Category: indonesia

  • Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    Indonesia is trying again to “divide and rule my people” by further carving Papua into three new provinces, warns interim president Benny Wenda of the United Liberation Movement of West Papua (ULMWP).

    And he says that Jakarta is bringing in another 450 troops in to “violently enforce” its policies.

    “Indonesian troops torture and stab our bodies, international corporations slice down our forests and mountains, and now the Indonesian government is trying to divide our unity,” Wenda said in a statement.

    “We are not three separate regions – we are West Papuans, one people with one soul and one mission: freedom.

    “The people of West Papua have rejected these proposals, part of the renewal of the 2001 ‘Special Autonomy’ legislation.

    “Over 600,000 of us have signed a petition rejecting ‘Special Autonomy’. Even the head of the Papuan People’s Assembly, an institution set up by Jakarta, has rejected the sham programme.

    Wenda said ‘Special Autonomy’ was “a dead end”.

    ‘Indonesia has failed the world’
    “It is Jakarta’s wish. A referendum and full independence is our wish. Indonesia has failed the world, and failed the people of West Papua,” he said.

    To enforce this renewal of Special Autonomy, even more Indonesian troops were flooding into West Papua – 450 in the last month alone.

    At least 6000 new troops were sent in 2019 and more than 1000 more in 2020.

    “Indonesia is turning our land into a war zone, a martial law colony with military check points on every street corner,” Wenda said.

    “Civilian rule in Indonesia is a myth: the military still holds power. Retired generals experienced in genocide in East Timor continue to call the shots.

    “Indonesia has done this to us many times before. In 1963, they invaded our land. They held the fraudulent Act of No Choice in 1969, against the desires of all West Papuans.

    “At every turn, they have treated us like a colonised people, less than human. We are called monkeys, spat at, forced off our land.”

    Papuans rejected Indonesian law
    From 1 December 2020, Papuans had rejected all Indonesian law and formed the ULMWP Provisional Government.

    “We are no longer bowing down to Jakarta’s rule. I call on all my people to unite and refuse all Indonesian law. We are establishing our own sovereign government,” said Wenda.

    “As the legitimate representative of the people of West Papua, the provisional government is peacefully demanding the following:

    1.The withdrawal of all Indonesian troops from West Papua;
    2. An end to all forms of racism and discrimination against Melanesian West Papuans;
    3. Immediate access to West Papua for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in accordance with the call of 83 international states;
    4. Cancellation of ‘Special Autonomy’ and an immediate referendum on independence; and
    5. For all international states and multinational corporations to cease any and all funding for Jakarta’s ‘Special Autonomy’.”

    Wenda saidf the international community must help to force Indonesia to negotiate by withdrawing all support for the “failed ‘Special Autonomy’ project”.

    “The world may be banned from seeing what is happening in West Papua. But we can see it,” Wenda said.

    And we are going to peacefully continue our long struggle for freedom until the world finally hears our cry.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Exiled Papuan leader Benny Wenda … “we are going to peacefully continue our long struggle for freedom until the world finally hears our cry”. Image: Office of Benny Wenda

    Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

    Indonesia is trying again to “divide and rule my people” by further carving Papua into three new provinces, warns interim president Benny Wenda of the United Liberation Movement of West Papua (ULMWP).

    And he says that Jakarta is bringing in another 450 troops in to “violently enforce” its policies.

    “Indonesian troops torture and stab our bodies, international corporations slice down our forests and mountains, and now the Indonesian government is trying to divide our unity,” Wenda said in a statement.

    “We are not three separate regions – we are West Papuans, one people with one soul and one mission: freedom.

    “The people of West Papua have rejected these proposals, part of the renewal of the 2001 ‘Special Autonomy’ legislation.

    “Over 600,000 of us have signed a petition rejecting ‘Special Autonomy’. Even the head of the Papuan People’s Assembly, an institution set up by Jakarta, has rejected the sham programme.

    Wenda said ‘Special Autonomy’ was “a dead end”.

    ‘Indonesia has failed the world’
    “It is Jakarta’s wish. A referendum and full independence is our wish. Indonesia has failed the world, and failed the people of West Papua,” he said.

    To enforce this renewal of Special Autonomy, even more Indonesian troops were flooding into West Papua – 450 in the last month alone.

    At least 6000 new troops were sent in 2019 and more than 1000 more in 2020.

    “Indonesia is turning our land into a war zone, a martial law colony with military check points on every street corner,” Wenda said.

    “Civilian rule in Indonesia is a myth: the military still holds power. Retired generals experienced in genocide in East Timor continue to call the shots.

    “Indonesia has done this to us many times before. In 1963, they invaded our land. They held the fraudulent Act of No Choice in 1969, against the desires of all West Papuans.

    “At every turn, they have treated us like a colonised people, less than human. We are called monkeys, spat at, forced off our land.”

    Papuans rejected Indonesian law
    From 1 December 2020, Papuans had rejected all Indonesian law and formed the ULMWP Provisional Government.

    “We are no longer bowing down to Jakarta’s rule. I call on all my people to unite and refuse all Indonesian law. We are establishing our own sovereign government,” said Wenda.

    “As the legitimate representative of the people of West Papua, the provisional government is peacefully demanding the following:

    1.The withdrawal of all Indonesian troops from West Papua;
    2. An end to all forms of racism and discrimination against Melanesian West Papuans;
    3. Immediate access to West Papua for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in accordance with the call of 83 international states;
    4. Cancellation of ‘Special Autonomy’ and an immediate referendum on independence; and
    5. For all international states and multinational corporations to cease any and all funding for Jakarta’s ‘Special Autonomy’.”

    Wenda saidf the international community must help to force Indonesia to negotiate by withdrawing all support for the “failed ‘Special Autonomy’ project”.

    “The world may be banned from seeing what is happening in West Papua. But we can see it,” Wenda said.

    And we are going to peacefully continue our long struggle for freedom until the world finally hears our cry.

    Print Friendly, PDF & Email

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The politics of divide and rule and how Indonesia’s attempt to separate indigenous Papuans is an irrational and unrealistic proposal that will damage the cultural values of kinship and togetherness as Melanesian people, writes Dr Socratez Yoman.


    ANALYSIS: By Dr Socratez Yoman

    The Indonesian coloniser has become an ignorant ruler with deaf ears and with evil intention in fighting for the addition of new Papuan provinces without the population numbers to justify this.

    Provincial division is a serious problem because the population of Papua and West Papua does not meet the requirements to establish new provinces.

    The planned provinces will cause division and destruction of the cultural values of kinship and togetherness as Melanesian people.

    After Indonesia failed with a plan to move 2 million indigenous Papuans to Manado, the new strategy devised by the Jakarta authorities is to separate indigenous Papuans according to ethnic groups. This is a crime against humanity and is a gross human rights violation carried out by the state.

    The author followed the presentation from the Minister of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Tito Karnavian, to the Working Meeting of Commission I DPD RI in Jakarta on 27 January 2021 regarding the government’s version of the Provincial Expansion scenario which was not rational or realistic.

    The Minister of Home Affairs is not paying attention to the standards and requirements for the development of a new administrative area, such as area size, population, human resources and financial and natural resources.

    The criteria for a new government have been largely ignored, but political interests and remilitarisation have become the main mission. To be honest, the people and nation of West Papua do not need lots of division of districts and provinces.

    Military purpose for new provinces
    These new provinces are only for political and military purposes and to move excess population from Java.

    The proposal in summary

    1. Papua Province
    (the original province)
    Capital: Jayapura
    a. Jayapura Town
    b. Jayapura Regency
    c. Keerom Regency
    d. Sarmi Regency
    e. Maberamo Raya Regency
    f. Waropen Regency
    g. Kep. Yapen Regency
    h. Biak Numfor Regency
    i. Supiori Regency

    2. South Papua Province
    (new province)
    Capital: Merauke
    a. Merauke Regency
    b. Boven Digoel Regency
    c. Mappi Regency
    d. Asmat Regeny
    e. Peg Bintang Regency

    3. Central Eastern Papua Province
    (new province)
    Capital: Wamena
    a. Jayawijaya Regency
    b. Lani Jaya Regency
    c. Tolikora Regency
    d. Nduga Regency
    e. Maberamo Tengah Regency
    f. Yalimo Regency
    g. Yahukimo Regency
    h. Puncak Jaya Regency
    i. Puncak Regency

    4. Western Central Papua Province
    (still under debate)
    Capital: Mimika
    a. Mimika Regency
    b. Paniai Regency
    c. Deiyai Regency
    d. Dogiay Regency
    e. Nabire Regency
    f. Intan Jaya Regency

    5. West Papua Daya Province
    (previously mostly West Papua Province)
    Capital: Sorong
    a. Town of Sorong
    b. Sorong Regency
    c. Sorong Selatan Regency
    d. Maybrat Regency
    e. Tambrauw Regency
    f. Raja Ampat Regency

    With these additions Papua would have five provinces. The mechanism for provincial expansion is in accordance with Article 76 of the Special Autonomy Law with additional authority changes from the central government when there is a deadlock in the region.

    The total population of West Papua includes two provinces respectively: Papua Province 3,322,526 people and West Papua 1,069,498 inhabitants. The total is 4,392,024 inhabitants.

    Evenly dividing up population
    If the population is divided evenly from the total population of 4,392,024 the population for the five provinces are as follows:

    1. Papua Province will be inhabited by a population of 878,404 people.

    2. West Papua Province will be inhabited by a population of 878,404 people.

    3. The Province of Puppet I will be inhabited by a population of 878,404 people.

    4. The Province of Puppet II will be inhabited by a population of 878,404 people.

    5. The Province of Puppet III will be inhabited by a population of 878,404 people.

    The question is whether a province with a total population of 878,404 people is worthy and eligible to become a province?

    It is very important to compare with the population of the provinces of West Java, Central Java and East Java.

    1. Total population of West Java: 46,497,175 people.

    2. Total population of Central Java: 35,557,248 people.

    3. Total Population of East Java: 38,828,061 people.

    The question is why does the government of the Republic of Indonesia not carry out splitting the provinces of West Java, Central Java and East Java, which have the largest population sizes?

    ‘Transfer of excess population’
    As a consequence of a population shortage in this province, the Indonesian authorities will transfer the excess population of Malay Indonesians to these puppet provinces.

    The creation of these five provinces also have as their main objective to build 5 military area commands, 5 police area command bases, tens of military district commands and dozens of police district headquarters and various other units. The land of Melanesia will be used as the home of the military, police and Indonesian Malay people.

    The consequences will be that the indigenous Papuans from Sorong to Merauke will lose their land because the land will be robbed and looted to build office buildings, military headquarters, police headquarters, army district bases, and police district bases.

    Humans will be removed, made impoverished, without land and without a future, even slaughtered and destroyed like animals in a natural or unnatural way as we have experienced and witnessed until the present.

    There is evidence that a genocide process has been carried out by the modern colonial rulers of Indonesia in this era of civilisation. The crimes of the Indonesian colonial rulers continue to be exposed in public.

    In 1969, when the West Papuan people were integrated into Indonesia, the indigenous population was around 809,337 people. Meanwhile, the neighbouring independent state of Papua New Guinea has around 2,783,121 people.

    Since then, the indigenous population of PNG has reached 8,947,024 million, while the number of Indigenous Papuans is still only 1.8 million.

    Modern colonial ruler
    This fact shows that the Indonesian government is a modern colonial ruler which has occupied and colonised the people and nation of West Papua.

    Dr Veronika Kusumaryati, a daughter of Indonesia’s young generation in her dissertation entitled: Ethnography of the Colonial Present: History, Experience, And Political Consciousness in West Papua, revealed:

    “For Papuans, current colonialism is marked by the experience and militariSation of daily life. This colonialism can also be felt through acts of violence that are disproportionately shown to Papuans, as well in the narrative of their lives.

    “When Indonesia arrived, thousands of people were detained, tortured and killed. Offices were looted and houses burned. … these stories did not appear in historical books, not in Indonesia, nor in the Netherlands. This violence did not stop in the 1960s.”

    (Kusumaryati, V. (2018). Ethnography of the Colonial Present: History, Experience, And Political Consciousness in West Papua, p. 25).

    The Indonesian government repeats the experience of the colonial rulers of apartheid in South Africa. In 1978, Peter W. Botha became Prime Minister and he carried out a politics of divide and conquer by dividing the unity of the people of South Africa through establishing puppet states: 1. The Transkei Puppet State. 2. The Bophutha Tswana Puppet State. 3. Venda Puppet State. 4. The Ciskei Puppet State. (Source: 16 Most Influential Heroes of Peace: Sutrisno Eddy, 2002, p. 14).

    There is a serious threat and displacement of indigenous Papuans from their ancestral lands proven by the fact that in the regencies they have been robbed by the Malays and have been deprived of their basic rights for Indigenous Papuans in the political field. See the evidence and examples as follows:

    1. Sarmi Regency 20 seats: 13 migrants and 7 indigenous Papuans (OAP).

    2. Boven Digul Regency 20 seats: 16 migrants and 6 Indigenous Papuans

    3. Asmat Regency 25 seats: 11 migrants and 14 Indigenous Papuans

    4. Mimika Regency 35 seats: 17 migrants and OAP 18 Indigenous Papuans

    5. 20 seats in Fakfak District: 12 migrants and 8 Indigenous Papuans.

    6. Raja Ampat Regency, 20 seats: 11 migrants and 9 Indigenous Papuans.

    7. Sorong Regency 25 seats: 19 migrants and 7 Indigenous Papuans.

    8. Teluk Wondama Regency 25 seats: 14 migrants and 11 Indigenous Papuans.

    9. Merauke Regency 30 seats: 27 migrants and only 3 Indigenous Papuans.

    10. South Sorong Regency 20 seats. 17 migrants and 3 indigenous Papuans.

    11. Kota Jayapura 40 seats: Migrants 27 people and 13 indigenous Papuans.

    12. Kab. Keerom 23 seats. Migrants 13 people and 7 indigenous Papuans.

    13. Kab. Jayapura 25 seats. Migrants 18 people and 7 indigenous Papuans.

    Meanwhile, the members of the Representative Council of Papua and West Papua Provinces are as follows:

    1.  Papua Province out of 55 members, 44 Papuans and 11 Malays/Newcomers.;
    2. West Papua Province, out of 45 members, 28 Malays/Newcomers and only 17 Indigenous Papuans.

    Reverend Socratez Sofyan Yoman is a Baptist priest, author and human rights defender from Papua. He filed this article for Asia Pacific Report.

     

     

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • The politics of divide and rule and how Indonesia’s attempt to separate indigenous Papuans is an irrational and unrealistic proposal that will damage the cultural values of kinship and togetherness as Melanesian people, writes Dr Socrates Yoman.


    ANALYSIS: By Dr Socrates Yoman

    The Indonesian coloniser has become an ignorant ruler with deaf ears and with evil intention in fighting for the addition of new Papuan provinces without population numbers to justify this.

    Provincial division is a serious problem because the population of Papua and West Papua does not meet the requirements to establish new provinces.

    The planned provinces will cause division and destruction of the cultural values of kinship and togetherness as Melanesian people.

    After Indonesia failed with a plan to move 2 million indigenous Papuans to Manado, the new strategy devised by the Jakarta authorities is to separate indigenous Papuans according to ethnic groups. This is a crime against humanity and is a gross human rights violation carried out by the state.

    The author followed the presentation from the Minister of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Tito Karnavian, to the Working Meeting of Commission I DPD RI in Jakarta on 27 January 2021 regarding the government’s version of the Provincial Expansion scenario which was not rational or realistic.

    The Minister of Home Affairs is not paying attention to the standards and requirements for the development of a new administrative area, such as area size, population, human resources and financial and natural resources.

    The criteria for a new government have been largely ignored, but political interests and remilitarisation have become the main mission. To be honest, the people and nation of West Papua do not need lots of division of districts and provinces.

    Military purpose for new provinces
    These new provinces are only for political and military purposes and to move excess population from Java.

    The proposal in summary

    1. Papua Province
    (the original province)
    Capital: Jayapura
    a. Jayapura Town
    b. Jayapura Regency
    c. Keerom Regency
    d. Sarmi Regency
    e. Maberamo Raya Regency
    f. Waropen Regency
    g. Kep. Yapen Regency
    h. Biak Numfor Regency
    i. Supiori Regency

    2. South Papua Province
    (new province)
    Capital: Merauke
    a. Merauke Regency
    b. Boven Digoel Regency
    c. Mappi Regency
    d. Asmat Regeny
    e. Peg Bintang Regency

    3. Central Eastern Papua Province
    (new province)
    Capital: Wamena
    a. Jayawijaya Regency
    b. Lani Jaya Regency
    c. Tolikora Regency
    d. Nduga Regency
    e. Maberamo Tengah Regency
    f. Yalimo Regency
    g. Yahukimo Regency
    h. Puncak Jaya Regency
    i. Puncak Regency

    4. Western Central Papua Province
    (still under debate)
    Capital: Mimika
    a. Mimika Regency
    b. Paniai Regency
    c. Deiyai Regency
    d. Dogiay Regency
    e. Nabire Regency
    f. Intan Jaya Regency

    5. West Papua Daya Province
    (previously mostly West Papua Province)
    Capital: Sorong
    a. Town of Sorong
    b. Sorong Regency
    c. Sorong Selatan Regency
    d. Maybrat Regency
    e. Tambrauw Regency
    f. Raja Ampat Regency

    With these additions Papua would have five provinces. The mechanism for provincial expansion is in accordance with Article 76 of the Special Autonomy Law with additional authority changes from the central government when there is a deadlock in the region.

    The total population of West Papua includes two provinces respectively: Papua Province 3,322,526 people and West Papua 1,069,498 inhabitants. The total is 4,392,024 inhabitants.

    Evenly dividing up population
    If the population is divided evenly from the total population of 4,392,024 the population for the five provinces are as follows:

    1. Papua Province will be inhabited by a population of 878,404 people.

    2. West Papua Province will be inhabited by a population of 878,404 people.

    3. The Province of Puppet I will be inhabited by a population of 878,404 people.

    4. The Province of Puppet II will be inhabited by a population of 878,404 people.

    5. The Province of Puppet III will be inhabited by a population of 878,404 people.

    The question is whether a province with a total population of 878,404 people is worthy and eligible to become a province?

    It is very important to compare with the population of the provinces of West Java, Central Java and East Java.

    1. Total population of West Java: 46,497,175 people.

    2. Total population of Central Java: 35,557,248 people.

    3. Total Population of East Java: 38,828,061 people.

    The question is why does the government of the Republic of Indonesia not carry out splitting the provinces of West Java, Central Java and East Java, which have the largest population sizes?

    ‘Transfer of excess population’
    As a consequence of a population shortage in this province, the Indonesian authorities will transfer the excess population of Malay Indonesians to these puppet provinces.

    The creation of these five provinces also have as their main objective to build 5 military area commands, 5 police area command bases, tens of military district commands and dozens of police district headquarters and various other units. The land of Melanesia will be used as the home of the military, police and Indonesian Malay people.

    The consequences will be that the indigenous Papuans from Sorong to Merauke will lose their land because the land will be robbed and looted to build office buildings, military headquarters, police headquarters, army district bases, and police district bases.

    Humans will be removed, made impoverished, without land and without a future, even slaughtered and destroyed like animals in a natural or unnatural way as we have experienced and witnessed until the present.

    There is evidence that a genocide process has been carried out by the modern colonial rulers of Indonesia in this era of civilisation. The crimes of the Indonesian colonial rulers continue to be exposed in public.

    In 1969, when the West Papuan people were integrated into Indonesia, the indigenous population was around 809,337 people. Meanwhile, the neighbouring independent state of Papua New Guinea has around 2,783,121 people.

    Since then, the indigenous population of PNG has reached 8,947,024 million, while the number of Indigenous Papuans is still only 1.8 million.

    Modern colonial ruler
    This fact shows that the Indonesian government is a modern colonial ruler which has occupied and colonised the people and nation of West Papua.

    Dr Veronika Kusumaryati, a daughter of Indonesia’s young generation in her dissertation entitled: Ethnography of the Colonial Present: History, Experience, And Political Consciousness in West Papua, revealed:

    “For Papuans, current colonialism is marked by the experience and militariSation of daily life. This colonialism can also be felt through acts of violence that are disproportionately shown to Papuans, as well in the narrative of their lives.

    “When Indonesia arrived, thousands of people were detained, tortured and killed. Offices were looted and houses burned. … these stories did not appear in historical books, not in Indonesia, nor in the Netherlands. This violence did not stop in the 1960s.”

    (Kusumaryati, V. (2018). Ethnography of the Colonial Present: History, Experience, And Political Consciousness in West Papua, p. 25).

    The Indonesian government repeats the experience of the colonial rulers of apartheid in South Africa. In 1978, Peter W. Botha became Prime Minister and he carried out a politics of divide and conquer by dividing the unity of the people of South Africa through establishing puppet states: 1. The Transkei Puppet State. 2. The Bophutha Tswana Puppet State. 3. Venda Puppet State. 4. The Ciskei Puppet State. (Source: 16 Most Influential Heroes of Peace: Sutrisno Eddy, 2002, p. 14).

    There is a serious threat and displacement of indigenous Papuans from their ancestral lands proven by the fact that in the regencies they have been robbed by the Malays and have been deprived of their basic rights for Indigenous Papuans in the political field. See the evidence and examples as follows:

    1. Sarmi Regency 20 seats: 13 migrants and 7 indigenous Papuans (OAP).

    2. Boven Digul Regency 20 seats: 16 migrants and 6 Indigenous Papuans

    3. Asmat Regency 25 seats: 11 migrants and 14 Indigenous Papuans

    4. Mimika Regency 35 seats: 17 migrants and OAP 18 Indigenous Papuans

    5. 20 seats in Fakfak District: 12 migrants and 8 Indigenous Papuans.

    6. Raja Ampat Regency, 20 seats: 11 migrants and 9 Indigenous Papuans.

    7. Sorong Regency 25 seats: 19 migrants and 7 Indigenous Papuans.

    8. Teluk Wondama Regency 25 seats: 14 migrants and 11 Indigenous Papuans.

    9. Merauke Regency 30 seats: 27 migrants and only 3 Indigenous Papuans.

    10. South Sorong Regency 20 seats. 17 migrants and 3 indigenous Papuans.

    11. Kota Jayapura 40 seats: Migrants 27 people and 13 indigenous Papuans.

    12. Kab. Keerom 23 seats. Migrants 13 people and 7 indigenous Papuans.

    13. Kab. Jayapura 25 seats. Migrants 18 people and 7 indigenous Papuans.

    Meanwhile, the members of the Representative Council of Papua and West Papua Provinces are as follows:

    1.  Papua Province out of 55 members, 44 Papuans and 11 Malays/Newcomers.;
    2. West Papua Province, out of 45 members, 28 Malays/Newcomers and only 17 Indigenous Papuans.

    Reverend Socratez Sofyan Yoman is a Baptist priest, author and human rights defender from Papua. He filed this article for Asia Pacific Report.

    Print Friendly, PDF & Email

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Pacific Media Watch newsdesk

    Scores of students from the Papuan Student Association (IMP) in Medan, North Sumatra, have held a protest action this week in front of the North Sumatra University (USU) Rectorate Bureau Building protesting against alleged racism by a professor, reports CNN Indonesia.

