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Category: Russia

  • Putin Signs Amendments To ‘Foreign Agents’ Law That Critics Say Undermine Democracy

    MOSCOW — Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed into law legislation that human rights watchdogs and opposition politicians have said will undermine democratic processes.

    The legislation, which came into force on December 30, included a series of amendments to the controversial law on “foreign agents” to allow individuals and public entities to be recognized as “foreign agents” if they are considered to be engaged in political activities “in the interests of a foreign state.”

    Among those individuals Russia has for the first time branded as “foreign agents” are three journalists who contribute to RFE/RL. Organizations that have received the label will be required to report their activities and face financial audits.

    Grounds for being recognized as a “foreign agent” could be holding rallies or political debates, providing opinions on state policies, actions promoting a certain outcome in an election or referendum, or participation as an electoral observer or in political parties if they are done in the interest of a foreign entity.

    Amnesty International has slammed the proposed legislation, saying it would “drastically limit and damage the work not only of civil society organizations that receive funds from outside Russia but many other groups as well.”

    Critics say the “foreign agent” law, originally passed in 2012 and since expanded through amendments, has been arbitrarily applied to target Russian civil society organizations, human rights defenders, and political activists.

    Putin also signed a bill allowing media regulator Roskomnadzor to partially or fully restrict or slow access to foreign websites that “discriminate against Russian media.”

    The legislation is expected to affect major social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • COVID-19 Crackdowns, Expanded Authoritarianism, And The Post-Pandemic World

    The approval of COVID-19 vaccines has raised hopes that the “new normal” of a post-pandemic world will start to emerge in 2021.

    But international rights groups say civil society must be able to return to its “normal” pre-pandemic role to prevent a permanent expansion of overreaching government power.

    They argue that civil society must provide checks and balances to ensure the rollback of temporary, emergency public-health measures imposed — and sometimes misused — during 2020.

    Transparency International has long warned about “worrying signs that the pandemic will leave in its wake increased authoritarianism and weakened rule of law.”

    “The COVID-19 crisis has offered corrupt and authoritarian leaders a dangerous combination of public distraction and reduced oversight,” the global anti-corruption group says.

    “Corruption thrives when democratic institutions such as a free press and an independent judiciary are undermined; when citizens’ right to protest, join associations, or engage in initiatives to monitor government spending is limited,” Transparency International says.

    Protesters clash with police in front of Serbia's National Assembly building in Belgrade on July 8 during a demonstration against a weekend curfew announced to combat a resurgence of COVID-19 infections.

    Protesters clash with police in front of Serbia’s National Assembly building in Belgrade on July 8 during a demonstration against a weekend curfew announced to combat a resurgence of COVID-19 infections.

    says authoritarianism in theory, as well as authoritarian regimes in practice, were “already gaining ground” before the pandemic.

    Hamid says some aspects of the post-pandemic era — such as COVID-19 tracing schemes and increased surveillance — can create “authoritarian temptations” for those in charge of governments.

    “During — and after — the pandemic, governments are likely to use long, protracted crises to undermine domestic opposition and curtail civil liberties,” Hamid concludes in a Brookings report called Reopening The World.

    The intent to suppress on the part of the government can provoke an unusually intense desire to expose its mistakes on the part of the press, the legislative branch, and civil society.”

    But despite those dangers, Hamid remains cautiously optimistic about political freedoms recovering in a post-pandemic world.

    In due time, he says, the removal of emergency restrictions will help “political parties, protesters, and grassroots movements to communicate their platforms and grievances to larger audiences.”

    “Democratic governments may try to suppress information and spin or downplay crises as well — as the Trump administration did — but they rarely get away with it,” Hamid concludes.

    “If anything, the intent to suppress on the part of the government can provoke an unusually intense desire to expose its mistakes on the part of the press, the legislative branch, and civil society,” he says.

    In countries from Russia to Turkmenistan, authoritarian tendencies under the guise of pandemic control have included the use of emergency health measures to crack down on political opposition figures and to limit the freedom of the press.

    They also have included attempts by authorities to restrict the ability of civic organizations to scrutinize and constrain the expansion of executive power.

    Crackdown In Baku

    Actions taken by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s government are a case in point.

    In March, Baku imposed tough new punishments for those convicted of “violating anti-epidemic, sanitary-hygienic, or lockdown” rules.

    The new criminal law imposed a fine of about $3,000 and up to three years in prison for violations such as failing to wear a mask in public.

    Those convicted of spreading the virus face up to five years in prison.

    A police officer inspects a woman's documents under the gaze of an Azerbaijani soldier in Baku in July during the coronavirus pandemic. Azerbaijan deployed troops to help police ensure a tight coronavirus lockdown in the capital and several major cities.

    A police officer inspects a woman’s documents under the gaze of an Azerbaijani soldier in Baku in July during the coronavirus pandemic. Azerbaijan deployed troops to help police ensure a tight coronavirus lockdown in the capital and several major cities.

    Human Rights Watch (HRW) warned that Baku’s criminal punishments for spreading COVID are “not a legitimate or proportionate response to the threat posed by the virus.”

    The U.S.-based rights group says it is all too easy for such laws to be misused to “target marginalized populations, minorities, or dissidents.”

    During the summer — amid public dissatisfaction about the lack of a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with neighboring Armenia — Aliyev also faced dissent over rampant corruption, economic mismanagement, and his handling of the pandemic.

    Aliyev’s response was to launch a crackdown in July widely seen as an attempt to eliminate his political rivals and pro-democracy advocates once and for all.

    A Washington Post editorial said Aliyev had “blown a gasket” with a “tantrum” that threatened to “obliterate what remains of independent political forces in Azerbaijan.”

    More than 120 opposition figures and supporters were rounded up in July by Aliyev’s security forces — mostly from the opposition Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (AXFP).

    Two opposition figures among those arrested were charged with violating Azerbaijan’s emergency COVID measures — Mehdi Ibrahimov, the son of AXFP Deputy Chairman Mammad Ibrahim, and AXFP member Mahammad Imanli.

    HRW says its own review of pretrial court documents concluded that Imanli was “falsely accused” of spreading COVID-19 and endangering lives by not wearing a mask in public.

    Ibrahimov’s arrest was based on a claim by police that he took part in an unauthorized street demonstration while infected with the coronavirus.

    But Ibrahimov’s lawyer says COVID tests taken after his arrest in July show he was not infected.

    In fact, he said, the charges of violating public-health rules were only filed against Ibrahimov after he was detained and authorities discovered he was the son of a prominent opposition leader.

    Belarusian Borders

    Critics accuse Belarus’s authoritarian ruler, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, of using COVID-19 restrictions to suppress mass demonstrations against his regime.

    To be sure, the use of politically related COVID-19 measures is seen as just one tool in Minsk’s broader strategy of intensified police crackdowns.

    The rights group Vyasna said in December that more than 900 politically motivated criminal cases were opened in 2020 against Belarusian opposition candidates and their teams, activists, and protesters.

    The ongoing, daily demonstrations pose the biggest threat to Lukashenka’s 26-year grasp on power — fueled by allegations of electoral fraud after he was declared the landslide winner of a sixth term in a highly disputed August 9 presidential election.

    While Minsk downplayed the threat posed by COVID-19 for months, Lukashenka has repeatedly accused the opposition and hundreds of thousands of protesters on the streets of being foreign-backed puppets.

    A Belarusian border guard wears a face mask and gloves to protect herself from the coronavirus early in the pandemic. Belarus closed off its borders to foreigners on November 1.

    A Belarusian border guard wears a face mask and gloves to protect herself from the coronavirus early in the pandemic. Belarus closed off its borders to foreigners on November 1.

    On November 1, after months of brutal police crackdowns failed to halt the anti-government demonstrations, Belarus closed off its borders to foreigners.

    The State Border Committee said the restrictions were necessary to “prevent the spread of infection caused by COVID-19.”

    In December, authorities expanded the border ban to prevent Belarusians and permanent residents from leaving the country — ostensibly because of the pandemic.

    Lukashenka’s own behavior on COVID-19 bolstered allegations the border closures are a politically motivated attempt to restrain the domestic opposition.

    In late November, Lukashenka completely disregarded safety protocols during a visit to a COVID-19 hospital ward — wearing neither gloves nor a mask when he shook hands with a medic in full protective gear.

    Opposition leader Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who left Belarus under pressure after she tried to file a formal complaint about the official election tally, says the border restrictions show Lukashenka is “in a panic.”

    Russia’s Surveillance State

    In Moscow, experts say the pandemic has tested the limitations of Russia’s surveillance state.

    Russia’s State Duma in late March approved legislation allowing Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin to declare a state of emergency across the country and establish mandatory public health rules.

    It also approved a penalty of up to five years in prison for those who “knowingly” disseminate false information during “natural and man-made emergencies.”

    The legislation called for those breaking COVID-19 measures to be imprisoned for up to seven years.

    In April, President Vladimir Putin tasked local governments with the responsibility of adopting COVID-19 restrictions.

    Experts say that turned some Russian regions into testing grounds for how much increased surveillance and control Russians will stand for.

    It also protected the Kremlin from political backlash over concerns that expanded government powers to control COVID-19 could become permanent in post-pandemic Russia.

    Meanwhile, Moscow took steps to control the free flow of information about Russia’s response to the pandemic.

    “It is staggering that the Russian authorities appear to fear criticism more than the deadly COVID-19 pandemic,” Amnesty International’s Russia director, Natalia Zviagina, said.

    “They justify the arrest and detention of Anastasia Vasilyeva on the pretext that she and her fellow medics violated travel restrictions,” Zviagina said. “In fact, they were attempting to deliver vital protective equipment to medics at a local hospital.”

    Anastasia Vasilyeva, a Russian doctor who heads a medical workers union, was arrested in April after she exposed shortcomings in the health system’s preparations to fight COVID-19.

    Anastasia Vasilyeva, a Russian doctor who heads a medical workers union, was arrested in April after she exposed shortcomings in the health system’s preparations to fight COVID-19.

    Zviagina concludes that by putting Vasilyeva in jail, Russian authorities exposed “their true motive.”

