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  • Scott Waide: Grand Chief Somare and the wisdom he left for everyone

    COMMENT: By Scott Waide in Wewak

    I have not written anything on my blog My Land, My Country since our arrival in Wewak the Sunday before last.  In fact, it has been overwhelming.

    The demonstration of sorrow and the pride is something to behold here in Wewak and all over Papua New Guinea.

    I  stayed away from the livestream that we in EMTV produced out of Port Moresby. I did watch parts of it. But it has been hard to watch a full session without becoming emotional and emotion is  something that has been in abundance over the last 16 days.

    There are a thousand and one narratives embedded in the life of  the man we call Michael Somare.

    How could I do justice to all of it?

    Do I write about the history? Do I write about the stories people are telling about him? Do I write about his band of brothers who helped him in the early years?

    Narratives embedded
    There are a thousand and one narratives embedded in the life of the man we call Michael Somare.

    Sir Michael was, himself,  a storyteller.

    Narratives woven into relationships
    He didn’t just tell stories with words.  The narratives were woven into his existence and in the relationships he built throughout his life.  From them, came  the stories that have been given new life with his passing.

    I went to speak to Sir Pita Lus, his closest friend and the man who, in Papua New Guinean terms, carried the spear ahead of the Chief.  He encouraged Michael Somare to run for office.

    Sir Pita Lus
    Speaking to Sir Pita Lus, Somare’s closest friend and the man who, in Papua New Guinean terms, carried the spear ahead of the Chief. Image: Scott Waide

    He told me about the old days about how he had told his very reluctant friend that he would be Prime Minister.  In Drekikir,  Sir Pita Lus told his constituents that his friend Michael Somare would run for East Sepik Regional.

    Sir Pita Lus and his relationship with Sir Michael is a chapter that hasn’t yet been written.  It needs to be written.  It is up to some young proud Papua New Guinean to write about this colorful old fella.

    Sir Michael Somare
    Sir Michael Somare (1936-2021) farewells a nation … a livestreamed tribute by EMTV News. Image: EMTV News screenshot APR

    A chief builds alliances. But what are alliances? They are relationships. How are they transmitted? Through stories.  Sir Michael built alliances from which stories were told.

    When I went to the  provincial haus krai in Wewak, there were  huge piles of food. I have never seen so much food in my life.  Island communities of Mushu, Kadowar and Wewak brought bananas, saksak and pigs in honor of the grand chief.  They also have their stories to tell about Sir Michael.

    The Mapriks came. Ambunti-Drekikir brought huge yams, pigs and two large crocodiles.  The Morobeans, the Manus, the Tolais, West Sepik, the Centrals.

    In Port Moresby, people came from the 22 provinces …  From  Bougainville, the Highlands, West Sepik and West Papua.

    In Fiji, Prime Minister, Voreqe Bainimarama sent his condolences as he read a eulogy. In Vanuatu, Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) members held a special service in honour of Sir Michael.  In Australia, parliamentarians stood in honour of Sir Michael Somare.

    Followed to his resting place
    Our people followed the Grand Chief to his resting place. The Madangs came on a boat. Others walked for days just to get to Wewak in time for the burial.

    How did one man do that?  How did he unite 800 nations?  Because that is what we are. Each with our own language and our own system of government that existed for 60,000 years.

    Here was a man who said, “this is how we should go now and we need to unite and move forward”.

    In generations past, what have our people looked for? How is one deemed worthy of a chieftaincy?

    I said to someone today that the value of a chief lies in his ability to fight for his people, to maintain peace and to unite everyone. In many of our cultures, a chief has to demonstrate a set of skills above and beyond the rest.

    He must be willing to sacrifice his life and dedicate himself to that  calling of leadership. He must have patience and the ability to forgive.

    The value of the chief is seen both during his life and upon his passing when people come from all over to pay tribute.

    For me, Sir Michael Somare, leaves wisdom and guidance – A part of it written into the Constitution and the National Goals and Directive Principles. For the other part, he showed us where to look.  It is found in our languages and in the wisdom of our ancestors held by our elders.

    Asia Pacific Report republishes articles from Lae-based Papua New Guinean television journalist Scott Waide’s blog, My Land, My Country, with permission.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Majlis Podcast: What Is Turkey Seeking In Central Asia?

    Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visited three Central Asian countries from March 6 to 9.

    Boosting trade was a big part of Cavusoglu’s mission during his visit to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, but there were unique reasons for the Turkish minister’s visit to each country.

    On this week’s Majlis Podcast, RFE/RL media-relations manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion on Turkish-Central Asian ties and what Cavusoglu was doing in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

    This week’s guests are: from the United Kingdom, Gul Berna Ozcan, reader in international business and entrepreneurship at the Royal Holloway University of London; from Bishkek, Medet Tiulegenov, assistant professor at the American University of Central Asia; and Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: Working To Eradicate Gender Bias In Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan

    As Central Asian countries mark International Women’s Day on March 8 this year, it also marks roughly one year since the coronavirus became a global pandemic.

    The spread of the virus prompted a series of measures in countries throughout the world, including lockdowns that saw millions of people confined to their homes for periods of time.

    Incidents of domestic violence jumped in many places.

    Public events were prohibited in many countries, including rallies in Central Asia to raise awareness of gender violence and promote equal rights were restricted, so many advocacy groups for women’s rights shifted their message to social networks and other media to continue fighting for women’s rights in the patriarchal societies of Central Asia.

    On this week’s Majlis Podcast, RFE/RL media-relations manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion on what has changed in the last year, the challenges that remain, and what is being done to bring gender equality to the region and end violence against women.

    This week’s guests are: from Bishkek, Natalia Nikitenko, a deputy in Kyrgyzstan’s parliament; from Tashkent, Irina Matvienko, journalist, rights defender, and founder of NeMolchi.uz, an organization fighting to end violence against women; from Washington, Jasmine Cameron, a senior staff attorney at the Human Rights Center of the American Bar Association, which published a recent report about violence against women in Kyrgyzstan, and Bruce Pannier, author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: Who Lives In Uzbekistan’s Shovvozsoy Mansion?

    RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service recently released a detailed report about a new resort that was secretly built about 100 kilometers southeast of the Uzbek capital, Tashkent.

    Allegedly it is the luxurious hideaway of President Shavkat Mirziyoev, which would seem to undercut Mirziyoev’s promises for a more responsible and transparent government than the one he inherited in September 2016 when his predecessor, Islam Karimov, died.

    On this week’s Majlis Podcast, RFE/RL media-relations manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion on the new complex, who it belongs to, and what is now being said about it inside Uzbekistan.

    This week’s guests are: from Tashkent, Mira Matyakubowa, co-founder of the anti-corruption organization UzInvestigations and a fellow at the U.K.-based Foreign Policy Center; from Prague, Carl Schreck, RFE/RL enterprise editor; and Bruce Pannier, author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: Despite Promises, Are Rights Abuses In Kazakhstan Getting Worse?

    When Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, officially stepped down from office in March 2019 and Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev became president, Toqaev promised changes to a system that had not changed very much in nearly 28 years.

    There were many fair words about reforms, but nearly two years later Kazakhstan’s political system looks to be much the same as it has been.

    On February 10, the European Parliament released a joint motion for a resolution that detailed the many areas where Kazakhstan continues to fall well short of its commitments to respect basic rights.

    Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev (file photo)

    Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev (file photo)

    Kazakh authorities responded with the now-common defense that the criticisms were superficial and failed to take into account all of the changes that are happening in Kazakhstan.