    During the action on Tuesday, the students demanded that the professorship of USU’s Yusuf Leonard Henuk be revoked, that he be expelled from the USU because he has tarnished the university’s good name, and that police investigate the case.

    “We’re asking that Henuk be removed from his position as a USU professor. We also ask that he be prosecuted,” said action coordinator Yance Emany at the demonstration.

    “On Twitter he likened Papuans to monkeys and said that Papuans were stupid. These kinds of cases cannot be allowed to be protected at USU or in Indonesia.”

    Emany also threatened to hold protest actions with even more people if the USU authorities failed to follow up on their demands.

    “End racism against Papuans. If there is no response we will come back with even more people. We ask for the Bapak [Mr] USU rector’s cooperation.

    “We as Papuan students oppose racism. We ask that there no longer be any racism against the Papuan people,” he said.

    Pledge to study student demands
    USU rector Muryanto Amin took the opportunity to pledge that he would first study the student’s demands. He said they would gather evidence and summon Henuk – who currently works at the USU agricultural faculty – and ask for clarification.

    “Later we will study the Papuan students’ demands and whether or not the person concerned committed an ethical violation. The person concerned is a lecturer at USU. Later we will summon him to then determine what steps will be undertaken,” he said.

    Last month on January 2, Henuk posted a tweet on his Twitter account @ProfYLH about former National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) commissioner Natalius Pigai which smacked of racism.

    Henuk uploaded a photograph of Pigai alongside a monkey looking at a mirror. The photograph was accompanied with the caption “Indeed, does Pigai have any capacity in this country”.

    In another posting he tweeted: IT’S BEEN PROVEN THAT PAPUANS ARE INDEED STUPID, THE PROBLEM IS PAPUANS WHO ARE CONSIDERED SMART SUCH AS @NataliusPigai2 CAN BE DECEIVED BY THE DEVIL @VeronicaKoman. ALL PAPUAN ARE CONTROLLED BY THE DEVIL/DAEMONS SO THEY DAMAGE THE ENTIRE CHRISTIAN FAITH. WHERE IS THE ROLE OF THE PAPUAN CHURCH?”.

    When sought separately for confirmation, Henuk denied that his posting was a form of racism.

    For Henuk, it was a “satirical allusion” about Pigai who he believed was arrogant.

    ‘A satirical allusion’
    Henuk said the public should focus on the mirror in the posting, not the photograph of the monkey placed alongside Pigai’s picture.

    “It was a satirical allusion, an allusion that he should self-reflect. Why’s he [Pigai] so arrogant. I don’t agree with the way he hit out at Hendropriyono”, said Henuk when sought for confirmation by CNN Indonesia.

    “In relation to my posting, that’s what’s called an illustration [the photograph of the monkey], a reflection that he should reflect, self-introspection. So I say if you don’t want to be attacked then don’t attack other people,” he added.

    With regard to saying that Papuans are stupid, Henuk said the statement was directed at Papuans who supported pro-independence leader Benny Wanda and exiled Papuan human rights activist and lawyer Veronica Koman.

    “It was just a satirical allusion, right. In saying stupid I meant Papuans who still support Koman and Wenda. Meaning they’re stupid. This country is already independent, but many Papuans still believe in Wenda and Koman,” he claimed.

    “Many of my friends are church people, why doesn’t the church function to make Papuan people aware. Come on lets enjoy the independence that God has given us.

    “I’m a person from eastern Indonesia, I’m envious of Papua, because Jokowi [President Joko Widodo] has built really good roads in Papua, but what have we got in East Nusa Tenggara?,” he claimed.

    IndoLeft News notes:
    Former State Intelligence Agency (BIN) chief retired general Abdullah Mahmud Hendropriyono recently called for the forced removal of some two million indigenous Papuans to the island of Manado in an apparent response to last year’s December 1 declaration by the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) of a West Papuan provisional government headed by ULMWP Chairperson Benny Wenda.

    Translated by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. The original title of the article was “Mahasiswa Papua Tuntut USU Copot Gelar Profesor Yusuf Henuk”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Pacific Media Watch newsdesk

    Scores of students from the Papuan Student Association (IMP) in Medan, North Sumatra, have held a protest action this week in front of the North Sumatra University (USU) Rectorate Bureau Building protesting against alleged racism by a professor, reports CNN Indonesia.

    During the action on Tuesday, the students demanded that the professorship of USU’s Yusuf Leonard Henuk be revoked, that he be expelled from the USU because he has tarnished the university’s good name, and that police investigate the case.

    “We’re asking that Henuk be removed from his position as a USU professor. We also ask that he be prosecuted,” said action coordinator Yance Emany at the demonstration.

    “On Twitter he likened Papuans to monkeys and said that Papuans were stupid. These kinds of cases cannot be allowed to be protected at USU or in Indonesia.”

    Emany also threatened to hold protest actions with even more people if the USU authorities failed to follow up on their demands.

    “End racism against Papuans. If there is no response we will come back with even more people. We ask for the Bapak [Mr] USU rector’s cooperation.

    “We as Papuan students oppose racism. We ask that there no longer be any racism against the Papuan people,” he said.

    Pledge to study student demands
    USU rector Muryanto Amin took the opportunity to pledge that he would first study the student’s demands. He said they would gather evidence and summon Henuk – who currently works at the USU agricultural faculty – and ask for clarification.

    “Later we will study the Papuan students’ demands and whether or not the person concerned committed an ethical violation. The person concerned is a lecturer at USU. Later we will summon him to then determine what steps will be undertaken,” he said.

    Last month on January 2, Henuk posted a tweet on his Twitter account @ProfYLH about former National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) commissioner Natalius Pigai which smacked of racism.

    Henuk uploaded a photograph of Pigai alongside a monkey looking at a mirror. The photograph was accompanied with the caption “Indeed, does Pigai have any capacity in this country”.

    In another posting he tweeted: IT’S BEEN PROVEN THAT PAPUANS ARE INDEED STUPID, THE PROBLEM IS PAPUANS WHO ARE CONSIDERED SMART SUCH AS @NataliusPigai2 CAN BE DECEIVED BY THE DEVIL @VeronicaKoman. ALL PAPUAN ARE CONTROLLED BY THE DEVIL/DAEMONS SO THEY DAMAGE THE ENTIRE CHRISTIAN FAITH. WHERE IS THE ROLE OF THE PAPUAN CHURCH?”.

    When sought separately for confirmation, Henuk denied that his posting was a form of racism.

    For Henuk, it was a “satirical allusion” about Pigai who he believed was arrogant.

    ‘A satirical allusion’
    Henuk said the public should focus on the mirror in the posting, not the photograph of the monkey placed alongside Pigai’s picture.

    “It was a satirical allusion, an allusion that he should self-reflect. Why’s he [Pigai] so arrogant. I don’t agree with the way he hit out at Hendropriyono”, said Henuk when sought for confirmation by CNN Indonesia.

    “In relation to my posting, that’s what’s called an illustration [the photograph of the monkey], a reflection that he should reflect, self-introspection. So I say if you don’t want to be attacked then don’t attack other people,” he added.

    With regard to saying that Papuans are stupid, Henuk said the statement was directed at Papuans who supported pro-independence leader Benny Wanda and exiled Papuan human rights activist and lawyer Veronica Koman.

    “It was just a satirical allusion, right. In saying stupid I meant Papuans who still support Koman and Wenda. Meaning they’re stupid. This country is already independent, but many Papuans still believe in Wenda and Koman,” he claimed.

    “Many of my friends are church people, why doesn’t the church function to make Papuan people aware. Come on lets enjoy the independence that God has given us.

    “I’m a person from eastern Indonesia, I’m envious of Papua, because Jokowi [President Joko Widodo] has built really good roads in Papua, but what have we got in East Nusa Tenggara?,” he claimed.

    IndoLeft News notes:
    Former State Intelligence Agency (BIN) chief retired general Abdullah Mahmud Hendropriyono recently called for the forced removal of some two million indigenous Papuans to the island of Manado in an apparent response to last year’s December 1 declaration by the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) of a West Papuan provisional government headed by ULMWP Chairperson Benny Wenda.

    Translated by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. The original title of the article was “Mahasiswa Papua Tuntut USU Copot Gelar Profesor Yusuf Henuk”.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Before I digress slightly, let me state from the outset that the book by Greg Poulgrain that I am about to review is extraordinary by any measure. The story he tells is one you will read nowhere else, especially in the way he links the assassination of President Kennedy to former CIA Director Allen Dulles and the engineering by the latter of one of the 20th century’s most terrible mass murders.  It will make your hair stand on end and should be read by anyone who cares about historical truth.

    About twelve years ago I taught a graduate school course to Massachusetts State Troopers and police officers from various cities and towns.  As part of the course material, I had created a segment on the history of the United States’ foreign policy, with particular emphasis on Indonesia.

    No one in this class knew anything about Indonesia, not even where it was. These were intelligent, ambitious adults, eager to learn, all with college degrees. This was in the midst of the “war on terror”; i.e., war on Muslim countries, and the first year of Barack Obama’s presidency.  Almost all the class had voted for Obama and were aware they he had spent some part of his youth in this unknown country somewhere far away.

    I mention this as a preface to this review of JFK vs. Dulles, because its subtitle is Battleground Indonesia, and my suspicion is that those students’ lack of knowledge about the intertwined history of Indonesia and the U.S. is as scanty today among the general public as it was for my students a dozen years ago.

    This makes Greg Poulgrain’s remarkable book – JFK vs. Allen Dulles: Battleground Indonesia – even more important since it is a powerful antidote to such ignorance, and a reminder for those who have fallen, purposefully or not, into a state of historical amnesia that has erased the fact that the U.S. has committed systematic crimes that have resulted in the deaths of more than a million Indonesians and many more millions throughout the world over innumerable decades.

    Such crimes against humanity have been hidden behind what the English playwright Harold Pinter in his 2005 Nobel Prize address called “a tapestry of lies.”  Of such massive crimes, he said:

    But you wouldn’t know it.

    It never happened. Nothing ever happened. Even while it was happening it wasn’t happening. It didn’t matter. It was of no interest. The crimes of the United States have been systematic, constant, vicious, remorseless, but very few people have actually talked about them.

    And when one examines the true history of such atrocities, again and again one comes up against familiar names of the guilty who have never been prosecuted.  Criminals in high places whose crimes around the world from Vietnam to Chile to Cuba to Nicaragua to Argentina to Iraq to Libya to Syria, etc. have been – and continue to be – integral to American foreign policy as it serves the interests of its wealthy owners and their media mouthpieces.

    In his brilliant new book on U.S./Indonesian history, Dr. Greg Poulgrain unweaves this tapestry of lies and sheds new light on the liars’ sordid deeds. He is an Australian expert on Indonesia whose work stretches back forty years, is a professor at University of the Sunshine Coast in Brisbane and has written four highly-researched books about Indonesia.

    In JFK vs. Dulles, he exposes the intrigue behind the ruthless regime-change strategy in Indonesia of the longest-serving CIA director, Allen Dulles, and how it clashed with the policy of President John F. Kennedy, leading to JFK’s assassination, Indonesian regime change, and massive slaughter.

    Poulgrain begins with this question:

    Would Allen Dulles have resorted to assassinating the President of the United States to ensure that his ‘Indonesian strategy’ rather than Kennedy’s was achieved?

    To which he answers: Yes.

    But let me not get ahead of myself, for the long, intricate tale he tells is one a reviewer can only summarize, so filled is it with voluminous details.  So I will touch on a few salient points and encourage people to buy and read this important book.

    Indonesia’s Strategic Importance

    The strategic and economic importance of Indonesia cannot be exaggerated.  It is the world’s 4th most populous country (275+ million), is located in a vital shipping lane adjacent to the South China Sea, has the world’s largest Muslim population, has vast mineral and oil deposits, and is home in West Papua to Grasberg, the world’s largest gold mine and the second largest copper mine, primarily owned by Freeport McMoRan of Phoenix, Arizona, whose past board members have included Henry Kissinger, John Hay Whitney, and Godfrey Rockefeller.

    Long a battleground in the Cold War, Indonesia remains vitally important in the New Cold War and the pivot to Asia launched by the Obama administration against China and Russia, the same antagonists Allen Dulles strove to defeat through guile and violence while he engineered coups home and abroad. It is fundamentally important in the Pentagon’s Indo-Pacific strategy for what it euphemistically calls a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” While not front-page news in the U.S., these facts make Indonesia of great importance today and add to the gravity of Poulgrain’s historical account.

    JFK

    Two days before President John Kennedy was publicly executed by the US national security state led by the CIA on November 22, 1963, he had accepted an invitation from Indonesian President Sukarno to visit that country the following spring.  The aim of the visit was to end the conflict (Konfrontasi) between Indonesia and Malaysia and to continue Kennedy’s efforts to support post-colonial Indonesia with economic and developmental aid, not military.   It was part of his larger strategy of ending conflict throughout Southeast Asia and assisting the growth of democracy in newly liberated post-colonial countries worldwide.

    He had forecast his position in a dramatic speech in 1957 when, as a Massachusetts Senator, he told the Senate that he supported the Algerian liberation movement and opposed colonial imperialism worldwide.  The speech caused an international uproar and Kennedy was harshly attacked by Eisenhower, Nixon, John Foster Dulles, and even liberals such as Adlai Stevenson.  But he was praised throughout the third world.

    Poulgrain writes:

    Kennedy was aiming for a seismic shift of Cold War alignment in Southeast Asia by bringing Indonesia ‘on side.’  As Bradley Simpson stated (in 2008), ‘One would never know from reading the voluminous recent literature on the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and Southeast Asia, for example, that until the mid-1960s most officials [in the US] still considered Indonesia of far greater importance than Vietnam or Laos.

    Of course, JFK never went to Indonesia in 1964, and his peaceful strategy to bring Indonesia to America’s side and to ease tensions in the Cold War was never realized, thanks to Allen Dulles.  And Kennedy’s proposed withdrawal from Vietnam, which was premised on success in Indonesia, was quickly reversed by Lyndon Johnson after JFK’s murder on November 22, 1963.  Soon both countries would experience mass slaughter engineered by Kennedy’s opponents in the CIA and Pentagon. Millions would die.

    While the Indonesian mass slaughter of mainly poor rice farmers (members of the Communist Party – PKI) instigated by Allen Dulles began in October 1965, ten years later, starting in December 1975, the American installed Indonesian dictator Suharto, after meeting with Henry Kissinger and President Ford and receiving their approval, would slaughter hundreds of thousands East-Timorese with American-supplied weapons in a repeat of the slaughter of more than a million Indonesians in 1965 when the CIA engineered the coup d’état that toppled President Sukarno.  The American installed dictator Suharto would rule for thirty years of terror.  The CIA considers this operation one of its finest accomplishments.  It became known as “the Jakarta Method,” a model for future violent coups throughout Latin America and the world.

    And in-between these U.S. engineered mass atrocities, came the bloody coup in Chile on September 11, 1973 and the ongoing colossal U.S. war crimes in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

    Dulles’s Secret

    What JFK didn’t know was that his plans for a peaceful resolution of the Indonesia situation and an easing of the Cold War were threatening a covert long-standing conspiracy engineered by Allen Dulles to effect regime change in Indonesia through bloody means and to exacerbate the Cold War by concealing from Kennedy the truth that there was a Sino-Soviet split.  Another primary goal behind this plan was to gain unimpeded access to the vast load of natural resources that Dulles had kept secret from Kennedy, who thought Indonesia was lacking in natural resources. But Dulles knew that if Kennedy, who was very popular in Indonesia, visited Sukarno, it would deal a death blow to his plan to oust Sukarno, install a CIA replacement (Suharto), exterminate alleged communists, and secure the archipelago for Rockefeller controlled oil and mining interests, for whom he had fronted  since the 1920s.

    Reading Poulgrain’s masterful analysis, one can clearly see how much of modern history is a struggle for control of the underworld where lies the fuel that runs the megamachine – oil, minerals, gold, copper, etc.  Manifest ideological conflicts, while garnering headlines, often bury the secret of this subterranean devil’s game.

    The Discovery of Gold

    His murder mystery/detective story begins with a discovery that is then kept secret for many decades.  He writes:

    In the alpine region of Netherlands New Guinea (so named under Dutch colonial rule – today, West Papua) in 1936, three Dutchmen discovered a mountainous outcrop of ore with high copper content and very high concentrations of gold.  When later analyzed in the Netherlands, the gold (in gram/ton) proved to be twice that of Witwatersrand in South Africa, then the world’s richest gold mine, but this information was not made public.

    The geologist among the trio, Jean Jacques Dozy, worked for the Netherlands New Guinea Petroleum Company (NNGPM), ostensibly a Dutch-controlled company based in The Hague, but whose controlling interest actually lay in the hands of the Rockefeller family, as did the mining company, Freeport Sulphur (now Freeport McMoRan, one of whose Directors from 1988-95 was Henry Kissinger, Dulles’ and the Rockefeller’s close associate) that began mining operations there in 1966.

    It was Allen Dulles, Paris-based lawyer in the employ of Rockefeller’s Standard Oil, who in 1935 arranged the controlling interest in NNGPN for the Rockefellers.  And it was Dulles, among a select few others, who, because of various intervening events, including WW II, that made its exploitation impossible, kept the secret of the gold mine for almost three decades, even from President Kennedy, who had worked to return the island to Indonesian control. JFK “remained uninformed of the El Dorado, and once the remaining political hurdles were overcome, Freeport would have unimpeded access.” Those “political hurdles”; i.e., regime change, would take a while to effect.

    The Need to Assassinate President Kennedy

    But first JFK would have to be eliminated, for he had brokered Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua/West Irian for Sukarno from the Dutch who had ties to Freeport Sulphur.  Freeport was aghast at the potential loss of “El Dorado,” especially since they had recently had their world’s most advanced nickel refinery expropriated by Fidel Castro, who had named Che Guevara its new manager.  Freeport’s losses in Cuba made access to Indonesia even more important. Cuba and Indonesia thus were joined in the deadly game of chess between Dulles and Kennedy, and someone would have to lose.

    While much has been written about Cuba, Kennedy, and Dulles, the Indonesian side of the story has been slighted. Poulgrain remedies this with an exhaustive and deeply researched exploration of these matters. He details the deviousness of the covert operations Dulles ran in Indonesia during the 1950s and 1960s.  He makes it clear that Kennedy was shocked by Dulles’s actions, yet never fully grasped the treacherous genius of it all, for Dulles was always “working two or three stages ahead of the present.”  Having armed and promoted a rebellion against Sukarno’s central government in 1958, Dulles made sure it would fail (shades of the Bay of Pigs to come) since a perceived failure served his long-term strategy.  To this very day, this faux 1958 Rebellion is depicted as a CIA failure by the media.  Yet from Dulles standpoint, it was a successful failure that served his long-term goals.

    “This holds true,” Poulgrain has previously written, “only if the stated goal of the CIA was the same as the actual goal.  Even more than five decades later, media analysis of the goal of The Outer Island rebels is still portrayed as a secession, as covert US support for ‘rebels in the Outer Islands that wished to secede from the central government in Jakarta’.  The actual goal of Allen Dulles had more to do with achieving a centralized army command in such a way as to appear that the CIA backing for the rebels failed.”

    Dulles’ the Devil

    Dulles betrayed the rebels he armed and encouraged, just as he betrayed friend and foe alike during his long career.  The rebellion that he instigated and planned to fail was the first stage of a larger intelligence strategy that would come to fruition in 1965-6 with the ouster of Sukarno (after multiple unsuccessful assassination attempts) and the institution of a reign of terror that followed.  It was also when – 1966 – Freeport McMoRan began their massive mining in West Papua at Grasberg at an elevation of 14,000 feet in the Alpine region.  Dulles was nothing if not patient; he had been at this game since WW I.  Even after Kennedy fired him following the Bay of Pigs, his plans were executed, just as those who got in his way were.  Poulgrain makes a powerful case that Dulles was the mastermind of the murders of JFK, U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold (working with Kennedy for a peaceful solution in Indonesia and other places), and Congolese President Patrice Lumumba, the first president of a newly liberated Congo.

    His focus is on why they needed to be assassinated (similar in this regard to James Douglass’s JFK and the Unspeakable), though with the exception of Kennedy (since the how is well-known and obvious), he also presents compelling evidence as to the how. Hammarskjold, in many ways Kennedy’s spiritual brother, was a particularly powerful obstacle to Dulles’s plans for Indonesia and colonial countries throughout the Third World. Like JFK, he was committed to independence for indigenous and colonial peoples everywhere and was trying to implement his Swedish-style ‘third way,’ proposing a form of ‘muscular pacifism’.

    Poulgrain argues correctly that if the UN Secretary General succeeded in bringing even half these colonial countries to independence, he would have transformed the UN into a significant world power and created a body of nations so large as to be a counter-weight to those embroiled in the Cold War.

    He draws on documents from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and Chairman Archbishop Desmond Tutu to show the connection between South Africa’s “Operation Celeste” and Dulles’s involvement in Hammarskjold’s murder in September 1961.  While it was reported at the time as an accidental plane crash, he quotes former President Harry Truman saying, “Dag Hammarskjold was on the point of getting something done when they killed him.  Notice that I said, ‘When they killed him’.”  Hammarskjold, like Kennedy, was intent on returning colonized countries to their indigenous inhabitants and making sure Papua was for Papuans, not Freeport McMoRan and imperial forces.

    And Dulles sold his overt Indonesian strategy as being necessary to thwart a communist takeover in Indonesia. Cold War rhetoric, like “the war on terrorism” today, served as his cover.  In this he had the Joint Chiefs of Staff on his side; they considered Kennedy soft on communism, in Indonesia and Cuba and everywhere else. Dulles’s covert agenda was to serve the interests of his power elite patrons.

    While contextually different from David Talbot’s portrayal of Dulles in The Devil’s Chessboard, Poulgrain’s portrait of Dulles within the frame of Indonesian history is equally condemnatory and nightmarish.  Both describe an evil genius ready to do anything to advance his agenda.

    Dulles and George de Mohrenschildt

    Poulgrain adds significantly to our understanding of JFK’s assassination and its aftermath by presenting new information about George de Mohrenschildt, Lee Harvey Oswald’s handler in Dallas.  Dulles had a long association with the de Mohrenschildt family, going back to 1920-21 when in Constantinople he negotiated with Baron Sergius Alexander von Mohrenschildt on behalf of Rockefeller’s Standard Oil.  The Baron’s brother and business partner was George’s father.  Dulles’s law firm, Sullivan & Cromwell, was Standard Oil’s primary law firm. These negotiations on behalf of elite capitalist interests, in the shadow of the Russian Revolution, became the template for Dulles’s career: economic exploitation was inseparable from military concerns, the former concealed behind the anti-communist rhetoric of the latter.  An anti-red thread ran through Dulles’s career, except when the red was the blood of all those whom he considered expendable.  And the numbers are legion.  Their blood didn’t matter.

