredients have been tossed in a bowl, mix in some mayonnaise (according to taste) and sprinkle with black pepper as the “final touch.”

    Lagunina stresses that the mayonnaise should be added “only before you serve the salad on the table,” as it will ensure a “fresher” flavor.

    Written by Coilin O’Connor based on an interview with Irina Lagunina from RFE/RL’s Russian Service

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Russia’s media regulator, Roskomnadzor, says the country needs an alternative to YouTube, the U.S. online video-sharing platform that it struggles to censor.

    “Due to the absence of a direct competitor in Russia, YouTube is still irreplaceable,” Roskomnadzor said in a statement on December 29.

    The regulator added that there was a need for a “popular equivalent” in Russia that would reduce Russians’ dependence on foreign social media.

    The Kremlin is losing its grip on information dissemination inside the country as more and more Russians turn to foreign social-media sites like YouTube and Instagram for content.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin has been able to maintain high ratings during his two decades in power in part thanks to Kremlin control over the country’s main TV stations.

    An effective and popular Russian competitor to YouTube would enable the government to impair YouTube’s ability to operate inside the country.

    Roskomnadzor’s comments came the same day that Russia’s Investigative Committee launched a criminal case against Aleksei Navalny, the Kremlin critic who has deftly used YouTube to expose corruption at the highest levels of government.

    It also comes the same day that Gazprom-Media, the media arm of state-controlled natural-gas giant Gazprom, acquired a 100 percent stake in Russian video-streaming service Rutube.

    Gazprom-Media is Russia’s largest media company, with holdings including several leading television channels, radio stations, and print media.

    Roskomnadzor’s chief, Aleksandr Zharov, said work was under way to make Rutube as “convenient” as YouTube.

    On December 23, the State Duma approved in a final reading a bill that would allow Roskomnadzor to block websites that “discriminate against Russian media.”

    Roskomnadzor would be allowed to partially or fully restrict or slow access to websites found in violation of the law.

    The bill is seen affecting major social media such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Russia’s Investigative Committee has launched a criminal case against Aleksei Navalny, accusing the Kremlin critic of stealing hundreds of millions of rubles donated to his anti-corruption organization.

    The criminal case now raises questions as to whether Navalny, who is recuperating in Germany following his poisoning in August with a military-grade nerve agent, will return to Russia, where he could face a lengthy prison term if convicted.

    Navalny dismissed the latest charges as the government’s revenge against him for surviving the poisoning and then exposing those who were behind it. The activist has called the poisoning an assassination attempt by the state’s security services.

    “I immediately said: they will try to jail me for not dying and then looking for my killers. For proving that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin is personally behind everything. He is a thief, ready to kill those who refuse to keep quiet about his theft,” Navalny said in a tweet on December 29 shortly after the launch of the case.

    Navalny has become a thorn in the Kremlin’s side over the years with his detailed investigations into corruption at the highest levels of government and has been jailed for short periods of time on several occasions.

    His investigative videos — which often take him abroad to film the rich lifestyle of Russian officials — receive millions of views each time they are uploaded online and have helped sour the public on the government and the ruling party, United Russia.

    The launch of a criminal case against Navalny comes amid an intensifying clampdown in recent years on the Kremlin opposition as the Russian economy struggles to grow and public frustration mounts over declining living standards.

    Russia holds key parliamentary elections next year after what is likely to be the country’s worst economic performance in more than a decade. Navalny is seeking to weaken United Russia’s hold by urging his supports to vote for other candidates.

    The Investigative Committee said in a post on December 29 that a series of nonprofit organizations run by Navalny, including the Anti-Corruption Foundation, raised a total of 588 million rubles ($7.94 million) from citizens.

    Investigators claim he spent 356 million rubles ($4.81 million) acquiring personal items and vacationing abroad. They did not say what those items were, whether they were used to carry out his work, nor whether the alleged vacations coincided with the destinations he filmed.

    Navalny later tweeted a link to his foundation’s donation page, telling his supporters that “the best way to laugh” at the new criminal case “invented” by the authorities was to finance his work.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • MITROVICA, Kosovo — Sretko Radenkovic was one of the first of Kosovo’s 1.7 million people to get vaccinated against COVID-19 last weekend.