    “They are willing to punish health professionals who dare contradict the official Russian narrative and expose flaws in the public health system,” she said.

    The State Duma also launched reviews and crackdowns in 2020 on reporting by foreign media organizations — including RFE/RL — about the way Russia has handled COVID.

    Human Rights Watch said police “falsely claimed” protesters violated COVID-19 measures — “yet kept most of the detained protesters in overcrowded, poorly ventilated police vehicles.”

    In July, police in Moscow detained dozens of journalists during a protest against Russia’s growing restrictions on media and freedom of expression.

    In several cases, Human Rights Watch said police “falsely claimed” protesters violated COVID-19 public health measures — “yet kept most of the detained protesters in overcrowded, poorly ventilated police vehicles where they could not practice social distancing.”

    HRW Russia researcher Damelya Aitkozhina says those cases “have taken the repression to a new level.”

    Aitkhozhina says authorities in Moscow “detained peaceful protesters under the abusive and restrictive rules on public assembly and under the guise of protecting public health, while exposing them to risk of infection in custody.”

    Rights activists say local authorities in some Russian regions also used COVID-19 measures as an excuse to crack down on protesters.

    In late April, authorities in North Ossetia detained dozens of demonstrators from a crowd of about 2,000 people who’d gathered in Vladikavkaz to demand the resignation of regional leader Vyacheslav Bitarov.

    Thirteen were charged with defying Russia’s COVID-19 measures and spreading “fake information” about the pandemic.

    In Russia’s Far East city of Khabarovsk, authorities used COVID-19 measures to try to discourage mass protests against the arrest of a popular regional governor on decades-old charges of complicity in murder.

    Demonstrators say the charges were fabricated by the governor’s local political opponents with help from the Kremlin.

    While municipal authorities in Khabarovsk warned about the risks of COVID-19 at the protests, police taped off gathering places for the demonstrations — claiming the move was necessary for COVID-19 disinfection.

    But the crowds gathered anyway — reflecting discontent with Putin’s rule and public anger at what residents say is disrespect from Moscow about their choice for a governor.

    Demo Restrictions In Kazakhstan

    Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev signed legislation in late May that tightened government control over the right of citizens to gather for protests.

    Going into effect during the first wave of the global COVID-19 outbreak, the new law defines how many people can attend a demonstration and where protests can take place.

    Critics say the new restrictions and bureaucratic hurdles include the need for “permission” from authorities before protests can legally take place in Kazakhstan — with officials being given many reasons to refuse permission.

    RFE/RL also has reported on how authorities in Kazakhstan used the coronavirus as an excuse to clamp down on civil rights activists who criticized the new public protest law.

    Kazakh and international human rights activists say the legislation contradicts international standards and contains numerous obstacles to free assembly.

    Information Control In Uzbekistan

    Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev has been praised by international rights groups since he came to power in late 2016 for his slight easing of authoritarian restrictions imposed by his predecessor, the late Islam Karimov.

    But the COVID-19 crisis has spawned a battle between emerging independent media outlets and the state body that oversees the press in Uzbekistan — the Agency for Information and Mass Communications (AIMC).

    Officials in Tashkent initially claimed Uzbekistan was doing well in combating COVID-19. But by the summer, some media outlets were questioning that government narrative.

    They began to delve deeply into details about the spread of the pandemic and its human costs within the country.

    AIMC Director Asadjon Khodjaev in late November threatened “serious legal consequences” about such reporting — raising concerns that COVID-19 could be pushing Uzbekistan back toward more authoritarian press controls, much like the conditions that existed under Karimov.

    Kyrgyz Upheaval

    Before the pandemic, Kyrgyzstan was considered by the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders as Central Asia’s most open country for the media. But Kyrgyzstan’s relative openness has been eroded by lockdowns and curfews imposed since a state of emergency was declared on March 22.

    Most independent media outlets have had difficulty getting accreditation or permits allowing their journalists to move freely in Bishkek or other areas restricted under the public health emergency.

    Violent political protests erupted after Kyrgyzstan’s controversial parliamentary elections on October 4 — which were carried out despite the complications posed by the COVID-19 control measures.

    The political tensions led to the downfall of President Sooronbai Jeenbekov’s government, plans to hold new elections, and the declaration of a state of emergency in Bishkek that included a ban on public demonstrations.

    Pascaline della Faille, an analyst for the Credendo group of European credit insurance companies, concludes that social tensions contributing to the political upheaval were heightened by the pandemic.

    She says those tensions included complaints about the country’s poor health system, an economy hit hard by COVID-19 containment measures, and a sharp drop in remittances from Kyrgyz citizens who work abroad.

    Turkmenistan Is Ridiculed

    One of the world’s most tightly controlled authoritarian states, Turkmenistan has never had a good record on press freedom or transparency.

    Not surprisingly, then, President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov’s claim that he has prevented a single COVID-19 infection from happening in his country has been the target of global ridicule rather than admiration.

    Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov

    Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov

    Ashgabat’s continued insistence that the coronavirus does not exist in Turkmenistan is seen as a sign of Berdymukhammedov’s authoritarian dominance rather than any credible public health policies.

    In early August, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that Berdymukhammedov had agreed to give WHO experts access to try to verify his claim about the absence of COVID-19 in his country.

    Hans Kluge, WHO’s regional director for Europe and Central Asia, said Berdymukhammedov had “agreed” for a WHO team “to sample independently COVID-19 tests in country” and take them to WHO reference laboratories in other countries.

    But after more than four months, Berdymukhammedov has still not kept his promise.

    Meanwhile, Turkmenistan’s state television broadcasts perpetuate Berdymukhammedov’s cult of personality by showing him opening new “state-of the-art” medical facilities in Ashgabat and other big cities.

    Privately, Turkmen citizens tell RFE/RL that they don’t believe the hype.

    They say they avoid hospitals when they become ill because facilities are too expensive for impoverished ordinary citizens and state facilities often have little to offer them.

    Patients at several regional hospitals in Turkmenistan told RFE/RL they’ve had to provide their own food, medicine, and even firewood to heat their hospital rooms.

    Still, in a former Soviet republic known for brutal crackdowns on critics and dissent, nobody openly criticizes Turkmenistan’s health officials about the dire situation in hospitals out of fear of reprisals.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Russian New Year: At The Heart Of A Wide Tapestry Of Winter Traditions

    As part of an occasional series on how the end-of-year holidays are celebrated in our broadcast region, we talked to Irina Lagunina from RFE/RL’s Russian Service about seasonal traditions in her country.

    Western visitors to Russia at this time of year may be surprised to discover that the locals usually refer to the seasonally decorated conifers you see everywhere as “New Year firs” or “New Year spruces.”

    So why would they call them this when they’re commonly known as Christmas trees in many other places?

    According to Irina Lagunina from RFE/RL’s Russian Service, it’s largely a quirky legacy of the country’s Soviet past.

    “It was really weird because, after the socialist revolution, the Bolsheviks actually banned not just the festivities of the Christmas season — this wonderful season of the year — but also the Christmas tree, which was considered to be a religious symbol,” she says.

    “They decided that, since the main ideology is atheism, the Christmas tree should be banned. And that remained up until the mid-1930s when the New Year and the Christmas tree were kind of rehabilitated.”

    When the Christmas tree was “rehabilitated” amid much fanfare in 1935, the official atheist ethos of the time ensured that it would primarily be associated with New Year celebrations and its Christian connotations were jettisoned.

    The New Year spruce at the Kremlin in 1978

    The New Year spruce at the Kremlin in 1978

    It’s something that has endured to this day and the unveiling of the “New Year spruce” at the Kremlin every year is still a big event for thousands of children, although it is no longer decorated with a big Soviet star.

    In a way, it’s perhaps fitting that the tree is still firmly associated with New Year’s rather than Christmas, as “Novy God” (New Year) has long been the focal point of the festive season in Russia.

    Moscow municipal workers used cranes to erect the traditional New Year spruce on Red Square in late November.

    Moscow municipal workers used cranes to erect the traditional New Year spruce on Red Square in late November.

    Like many other Orthodox believers, most Russians typically celebrate Christmas Day on January 7. But for many, the day itself is quite low-key compared to other festivities that are observed in the country at this time of year.

    “For those who celebrate it in Russia right now, Christmas is a purely religious event,” says Lagunina. “Believers go to the churches — the churches are actually full these days — but there is still no kind of notion and tradition of family gathering on this day or having something special.”

    People light candles during Christmas midnight Mass at Moscow's Cathedral of Christ the Savior on January 6.

    People light candles during Christmas midnight Mass at Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior on January 6.

    According to Lagunina, the main day of celebration “is actually not Christmas, but New Year.”

    “It’s all about New Year,” she says. “This comes first in the Orthodox calendar, so Christmas is basically the next seven days, [but] the main festivity is New Year’s night, and that’s when Russians prepare the dinner of the year, the main celebration for family, unity, and so forth.”

    Although Lagunina says New Year in Russia is “like everywhere else in the world, with a lot of champagne and a lot of fireworks,” it is also the centerpiece of a wider tapestry of formal and informal celebrations that are observed at this time of year.

    Decorated Russia Lights Up As Holidays Approach

    Decorated Russia Lights Up As Holidays Approach Photo Gallery:

    Decorated Russia Lights Up As Holidays Approach

    Russians are preparing for the holidays with ornamented seasonal trees, festive decorations, and light displays.

    “Well, in Russia right now, of course, there is a reason to celebrate everything,” she says. “Russians start to celebrate with the Western Christmas, then New Year, Orthodox Christmas…. Basically, it’s three weeks of festivities. You cannot get sober during this time!”

    One of the most famous traditions observed during this period is not for the fainthearted.

    “Ice swimming is a big deal in Russia,” says Lagunina, referring to the many hardy souls who brave the freezing waters of their local lakes and rivers for a bracing dip on January 19 to celebrate the Epiphany.

    A Russian Orthodox priest takes an Epiphany dip in the icy waters of the Gulf of Finland outside St. Petersburg.

    A Russian Orthodox priest takes an Epiphany dip in the icy waters of the Gulf of Finland outside St. Petersburg.

    Amid all the festivities, however, New Year is always seen as the big event when people get together with close friends and relatives.