    Standard Oil is the link that joins Dulles [who controlled the Warren Commission investigating the assassination of JFK] and de Mohrenschildt. This connection was kept from the Warren Commission despite Dulles’ prominent role and the importance of the testimony of de Mohrenschildt. Poulgrain argues convincingly that de Mohrenschildt worked in “oil intelligence” before his CIA involvement, and that oil intelligence was not only Dulles’s work when he first met George’s father, Sergius, in Baku, but that that “oil intelligence” is a redundancy. The CIA, after all, is a creation of Wall Street and their interests have always been joined. The Agency was not formed to provide intelligence to US Presidents; that was a convenient myth used to cover its real purpose which was to serve the interests of investment bankers and the power elite, or those I call The Umbrella People who control the U.S.

    While working in 1941 for Humble Oil  (Prescott Bush was a major shareholder, Dulles was his lawyer, and Standard Oil had secretly bought Humble Oil sixteen years before), de Mohrenschildt was caught up in a scandal that involved Vichy (pro-Nazi) French intelligence in selling oil to Germany.  This was similar to the Dulles’s brothers and Standard Oil’s notorious business dealings with Germany.

    It was an intricate web of the high cabal with Allen Dulles at the center.

    In the midst of the scandal, de Mohrenschildt, suspected of being a Vichy French intelligence agent, “disappeared” for a while.  He later told the Warren Commission that he decided to take up oil drilling, without mentioning the name of Humble Oil that employed him again, this time as a roustabout.

    “Just when George needed to ‘disappear’, Humble Oil was providing an oil exploration team to be subcontracted to NNGPM – the company Allen Dulles had set up five years earlier to work in Netherlands New Guinea.”  Poulgrain makes a powerful circumstantial evidence case (certain documents are still unavailable) that de Mohrenschildt, in order to avoid appearing in court, went incommunicado in Netherlands New Guinea in mid-1941 where he made a record oil discovery and received a $10,000 bonus from Humble Oil.

    “Avoiding adverse publicity about his role in selling oil to Vichy France was the main priority; for George, a brief drilling adventure in remote Netherlands New Guinea would have been a timely and strategic exit.”  And who best to help him in this escape than Allen Dulles – indirectly, of course; for Dulles’s modus operandi was to maintain his “distance” from his contacts, often over many decades.

    In other words, Dulles and de Mohrenschildt were intimately involved for a long time prior to JFK’s assassination. Poulgrain rightly claims that “the entire focus of the Kennedy investigation would have shifted had the [Warren] Commission become aware of the 40-year link between Allen Dulles and de Mohrenschildt.” Their relationship involved oil, spying, Indonesia, Nazi Germany, the Rockefellers, Cuba, Haiti, etc.  It was an international web of intrigue that involved a cast of characters stranger than fiction, a high cabal of the usual and unusual operatives.

    Two unusual ones are worth mentioning: Michael Fomenko and Michael Rockefeller.  The eccentric Fomenko – aka “Tarzan” – is the Russian-Australian nephew of de Mohrenschildt’s wife, Jean Fomenko.  His arrest and deportation from Netherlands New Guinea in 1959, where he had travelled from Australia in a canoe, and his subsequent life, are fascinating and sad. It’s the stuff of a bizarre film. It seems he was one of those victims who had to be silenced because he knew a secret about George’s 1941 oil discovery that was not his to share. “In April 1964, at the same time George de Mohrenschildt was facing the Warren Commission – a time when any publicity regarding Sele 40 [George’s record oil discovery] could have changed history – it was decided that electro-convulsive therapy would be used on Michael Fomenko.” He was then imprisoned at the Ipswich Special Mental Hospital.

    Equally interesting is the media myth surrounding the disappearance of Michael Rockefeller, Nelson’s son and heir to the Standard Oil fortune, who was allegedly eaten by cannibals in New Guinea in 1961. His tale became front-page news, “a media event closed off to any other explanation and the political implications of his disappearance became an ongoing tragedy for the Papuan people.”  To this very day, the West Papuan people, whose land was described by Standard Oil official Richard Archbold in 1938 as “Shangri-la,” are fighting for their independence.

    The Sino-Soviet Split

    While the gold in West Papua was very important to Allen Dulles, his larger goal was to keep the Cold War blazing by concealing the dispute between China and the Soviet Union from Kennedy while instigating the mass slaughter of “communists” that would lead to regime change in Indonesia, with Major-General Suharto, his ally, replacing President Sukarno. In this he was successful. Poulgrain says:

    Not only did Dulles fail to brief Kennedy on the Sino-Soviet dispute early in the presidency, but he also remained silent about the rivalry between Moscow and Beijing to wield influence over the PKI or win its support.  In geographical terms, Beijing regarded Indonesia as its own backyard, and winning the support of the PKI would give Beijing an advantage in the Sino-Soviet dispute.  The numerical growth of the PKI was seen by Moscow and Beijing for its obvious political potential.  Dulles was also focused on the PKI, but his peculiar skill in political intelligence turned what seemed inevitable on its head.  The size of the party [the Indonesian Communist Party was the largest outside the Sino-Soviet bloc] became a factor he used to his advantage when formulating his wedge strategy – the greater the rivalry between Moscow and Beijing over the PKI, the more intense would be the recrimination once the PKI was eliminated.

    The slaughter of more than a million poor farmers was a trifle to Dulles.

    The September 30, 1965 Movement

    In the early hours of October 1, 1965, a fake coup d’état was staged by the CIA’s man, Major-General Suharto.  It was announced that seven generals had been arrested and would be taken to President Sukarno “to explain the rumor that they were planning a military coup on October 5.”  Suharto declared himself the head of the army. Someone was said to have killed the generals. In the afternoon, a radio announcement was made calling for the Sukarno government to be dismissed.  This became Suharto’s basis for blaming it on the communists and the so-called September 30 Movement, and he gave the order to kill the PKI leaders.  This started the massive bloodshed that would follow.

    With one hand, Suharto crushed the Movement, accusing the PKI of being the ultimate instigator of an attempt to oust Sukarno, and with the other hand he feigned to protect the “father of the Indonesian revolution,” while actually stripping Sukarno of every vestige of political support.

    When the generals’ bodies were recovered a few days after October 1, Suharto falsely claimed the PKI women had tortured and sexually mutilated them as part of some primitive sexual orgy.  This heinous perversion of power was the start of the Suharto era.  In total control of the media, he manipulated popular wrath to call for revenge.

    If this confuses you, it should, because the twisted nature of this fabricated coup was actually part of a real coup in slow motion aimed at ousting Sukarno and replacing him with the CIA’s man Suharto.  This occurred in early 1967 after the mass slaughter of communists.  It was a regime change cheered on by the American mass media as a triumph over communist aggression.

    New Evidence of U.S. Direct Involvement in the Slaughter

    Poulgrain has spent forty years interviewing participants and researching this horrendous history. His detailed research is quite amazing. And it does take concentration to follow it all, as with the machinations of Dulles, Suharto, et al.

    Some things, however, are straightforward.  For example, he documents how, during the height of the slaughter, two Americans – one man and one woman – were in Klaten (PKI headquarters in central Java) supervising the Indonesian army as they killed the PKI. These two would travel back and forth by helicopter from a ship of the U.S. 7th Fleet that was off the coast of Java.  The plan was that the more communists killed, the greater would be the dispute between Moscow and Beijing, since they would accuse each other for the tragedy, which is exactly what they did.  This was the wedge that was mentioned in the Rockefeller Brothers Panel Report from the late 1950s in which Dulles and Henry Kissinger both participated.

    The hatred drummed up against these poor members of the Communist Party was extraordinary in its depravity.  In addition to Suharto’s lies about communist women mutilating the generals’ bodies, a massive campaign of hatred was directed against these landless peasants who made up the bulk of the PKI.  False Cold War radio broadcasts from Singapore stirred up hostility toward them, declaring them atheists, etc.  Wealthy Muslim landowners – the 1 per cent – made outrageous charges to assist the army’s slaughter.  Poulgrain tells us:

    Muhammadiyah preachers were broadcasting from mosques that all who joined the communist party must be killed, saying they are the ‘lowest order of infidel, the shedding of whose blood is comparable to killing a chicken.’

    For those Americans especially, who think this history of long ago and far away does not touch them, its compelling analysis of how and why Allen Dulles and his military allies would want JFK dead since he was a threat to national security as they defined in it their paranoid anti-communist ideology might be an added impetus to read this very important book. Indonesia may be far away geographically, but it’s a small world.  Dulles and Kennedy had irreconcilable differences, and when Dulles was once asked in a radio interview what he would do to someone who threatened national security, he matter-of-factually said, “I’d kill him.”  The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed.

    I would be remiss if I didn’t say that the introduction to JFK vs. Dulles by Oliver Stone and the afterward by James DiEugenio are outstanding.  They add excellent context and clarity to a really great and important book.

    The post Indonesian Slaughter, Allen Dulles, and the Assassination of JFK first appeared on Dissident Voice.

    This post was originally published on Dissident Voice.

  • A Review of Greg Poulgrain’s book JFK vs. Allen Dulles

    Before I digress slightly, let me state from the outset that the book by Greg Poulgrain that I am about to review is extraordinary by any measure. The story he tells is one you will read nowhere else, especially in the way he links the assassination of President Kennedy to former CIA Director Allen Dulles and the engineering by the latter of one of the 20th century’s most terrible mass murders.  It will make your hair stand on end and should be read by anyone who cares about historical truth.

    About twelve years ago I taught a graduate school course to Massachusetts State Troopers and police officers from various cities and towns.  As part of the course material, I had created a segment on the history of the United States’ foreign policy, with particular emphasis on Indonesia.

    No one in this class knew anything about Indonesia, not even where it was. These were intelligent, ambitious adults, eager to learn, all with college degrees. This was in the midst of the “war on terror”; i.e., war on Muslim countries, and the first year of Barack Obama’s presidency.  Almost all the class had voted for Obama and were aware they he had spent some part of his youth in this unknown country somewhere far away.

    I mention this as a preface to this review of JFK vs. Dulles, because its subtitle is Battleground Indonesia, and my suspicion is that those students’ lack of knowledge about the intertwined history of Indonesia and the U.S. is as scanty today among the general public as it was for my students a dozen years ago.

    This makes Greg Poulgrain’s remarkable book – JFK vs. Allen Dulles: Battleground Indonesia – even more important since it is a powerful antidote to such ignorance, and a reminder for those who have fallen, purposefully or not, into a state of historical amnesia that has erased the fact that the U.S. has committed systematic crimes that have resulted in the deaths of more than a million Indonesians and many more millions throughout the world over innumerable decades.

    Such crimes against humanity have been hidden behind what the English playwright Harold Pinter in his 2005 Nobel Prize address called “a tapestry of lies.”  Of such massive crimes, he said:

    But you wouldn’t know it.

    It never happened. Nothing ever happened. Even while it was happening it wasn’t happening. It didn’t matter. It was of no interest. The crimes of the United States have been systematic, constant, vicious, remorseless, but very few people have actually talked about them.

    And when one examines the true history of such atrocities, again and again one comes up against familiar names of the guilty who have never been prosecuted.  Criminals in high places whose crimes around the world from Vietnam to Chile to Cuba to Nicaragua to Argentina to Iraq to Libya to Syria, etc. have been – and continue to be – integral to American foreign policy as it serves the interests of its wealthy owners and their media mouthpieces.

    In his brilliant new book on U.S./Indonesian history, Dr. Greg Poulgrain unweaves this tapestry of lies and sheds new light on the liars’ sordid deeds. He is an Australian expert on Indonesia whose work stretches back forty years, is a professor at University of the Sunshine Coast in Brisbane and has written four highly-researched books about Indonesia.

    In JFK vs. Dulles, he exposes the intrigue behind the ruthless regime-change strategy in Indonesia of the longest-serving CIA director, Allen Dulles, and how it clashed with the policy of President John F. Kennedy, leading to JFK’s assassination, Indonesian regime change, and massive slaughter.

    Poulgrain begins with this question:

    Would Allen Dulles have resorted to assassinating the President of the United States to ensure that his ‘Indonesian strategy’ rather than Kennedy’s was achieved?

    To which he answers: Yes.

    But let me not get ahead of myself, for the long, intricate tale he tells is one a reviewer can only summarize, so filled is it with voluminous details.  So I will touch on a few salient points and encourage people to buy and read this important book.

    Indonesia’s Strategic Importance

    The strategic and economic importance of Indonesia cannot be exaggerated.  It is the world’s 4th most populous country (275+ million), is located in a vital shipping lane adjacent to the South China Sea, has the world’s largest Muslim population, has vast mineral and oil deposits, and is home in West Papua to Grasberg, the world’s largest gold mine and the second largest copper mine, primarily owned by Freeport McMoRan of Phoenix, Arizona, whose past board members have included Henry Kissinger, John Hay Whitney, and Godfrey Rockefeller.

    Long a battleground in the Cold War, Indonesia remains vitally important in the New Cold War and the pivot to Asia launched by the Obama administration against China and Russia, the same antagonists Allen Dulles strove to defeat through guile and violence while he engineered coups home and abroad. It is fundamentally important in the Pentagon’s Indo-Pacific strategy for what it euphemistically calls a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” While not front-page news in the U.S., these facts make Indonesia of great importance today and add to the gravity of Poulgrain’s historical account.

    JFK

    Two days before President John Kennedy was publicly executed by the US national security state led by the CIA on November 22, 1963, he had accepted an invitation from Indonesian President Sukarno to visit that country the following spring.  The aim of the visit was to end the conflict (Konfrontasi) between Indonesia and Malaysia and to continue Kennedy’s efforts to support post-colonial Indonesia with economic and developmental aid, not military.   It was part of his larger strategy of ending conflict throughout Southeast Asia and assisting the growth of democracy in newly liberated post-colonial countries worldwide.

    He had forecast his position in a dramatic speech in 1957 when, as a Massachusetts Senator, he told the Senate that he supported the Algerian liberation movement and opposed colonial imperialism worldwide.  The speech caused an international uproar and Kennedy was harshly attacked by Eisenhower, Nixon, John Foster Dulles, and even liberals such as Adlai Stevenson.  But he was praised throughout the third world.

    Poulgrain writes:

    Kennedy was aiming for a seismic shift of Cold War alignment in Southeast Asia by bringing Indonesia ‘on side.’  As Bradley Simpson stated (in 2008), ‘One would never know from reading the voluminous recent literature on the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and Southeast Asia, for example, that until the mid-1960s most officials [in the US] still considered Indonesia of far greater importance than Vietnam or Laos.

    Of course, JFK never went to Indonesia in 1964, and his peaceful strategy to bring Indonesia to America’s side and to ease tensions in the Cold War was never realized, thanks to Allen Dulles.  And Kennedy’s proposed withdrawal from Vietnam, which was premised on success in Indonesia, was quickly reversed by Lyndon Johnson after JFK’s murder on November 22, 1963.  Soon both countries would experience mass slaughter engineered by Kennedy’s opponents in the CIA and Pentagon. Millions would die.

    While the Indonesian mass slaughter of mainly poor rice farmers (members of the Communist Party – PKI) instigated by Allen Dulles began in October 1965, ten years later, starting in December 1975, the American installed Indonesian dictator Suharto, after meeting with Henry Kissinger and President Ford and receiving their approval, would slaughter hundreds of thousands East-Timorese with American-supplied weapons in a repeat of the slaughter of more than a million Indonesians in 1965 when the CIA engineered the coup d’état that toppled President Sukarno.  The American installed dictator Suharto would rule for thirty years of terror.  The CIA considers this operation one of its finest accomplishments.  It became known as “the Jakarta Method,” a model for future violent coups throughout Latin America and the world.

    And in-between these U.S. engineered mass atrocities, came the bloody coup in Chile on September 11, 1973 and the ongoing colossal U.S. war crimes in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

    Dulles’s Secret

    What JFK didn’t know was that his plans for a peaceful resolution of the Indonesia situation and an easing of the Cold War were threatening a covert long-standing conspiracy engineered by Allen Dulles to effect regime change in Indonesia through bloody means and to exacerbate the Cold War by concealing from Kennedy the truth that there was a Sino-Soviet split.  Another primary goal behind this plan was to gain unimpeded access to the vast load of natural resources that Dulles had kept secret from Kennedy, who thought Indonesia was lacking in natural resources. But Dulles knew that if Kennedy, who was very popular in Indonesia, visited Sukarno, it would deal a death blow to his plan to oust Sukarno, install a CIA replacement (Suharto), exterminate alleged communists, and secure the archipelago for Rockefeller controlled oil and mining interests, for whom he had fronted  since the 1920s.

    Reading Poulgrain’s masterful analysis, one can clearly see how much of modern history is a struggle for control of the underworld where lies the fuel that runs the megamachine – oil, minerals, gold, copper, etc.  Manifest ideological conflicts, while garnering headlines, often bury the secret of this subterranean devil’s game.

    The Discovery of Gold

    His murder mystery/detective story begins with a discovery that is then kept secret for many decades.  He writes:

    In the alpine region of Netherlands New Guinea (so named under Dutch colonial rule – today, West Papua) in 1936, three Dutchmen discovered a mountainous outcrop of ore with high copper content and very high concentrations of gold.  When later analyzed in the Netherlands, the gold (in gram/ton) proved to be twice that of Witwatersrand in South Africa, then the world’s richest gold mine, but this information was not made public.

    The geologist among the trio, Jean Jacques Dozy, worked for the Netherlands New Guinea Petroleum Company (NNGPM), ostensibly a Dutch-controlled company based in The Hague, but whose controlling interest actually lay in the hands of the Rockefeller family, as did the mining company, Freeport Sulphur (now Freeport McMoRan, one of whose Directors from 1988-95 was Henry Kissinger, Dulles’ and the Rockefeller’s close associate) that began mining operations there in 1966.

    It was Allen Dulles, Paris-based lawyer in the employ of Rockefeller’s Standard Oil, who in 1935 arranged the controlling interest in NNGPN for the Rockefellers.  And it was Dulles, among a select few others, who, because of various intervening events, including WW II, that made its exploitation impossible, kept the secret of the gold mine for almost three decades, even from President Kennedy, who had worked to return the island to Indonesian control. JFK “remained uninformed of the El Dorado, and once the remaining political hurdles were overcome, Freeport would have unimpeded access.” Those “political hurdles”; i.e., regime change, would take a while to effect.

    The Need to Assassinate President Kennedy

    But first JFK would have to be eliminated, for he had brokered Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua/West Irian for Sukarno from the Dutch who had ties to Freeport Sulphur.  Freeport was aghast at the potential loss of “El Dorado,” especially since they had recently had their world’s most advanced nickel refinery expropriated by Fidel Castro, who had named Che Guevara its new manager.  Freeport’s losses in Cuba made access to Indonesia even more important. Cuba and Indonesia thus were joined in the deadly game of chess between Dulles and Kennedy, and someone would have to lose.

    While much has been written about Cuba, Kennedy, and Dulles, the Indonesian side of the story has been slighted. Poulgrain remedies this with an exhaustive and deeply researched exploration of these matters. He details the deviousness of the covert operations Dulles ran in Indonesia during the 1950s and 1960s.  He makes it clear that Kennedy was shocked by Dulles’s actions, yet never fully grasped the treacherous genius of it all, for Dulles was always “working two or three stages ahead of the present.”  Having armed and promoted a rebellion against Sukarno’s central government in 1958, Dulles made sure it would fail (shades of the Bay of Pigs to come) since a perceived failure served his long-term strategy.  To this very day, this faux 1958 Rebellion is depicted as a CIA failure by the media.  Yet from Dulles standpoint, it was a successful failure that served his long-term goals.

    “This holds true,” Poulgrain has previously written, “only if the stated goal of the CIA was the same as the actual goal.  Even more than five decades later, media analysis of the goal of The Outer Island rebels is still portrayed as a secession, as covert US support for ‘rebels in the Outer Islands that wished to secede from the central government in Jakarta’.  The actual goal of Allen Dulles had more to do with achieving a centralized army command in such a way as to appear that the CIA backing for the rebels failed.”

    Dulles’ the Devil

    Dulles betrayed the rebels he armed and encouraged, just as he betrayed friend and foe alike during his long career.  The rebellion that he instigated and planned to fail was the first stage of a larger intelligence strategy that would come to fruition in 1965-6 with the ouster of Sukarno (after multiple unsuccessful assassination attempts) and the institution of a reign of terror that followed.  It was also when – 1966 – Freeport McMoRan began their massive mining in West Papua at Grasberg at an elevation of 14,000 feet in the Alpine region.  Dulles was nothing if not patient; he had been at this game since WW I.  Even after Kennedy fired him following the Bay of Pigs, his plans were executed, just as those who got in his way were.  Poulgrain makes a powerful case that Dulles was the mastermind of the murders of JFK, U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold (working with Kennedy for a peaceful solution in Indonesia and other places), and Congolese President Patrice Lumumba, the first president of a newly liberated Congo.

    His focus is on why they needed to be assassinated (similar in this regard to James Douglass’s JFK and the Unspeakable), though with the exception of Kennedy (since the how is well-known and obvious), he also presents compelling evidence as to the how. Hammarskjold, in many ways Kennedy’s spiritual brother, was a particularly powerful obstacle to Dulles’s plans for Indonesia and colonial countries throughout the Third World. Like JFK, he was committed to independence for indigenous and colonial peoples everywhere and was trying to implement his Swedish-style ‘third way,’ proposing a form of ‘muscular pacifism’.

    Poulgrain argues correctly that if the UN Secretary General succeeded in bringing even half these colonial countries to independence, he would have transformed the UN into a significant world power and created a body of nations so large as to be a counter-weight to those embroiled in the Cold War.

    He draws on documents from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and Chairman Archbishop Desmond Tutu to show the connection between South Africa’s “Operation Celeste” and Dulles’s involvement in Hammarskjold’s murder in September 1961.  While it was reported at the time as an accidental plane crash, he quotes former President Harry Truman saying, “Dag Hammarskjold was on the point of getting something done when they killed him.  Notice that I said, ‘When they killed him’.”  Hammarskjold, like Kennedy, was intent on returning colonized countries to their indigenous inhabitants and making sure Papua was for Papuans, not Freeport McMoRan and imperial forces.

    And Dulles sold his overt Indonesian strategy as being necessary to thwart a communist takeover in Indonesia. Cold War rhetoric, like “the war on terrorism” today, served as his cover.  In this he had the Joint Chiefs of Staff on his side; they considered Kennedy soft on communism, in Indonesia and Cuba and everywhere else. Dulles’s covert agenda was to serve the interests of his power elite patrons.

    While contextually different from David Talbot’s portrayal of Dulles in The Devil’s Chessboard, Poulgrain’s portrait of Dulles within the frame of Indonesian history is equally condemnatory and nightmarish.  Both describe an evil genius ready to do anything to advance his agenda.

    Dulles and George de Mohrenschildt

    Poulgrain adds significantly to our understanding of JFK’s assassination and its aftermath by presenting new information about George de Mohrenschildt, Lee Harvey Oswald’s handler in Dallas.  Dulles had a long association with the de Mohrenschildt family, going back to 1920-21 when in Constantinople he negotiated with Baron Sergius Alexander von Mohrenschildt on behalf of Rockefeller’s Standard Oil.  The Baron’s brother and business partner was George’s father.  Dulles’s law firm, Sullivan & Cromwell, was Standard Oil’s primary law firm. These negotiations on behalf of elite capitalist interests, in the shadow of the Russian Revolution, became the template for Dulles’s career: economic exploitation was inseparable from military concerns, the former concealed behind the anti-communist rhetoric of the latter.  An anti-red thread ran through Dulles’s career, except when the red was the blood of all those whom he considered expendable.  And the numbers are legion.  Their blood didn’t matter.