    From the village of Srbovac, outside the divided northern city of Mitrovica near the border with Serbia, the 77-year-old says he kind of lucked out.

    Radenkovic, an ethnic Serb, said he had heard from a neighbor late on December 25 about a chance to get inoculated against the pathogen that has so far infected 82 million people worldwide, killing nearly 1.8 million of them.

    The next day, after hearing that three people had given up their spots, he was in line alongside dozens of others at the Zvecan Health Center, part of a shadow health system in the area run by Serbia for ethnic Serbs.

    There were said to be 50 or 60 doses of the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine earmarked for elderly patients.

    “I got the vaccine without hesitation,” Radenkovic told RFE/RL’s Balkan Service. “It simply happened.”

    Under other circumstances, in a region plagued by anti-vaccination sentiment and disinformation, anyone’s eagerness for a vaccine to protect them from the coronavirus might be welcomed.

    But Radenkovic’s discretion about how exactly he got his shot could be warranted.

    Kosovo is not expected to get its first shipment of vaccines under the COVAX international distribution system for at least two months.

    Even then, it is expected to receive only enough doses for around one-fifth of the country’s residents.

    So Kosovo’s judicial authorities, faced with possibly hundreds of vaccinations in a handful of communities in the northern region bordering Serbia, want to know exactly who is vaccinating whom, with what, and on whose authority.

    Simple Deduction

    Regional prosecutors in Kosovo say they are collecting information for what could become criminal investigations that lead to prosecutions over the vaccine reports.

    “If we have evidence that [vaccines] are indeed smuggled — because use of these vaccines requires authorization — and if they are illegal, criminal proceedings will be instituted against those who did these things,” Shyqri Syla, the prosecutor in Mitrovica, told RFE/RL.

    They might not need to look very far.

    Unofficial reports suggest Zvecan was one of four northern Kosovar municipalities to have received about 50 doses of the Pfizer vaccine despite no authorization so far from Kosovar health and safety regulators.

    The others were North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, and Leposavic.

    Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic announced on December 25 that the vaccination of elderly residents in Lepasovic had begun and were imminent in the ethnically divided city of Mitrovica.

    “Let’s protect them first and then the others,” Vucic said of elderly Serbs at a press conference at a military airport outside the Serbian capital, Belgrade, where he was welcoming a shipment of medical equipment from the United Arab Emirates.

    He has since said Serbia will continue to look after “its people in Kosovo.”

    Serbian authorities have not said whether they are continuing to vaccinate in Kosovo, a former province whose sovereignty Belgrade still rejects despite recognition from more than 115 countries.

    But an official in Gracanica, a Serbian-majority community near the Kosovar capital, Pristina, suggested that the Serbian Health Ministry was preparing to send vaccinations to that area.

    Mirjana Dimitrijevic, the director of a health facility in Gracanica, told RFE/RL that residents over the age of 65 were being surveyed to gauge interest in the Serbian vaccine.

    “We expect that after submitting this data to the competent institutions, we will receive the invitation for supply and will start distributing vaccines,” Dimitrejevic said.

    Pristina Appeals For Consequences

    In a Facebook post under the heading “Sanction Serbia’s Violations,” Kosovar Foreign Minister Meliza Haradinaj-Stublla called it a “clandestine intervention” in her country’s affairs and a “flagrant violation” of a 2015 agreement on rules governing the mutual recognition of pharmaceuticals.

    “Serbia and its top officials, with [its] recent actions as well as with ongoing violations, has endangered Kosovo’s state security and has therefore undermined the entire process and achievements of the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia in Washington, just as in Brussels,” she said in reference to international efforts to mediate a path to normalcy between Pristina and Belgrade.

    Meliza Haradinaj-Stublla (file photo)

    Meliza Haradinaj-Stublla (file photo)

    Kosovar’s caretaker prime minister, Avdullah Hoti, noted on December 26 the reported distribution of vaccines to “citizens in the north of the country” and suggested any such medicines had “entered through illegal channels.” He vowed that “Kosovo institutions will take the necessary legal measures against persons involved in this illegal activity such as drug smuggling.”