    On this week’s Majlis podcast, RFE/RL media-relations manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion on Kazakhstan in which some say the situation is actually becoming worse, not better, despite Toqaev’s promises.

    This week’s guests are: from Almaty: Yevgeny Zhovtis, veteran rights defender and director of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, and Marius Fossum, the Central Asia representative of the Norwegian Helsinki Committee; and from Prague: Aigerim Toleukhanova, a journalist in RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service, and Bruce Pannier, author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Kyrgyz Villagers Losing Patience With State’s Failure To Resolve Border Problems With Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

    Fresh from medical treatment in Germany, Kyrgyz national security head Kamchybek Tashiev urgently flew from Bishkek to the southern Batken region on February 18 to deal with people’s growing anger over the failure by officials to resolve pressing border issues.

    Tashiev, chief of Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security (UKMK), hoped to reduce tensions along Kyrgyzstan’s long southern borders with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Since the border guard service was put under UKMK control in November, the problems are Tashiev’s responsibility.

    Grumbling by residents along the border resulted in people from Batken and districts in Jalal-Abad Province demonstrating earlier this month in the capital for a resolution to the long-standing problem of demarcation.

    Villagers living along the borders claim neighboring states are encroaching on Kyrgyz territory and want it stopped.

    New Kyrgyz Prime Minister Ulukbek Maripov spoke about the disputed Torkul reservoir and canal in the Kyrgyz-Tajik border area on February 8.

    “Unfortunately, it seems we (Kyrgyzstan) have ceded the upper reaches of the Tokgul reservoir channel,” Maripov explained.

    Maripov’s comment is precisely what residents of Kyrgyzstan’s border areas do not want to hear from government officials.

    In Bishkek on February 15, Gulzhigit Isakov, the leader of a group from Batken that calls itself Chek Ara (Border), criticized new populist President Sadyr Japarov.

    “It is upsetting that while someone is taking over our border, Sadyr [Japarov] has not raised the issue once in any of his interviews,” Isakov said.

    The Kyrgyz-Tajik Border

    Isakov was referring to the situation in the area around the Kyrgyz villages of Ak-Sai and Kok-Tash that over the last decade have seen many clashes between residents from both sides of the border.

    And while once those clashes were limited to the two parties throwing sticks and stones at each other, they have increasingly involved gunfire and deaths.

    On February 11, a group of Tajik villagers planted trees in a field by the Kyrgyz village of Chek-Dobo, which is near Kok-Tash.

    The field was in an area that has not yet been demarcated.

    The next day, all the trees had been dug up and were left lying on the ground. So the Tajik villagers returned to try and replant them.

    But Kyrgyz border guards arrived and ordered them to stop, with harsh words exchanged. Then Tajik border guards arrived and the “border guards of the two countries took up positions.”

    The villagers of Ak-Sai are fed up by the failure of officials to resolve pressing border issues.

    The villagers of Ak-Sai are fed up by the failure of officials to resolve pressing border issues.

    In Bishkek, Isakov claimed “the Tajik side brought soldiers and equipment to the Ak-Sai area…because our border guards removed their post [there].”

    Officials from both countries eventually arrived and negotiations cooled tempers — for a while at least — with each side pledging not to do any work of any kind on disputed land.

    But the incident points out how sensitive the situation is and how high emotions there are, that a simple act such as planting trees nearly set off violent clashes.

    The Kyrgyz-Uzbek Border

    On February 14, workers from Uzbekistan’s electricity company started setting up electricity poles near the Kyrgyz villages of Suu-Bash and Boz-Adyr in Batken Province.

    The village is near Uzbekistan’s Soh exclave, one of the most interesting places in the Ferghana Valley. It belongs to Uzbekistan, is surrounded by Kyrgyzstan, and is inhabited overwhelmingly by ethnic Tajiks.

    Ethnic Kyrgyz residents alerted border guards to the action and, after a meeting with their Uzbek counterparts, the poles were removed.

    But more problems are almost surely coming as Uzbekistan has already started building an airport at Soh — scheduled to be completed in May — to better connect the exclave with Uzbekistan proper.

    No Kyrgyz territory is endangered by the airport, but symbolically it certainly reinforces Uzbekistan’s claim to the exclave and is a reminder to local Kyrgyz that its larger neighbor is paying attention to an area many in Kyrgyzstan believe is neglected by their government.

    On the same day Tajik villagers attempted to plant trees near Chek-Dobo, Uzbek border guards accompanied by others in plainclothes began setting up border markers near the Kyrgyz village of Kosh-Bolot, in the Ala-Buka district of Jalal-Abad Province.

    Kosh-Bolot residents say the Uzbeks were on Kyrgyz territory.

    “The Uzbek military came close to the house of one of our residents and put their pillars there, thereby marking it as their territory. Our border guards arrived at the scene but did not say anything,” one local resident said.

    The Kyrgyz website Kaktus.media reported that “sources in the government” said that the area where the Uzbek border guards were setting up markers belongs to Uzbekistan under the terms of a September 2017 agreement, “but local residents, not understanding the situation, expressed their dissatisfaction.”

    The Ala-Buka district has been the scene of high tension between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan before.

    A reservoir is located there that is claimed by both countries: by Uzbekistan because they say they paid for its construction during the Soviet era, and by Kyrgyzstan because it is located well inside Kyrgyzstan.

    Water from the reservoir has always been mainly used for fields in Uzbekistan.

    Uzbek troops crossed into the area twice in 2016 and, in August of that year, occupied a nearby mountain called Ungar-Too, holding captive several Kyrgyz employees there who were operating a telecommunications relay station.

    No Easy Solutions

    The Kyrgyz-Tajik border is some 976 kilometers long, of which about 520 kilometers has been demarcated.

    The Kyrgyz-Uzbek border is some 1,378 kilometers long, with about 1,100 kilometers of it demarcated.

    Nazirbek Borubaev is Kyrgyzstan's special representative for border issues.

    Nazirbek Borubaev is Kyrgyzstan’s special representative for border issues.

    Kyrgyz Special Representative for Border Issues Nazirbek Borubaev said at a February 15 press conference that “many of our citizens are making statements that ‘our land is being given to the neighbors,’ based on unconfirmed information.”

    But some people in Kyrgyzstan doubts this.

    Tashiev said border talks with Tajik officials would take place in the first half of March and with Uzbek officials in the second part of that month.

    Tashiev also said the budget for border security would be increased, and he repeated to residents of border villages in Batken Province a promise he has made several times over the years, long before he was UKMK chief, that “not one square centimeter” of Kyrgyz territory would be given to the country’s neighbors.

    That undoubtedly suits people in Kyrgyzstan, but it is a hard bargaining point for neighbors who are also seeking concessions.

    Borubaev said that “if necessary, we can find something in the archives in Moscow.” Generally, maps drawn after Russian colonization of Central Asia have been the basis for contemporary border demarcation work for the current Central Asian states that didn’t exist at the time.

    Meetings of officials poring over Russian-Soviet maps to determine the borders of their countries is possibly the only way to make progress in reaching final agreements on the remaining frontiers of the five Central Asian states.

    But for the people living in these areas, the issue of where the borders should be depends on where arable fields and pasturelands are located and where the water sources are.

    And as long as the border talks continue, there are tracts of land in disputed areas that could be used for orchards or grazing but are left unused.

    Meanwhile, many Kyrgyz residents seem to be poorly informed about the deals that have been made by previous governments about what is and what is not Kyrgyz territory.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Dynastic Succession, Renewed Hopes For Pipelines: What’s Going On In Turkmenistan?

