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Category: Qishloq Ovozi

  • Majlis Podcast: Kazakhstan Has A New Parliament, Kyrgyzstan Has A New President. So What Comes Next?

    On January 10, voters in Kazakhstan went to the polls and elected a new parliament that looks very much like the old parliament.

    The same day, voters in Kyrgyzstan went to the polls and elected a new president and voted to change the system of government to a presidential form of rule.

    On this week’s Majlis podcast, RFE/RL’s Media-Relations Manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion looking at what happened — and what might come next for both countries.

    This week’s guests are: speaking from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Gulnara Iskakova, a former Kyrgyz ambassador to the U.K. and Switzerland; from Washington, Paul Stronski, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace and author of numerous reports about Central Asia; and Bruce Pannier, the author of RFE/RL’s Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: Kazakhstan Has A New Parliament, Kyrgyzstan Has A New President. So What Comes Next?

    On January 10, voters in Kazakhstan went to the polls and elected a new parliament that looks very much like the old parliament.

    The same day, voters in Kyrgyzstan went to the polls and elected a new president and voted to change the system of government to a presidential form of rule.

    On this week’s Majlis podcast, RFE/RL’s Media-Relations Manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion looking at what happened — and what might come next for both countries.

    This week’s guests are: speaking from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Gulnara Iskakova, a former Kyrgyz ambassador to the U.K. and Switzerland; from Washington, Paul Stronski, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace and author of numerous reports about Central Asia; and Bruce Pannier, the author of RFE/RL’s Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Elections In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Fail To Satisfy

    There were expectations that the January 10 elections in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan would fail to truly reflect the will of the people in those two Central Asian neighbors.

    Now that preliminary results are in, they look even worse than feared.

    Kazakhstan

    Kazakhstan’s vote was its first parliamentary elections since Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev became president nearly two years ago.

    Campaigning was barely noticeable, but election officials still claimed that more than 63 percent of voters cast ballots.

    Despite Toqaev’s promises of allowing genuine opposition parties to participate in politics, no such parties were registered and allowed on the ballot, though several tried.

    That left five pro-government parties to compete.

    Toqaev also said he would ease restrictions on peaceful demonstrations, but there was no evidence of that in the days leading up to elections or the day of voting.

    Reports from Kazakhstan on election day included members of Oyan Qazaqstan (Wake Up Kazakhstan) and the unregistered Democratic Party of Kazakhstan being surrounded by police in Almaty and forced to remain there in freezing temperatures for more than eight hours.

    Police prevented any of those who were ring-fenced from leaving, forcing some with no choice but to urinate on the ground, and prevented outsiders from bringing tea or food to the demonstrators.

    Two people were taken by ambulance to the hospital, one with frostbite.

    Dozens of activists were detained, arrested, or fined ahead of or on election day.

    Reports said more than 100 people were detained in Almaty alone. Some people planned to protest, but others said they were detained as they left their homes on the way to cast their ballots, thus depriving them of their right to vote.

    The number of independent election observers has been growing in Kazakhstan since the 2019 presidential election. But on January 10, many were prevented from doing their jobs.

    Some were ejected from polling places.

    Some said they were turned away because they didn’t have documents certifying they had been tested and were negative for the coronavirus.

    Activist Roza Musaeva posted on Twitter that she was a “legal observer” but that police detained her and that the head of the local election commission told her that her accreditation had been revoked.

    The outcome of the elections was never in doubt.

    But when the preliminary tally was announced, it also appeared to vindicate the skepticism of those who warned that there would be no difference between these elections and previous Kazakh parliamentary elections.

    The results suggested that the only three parties to win seats in the 2012 and 2016 elections were once again the only parties to be awarded seats.

    In 2012, the state allocated some 5.2 billion tenges (about $34.5 million at the time based on the 2012 average exchange rate of 150 tenges to $1) from the budget for the elections to parliament and local councils, or maslikhats. The result was that the Nur-Otan party, headed by longtime Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev, won 83 of the 98 available seats, the Aq Zhol party won eight seats, and the People’s Communist Party of Kazakhstan won seven.

    Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev votes in Nur-Sultan on January 10.

    Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev votes in Nur-Sultan on January 10.

    In 2016, Kazakhstan held early parliamentary elections after authorities said the deteriorating economic situation caused by the fall in the price of oil — Kazakhstan’s major export — demanded a new parliament with fresh approaches to deal with the situation.

    The state allocated 4.8 billion tenges (about $14 million at the March 2016 exchange rate of 340 tenges to $1) for those elections.

    The result was that the Nur-Otan party won 84 seats, while Aq Zhol and the People’s Communist Party of Kazakhstan were each awarded seven seats.

    Kazakhstan’s Central Election Commission said in October 2020 that some 15.3 billion tenges (about $34 million at the January 2021 rate of 420 tenges to $1) would be spent on the January 10 elections to parliament and local councils.

    The result was the Nur-Otan party reportedly winning 76 seats, Aq Zhol 12, and the People’s Party of Kazakhstan (they dropped “communist” from their name in November) 10 seats.

    Even if these results were genuine mandates from the masses, the three parties that won seats are neither gaining nor losing much support over the past decade. The government has spent tens of millions of dollars (or tens of billions of tenges) in that time for elections that produced essentially the same results.

    And this continues to happen as the younger generation in particular in Kazakhstan has been calling for change since Nazarbaev stepped down as president in March 2019.

    Kyrgyzstan

    In Kyrgyzstan, fewer than 40 percent of eligible voters participated in the snap presidential election and national referendum on January 10.

    According to RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, known locally as Azattyk, Kyrgyzstan has 3.56 million eligible voters, some 1.354 million of whom cast ballots.

    Among 17 candidates, Sadyr Japarov, a man who was in prison barely three months ago, won the election with almost 80 percent of the vote, the second-highest total in a presidential election in Kyrgyzstan’s history after Kurmanbek Bakiev’s 89.5 percent in the 2005 poll.

    According to Kyrgyzstan’s Central Election Commission (CEC), Japarov received 1.1 million votes.

    In the accompanying referendum on whether Kyrgyzstan should have a presidential or parliamentary form of government, almost 81 percent, or some 1.147 million people, voted for a presidential system.

    Both figures look like overwhelming victories for both Japarov and change.

    But looked at another way, it is difficult to see them as the will of the people.

    In part, that is because more than half of eligible voters did not participate.

    Some good reasons have been offered for this.

    Japarov and others in his interim government claim there was less vote-buying and less use of administrative resources. Certainly the former, if true, would be one reason that fewer people turned out on January 10.

    A supporter of Kyrgyz President-elect Sadyr Japarov attends a rally on Ala-Too Square in Bishkek on January 11.

    A supporter of Kyrgyz President-elect Sadyr Japarov attends a rally on Ala-Too Square in Bishkek on January 11.

    Vote-buying plagued the October 4 parliamentary elections and played a large role in fomenting the popular backlash in Bishkek on October 5 that eventually brought down the government.

    Authorities scrapped the use of Form No. 2, a document that allowed people living away from their registered area of residence to vote anywhere in Kyrgyzstan so long as they registered there ahead of election day.

    And perhaps some of the 2 million-plus voters who did not cast ballots were simply disillusioned. Kyrgyzstan held a referendum on constitutional changes in 2016, a presidential election in 2017, and then there were last year’s parliamentary elections.

    It is worth remembering that the population of Kyrgyzstan is around 6.5 million.

    So Japarov is said to have received the backing of 1.12 million people, while the referendum got support from 1.15 million. Each figure represents around 17 percent of the country’s population, which arguably does not qualify as overwhelming popular support.

    Japarov’s amazing rise from prisoner to president is thought by some to be the result of backing from organized criminal groups.

    Such suspicions will likely limit foreign investment in Kyrgyzstan in the coming months, and possibly years, potentially prolonging the deep economic problems that Kyrgyzstan faces.