    Two days later — just as the European Commission adopted a 70 million-euro ($86 million) package for early Western Balkan access to EU coronavirus vaccines — Hoti suggested that EU Neighborhood and Enlargement Commissioner Oliver Varhelyi shared his “concerns” about the matter.

    World Health Organization (WHO) officials in Pristina have said a vaccine under COVAX, the UN public-health agency’s global distribution mechanism, is unlikely to arrive in Kosovo until the spring — early April at the latest.

    WHO experts say Kosovo currently lacks the technical infrastructure and trained medical staff needed to administer the vaccine.

    Hoti also said Varhelyi had “assured” him that a vaccine “will arrive in Kosovo at the same time as in other Western Balkan countries.”

    When asked by RFE/RL’s Balkan Service, Kosovar Health Minister Armend Zemaj last week declined to say whether Pristina was negotiating for the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine.

    Acting Kosovar President Vjosa Osmani on December 29 called vaccines already imported from Serbia a violation of agreements within the international normalization efforts but also suggested they bespoke “a lack of preparation on the part of our institutions.”

    Kosovars, including those in the north, should be “notified [as to] when they should expect vaccines from health institutions of Kosovo.”

    Vjosa Osmani (file photo)

    Vjosa Osmani (file photo)

    “I think we have delays that should not be justified,” Osmani told reporters. “Other countries in the region are ahead of us, so we must and will demand responsibility from the government for why we are not prepared and it is expected that, in all likelihood, vaccines will arrive sometime after April.”

    She also said that in addition to any COVAX vaccines, Kosovo’s government should be trying to obtain vaccines from other EU countries.

    Political Preening?

    Although the numbers are slippery, at least 100,000 or so of Kosovo’s residents are ethnic Serbs, mostly in the north but also in scattered communities in the south.

    Belgrade maintains a shadow health-care system in many of those regions.

    Serbia, a regional economic power, led the area in kicking off its vaccination effort thanks to the arrival of nearly 5,000 doses of the Pfizer/BioNTech serum on December 22.

    Two days later, it became the third country in Europe to start inoculating with the Pfizer vaccine, after the United Kingdom and Switzerland.

    Its use everywhere but Switzerland has so far relied on emergency-use authorizations following extensive testing.

    Serbia is currently testing the Russian-made Sputnik-V vaccine and has reportedly been negotiating for Sinopharm’s Chinese vaccine.

    While it is unclear if or when regulatory approval might come from Serbian laboratories, concerns about a lack of testing and transparency have dogged the Russian vaccine in particular.

    Is Serbia's Vucic playing politics with vaccines?

    Is Serbia’s Vucic playing politics with vaccines?

    Vucic, who burnished his ultranationalist credentials opposing Kosovo’s bid for independence in the 1990s, cultivates strong formal and informal ties between Serbia’s government and ethnic Serbian communities in Kosovo and other neighboring countries.

    Arton Demhasaj, director of the Kosovo-based NGO Cohu!, a think tank that promotes democracy and anti-corruption efforts, said he believed Vucic’s apparent vaccination politics in northern Kosovo were aimed at provoking Pristina.

    “He now expects institutional reactions from Kosovo and then this will be used in the international arena as ‘Lo and behold, even for a humanitarian intervention for Serb citizens in Kosovo, these are the reactions,’” Demhasaj told RFE/RL.

    He suggested that even securing the vaccine so quickly — even ahead of many EU countries — was part of a deliberate political show on Vucic’s part.

    “First bring it to Kosovo and wait for the reaction of our institutions, and then use that politically,” Demhasaj said. “I think this shouldn’t have been allowed to happen.”

    Written by Andy Heil based on reporting by Bekim Bislimi of RFE/RL’s Balkan Service with contributions by Maja Ficovic from North Mitrovica and Sandra Cvetkovic from Gracanica

    IMAGE:
    https://gdb.rferl.org/29e1465a-c5a3-4c05-9813-376db860f2be.jpg

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Optima Ventures, the U.S. real-estate holding company owned by two Ukrainian tycoons under FBI investigation for money laundering, has filed a motion in a court in the U.S. state of Delaware to sell two more buildings in the city of Cleveland amid foreclosure proceedings.