    There has been a lot of news coming out of Turkmenistan lately — the president’s heir-apparent son climbed up a few more rungs on the government ladder, a Taliban delegation visited Ashgabat and promised not to hinder the construction of a natural-gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghan territory, and a long dispute with Azerbaijan over ownership of a gas and oil field in the Caspian Sea was resolved.

    On this week’s Majlis Podcast, RFE/RL media-relations manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion on what has been happening in Turkmenistan recently and if any of these events signal a change in the country’s future.

    This week’s guests are: from Glasgow, Luca Anceschi, professor of Central Asian Studies at Glasgow University and author of the book Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy: Positive Neutrality And The Consolidation Of The Turkmen Regime; from Moscow, Stanislav Pritchin, an expert on the Caucasus region and Central Asia who is currently a senior research fellow at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Center for Post-Soviet Studies IMEMO (Institute of World Economy and International Studies); from Prague, Farruh Yusupov, the director of RFE/RL’s Turkmen Service, known locally as Azatlyk; and from Prague, Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: The Japarov Era Opens In Kyrgyzstan

    In January, Sadyr Japarov completed his amazing rise from a prison cell in early October to being elected Kyrgyz president.

    In between, Japarov promised changes and a new way of governing the country, and changes have been coming fast, to be sure.

    On this week’s Majlis Podcast, RFE/RL media-relations manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion on what has been changing in Kyrgyzstan now that Japarov is president.

    This week’s guests are: from Bishkek, Saniia Toktagazieva, an expert in constitutional law; from Columbia University in New York City, where she is a PhD candidate, Colleen Wood, who lived in Kyrgyzstan and is a noted author of many articles on the country’s politics; and from Prague, Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: Lawyers In Central Asia — Defending Clients And Themselves

    January 24 was the Day of the Endangered Lawyer and an opportunity to remember the many problems some Central Asian attorneys have to face.

    In Central Asia, defendants have a right to an attorney, but state-appointed defenders have a reputation for half-hearted work or, in some cases, even supporting the prosecution in convicting their clients.

    Being an independent lawyer willing to defend people who for some reason or another are looked upon as a nuisance or threat by the governments of the region is a hazardous occupation.

    Some of these attorneys are intimidated or threatened, some are attacked, and some are imprisoned.

    On this week’s Majlis podcast, RFE/RL media-relations manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion on the plight of lawyers in Central Asia.

    This week’s guests are: Madina Akhmetova, the director of the Dignity public association based in the Kazakh capital, Nur-Sultan; Jasmine Cameron, who is originally from Kyrgyzstan but is now a senior staff attorney at the Human Rights Center of the American Bar Association; from California, Steve Swerdlow, a longtime Central Asia watcher, recently returned from Uzbekistan, and human rights lawyer who is currently an associate professor of human rights at the University of Southern California; and from Prague, Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: Lawyers In Central Asia — Defending Clients And Themselves

    January 24 was the Day of the Endangered Lawyer and an opportunity to remember the many problems some Central Asian attorneys have to face.

    In Central Asia, defendants have a right to an attorney, but state-appointed defenders have a reputation for half-hearted work or, in some cases, even supporting the prosecution in convicting their clients.

    Being an independent lawyer willing to defend people who for some reason or another are looked upon as a nuisance or threat by the governments of the region is a hazardous occupation.

    Some of these attorneys are intimidated or threatened, some are attacked, and some are imprisoned.

    On this week’s Majlis podcast, RFE/RL media-relations manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion on the plight of lawyers in Central Asia.

    This week’s guests are: Madina Akhmetova, the director of the Dignity public association based in the Kazakh capital, Nur-Sultan; Jasmine Cameron, who is originally from Kyrgyzstan but is now a senior staff attorney at the Human Rights Center of the American Bar Association; from California, Steve Swerdlow, a longtime Central Asia watcher, recently returned from Uzbekistan, and human rights lawyer who is currently an associate professor of human rights at the University of Southern California; and from Prague, Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: Biden And Central Asia — Three Former Ambassadors Weigh In

    On January 20, Joe Biden was inaugurated as the 46th president of the United States. How might the new U.S. leadership change policy toward Central Asia? What might the Central Asian states be looking for from the Biden administration? And what aspects of U.S.-Central Asian relations are likely to remain the same?

    On this week’s Majlis podcast, RFE/RL media-relations manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion on those questions and more.

    This week’s guests are: from Bishkek, the former Kyrgyz ambassador to the United States, Kadyr Toktogulov; from Washington, the former U.S ambassador to Kyrgyzstan and later Uzbekistan, Pamela Spratlen; also from Washington, the former U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan and later Georgia, William Courtney; and from Prague, Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: Biden And Central Asia — Three Former Ambassadors Weigh In

    On January 20, Joe Biden was inaugurated as the 46th president of the United States. How might the new U.S. leadership change policy toward Central Asia? What might the Central Asian states be looking for from the Biden administration? And what aspects of U.S.-Central Asian relations are likely to remain the same?

    On this week’s Majlis podcast, RFE/RL media-relations manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion on those questions and more.

    This week’s guests are: from Bishkek, the former Kyrgyz ambassador to the United States, Kadyr Toktogulov; from Washington, the former U.S ambassador to Kyrgyzstan and later Uzbekistan, Pamela Spratlen; also from Washington, the former U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan and later Georgia, William Courtney; and from Prague, Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Activist Defending Ethnic Kazakhs In China Explains Why He Had To Flee Kazakhstan

    Tens of thousands of ethnic Kazakhs in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region have been sent to “reeducation camps” along with hundreds of thousands of others from that western province after being rounded up by China because they are Muslims.

    Serikzhan Bilash is one of the people who helped bring this great injustice to light by exposing the suffering of ethnic Kazakhs at the camps in Xinjiang.

    An ethnic Kazakh from Xinjiang who moved to neighboring Kazakhstan in 2000, Bilash received Kazakh citizenship in 2011 under the “oralman” program, which was designed in 1991 to entice ethnic Kazakhs abroad to resettle in sparsely inhabited Kazakhstan.

    In 2017, Bilash founded the Atajurt Eriktileri (Volunteers of the Fatherland) organization to keep track of ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Uyghurs in Xinjiang as Beijing began implementing its latest and by far harshest campaign against perceived separatists, who were overwhelmingly Chinese Muslims.

    But China is a major investor in and trade partner of Kazakhstan.

    That brought the 46-year-old Bilash and his work into conflict with Kazakh authorities, and he was arrested and charged with inciting ethnic hatred in March 2019.

    But amid an international outcry and quite a lot of rumbling from inside Kazakhstan — where many people wondered why the government would try to silence someone defending ethnic Kazakhs against Chinese repression — Bilash was convicted in August 2019 but given a fine and released from custody in exchange for promising to cease his activism for seven years.

    But the pressure on Bilash, his family, and associates was massive and did not stop.

    So, in late summer 2020, Bilash and his family began their journey to Turkey, where they have been since September 10.

    He recently spoke with RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service, known locally as Azattyq, to explain why he chose to leave.

    “In April 2020, two charges were filed against me [in Kazakhstan] — desecration of the state flag and inciting hatred,” he said.

    Bilash attempted to register Atajurt Eriktileri in Kazakhstan, but after his court case in 2019, Kazakh authorities registered another group called Atajurt Eriktileri, which was a phony splinter group made up of members who took a soft stance against China.

    Bilash then founded a group called Naghyz (the Real) Atajurt.

    Bilash told Azattyq that the desecration of the state flag charge stems from comments he made about a court case involving Saltanat Kusmankyzy, a Kazakh woman working for a Chinese company in Kazakhstan who was convicted of embezzlement in January 2020 and sentenced to eight years in prison.