    Standard Oil is the link that joins Dulles [who controlled the Warren Commission investigating the assassination of JFK] and de Mohrenschildt. This connection was kept from the Warren Commission despite Dulles’ prominent role and the importance of the testimony of de Mohrenschildt. Poulgrain argues convincingly that de Mohrenschildt worked in “oil intelligence” before his CIA involvement, and that oil intelligence was not only Dulles’s work when he first met George’s father, Sergius, in Baku, but that that “oil intelligence” is a redundancy. The CIA, after all, is a creation of Wall Street and their interests have always been joined. The Agency was not formed to provide intelligence to US Presidents; that was a convenient myth used to cover its real purpose which was to serve the interests of investment bankers and the power elite, or those I call The Umbrella People who control the U.S.

    While working in 1941 for Humble Oil  (Prescott Bush was a major shareholder, Dulles was his lawyer, and Standard Oil had secretly bought Humble Oil sixteen years before), de Mohrenschildt was caught up in a scandal that involved Vichy (pro-Nazi) French intelligence in selling oil to Germany.  This was similar to the Dulles’s brothers and Standard Oil’s notorious business dealings with Germany.

    It was an intricate web of the high cabal with Allen Dulles at the center.

    In the midst of the scandal, de Mohrenschildt, suspected of being a Vichy French intelligence agent, “disappeared” for a while.  He later told the Warren Commission that he decided to take up oil drilling, without mentioning the name of Humble Oil that employed him again, this time as a roustabout.

    “Just when George needed to ‘disappear’, Humble Oil was providing an oil exploration team to be subcontracted to NNGPM – the company Allen Dulles had set up five years earlier to work in Netherlands New Guinea.”  Poulgrain makes a powerful circumstantial evidence case (certain documents are still unavailable) that de Mohrenschildt, in order to avoid appearing in court, went incommunicado in Netherlands New Guinea in mid-1941 where he made a record oil discovery and received a $10,000 bonus from Humble Oil.

    “Avoiding adverse publicity about his role in selling oil to Vichy France was the main priority; for George, a brief drilling adventure in remote Netherlands New Guinea would have been a timely and strategic exit.”  And who best to help him in this escape than Allen Dulles – indirectly, of course; for Dulles’s modus operandi was to maintain his “distance” from his contacts, often over many decades.

    In other words, Dulles and de Mohrenschildt were intimately involved for a long time prior to JFK’s assassination. Poulgrain rightly claims that “the entire focus of the Kennedy investigation would have shifted had the [Warren] Commission become aware of the 40-year link between Allen Dulles and de Mohrenschildt.” Their relationship involved oil, spying, Indonesia, Nazi Germany, the Rockefellers, Cuba, Haiti, etc.  It was an international web of intrigue that involved a cast of characters stranger than fiction, a high cabal of the usual and unusual operatives.

    Two unusual ones are worth mentioning: Michael Fomenko and Michael Rockefeller.  The eccentric Fomenko – aka “Tarzan” – is the Russian-Australian nephew of de Mohrenschildt’s wife, Jean Fomenko.  His arrest and deportation from Netherlands New Guinea in 1959, where he had travelled from Australia in a canoe, and his subsequent life, are fascinating and sad. It’s the stuff of a bizarre film. It seems he was one of those victims who had to be silenced because he knew a secret about George’s 1941 oil discovery that was not his to share. “In April 1964, at the same time George de Mohrenschildt was facing the Warren Commission – a time when any publicity regarding Sele 40 [George’s record oil discovery] could have changed history – it was decided that electro-convulsive therapy would be used on Michael Fomenko.” He was then imprisoned at the Ipswich Special Mental Hospital.

    Equally interesting is the media myth surrounding the disappearance of Michael Rockefeller, Nelson’s son and heir to the Standard Oil fortune, who was allegedly eaten by cannibals in New Guinea in 1961. His tale became front-page news, “a media event closed off to any other explanation and the political implications of his disappearance became an ongoing tragedy for the Papuan people.”  To this very day, the West Papuan people, whose land was described by Standard Oil official Richard Archbold in 1938 as “Shangri-la,” are fighting for their independence.

    The Sino-Soviet Split

    While the gold in West Papua was very important to Allen Dulles, his larger goal was to keep the Cold War blazing by concealing the dispute between China and the Soviet Union from Kennedy while instigating the mass slaughter of “communists” that would lead to regime change in Indonesia, with Major-General Suharto, his ally, replacing President Sukarno. In this he was successful. Poulgrain says:

    Not only did Dulles fail to brief Kennedy on the Sino-Soviet dispute early in the presidency, but he also remained silent about the rivalry between Moscow and Beijing to wield influence over the PKI or win its support.  In geographical terms, Beijing regarded Indonesia as its own backyard, and winning the support of the PKI would give Beijing an advantage in the Sino-Soviet dispute.  The numerical growth of the PKI was seen by Moscow and Beijing for its obvious political potential.  Dulles was also focused on the PKI, but his peculiar skill in political intelligence turned what seemed inevitable on its head.  The size of the party [the Indonesian Communist Party was the largest outside the Sino-Soviet bloc] became a factor he used to his advantage when formulating his wedge strategy – the greater the rivalry between Moscow and Beijing over the PKI, the more intense would be the recrimination once the PKI was eliminated.

    The slaughter of more than a million poor farmers was a trifle to Dulles.

    The September 30, 1965 Movement

    In the early hours of October 1, 1965, a fake coup d’état was staged by the CIA’s man, Major-General Suharto.  It was announced that seven generals had been arrested and would be taken to President Sukarno “to explain the rumor that they were planning a military coup on October 5.”  Suharto declared himself the head of the army. Someone was said to have killed the generals. In the afternoon, a radio announcement was made calling for the Sukarno government to be dismissed.  This became Suharto’s basis for blaming it on the communists and the so-called September 30 Movement, and he gave the order to kill the PKI leaders.  This started the massive bloodshed that would follow.

    With one hand, Suharto crushed the Movement, accusing the PKI of being the ultimate instigator of an attempt to oust Sukarno, and with the other hand he feigned to protect the “father of the Indonesian revolution,” while actually stripping Sukarno of every vestige of political support.

    When the generals’ bodies were recovered a few days after October 1, Suharto falsely claimed the PKI women had tortured and sexually mutilated them as part of some primitive sexual orgy.  This heinous perversion of power was the start of the Suharto era.  In total control of the media, he manipulated popular wrath to call for revenge.

    If this confuses you, it should, because the twisted nature of this fabricated coup was actually part of a real coup in slow motion aimed at ousting Sukarno and replacing him with the CIA’s man Suharto.  This occurred in early 1967 after the mass slaughter of communists.  It was a regime change cheered on by the American mass media as a triumph over communist aggression.

    New Evidence of U.S. Direct Involvement in the Slaughter

    Poulgrain has spent forty years interviewing participants and researching this horrendous history. His detailed research is quite amazing. And it does take concentration to follow it all, as with the machinations of Dulles, Suharto, et al.

    Some things, however, are straightforward.  For example, he documents how, during the height of the slaughter, two Americans – one man and one woman – were in Klaten (PKI headquarters in central Java) supervising the Indonesian army as they killed the PKI. These two would travel back and forth by helicopter from a ship of the U.S. 7th Fleet that was off the coast of Java.  The plan was that the more communists killed, the greater would be the dispute between Moscow and Beijing, since they would accuse each other for the tragedy, which is exactly what they did.  This was the wedge that was mentioned in the Rockefeller Brothers Panel Report from the late 1950s in which Dulles and Henry Kissinger both participated.

    The hatred drummed up against these poor members of the Communist Party was extraordinary in its depravity.  In addition to Suharto’s lies about communist women mutilating the generals’ bodies, a massive campaign of hatred was directed against these landless peasants who made up the bulk of the PKI.  False Cold War radio broadcasts from Singapore stirred up hostility toward them, declaring them atheists, etc.  Wealthy Muslim landowners – the 1 per cent – made outrageous charges to assist the army’s slaughter.  Poulgrain tells us:

    Muhammadiyah preachers were broadcasting from mosques that all who joined the communist party must be killed, saying they are the ‘lowest order of infidel, the shedding of whose blood is comparable to killing a chicken.’

    For those Americans especially, who think this history of long ago and far away does not touch them, its compelling analysis of how and why Allen Dulles and his military allies would want JFK dead since he was a threat to national security as they defined in it their paranoid anti-communist ideology might be an added impetus to read this very important book. Indonesia may be far away geographically, but it’s a small world.  Dulles and Kennedy had irreconcilable differences, and when Dulles was once asked in a radio interview what he would do to someone who threatened national security, he matter-of-factually said, “I’d kill him.”  The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed.

    I would be remiss if I didn’t say that the introduction to JFK vs. Dulles by Oliver Stone and the afterward by James DiEugenio are outstanding.  They add excellent context and clarity to a really great and important book.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo looks out of a car window after visiting the national heroes’ cemetery in Kalibata. Image: Kompas/Antara file

    By Ihsanuddin in Jakarta

    Jakarta Indonesian Doctor’s Association (IDI) chairperson Slamet Budiarto has challenged a statement by President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo who has claimed that the Indonesian government has succeeded in bringing the coronavirus pandemic under control.

    Budiarto said he was confused about what parameters Widodo was using in making such a statement.

    “I don’t understand why Pak [Mr] Jokowi made such a statement. Perhaps in terms of the economy, I don’t know what the economy is like. What I do know is in terms of health,” Budiarto told Kompas.com.

    Budiarto asserted that in terms of health, the pandemic was clearly “out of control”. This could be seen from the first parameter – the high death rate.

    According to the Johns Hopkins University world covid-19 map, Indonesia’s total number of deaths today is 30,277.

    “Our death rate is the highest – number 1 among Asean countries – both in terms of percentage and number. I expect that by the end of the year there will be 100,000 deaths, by December 2021,” said Budiarto.

    The second parameter used by the IDI, meanwhile, is the rate of new daily infections. On the day of the interview, there were an additional 13,094 new cases.

    More than 1 million cases
    Today the accumulative number of covid-19 cases in Indonesia is 1,089,308.

    The deputy chairperson of the IDI confessed that he did not understand the parameters being used by Jokowi when he said the pandemic was under control.

    “Yes, well perhaps the President has another parameter. For us at the IDI the parameters are the death and infection rate,” said Budiarto.

    Regardless of the parameters being used, Budiarto is asking the government to focus on dealing with the pandemic in terms of health so the death rate can be brought down.

    He said he had already proposed to Health Minister Budi Gunadi Sadikin that covid-19 patients with minor symptoms be treated at home under the care of general practitioners.

    “One doctor can monitor 10 people. Later they could be given incentives,” said Budiarto.

    In this way, hospitals will not be full and treatment rooms in hospitals can be used to focus on patients with medium and serious symptoms.

    ‘Death rate rising’
    “Right now the death rate is rising because hospitals are overloaded”, he said.

    President Widodo said recently that in 2020 and entering 2021 Indonesia had faced a number of difficult challenges. One of these was the covid-19 pandemic which had resulted in a health and economic crisis.

    Widodo, however, also claimed that Indonesia has been able to control both crises well.

    “We are grateful. Indonesia is among the countries that is controlling these two [health and economic] crises well,” said Widodo during a full working assembly session of the Indonesian Communion of Churches (PGI) through the PGI Yakoma YouTube channel last week.

    Translated by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. The original title of the article was “Jokowi Klaim Pandemi Terkendali, IDI Bingung Apa Indikatornya”.

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    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • By Ihsanuddin in Jakarta

    Jakarta Indonesian Doctor’s Association (IDI) chairperson Slamet Budiarto has challenged a statement by President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo who has claimed that the Indonesian government has succeeded in bringing the coronavirus pandemic under control.

    Budiarto said he was confused about what parameters Widodo was using in making such a statement.

    “I don’t understand why Pak [Mr] Jokowi made such a statement. Perhaps in terms of the economy, I don’t know what the economy is like. What I do know is in terms of health,” Budiarto told Kompas.com.

    Budiarto asserted that in terms of health, the pandemic was clearly “out of control”. This could be seen from the first parameter – the high death rate.

    According to the Johns Hopkins University world covid-19 map, Indonesia’s total number of deaths today is 30,277.

    “Our death rate is the highest – number 1 among Asean countries – both in terms of percentage and number. I expect that by the end of the year there will be 100,000 deaths, by December 2021,” said Budiarto.

    The second parameter used by the IDI, meanwhile, is the rate of new daily infections. On the day of the interview, there were an additional 13,094 new cases.

    More than 1 million cases
    Today the accumulative number of covid-19 cases in Indonesia is 1,089,308.

    The deputy chairperson of the IDI confessed that he did not understand the parameters being used by Jokowi when he said the pandemic was under control.

    “Yes, well perhaps the President has another parameter. For us at the IDI the parameters are the death and infection rate,” said Budiarto.

    Regardless of the parameters being used, Budiarto is asking the government to focus on dealing with the pandemic in terms of health so the death rate can be brought down.

    He said he had already proposed to Health Minister Budi Gunadi Sadikin that covid-19 patients with minor symptoms be treated at home under the care of general practitioners.

    “One doctor can monitor 10 people. Later they could be given incentives,” said Budiarto.

    In this way, hospitals will not be full and treatment rooms in hospitals can be used to focus on patients with medium and serious symptoms.

    ‘Death rate rising’
    “Right now the death rate is rising because hospitals are overloaded”, he said.

    President Widodo said recently that in 2020 and entering 2021 Indonesia had faced a number of difficult challenges. One of these was the covid-19 pandemic which had resulted in a health and economic crisis.

    Widodo, however, also claimed that Indonesia has been able to control both crises well.

    “We are grateful. Indonesia is among the countries that is controlling these two [health and economic] crises well,” said Widodo during a full working assembly session of the Indonesian Communion of Churches (PGI) through the PGI Yakoma YouTube channel last week.

    Translated by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. The original title of the article was “Jokowi Klaim Pandemi Terkendali, IDI Bingung Apa Indikatornya”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • By Adi Briantika in Jakarta

    A group of Papuan students in front of the House of Representatives (DPR) building in Jakarta, who were planning to hold a protest action opposing the extension of Papuan Special Autonomy (Otsus), have been arrested and taken to the Metro Jaya regional police headquarters.

    “Around 15 people were taken away and put into a police crowd control vehicle”, one of the participants, Ambrosius Mulait, told Tirto.

    Mulait said he did not know the reason for the arrest yesterday because the group had not yet arrived at the rally location when the arrests took place.

    Two days ago, said Mulait, the group sent a written notification of the action to police, but the police did not issue a permit for the demonstration.

    He suspects that this was the reason for the arrest – as well as the pretext of Covid-19 health protocols which prohibit crowds from gathering.

    Although they tried to negotiate with the police to be allowed to demonstrate, this did not succeed.

    Mulait and the other participants who were not arrested are still being held in front of the parliament under police guard.

    “How can Papuans convey their right to an opinion opposing Otsus, but are always silenced. Today we were silenced,” he said.

    A similar incident occurred on 27 October 2020 when demonstrators near the Cenderawasih University in Jayapura, Papua, were dispersed and 13 were arrested.

    Action coordinator Mani Iyaba said that based on directives issued by the Jayapura district police, “Any protesters can be beaten, trampled underfoot”.

    Translated by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. The original title of the article was “15 Demonstran Tolak Otsus Papua Jilid II Ditangkap di Kompleks DPR”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Pacific Media Watch newsdesk

    More leading Indonesian figures have made racial slurs against Natalius Pigai, former chair of the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) – and all West Papuans, says United Liberation Movement of West Papua (ULMWP) interim president Benny Wenda.

    “Since the illegal Indonesian invasion in 1963, Indonesian elites have made clear their racist plans to destroy Melanesian West Papuans as a distinct people,” said Wenda in a statement.

    Last month retired General Hendropriyono, former head of the Indonesian intelligence agency (BIN) and special forces (Kopassus) general, claimed that two million West Papuans should be separated from their Melanesian brothers and sisters in the Pacific and moved to the island of Manado in Indonesia.

    “This is racial ethnic cleansing, a genocidal fantasy at the highest levels of the Indonesian state,” Wenda said.

    Last week, one of President Jokowi’s most prominent supporters called a leading West Papuan human rights defender a “monkey”, the same racial slur that sparked the 2019 West Papua Uprising.

    Ambronicus Nababan, chair of the Pro Jokowi-Amin Volunteers (Projamin), made the racial comment about Natalius Pigai, former head of Indonesia’s leading human rights group.

    “These remarks stand in a long tradition. When Indonesia invaded our land, General Ali Moertopo said the Papuan people should be transferred to the moon,” Wenda said in the statement.

    ‘Obstacle to development’
    “In 2016, General Luhut Panjaitan said the Papuans should be transferred to the Pacific. Indonesia’s rulers have always seen us as sub-human, as an obstacle to ‘development’ that needs to be ethnically cleansed and killed.

    “My people rose up against this racism and colonisation in 2019. Thousands of students returned from the rest of Indonesia in an exodus from racism, dozens were killed by Indonesia, and hundreds arrested.

    “The Indonesian state punished those who spoke out with over 100 years of collective prison time. The killers and racists in the army, police and state-backed militias were allowed to go free.”

    These are not just statements from Indonesian officials, Wenda’s statement said.

    They were linked to the military operations that had displaced more than 60,000 people since December 2018. The racist attitudes “justify treating us as second-class citizens, torturing and imprisoning us for exercising our rights to free expression under international law”.

    Indonesia’s settler colonial project in West Papua had been built on racism.

    Wenda said this was why the ULMWP provisional government was formed on December 1 last year.

    ‘We are no longer accepting Indonesian law’
    “We are no longer accepting any Indonesian law, policy or proposal. We will not bow down to Indonesian rule any more. The provisional government is issuing the following four points:

    1. We reject all forms of Indonesian law enforced in West Papua;
    2. We support the 83 countries demanding Indonesia allow the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights into West Papua;
    3. The solution to West Papuan suffering is an independence referendum; and
    4. All West Papuans must unite behind the provisional government.

    “It is time to end this: no more torture, no more displacement, no more killing, no more discrimination. To all my people, those who are working in the Indonesian government, in the civil service, professionals, exiles, lawyers, those inside, in the highlands, coasts, islands and towns – we are no longer Indonesian citizens.

    “We are forming our own Melanesian nation. Come behind the provisional government, and we will peacefully reclaim our country and refuse Indonesia’s illegal occupation of our territory.”

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • “Town & Village”, the first two episodes of the podcast series ShareLoc, send me the location, have been released on Never Was Radio. In these two episodes Indonesians Galih and Raka engage in cross-generational conversation and walk us through different soundscapes. The first location is Batam, the well-known Indonesian industrial town, to which the two protagonists migrated and worked in electronics factories. Batam is perceived as a large industrial town, far from home, where you earn and live well. However in recent years, Batam has been deeply transformed by the global financial crisis, which has led many companies to relocate production and get rid of workers. Part of Indonesia, Batam and nearby islands in the Riau Archipelago overlook the busy Strait of Malacca and are geographically closer to Singapore and Malaysia. They sit more than two hours by plane from the Indonesian capital Jakarta and the populous island of Java, but only twenty minutes by ferry from downtown Singapore and Johor Bahru, in Malaysia. It was precisely the geographical location of this region that has triggered a series of socio-economic transformations. Occupying such a strategic spot along the trade route from East Asia to the Gulf and Europe, the area of Batam has been designated by the Indonesian government as a greenfield for industrial development since 1973. Indonesian bureaucrats of the New Order were motivated by the idea of creating an industrial outpost for Indonesia, a centre of excellence capable of competing with Singapore and Malaysia. From the early 1970s to the present day, with the alternation of different political seasons and governments, Batam and the Riau Islands have repeatedly changed their formal structure and purpose: a “free port” for hydrocarbons and goods, a centre of excellence for industrial research, a low-cost production platform based upon direct foreign investment, one of the targets of the Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore growth triangle (a trans-national program aimed at enhancing prosperity and complementarity in the region) and finally, a Special Economic Zone. Batam transformed the most in the late 1990s and 2000s. This interval also corresponds to the fall of totalitarianism in Indonesia, a period marked by vast social unrest, as well as massive global investment in the country. During those years, the government managed to convince many businesspeople, mostly Singaporean and Japanese, in some cases European, to move their electronics factories and their shipyards to Batam, assuring a complete package of industrial benefits: adequate infrastructure, low-cost workforce thanks to domestic migration from other parts of Indonesia, tax-holiday measures and administrative simplification. In the late 1990s, Batam became an industrial town with over a million inhabitants and one of the “global factories of the world”, smaller in scale but similar Hong Kong, to the point that many products exported all over the world, including fax machines, printers, microprocessors and even large ships were “Made in Batam”. Batam, as a rapidly expanding urban centre, was also complemented by a series of ancillary services: an articulated housing system, dormitories next to factories, apartments for rent, temporary housing, homes sold through mortgages (aimed at the thousands of workers and any relatives who joined them). More than that, a profitable entertainment industry, which included discos and brothels aimed primarily at Singaporean tourists, took off. In the last decade, however, the industrial, urban and social systems of Batam gradually broke down. Today Batam is an underused, to some extent failed, industrial hub. Several factors have caused a deep and irreversible crisis. First, manufacturers have invested too little, or have done so too late, to refurbish their production lines, which often still feature technology dating back to the 1990s. Second, competition from other more modern and efficient state-supported industrial centres, such as those in Vietnam, has become increasingly unendurable. Third, bureaucracy has become more complex in Batam. With the decline of big industry, the town has also begun to stall; little by little, the factory workers and the nightclubs have disappeared. As for the latter, Singaporeans can now take low-cost flights to other destinations. Today Batam is made up of an alternation of factories, shipyards and shopping centres that are completely abandoned and silent, with some workshops still running here and there, often owned by international industrial groups that have maintained a production niche in Batam and some staff, often outsourced. There has been a slight recovery in the tourism and real estate sector, essentially intended for Singaporean pensioners, to whom Batam can offer world-class services, luxury residences, golf courses, and medical assistance at a fraction of their cost in Singapore. The second location featured in the podcast is a village that we will call Arjobembang, in the heart of rural Indonesia, in East Java, with several traditional but not archaic elements, where Galih and Raka sought refuge after losing their factory jobs and where they try to reinvent themselves as tobacco farmers, among many difficulties and little money. A village in general, and Arjobembang in particular, is a place where work usually ends at sunset and people go to sleep relatively early; at night you can hear a pin drop, as opposed to the noise in Batam that goes (or once went) on all night long. Yet, the village is also an articulated, hyperconnected, and globalised environment, not at all backward. The village is home to the returning migrants, women and men who had left the village a few decades earlier to work as maids, waiters and bricklayers, and also technicians and factory workers, in Malaysia, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and often Batam. Even very young people, some of them in their early twenties, are generally very mobile: one of them, whom I met during my field trip, had just returned from Kalimantan, where he operated a bulldozer in a deforestation project. Another young man was taking classes to learn Korean and was planning to migrate to South Korea. A third, who had worked for a couple of years in Japan until his contract and visa expired, returned to the village and opened a ramen bar. Different generations of villagers are often very cosmopolitan, either through direct experiences or the stories of fellow villagers. In many cases, they are also aware of the diverse job opportunities in the so-called New Economy: for instance, the use of social media to advertise and sell one’s products, and ride-hailing apps which seek freelance riders. People are similarly conscious of the drawbacks of modernity: job loss, precarious work, the climate crisis.