    Optima Ventures, once the largest commercial real-estate operator in the Midwestern city, is seeking to sell 55 Public Square, a 22-story skyscraper, as well as its stake in the Westin Cleveland Downtown hotel, according to court documents filed on December 24.

    The holding company, which is controlled by Ukrainian billionaires Ihor Kolomoyskiy and Hennadiy Boholyubov, owes about $50 million on the two properties and has failed to make payments in recent months, according to separate lawsuits filed in Cleveland.

    The United States has accused Kolomoyskiy and Boholyubov of buying U.S. assets, including real estate and metals plants, with hundreds of millions of dollars laundered from their Kyiv-based lender PrivatBank.

    Kolomoyskiy, who owns media, energy, and metals assets, is one of the most powerful magnates in Ukraine. He and Boholyubov deny the charges and claim they bought the U.S. assets with money received from the sale of a steel business.

    Ukraine nationalized PrivatBank in 2016 and pumped $5.5 billion into the lender to stave off its bankruptcy. PrivatBank in May 2019 then filed a civil lawsuit in Delaware against the billionaires to recoup the money it claims they stole. The motion to sell the two Cleveland properties was filed as part of those proceedings.

    The FBI confirmed on August 4 that it was investigating the two tycoons for embezzlement and money laundering. That probe is continuing, the FBI told RFE/RL earlier this month.

    Separately, the Justice Department is seeking the forfeiture of two commercial buildings owned by Optima Ventures in Louisville, Kentucky, and Dallas, Texas.

    Optima Ventures had owned nine commercial buildings in the United States at its peak, including five in Cleveland, making it temporarily the largest commercial real-estate owner in the city. The holding has sold off several of the buildings in recent years.

    Upon completion of the two sales, Optima Ventures will own just one building in Cleveland as well as the two buildings currently facing forfeiture.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • WASHINGTON — Kosovo will lose its biggest supporter in the U.S. Congress when Representative Eliot Engel leaves Capitol Hill in January after more than three decades in office.

    Engel, a Democrat, has represented parts of the Bronx — a New York City borough with a large and politically active ethnic Albanian population — since 1989 and was a leader in Congress gathering support for recognition of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia in 2008.

    His unwavering support for Kosovo through the decades has made him a celebrity in the predominantly ethnic Albanian republic, which has been recognized by some 115 countries.

    Kosovo has named a street and a highway in honor of Engel and even issued a stamp with his image. Conversely, all of this has made him a controversial figure in Serbia, which still refuses to accept the loss of its former province and lobbies against its recognition by the international community.

    But Engel’s departure from the House of Representatives — where he most recently chaired the lower chamber’s Foreign Affairs Committee, using his formidable position to chastise Belgrade and defend Kosovo — might not be an occasion for Serbia to rejoice.

    Kosovo's then-speaker of parliament, Kadri Veseli, meets in Washington with Eliot Engel in 2019.

    Kosovo’s then-speaker of parliament, Kadri Veseli, meets in Washington with Eliot Engel in 2019.

    Engel, 73, has said he has no plans to retire following his surprise defeat to a school principal in the Democratic primaries earlier this year. He said he has been asked if he wants to be an ambassador or undersecretary in the administration of President-elect Joe Biden and is considering his options, raising the question of whether he might continue to influence U.S. Balkan policy.

    “[There are] lots of different things I could do…. I’m not going to make any decisions right now, but, you know, I’m thinking about it,” he told the Washington Examiner in early December. “Maybe do something with the administration…. Some people have suggested perhaps I could be an ambassador.”

    Balkan Passion

    Though Engel is keeping his cards close to his chest regarding his future plans, he recently demonstrated where his policy interests lie during one of his last House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings.

    “Little did I know the passion I would develop for a small corner of Europe called the Balkans,” Engel said on December 8 as he kicked off a hearing he called to give policy recommendations to the incoming Biden administration on the region.

    “I’ve traveled to every country in the Western Balkans several times, met with so many leaders from so many parties, and come to love the rich variety of cultures, ethnicities, and religions,” he said.