    Gifts are exchanged and copious amounts of food and drink are often consumed.

    Many families also take the time to watch The Irony Of Fate, a Trading Places kind of musical comedy that has been broadcast on state TV every New Year’s Day since 1976 and is now a firmly established tradition.

    But it is frequently the food that is at the heart of New Year proceedings.

    Lagunina says her seasonal table usually includes typical Russian fare, such as “pirozhki” pastries with various fillings and “kholodets” — cold stewed meat in aspic. Stuffed duck is also a very common dish on this day and “a regular middle-class family” might even have “a little bit of red caviar, sometimes salted salmon,” the main idea being that the choice of food on offer is “the best of what you can imagine.”

    Irina Lagunina's New Year's table: Top row (left to right): seledka pod shuboi (a salad of pickled herring "in a fur coat"), pirozhki pastries (often stuffed with meat, mushrooms, cabbage, and even jam), and pickled cabbage. Center: vinegret (Russian beetroot salad) and Salad Olivier (Russian salad). Bottom row: kholodets, seledka (pickled herring with marinated onion), and salted mushrooms.

    Irina Lagunina’s New Year’s table: Top row (left to right): seledka pod shuboi (a salad of pickled herring “in a fur coat”), pirozhki pastries (often stuffed with meat, mushrooms, cabbage, and even jam), and pickled cabbage. Center: vinegret (Russian beetroot salad) and Salad Olivier (Russian salad). Bottom row: kholodets, seledka (pickled herring with marinated onion), and salted mushrooms.

    No New Year’s feast is complete, however, without a typical Russian salad or “Salad Olivier,” which according to legend was first invented by a French chef of that name while he was working in tsarist Russia.

    Lagunina says a Salad Olivier is one of the “absolute must-have dishes on the table” at New Year. She puts the dish’s popularity down to its versatility, which allows it to be easily adapted for anyone observing a strict pre-Christmas fast.

    “Olivier is made of peas, potatoes, carrots, pickles, ham, and mayonnaise, but the ham can be replaced,” she says. “Depending on how strong a believer you are, it can be replaced with chicken, crabmeat, fish, practically everything…. So it’s this kind of multicultural, multireligious, suitable-for-everybody dish, and you can even make it for vegetarians without any meat or chicken.”

    How To Make Salad Olivier

    Ingredients

    1 small can of peas (100 grams)

    1 large or two small potatoes, peeled and boiled

    1 large boiled carrot

    4 hard-boiled eggs

    10 salted pickles (Irina makes these herself at home, but they can be shop-bought)

    2 slices of sweet onion, finely chopped

    200 grams (about 1/2 pound) of ham (common alternatives include a Mortadella type of sausage, crabmeat, boiled beef tongue, or fish. Irina has chosen “Doktorskaya kolbasa or “Doctor’s sausage,” a lunch meat that has been popular in Russia since Soviet times.)

    Method

    “Like all Russian salads, all the items should be the size of the smallest ingredient that cannot be divided,” says Lagunina. “The peas are the smallest undividable element, so everything you cut should be the size of a pea [at most]. That’s the basis of all Russian salads.”

    As everything should be cut into pea-sized cubes, Lagunina uses a potato slicer for this purpose.

    “This tool is very popular not only in Russia but also in the Czech Republic, Austria, and all other places where they make potato salad,” she says.

    Lagunina is in favor of breaking with tradition and grating the carrots even smaller, however, as cutting them into cubes gives the salad “an overwhelming taste.”

    Like the carrots, Lagunina also prefers to cut the eggs smaller than the peas, as they help “cement the salad.”

    Once all the ingredients have been tossed in a bowl, mix in some mayonnaise (according to taste) and sprinkle with black pepper as the “final touch.”

    Lagunina stresses that the mayonnaise should be added “only before you serve the salad on the table,” as it will ensure a “fresher” flavor.

    Written by Coilin O’Connor based on an interview with Irina Lagunina from RFE/RL’s Russian Service

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Russia Needs ‘Popular Equivalent’ To YouTube, Regulator Says As it Struggles to Censor Platform

    Russia’s media regulator, Roskomnadzor, says the country needs an alternative to YouTube, the U.S. online video-sharing platform that it struggles to censor.

    “Due to the absence of a direct competitor in Russia, YouTube is still irreplaceable,” Roskomnadzor said in a statement on December 29.

    The regulator added that there was a need for a “popular equivalent” in Russia that would reduce Russians’ dependence on foreign social media.

    The Kremlin is losing its grip on information dissemination inside the country as more and more Russians turn to foreign social-media sites like YouTube and Instagram for content.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin has been able to maintain high ratings during his two decades in power in part thanks to Kremlin control over the country’s main TV stations.

    An effective and popular Russian competitor to YouTube would enable the government to impair YouTube’s ability to operate inside the country.

    Roskomnadzor’s comments came the same day that Russia’s Investigative Committee launched a criminal case against Aleksei Navalny, the Kremlin critic who has deftly used YouTube to expose corruption at the highest levels of government.

    It also comes the same day that Gazprom-Media, the media arm of state-controlled natural-gas giant Gazprom, acquired a 100 percent stake in Russian video-streaming service Rutube.

    Gazprom-Media is Russia’s largest media company, with holdings including several leading television channels, radio stations, and print media.

    Roskomnadzor’s chief, Aleksandr Zharov, said work was under way to make Rutube as “convenient” as YouTube.

    On December 23, the State Duma approved in a final reading a bill that would allow Roskomnadzor to block websites that “discriminate against Russian media.”

    Roskomnadzor would be allowed to partially or fully restrict or slow access to websites found in violation of the law.

    The bill is seen affecting major social media such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Russia Launches Criminal Case Against Kremlin Critic Navalny

    Russia’s Investigative Committee has launched a criminal case against Aleksei Navalny, accusing the Kremlin critic of stealing hundreds of millions of rubles donated to his anti-corruption organization.

    The criminal case now raises questions as to whether Navalny, who is recuperating in Germany following his poisoning in August with a military-grade nerve agent, will return to Russia, where he could face a lengthy prison term if convicted.

    Navalny dismissed the latest charges as the government’s revenge against him for surviving the poisoning and then exposing those who were behind it. The activist has called the poisoning an assassination attempt by the state’s security services.

    “I immediately said: they will try to jail me for not dying and then looking for my killers. For proving that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin is personally behind everything. He is a thief, ready to kill those who refuse to keep quiet about his theft,” Navalny said in a tweet on December 29 shortly after the launch of the case.

    Navalny has become a thorn in the Kremlin’s side over the years with his detailed investigations into corruption at the highest levels of government and has been jailed for short periods of time on several occasions.

    His investigative videos — which often take him abroad to film the rich lifestyle of Russian officials — receive millions of views each time they are uploaded online and have helped sour the public on the government and the ruling party, United Russia.

    The launch of a criminal case against Navalny comes amid an intensifying clampdown in recent years on the Kremlin opposition as the Russian economy struggles to grow and public frustration mounts over declining living standards.

    Russia holds key parliamentary elections next year after what is likely to be the country’s worst economic performance in more than a decade. Navalny is seeking to weaken United Russia’s hold by urging his supports to vote for other candidates.

    The Investigative Committee said in a post on December 29 that a series of nonprofit organizations run by Navalny, including the Anti-Corruption Foundation, raised a total of 588 million rubles ($7.94 million) from citizens.

    Investigators claim he spent 356 million rubles ($4.81 million) acquiring personal items and vacationing abroad. They did not say what those items were, whether they were used to carry out his work, nor whether the alleged vacations coincided with the destinations he filmed.

    Navalny later tweeted a link to his foundation’s donation page, telling his supporters that “the best way to laugh” at the new criminal case “invented” by the authorities was to finance his work.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Moscow Extends School Holidays To Limit Spread Of Coronavirus

    Moscow authorities say they will extend the winter school holidays by one week until January 17 to limit the spread of the coronavirus and avoid new restrictions.

    Russian schoolchildren will be on holiday starting January 1. Russian officials have resisted imposing a strict lockdown as they did earlier this year, relying on such targeted measures instead.

    Authorities are betting on a mass vaccination program using Russia’s Sputnik-V coronavirus vaccine to get the outbreak under control.

    In a statement on December 29, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin said the extended school holidays will help stabilize the daily rate of COVID-19 infections “at a lower level than at present.”

    “This means we would be able to avoid introducing new, highly undesirable restrictions in January,” he added.

    Sobyanin called the Russian capital’s surging coronavirus outbreak “alarming.”

    Russia reported 27,002 new COVID-19 cases on December 29, including 5,641 in Moscow, taking the total to 3,105,037 since the pandemic began.

    On December 28, Russia confirmed that it has been underreporting its coronavirus death toll, announcing that the actual number of fatalities related to the pandemic was more than three times higher than previously released figures.

    The Rosstat statistics agency said more than 186,000 Russians had died from COVID-19.

    The admission places Russia third behind the United States and Brazil in terms of COVID-19 fatalities.

    Based on reporting by Reuters and AFP

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Russian Coronavirus Fatalities Much Higher Than Initially Reported

    Russia has confirmed that it has been underreporting its coronavirus death toll, announcing that the actual number of fatalities related to the pandemic is more than three times higher than previously released figures.

    The admission would place Russia third behind the United States and Brazil in terms of COVID-19 fatalities.

    The Rosstat statistics agency said on December 28 that the number of deaths from all causes recorded between January and November had risen by 229,700 compared to the previous year.

    “More than 81 percent of this increase in mortality over this period is due to COVID,” Deputy Prime Minister Tatiana Golikova said. The percentage increase would mean that more than 186,000 Russians have died from COVID-19, whereas recorded figures stand at around 54,500 deaths and more than 3 million infections.

    Golikova added that death rates in November-December were higher than other periods due to the “autumn/winter period, when the spread of COVID-19 is increasing in combination with other diseases.”

    Rosstat on December 28 announced that 23,610 deaths in Russia were attributed to COVID-19 in November alone, whereas the initial figure for that month was recorded as 19,626. Rosstat said that the additional deaths had been assumed to be coronavirus-related, but that additional medical research was required to confirm it.