    Recording the interviews on Raka’s porch

    The village is not only connected to the rest of the world through long-distance migration routes. It is also communicating with the neighbouring region. It is no coincidence that the third location that Galih and Raka share is Malang, a medium-sized town in East Java, geographically close to the village but at the same time very different. Here, while they farm tobacco in Arjobembang, Galih and Raka try to make ends meet. The former sets money aside to open a traveling espresso bar and the latter is a freelance rider for a mobility app. In recent months, the pandemic has predictably turned the tables. A closing note should be made about the relevance of “audio elements” and the importance of carrying out research “with audio”. The spread of photo and video sharing across Southeast Asia, as well as in Indonesia, has undoubtedly reinforced the centrality of visual elements in the communication and cognitive processes. However, from what I gathered in my field trips to Indonesia, people’s perception of the social and spatial transformation is not only visual and aesthetic but also auditory. It is therefore worth engaging with respondents in a fascinating exploration and participative recording of the several soundscapes that people are, or used to be, immersed in. The “Town & Village” episodes convey two emblematic stories of people who live on the edge between different worlds, namely town and village. They also bespeak the ability to adapt to Indonesian (and global) socio-economic changes, the perception of forms of social, labor and environmental inequality, and the need to build a safe and stable future for themselves and their loved ones. “Town & Village”, available in Italian and English, originated from a collaboration between Giacomo Tabacco, who conducted the original research in Indonesia, collected the stories of Galih and Raka, and conceived the project, and Paolo Righi, who edited and produced the episodes at Never Was Radio, an Italian community radio. The European Community’s project “Competing Regional Integrations in Southeast Asia” (CRISEA) funded the original research in Indonesia. The post De-industrialisation and returning to the land in Indonesia appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • By Devina Halim in Jakarta

    The Security sector Reform Coalition says there are three problems which need to be addressed when the sole candidate for Indonesia’s next police chief, Commissioner General Listyo Sigit Prabowo, takes over the national leadership.

    The coalition is made up of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras), Amnesty International Indonesia, the Human Rights Working Group (HRWG), the Jakarta Legal Aid Foundation (LBH Jakarta), the Setara Institute for Democracy, the Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association (PBHI) and Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW).

    “We are of the view that if these problems are not evaluated then it will be difficult to have democratic policing under the Listyo’s leadership”, said coalition representative and Kontras coordinator Fatia Maulidiyanti in a media release last week.

    The coalition highlighted a statement by Listyo who stated that the police would provide a sense of security to investors. This was revealed during a fit and proper test at the House of Representatives on Wednesday, January 20.

    In relation to this statement, the Coalition believes that this has the potential for the national police to become a tool of the interests of capitalist or certain sections of the elite.

    Yet, according to Law Number 2/2002 on the Indonesian Police, the police are an instrument of the state whose role is to maintain security and public order, uphold the law and protect, safeguard and serve the public.

    “Moreover, we are concerned that this policy will increase the criminalisation or prosecution of environmental activists who often criticise and oppose corporations which damage the environment,” he said.

    Call for police ‘neutrality’
    The coalition is therefore asking Listyo to ensure that the police remain neutral in responding to the social, political and economic dynamics of society.

    The coalition also criticised Listyo’s plan to reactivate the Swakarsa Civilian Security Force or Pam Swakarsa because it has the potential to violate human rights.

    According to Maulidiyanti, there was no clarification on the issue of which organisation can be recruited as Pam Swakarsa or limits on the authority of the police to deploy Pam Swakarsa members.

    Aside from the potential to violate human rights, the police could also give rise to violent incidents, horizontal conflicts and the misuse of power.

    “[This must be avoided by] revoking Police Regulation Number 4/2020 on Swakarsa Security.” she said.

    Incidents of police brutality
    The coalition believes that continuing incidents of police brutality is because there has not been a thorough evaluation and the minimum levels of supervision and accountability. The other reason is the lack of firm punishments, in the form of ethical or criminal punishments.

    Thus the coalition is asking Listyo to conduct an evaluation into the matter.

    “Evaluate the excessive use of violence by firmly upholding the law and applying accountability for police officers who commit excessive violence in dealing with mass protest and improve the national police’s internal monitoring system,” said Maulidiyanti.

    President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has selected Listyo as the sole candidate to replace Indonesian police chief General Idham Azis.

    After taking part in the fit and proper test Wednesday, a DPR plenary session ratified a decision by the DPR’s Commission III to agree to Listyo’s appointment as the next national police chief.

    Listyo will later be inaugurated at a ceremony at the State Palace in Jakarta.

    IndoLeft News notes:
    Pam Swakarsa along with Islamic vigilante groups such as the now outlawed Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) were setup in 1998 by the police and military to counter student demonstrations ahead of the 1998 Special Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly, which was to hear the accountability speech of former President Suharto’s hand-picked successor President B.J. Habibie.

    Translated by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. The original title of the article was “Koalisi Soroti 3 Pernyataan Komjen Listyo Sigit yang Perlu Dievaluasi”.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • The end of the year award of a $458 million contract to Hanwha Defense to supply as many as up to 110 M3 Amphibious Bridge and Ferry Systems for the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army will significantly enhance its abilities to rapidly span even the country’s largest rivers.  The challenge of such river crossings was […]

    The post Republic of Korea Army Builds River Crossing Capabilities appeared first on Asian Military Review.

    This post was originally published on Asian Military Review.

  • Part of the militarised police convoy at Manokwari, West Papua. Image: ULMWP

    Pacific Media Watch newsdesk

    Indonesia has pursued a strategy of aggressive arrests and violence against peaceful demonstrations for independence since the announcement of a provisional government of West Papua and rejection of Jakarta’s “Special Autonomy” renewal last month, reports the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP).

    ULMWP chair Benny Wenda was named interim President of the provisional government on 1 December 2020 as the Papuan people roundly rejected renewal of the failed 2001 Special Autonomy law.

    Highlighting the vast resources the Indonesian state is dedicating to crushing dissent over  renewal of Special Autonomy status across West Papua, a large convoy of heavily-armed police vehicles was photographed heading toward demonstrations in Manokwari last week on January 11.

    On January 7, West Papuan activist Alvarez Kapisa was arrested by Indonesian security forces.

    Kapisa helped organise meetings where West Papuan’s overwhelmingly asserted their rejection of the colonial special autonomy law, calling for their legal right to self-determination, decolonisation and independence.

    Nine more Papuans were arrested in Biak and Supiori between January 4-7 by joint Indonesian military and police patrols for questioning over their support for Benny Wenda’s provisional government and rejection of special autonomy.

    In Biak, they include Yusup Daimboa, Soleman Rumayomi and Yermias Rabrageri, as well as five villagers in Supirori.

    In Serui, Frans Kapisa, Yonathan Ruwayari and Yuliana Rumbara have also been detained. The International Lawyers for West Papua has released a statement condemning their treating.

    KNPB leader abducted
    On January 4, at 5pm, popular activist and National Committee for West Papua (KNPB) leader Naftall Tipagau was abducted by police intelligence agents, alleged ULMWP.

    The husband and father was attacked and dragged into a black van in front of his family, in Intan Jaya, where military operations have displaced over 13,000 people.

    He is yet to be released and no charges have been made by police.

    Tipagau actively reported in Intan Jaya, where the Indonesian military has recently killed Papuan priests.

    The recently discovered Wabu Bloc of gold reserves is planned for extraction by Freeport McMoran, the mining company responsible for decades of environmental destruction and human rights abuses at the Grasberg gold and copper mine in West Papua.

    Papuans and political leaders around the world were horrified on January 6 as plans for a complete “ethnic cleansing” of Papuans were revealed by Indonesian General Hendropriyono.

    Plan to remove Papuans
    The retired Kopassus general and former head of the Indonesian State Intelligence Agency (BIN) declared his proposal to forcibly remove two million Papuans from their homeland and replace them with Indonesians.

    He stated his plans for Indonesia to “transmigrate these two million people to Manado and move two million Manadonese over to Papua. What for? So that we could racially separate them from Papuans in PNG, so that they could feel more like Indonesians instead of foreigners”.

    This plan for ethnic cleansing matches the history of Indonesian population management, described as settler colonialism by a recent study.

    In 1985, the head of the Indonesian “Transmigration” policy of population resettlement described the aim of the programme thus: “The different ethnic groups will in the long run disappear because of integration, and there will be one kind of man.”

    That same day, on January 6, Indonesian forces tortured and killed Mispo Gwijangge, a Papuan who was only 14 years old when he was first arrested in 2018. The 16-year-old boy was falsely charged with the killing of 17 Indonesian soldiers in Nduga, and was imprisoned and tortured for 333 days.

    In Serui, Papuan elder and chairman of West Papua National Authority (WPNA) Waropen regency, Jeremias Rabrageri, was arrested by colonial Indonesian forces on December 30 along with his son, Reiner Rabrageri, after declaring his support for Benny Wenda’s provisional West Papuan government.

    In the week before Christmas, 4850 TNI soldiers were deployed to West Papua to assist the Indonesian police. TNI soldiers were placed throughout West Papua to shut down the peaceful demonstrations marking two decades of failed special autonomy that ended on January 1 and the displays of support for Benny Wenda’s provisional government.

    Confession to torture
    This deployment comes alongside a confession on December 23 by an Indonesian military chief that TNI soldiers tortured, murdered and burned two West Papuan brothers in their custody, alleges ULMWP.

    The bodies of Luther and Apinus Zanambani were then thrown into a river in April 2020.

    This is not the only recent execution carried out. On 26 October 2020, Catholic Catechist Rufinus Tigau was also murdered by the TNI in a village raid.

    On the anniversary of Indonesia’s 1961 attempted invasion of West Papua, on December 19, Indonesian police arrested both Indonesians and Papuans who came together to peacefully protest 59 years of human rights abuses.

    Lombok was the signing place of a notorious treaty between Indonesia and Australia, in which the latter promised to avoid upsetting Indonesia’s occupation of West Papua.

    Indonesian police attacked West Papuan students peacefully protesting against Indonesian human rights abuses, arresting 18 students in Nabire on 10 December 2020.

    Fourteen members of the National Committee for West Papua (KNPB) were also arrested in Merauke and accused of treason on December 12, including chairman of the Merauke branch Charles Sraun, by Indonesian police, who also destroyed the KNPB office. They remain incarcerated and their families have been denied visitation rights.

    Media investigate Indonesian propaganda
    In December, Australian and British media began investigating the Indonesian government’s use of propaganda and fake social media accounts.

    Indonesian intelligence has been running a coordinated social media campaign to discredit the West Papuan independence movement, attributing online posts supporting Indonesia’s colonisation to UK politicians and Australian officials.

    This followed a Bellingcat investigation exposing Indonesia’s creation of fake profiles to disseminate pro-occupation propaganda that have flooded Facebook and Twitter in the past 12 months.

    On 12 January 2021, the Netherlands became the 83rd international state calling for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to be allowed into West Papua.

    This comes after similar calls by the UK government on November 11 following a declaration of concern over killings of Papuans by Indonesian forces by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

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    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Pacific Media Watch newsdesk

    Indonesia has pursued a strategy of aggressive arrests and violence against peaceful demonstrations for independence since the announcement of a provisional government of West Papua and rejection of Jakarta’s “Special Autonomy” renewal last month, reports the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP).

    ULMWP chair Benny Wenda was named interim President of the provisional government on 1 December 2020 as the Papuan people roundly rejected renewal of the failed 2001 Special Autonomy law.

    Highlighting the vast resources the Indonesian state is dedicating to crushing dissent over  renewal of Special Autonomy status across West Papua, a large convoy of heavily-armed police vehicles was photographed heading toward demonstrations in Manokwari last week on January 11.

    On January 7, West Papuan activist Alvarez Kapisa was arrested by Indonesian security forces.

    Kapisa helped organise meetings where West Papuan’s overwhelmingly asserted their rejection of the colonial special autonomy law, calling for their legal right to self-determination, decolonisation and independence.

    Nine more Papuans were arrested in Biak and Supiori between January 4-7 by joint Indonesian military and police patrols for questioning over their support for Benny Wenda’s provisional government and rejection of special autonomy.

    In Biak, they include Yusup Daimboa, Soleman Rumayomi and Yermias Rabrageri, as well as five villagers in Supirori.

    In Serui, Frans Kapisa, Yonathan Ruwayari and Yuliana Rumbara have also been detained. The International Lawyers for West Papua has released a statement condemning their treating.

    KNPB leader abducted
    On January 4, at 5pm, popular activist and National Committee for West Papua (KNPB) leader Naftall Tipagau was abducted by police intelligence agents, alleged ULMWP.

    The husband and father was attacked and dragged into a black van in front of his family, in Intan Jaya, where military operations have displaced over 13,000 people.

    He is yet to be released and no charges have been made by police.

    Tipagau actively reported in Intan Jaya, where the Indonesian military has recently killed Papuan priests.

    The recently discovered Wabu Bloc of gold reserves is planned for extraction by Freeport McMoran, the mining company responsible for decades of environmental destruction and human rights abuses at the Grasberg gold and copper mine in West Papua.

    Papuans and political leaders around the world were horrified on January 6 as plans for a complete “ethnic cleansing” of Papuans were revealed by Indonesian General Hendropriyono.

    Plan to remove Papuans
    The retired Kopassus general and former head of the Indonesian State Intelligence Agency (BIN) declared his proposal to forcibly remove two million Papuans from their homeland and replace them with Indonesians.

    He stated his plans for Indonesia to “transmigrate these two million people to Manado and move two million Manadonese over to Papua. What for? So that we could racially separate them from Papuans in PNG, so that they could feel more like Indonesians instead of foreigners”.

    This plan for ethnic cleansing matches the history of Indonesian population management, described as settler colonialism by a recent study.

    In 1985, the head of the Indonesian “Transmigration” policy of population resettlement described the aim of the programme thus: “The different ethnic groups will in the long run disappear because of integration, and there will be one kind of man.”

    That same day, on January 6, Indonesian forces tortured and killed Mispo Gwijangge, a Papuan who was only 14 years old when he was first arrested in 2018. The 16-year-old boy was falsely charged with the killing of 17 Indonesian soldiers in Nduga, and was imprisoned and tortured for 333 days.

    In Serui, Papuan elder and chairman of West Papua National Authority (WPNA) Waropen regency, Jeremias Rabrageri, was arrested by colonial Indonesian forces on December 30 along with his son, Reiner Rabrageri, after declaring his support for Benny Wenda’s provisional West Papuan government.

    In the week before Christmas, 4850 TNI soldiers were deployed to West Papua to assist the Indonesian police. TNI soldiers were placed throughout West Papua to shut down the peaceful demonstrations marking two decades of failed special autonomy that ended on January 1 and the displays of support for Benny Wenda’s provisional government.

    Confession to torture
    This deployment comes alongside a confession on December 23 by an Indonesian military chief that TNI soldiers tortured, murdered and burned two West Papuan brothers in their custody, alleges ULMWP.

    The bodies of Luther and Apinus Zanambani were then thrown into a river in April 2020.

    This is not the only recent execution carried out. On 26 October 2020, Catholic Catechist Rufinus Tigau was also murdered by the TNI in a village raid.

    On the anniversary of Indonesia’s 1961 attempted invasion of West Papua, on December 19, Indonesian police arrested both Indonesians and Papuans who came together to peacefully protest 59 years of human rights abuses.

    Lombok was the signing place of a notorious treaty between Indonesia and Australia, in which the latter promised to avoid upsetting Indonesia’s occupation of West Papua.

    Indonesian police attacked West Papuan students peacefully protesting against Indonesian human rights abuses, arresting 18 students in Nabire on 10 December 2020.

    Fourteen members of the National Committee for West Papua (KNPB) were also arrested in Merauke and accused of treason on December 12, including chairman of the Merauke branch Charles Sraun, by Indonesian police, who also destroyed the KNPB office. They remain incarcerated and their families have been denied visitation rights.

    Media investigate Indonesian propaganda
    In December, Australian and British media began investigating the Indonesian government’s use of propaganda and fake social media accounts.

    Indonesian intelligence has been running a coordinated social media campaign to discredit the West Papuan independence movement, attributing online posts supporting Indonesia’s colonisation to UK politicians and Australian officials.

    This followed a Bellingcat investigation exposing Indonesia’s creation of fake profiles to disseminate pro-occupation propaganda that have flooded Facebook and Twitter in the past 12 months.

    On 12 January 2021, the Netherlands became the 83rd international state calling for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to be allowed into West Papua.

    This comes after similar calls by the UK government on November 11 following a declaration of concern over killings of Papuans by Indonesian forces by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Corruption is a pervasive feature of Indonesia’s contemporary political economy. In-depth studies and cross-national surveys alike emphasise that illicit fees and bribery are widespread across the public and private sectors, and in the everyday lives of Indonesians. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which is based on the views of experts and business people, gave Indonesia a score of 40 out of a possible 100 in 2019, where 100 is very clean. This moved Indonesia up to the 85th position in the world in 2019, an improvement on recent years—in 2014 Indonesia was ranked 107th.

    On other sorts of measures, however, it’s clear that corruption remains an ongoing impediment to governance and investment. In the 2017 World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey, for example, companies reported corruption to be the most significant challenge for their operations in Indonesia. Yet in the World Bank’s 2015 Enterprise survey (which draws on a larger sample but with a more limited sectoral reach) just 13% of business people stated that corruption was a major constraint on their firm’s operations. Such wide-ranging assessments underscore the challenge of measuring corruption, but also suggest that companies in Indonesia experience corrupt exchanges in very different ways.

    Our study contributes to efforts to better understand the nature of corruption in contemporary Indonesia. It looks specifically at how businesses experience bribery and extortion, and how those experiences differ depending on the sector, firm type, and on the different actors with whom firms interact. To do so, we conducted a survey of Indonesian business elites.

    Click on image for the full report

    Sectors matter

    In collaboration with the Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, LSI), we administered a face-to-face survey of 672 business representatives between July 2019 and February 2020. The sample frame was designed to reflect the structure of the Indonesian economy in terms of sectoral contributions, the geographic spread of economic activity, and the size of the firms operating in each sector. We offer a brief glimpse at the findings here, but further detail, analysis and discussion of anti-corruption reforms, can be found in our full report.

    We first examined firms’ experience of corruption, and their perception of the prevalence of corruption in their sector. We asked respondents (1) how frequently their firm has been asked to pay illicit fees or bribes (2) how frequently they have paid illicit fees or bribes and (3) how common it is for firms in their sector to pay illicit fees or bribes. Overall, some 33.2% of firms report that they have been asked to pay fees outside the official requirements (i.e. extortion, facilitation, or security money). 30.6% report having paid such fees, while 35.7% believe such illicit fees are commonly paid by businesses in their sector. These figures are marginally higher than results reported in the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey from 2015, where 30% of Indonesian firms (in the manufacturing, service and retail sectors) stated they had experienced at least one bribe payment request.

    But responses vary significantly by industry. The highest proportions of firms reporting being extorted, paying bribes and believing the practice is common in their sector (columns 1 to 3) are found in the extractive industries (47.9, 42.7, 53.1%) and in construction (49.5, 44.2 and 51.6%), while the lowest proportion of firms is in the financial sector (17.0, 16.0 and 22.3%). It is worth noting that in most cases (trade and logistics being the exceptions), the perceived incidence of corruption is higher than the reported experience of corruption.

    We also asked respondents whether firms in their sector ever manipulate financial reports (column 5). Very few companies responded that such practices were commonplace (9.8% overall, with a non-response rate of 4.0%). Again, however, variation across sectors is revealing. Responses ranged from highs of 16.8% in the construction sector and 15.6% in the extractive sector, to a low of 2.1% in the financial sector.

    Explaining sectoral differences—hiding profits

    These sectoral differences reflect, in many ways, global patterns of corruption. Mining and other resource extraction industries, especially in middle-income and developing countries, are particularly vulnerable to corrupt practices on the part of firms, politicians and bureaucrats. Analysts have long argued that natural monopolies, such as in petroleum oil extraction or timber logging, provide opportunities for rent extraction on the part of government agents. Additionally, all around the world, from developed to developing countries, construction sectors are notoriously corrupt and present state officials with opportunities for kickbacks and bribes.

    In Indonesia, previous research has shown that construction and public infrastructure is especially prone to corruption. The state issues crucial licenses and plays a substantial regulatory role in these sectors, making them more prone to rent-seeking on the part of state officials as well. Firms also benefit directly from engaging in corruption (access to licenses and permits, for example) and thus have strong incentives to invest in corrupt exchanges, especially in developing countries where autonomous judicial oversight is weak.

    What our survey suggests, however, is that extractives and construction share another feature that has so far been overlooked in studies of corruption. The fact that firms in these two sectors are much more likely to alter their financial reports indicates that, potentially, hiding firm profits is easier and more common.

    Both the construction sector and natural resource industries are characterised by bespoke (as opposed to standardised), uncertain inputs and outputs. This in turns make manipulating reports and hiding revenue from auditors much more viable. Firms in these sectors can thus ‘make back’ the losses incurred through bribery and extortion. For example, each mineral, oil or coal deposit is different, such that estimating and monitoring the real costs of constructing a mine in a given location is immensely difficult, making this phase of an extractive project ripe for financial manipulation. Unreported production can then be diverted onto the black market beyond the purview of tax collectors.

    Designing solutions at the sector level

    What do these findings mean for measuring corruption generally and for anti-corruption policy in contemporary Indonesia specifically? Measuring corruption at the national scale, and making cross-country comparisons based on those state-level observations, might produce misleading characterisations of the nature of corruption in a country such as Indonesia. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and the Global Corruption Index by Global Risk Profile, for example, allocate states an overall score when it comes to the intensity of illicit economic activity. The important differences between sectors are usually lost in these aggregated indexes; yet such differences are potentially critical for designing appropriate anti-corruption interventions that focus on both bureaucrats and companies.

    Our results suggest a role for more investment in sector-level monitoring agencies and watchdogs. In general, the Jokowi government has pivoted away from punitive measures in the fight against corruption, and instead emphasised preventative measures such as cutting red tape and improving permitting processes. Such interventions have probably reduced firms’ exposure to bribery and rent-seeking.

    But the government’s approach has also drawn much criticism. A new law introduced in late 2019 reduces the investigatory powers of the KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission) and undermines the body’s independence by bringing it under the auspices of a politically appointed supervisory body. The move triggered nation-wide protests against what many saw as an attempt to dismantle one of the few effective and trusted corruption watchdogs in the country. This strategy, Jokowi hopes, will relieve investors and firms from the burden of bribery, while avoiding what he views as politically disruptive investigations.

    Our data, on the other hand, suggest a need for more, not less, monitoring and enforcement of firms and bureaucrats. Indonesia’s anti-corruption interventions should be designed at the sector level, led by an independent KPK with a strong sectoral orientation, and should engage with the major business actors in each sector.