    “But no place has touched my heart more than Kosovo,” he said in an introduction that often touched upon his leading role in U.S. Balkan policy over the decades.

    Engel’s decision to hold a hearing in his waning days in Congress on a part of Europe that rarely makes headlines in the United States — amid more immediate national security concerns such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea — was noteworthy, observers said.

    Eliot Engel holds a joint press conference with then-Kosovar Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj in Pristina in November 2017.

    Eliot Engel holds a joint press conference with then-Kosovar Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj in Pristina in November 2017.

    “The hearing was meant to cement Engel’s legacy in the Balkans, especially with respect to Kosovo,” said Dan Vajdich, who covered Europe and Eurasia for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and now advises the Serbian Chamber of Commerce on attracting American investment to Serbia and the Western Balkans.

    Engel entered Congress just as Yugoslavia was breaking up violently along ethnic lines, and he immersed himself in the many regional disputes through his seat on the Foreign Affairs Committee, eventually earning a reputation as a Balkan expert.

    He was among the first U.S. lawmakers to call on the administration of President Bill Clinton to intervene in 1998 to stop Yugoslav and Serbian forces in Kosovo and was arguably the most outspoken advocate in Congress for U.S. recognition of the country’s independence a decade later.

    Engel continues to fight for justice for the Bytyqi brothers, three Albanian-Americans who fought on the side of the Kosovar rebels and were summarily executed by Serb police in 1999. Their killers have not been prosecuted.

    “As all of you know, Elliott has been Kosovo’s greatest champion in the United States Congress,” Representative Kevin McCarthy (Republican-California), the ranking minority member on the Foreign Affairs Committee, told the December 8 House of Representatives hearing.

    Balkan Ambassadorships?

    With Engel possibly looking at ambassadorships, some have speculated whether a Balkan role could be in the cards for the outgoing lawmaker.

    Balkan postings will likely open up by early 2022 as U.S. ambassadors in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina reach the typical three-year term limit for service in a country.

    The Biden administration may also appoint special envoys to the region, including for Serbia-Kosovo talks.

    Engel would not be good news for negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade. He has become too biased, too one-sided, and he is totally out of touch with what is happening on the ground in Serbia.”

    Washington is still focused on solving the unresolved dispute between Serbia and Kosovo over the latter’s recognition, which would open the door for both countries to move closer to EU membership and potentially even NATO.

    Washington is also pushing for constitutional reform in Bosnia with the aim of maintaining its territorial integrity amid threats by Republika Srpska, Bosnia’s ethnic Serb entity, to secede.

    Tim Mulvey, communications director for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, declined to comment on whether Engel is interested in ambassadorial postings or being appointed as a special envoy in the Balkans.

    Ronald Neumann, the president of the American Academy of Diplomacy and a former U.S. ambassador, told RFE/RL that someone of Engel’s stature would more likely be tapped to head a large embassy in a Western European capital like London or Berlin rather than a small posting in the Balkans.

    Jelena Milic, director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies in Belgrade, said Serbia would view it as a setback if Engel became involved in Serbia-Kosovo peace talks, due to his close ties to Pristina. For the same reason, she also doubted he would make a positive impact on regional issues if we were appointed as ambassador to Kosovo or Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    “Engel would not be good news for negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade,” she said. “He has become too biased, too one-sided, and he is totally out of touch with what is happening on the ground in Serbia. He still views Serbia through [the prism of] the 1990s,” she said.

    Milic said the December 8 House hearing was a case in point.

    Engel highlighted some of Serbia’s shortcomings, including its failure to prosecute war criminals, a rollback of democracy under President Aleksandr Vucic, and the country’s close military ties to Russia. The lawmaker also criticized current U.S policy on Kosovo as too beholden to Serbia.

    “Too often we deal with Kosovo as [an offshoot] of the dialogue with Serbia. We subsume our bilateral ties to such an extent that we, the United States, are limiting Kosovo’s choices to avoid offending Belgrade,” Engel said.

    Eliot was a singular champion on Kosovo. He didn’t really have any peers. But that doesn’t mean that there aren’t others that will emerge [in Congress].”

    Many Balkan analysts in the United States say Engel was right to highlight those issues.