    Since the beginning of the pandemic, Russia has consistently downplayed its impact even as outside observers suggested that the casualty count was far too low. Earlier this month, President Vladimir Putin said that Russia had done a better job managing the pandemic than Western countries and rejected introducing a nationwide lockdown.

    Some of the disparity is attributed to Russia only listing deaths as coronavirus-related if COVID-19, rather than other causes such as upper respiratory infections, were listed in the autopsy as the cause of death.

    Based on AFP and TASS

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Individuals Named To Russia’s ‘Foreign-Agent’ Registry For First Time

    Russia has for the first time branded individuals as “foreign agents,” including three who contribute to RFE/RL.

    Five journalists or activists in total were added to the Russian Justice Ministry’s registry of “foreign mass media performing the functions of a foreign agent” on December 28.

    Previously only foreign-funded, nongovernmental rights organizations (NGOs) and rights groups were placed on the registry, in keeping with Russia’s passage of its controversial “foreign-agents law” in 2012. The law was later expanded to include media outlets and independent journalists.

    Inclusion on the registry imposes additional restrictions, such as the obligation to provide regular financial reports on activities and in the way publications are labeled.

    The legislation has been criticized by rights groups, who say the law has harmed NGOs and is used to clamp down on dissent.

    The three listed individuals affiliated with RFE/RL are: Lyudmila Savitskaya and Sergei Markelov, freelance correspondents for the North Desk (Sever.Realii) of RFE/RL’s Russian Service; and Denis Kamalyagin, editor in chief of the online news site Pskov Province and a contributor to RFE/RL’s Russian Service.

    Prominent human rights activist Lev Ponomaryov was also named to the registry, as was activist and Red Cross worker Daria Apakhonchich.

    The additions bring the total number of individuals or entities listed to 17, the majority affiliated with RFE/RL.

    “It is reprehensible that professional journalists are among the first individuals singled out by Russia as ‘foreign agents,’” RFE/RL Vice President and Editor in Chief Daisy Sindelar said in response on December 28.

    “Our Sever.Realii colleagues have reported responsibly on everything from free-speech rights to local government corruption and the ongoing toll of coronavirus. With today’s action, the Justice Ministry is stating unambiguously that reporting the facts is a crime, and that it will stop at nothing to silence the voices that seek to inform, protect, and engage their compatriots, the people of Russia.”

    According to Russia’s controversial “foreign-agents law,” any individual who distributes materials of a publication or a legal entity recognized as a foreign agent, participates in its creation, and receives foreign funding from abroad can be recognized as a “foreign media agent.”

    The Justice Ministry did not explain on what grounds it included the five individuals added to the registry on December 28.

    Russian officials have previously said that amending the “foreign-agents law” to include mass media in 2017 was a “symmetrical response” to the U.S. requirement that Russia’s state-funded channel RT register under the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).

    U.S. officials have said the action is not symmetrical, arguing that the U.S. and Russian laws differ and that Russia uses its “foreign-agent” legislation to silence dissent and discourage the free exchange of ideas.

    ‘Devastating’

    Human Rights Watch, a U.S.-based rights group, in 2017 called the law “devastating” for local NGOs, saying more than a dozen had been forced to close their doors.

    Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty as a whole was listed in the original registry in December 2017, along with several of RFE/RL’s regional news sites: the Crimea Desk of RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service; the Siberia Desk of RFE/RL’s Russian Service; RFE/RL’s North Caucasus Service; Idel.Realii of RFE/RL’s Tatar-Bashkir Service; Kavkaz Realii; RFE/RL’s Tatar-Bashkir Service; and Factograph, a former special project by RFE/RL’s Russian Service.

    Current Time, the Russian-language network led by RFE/RL in cooperation with Voice of America, was also named in the original list, as was the Voice of America.

    In November 2019, the list was expanded to include Sever.Realii. In February 2020, the Russian Justice Ministry added RFE/RL’s corporate entity in Russia.

    The only non-U.S. entity named to the list is the Czech news agency Medium Orient.

    On December 23, the Russian State Duma, the lower house of parliament, gave its final approval to a bill that would allow individuals and public entities to be recognized as foreign agents if they are considered to be engaged in political activities “in the interests of a foreign state.”

    A separate bill passed the same day introduces penalties of up to five years in prison against individuals identified as “foreign agents” if they do not register as such or fail to report on their activities.

    Under the proposed legislation, which would have to be signed into law by President Vladimir Putin, grounds for being recognized as a “foreign agent” could be holding rallies or political debates, providing opinions on state policies, actions promoting a certain outcome in an election or referendum, or participation as an electoral observer or in political parties if they are done in the interest of a foreign entity.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Russia Orders Bulgarian Diplomat To Leave In Tit-For-Tat Move

    Russia says it has given a Bulgarian diplomat 72 hours to leave the country following the expulsion of its military attache in Sofia.

    In a December 28 press release, the Russian Foreign Ministry said it had sent the Bulgarian ambassador to Moscow a note announcing that the assistant to Bulgaria’s military attache had been declared “persona non-grata” in response to the “unjustified” removal of a Russian diplomat earlier this month.

    Bulgarian authorities on December 18 gave a Russian diplomat 72 hours to leave the EU and NATO member state after prosecutors alleged he had been involved in espionage since 2017.

    Prosecutors have said that the diplomat had “collected military information, including about the numbers of U.S. troops deployed on Bulgarian territory during exercises.”

    The aim was to transfer this information to Russian military intelligence, they said, adding that they had evidence the diplomat had been in contact with a Bulgarian citizen with access to classified information to whom money had been offered.

    It was the sixth case of a Russian diplomat or official at the Russian Embassy in Sofia being expelled for suspected espionage since October 2019.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • ‘A Chance To Return To Normal Life’: Russians React After Getting Sputnik-V Vaccine

    Russians have been telling RFE/RL about their experiences with the new Sputnik-V COVID-19 vaccine after the country began a mass vaccination program. President Vladimir Putin said on December 2 that 2 million doses of the Russian-made vaccine would be made available within days. A total of 150,000 people were vaccinated by December 25. According to a new poll, only about one-third of Russians are willing to be vaccinated.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • 17 People Missing After Russian Fishing Boat Sinks In Barents Sea

    Russian authorities say a fishing boat has sunk in the Arctic Ocean, leaving 17 people missing.

    “At 7:30 a.m., information was received that the Onega vessel…had sunk in the Barents Sea near Novaya Zemlya in the Arkhangelsk region. The crew had 19 people. Two people were rescued,” the Russian Emergencies Ministry said on December 28, adding that searches are under way.

    At least four boats were sent to look for potential survivors, according to Russian news agencies.

    The source said the two rescued sailors were wearing wetsuits.

    According to preliminary information, ice accumulation led to the sinking of the fishing boat.

    Based on reporting by Reuters, Reuters, and TASS

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Doping Whistle-Blowers Have No Plans To Return To Russia

    The Russian couple who played a major role in exposing the nation’s sports doping scandal said in an interview published on December 27 that they no longer consider Russia their home and have no plans to return to the country.

    Vitaly and Yulia Stepanov live in the United States in an undisclosed location with their 7-year-old son and are waiting for an interview as part of their application for asylum, they told the German news agency dpa.

    Russia, Vitaly Stepanov said, “is a place where we were born. We have no plans to go back to Russia.”

    The couple fled Russia in 2014, initially landing in Germany, days before the screening of a documentary in which they detailed Russia’s state-sponsored doping program.

    Stepanov said the family applied for asylum in the United States in 2016 and have been living a typical middle-class American life.

    “Nobody really knows who we are,” he said in the telephone interview. “We don’t have many friends, but we do have friends that we appreciate and we are proud that they are part of our life.”

    And he said he has no regrets about doing what they did six years ago.

    “The truth came out and the relevant organizations were forced to deal with it. We are glad,” he said, “and in general I believe the anti-doping movement is stronger.”

    The doping was exposed after Yulia Stepanova, a former top runner on Russia’s national team, made secret recordings of coaches and athletes. A German television documentary reported it largely based on the Stepanovs’ evidence.

    Grigory Rodchenkov speaks at a meeting with U.S. senators in March 2018

    Grigory Rodchenkov speaks at a meeting with U.S. senators in March 2018

    That prompted a World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) investigation aided by another whistle-blower — the former head of Moscow’s anti-doping laboratory, Grigory Rodchenkov — that exposed state-sponsored doping practices and cover-ups in the country and at the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics.

    The result was a ban on Russia’s track-and-field team from the 2016 Olympics.

    Earlier this month, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) upheld doping sanctions that will prevent Russian athletes from competing at major sporting events under the country’s flag, but halved the period of the ban from four years to two.

    The ban means Russia will not be allowed to use its flag and anthem at any major sporting events for the next two years.

    Athletes will be able to compete under a neutral flag if they prove no connection to doping. They can wear a uniform bearing the Russian colors, but it cannot contain the Russian flag or any national symbol.

    The ruling affects Russia’s participation in the delayed Tokyo 2020 and Beijing 2022 Olympics.

    Stepanov said he wished the punishment hadn’t been reduced, but he hoped it was proper, noting that “everybody has to live with this decision, including athletes from Russia.”

    Stepanov believes that WADA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) are doing more than in the past, despite wide-ranging criticism that they have been too lenient. But he has little hope that Russia will change its doping climate.

    “The Russian government is not helping by continuing to cover up and cheat the Olympic movement. They are the main guilty party here,” Stepanov said.

    Yuliya Stepanova receives funding from the IOC to help her train, while Stepanov works as an adviser to the organization.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Navalny Associate Sobol Says Criminal Charges Against Her Are Kremlin’s ‘Revenge’

    Lyubov Sobol, a prominent lawyer for outspoken Kremlin critic Aleksei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), has said upon her release from detention that charges filed against her are “revenge” for Navalny’s survival of a recent assassination attempt.

    “I believe that this criminal case against me is, firstly, revenge against Navalny, no matter how absurd it may sound, revenge on him for surviving after being poisoned with chemical weapons, revenge for his anti-corruption activities,” Sobol told TV Dozhd regarding the charges, which stem from her ringing the doorbell of a Federal Security Service (FSB) officer implicated in Navalny’s August poisoning.