    Lawyer Ayman Umarova (left) with Serikzhan Bilash (file photo)

    Lawyer Ayman Umarova (left) with Serikzhan Bilash (file photo)

    Kusmankyzy’s lawyer Ayman Umarova, who is also one of Bilash’s lawyers, said the court refused to accept her client’s evidence, which would have cleared her of the charge.

    Bilash said his comments about Kusmankyzy’s case were taken out of context and bizarrely presented as disrespecting the Kazakh flag.

    Bilash said police conducted a linguistic analysis of the comments that showed nothing Bilash said amounted to denigrating the flag.

    ‘A Heavy Blow’

    Bilash said one of the people behind the inciting hatred charge was Erbol Dauletbek, the leader of the Atajurt Eriktileri group registered instead of Bilash’s group. Bilash said Dauletbek is trying to gain the rights to Bilash’s Atajurt Kazakh Human Rights channel on YouTube.

    RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service, known locally as Azattyq, asked Dauletbek about the claim but he denied filing any legal complaints against Bilash.

    Keeping the YouTube channel is part of the reason Bilash went to Turkey. Bilash officially registered the popular channel in 2013.

    “There were not any mass arrests in China then…and there was not even an organization called Atajurt,” Bilash said.

    He added that Kazakh police started coming to the apartment of Galym Rakizhan, the editor of the video for the Atajurt YouTube channel, and threatened the owner, who finally told Rakizhan he must leave despite having lived there for many years.

    Bilash then signed over the YouTube channel to Turkish citizen Babisalem Okitan, who is also a member of Naghyz Atajurt and now in charge of programming for the channel.

    Bilash said he has no plans to seek asylum in Turkey and intends to return to Kazakhstan. But he noted that cannot happen until he is cleared of charges there and the pressure against him, his family, and his organization ceases.

    “On August 18, 2020, a court ruled that I was involved with the activities of an unregistered illegal organization and was fined…[the equivalent of $333]. Several members of Naghyz Atajurt Eriktileri were also fined,” he said. “That was a heavy blow for us.”

    “Any time I drove, [the police] stopped me without fail,” Bilash said. “Day and night there are people and vehicles outside my house. My relatives and my wife’s relatives have all been questioned.”

    ‘Branded A Terrorist’

    Bilash said he was also put on a blacklist in Kazakhstan.

    Bilash said Kazakh authorities have branded him a terrorist and, when his mother died and he went to the notary to sign over her property to his father, he was told it was not possible.

    “It turns out that on their network I was shown to be a terrorist, I have a screenshot of it… from the computer at the notary public,” Bilash explained.

    He added that his bank accounts in Kazakhstan have been frozen and his car was impounded.

    Bilash also recounted seven meetings he had in 2019 while he was under house arrest in Nur-Sultan and Almaty with a person named Maksat Iskakov, a representative that Bilash said was sent by President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev.

    According to Bilash, at one of those meetings, Iskakov told him, “In September [2019], Mr. Toqaev is going to China and your sentence [and conviction] will be a present to the Chinese president.”

    Iskakov advised him to cooperate with Kazakh officials and agree to the deal whereby he would be fined and cease his activism for seven years.

    “My goals were not to challenge Kazakh authorities, I wanted to defend the rights of Kazakhs and other Turkic-speaking peoples who were abused in China,” Bilash said in explaining why he agreed to the deal.

    Bilash also assured: “I am not a dangerous person to the authorities of Kazakhstan, I am not an opposition figure, not an opponent.”

    Bilash said he hoped Turkish authorities will register Naghyz Atajurt. If that happens, Bilash said the group will then seek recognition as a human rights defender from international organizations.

    In the meantime, Bilash has been trying to help five other Kazakhs who recently illegally crossed from Xinjiang into Kazakhstan to obtain Turkish citizenship.

    Azattyq sent a copy of Bilash’s interview to the Kazakh Foreign Ministry and the presidential administration seeking comment but there had been no response as of the time this report was issued.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: Kazakhstan Has A New Parliament, Kyrgyzstan Has A New President. So What Comes Next?

    On January 10, voters in Kazakhstan went to the polls and elected a new parliament that looks very much like the old parliament.

    The same day, voters in Kyrgyzstan went to the polls and elected a new president and voted to change the system of government to a presidential form of rule.

    On this week’s Majlis podcast, RFE/RL’s Media-Relations Manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion looking at what happened — and what might come next for both countries.

    This week’s guests are: speaking from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Gulnara Iskakova, a former Kyrgyz ambassador to the U.K. and Switzerland; from Washington, Paul Stronski, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace and author of numerous reports about Central Asia; and Bruce Pannier, the author of RFE/RL’s Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: Kazakhstan Has A New Parliament, Kyrgyzstan Has A New President. So What Comes Next?

    On January 10, voters in Kazakhstan went to the polls and elected a new parliament that looks very much like the old parliament.

    The same day, voters in Kyrgyzstan went to the polls and elected a new president and voted to change the system of government to a presidential form of rule.

    On this week’s Majlis podcast, RFE/RL’s Media-Relations Manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion looking at what happened — and what might come next for both countries.

    This week’s guests are: speaking from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Gulnara Iskakova, a former Kyrgyz ambassador to the U.K. and Switzerland; from Washington, Paul Stronski, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace and author of numerous reports about Central Asia; and Bruce Pannier, the author of RFE/RL’s Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Elections In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Fail To Satisfy

    There were expectations that the January 10 elections in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan would fail to truly reflect the will of the people in those two Central Asian neighbors.

    Now that preliminary results are in, they look even worse than feared.

    Kazakhstan

    Kazakhstan’s vote was its first parliamentary elections since Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev became president nearly two years ago.

    Campaigning was barely noticeable, but election officials still claimed that more than 63 percent of voters cast ballots.

    Despite Toqaev’s promises of allowing genuine opposition parties to participate in politics, no such parties were registered and allowed on the ballot, though several tried.

    That left five pro-government parties to compete.

    Toqaev also said he would ease restrictions on peaceful demonstrations, but there was no evidence of that in the days leading up to elections or the day of voting.

    Reports from Kazakhstan on election day included members of Oyan Qazaqstan (Wake Up Kazakhstan) and the unregistered Democratic Party of Kazakhstan being surrounded by police in Almaty and forced to remain there in freezing temperatures for more than eight hours.

    Police prevented any of those who were ring-fenced from leaving, forcing some with no choice but to urinate on the ground, and prevented outsiders from bringing tea or food to the demonstrators.

    Two people were taken by ambulance to the hospital, one with frostbite.

    Dozens of activists were detained, arrested, or fined ahead of or on election day.

    Reports said more than 100 people were detained in Almaty alone. Some people planned to protest, but others said they were detained as they left their homes on the way to cast their ballots, thus depriving them of their right to vote.

    The number of independent election observers has been growing in Kazakhstan since the 2019 presidential election. But on January 10, many were prevented from doing their jobs.

    Some were ejected from polling places.

    Some said they were turned away because they didn’t have documents certifying they had been tested and were negative for the coronavirus.

    Activist Roza Musaeva posted on Twitter that she was a “legal observer” but that police detained her and that the head of the local election commission told her that her accreditation had been revoked.

    The outcome of the elections was never in doubt.

    But when the preliminary tally was announced, it also appeared to vindicate the skepticism of those who warned that there would be no difference between these elections and previous Kazakh parliamentary elections.

    The results suggested that the only three parties to win seats in the 2012 and 2016 elections were once again the only parties to be awarded seats.