    But Milic said Engel distorted the perception of Serbia and failed to acknowledge some “positive changes” that have occurred over the years, listing respect for Bosnia’s territorial integrity and what she termed “cooperation” with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), despite Belgrade’s failure to extradite criminal suspects to The Hague. She also said Engel had downplayed the deaths of 2,000 Serbians during the 1999 Kosovo War.

    Vajdich said Engel’s comments make it “politically difficult” for politicians in Belgrade to advocate for stronger ties with the United States and are used by Russia for propaganda purposes to build a divide between Serbia and the West.

    “The Russian messaging is that America will never accept you and all it cares about is Kosovo. And it resonates with the average Serb,” he said.

    Neumann said Serbian opposition to Engel would be “germane” in debating who to tap as an envoy to peace talks.

    “If one of the parties is very negative, that would not help the work of a special envoy,” he said.

    Janusz Bugajski, a Balkan expert at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, said Engel could still do work in the Biden administration on the Balkans that is not tied to Serbia-Kosovo peace talks, such as working with the Europeans on combating Russian and Chinese influence in the region. Engel, he pointed out, has extensive experience with transatlantic relations.

    Engel speaks to the Kosovar parliament in July 2015.

    Engel speaks to the Kosovar parliament in July 2015.

    “There are many possibilities” for Engel in a Biden administration, some of which would be “more sensitive vis-a-vis Belgrade,” he said.

    No Loss For Kosovo?

    Tanya Domi, a Balkan expert at Columbia University who previously worked on Balkan policy for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, said she doesn’t expect Engel’s departure to weaken U.S. support for Kosovo.

    Engel, she said, may have become so outspoken on Kosovo and other Balkan issues in part because White House attention to the region had declined over the years.

    That changed at the end of Donald Trump’s administration with the 2019 appointment of Richard Grenell as special envoy for the Serbia and Kosovo talks and the signing of a deal in September to normalize economic relations.

    That trend is likely to continue under Biden, who knows the region firsthand from his days on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

    Domi predicted that Biden is likely to take up the cause of the region more aggressively than previous presidents.

    “Eliot was a singular champion on Kosovo. He didn’t really have any peers,” Domi said. “But that doesn’t mean that there aren’t others that will emerge [in Congress]. And this loss will be offset by a Biden State Department that is going to be very forward-leaning on the Balkans,” she said.

    Engels will be replaced as chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee by Gregory Meeks (Democrat-New York), who will take the reins on January 6 when the Congress that was elected on November 3 meets for the first time.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Russia has confirmed that it has been underreporting its coronavirus death toll, announcing that the actual number of fatalities related to the pandemic is more than three times higher than previously released figures.

    The admission would place Russia third behind the United States and Brazil in terms of COVID-19 fatalities.

    The Rosstat statistics agency said on December 28 that the number of deaths from all causes recorded between January and November had risen by 229,700 compared to the previous year.

    “More than 81 percent of this increase in mortality over this period is due to COVID,” Deputy Prime Minister Tatiana Golikova said. The percentage increase would mean that more than 186,000 Russians have died from COVID-19, whereas recorded figures stand at around 54,500 deaths and more than 3 million infections.

    Golikova added that death rates in November-December were higher than other periods due to the “autumn/winter period, when the spread of COVID-19 is increasing in combination with other diseases.”

    Rosstat on December 28 announced that 23,610 deaths in Russia were attributed to COVID-19 in November alone, whereas the initial figure for that month was recorded as 19,626. Rosstat said that the additional deaths had been assumed to be coronavirus-related, but that additional medical research was required to confirm it.

    Since the beginning of the pandemic, Russia has consistently downplayed its impact even as outside observers suggested that the casualty count was far too low. Earlier this month, President Vladimir Putin said that Russia had done a better job managing the pandemic than Western countries and rejected introducing a nationwide lockdown.

    Some of the disparity is attributed to Russia only listing deaths as coronavirus-related if COVID-19, rather than other causes such as upper respiratory infections, were listed in the autopsy as the cause of death.

    Based on AFP and TASS

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Thirty-nine-year-old Igor Paspalj didn’t necessarily do it to the same drumbeat as millions of other former Yugoslavs.