    “And since they cannot do anything with him now, they apparently decided to take revenge on me,” said Sobol, who proclaimed her innocence and called the charges “absurd.”

    Sobol was detained by police on December 25 and taken in for questioning by Russia’s main investigative body, the Investigative Committee. She was questioned six times in relation to a criminal probe that was launched after a group of journalists and activists, including Sobol, attempted to speak to the FSB officer at his home on December 21.

    The officer, Konstantin Kudryavtsev, had been identified as the apparent recipient of a recorded phone call from Navalny in which the anti-corruption activist’s poisoning was discussed.

    Navalny had earlier on December 21 published an audio recording of the call, in which Kudryavtsev appears to believe he is speaking with a Russian security official and freely describes the circumstances of Navalny’s poisoning by a Soviet-era nerve agent.

    A criminal investigation into Sobol trespassing “with the use of violence or a threat to use it” was launched following a complaint from Kudryavtsev’s mother.

    Upon questioning, Sobol’s status was changed from a witness to a suspect, and she was charged under Russia’s Criminal Code. She faces two to five years in prison if convicted.

    Speaking to TV Dozhd, Sobol said that the charges against her were also a warning to journalists who have covered Navalny’s poisoning.

    “You — Dozhd television — have approached one of the poisoners [of Navalny], coming to his apartment and trying to take comments from him. I myself went to another apartment. CNN came,” she said.

    “That is why, I think, they are really scared that journalists will now be asking questions of the people who have tried to kill Navalny. Through me, they want to intimidate journalists as well.”

    Sobol posted a video on Twitter of police raiding her apartment on December 25, before going incommunicado. In the video, her 7-year-old daughter can be heard crying as someone pounds on the front door, demanding it be opened.

    “They knock on the door and say the police are here. Apparently, the search will be at my home. I’ve never had a personal search before. Well, everything happens for the first time. Apparently, because I recently went to Navalny’s poisoner, ” Sobol says in the video.

    Police searched Sobol’s apartment and her computers and phones were taken away, according to Navalny supporters.

    Navalny has blamed President Vladimir Putin for his poisoning in Siberia. The fierce Kremlin critic and Putin foe fell ill on August 20 while flying en route from Tomsk to Moscow. After his flight was diverted to Omsk, where Russian doctors said they had found no trace of poisoning and placed Navalny in an induced coma, the he was transferred to a hospital in Germany.

    Laboratory tests in three separate European countries, confirmed by the global chemical-weapons watchdog, have established that Navalny was poisoned with a nerve agent of the Novichok class.

    Russia has rejected calls for an investigation into the poisoning, and denies the involvement of state agents in the case, saying it has yet to be shown any evidence. In October, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov accused Navalny of collaborating with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, an allegation Lyubov at the time called “complete gibberish.”

    In a separate case, a Moscow court has ordered Sobol, Navalny, and the FBK to jointly pay a total of 87.6 million rubles ($1.15 million) in relation to a defamation lawsuit filed by a businessman with close ties to Putin.

    Sobol announced earlier this year that she would run in Russia’s 2021 parliamentary elections.

    Navalny remains in Germany, where he is recovering from the poisoning. He has said he plans to return home at an undisclosed date.

    With reporting by TV Dozhd

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Kremlin Says Putin To Get Coronavirus Vaccine Soon

    Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to receive his country’s Sputnik-V coronavirus vaccine in the near future.

    Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on December 27 that “the president himself will announce about the decision” soon.

    Russia’s Health Ministry a day earlier approved the vaccine for use by people over the age of 60. The ministry said the vaccine was more than 90 percent effective for this age group.

    Putin is 68.

    During a marathon press conference on December 17, Putin said he would get vaccinated after “all formal issues” were resolved.

    Russia approved the Sputnik-V vaccine on August 11, making it the first coronavirus vaccine to gain official approval anywhere in the world.

    According to official Russian government statistics, just over 3 million cases of coronavirus infection have been recorded since the beginning of the pandemic, with 54,778 fatalities.

    With reporting by TASS

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Russian Court Bans Four AP Videos From Chechen Conflicts

    A court in the Russian North Caucasus city of Nalchik has banned four archive videos by the AP news agency from the wars in Chechnya in the 1990s and 2000s for allegedly “propagandizing cruelty.”

    One of the videos banned by the Nalchik court on December 27 shows Russian soldiers who were being held prisoner by Chechen fighters in 1995. In the video, which has been viewed nearly 2 million times, a Russian officer says he has been treated “very surprisingly” and criticizes Russian tactics in the war.

    Another video, also from 1995, shows the results of Russian attacks on the Chechen cities of Grozny, Argun, and Shali.

    The court’s decision stated that the videos “facilitate the undertaking of illegal activities,” could provoke “negative social, economic, and other consequences,” and violate “the right of citizens to live in a law-based state as guaranteed by the constitution.”

    Russia fought two wars against separatists in Chechnya. The first began in December 1994 and lasted until August 1996. It ended with a peace agreement that left the republic a considerable degree of autonomy.

    The second Chechen war began in August 1999 and formally came to an end when Russia declared the end of the “counterterrorism operation” in the republic in April 2009.

    The conflicts produced tens of thousands of civilian casualties and hundreds of thousands of displaced people.

    Both campaigns have been criticized by domestic and international human rights activists for rights violations and atrocities on both sides.

    With reporting by Meduza

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • ‘War Minus The Shooting’: When Soviet Soccer Took On the Brits After World War II

    Tens of millions of people were dead. Cities and towns lay in rubble months after the bloodiest conflict the world had ever known. With much of Europe still reeling from World War II, it hardly seemed the time for games.

    But in November 1945, clubs from Great Britain, the cradle of the modern game of soccer, would host matches involving an unusual foe: Dynamo Moscow, champions of the Soviet Union.

    Interest would be high as the Soviet Union still basked in the glow of the Allied victory over Nazi Germany and British fans were eager to get a peek of such an exotic opponent.

    However, Cold War tensions were already percolating when Dynamo Moscow arrived, as Josef Stalin’s communist regime was occupying most of Eastern Europe. The tour would come months ahead of former Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s famous Iron Curtain speech, condemning the Soviet Union’s expansionist policies in Europe. As such, the game would take on political overtones. It was, George Orwell later said, “war minus the shooting.”

    And so, while British fans were eager to watch the Soviet side, British authorities were much less eager to accommodate them.

    The Foreign Office said that “it would take much more than a football match to break down the real barriers which the Soviet government firmly believes in.” Pressed by the British Embassy in Moscow, London ultimately acquiesced, but said Dynamo Moscow was being hosted not by the government but the British Football Association (FA).

    The Soviet delegation had its own list of demands, including that a Soviet referee call one match — a game against Arsenal — and that all team meals take place at the Soviet Embassy, ostensibly because they feared the British might poison them. Moscow also insisted that revenue from the tour be split 50-50, a demand that was met.

    Four games were finally scheduled, against London clubs Arsenal and Chelsea, Welsh side Cardiff City, and the Scottish team Glasgow Rangers.

    Dynamo Moscow players (in dark) attack the Chelsea goal during the match at Stamford Bridge, London, on November 13, 1945.

    Dynamo Moscow players (in dark) attack the Chelsea goal during the match at Stamford Bridge, London, on November 13, 1945.

    The tour started inauspiciously in November, 1945. The FA angered Dynamo Moscow by first accommodating the team in a military barracks in central London without pillows or sheets, before scrambling to book them in a fancy hotel.

    British press reports hinted that the local teams and their fans had little to fear. “Don’t expect much from Dynamo. They are only beginners, blue-collars, amateurs,” the London newspaper Evening Standard wrote.

    That blasé attitude contrasted with Soviet awe.

    “Until those games, we only knew that England was the motherland of football, that English football was the best in the world,” Dynamo Moscow forward Konstantin Beskov said in a 2001 documentary, More Than Just Football.

    Leonid Solovyov, a Dynamo midfielder, remembered, “They told us that Englishmen are awesome, that they can carry the ball across the fields on their heads.”

    At the same time, the Dynamo players were also aware of the pressure to positively represent the Soviet Union, which would use sports over the coming decades to illustrate the ostensible superiority of the communist system.

    “It would have been a disgrace if we had come back to Moscow defeated. We would have been ashamed to show our faces in public,” Beskov recalled. In the end, Dynamo won two matches and drew the other two.

    The visitors’ first match, against Chelsea, took place on November 13. Some 75,000 tickets were sold but at least 100,000 fans turned up, packing Stamford Bridge stadium to the rafters. The sheer weight of the crowd literally led to gates around the grounds crashing to the ground.

    British Labour Party politician Albert Victor Alexander greets members of the Dynamo Moscow team before their game against Chelsea at Stamford Bridge.

    British Labour Party politician Albert Victor Alexander greets members of the Dynamo Moscow team before their game against Chelsea at Stamford Bridge.

    Before kickoff, Dynamo players handed bouquets of flowers to their bemused opponents, who were empty-handed and not used to such gestures.

    Dynamo Moscow players walk out onto the pitch at Stamford Bridge carrying bouquets for their Chelsea opponents.

    Dynamo Moscow players walk out onto the pitch at Stamford Bridge carrying bouquets for their Chelsea opponents.

    On the field, powerhouse Chelsea took a quick 2-0 lead, as Dynamo players appeared awed by the amped-up audience — a change from the sedate and somber supporters they were used to at home. But the Soviet side shook off the early jitters and, supported by strong goalkeeping from Aleksei Khomich, fought back to earn a 3-3 tie.

    After the match, Chelsea players tipped their hats to Dynamo, expressing their own awe. “Dynamo were one of the fastest teams I have ever seen in my life. They flash the ball from man to man in bewildering fashion, often while standing still,” defender Tommy Lawton said.

    Later, Orwell wrote that “Dynamo is one of the fastest teams I’ve ever seen. They passed the ball while we were standing.”

    Up next on November 19 was Cardiff City, then a third-division team, which Dynamo trounced 10-1 in a game broadcast live by Radio Moscow.