    The post Paying bribes in Indonesia appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Indonesian President Joko Widodo … response to the covid-19 pandemic “weak, with low testing and tracing rates, and little transparency”. Image: IndoLeft/CNN Indonesia

    Pacific Media Watch newsdesk

    Human Rights Watch (HRW) has criticised the Indonesian government of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo for its weak health response to covid-19 which has brought Indonesia to its knees since March 2020, reports CNN Indonesia.

    The assessment is based on Indonesia’s poor rates of testing and tracing and minimal transparency. Furthermore, the government was both slow and incompetent in dealing with the covid-19 pandemic.

    In its annual World Report 2021 the human rights organisation highlighted that under President Widodo’s leadership the government had instead focused on regulations related to labour which harmed the rights of workers and damaged the environment.

    Yet the epidemic itself has killed at least 17,000 Indonesians and resulted in around 2.6 million people losing their jobs.

    “The response of President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s government to the covid-19 pandemic was weak, with low testing and tracing rates, and little transparency,” the report said.

    “The impact of the virus has been devastating, killing at least 17,000 people, and leading to the loss of 2.6 million jobs.”

    HRW Asia director Brad Adams said that the Widodo government never made dealing with the pandemic its top priority and focusing instead on passing laws that harmed workers and the environment.

    Pandemic not top priority
    “The Jokowi government never seemed to make the pandemic its top priority, focusing instead on passing a business-friendly law that harm workers and the environment”, said Adams as quoted from the HRW website by CNN Indonesia.

    According to Adams, which creating jobs and planning economic recovery are important goals especially in a pandemic, “but they should not come at the expense of fighting the virus or protecting the hard-fought rights of workers”.

    Adams said that the HRW also highlighted violations of the rights of women, religious minorities and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) groups.

    There were many cases of Muslim groups who threatened religious minority groups found in Indonesia but the government’s response this kind of intimidation was still very minimal.

    Adams said that according to HRW’s records, Indonesian police arrested at least 38 people for blasphemy across 16 provinces in 2020.

    The Supreme Court also rejected a petition to revoke the joint ministerial decree on houses of worship, which has been used to close down hundreds of churches since 2006.

    “Jokowi came to office promising progressive reforms, but in 2020 he seemed to give up any remaining intentions he had to protect rights and the most vulnerable,” Adams said.

    Limited access to Papuan provinces
    Indonesia, according to the HRW report, has also continued to limit access for international rights monitors and journalists to visit Papua and West Papua provinces, which have long been affected by unrest and rights violations.

    “It’s not too late for him to take bold steps to prioritise public health, reinstate labor and environmental protections, and protect free expression. His last years in office will define his legacy”, concluded Adams.

    Translated by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. The original title of the article was “HRW: Respons Jokowi Lemah terhadap Penanganan Pandemi Corona”.

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    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Pacific Media Watch newsdesk

    Human Rights Watch (HRW) has criticised the Indonesian government of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo for its weak health response to covid-19 which has brought Indonesia to its knees since March 2020, reports CNN Indonesia.

    The assessment is based on Indonesia’s poor rates of testing and tracing and minimal transparency. Furthermore, the government was both slow and incompetent in dealing with the covid-19 pandemic.

    In its annual World Report 2021 the human rights organisation highlighted that under President Widodo’s leadership the government had instead focused on regulations related to labour which harmed the rights of workers and damaged the environment.

    Yet the epidemic itself has killed at least 17,000 Indonesians and resulted in around 2.6 million people losing their jobs.

    “The response of President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s government to the covid-19 pandemic was weak, with low testing and tracing rates, and little transparency,” the report said.

    “The impact of the virus has been devastating, killing at least 17,000 people, and leading to the loss of 2.6 million jobs.”

    HRW Asia director Brad Adams said that the Widodo government never made dealing with the pandemic its top priority and focusing instead on passing laws that harmed workers and the environment.

    Pandemic not top priority
    “The Jokowi government never seemed to make the pandemic its top priority, focusing instead on passing a business-friendly law that harm workers and the environment”, said Adams as quoted from the HRW website by CNN Indonesia.

    According to Adams, which creating jobs and planning economic recovery are important goals especially in a pandemic, “but they should not come at the expense of fighting the virus or protecting the hard-fought rights of workers”.

    Adams said that the HRW also highlighted violations of the rights of women, religious minorities and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) groups.

    There were many cases of Muslim groups who threatened religious minority groups found in Indonesia but the government’s response this kind of intimidation was still very minimal.

    Adams said that according to HRW’s records, Indonesian police arrested at least 38 people for blasphemy across 16 provinces in 2020.

    The Supreme Court also rejected a petition to revoke the joint ministerial decree on houses of worship, which has been used to close down hundreds of churches since 2006.

    “Jokowi came to office promising progressive reforms, but in 2020 he seemed to give up any remaining intentions he had to protect rights and the most vulnerable,” Adams said.

    Limited access to Papuan provinces
    Indonesia, according to the HRW report, has also continued to limit access for international rights monitors and journalists to visit Papua and West Papua provinces, which have long been affected by unrest and rights violations.

    “It’s not too late for him to take bold steps to prioritise public health, reinstate labor and environmental protections, and protect free expression. His last years in office will define his legacy”, concluded Adams.

    Translated by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. The original title of the article was “HRW: Respons Jokowi Lemah terhadap Penanganan Pandemi Corona”.

     

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Pacific Media Watch correspondent

    The pro-independence conflict in West Papua with a missionary plane reportedly being shot down at Intan Jaya has stirred contrasting responses from the TNI/POLRI state sources, church leaders and an independence leader.

    A shooting caused a plane to catch fire on 6 January 2021 in the Intan Jaya regency, Papua province.

    The West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) or OPM (Papua Liberation Organisation) were alleged to have opened fire on the Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAF) aircraft.

    The shooting and blaze also sparked different responses from the leader of the KINGMI Synod on the Land of Papua, the interim president of the ULMWP, the TPNPM spokesperson and Indonesian police officers.

    Jubi reports that the Head of Public Relations of the Papua Police (Kombes Pol), Achmad Mustofa Kamal, said the aircraft was set ablaze when it landed at Pagamba Airport, Nabire City, Papua.

    The MAF PK-MAX aircraft piloted by an American citizen, Alex Luferchek departed from Nabire airport carrying two passengers from the local community bound for Pagamba (MAF’s pioneering airport), Biandoga district, Intan Jaya regency.

    About 09.30am, pilot Luferchek reported via radio to the MAF office that the plane had landed at Pagamba airport.

    Pilot secured by priests
    When the pilot got off the plane, somebody – allegedly from an “Armed Criminal Group” (the Indonesian security description for TPNPB) – came with a gun. He fired a shot into the air while telling the pilot to duck.

    The pilot was secured by priests and the community and taken to to Kampung Tekai, the border between Kampung Bugalaga and Kampung Pagamba, Mbiandoga district, Intan Jaya regency.

    According to Sebby Sambom, an international spokesman for the TPNPB, the reports he had received were only related to the shooting. His party did not yet know about the burning of the MAF aircraft.

    Sambom said that the arson was reported by Indonesian media to “build a bad narrative” against the TPNPB.

    “We’re freedom fighters. The ones who have developed this burning aircraft issue are the Indonesian media,” he said.

    Sambom also said that the shootings carried out by the TPNPB were not arbitrary. His party had learned that the TNI/POLRI used missionary planes to transport Indonesian military and their logistics.

    Benny Wenda, acting President of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua, told Pacific Media Watch by telephone that the ULMWP was the umbrella organisation for independence groups.

    Struggle through ‘peaceful means’
    He said the ULMWP struggle was a struggle through peaceful means.

    He added that the enemy of TPNPB was the Indonesian army, not humanitarian workers and that West Papuans always “respected missionaries and other humanitarian workers” for their sacrifices and services to the people of the West Papua region.

    “The shooting that took place (on January 4) was two days after the statement made by the former head of the State Intelligence Agency, Hendropriyono, that some missionaries had been involved using the church’s channels in an effort to liberate Papua from Indonesia,” said Wenda.

    Retired general Abdullah Mahmud Hendropriyono from Kopassus, the Indonesian Army special forces group is also the first head of Indonesia’s State Intelligence Agency (BIN).

    Wenda, who is currently living in Oxford, United Kingdom, as interim President of West Papua-in-exile, says his party is fighting for the independence of West Papua through peaceful means.

    “In our policy it is very clear that, we do not take any harmful action against missionaries or any other humanitarian workers, because it would violate international law,” said Wenda.

    He said the public could not simply accept the news reported by Indonesian authorities because an incident like this had happened because it is likely it was was “fabricated by the Indonesians”.

    Asked by Pacific Media Watch, whether the OPM was a terrorist organisation, Wenda said: “West Papua does not have terrorists. In fact, it was Indonesia who came to Papua as terrorists killing Papuans with modern weapons”.

    This report has been compiled by a special Pacific Media Watch freedom project correspondent.

     

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Pacific Media Watch correspondent

    The pro-independence conflict in West Papua with a missionary plane reportedly being shot down at Intan Jaya has stirred contrasting responses from the TNI/POLRI state sources, church leaders and an independence leader.

    A shooting caused a plane to catch fire on 6 January 2021 in the Intan Jaya regency, Papua province.

    The West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) or OPM (Papua Liberation Organisation) were alleged to have opened fire on the Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAF) aircraft.

    The shooting and blaze also sparked different responses from the leader of the KINGMI Synod on the Land of Papua, the interim president of the ULMWP, the TPNPM spokesperson and Indonesian police officers.

    Jubi reports that the Head of Public Relations of the Papua Police (Kombes Pol), Achmad Mustofa Kamal, said the aircraft was set ablaze when it landed at Pagamba Airport, Nabire City, Papua.

    The MAF PK-MAX aircraft piloted by an American citizen, Alex Luferchek departed from Nabire airport carrying two passengers from the local community bound for Pagamba (MAF’s pioneering airport), Biandoga district, Intan Jaya regency.

    About 09.30am, pilot Luferchek reported via radio to the MAF office that the plane had landed at Pagamba airport.

    Pilot secured by priests
    When the pilot got off the plane, somebody – allegedly from an “Armed Criminal Group” (the Indonesian security description for TPNPB) – came with a gun. He fired a shot into the air while telling the pilot to duck.

    The pilot was secured by priests and the community and taken to to Kampung Tekai, the border between Kampung Bugalaga and Kampung Pagamba, Mbiandoga district, Intan Jaya regency.

    According to Sebby Sambom, an international spokesman for the TPNPB, the reports he had received were only related to the shooting. His party did not yet know about the burning of the MAF aircraft.

    Sambom said that the arson was reported by Indonesian media to “build a bad narrative” against the TPNPB.

    “We’re freedom fighters. The ones who have developed this burning aircraft issue are the Indonesian media,” he said.

    Sambom also said that the shootings carried out by the TPNPB were not arbitrary. His party had learned that the TNI/POLRI used missionary planes to transport Indonesian military and their logistics.

    Benny Wenda, acting President of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua, told Pacific Media Watch by telephone that the ULMWP was the umbrella organisation for independence groups.

    Struggle through ‘peaceful means’
    He said the ULMWP struggle was a struggle through peaceful means.

    He added that the enemy of TPNPB was the Indonesian army, not humanitarian workers and that West Papuans always “respected missionaries and other humanitarian workers” for their sacrifices and services to the people of the West Papua region.

    “The shooting that took place (on January 4) was two days after the statement made by the former head of the State Intelligence Agency, Hendropriyono, that some missionaries had been involved using the church’s channels in an effort to liberate Papua from Indonesia,” said Wenda.

    Retired general Abdullah Mahmud Hendropriyono from Kopassus, the Indonesian Army special forces group is also the first head of Indonesia’s State Intelligence Agency (BIN).

    Wenda, who is currently living in Oxford, United Kingdom, as interim President of West Papua-in-exile, says his party is fighting for the independence of West Papua through peaceful means.

    “In our policy it is very clear that, we do not take any harmful action against missionaries or any other humanitarian workers, because it would violate international law,” said Wenda.

    He said the public could not simply accept the news reported by Indonesian authorities because an incident like this had happened because it is likely it was was “fabricated by the Indonesians”.

    Asked whether the OPM was a terrorist organisation, Wenda said: “West Papua does not have terrorists. In fact, it was Indonesia who came to Papua as terrorists killing Papuans with modern weapons”.

    This report has been compiled by a special Pacific Media Watch freedom project correspondent.

     

    This post was originally published on Asia Pacific Report.

  • Recent reports of potential normalisation between Indonesia and Israel have received varied reactions in the respective countries. In his three-month marathon toward normalization, U.S. President Donald Trump has persuaded four Arab countries to open diplomatic relations with Israel. With his term set to end in a matter of days, Trump carries on in a full sprint to rack up even more. Oman and Indonesia, said an Israeli source, are predicted to be the next targets.

    In his latest book, The Hundred Years War on Palestine, historian Rashid Khalidi writes that Israel’s “most vital asset” is its reputation abroad. Since its founding, Israel has struggled to protect its image and stature in the face of delegitimization by Arab and Muslim countries. For the regionally isolated Jewish state, for whom the question of legitimacy is of existential importance, normalisation is understandably a top foreign policy priority.

    While news surrounding normalisation has acquired a banality due to frequent media coverage, the significance of an official Indonesian thawing of ties to Israel should not be underestimated. Previous deals for the normalisation of ties to Israel by other sovereign states were made by monarchs and dictators. These decisions were grossly unrepresentative of the opinions of their people, an overwhelming majority of whom disapprove of such a normalization. When viewed through an Israeli lens, normalisation with Indonesia—a thriving Muslim democracy—could be seen as its first success in winning the hearts and minds of both the public and leadership of a previously antagonistic nation.

    Surprising but not unforeseeable

    The Indonesian government was quick to refute the alleged opening. The Foreign Ministry denied any talks had taken place with Israel, while affirming Indonesia’s unwavering support for Palestinian independence — a position which was later reiterated by Speaker of Parliament Puan Maharani.

    While the suddenness of the news may come as a shock, it is by no means unforeseeable.

    In late November, Indonesia decided to reinstate calling visas for citizens of Israel and seven other countries. This action was criticized by some Indonesian MPs, as potential soft diplomacy to ease and cushion an eventual normalisation of ties. Curiously, the decision came several weeks after U.S. State Secretary Mike Pompeo’s first official visit to Indonesia. Pompeo has been a key figure in the normalisation marathon, well known for his shuttle diplomacy between the U.S. and the Middle East for that purpose.

    Compared to Malaysia and Brunei, Indonesia seems to have a more welcoming climate to open relations with Israel. While normalisation only enjoys minute support today, Israel and its lobby groups have successfully reached out to these marginal voices.

    Social media has proven very effective as a point of contact. “Israel Berbahasa Indonesia”, a Facebook page managed by the Israeli government, has achieved more than 280,000 followers. The page, self-declared as “educational” in its mission, shares select pieces of news that counter the mainstream anti-Israeli narrative in Indonesia. The human-to-human track is exemplified by the social media strategy of influencer Hananya Naftali, a member of Israeli PM’s outreach team. Naftali regularly sends heart-felt messages to Indonesians on their day of independence. In a recent tweet he shared a picture six hijabi students whose entangled bodies form the Star of David. “We were not meant to be enemies”, he wrote.

    Israel has also sponsored programs and gatherings specifically designed to amplify the impact of its cultural diplomacy.

    Early next year the Israel Asia Centre will inaugurate the “Israel-Indonesia Futures” program where entrepreneurs and professionals are trained to strengthen ties between the two countries. The organizing team boasted securing at least 200 million USD in investment to the Israeli economy by the alumni of its previous programs. While the annual visit by Indonesian pilgrims to Israel is well documented, lesser known are the organized educational tours funded by pro-Israel groups for Indonesians who demonstrate sound capacity as cultural bridges between the two nations. My correspondence with one participant shows the meticulousness with which the itinerary of these tours is crafted. Locations visited include the West Bank settlements and the disputed Golan Heights—places ordinary tourists cannot easily access.

    For some Indonesians, whose state-imposed restrictions from interacting with Israelis has ironically bred curiosity to see the other side, “visit us and you’ll understand us” has become an almost irresistible mantra. Although largely unnoticed, pro-Israel sympathy is becoming less a taboo for certain circles in Indonesia. To those who closely follow this trajectory, news on normalization, while sudden, is not surprising.

    Material benefit, symbolic loss

    Arab countries who have normalized ties with Israel have been promised specific benefits from the US. Most notoriously in the Moroccan case, the normalisation of ties was conditioned upon American recognition of the kingdom’s sovereignty over the disputed Western Sahara. In a future Indonesian scenario, similar quid pro quo arrangements are possibly in order. One senior U.S. official recently disclosed the possibility of Indonesia receiving billions of dollars in American aid as a reward of normalisation of ties.

    Few disciples of realpolitik would dispute the merits of relations with Israel. Normalisation advocacy often highlight the benefit Indonesia may reap from Israel’s cutting-edge technology, particularly in the agriculture and health sector. Moreover, with open relations Indonesia would no longer depend on third parties to purchase military equipment from Israel—like its past procurement of Israeli Skyhawks in the 1980s. In the current pandemic, the interest in Israel’s world-class vaccine research is becoming ever apparent.

    This rationalization is certainly true insofar as material benefit is concerned. An ideological reading of the situation, however, projects a more sinister scenario.

    Indonesia’s national prestige historically stems from its spearheading role in the Third World anti-colonial struggle. As the only nation in attendance at the 1955 Bandung Conference  yet to gain independence, it is almost expected that Palestine captures the current focus of Indonesia’s anti-colonial mission. Just several years ago, in the sixtieth commemoration of the conference, President Joko Widodo urged the world “not to turn their back on Palestinian suffering”. In the mainstream Palestinian parlance, normalisation is spoken of as exactly that: a stab in the back. The reputational toll to Indonesia for being perceived as a hypocrite who abandons the Palestinian cause is tremendous.

    Even during the Suharto era, the heyday of covert cooperation with Israel, Indonesia did not go to the extent of normalisation. If in the oppressive New Order—when controversial policy could be pursued with fewer political cost—Israeli material incentives did not allure Indonesia to forego its special commitment for Palestine, assuming that the same reasoning could work today is a naiveté.

    “Saviour complex”: normalizing to help Palestinians

    The Indonesian non-recognition of Israel primarily stems from the symbolic importance (nationalist and religious) of solidarity with the Palestinians. Lip-service to this symbolic aspect, at the least, is a must for pro-normalisation arguments to gain traction. Relying on material grounds alone will not succeed.

    The late-president Abdurrahman Wahid once made an intriguing argument: if Indonesia, whose state-ideology abhors atheism, has relations with Communist China why not with God-believing Israel? Indonesia, Wahid argued further, could never play a meaningful role in brokering peace by only talking to one side and avoiding the other.

    The echo of this Gusdurian legacy still resonates with many Indonesian Muslims today, particularly among the Nahdliyin. The controversial 2017 visit to Israel by Yahya Cholil Staquf, the General Secretary of NU, was hailed by his supporters as the continuation of Wahid’s inter-civilizational mission. Staquf sought to convey the message of Islam as rahmah (universal compassion) to Israelis, hoping it would persuade them to the path of peace.

    For Indonesians who have witnessed decades of hostility that have brought the Palestinians nowhere, reaching to the other side—even with the slightest chance to achieve peace—seems like a reasonable step to take. Normalisation, in this line of thinking, constitutes a strategic move to increase Indonesia’s leverage such that its concern on the Palestinian question is solemnly heard by Israel. Or does it?

    In my estimation, this gesture of benevolence might unfortunately be misplaced. Beyond simply a matter of future statehood, supporting the Palestinian right of self-determination should mean an acknowledgement that they are best placed to shape their future. Indonesia is an ally to the Palestinians; it is neither their saviour nor it should pretend to be one. What good is the helper, if its help is not sought by the helped?

    If anything unites the different Palestinian factions, it is their resistance against the normalisation trend. Both the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority and Hamas have appealed directly to the Indonesian president, alerting him of the trend’s detriments. Palestine even left its chairmanship in the Arab League precisely due to the organization’s failure to condemn normalisation. There are no grounds to claim that Palestinians would feel helped by Indonesia opening up to Israel. If anything, it would seriously demoralise them.

    One must remember that the Israel of Gusdur’s time is different from today. Israel’s Overton window has shifted so much to the right, that the leftist peace camp has become a virtually irrelevant player. Today, political centrism in Israel still means retention of illegal settlements and ambivalence to Palestinian statehood. Many in the Israeli leadership have now spoken of containing the conflict, rather than resolving it.

    A garrison state in the region, Israel prizes recognition as an insurance policy in the context of its existential insecurity. For such a treasured bargaining chip, normalisation should not be given away for facile promises and mere material incentives. Indonesia must remain steadfast to its two-state commitment and quell the normalisation trend. Peace and justice should come before recognition, not the reverse.

    The post Indonesia is no saviour: against normalisation with Israel appeared first on New Mandala.

    This post was originally published on New Mandala.

  • Pacific Media Watch newsdesk

    Body parts and debris were hauled from waters near Indonesia’s capital Jakarta today from a Boeing passenger plane that crashed shortly after take off with 62 people on board, reports The Jakarta Post.

    The Sriwijaya Air Boeing 737-500 plunged into a steep dive about four minutes after it left Soekarno-Hatta international airport in Jakarta on Saturday afternoon.

    No reasons have yet been given for the crash, with authorities focusing on a frantic search and rescue effort that appeared to offer no hope of finding any survivors.

    “As of this morning, we’ve received two (body) bags, one with passenger belongings and the other with body parts,” Jakarta police spokesman Yusri Yunus told Metro TV.

    The discovery came as a flotilla of warships, helicopters and divers were deployed off the coast of the sprawling city.

    Sixty-two passengers and crew were on board, including 10 children, all of them Indonesians, according to authorities.

    Sriwijaya Air flight SJ182 was bound for Pontianak city on Indonesia’s section of Borneo island, about 90 minutes flying time over the Java Sea.

    Crashed in Java Sea
    It crashed in the Java Sea near popular day-trip tourist islands just off the coast.

    Distraught relatives waited nervously for news at Pontianak airport on Saturday night.

    “I have four family members on the flight — my wife and three children,” Yaman Zai said as he sobbed.

    “(My wife) sent me a picture of the baby today…How could my heart not be torn into pieces?”

    Officials said today they would continue their search by sea and air while also using sonar radar to pick up more signs of the downed jet.

    Divers marked at least three sites at the suspected crash site with orange ballons, according to an Agence France-Presse reporter on the scene.

    “From our observation, it is strongly believed the coordinates match the ones from the plane’s last signal contact,” said Hadi Tjahjanto, head of Indonesia’s military.

    Hundreds of personnel from search and rescue, the navy, the police, with 10 warships also taking part in the search effort.

    Sudden dive
    Data from FlightRadar24 said the plane reached an altitude of nearly 3,350m before dropping suddenly to 100m. It then lost contact with air traffic control.

    Indonesian Transport Minister Budi Karya Sumadi said Saturday that the jet appeared to deviate from its intended course just before it disappeared from radar.