    But the tattooed, bare-sleeved music teacher and session guitarist has picked and bent his way to global recognition at the top of his craft.

    An emigre whose love for his music and gigging took him from the Balkans to Dubai six years ago, Paspalj was named Electric Guitarist Of The Year this month by specialist magazines Guitar World and Guitar Player.

    While it’s no Grammy, Paspalj said it’s a “great accolade for me, personally,” because like so many of his counterparts around the world, he was a big fan of those publications, which shaped his musical worldview when he was young.

    “I was surprised they even nominated me among the top five and when they declared me the winner I was really happy for the simple reason that I grew up on those magazines,” Paspalj, who was raised in the Bosnian city of Banja Luka, told RFE/RL’s Balkan Service. “I read them as a boy, like all guitarists who grew up with access to them.”

    The magazines pick their annual winners in several categories based on a poll of readers, staff, and input from three celebrity musicians.

    The judges this year were prog metal icon and Dream Theater guitarist John Petrucci; Nita Strauss, who toured pre-pandemic with Alice Cooper; and John 5, formerly of both David Lee Roth’s and Marilyn Manson’s bands.

    Paspalj won with nearly four minutes of a string-bending, alternately soaring and racing rendition of Into The Blue.

    Many of the candidates for the award are longtime performers with hard-core followings on the growing market for online musical instruction but are mostly unknown to general audiences.

    The award was announced by Guitar World — along with other annual winners in categories for young guitarists, bassists, and even guitar teachers — on December 22.

    “With a playing style fueled by a strong cocktail of virtuoso influences – including Eddie Van Halen, Yngwie Malmsteen, Paul Gilbert, Vinnie Moore, Joe Satriani, Steve Vai, and Guthrie Govan — Igor displays exceptional instrumental dominance, as well as an unparalleled compositional ability,” the magazine said.

    Paspalj was born in Zagreb but as a young boy moved in 1991 to Prijedor, in what is now a majority ethnic Serb region in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    That was shortly before the breakup of Yugoslavia that sparked deadly wars and a major exodus from the Balkans.

    He studied at the Academy of Arts in Banja Luka, the capital of the Republika Srpska entity that along with the Bosniak and Croat federation makes up Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    Igor Paspalj

    Igor Paspalj

    Paspalj went on to get his master’s degree in theory and harmonics and teach at the same academy. He also made a collaborative and a solo album and held music classes all over the world.

    Paspalj has been in Dubai since 2014 lecturing on music and working as a session musician, performing at a feverish pace for what he suggested are better-paid gigs than what he can find in many places, including Bosnia.

    Paspalj estimated that he has had about 1,500 paid performances in the last five years — “probably the biggest advantage of Dubai” — and said he hoped his new award as the best in the world will bring more work.

    Speaking to RFE/RL in Banja Luka, Paspalj said the coronavirus pandemic had made traveling for work “three times as difficult.”

    He added that after the award was announced it had “already produced a few offers in the last two days, [and] I hope it brings a lot more engagements in the future.”

    Some of those new offers were from the United Kingdom and Canada, he said, in addition to Dubai.

    One of the admirers of his winning entry, Sasa Sibincic, proclaimed that “with your masterful cover performances you proved that rock ‘n’ roll is not dead, at least not in this part of the world!”

    “I sincerely hope so,” Paspalj said when asked if his success might inspire other Bosnian and Balkan musicians.

    “I’d really like many young musicians, if that’s their inspiration, if they’re lucky, from that area, to be there. Soon.”

    But he’s not especially well-informed on the Balkan music scene, he says, since he’s mostly been collaborating with bands from places such as the Philippines, Britain, and South Africa.

    Now, having spent the past two months back in Banja Luka, he’s reacquainting himself with new bands and old bandmates.

    “It’s hard to define where I get my inspiration from,” Paspalj told RFE/RL. “But guitar and music are everything I do professionally — it’s both a hobby and a calling. And I’m glad I have the opportunity to do what I love.”

    Written in Prague based on an interview by RFE/RL Balkan Service correspondent Milorad Milojevic in Banja Luka

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.