    With socialist sympathy relatively high among the coal miners and steelworkers of South Wales, Cardiff warmly welcomed their Soviet visitors, hoisting the hammer-and-sickle flag above city hall and gifting each player a commemorative miner’s lamp.

    Dynamo Moscow goalkeeper Aleksei Khomich kicks the ball up-field at Cardiff City's Ninian Park ground during his team's British tour. Cardiff lost 10-1.

    Dynamo Moscow goalkeeper Aleksei Khomich kicks the ball up-field at Cardiff City’s Ninian Park ground during his team’s British tour. Cardiff lost 10-1.

    On November 21, Dynamo faced Arsenal, which suited up “guest” players to replace regular squad members still serving in the armed forces. Among the additions was future legend Stanley Matthews, who in the 1960s would become the first player to be knighted.

    Suspecting they were facing an English all-star team, the Soviet delegation insisted the match be officiated by their Russian referee, Nikolai Latyshev.

    Arsenal’s home, Highbury, was still being used as an air-raid precaution center, so the match was played at Tottenham Hotspur’s stadium, White Hart Lane.

    Lines of fans formed overnight, and police began letting them in the morning of the match.

    But with fog blanketing most of London that day, few in the stands — or on the field, for that matter — could see much of the action. Latyshev was accused by Arsenal and British soccer heads of several dubious calls, including calling back what appeared to be a legitimate Arsenal goal. The game, dubbed “the farce in the fog” by the British, ended with Dynamo winning 4-3.

    Soviet soccer legends Konstantin Beskov (left) and Vsevolod Bobrov did most of the scoring in Britain for Dynamo.

    Soviet soccer legends Konstantin Beskov (left) and Vsevolod Bobrov did most of the scoring in Britain for Dynamo.

    Scotland was the last stop for the Soviet side, which faced Glasgow Rangers at Ibrox Stadium on November 28. Tickets were sold on the black market for as much as 10 pounds –10 times their face value.

    The game ended 3-3 and witnessed what some later called the goal of the tournament, scored by Vasily Kartsev after a passing sequence between Beskov and Vsevolod Bobrov. It was “as perfect a goal as has ever been scored at Ibrox,” The Daily Telegraph said.

    Dynamo Moscow’s return home “resembled scenes reminiscent of soldiers returning from war — as they had done just months earlier,” Russian sportswriter Vladislav Ryabov wrote.

    Dynamo left its mark on soccer fans in Britain as well — in a way that was summed up by Sir Stanley Matthews, the knighted former player nicknamed the Wizard of Dribble.

    “Many years passed since we first met the Russian football players,” he would later recount. “Since then, in the hearts of everyone who lived in those days, the words Dynamo Moscow are associated with the concept of class football.”

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Kremlin Cancels Putin’s Traditional Meeting With Business Leaders

    The Kremlin has announced that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not participate in the traditional end-of-the-year meeting with business leaders.

    Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on December 27 that the meeting, which is normally held each year in the days before New Year’s, would not be held. He did not give a reason.

    Earlier this month, Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs head Aleksandr Shokhin said the meeting would take place sometime after December 25.

    This year Putin also cancelled his annual Direct Line question-and-answer session, an annual televised event at which the president spends several hours fielding carefully chosen questions from people across Russia.

    Last year, the meeting with business leaders was held in the Kremlin and included billionaires Mikhail Gutseriyev, Mikhail Prokhorov, Mikhail Fridman, Gennady Timchenko, and Vladimir Potanin. Rosneft state oil company CEO Igor Sechin also attended.

    Although attendees normally discuss economic issues at the closed-door meetings, Forbes magazine quoted anonymous sources as saying Putin devoted considerable time to discussing his research into the diplomatic run-up to World War II, focusing on the position of Poland.

    With reporting by TASS

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Cold War-Era Double Agent George Blake Dies In Russia, Age 98

    Prominent Cold War-era double agent George Blake has died in Moscow at the age of 98, Russian authorities have reported.

    “The legendary intelligence officer George Blake has passed away today,” a spokesman for Russia’s SVR foreign intelligence agency told the state TASS news agency. He added that Blake “sincerely loved our country and admired our people’s achievements during World War II.”

    Blake was born in the Netherlands in 1922, and his original family name was Behar. He grew up in Rotterdam and in Egypt before attending Cambridge University to study Russian.

    During World War II, he served in the Dutch resistance, despite his youth. In 1944, he joined Britain’s Royal Navy and was recruited later that year by the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6).

    He was posted to Seoul and was captured by North Korean forces in 1950. During his three-year captivity, Blake became a communist and was recruited by the Soviet KGB.

    In the mid-1950s, he was stationed in Berlin as an MI6 case officer tasked with recruiting Soviet officers as double agents. During this time, he informed the KGB of a joint British-American operation called Operation Gold, which involved creating a tunnel into East Berlin to tap Soviet communications lines.

    Over nine years, Blake is believed to have exposed some 40 MI6 agents to the KGB, causing substantial disruption to MI6 activities in Eastern Europe.

    Blake came under suspicion in 1959 as a result of information from Polish defector Michael Goleniewski. He was arrested in 1961 and confessed to voluntarily working for the KGB.

    In May 1961, he was sentenced to serve three consecutive 14-year prison terms. In 1966, however, with the help of three men whom he met in prison, Blake escaped from London’s Wormwood Scrubs prison through a broken window. He was taken to a safe house and later smuggled across the English Channel and into East Germany.

    From there, he traveled on to the Soviet Union. He taught at the Soviet Foreign Intelligence Academy and was given the Soviet Order of Lenin.

    In an 1991 interview with U.S. NBC television, Blake said he regretted the deaths of the agents he had exposed to the Soviets.

    In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded Blake the Order of Friendship medal.

    In the introduction to Blake’s 2006 book Transparent Walls, then SVR Director Sergei Lebedev wrote that Blake was an SVR colonel who “still takes an active role in the affairs of the secret service” despite his advanced age.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • 19 Detained As Long-Running Khabarovsk Protests Continue

    Police in the Russian Far Eastern city of Khabarovsk have detained at least 19 people who were participating in a demonstration in support of the region’s jailed former governor, activists say.

    The OVD-Info group, which monitors police activity, said on December 26 that the protesters were detained during a small demonstration against the July arrest of former Governor Sergei Furgal on charges connected with several murders from more than a decade ago.

    Several dozen protesters braved temperatures far below freezing to gather in front of the regional government office in Khabarovsk and then march through the center of the city.

    It was the 169th day of protests since Furgal’s arrest and his transfer to Moscow.

    Furgal denies the allegations against him, and he and his supporters say he is being persecuted because he soundly defeated the incumbent from the ruling United Russian party in the region’s 2018 gubernatorial election.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Russian Justice Ministry Expands ‘Foreign Agents’ List To Include Navalny Foundation

    The Russian Ministry of Justice has expanded the list of so-called “foreign agents” to include a foundation of Kremlin critic Aleksei Navalny and other human rights and health-care organizations, the head of the international human rights group Agora said on December 25.

    Pavel Chikov said on Telegram that Navalny’s Foundation for the Protection of Citizens’ Rights was among those added to the list. The Ministry of Justice at the same time refused to exclude Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) from it.

    Navalny announced the closure of the FBK in July after a court ordered the organization to pay 88 million rubles ($1.2 million) over a lawsuit filed by a food company associated with businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

    But FBK’s brand has survived although its texts, graphics, and other materials posted at its site now belong to the Foundation for the Protection of Citizens’ Rights, according to the FBK website.

    The “foreign agent” law, originally passed in 2012, requires designated organizations to report their activities and face financial audits. Critics say the law has been arbitrarily applied to target Russian civil society organizations, human rights defenders, and political activists, including Navalny’s FBK.

    On December 25 the Federation Council approved amendments to the controversial law. The approval came two days after the Russian parliament’s lower chamber approved the amendments. Putin’s signature is required for the amendments to become part of the law.

    The changes expand the scope of individuals and groups that can be designated foreign agents, introduce new restrictions and registration and reporting requirements, and oblige the media to note the designation whenever they mention these individuals or groups.

    Earlier on December 25 Lyubov Sobol, a lawyer for the FBK, was detained for questioning on charges of violent trespassing.

    Russian law enforcement agencies have opened a criminal case against Sobol, the head of the foundation said on December 25.

    FBK Director Ivan Zhdanov said on Twitter that investigators launched the probe for trespassing “with the use of violence or a threat to use it” after she rang the doorbell of an agent who has implicated the Federal Security Service (FSB) in the poisoning of the 44-year-old Kremlin critic.

    Sobol has denied the accusations and insisted that she violated no law by ringing the doorbell in an attempt to speak to FSB agent Konstantin Kudryavtsev.

    The FBK said on Twitter that Sobol’s apartment was searched apparently in response to Sobol’s actions.

    Sobol was among journalists and political activists who tried to meet with Kudryavtsev late in the evening on December 21, the day Navalny published an audio-recording of what appears to be a conversation with Kudryavtsev over the FSB’s role in the poisoning.

    With reporting by RFE/RL’s Russian Service

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Russian Justice Ministry Expands ‘Foreign Agents’ List To Include Navalny Foundation

    The Russian Ministry of Justice has expanded the list of so-called “foreign agents” to include a foundation of Kremlin critic Aleksei Navalny and other human rights and health-care organizations, the head of the international human rights group Agora said on December 25.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Several Detained At Trial Of Russian Mathematician Who Claims He Was Tortured

    A mathematician at the center of a high-profile trial in Russia gave a final statement to a Moscow court on December 25 as police detained journalists and activists gathered outside.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Russian Security Forces Raid Home Of Navalny Lawyer Sobol

    Security video shows Russian officers taping over a camera before pounding on the door of Lyubov Sobol, a lawyer for Kremlin critic Aleksei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation. Sobol also shared footage of her reaction as she waited inside with her husband and child before the officers took her in for questioning on December 25. Authorities opened a criminal case against Sobol for trespassing after she rang the doorbell of a Federal Security Agency (FSB) agent who has been implicated in the poisoning of Navalny with a deadly toxin. (YouTube/NavalnyLive)

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Russia Historian Gets More Than 12 Years For Murdering, Dismembering Girlfriend

    A Russian court has sentenced a flamboyant Russian professor who killed and dismembered his student lover to 12 1/2 years in prison after convicting him of her murder.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Russia Criticizes Threatened U.S. Sanctions Against Nord Stream 2

    The Kremlin has said it does not rule out delays to the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in light of the threat of new U.S. sanctions.