    Sriwijaya Air, which has about 19 Boeing jets that fly to destinations in Indonesia and Southeast Asia, has said only that it was investigating the loss of contact.

    It did not immediately comment when contacted by AFP again on Sunday.

    In October 2018, 189 people were killed when a Lion Air Boeing 737 MAX jet slammed into the Java Sea about 12 minutes after take-off from Jakarta on a routine one-hour flight.

    That crash – and a subsequent fatal flight in Ethiopia – saw Boeing hit with $2.5 billion in fines over claims it defrauded regulators overseeing the 737 MAX model, which was grounded worldwide following the two deadly crashes.

    The jet that went down Saturday is not a MAX model and was 26 years old, according to authorities.

    No immediate insights
    In its initial statements on Saturday’s crash, Boeing offered no immediate insights into the cause.

    “We are aware of media reports from Jakarta regarding Sriwijaya Air flight SJ-182. Our thoughts are with the crew, passengers, and their families,” the US-based planemaker said in a statement.

    “We are in contact with our airline customer and stand ready to support them during this difficult time.”

    Indonesia’s aviation sector has long suffered from a reputation for poor safety, and its airlines were once banned from entering US and European airspace.

    In 2014, an AirAsia plane crashed with the loss of 162 lives.

    Domestic investigators’ final report on the AirAsia crash showed a chronically faulty component in a rudder control system, poor maintenance and the pilots’ inadequate response were major factors in what was supposed to be a routine flight from the Indonesian city of Surabaya to Singapore.

    A year later, in 2015, more than 140 people, including people on the ground, were killed when a military plane crashed shortly after takeoff in Medan on Sumatra island.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The COVID-19 crisis is exacerbating gender inequality in global supply chains. Because COVID-19 has hit low-paid manufacturing sectors where women work in large proportions, these consequences are not gender-neutral. The ILO reports, for example, that 2 out of 5 workers in the Asia-Pacific garment industry have not returned to work after factory closures. Women in the garment sector represent a majority of workers in the industry and contribute to 5.2% of the region’s total women’s labour force.

    Yet amid the pandemic, the invisible labour performed by many women in Asia has not merely doubled but tripled. Not only are many women workers primary caregivers at home, some are also active unionists facing an uphill battle to protect the rights of the region’s most vulnerable workers.

    The disrupted global supply chain, where demand from global buyers has dropped, sets suppliers up in a position of weak bargaining power. Demand for garment production has dropped by some 70%, with the availability of input supplies also down. The cancellation of buyers’ orders and lockdowns have necessitated temporary and indefinite factory closures. Actions taken by industrial companies have mostly transferred the risk to women workers. Approximately 60% of garment suppliers in Asian countries have dismissed some workers, while half have terminated more than 10% of their labour force.

    For those still in work, many women workers in Asia from manufacturing sectors are suffering both reduced and delayed pay. According to Willis Towers Watson, 34% of 3,800 companies across 22 Asia-Pacific countries have adjusted their wages. In Bangladesh, some 32 per cent of workers in 80 factories have experienced late payments.

    Unions are a crucial channel for workers to exercise their bargaining power through dialogue with companies and governments. Rights to organise and collective bargaining are ways for unions to propose, design and evaluate social protection schemes to improve the livelihoods of workers. Unions are also pillars of democracy that support political organising and the mobilisation of collective power.

    But for women union leaders, the triple burden of work in the house, workplace and union is a delicate balancing act. With children expected to do online schooling from home during the pandemic, many working mothers are now carrying larger burdens outside of work hours, with gender expectations placing the lion’s share of domestic work on their shoulders.

    The Inter-Factory Workers’ Federation (FBLP but currently in the process of changing its name to the Federation of United Indonesian Workers Unions/FSBPI) is one case study of women workers building collective power as a way to protect their rights. Active since 2009, the union federation emerged from disappointment and anger at company-dominated  “yellow unions” that did not represent worker interests. Many FBLP members recounted resenting seeing male leaders of yellow unions flaunt their wealth while workers were deficiently paid.

    In a culmination of anger and frustration, in 2010, the union successfully organised a large strike in Kawasan Berikat Nusantara (KBN Cakung), the most significant Export Processing Zone in greater Jakarta, for an increase to the minimum wage from 1.1 million rupiahs (US$79) per month to 1.4 million rupiahs (US$99) per month. As a women workers’ union with some 1,000 members, FBLP has gained a reputation for fighting for rights from living wages, fair working hours, to paid days off.

    Jumisih, as well as being a “full-time” unionist and leader, is also a wife and mother of a 13-year-old son. She has been the primary breadwinner in her family since her husband lost his job last year, though most of her time is spent with the union. Before the pandemic, Jumisih often slept at the union’s headquarters. After March 2020 though, she rarely went into the office until the Indonesian government and the Jakarta municipality announced the lifting of the lockdown.

    During the lockdown, Jumisih struggled to manage roles in three equally demanding worlds, while fretting over fears her family would be exposed to the virus. “I’m so exhausted helping my son attend online classes that I have to manage my time precisely. I also organise workers on the weekends.” Her union works hard to gather collective funds as alternative safety nets, distributing food and cash to women workers to support workers without access to formal social protection.

    Now corporations are using COVID-19 as a pretext to dismantle and crackdown on unions. Rahma is a leader of a factory-level union under FBLP as well as a worker at PT Amos Indah Indonesia, a garment factory located in KBN Cakung. She recounts that management refused to meet the union when it ordered approximately 800 workers to have unpaid time off for two weeks, which both Jumisih and Rahma argue are violations of labour law. Management then asked them to continue working with wage cuts afterwards. The transition to online communications during factory closures have made it easier for management to deny requests for meetings, or not to respond at all, Rahma says. Frustrated by being ignored, she, together with Jumisih and other FBLP leaders, mobilised workers to strike on several occasions.

    Under lockdown, women unionists have had to adapt their modes of organisation, maximising virtual spaces to allow workers to gather. Just a month after the pandemic, together with the organisation Perempuan Mahardhika, FBLP leaders have organised weekly discussions called Ngobras (Ngobrol Santai Bareng Buruh – an informal discussion with workers) every weekend when workers have days off. Discussions span many topics, such as a living wage, maternity rights, rights to housing, decent work and sexual harassment. During discussions, cameras reveal how many members spend their weekends; many listen while doing their domestic chores or taking care of children.

    Still, leaders continue to view “offline” strikes as the central strategy for sustaining solidarity among workers. The labour movement is currently focussed on the recently passed Omnibus Law (Law on Job Creation) whose informalisation of work makes workers more vulnerable to poverty wages and poor working conditions. Before the Omnibus Law’s passage, unions protested at both the Ministry of Labour and the Indonesian parliament. Strikes against the Omnibus Law were exhausting for unions because they took place over multiple weeks and saw outbreaks of violence, with some unionists eventually arrested. “I always hide my family’s identity because I don’t want them to be impacted by my activism,” Jumisih said.

    For women unionists, the delicate balancing of labour across the home, workplace and union is no small burden. They face not only the existential threat of a pandemic in their family and community lives, but maintain a presence for women workers struggling in industrial relations. Despite the heavier burdens they carry during the crisis, militancy remains at the heart of their struggle.

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  • The Indonesian government has officially banned the hardline Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) through a joint ministerial decree (SKB) on 30 December 2020. It lists six reasons for the ban. Among them is that FPI has no legal grounds to operate as a civil organization, and many of its members were involved in terrorism, illegal raids, and other violent activities.

    On December 12, 2020, the police detained Habib Rizieq Syihab, the leader of the FPI. He was charged with violating COVID-19 health protocols at his daughter’s wedding party and a celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday. The events drew large crowds, following Rizieq’s homecoming after three years in exile in Saudi Arabia. Five other FPI members were also named suspects in this case, including the FPI general chairman, Sabri Lubis.

    Habib Rizieq surrendered to the police a few days after six FPI members were shot dead by the police who were allegedly investigating the COVID-19 violations. The incident leaves many unanswered questions. The police and the FPI have their own versions. The police claim that the shooting was carried out in self-defence because the six FPI members attacked first with firearms and sharp weapons. The FPI claim that they were massacred by the police and deny that they had weapons. This incident is still under investigation due to concerns that these may have been extrajudicial executions.

    The events of the past month signify how the government has become increasingly repressive in coping with Islamist groups considered a threat to the Indonesian state. Many Indonesians are happy with and appreciate the government’s move, even those who claim to be pluralist and progressive. The actions, however, will intensify grievances against the government. Quite apart from the question of whether the government’s repressive measures undermine democracy, it is not yet clear whether the crackdown demonstrates the powerlessness of Islamists, particularly the 212 movement, or whether it serves as a new, unifying issue in a way that could have ramifications for the next round of elections in 2024.

    Habib Rizieq and the 212 Movement

    The 212 movement, also known as “Action to Defend Islam (Aksi Bela Islam)”, was born out of the 2 December 2016 mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of Muslims in the streets of Jakarta to protest against Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), former Jakarta governor whom the organisers accused of blasphemy. They included the conservative-traditionalist FPI, the Salafi-modernist network of the Indonesian Council of Young Intellectuals and Ulama (MIUMI, Majelis Intelektual dan Ulama Muda Indonesia), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and the Forum of Islamic Society (Forum Umat Islam, FUI), and some Islamic study groups (majelis taklim).

    To commemorate the anti-Ahok mobilisation, an annual reunion has been held on 2 December, at the National Monument (Monas) in Jakarta. The reunion in 2018 still attracted a huge crowd, but the numbers began to decline in 2019. The 212 movement by then was in disarray. Not only were there internal frictions, but the movement had lost both its original reason for unity (the blasphemy case), and its main political patron, Prabowo Subianto, rival of President Jokowi in the 2019 election, who later joined Jokowi’s second-term cabinet as Defence Minister.

    Habib Rizieq was a key figure in the 212 movement from the beginning. The 212 rallies arguably made him and his organization, FPI, even more significant and popular. Rizieq’s return to Indonesia, therefore, initially raised hopes that the 2020 reunion could attract far more attendees and reconsolidate the movement amid the changing political landscape.

    However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government prohibited the 2020 212 reunion rally. Consequently, the 212 Alumni Brotherhood (the institutional representative of the 212 movement) held an online event entitled “National Dialogue of 100 Ulamas and Figures”,  broadcast live on FPI’s YouTube channel: Front TV. The participants were prominent figures, supporters, and sympathisers of the 212-movement alliance, such as the MIUMI chairman Bachtiar Nasir, the Salafi Wahdah Islamiyah chairman Zaitun Rasmin, HTI preacher Felix Siauw, and some politicians. That suggested a reconsolidation was in the works, using Rizieq’s call for “moral revolution (revolusi akhlaq)” as a catch-all phrase to criticise the Jokowi government. If the Islamists could agree on little else, they could agree that Jokowi’s government was unfair and despotic.

    During the event celebrating the Prophet’s birthday in Petamburan, Jakarta, on December 14, 2020, Habib Rizieq conveyed five core points of the Jokowi government which he intended to fight with his moral revolution: [1] efforts to secularise the state governance; [2] criminalisation of ulamas and figures opposing the government; [3] protection for blasphemers; [4] the controversial Omnibus Law; [5] the oligarchy that rules the economy.

    The substance of the revolusi akhlaq was, in fact, similar to the narratives that Habib Rizieq and FPI voiced during the 212 rallies, such as “NKRI Bersyariah (the sharia-based Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia), “ayat suci di atas ayat konstitusi” (the holy verses above constitutional articles), and other terms that reflect the agenda of Islamic supremacy. While the slogan of “revolusi akhlaq” has little potential in consolidating the Islamist alliance of the 212 movement, I contend it is the government’s recent treatment of Habib Rizieq and the FPI that could empower this movement.

    Government Response and Islamist Militancy

    Studies on democracy and Islamist movements in Indonesia demonstrate that the Jokowi government is increasingly using repressive measures to suppress Islamist opposition—a policy direction that Greg Fealy calls “repressive pluralism”. This is done by implementing a confusing anti-radicalism policy, increasingly reliant on the military and police, and which involves marginalisation and sometimes criminalisation of anyone suspected of (broadly defined) radical views and favouritism towards moderate groups like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The government’s response to what has happened since Rizieq’s return should be viewed in this context.

    For example, the military was involved in taking down billboards showing Habib Rizieq’s picture, that had been erected by his supporters in Jakarta. The police threatened to charge anyone claiming that the six men killed did not carry sharp weapons and firearms. The chairman of the North Sumatra FPI was arrested for defaming President Jokowi and Megawati (Indonesia’s fifth president and chairman of PDIP). More importantly, by arresting Habib Rizieq and banning FPI, the government increasingly shows aggressive attitudes in coping with Islamists.

    Hypocrisy or imagination? Pseudo-pluralism in Indonesia

    The Indonesian government’s approach to Islamic outliers simultanesously marks them as dangerous and fails to protect the vulnerable from harm

    In addition, it is difficult not assume that Habib Rizieq’s recent arrest is political. In fact, there have been many other cases of violations of the COVID-19 health protocol, such as during the 2020 regional election campaigns, that have gone unpunished. This suggests that the protocols are being used by the government as a tool to limit the activities of Islamist groups.

    Habib Rizieq seems to have kept control of his supporters and so far prevented a backlash, yet the anger against the government from a wide spectrum of Islamist groups is growing. A wave of mass protests emerged in many regions across Java and Madura, demanding justice for the deaths of the six FPI members and the release of Habib Rizieq. This was then followed by an attempt to organise a protest rally on 18 December, to be called the  “1812 action” organized by FPI, the 212 Alumni Brotherhood, and their allies in central Jakarta. But the police prevented it on the grounds that it could lead to a new cluster of COVID-19 transmission.

    The 212 Alumni Brotherhood has pinned the title of “hero and martyr (syuhada) of revolusi akhlaqto the six FPI men killed. Many Islamist groups within the alliance of the 212 movement, such as MIUMI, HTI, and some Salafi groups, believe that they are martyrs who defended Islam. This belief reflects what Marx Jurgensmayer calls “cosmic war”, meaning the Islamists are struggling in “a religious scenario” against the government they believe marginalises Muslims. This further provides a moral-religious justification for them to increasingly oppose the ruling government.

    The government’s aggressive response may restrict political space in the short-term for Islamists, but in the long-term it could be counter-productive for the state, strengthening Islamist militancy, and perpetuating the Indonesian proverb about “a fire in the rice husks” that can explode at any time. It gives the Islamists a new issue to rally around, powerful new grievances against the government and an atmosphere to restore their movement’s solidarity ahead of the 2024 presidential election.

     

    The post The impact of the Indonesian government’s crackdown on Islamists appeared first on New Mandala.

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  • ANALYSIS: By James Laurenceson, University of Technology Sydney

    Great power competition in the Asia-Pacific region has been building for years. But covid-19 has turbo-charged the shifts taking place and China has finished 2020 in a significantly stronger position compared with the US than when the year started.

    Meanwhile, Canberra’s relations with Beijing continue to deteriorate and there’s little reason to be optimistic that a sudden, positive turnaround will be seen in 2021.

    As competition rather than cooperation has become the dominant frame through which both Beijing and Washington view their bilateral relationship, each is increasingly sensitive to evidence that other countries in the Asia-Pacific region are supporting their opponent.

    The fundamental driver of China’s hostility towards Australia in 2020 stems from its assessment that Australia’s leaders have reneged on earlier commitments to never direct the country’s security alliance with the US against China.

    Prime Minister Scott Morrison has appealed for Australia and other middle and smaller powers to be granted “greater latitude” in how they manoeuvre between the US and China in the future.

    But the University of Sydney’s James Curran cautions against unrealistic expectations:

    Great powers simply don’t dole out strategic space to others.

    China’s power on an upwards trajectory
    At the end of 2019, China’s GDP stood at US$14.3 trillion. This was two-thirds that of the US GDP of $21.3 trillion.

    The fallout from covid-19 has accelerated the trend in China’s favour. The International Monetary Fund’s latest growth forecasts suggest China’s economy will jump from two-thirds to three-quarters the size of the US by the end of 2021.

    And when cost differences are accounted for and the two economies are measured in terms of their respective purchasing power, China’s GDP is actually already 10 percent larger than the US.

    Retail sales grew by 5 percent in China in November, compared to the same month last year, as the country’s economy continues its strong recovery. Image: The Conversation/Yang Jianzheng/AP

    According to the Lowy Institute’s “Asia Power Index”, which tracks power in the economic, military, diplomatic and cultural domains, the US still comes out on top, but its lead over China has been cut in half since 2018. This mainly reflected losses by the US rather than gains by China.

    And even before covid-19 hit, a survey of business, media and civil society leaders in Southeast Asia showed that Beijing was considered vastly more influential than Washington in the region, though this increasing power was viewed with apprehension.

    Nearly half said they had little to no confidence in the US as a strategic partner or provider of regional security.

    And when asked if the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was forced to align itself with either the US or China, a majority in seven of the 10 ASEAN member countries chose China.

    The past year has also delivered dividends for China’s leaders domestically, with most citizens giving them high marks for their handling of the public health crisis, despite some initial anger over the government’s early attempts to cover up the severity of the pandemic.

    This reinforces already high levels of overall trust in the central government.

    The contrast with the US in this regard is stark. In May, a cross-country survey revealed that 95 percent of Chinese respondents had trust in their government, compared with just 48 percent in the US.

    Yet, China’s leaders still seem insecure
    All of these “wins” would naturally provide impetus for China’s international behaviour to become more confident and assertive.

    But President Xi Jinping’s worldview is another factor. In September, Xi exhorted Communist Party cadres to “maintain a fighting spirit and strengthen their ability to struggle”. The word “struggle” appeared more than another 50 times in the same speech.

    The Lowy Institute’s Richard McGregor says this reflects Xi’s view that China is in an

    existential struggle against an implacable enemy dead-set on destroying China.

    China’s diplomats had already been primed to embrace a “fighting spirit” in a speech delivered by Foreign Minister Wang Yi last November.

    All of this has meant that rather than projecting a self-assured poise, China’s international behaviour has frequently veered in the direction of bullying fuelled by insecurity.

    Australia has been on the front lines of this treatment — dialogue on the leader and ministerial level has been refused, exports have been targeted and propaganda campaigns have been deployed.

    Beijing’s intransigence has predictably led to the strengthening of coalitions like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (comprised of the US, Australia, Japan and India), as well as deeper conversations among Japan, India and Australia about how to build greater resilience into supply chains that are currently heavily exposed to China.

    Defence pactChina warned Australia and Japan will ‘pay a corresponding price” if a new defence pact signed between the countries threatens its security. Image: The Conversation/Eugene Hoshiko/AP

    Greater use of carrots than sticks
    There is some evidence China is beginning to recognise its over-the-top behaviour is counterproductive, at least towards some countries, and make greater use of carrots rather than sticks.

    Its “vaccine diplomacy” in Southeast Asia is a case in point.

    Covid-19 has hit Indonesia particularly hard, hit with more than 600,000 total cases so far. But just last week, Jakarta received 1.2 million doses of a vaccine manufactured by a Chinese pharmaceutical company, Sinovac.

    China is touting this effort a “Health Silk Road”, with pledges to provide billions in aid and loans to mostly developing countries to help them recover from the pandemic.

    Sinovac vaccineBoxes containing coronavirus vaccines made by Sinovac arriving last week at a facility in Indonesia. Image: The Conversation/Indonesian Presidential Palace/AP

    Australia won’t have much latitude with a stronger China
    In the case of Australia, however, China is unlikely to put the stick down any time soon.

    As Dirk van der Klay, a research fellow at ANU, explains, painting a stark contrast between Southeast Asia and Australia serves the purpose of reminding the region of the benefits of staying in Beijing’s good books — as well as the costs of crossing it.

    While countries like the US, Britain and France have at least offered Australia some rhetorical support in its China predicament, Australia’s most significant Southeast Asian neighbours have been notably quiet.

    With China’s relative power set to grow further in 2021, Canberra might feel even more uncomfortable. But as former senior Singaporean diplomat, Bilahari Kausikan, remarked in October, Australia is “not in a unique position” as “almost everybody” in the region faces the same challenge of managing relations with China and the US to maximise their economic and security interests.

    Australia’s unfortunate distinction is that because its relations with China have already sunk to such depths, it has less ability to negotiate a path between the two great powers.

    Elevating partnerships with countries like Japan, India and Indonesia offers one way forward, but alongside this needs to be a pragmatic strategy for getting the China relationship at least back on an even keel.

    Tokyo, New Delhi and Jakarta have all had serious challenges with Beijing, but their relations never fell to the depths of the current China-Australia tensions. These countries might offer some useful advice here, too.The Conversation

    Dr James Laurenceson is director and professor, Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI), University of Technology Sydney. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

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  • Lieutenant-General Dodik Widjanarko … named nine suspects over the killing of two Zanambani brothers. Image: CNN Indonesia

    Pacific Media Watch newsdesk

    The commander of the Indonesian Army Military Police (Danpuspomad), Lieutenant-General Dodik Widjanarko says TNI AD soldiers in Papua have committed acts of violence, including burning bodies to erase traces of their killing.

    General Widjanarko said bodies were burned after in an incident that led to two civilians, Luther Zanambani and Apinus Zanambani, detained at the Sugapa Koramil, Papua, on 21 April 2020 dying without trace, reports CNN Indonesia.

    The two brothers are reportedly the family of Pastor Yeremia Zanambani, who was shot dead in Intan Jaya, Papua, on September 19.

    General Widjanarko described the chronology of the deaths of the two civilians.

    The incident began when the Raider Battalion Unit 433 JS Kostrad carried out a sweeping operation on April 21. During the operation, they suspected the two brothers were part of an alleged “Armed Criminal Group” (KKB).

    The KKB, or the Armed Separatist Criminal Group (KKSB), is how law enforcers in Indonesia label the militant group of the pro-independence Free Papua Organisation (OPM).

    On the basis of this suspicion, several members who were on duty at that time immediately interrogated the two people at Sugapa Koramil Paniai Kodim, said General Widjanarko.

    Yellow public truck
    “During the interrogation, there was excessive action beyond the limits of propriety which resulted in Apinus Zanambani’s death and Luther Zanambani’s critical death at that time,” General Widjanarko told a media conference at the Army Puspom Building, Jalan Medan Merdeka Timur, Central Jakarta, on Wednesday.

    At first the two civilians were about to be transferred to Kostrad’s Yonif PR 433 JS Kotrad by using a yellow public truck, said the general.

    However, while riding a vehicle with police number B 9745 PGD in the middle of the journey, Luther Zanambani, who was previously critical, died.

    General Widjanarko said that in order to erase any trace of the deaths of the two civilians, members of the Indonesian Army who were ainvolved in the incident tried to remove the two bodies.

    “When arriving at Kotis Yonif Pararider 433 JS Kostrad to leave a trail, the victim’s bodies were then burned and the ashes dumped in the Julai River in Sugapa sub-district,” said the three-star TNI general.

    Regarding the deaths of the two Zanambani brothers, General Widjanarko said that the Joint Army Police Headquarters Team together with the Cenderawasih XVII Military Command had named nine suspects.

    The nine suspects, comprised two Paniai Kodim personnel and seven personnel from Yonit Pararider 433 JSD Kostrad.