    Democratic governments have given the lion’s share of Central Asian aid to Kyrgyzstan because it was seen as an “island of democracy” that could set an example for its neighbors of the goodwill that accompanies democratic progress.

    Voting for a presidential system of government could limit such aid in the future.

    Russia has been cautious about the change of power in Kyrgyzstan after October and has withheld promised aid, though President Vladimir Putin did send Japarov a letter of congratulations on January 11.

    Kyrgyz authorities — before and since October 4 — have made repeated requests to China for more time in repaying loans. In so doing, they likely put Kyrgyzstan on Beijing’s list of high-risk countries for future investment.

    And the coronavirus continues to affect Kyrgyzstan’s economy, with little indication so far of when vaccines will be available and the health crisis brought under control.

    Speaking to supporters on Ala-Too Square in Bishkek on January 11, Japarov said time is needed to put the country on the right track.

    But some think Japarov will need to hurry. He has promised a lot, and much of the reason people voted for Japarov was because they wanted change for the better — and soon.

    And in a country that has seen three presidents chased from power by protests since 2005, there already seems to be ample room to bring Japarov’s election and the referendum into question.

    Aigerim Toleukhanova of RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service contributed to this report.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: How Central Asia Dealt With COVID In 2020 And What’s Coming In 2021

    The year 2020 will always be remembered as the year the coronavirus appeared and spread across the globe.

    The virus exposed weaknesses in every country, particularly in health-care systems, but it also affected trade and tested alliances.

    The responses from the five Central Asian countries differed.

    This was most evident in their official reporting on registered cases and deaths, where countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, even though their figures were often questionable, released statistics that showed the countries were facing a serious health crisis, while countries like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan carefully manipulated figures to ensure an outward appearance of controlling the situation. And then there was Turkmenistan, which chose complete denial and continues its farcical claims that the country has somehow been immune to the coronavirus.

    How did the five countries fare in 2020 and, with various vaccines being developed and gradually being made available internationally, how does 2021 look for Central Asia?

    On this week’s Majlis Podcast, RFE/RL’s media-relations manager for South and Central Asia, Muhammad Tahir, moderates a discussion that looks at these questions.

    This week’s guests are: from Kazakhstan, Gaukhar Mergenova, a public-health specialist; from Kyrgyzstan, Ermek Ismailov, a surgeon at the Clinical Hospital Office of the President and Government of the Kyrgyz Republic; and originally from Uzbekistan but currently a senior journalist for RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, known locally as Ozodlik, and based in Prague, Barno Anvar; and Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Questions Arise With Ex-Fugitive Japarov, The Favorite In Kyrgyz Presidential Race

    Kyrgyzstan is holding a crucial presidential election and national referendum on January 10 to determine if the country should revert to a presidential system.

    But because the processes that led to this election day were rushed, questions linger about the legality and legitimacy of decisions that have been made by Kyrgyz officials. It is therefore difficult to escape the feeling that this election will not deliver stability and could even sow the seeds for future problems.

    The elections are a consequence of the mass unrest that broke out after the country held parliamentary elections on October 4.

    Concerns before the election of vote-buying were confirmed when the results showed the two parties suspected of dishonest campaign tactics, Mekenim Kyrgyzstan and Birimdik, received an overwhelming percentage of the votes.

    Unrest then broke out in the capital, Bishkek, on October 5 and a day later the government had been chased from power with the president, Sooronbai Jeenbekov, seemingly in hiding. He would soon resign.

    The tumult marked the third time since 2005 that a president and his government had been ousted by protests and most assumed — as happened in 2005 and 2010 — that opposition leaders would cobble together an interim government.

    But while many opposition figures and groups were anxious to claim a role in the victory of having the faulty elections annulled, they were slow to cooperate in forming an alliance to take up the reins of power.

    A huge power vacuum appeared and a group that did not take part in the October 5 protests came to the fore.

    That group then also pushed for this presidential election.