    Sanctions are aimed at hampering the project and can fulfill their goal, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told a news conference on December 24.

    “Of course, this can complicate [the implementation of the project], but at the same time, our European partners and we are interested in the project’s implementation so that it is finalized in the interests of European consumers and Russian gas suppliers,” Peskov said.

    Commenting on whether the Trump administration will have time to stop the project, Peskov said: “We are not inclined to read coffee grounds here. We have our own issues to work out, and we’re working on them.”

    “However, our European partners and we are interested in this project being implemented,” he said.

    The Nord Stream 2 pipeline is to carry Russian-sourced gas directly to Germany, the European Union’s largest economy, via a route under the Baltic Sea similar to the existing Nord Stream line.

    The United States has condemned the pipeline as threatening the security of NATO allies in the EU by increasing dependence on Russia.

    Washington in December 2019 passed a bill that imposed sanctions on vessels laying the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, forcing Swiss-based Allseas to stop work on the project shortly before its completion.

    Russia is now seeking to retrofit its own vessels to finish the pipeline to complete the project.

    The National Defense Authorization Act, an annual bill that mainly sets the policy for the U.S. Department of Defense, includes an extension of Washington’s sanctions against the pipeline. However, outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump on December 23 vetoed the bill.

    Peskov would not comment on whether Trump could still stop completion of the pipeline. Washington does want to make it as difficult as possible to implement the project, he added.

    The pipeline is currently reported to be 93 percent completed.

    With reporting by dpa and TASS

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Don’t Blame the Soviets for the War in Nagorno-Karabakh

    In the final week of September, an Azerbaijani offensive renewed hostilities in the perennial armed conflict and territorial dispute in the South Caucasus between Armenia and its neighbor over the Nagorno-Karabakh (“Mountainous Karabakh”) region. By October, the clashes had escalated past the state border between Azerbaijan and the internationally-unrecognized Republic of Artsakh which suffered heavy shelling from banned Israeli-made cluster bombs by the Azeris. Meanwhile, Armenia retaliated with strikes in Azerbaijan outside of the contested enclave, with civilian casualties reported on both sides in the deadliest resumption of large scale fighting since the Russian-brokered ceasefire in 1994. Following Baku’s victory recapturing the town of Shusha which had been under Artsakh control since 1992, a new armistice was signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and Russian President Vladimir Putin last month. However, what distinguished this re-ignition of the war from previous skirmishes were not just the severity but its direct instigation by Turkey with military support for Azerbaijan, which included the widely publicized recruitment of jihadist mercenaries from Syria.

    Contrary to what one might assume, the boundary dispute does not date back centuries and its roots are relatively modern, despite the interrelated historical persecution of Armenians by the Turks and Ottoman Empire. As many have noted, the foundations for the war which began in 1988 were laid not in antiquity but decades prior during the establishment of the Soviet republics in the South Caucasus following the Russian Revolution. More specifically, the controversial decision by Joseph Stalin in 1921 to incorporate the region into Azerbaijan would have enormous consequences when the USSR later dissolved, as the vast majority of the population within the upland territory have historically been ethnic Armenians. While that may be partly to blame, much of the shortsighted analysis of the current flare-up has oversimplified its basis by placing sole responsibility on the political decisions made by the Soviet leadership decades ago at the expense of addressing the real reasons for the “frozen conflict” in the South Caucasus.

    Vladimir Lenin once described the Russian Empire as a “prison of peoples” or a “prison house of nations” in reference to the more than 120 different nationalities colonized by the Tsarist autocracy. Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I and the Russian Revolution, the demographics of Transcaucasia shifted with the changes in borders increasing the overall make-up of ethnic Armenians, many of whom were displaced by the genocide. However, even a century prior Nagorno-Karabakh had still been more than 90% Armenian, despite the South Caucasus generally comprising many different ethnic communities. In the 19th century, the influence of European conceptions of nationalism resulted in the various intermingling groups of the region redefining their identities in increasingly ethno-territorial and nationalist terms. To resolve the national question, the Soviets adopted a policy which encouraged the establishment of republics and administrative borders which unfortunately did not always perfectly align with the overlapping and intermixing populations.

    After the Russian Revolution, Transcaucasia was initially a unified Soviet republic consisting of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, but it soon split into three separate states. Despite promising Artsakh to Armenia and against the wishes of its population, Nagorno-Karabakh was then granted to Azerbaijan but with autonomy by the Georgian-born Stalin, then the Soviet Commissar of Nationalities. However, it is important to recognize that in spite of this fateful decision, under the USSR for seven decades the two sides held a mostly peaceful co-existence, while Karabakh Armenians continued to champion reunification with their homeland without bloodshed. That is not to say mistakes weren’t committed by the Soviet leaders who were often at odds over the national question, but one of the signature accomplishments of socialism was greatly reducing the frequently bloody conflicts between oppressed groups which shared national spaces. It was only during the circumstances of glasnost and perestroika that the social grievances of the South Caucasus took an irredentist expression which turned violent in Nagorno-Karabakh, just as it did in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and the North Caucasus in Chechnya.

    The recolonization of Eastern Europe by foreign capital included the encouragement of secessionist and nationalist independence movements throughout the post-Soviet sphere and the South Caucasus were no exception. The template for Western hegemony over the east — based on the British founder of modern geopolitics Sir Halford Mackinder’s ‘Heartland Theory’ whose “The Geographical Pivot of History” emphasized the strategic importance of Eastern Europe — was put into practice by Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor in the Jimmy Carter administration. While the Polish-born Brzezinski delivered the Soviet equivalent of the Vietnam War and the U.S. empire’s own ‘Great Game’ by supplying lethal arms to the Afghan mujahideen, he also established the Nationalities Working Group (NWG) tasked with inciting ethnic tensions among non-Russian groups in the Soviet orbit. After the USSR collapsed, Brzezinski and the Atlanticist coven continued to mastermind the complete resizing and balkanization of Eurasia by inciting ethno-nationalist divisions in the formely ‘captive nations’ behind the Iron Curtain even after the re-establishment of the free market.

    Brzezinski’s Machiavellian strategy was crystallized in his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, which not only prophesied the easterly expansion of NATO on Russia’s borders but the resurgence of Islamism and Pan-Turkism in the post-Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia. As an intellectual disciple of Mackinder, Brzezinski drew from his ideas which first theorized the importance of pulling the oil-rich South Caucasus away from Moscow’s sphere of influence. Azerbaijan was one of the first former Soviet countries to become a Western power-base after the 1993 CIA-backed coup d’etat which ousted the democratically-elected government of Abulfaz Elchibey and brought to power Heydar Aliyev, father of the current Azeri president, who pivoted the country away from Moscow and began the Azerification of Nagorno-Karabakh. Two years later, Brzezinski visited Azerbaijan and helped arrange the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline linking the Caspian Sea oil basin from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey.

    Since 2018, Armenia has also been in danger of becoming a Western client state after the so-called ‘Velvet Revolution’ which installed current Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who rewarded the Russophobic international financier George Soros with appointments in his new government straight from the Hungarian billionaire’s NGO network which sponsored the mass demonstrations that overthrew President Serzh Sarsgyan. Pashinyan has since pledged to sign a European Union Association Agreement but will first have to withdraw Yerevan from Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union. Following the November ceasefire agreement, Pashinyan has become the subject of widespread protests himself by Armenians, which included the storming of Yerevan’s parliament building, as many were furious over his perceived premature surrender of the strategic city of Shusha which had been under Artsakh control since the end of the first Nagorno-Karabakh war.

    As it happens, Soros also gave financial impetus to the civil society group Charter 77 that led the original 1989 ‘Velvet Revolution’ which deposed the Marxist-Leninist government in Czechoslovakia, but don’t speak of this to the political right which falsely imagines Soros to be a “communist” bogeyman despite his occupation as a global hedge fund tycoon. Armenia’s 2018 ‘Color Revolution’ was identical to the many pro-Western protest movements which brought regime change in Eastern European and Central Asian countries in the post-Soviet world that was first prototyped during the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Eastern Bloc. The subsequent election of Pashinyan was supposed to reset the negotiations with Baku but instead there was a resurgence of the violence in the enclave. It is not by chance that as soon as the Armenian government began to pivot to the EU away from Moscow, a revival of clashes began. Armenians should be wary of Soros pulling the strings behind their government based on the man’s own words. Even though Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has vilified the Open Society Foundation, the investor took out an op-ed in the Financial Times in March which whitewashed the neo-sultan while demonizing Putin.

    From the Armenian perspective, it is impossible to separate the direct aid by Turkey for the Azeris during the current war from its collective memory of the genocide which Ankara and Baku deny to this day. It can only be interpreted as an existential threat and a sign of Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman aspirations. For anyone who doubts Turkey’s expansionist ambitions, it has also been reported that Ankara has since recruited Syrian mercenaries to the Greek border and Kashmir. The exporting of foreign terrorists from Afrin and Idlib into Nagorno-Karabakh has resulted in war crimes such as the beheadings of Armenian soldiers. In the face of Azerbaijan’s reputation as the most secular country in the Muslim world, it appears the practices of Sunni Islamist head-choppers have been passed on to its nominally Shia armed forces. Turkey’s support also introduces an international dimension that presents a danger of the conflict transforming into a proxy war which threatens to draw in Israel, Iran, Russia, the U.S. and other players.