    In 2012, the state allocated some 5.2 billion tenges (about $34.5 million at the time based on the 2012 average exchange rate of 150 tenges to $1) from the budget for the elections to parliament and local councils, or maslikhats. The result was that the Nur-Otan party, headed by longtime Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev, won 83 of the 98 available seats, the Aq Zhol party won eight seats, and the People’s Communist Party of Kazakhstan won seven.

    Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev votes in Nur-Sultan on January 10.

    Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev votes in Nur-Sultan on January 10.

    In 2016, Kazakhstan held early parliamentary elections after authorities said the deteriorating economic situation caused by the fall in the price of oil — Kazakhstan’s major export — demanded a new parliament with fresh approaches to deal with the situation.

    The state allocated 4.8 billion tenges (about $14 million at the March 2016 exchange rate of 340 tenges to $1) for those elections.

    The result was that the Nur-Otan party won 84 seats, while Aq Zhol and the People’s Communist Party of Kazakhstan were each awarded seven seats.

    Kazakhstan’s Central Election Commission said in October 2020 that some 15.3 billion tenges (about $34 million at the January 2021 rate of 420 tenges to $1) would be spent on the January 10 elections to parliament and local councils.

    The result was the Nur-Otan party reportedly winning 76 seats, Aq Zhol 12, and the People’s Party of Kazakhstan (they dropped “communist” from their name in November) 10 seats.

    Even if these results were genuine mandates from the masses, the three parties that won seats are neither gaining nor losing much support over the past decade. The government has spent tens of millions of dollars (or tens of billions of tenges) in that time for elections that produced essentially the same results.

    And this continues to happen as the younger generation in particular in Kazakhstan has been calling for change since Nazarbaev stepped down as president in March 2019.

    Kyrgyzstan

    In Kyrgyzstan, fewer than 40 percent of eligible voters participated in the snap presidential election and national referendum on January 10.

    According to RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, known locally as Azattyk, Kyrgyzstan has 3.56 million eligible voters, some 1.354 million of whom cast ballots.

    Among 17 candidates, Sadyr Japarov, a man who was in prison barely three months ago, won the election with almost 80 percent of the vote, the second-highest total in a presidential election in Kyrgyzstan’s history after Kurmanbek Bakiev’s 89.5 percent in the 2005 poll.

    According to Kyrgyzstan’s Central Election Commission (CEC), Japarov received 1.1 million votes.

    In the accompanying referendum on whether Kyrgyzstan should have a presidential or parliamentary form of government, almost 81 percent, or some 1.147 million people, voted for a presidential system.

    Both figures look like overwhelming victories for both Japarov and change.

    But looked at another way, it is difficult to see them as the will of the people.

    In part, that is because more than half of eligible voters did not participate.

    Some good reasons have been offered for this.

    Japarov and others in his interim government claim there was less vote-buying and less use of administrative resources. Certainly the former, if true, would be one reason that fewer people turned out on January 10.

    A supporter of Kyrgyz President-elect Sadyr Japarov attends a rally on Ala-Too Square in Bishkek on January 11.

    A supporter of Kyrgyz President-elect Sadyr Japarov attends a rally on Ala-Too Square in Bishkek on January 11.

    Vote-buying plagued the October 4 parliamentary elections and played a large role in fomenting the popular backlash in Bishkek on October 5 that eventually brought down the government.

    Authorities scrapped the use of Form No. 2, a document that allowed people living away from their registered area of residence to vote anywhere in Kyrgyzstan so long as they registered there ahead of election day.

    And perhaps some of the 2 million-plus voters who did not cast ballots were simply disillusioned. Kyrgyzstan held a referendum on constitutional changes in 2016, a presidential election in 2017, and then there were last year’s parliamentary elections.

    It is worth remembering that the population of Kyrgyzstan is around 6.5 million.

    So Japarov is said to have received the backing of 1.12 million people, while the referendum got support from 1.15 million. Each figure represents around 17 percent of the country’s population, which arguably does not qualify as overwhelming popular support.

    Japarov’s amazing rise from prisoner to president is thought by some to be the result of backing from organized criminal groups.

    Such suspicions will likely limit foreign investment in Kyrgyzstan in the coming months, and possibly years, potentially prolonging the deep economic problems that Kyrgyzstan faces.

    Democratic governments have given the lion’s share of Central Asian aid to Kyrgyzstan because it was seen as an “island of democracy” that could set an example for its neighbors of the goodwill that accompanies democratic progress.

    Voting for a presidential system of government could limit such aid in the future.

    Russia has been cautious about the change of power in Kyrgyzstan after October and has withheld promised aid, though President Vladimir Putin did send Japarov a letter of congratulations on January 11.

    Kyrgyz authorities — before and since October 4 — have made repeated requests to China for more time in repaying loans. In so doing, they likely put Kyrgyzstan on Beijing’s list of high-risk countries for future investment.

    And the coronavirus continues to affect Kyrgyzstan’s economy, with little indication so far of when vaccines will be available and the health crisis brought under control.

    Speaking to supporters on Ala-Too Square in Bishkek on January 11, Japarov said time is needed to put the country on the right track.

    But some think Japarov will need to hurry. He has promised a lot, and much of the reason people voted for Japarov was because they wanted change for the better — and soon.

    And in a country that has seen three presidents chased from power by protests since 2005, there already seems to be ample room to bring Japarov’s election and the referendum into question.

    Aigerim Toleukhanova of RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service contributed to this report.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: How Central Asia Dealt With COVID In 2020 And What’s Coming In 2021

    The year 2020 will always be remembered as the year the coronavirus appeared and spread across the globe.

    The virus exposed weaknesses in every country, particularly in health-care systems, but it also affected trade and tested alliances.

    The responses from the five Central Asian countries differed.

    This was most evident in their official reporting on registered cases and deaths, where countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, even though their figures were often questionable, released statistics that showed the countries were facing a serious health crisis, while countries like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan carefully manipulated figures to ensure an outward appearance of controlling the situation. And then there was Turkmenistan, which chose complete denial and continues its farcical claims that the country has somehow been immune to the coronavirus.

    How did the five countries fare in 2020 and, with various vaccines being developed and gradually being made available internationally, how does 2021 look for Central Asia?

    On this week’s Majlis Podcast, RFE/RL’s media-relations manager for South and Central Asia, Muhammad Tahir, moderates a discussion that looks at these questions.

    This week’s guests are: from Kazakhstan, Gaukhar Mergenova, a public-health specialist; from Kyrgyzstan, Ermek Ismailov, a surgeon at the Clinical Hospital Office of the President and Government of the Kyrgyz Republic; and originally from Uzbekistan but currently a senior journalist for RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, known locally as Ozodlik, and based in Prague, Barno Anvar; and Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Questions Arise With Ex-Fugitive Japarov, The Favorite In Kyrgyz Presidential Race

    Kyrgyzstan is holding a crucial presidential election and national referendum on January 10 to determine if the country should revert to a presidential system.

    But because the processes that led to this election day were rushed, questions linger about the legality and legitimacy of decisions that have been made by Kyrgyz officials. It is therefore difficult to escape the feeling that this election will not deliver stability and could even sow the seeds for future problems.

    The elections are a consequence of the mass unrest that broke out after the country held parliamentary elections on October 4.

    Concerns before the election of vote-buying were confirmed when the results showed the two parties suspected of dishonest campaign tactics, Mekenim Kyrgyzstan and Birimdik, received an overwhelming percentage of the votes.

    Unrest then broke out in the capital, Bishkek, on October 5 and a day later the government had been chased from power with the president, Sooronbai Jeenbekov, seemingly in hiding. He would soon resign.