    From Prison To President?

    There are 17 candidates competing to be president in Kyrgyzstan, the lone Central Asian country where free and democratic elections are held.

    The favorite to win the vote is Sadyr Japarov, who woke up in a prison cell on October 5 where he was about one-third of the way through a 10-year prison sentence he was serving for hostage-taking during a protest against a mining operation in northeast Kyrgyzstan in October 2013.

    Quickly freed from prison overnight on October 5-6 during unrest in Bishkek, within two weeks he would become acting prime minister and acting president of the country. It is still unclear which powerful figures have backed Japarov’s meteoric rise to power, though there are suspicions organized criminal groups have played a role.

    Along with Japarov there are some other relatively well-known people running for the presidency.

    Adakhan Madumarov (file photo)

    Adakhan Madumarov (file photo)

    Adakhan Madumarov is the leader of Butun Kyrgyzstan, the only opposition party that won seats in the October 4 parliamentary elections, garnering 13 of the 120 available.

    Madumarov was a candidate in the 2011 presidential election when he placed second, and in 2017 when he was third.

    Kanatbek Isaev (file photo)

    Kanatbek Isaev (file photo)

    Kanatbek Isaev is the leader of the Kyrgyzstan party, which also won seats in the October 4 elections (16) but was seen as a pro-government party. Isaev was a parliament deputy and served as parliament speaker from October 13 to November 4.

    He should have become acting president when Jeenbekov resigned on October 15 but declined, paving the way for Japarov to take the post. Isaev later said he did not want to be acting president because it constitutionally prohibited him from running for president.

    Klara Sooronkulova (file photo)

    Klara Sooronkulova (file photo)

    Klara Sooronkulova is the leader of the Reforma party, which was created just before October’s parliamentary poll. She is a former Supreme Court judge and since October has led many of the court challenges against the decision to delay new parliamentary elections, allowing Japarov to run for president despite having served as acting president, and the decision to hold a referendum on the constitution.

    Kanybek Imanaliev (file photo)

    Kanybek Imanaliev (file photo)

    Kanybek Imanaliev is a deputy from the Ata-Meken party, an opposition party from the parliamentary elections. He was one of only four deputies to oppose holding the constitutional referendum.

    Abdil Segizbaev (file photo)

    Abdil Segizbaev (file photo)

    Abdil Segizbaev is a former chief of the State Committee for National Security (UKMK) and, as a presidential candidate, has been one of the most vocal critics of Japarov. He has challenged Japarov about his role as a top official in the anti-corruption agency under President Kurmanbek Bakiev (2005-2010), when billions of dollars were taken out of Kyrgyzstan and several successful private firms were taken over by Bakiev’s friends and relatives.

    Nearly all the other candidates have made negative comments about Japarov in a series of debates held on state television in late December.

    Japarov is the only candidate still running who did not participate in the debates, claiming he was too busy meeting with voters.

    The 52-year-old Japarov has received far more donations for his campaign than his opponents.

    According to the Kyrgyz news website Kaktus.media, as of early December Japarov had raised 1.23 million soms (about $15,000), trailing two other candidates: Babarjan Tolbaev (5.2 million soms/$63,000) and Aymen Kasenov (1.454 million soms/$17,000).

    Also Read: Plunder And Patronage In The Heart Of Central Asia

    But by December 25, Kaktus reported that Japarov’s campaign fund had raised 47.4 million soms ($570,000). The candidate with the next most campaign money is Babyrjan Tolbaev, with 9.35 million soms ($112,000). The other candidates have all raised less than 5 million soms ($60,000).

    Japarov has said several times that the money had been donated by the “people of Kyrgyzstan,” but one report said at least 30.9 million soms of his total came from just 10 people and two companies.

    The ‘Khanstitution’

    Holding a constitutional referendum was an idea raised in late October, but it quickly went from just making some reforms to the document to making major changes that amounted to rewriting it.