    The geopolitical context of the war is not cut and dried. Ankara’s suspicion of U.S. involvement in the 2016 Turkish coup d’etat attempt and Washington’s refusal to extradite the CIA-sponsored Islamic cleric Fetullah Gülen from Pennsylvania put the US-Turkey relationship in shambles and relations were only further soured by Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system in defiance of its NATO commitments. The U.S. incorporation of the Kurds into the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) coalition to fight Daesh pushed Turkey even closer towards Moscow’s camp. To both punish Ankara and rebuke U.S. President Donald Trump’s troop withdrawal from Northeast Syria that precipitated the Turkish invasion of Kurdish-held territory last year, the U.S. House of Representatives opportunistically passed a resolution formally recognizing the Armenian genocide after decades of refusal. However, it was dead on arrival in the Senate as Turkish and Azeri pressure groups remain a top player in foreign agent lobbying exceeded only by the exempted Zionists. At the congressional level, even “progressive” Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-MN) who has taken campaign donations from the Turkish lobby and held closed door meetings with Erdoğan notably abstained on the bill.

    Some analysts intent on embellishing Turkey have suggested that because of cooling relations between the U.S. and its NATO ally in recent years, along with Armenia’s pivot to the EU, it would somehow be advantageous for Moscow to favor an Azeri victory. Even if that were true, it underestimates the historical relationship between Russia and Armenia as the protector of Orthodox Christian subjects under Ottoman rule. In reality, the only preference for Moscow is a balancing act and diplomatic victory that will resolve what the U.S. and Turkey are instigating. Three decades after the dissolution of the USSR, Russia’s ‘near abroad’ has been almost completely absorbed into the EU and NATO which rescinded their promise not to expand past East Germany with tensions between Washington and Moscow reaching a point not seen since the height of the Cold War. While Putin has become quite adept at negotiating compromises to national conflicts as he did in the North Caucasus ending the Chechen Wars, any new ceasefire mediated in Nagorno-Karabakh will only be a short-term band-aid on a deep-seated wound so long as the regions of the former Soviet Union remain under free enterprise and a target of imperialism which can sow dissension between its heterogeneous inhabitants.

    This article was posted on Tuesday, December 22nd, 2020 at 10:39pm and is filed under Armenia, Azerbaijan, History, Russia.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Two Russian Diplomats Leave Colombia Over Reported Espionage

    Colombia has confirmed two Russian diplomats were stripped of accreditation and forced to leave the South American country, due to what local media reported was espionage.

    Colombia’s Foreign Ministry said December 22 that two diplomats stationed at the Russian Embassy in Bogota had engaged in activities that were “incompatible” with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

    Colombian officials did not provide specifics as to why the two men left but said that in response Russia had removed two Colombian diplomats.

    Local media cited anonymous security sources as saying the two men were engaged in gathering military intelligence and economic information related to natural resource extraction.

    President Ivan Duque also cited the Vienna Convention for the move.

    In an interview with television outlet NTN24, he declined to reveal more information about the issue, saying it would go against the principle of continuing good bilateral relations with Russia.

    Francisco Espinosa, the head of Colombia’s migration agency, told a news conference the two men left on December 8 for “issues related to the state.”

    Based on reporting by El Tiempo and El Colombiano

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • ‘Russian Watergate’: Russian Social Media Reacts After Navalny Dupes FSB Agent On His Poisoning

    Within 24 hours of being posted, Russian opposition figure Aleksei Navalny’s video report of a conversation in which a Federal Security Agency (FSB) chemist confesses to participating in Navalny’s poisoning with a deadly nerve agent in August racked up nearly 12 million views.

    A video report posted one week earlier that identified the FSB agents who tracked Navalny and purportedly attempted to assassinate him at least three times has been viewed nearly 19 million times.

    The shocking report, in which Navalny tricked FSB military chemist Konstantin Kudryavtsev into confessing that FSB agents smeared a toxin from the Novichok group in the oppositionist’s underwear in a hotel in Tomsk in a bid to kill him, lit up the Russian Internet.

    A full day after the video landed, Navalny’s name was still No. 2 on Twitter’s “Russia Trends” list. And St. Petersburg writer and journalist Tatyana Shorokhova wrote: “This was the day the entire Russian Facebook rumbled.”

    History In The Making

    “What Navalny did to the FSB with his investigations, in terms of the extent of the demoralization and humiliation of the employees of this ‘new aristocracy’ is comparable only to the historical moment when the monument to [Soviet secret police founder Feliks] Dzerzhinsky was dragged along the Lubyanka like a market girl by the hair “wrote the humorous Stalingulag account on Twitter, referring to the August 1991 toppling of the colossal Dzerzhinsky statue in front of Moscow’s KGB headquarters at Lubyanka.

    Moscow photographer Yevgeny Feldman also highlighted the potentially historic significance of the episode, writing on Twitter: “Russia’s Watergate: senseless and pitiless.”

    Russian politician Gennady Gudkov (file photo)

    Russian politician Gennady Gudkov (file photo)

    Former State Duma Deputy Gennady Gudkov wrote on Facebook that Navalny’s investigations mean Russia “has entered a new phase in the recognition of the criminal character and complete amorality of the Putin regime…. Russia is ruled by a criminal band that has seized power and that in order to continue its usurpation is prepared to undertake openly monstrous crimes.”

    Time To Investigate?

    Other observers noted that the revelations would seem to put significant pressure on the government of President Vladimir Putin to open a criminal investigation into Navalny’s poisoning. Previously, the government had said there was no evidence of a crime and had insinuated that Navalny either poisoned himself or was poisoned after he was medically evacuated to Germany by Western security agents.

    Mikhail Khodorkovsky (file photo)

    Mikhail Khodorkovsky (file photo)

    “This is a serious business, but I was laughing my head off,” wrote former Russian oligarch and Putin opponent Mikhail Khodorkovsky on Twitter, addressing Putin by his first name and patronymic. “It looks like a criminal case will have to be opened after all, eh, Vladimir Vladimirovich?”

    On Facebook, journalist Roman Dobrokhotov, of The Insider, wrote: “Earlier we said: ‘Well, what more proof do you need? Do you insist that they personally confess to everything?’ Now look – they have confessed.”

    Chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov (file photo)

    Chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov (file photo)

    Former world chess champion Garry Kasparov, who also is a vocal critic of Putin, compared the Navalny case to the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi agents in a post on Twitter: “Doing business as usual with Putin after this, like ignoring the Saudi murder of Khashoggi, just encourages more murders. It doesn’t matter if they get caught if they get to keep killing critics with impunity.”

    Politics Is All In The Timing

    Still other commentators noted that Navalny’s revelations come just days after Putin’s end-of-the-year marathon press conference. During the December 17 event, Putin denied that Russian agents had poisoned Navalny and dismissed the accusations as disinformation from the CIA.

    The humorous Twitter account Prof. Preobrazhensky noted that many more people have watched Navalny’s video than tuned in for Putin’s much-hyped Q-and-A session.

    Activist Mikhail Svetov praised the political acumen of Navalny’s timing in a post on Twitter: “The way that Navalny knows how to pick his moment deserves particular respect. He could have rushed and published the recording before Putin’s press conference. But he held on until afterward in order to give the Kremlin the chance to dig itself in still deeper. This is real politics.”

    Political commentator and former head of Gazprom-Media Alfred Kokh wrote on Facebook: “Putin was dissected like a complete sucker. A real professional should have assumed that his opponent had a trump card in reserve.”

    In a post on Facebook, Voronezh lawyer Vasily Shlykov was even more direct: “According to the codes of the Russian-speaking world, any officer and soldier who has sworn an oath to the Fatherland must, after such a thing, shoot himself. Putin is an officer! Russia has never seen such a shameful thing!!”

    Journalist Roman Super voiced the general surprise at the low level of professionalism the FSB agents allegedly involved in the case seemed to show: “In just 20 years, [Putin] destroyed all state institutions in general, not even sparing the State Security Committee [KGB] that pushed him to the zenith of this beautiful Russian chaos. But still he understands nothing. That is talent.”

    Meanwhile…

    The day after the Navalny video appeared, Russia’s state news agency TASS cited a survey from the Kremlin-friendly All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) in which a plurality of Russians named Vladimir Putin “2020’s politician of the year.”

    Written by RFE/RL senior correspondent Robert Coalson based on reporting by RFE/RL Russian Service correspondent Ivan Belyayev.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Most Russians Back Traditional Gender Roles For Kids

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Russia Hits EU Officials, Entities With Tit-For-Tat Navalny Sanctions

    Russia says it has expanded its list of European Union officials barred from the country in response to the bloc’s “unacceptable” decision to place travel bans on Russian officials over the poisoning of opposition leader Aleksei Navalny.

    The Foreign Ministry in Moscow “decided to expand the list of representatives of EU member states and institutions who will be denied entry to the Russian Federation,” the ministry said in a statement on December 22, adding that those targeted are held “responsible for promoting anti-Russian sanctions initiatives within the framework of the European Union.”

    It did not name the officials but said it had called in the heads of the diplomatic missions of Germany, France, and Sweden, as well as to the EU delegation in Moscow to inform them of the decision.

    Navalny was airlifted to Germany for treatment in August after collapsing on a plane in Russia.

    Laboratories in Germany, France, and Sweden later concluded that the leading Kremlin critic and anti-corruption campaigner was poisoned with a Soviet-style Novichok nerve agent.

    The EU and Britain in mid-October imposed asset freezes and travel bans against six senior Russian officials and a state scientific research center for the “attempted assassination.”

    Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, have denied involvement in the poisoning.

    However, on December 21, Navalny released a 49-minute phone call with a Russian agent who was apparently duped into revealing how the country’s Federal Security Service (FSB) committed the attack.

    The agent, Konstantin Kudryavtsev, inadvertently made the admission during the call with Navalny, who was posing as a high-ranking security official conducting a debriefing on the August attack in the Siberian city of Tomsk.

    During the call, which used software to make it appear it originated from an FSB phone line, Kudryavtsev admits that Russian security officials put the Novichok chemical nerve agent in Navalny’s underwear, expecting it would kill the 44-year-old while on a flight to Moscow from Tomsk.

    Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov on December 22 said Navalny’s attempts to “discredit” the FSB will fail.

    Peskov said that the opposition leader is a “sick” man who exhibited clear “traits of megalomania” and has “delusions of persecution.”

    Navalny fell violently ill on the flight shortly after takeoff, prompting the crew to make an emergency landing in the city of Omsk. He was hospitalized for days before being flown to Berlin, where doctors concluded that he had been poisoned with a nerve agent.

    He is still in Germany recovering from the attack.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.