    The tumult marked the third time since 2005 that a president and his government had been ousted by protests and most assumed — as happened in 2005 and 2010 — that opposition leaders would cobble together an interim government.

    But while many opposition figures and groups were anxious to claim a role in the victory of having the faulty elections annulled, they were slow to cooperate in forming an alliance to take up the reins of power.

    A huge power vacuum appeared and a group that did not take part in the October 5 protests came to the fore.

    That group then also pushed for this presidential election.

    From Prison To President?

    There are 17 candidates competing to be president in Kyrgyzstan, the lone Central Asian country where free and democratic elections are held.

    The favorite to win the vote is Sadyr Japarov, who woke up in a prison cell on October 5 where he was about one-third of the way through a 10-year prison sentence he was serving for hostage-taking during a protest against a mining operation in northeast Kyrgyzstan in October 2013.

    Quickly freed from prison overnight on October 5-6 during unrest in Bishkek, within two weeks he would become acting prime minister and acting president of the country. It is still unclear which powerful figures have backed Japarov’s meteoric rise to power, though there are suspicions organized criminal groups have played a role.

    Along with Japarov there are some other relatively well-known people running for the presidency.

    Adakhan Madumarov (file photo)

    Adakhan Madumarov (file photo)

    Adakhan Madumarov is the leader of Butun Kyrgyzstan, the only opposition party that won seats in the October 4 parliamentary elections, garnering 13 of the 120 available.

    Madumarov was a candidate in the 2011 presidential election when he placed second, and in 2017 when he was third.

    Kanatbek Isaev (file photo)

    Kanatbek Isaev (file photo)

    Kanatbek Isaev is the leader of the Kyrgyzstan party, which also won seats in the October 4 elections (16) but was seen as a pro-government party. Isaev was a parliament deputy and served as parliament speaker from October 13 to November 4.

    He should have become acting president when Jeenbekov resigned on October 15 but declined, paving the way for Japarov to take the post. Isaev later said he did not want to be acting president because it constitutionally prohibited him from running for president.

    Klara Sooronkulova (file photo)

    Klara Sooronkulova (file photo)

    Klara Sooronkulova is the leader of the Reforma party, which was created just before October’s parliamentary poll. She is a former Supreme Court judge and since October has led many of the court challenges against the decision to delay new parliamentary elections, allowing Japarov to run for president despite having served as acting president, and the decision to hold a referendum on the constitution.

    Kanybek Imanaliev (file photo)

    Kanybek Imanaliev (file photo)

    Kanybek Imanaliev is a deputy from the Ata-Meken party, an opposition party from the parliamentary elections. He was one of only four deputies to oppose holding the constitutional referendum.

    Abdil Segizbaev (file photo)

    Abdil Segizbaev (file photo)

    Abdil Segizbaev is a former chief of the State Committee for National Security (UKMK) and, as a presidential candidate, has been one of the most vocal critics of Japarov. He has challenged Japarov about his role as a top official in the anti-corruption agency under President Kurmanbek Bakiev (2005-2010), when billions of dollars were taken out of Kyrgyzstan and several successful private firms were taken over by Bakiev’s friends and relatives.

    Nearly all the other candidates have made negative comments about Japarov in a series of debates held on state television in late December.

    Japarov is the only candidate still running who did not participate in the debates, claiming he was too busy meeting with voters.

    The 52-year-old Japarov has received far more donations for his campaign than his opponents.

    According to the Kyrgyz news website Kaktus.media, as of early December Japarov had raised 1.23 million soms (about $15,000), trailing two other candidates: Babarjan Tolbaev (5.2 million soms/$63,000) and Aymen Kasenov (1.454 million soms/$17,000).

    Also Read: Plunder And Patronage In The Heart Of Central Asia

    But by December 25, Kaktus reported that Japarov’s campaign fund had raised 47.4 million soms ($570,000). The candidate with the next most campaign money is Babyrjan Tolbaev, with 9.35 million soms ($112,000). The other candidates have all raised less than 5 million soms ($60,000).

    Japarov has said several times that the money had been donated by the “people of Kyrgyzstan,” but one report said at least 30.9 million soms of his total came from just 10 people and two companies.

    The ‘Khanstitution’

    Holding a constitutional referendum was an idea raised in late October, but it quickly went from just making some reforms to the document to making major changes that amounted to rewriting it.

    By early November, Japarov and members of his Mekenchil party said the current constitution establishing the parliamentary system of government and a division of power between the president and prime minister has not worked. They argued that it is necessary for one person to hold all of the main powers.

    A new constitution was drafted that immediately sparked resistance from several quarters in Kyrgyzstan.

    The draft would make the president the head of state and head of government while including an official role for a kuriltai, or council, that would be a consultative body able to recommend, among other things, the dismissal of officials.

    It was dubbed the “khanstitution” by opponents who said it would legitimize authoritarian rule.

    On November 22, the first of a series of peaceful marches against the constitution started in Bishkek. They have continued every Sunday since then.

    Acting President Talant Mamytov signed a decree on November 20 to establish a constitutional chamber of 89 members to redraft the “khanstitution” and the group quickly fell into disagreement over many points, for example whether the word “secular” should be stricken from the constitution or the name of parliament, Jogorku Kenesh, should be changed.

    In the end, the motion for a referendum on a constitution was adopted by parliament on December 10 — one month before the referendum would be held — after quickly approving it on the second and third readings.

    What voters in Kyrgyzstan are being asked to approve on January 10 is simply whether they want a parliamentary of presidential form of government.

    A second referendum will need to be conducted, tentatively in March, to vote on a new draft constitution.

    Questions Of Legitimacy

    From just after the October parliamentary elections until January there have been a multitude of questions and problems about the decision-making processes of Kyrgyz officials.

    First off, the parliamentary mandates for the deputies expired on October 28, and though deputies voted to extend them until new parliamentary elections are held, they legally should have not been allowed to vote on any matters involving a major policy change, such as the holding of a referendum to change the constitution.

    Therefore every decision parliament approved after October 28 is considered by some legal experts in Kyrgyzstan and many others to have no validity.

    Also, Japarov was named acting president on October 16 and officially took up the duties of that office on October 21, but as former parliament speaker Isaev noted, it is banned by the constitution for an acting president to run for president.

    On October 26, Japarov announced he would step down as prime minister and acting president so he could run for president.

    But two days later, Japarov and other government members took their oaths of office.

    Kyrgyz acting President Talant Mamytov (file photo)

    Kyrgyz acting President Talant Mamytov (file photo)

    On November 14, Japarov finally left his state posts and Talant Mamytov, the parliament speaker since November 4, was named acting president.

    Japarov has also said several times that he would not appoint his friends to government positions, but Mamytov and the current head of the UKMK, Kamchybek Tashiev, were co-defendants with Japarov when they were on trial in 2013 for trying to overthrow the government.

    They were convicted in March 2013 and sentenced to 18 months in prison.

    One of the judges that eventually acquitted the three in an appeals court in June 2013 was Kurmankul Zulushev, who was appointed prosecutor-general on October 21, just days after Japarov became acting president.

    Zulushev was dismissed for the decision to acquit the three deputies and two months later the Supreme Court overturned those acquittals but ruled the three did not have to return to prison.

    There are also questions about the Supreme Court’s abrupt decision to acquit Japarov of the hostage-taking charges and to overturn the guilty verdict against Japarov, Mamytov, and Tashiev for trying to overthrow the government.

    And it is still not clear when there will be new parliamentary elections, even though the annulled October 4 elections led to so much that has happened since then and despite the fact that preparations to hold them began in late October.