    By early November, Japarov and members of his Mekenchil party said the current constitution establishing the parliamentary system of government and a division of power between the president and prime minister has not worked. They argued that it is necessary for one person to hold all of the main powers.

    A new constitution was drafted that immediately sparked resistance from several quarters in Kyrgyzstan.

    The draft would make the president the head of state and head of government while including an official role for a kuriltai, or council, that would be a consultative body able to recommend, among other things, the dismissal of officials.

    It was dubbed the “khanstitution” by opponents who said it would legitimize authoritarian rule.

    On November 22, the first of a series of peaceful marches against the constitution started in Bishkek. They have continued every Sunday since then.

    Acting President Talant Mamytov signed a decree on November 20 to establish a constitutional chamber of 89 members to redraft the “khanstitution” and the group quickly fell into disagreement over many points, for example whether the word “secular” should be stricken from the constitution or the name of parliament, Jogorku Kenesh, should be changed.

    In the end, the motion for a referendum on a constitution was adopted by parliament on December 10 — one month before the referendum would be held — after quickly approving it on the second and third readings.

    What voters in Kyrgyzstan are being asked to approve on January 10 is simply whether they want a parliamentary of presidential form of government.

    A second referendum will need to be conducted, tentatively in March, to vote on a new draft constitution.

    Questions Of Legitimacy

    From just after the October parliamentary elections until January there have been a multitude of questions and problems about the decision-making processes of Kyrgyz officials.

    First off, the parliamentary mandates for the deputies expired on October 28, and though deputies voted to extend them until new parliamentary elections are held, they legally should have not been allowed to vote on any matters involving a major policy change, such as the holding of a referendum to change the constitution.

    Therefore every decision parliament approved after October 28 is considered by some legal experts in Kyrgyzstan and many others to have no validity.

    Also, Japarov was named acting president on October 16 and officially took up the duties of that office on October 21, but as former parliament speaker Isaev noted, it is banned by the constitution for an acting president to run for president.

    On October 26, Japarov announced he would step down as prime minister and acting president so he could run for president.

    But two days later, Japarov and other government members took their oaths of office.

    Kyrgyz acting President Talant Mamytov (file photo)

    Kyrgyz acting President Talant Mamytov (file photo)

    On November 14, Japarov finally left his state posts and Talant Mamytov, the parliament speaker since November 4, was named acting president.

    Japarov has also said several times that he would not appoint his friends to government positions, but Mamytov and the current head of the UKMK, Kamchybek Tashiev, were co-defendants with Japarov when they were on trial in 2013 for trying to overthrow the government.

    They were convicted in March 2013 and sentenced to 18 months in prison.

    One of the judges that eventually acquitted the three in an appeals court in June 2013 was Kurmankul Zulushev, who was appointed prosecutor-general on October 21, just days after Japarov became acting president.

    Zulushev was dismissed for the decision to acquit the three deputies and two months later the Supreme Court overturned those acquittals but ruled the three did not have to return to prison.

    There are also questions about the Supreme Court’s abrupt decision to acquit Japarov of the hostage-taking charges and to overturn the guilty verdict against Japarov, Mamytov, and Tashiev for trying to overthrow the government.

    And it is still not clear when there will be new parliamentary elections, even though the annulled October 4 elections led to so much that has happened since then and despite the fact that preparations to hold them began in late October.

    Japarov has variously cited “spring” or “before the end of the first half of 2021” as the time when they would be held.

    In the end, the populist Japarov is the big favorite to win the presidential election and the proposal for a presidential form of government also seems likely to be approved by voters, largely because of Japarov’s support and promotion of it.

    But there are so many aspects of Japarov’s rise to power, and the changes he has been making since then, which are open to legal challenges, leaves many thinking that once his momentum slows and his popularity dissipates — as seems almost certain to happen given the economic and other crises Kyrgyzstan faces — the country is likely to fall back into a political crisis of some kind.