    Nine suspects named
    “The suspects comprise two personnel from the Paniai Military Command, Major Inf ML and the FTP Special Officer as well as seven personnel from the Yonif Para Raider 433 JS Kostrad, namely Major Inf YAS, Lettu Inf JMTS, Serka B, Seryu OSK, Sertu MS, Serda PG, and Kopda MAY,” said General Widjanarko.

    The suspects’ determination was carried out after examining 21 witnesses, both from the TNI and civilians, said the general.

    The investigation was carried out on 19 members of the Indonesian Army comprising five personnel from the Paniai Kodim, 13 personnel from Yonif Para Raider 433 JS, and one personnel from Denintel Kodam XVII Cenderawasih.

    Even though nine suspects had been named, General Widjanarko said that his party was still conducting an in-depth examination of several personnel of Yonif Para Raider 433 JS, which needed further investigation.

    This article was translated by a Pacific Media Watch correspondent from the original report

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  • Investigators at the scene where Pastor Yeremia Zanambani was alleged to have been shot dead by the Indonesian military near Hitadiap village. Image: CNN Indonesia screenshot

    Pacific Media Watch newsdesk

    The family of Pastor Yeremia Zanambani, who was shot dead in Hitadipa district, Intan Jaya regency, Papua, three months ago are asking that the case be tried in a human rights court.

    They oppose having the trial being taken to a military tribunal, reports CNN Indonesia.

    “They [Yeremia’s family] want the case to be heard in a human rights court, so that the perpetrator can be tried in accordance with his actions and there will be justice for the victim. The victim’s family has no faith in the legal process of a military tribunal,” said a member of the team of lawyers representing Zanambani’s family, Yohanis Mambrasar.

    In early October the government formed the Intan Jaya Joint Fact Finding Team (TGPF) to investigate the killing of Pastor Zanambani on September 19.

    The team found allegations of the involvement of security personnel in the murder of the religious figure.

    In a press release on Wednesday, the commander of the Army’s Military Police Centre, Lieutenant General Dodik Widjanarko, said that the Army Headquarters Legal Process Reinforcement Team was in the process of attempting to question 21 personnel from the 400 Raider Military Battalion in relation to the shooting.

    Aside from questioning the 21 personnel, Widjanarko said that they had also questioned 14 personnel from the Cendrawasih XVII Regional Military Command’s (Kodam) Penebalan Apter Military Operational Unit Task Force.

    Legal handling deplored
    Mambrasar said that he deplored the legal handling of the case which should already be at a more advanced stage in the investigation.

    “Like arresting and declaring suspects, because there’s already enough evidence. There are many witnesses and the indicating evidence is already very strong [and enough] to explain the case and the perpetrator,” he said.

    He also said other such cases which had occurred in Papua recently, such as the murder of two youths named Luter Zanambani and Apinus Zanambani on April 21, the torching of a healthcare office on September 19 and the shooting of Agus Duwitau on October 7 must also be resolved by a human rights court.

    Pastor Yeremia ZanambaniRev Yeremia Zanambani … alleged to have been shot dead by the Indonesian military in Hitadiap village on September 19. Image: Suara Papua

    Mambrasar said that as regulated under Article 9 in conjunction with Article 7(b) of Law Number 26/2000 on a Human Rights Court, the elements of a gross human rights violation in these cases — including Zanambani’s shooting — had already been met.

    “As referred to under Article 7, namely that there were acts of violent killing which took in a systematic and broad manner”, he said.

    IndoLeft News reports:
    Although the government sanctioned TGPF only said that it found indications of the involvement of security personnel in Zanambani’s murder, an investigation by the government’s own National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) explicitly alleged Zanambani’s murderer as being Hitadipa sub-district military commander Chief Sergeant Alpius Hasim Madi.

    Komnas HAM said Zanambani was killed while being interrogated on the whereabouts of an Indonesian military assault rifle two days earlier during an exchange of fire with the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB).

    Translated by James Balowski for IndoLeft News. The original title of the article was “Keluarga Korban Minta Kasus Intan Jaya Diadili Pengadilan HAM”.

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  • Last September, I drove for four hours from Jakarta to a small town in western Java, staying one night in a Javanese-styled hotel at the foot of Mt. Ciremai, a 3,000-meter volcano on Java. When I got to Cisantana, I journeyed down a stone path, looking for the Mother Mary shrine. It was a welcome surprise to see this Catholic shrine, equipped with a tropical version of the Via Dolorosa—the route believed to have been taken by Jesus through Jerusalem to Calvary—and supported by electricity coming from a nearby Islamic boarding school.

    The presence of such a shrine was all the more surprising in West Java, one of Indonesia’s most conservative Muslim provinces, where attacks against Christians, Ahmadis, and other religious minorities frequently make headlines in local news. Attacks against women’s rights, private gay parties, and transgender crowds are not uncommon.

    I continued walking past avocado farms, a banana plantation, and cornfields and finally came upon an open space where a handful of Sundanese women and men were working to construct a tomb.

    They were very pleasant. “It’s a quiet day today,” an elderly man said to me. They were taking a break and welcomed me to sit in their bamboo hut with a fire stove.

    A woman showed me phone videos of the work they did with more than 100 volunteers, who used wooden poles and bamboo to bring several huge stones from a nearby river to this spot, which is inaccessible by road. They called the tomb “Batu Satangtung” or the “Human Stone,” intended for their elderly religious leader and his wife.

    I imagined the makers of Stonehenge might have used similar methods two or three millennia ago in England.

    The Sundanese people are from West Java, a province of about 40 million. They are the second largest ethnic group in Indonesia, after the neighbouring Javanese. The volunteers I met are not only Sundanese but of the ethnic-religious group Sunda Wiwitan. The name literally means “early Sunda” or “real Sunda.” Its practitioners assert that Sunda Wiwitan has been part of the Sundanese way of life since before the arrival of Hinduism and Islam.

    Why were they building the tomb here? Ela Romlah, the woman with the videos, told me that in 1937 and 1938, when Mt. Ciremai was expected to erupt, Pangeran Madrais—then the leader of this group—and his followers climbed the mountain, carrying a set of gamelan instruments. He and hundreds of his musicians played the gamelan on the mountain for months. They believed their music and prayer stopped the eruption. “They then set up a camp at the foot of the mountain. It was here in Curug Goong.”

    Madrais was an inspirational cleric, interpreting old Sundanese and Javanese beliefs. He helped establish the community in 1925.

    The Sunda Wiwitan tomb site. Image supplied by the author. ©2020 Andreas Harsono/Human Rights Watch

    The Dutch colonial officials in charge at the time were not amused to see this kind of independent behaviour. They tried to prevent hundreds of Sundanese people from staying at Curug Goong. But they said nothing when Mt. Ciremai calmed down.

    In August 1945, at the end of World War II, Indonesia’s independence leaders adopted a constitution that vowed to protect all Indonesian citizens equally. But they also reached a political compromise with conservative Muslims, including Wahid Hasjim, the chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama. The agreement, designed to avoid setting up an Islamic state, established the Ministry of Religious Affairs to be “the bridge” between Muslims and the state. The compromise was called Pancasila.

    In Garut, about four hours’ drive from Curug Goong, Islamist militants were not satisfied with this and declared the Darul Islam (Islamic State) movement in August 1949, vowing to implement their version of Sharia in Indonesia. From 1950 to 1958, Darul Islam conducted a failed guerrilla campaign in West Java that nonetheless attracted some popular support. They attacked not only the Indonesian military but also religious minorities.

    In response, Wahid Hasjim, the minister of religious affairs, adopted a 1952 decree to differentiate between “kepercayaan” (faith) and “agama” (religion). In Indonesian vocabulary, “aliran kepercayaan” is officially used to cover multiple minor religions and spiritual movements. Hasjim decreed that aliran kepercayaan” are “dogmatic ideas, intertwined with the living customs of various ethnic groups, especially among those who are still underdeveloped, whose main beliefs are the customs of their ancestors throughout the ages.”

    Meanwhile, “agama” was defined according to monotheistic understandings. If a community is to be recognised as “religious,” it must adhere to “an internationally recognised monotheistic creed; taught by a prophet through the scriptures.” In this way the decree discriminates against non-monotheistic religions including Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Bahaism, Zoroastrianism and hundreds of local religions and spiritual movements in Indonesia.

    In West Java, the Sunda Wiwitan people faced two serious challenges: the Darul Islam militants, who repeatedly intimidated and attacked them, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which actively tried to align “underdeveloped religions” such as theirs with Christianity or Islam.

    In 1954, Darul Islam militants attacked the Sunda Wiwitan base in Kuningan. “They managed to burn our paseban (communal spaces) including the kitchen and the garages but fortunately not the main hall,” she said. “They forced our members to convert to Islam,” said Dewi Kanti, a great granddaughter of Madrais.

    Similar intimidation and violence took place in neighbouring regencies Tasikmalaya, Banjar, and Garut. Dewi’s grandfather, Pangeran Tedja Buwana, who succeeded Madrais, fled Kuningan to Bandung.

    Darul Islam also sent militants into Jakarta. On November 30, 1957, President Sukarno attended a school function at which a Darul Islam militant threw a grenade. Sukarno was unharmed, but six schoolchildren died.

    Even after Darul Islam had been militarily defeated, eight Darul Islam militants mingled with a Muslim congregation during a prayer service inside the State Palace on May 14, 1962. They fired shots at Sukarno but missed, hitting one of his bodyguards and a Muslim scholar instead.

    Muslim conservatives continued their opposition to smaller religions and spiritual movements. To placate hardliners, Sukarno banned the Indonesian Freemasons (Vrijmetselaren-Loge) along with six so-called “affiliates,” without providing evidence of any illegal links: the Bahai Indonesia organisation, the Divine Life Society, the Moral Rearmament Movement, the Ancient Mystical Order Rosae Crucis, the Rotary Club and the Democracy League, a non-religious organisation considered to be critical of Sukarno. The Rotary Club was accused of being a Zionist group; this was essentially  a conspiracy theory intended to connect the Freemasons to the six organisations.

    In June 1964, the Kuningan authorities declared Sunda Wiwitan marriages illegal. The Kuningan prosecutor’s office later detained nine believers—a priest and eight young grooms who married in Sundanese Wiwitan rituals—for several months.

    A portrait of Sunda Wiwitan faith leader, Prince Tedja Buwana. © 2020 Andreas Harsono/Human Rights Watch

    Anticipating increased hostilities, Tedja Buwana, who had returned from Bandung, left the Sunda Wiwitan faith, joined the Catholic church and used their paseban as a church. His move prompted 5,000 Sunda Wiwitan believers to convert to Catholicism, according to a researcher, Cornelius Iman Sukmana, himself a Catholic in Kuningan, who wrote a book about the Sunda Wiwitan and the Catholic church.

    “It was an important decision. My grandfather saved thousands of our members from accusations of atheism,” said Dewi Kanti, referring to massacres of the communists between 1965 and 1969. “We can’t imagine what would have happened if he didn’t do it.”

    Decades later, when the situation finally calmed down, many of these Sunda Wiwitan people, including Dewi Kanti, openly, but not offficially, re-converted to Sunda Wiwitan. Many who converted away from Christianity still go to Sunday mass and wear a cross around their necks. But inside their pockets, they also have Sunda Wiwitan pendants (a mountain, an eagle and two snakes).

    “It is common in Kuningan to meet a single family with several religions,” said a vendor near the shrine.

    As I walked down from the tomb, I wondered if these conversions and re-conversions prove that religious identity is not a zero-sum game. Identity is somehow imagined like a container with a fixed volume; if you have more of one identity, you have less of another. The Sunda Wiwitan people showed me that they could expand the container and have multiple identities. Thinking of it from this perspective, it is no surprise that I found a tropical Via Dolorosa and an Islamic boarding school near the tomb construction.

    The 1965 Blasphemy Law

    In downtown Kuningan, I drove to the paseban area, looking at the beautiful wooden hall and sipping a smooth ginger-lemon tea while chatting with Okky Satrio Djati, a Catholic Javanese, who had married the Sunda Wiwitan leader Dewi Kanti almost two decades earlier.

    Djati and I used to work together in a newsroom during the Suharto era, publishing online samizdat and managing a mobile internet server. He went to Kuningan in 1998 when President Suharto was facing the mass protests at the height of the Asian economic crisis and helped hide political activists fleeing trouble.

    Djati is now a Sunda Wiwitan member, speaking Sundanese, burning incense and sometimes performing midnight prayers in a nearby mountain. “He seems to be more Sundanese than me,” said Kanti, with a giggle.

    Djati helps his wife deal with the discrimination that many Sunda Wiwitan members face. “My husband chose Catholicism as his official religion,” Kanti said. “But he practices Kejawen faith. If we insisted on marrying with our own (real) religions, we wouldn’t have birth certificates for our children, or at least, not with my husband’s name on them.”

    Under Indonesia’s legal system, an ethnic believer cannot put their kepercayaan on the agama column of their national ID cards and thus cannot legally marry unless they change their kepercayaan to a recognised religion. In these cases, they leave a blank space in the religion column of the card and the civil registration office does not recognise paternity because the couples are not officially married.

    The Sunda Wiwitan “paseban” (house of worship) in Kuningan, West Java, was also used as a Catholic church. © 2020 Andreas Harsono/Human Rights Watch

    Problems for religious minorities escalated in January 1965 when President Sukarno issued a decree that prohibited people from being hostile toward religions or committing blasphemy, which is defined as “abuse” and “desecration” of a religion. Sukarno decreed that the government would steer “mystical sects … toward a healthy way of thinking and believing in the One and Only God.” The decree, which gave official approval only to Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism, was immediately incorporated into the Criminal Code as article 156(a), with a maximum penalty of five years in prison. This has had disastrous effects until the present.

    After deposing Sukarno, Suharto and his regime enforced the 1952 decree, which also requires a religion to have a holy book, leading to many bizarre stories of “religious alignment.” In Kalimantan, Dayak tribal leaders created the Panaturan –a collection of Dayak ancestral wisdom compiled into a single “holy book.” This required the creation of a clergy, so Dayak priests were trained. Religious rituals once held in fields and homes were moved into new worship halls called Balai Basarah. But most importantly, Kaharingan religious leaders had to choose a permitted religion to align with. They chose Hinduism, and thus became “Kaharingan Hindu.” But do not ask them about Ganesh or karma!

    President Suharto’s wrote about his own Javanese Kejawen faith and Islam in his 1989 authorised biography. He described the syncretism common among the Javanese, conducting his Islamic prayers and celebrating Islamic holidays while also meditating in the sacred places of the Javanese traditions when he wanted to make major decision.

    On September 7, 1974, three months before the East Timor invasion, Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam met Suharto in a villa in Mt. Dieng, Java Island, where Suharto was meditating in the Semar Cave, which is named after a mythical Javanese character with whom Suharto identified. That cave is still regarded as sacred. When I visited in 2019 it was locked—the villa is now a museum where photos of the Suharto-Whitlam meeting are displayed. Showing a more open mind towards religious minorities, in 1978, Suharto created a directorate within the Ministry of Education and Culture to service these local religions, telling the Indonesian parliament, “These kepercayaan are part of our national tradition, and need not to be opposed to agama.”

    The site of the Soeharto Whitlam meeting is now a museum. Image supplied by the author. Image supplied by the author. ©2020 Andreas Harsono/Human Rights Watch

    Yet even under a strongman, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, technically in charge of religions, resisted and maintained its opposition to local religions. They have refused to include kepercayaan within their domain and have promoted the inclusion of these believers into monotheistic realms. One reason Muslim groups refuse to recognise kepercayaan is their concern that the percentage of Muslims (88 percent) in Indonesia may decline, threatening their majority status.

    In Kuningan, the new atmosphere under Suharto prompted the Sunda Wiwitan to re-convert to their native faith. Some of them legally left the Catholic church. Some maintain the practice of two religions, living with multiple identities. In 1982, the faith registered with the Ministry of Education and Culture’s directorate, seeking government services along with President Suharto’s accommodation of ethnic believers.

    During the weekend I spent talking with Kanti, Djati and other Sunda Wiwitan believers, young and old, women and men, I witnessed the pain of the discrimination they faced and the cost of religious intolerance to people full of tolerance themselves.

    It is fascinating to see a small religion resisting the power of the state. While Suharto took some important steps to protect religious freedom, it would have been better still if he had shown the moral courage to rescind the blasphemy law and the idiosyncratic and dangerous definition of religion from the Sukarno era. Sadly, Suharto’s successors have also failed to find the necessary political will.

    Post-Suharto Discrimination

    Jarwan is the only Sundanese man who stays overnight to guard the Sunda Wiwitan tomb in Curug Goong. He is a well-built man, keeping a motorcycle and several guard dogs in the bamboo hut.

    “Someone has to stay here,” he said. “I am the youngest of the elders.”

    In July 2020, the Kuningan government sealed off the tomb, declaring that the Sunda Wiwitan group had no permit to build “a monument.” Dozens of Sunni Muslim militants accompanied government officials to seal the tomb, saying that “the monument” is idolatrous.

    Sunda Wiwitan members argue that the construction is not a “monument” but rather a “tomb” prepared for two of their elders, Dewi Kanti’s parents, Pangeran Djati Kusumah, and Emalia Wigarningsih. “It’s built on their own land. There is no regulation here to ban anyone to have cemeteries on our own land,” Djati said.

    This is not an unfamiliar scene in many Muslim-majority provinces in Indonesia. Rights monitors have recorded hundreds of incidents like this involving Sunni militant groups, whose thuggish harassment and assaults on houses of worship and members of religious minorities have become increasingly aggressive. Those targeted include Ahmadis, Christians, and Shia Muslims. To give just one grisly example, on May 13-14, 2018, Islamist suicide bombers  detonated explosives at three Christian churches in Surabaya. The bombings killed at least 12 and wounded at least 50 people. Thirteen suicide bombers also died.

    In 2006 the government introduced regulations for building permits for houses of worship, prompting Muslim protesters to demand the closure of “illegal churches.” Hundreds of churches were closed. Some Christian congregations won lawsuits allowing them to build, but local governments simply ignored  court rulings. GKI Yasmin Protestant Church in Bogor was shut down in 2008. The congregation won the case at the Supreme Court in 2010 and then-President Yudhoyono asked the local government to reopen the church, but the city government defied the orders, without consequence.

    By contrast, in 2010 the Religious Affairs Ministry listed 243,199 mosques throughout Indonesia, around 78 percent of all houses of worship. Recently an ongoing government census using drones and photography has registered at least 554,152 mosques, suggesting that the number of mosques has more than doubled in a decade.

    The hardline Islamist preacher, Rizieq Shihab, has just returned to Indonesia from self-imposed exile in Saudi Arabia. He then called on his supporters “to behead blasphemers;” on November 27 an Islamist group attacked a village in Sigi, Sulawesi island, beheading a Salvation Army elder and three of his relatives. The attackers also burned a Salvation Army church and six other Christian-owned houses. No action has been taken against Rizieq for inciting violence, although police arrested him for breaking coronavirus restrictions.

    Threats and speeches that incite violence are facilitated by Indonesia’s discriminatory laws and regulations. They give local majority religious populations significant leverage over religious minority communities. Compounding this, institutions including the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Coordinating Board for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society (Bakor Pakem) under the Attorney General’s Office, the Religious Harmony Forum, and the semi-official Indonesian Ulema Council have issued decrees and fatwas (religious rulings) against members of religious minorities, and frequently press for the prosecution of “blasphemers.”

    Recent targets of the blasphemy law include three former leaders of the Gafatar religious community, prosecuted following the violent, forced eviction in 2016 of more than 7,000 members of the group from their farms on Kalimantan. A more prominent target was former Jakarta Governor Basuki “Ahok” Purnama, sentenced to a two-year prison term for blasphemy in a politically motivated case in May 2017. His longtime friend and ally, President Joko Widodo, simply stood by, afraid of the wrath of radical conservatives.

    Violence against religious minorities and government failures to take decisive action negate guarantees of religious freedom in the Indonesian constitution and international law, including core international human rights conventions ratified by Indonesia. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Indonesia acceded to in 2005, provides that “persons belonging to…minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion.”

    Throughout there have been occasional and modest examples of progress. The Rotary Club began operating again in 1970 after Sukarno died. In 2000, President Abdurrahman Wahid, the eldest son of Hasjim Wahid, cancelled President Sukarno’s 1962 decree banning the Freemasons and alleged associate organisations. After more than a dozen members were detained under the law during the New Order, the Bahai community has since been able to revive their network; however, they have been denied permission to build a temple so they continue to worship in private homes.

    A major reform took place in 2006 when President Yudhoyono signed the Population Administrative Law, which no longer requires kepercayaan believers to convert to official religions to be listed on ID cards. But many civil servants are still not aware of or ignore the law, so religious minorities face problems if they refuse to choose one of the six religions that these officials recognise. “They simply say you’re a godless woman if you want to keep the [religion] column blank,” said Kanti, whose ID card has a blank space after the word agama.

    In Kuningan, Indonesia’s Ombudsman finally helped mediate the dispute between the Sunda Wiwitan community and the local government, prompting the local authorities to lift the seal on the site and permitting the group to continue constructing the tomb.

    The Ombudsman’s Office also helped the Dayak Kaharingan, pressuring several local governments to drop decades of discrimination. Ombudsman Ahmad Suaedy said in a webinar: “The key issue is that they [local religious groups] should get public service. The religious minorities should take courage to report their difficulties.”

    Hypocrisy or imagination? Pseudo-pluralism in Indonesia

    The Indonesian government’s approach to Islamic outliers simultanesously marks them as dangerous and fails to protect the vulnerable from harm

    In 2017, four Indonesian citizens petitioned the Constitutional Court, demanding the right to have their religions listed on their ID cards. They represented four Indigenous religions including the Marapu  (Sumba ), the Sapto Darmo (Java ), and the Parmalim and the Ugamo Bangsa Batak (Sumatra). On November 7, 2017, the court ruled in their favour.

    But the Ulama Council objected to the decision. The Ministry of Home Affairs, which issues and manages ID cards, has since failed to implement the court decision. The Ulama Council argued that the ruling “hurts the feeling of the Islamic ummah,” but it is not clear on what legal grounds the ministry refuses to do its duty.

    Separately, the Constitutional Court rejected three petitions to revoke the blasphemy law between 2009 and 2018, declaring that religious freedom was subject to certain limitations to preserve public order (former President Abdurrahman Wahid joined the lawsuit in 2009). Those limitations, the court stated in its 2010 decision, were to be defined by “religious scholars,” thereby outsourcing the rights of minorities to unelected members of the majority religion.

    There are more than 180 ethnic-religious communities spanning from Sumatra to the smaller islands in eastern Indonesia. They are estimated to encompass around 10 to 12 million people, although the 2010 census recorded only 299,617 people or 0.13 percent of Indonesians claiming to be exclusively ethnic believers. It is still hard and even dangerous to publicly declare one’s religion in Indonesia.

    Indeed, it is gruelling work to battle against both government officials and the Sunni ulama. Spineless politicians, feckless government bureaucrats, and narrow-minded ulama officials hamper the development of democracy and human rights in Indonesia.

    Jarwan in Curug Goong knows very well that he cannot rely on the government or anyone else to protect the tomb he stands guard over. “We have seen this mistreatment and intimidation for decades. We must guard our sacred places ourselves.

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