    Japarov has variously cited “spring” or “before the end of the first half of 2021” as the time when they would be held.

    In the end, the populist Japarov is the big favorite to win the presidential election and the proposal for a presidential form of government also seems likely to be approved by voters, largely because of Japarov’s support and promotion of it.

    But there are so many aspects of Japarov’s rise to power, and the changes he has been making since then, which are open to legal challenges, leaves many thinking that once his momentum slows and his popularity dissipates — as seems almost certain to happen given the economic and other crises Kyrgyzstan faces — the country is likely to fall back into a political crisis of some kind.

    Gulaiym Ashakeeva of RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, known locally as Azattyk, contributed to this report.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: Opposition Squeezed Out Of Kazakhstan’s Parliamentary Elections

    On January 10, Kazakhstan will hold its first parliamentary elections since the country’s longtime president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, stepped down in March 2019.

    Nazarbaev remains the head of the Nur-Otan party, which is expected to do well in these elections to the Mazhilis, the lower house of parliament, as it always has since its founding in 1999.

    Conspicuously absent from these elections are any political parties that could remotely be called a genuine opposition, despite a pledge from the new president, Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev, about the need for opposition parties to participate in politics.

    Political activists are reporting increased harassment in the weeks leading up to elections.

    And a new report from RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service, known locally as Azattyq, casts new light on the vast wealth former President Nazarbaev and members of his family have acquired outside Kazakhstan.

    On this week’s Majlis Podcast, RFE/RL’s media-relations manager for South and Central Asia, Muhammad Tahir, moderates a discussion on Kazakhstan’s approaching parliamentary elections and what has changed and what looks the same under a different president.

    This week’s guests are: from Kazakhstan, Darkhan Umirbekov, Azattyq’s digital editor, who also participated in preparing the report on the Nazarbaev family wealth; Sofya du Boulay, who is researching the study of legitimation, authoritarian durability, and politics in Central Asia and the South Caucasus at Oxford Brookes University; Luca Anceschi, professor of Central Asian studies at Glasgow University and author of the recently published book Analysing Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: Regime Neo-Eurasianism In The Nazarbaev era; and Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Analysis: Jailed Ex-Diplomat’s Uzbek Family Turns To UN Over His Treason Conviction

    Last week, Kadyr Yusupov marked his third straight birthday in jail.

    A 69-year-old career diplomat for Uzbekistan, Yusupov was detained shortly after a reported suicide attempt in December 2018, interrogated by security officials while hospitalized, and convicted of treason and sentenced to 5 1/2 years in prison in January on the basis of a confession he purportedly made from his hospital bed.

    Yusupov is said to suffer from schizophrenia, and there were questions from the start over his fitness for questioning and whether anything he said while recovering should be used as evidence.

    The case has been shrouded in secrecy.

    A lawyer hired by Yusupov’s family was forced to sign a nondisclosure agreement and was rarely allowed to meet with him.

    Yusupov’s family has been unable to see him since he was taken into custody shortly after jumping in front of a subway train in Tashkent two years ago.

    So Yusupov’s family sought help outside Uzbekistan.

    Geoffrey Robertson, a founding head of the U.K.-based Doughty Street Chambers, a private legal defense firm that focuses on human rights and civil liberties, has been brought in as legal counsel for the Yusupov family. He has said he is preparing applications on Yusupov’s behalf to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions.

    At a December 10 press conference, Robertson alleged a long list of procedural violations under Uzbek and international law in Yusupov’s case.

    Yusupov is one of several people who worked many years for the Uzbek government before reports suddenly emerged saying they had been accused of spying and charged with treason.

    A recent Majlis podcast explored Yusupov’s case along with those of former Defense Ministry reporter Vladimir Kaloshin and a former director of the presidential Institute for Strategic and Interregional Research, Rafik Saifulin.

    Spying cases by nature involve matters of state security that many governments try to keep away from the public record.

    But in Yusupov’s and other cases, public information has mostly been limited to the facts that they were arrested, confessed, and were tried and convicted.

    Even details like on whose behalf they might have been spying has been unavailable.

    Yusupov’s family and rights groups have repeatedly called for him to be freed on compassionate grounds, since the coronavirus is reportedly spreading within Uzbekistan’s prison system.

    Robertson said at his press conference that he and Yusupov’s family had been hoping the former diplomat would be released under a recent amnesty to mark Uzbek Constitution Day on December 8, but he was not among those released.

    The family has released a video on Yusupov’s case, in the hope of getting broader support for his release.

    Family, friends, and rights defenders now hope the United Nations might pressure the Uzbek government to act, since Uzbek courts and prosecutors seemingly appear to have no intention of freeing Yusupov.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Live Blog: Putin’s Annual Press Conference 2020

    Russian President Vladimir Putin will take questions from reporters today in his highly choreographed end-of-the-year news conference that comes amid suspicions Russia was behind a massive cyberattack on the U.S. and a report presenting evidence that the FSB poisoned Kremlin critic Aleksei Navalny.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: How Far Has Tashkent Gone In Greater Respect For Religious Rights?

    Under President Shavkat Mirziyoev, who was elected on December 4, 2016, Uzbekistan has made some progress addressing the long list of rights violations that came to characterize the Uzbek government under Mirziyoev’s predecessor, Islam Karimov. But how much?

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: Fighting To Stop Violence Against Women

    November 25 was the International Day For The Elimination Of Violence Against Women and it started 16 days of activism that concludes on December 10.

    Violence against women is a problem in Central Asia, and while the issue is receiving somewhat more attention, progress in combating abuse has been slow — and efforts by authorities have often been no more than superficial.

    On this week’s Majlis podcast, RFE/RL’s Media-Relations Manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion about what changes have and are taking place in Central Asia to address the scourge of gender violence, and some of the challenges that still lie ahead.

    This week’s guests are: from Kazakhstan, Khalida Azhigulova, the director of the Research Center for Human Rights, Inclusion, and Civil Society and an associate professor at the Eurasian Technology University; from Uzbekistan, Irina Matvienko, a feminist activist and founder of Nemolchi.uz, which loosely translates as “don’t remain silent” and is an organization dedicated to the prevention of violence against women and helping victims; and Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: Fighting To Stop Violence Against Women

    November 25 was the International Day For The Elimination Of Violence Against Women and it started 16 days of activism that concludes on December 10.

    Violence against women is a problem in Central Asia, and while the issue is receiving somewhat more attention, progress in combating abuse has been slow — and efforts by authorities have often been no more than superficial.

    On this week’s Majlis podcast, RFE/RL’s Media-Relations Manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion about what changes have and are taking place in Central Asia to address the scourge of gender violence, and some of the challenges that still lie ahead.

    This week’s guests are: from Kazakhstan, Khalida Azhigulova, the director of the Research Center for Human Rights, Inclusion, and Civil Society and an associate professor at the Eurasian Technology University; from Uzbekistan, Irina Matvienko, a feminist activist and founder of Nemolchi.uz, which loosely translates as “don’t remain silent” and is an organization dedicated to the prevention of violence against women and helping victims; and Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Is Uzbekistan Returning To The ‘Bad Old Days’ Of Reporting Only Good News?

    There is a very public battle under way in Uzbekistan between several media outlets and the agency tasked with overseeing the press in the country.

    The outlets say they have the right — and a duty — to report on current and pervasive energy shortages and the true scale of the spread and human cost of the coronavirus pandemic in Uzbekistan.

    But the Agency for Information and Mass Communications (AIMC) objects to the sources and “negativity” of some reports and what it calls “one-sided” information.

    AIMC Director Asadjon Khodjaev has warned the offending outlets and said there could be “serious legal consequences” if they do not rein in their reporting.

    Ever since Shavkat Mirziyoev became president in late 2016, Uzbek authorities have promised to ease restrictions put in place by his predecessor, longtime authoritarian leader Islam Karimov, that earned the government a reputation as a chronic abuser of rights.

    There have been some positive changes, though the media has been kept on a short leash the past four years.

    Uzbek President Shavkhat Mirziyoev (file photo)

    Uzbek President Shavkhat Mirziyoev (file photo)

    The AIMC and Uzbekistan’s Supreme Court have warned media outlets about “objectivity” in their reporting, and the AIMC has made it clear that the authorities will hold not only media outlets — but also bloggers and people posting material on social networks — responsible for their comments and content.

    Uzbek media outlets reported on an Energy Ministry announcement at the start of November that there would be limits on the use of gas and electricity in homes and businesses.

    Some small- and medium-sized businesses in Tashkent said they were cut-off entirely from gas supplies while others faced rationing.

    Many people around Uzbekistan looked for substitutes for heating and cooking – including using gas canisters, coal, wood, and pressed manure (kizyak).

    ‘Serious Legal Consequences’

    Gazeta.uz, one of the media outlets that recently got a warning from the AIMC, reported on November 10 that Deputy Energy Minister Behzot Normatov gave assurances there was no need to resort to burning wood, coal, or “kizyak” since there were ample supplies of gas canisters that could be used to cook.

    But one week later, RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, known locally as Ozodlik, reported that people were waiting in line to buy coal in some parts of Uzbekistan and unscrupulous merchants were jacking up the prices.

    Uzbeks line up for coal in the Andijon region. (file photo)

    Uzbeks line up for coal in the Andijon region. (file photo)

    Media outlets such as Daryo started reporting on the deaths of thousands of chickens at poultry farms after their electricity had been turned off.

    Many other businesses were left without gas or electricity and now face financial ruin while an ever-increasing number of people are huddled together in their dark, cold homes.

    Kun.uz was one of the outlets reporting on the energy shortages, including a November 22 story, Give The People Electricity And Gas! An old and painful topic on social media, it reported what problems people were posting about due to the electricity and gas shortages.

    The next day, Kun.uz received a letter from AIMC Director Khodjaev that claimed the “[Kun.uz] material highlights the problems in the supply of electricity and natural gas to the population in a one-sided way.”

    The letter warned Kun.uz that if it “does not take the necessary measures to prevent the recurrence of such a situation in the future, it will have serious legal consequences.”

    The management at Kun.uz was sufficiently incensed at the letter that they wrote and published a response, including an English version, to AIMC and Khodjaev.

    Lack Of Transparency?

    The other story of major significance for Uzbekistan in November was the continued debilitating effects of the coronavirus and some doubts that officials are providing accurate information about the number of people infected and those who have died from COVID-19.

    A lack of transparency on the part of the state regarding those numbers has long been suspected.

    As of December 1, the number of registered coronavirus cases in Uzbekistan was 73,145 with about 610 deaths in a country of more than 34 million.

    Many have cast doubt on Uzbekistan's official coronavirus infection rates, which are considerably lower than those recorded in some neighboring countries. (file photo)

    Many have cast doubt on Uzbekistan’s official coronavirus infection rates, which are considerably lower than those recorded in some neighboring countries. (file photo)

    In neighboring Kazakhstan, with a population of about 18.7 million, the number of registered cases as of December 1 was 132,348 with 1,990 deaths. And in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, with a population of some 6.5 million, the number of registered cases was about 73,200 with 1,275 deaths.

    Gazeta.uz, for one, reported on the discrepancies in the figures between state agencies and in one of the reports.

    It noted in a November 17 statement from the prime minister’s press service that 17,500 beds had been made available for COVID-19 patients around the country and currently some 6,570 infected people were being treated.

    Gazeta.uz noted in its report that on the same day, the Health Ministry had reported that 2,123 patients were being treated for COVID-19. The news site had inquired with the Health Ministry about the lower figure but had not yet received a response.

    Khodjaev sent a letter on November 20 warning Gazeta.uz of “serious legal consequences” for, according to Gazeta.uz, publishing news that “compared statistics of patients at COVID-19 hospitals with data from the Health Ministry.

    Gazeta.uz’s management wrote on November 25 that it considered “the warning letter an overreaction [and] an attempt to force the publication to stop asking the government ‘unpleasant’ questions.”

    On November 27, Gazeta.uz said the AIMC had warned Gazeta.uz, Daryo.uz, Kun.uz, Podrobno.uz, and Repost.uz about publishing “commentary and insults” and for “expressing doubts about coronavirus statistics and a failure to provide an official clarification.”

    Concerning Khodjaev’s complaint about reports on electricity and gas shortages, Kun.uz wrote that Khodjaev’s letter claimed “the government of Uzbekistan was accused of committing crimes against the population in the material.”

    But Kun.uz countered: “the material was about how people reacted to problems in the power supply system [and] was not focusing on criticizing the government.”

    Kun.uz continued that “it is a fact that electricity is cut off for hours all over the country. This can be seen from the complaints on social networks and the thousands of appeals addressed to our editorial office.”

    In its November 25 post, Gazeta.uz responded to the AIMC complaints by saying: “There are many cases when state bodies provide the public with incomplete information on issues of interest to citizens or do not issue it at all.” It continued: “Often the AIMC in such situations remains on the sidelines and the public, not receiving important information, loses.”

    Western diplomats in Uzbekistan have certainly taken note of the dispute between the media outlets and the AIMC.

    On November 26, British Ambassador to Uzbekistan Tim Torlot posted on Twitter: “I am surprised and sad to see how AIMC’s approach [in] support of [the] development of [the] mass media seems to have changed recently. A democratic society cannot be built without a robust, free media.”

    ‘Smells Like Old Uzbekistan’

    On November 28, U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan Daniel Rosenblum tweeted that he was “Disappointed by recent actions taken by the Agency for Information and Mass Communications to pressure [independent] media outlets. To succeed, Uzbekistan’s ambitious reforms require a free & open press. AIMC pressure [is] not consistent with this.”

    As mentioned, the AIMC and Uzbekistan’s Supreme Court have previously warned media outlets about their reporting and the prime minister and mayor of Tashkent have also had some very harsh words and even threats for journalists.

    But there are mixed signals coming from Uzbek officials.

    On November 30, 2019, the chairwoman of the Uzbek Senate, Tanzila Narbaeva, addressed parliament, saying, “The head of our state rightly stressed that the media play a special role in the implementation of reforms” and that “we [officials] need to accept media criticism the right way.”

    On February 3, Saida Mirziyoeva, the president’s daughter, presented a new social fund for the development of the country’s mass media by saying, “We believe in freedom of speech and its power.”

    The media outlets mentioned have all reported on certain successes the government has claimed in the fight against the spread of the coronavirus. They have also covered efforts to improve the gas-distribution system, the discovery of new gas fields, increases in production, and other positive stories associated with efforts to improve Uzbekistan’s horribly inadequate power grid.

    But it is difficult to put a positive spin on severe power shortages in winter and people becoming ill from a virus that worldwide has affected nearly 64 million people and killed about 1.5 million.

    Uzbek officials, including President Mirziyoev, have emphasized that the media is essential for reporting the problems and opinions of Uzbeks so that the authorities are aware of the problems.

    Yet when reporting bad news, several media outlets have been threatened with “legal consequences” if they continue to do so.

    Kun.uz wrote, “It would not be wrong to say that this behavior [toward the media] smells like ‘Old Uzbekistan.’”

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.