    Gulaiym Ashakeeva of RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, known locally as Azattyk, contributed to this report.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: Opposition Squeezed Out Of Kazakhstan’s Parliamentary Elections

    On January 10, Kazakhstan will hold its first parliamentary elections since the country’s longtime president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, stepped down in March 2019.

    Nazarbaev remains the head of the Nur-Otan party, which is expected to do well in these elections to the Mazhilis, the lower house of parliament, as it always has since its founding in 1999.

    Conspicuously absent from these elections are any political parties that could remotely be called a genuine opposition, despite a pledge from the new president, Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev, about the need for opposition parties to participate in politics.

    Political activists are reporting increased harassment in the weeks leading up to elections.

    And a new report from RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service, known locally as Azattyq, casts new light on the vast wealth former President Nazarbaev and members of his family have acquired outside Kazakhstan.

    On this week’s Majlis Podcast, RFE/RL’s media-relations manager for South and Central Asia, Muhammad Tahir, moderates a discussion on Kazakhstan’s approaching parliamentary elections and what has changed and what looks the same under a different president.

    This week’s guests are: from Kazakhstan, Darkhan Umirbekov, Azattyq’s digital editor, who also participated in preparing the report on the Nazarbaev family wealth; Sofya du Boulay, who is researching the study of legitimation, authoritarian durability, and politics in Central Asia and the South Caucasus at Oxford Brookes University; Luca Anceschi, professor of Central Asian studies at Glasgow University and author of the recently published book Analysing Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: Regime Neo-Eurasianism In The Nazarbaev era; and Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Analysis: Jailed Ex-Diplomat’s Uzbek Family Turns To UN Over His Treason Conviction

    Last week, Kadyr Yusupov marked his third straight birthday in jail.

    A 69-year-old career diplomat for Uzbekistan, Yusupov was detained shortly after a reported suicide attempt in December 2018, interrogated by security officials while hospitalized, and convicted of treason and sentenced to 5 1/2 years in prison in January on the basis of a confession he purportedly made from his hospital bed.

    Yusupov is said to suffer from schizophrenia, and there were questions from the start over his fitness for questioning and whether anything he said while recovering should be used as evidence.

    The case has been shrouded in secrecy.

    A lawyer hired by Yusupov’s family was forced to sign a nondisclosure agreement and was rarely allowed to meet with him.

    Yusupov’s family has been unable to see him since he was taken into custody shortly after jumping in front of a subway train in Tashkent two years ago.

    So Yusupov’s family sought help outside Uzbekistan.

    Geoffrey Robertson, a founding head of the U.K.-based Doughty Street Chambers, a private legal defense firm that focuses on human rights and civil liberties, has been brought in as legal counsel for the Yusupov family. He has said he is preparing applications on Yusupov’s behalf to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions.

    At a December 10 press conference, Robertson alleged a long list of procedural violations under Uzbek and international law in Yusupov’s case.

    Yusupov is one of several people who worked many years for the Uzbek government before reports suddenly emerged saying they had been accused of spying and charged with treason.

    A recent Majlis podcast explored Yusupov’s case along with those of former Defense Ministry reporter Vladimir Kaloshin and a former director of the presidential Institute for Strategic and Interregional Research, Rafik Saifulin.

    Spying cases by nature involve matters of state security that many governments try to keep away from the public record.

    But in Yusupov’s and other cases, public information has mostly been limited to the facts that they were arrested, confessed, and were tried and convicted.

    Even details like on whose behalf they might have been spying has been unavailable.

    Yusupov’s family and rights groups have repeatedly called for him to be freed on compassionate grounds, since the coronavirus is reportedly spreading within Uzbekistan’s prison system.

    Robertson said at his press conference that he and Yusupov’s family had been hoping the former diplomat would be released under a recent amnesty to mark Uzbek Constitution Day on December 8, but he was not among those released.

    The family has released a video on Yusupov’s case, in the hope of getting broader support for his release.

    Family, friends, and rights defenders now hope the United Nations might pressure the Uzbek government to act, since Uzbek courts and prosecutors seemingly appear to have no intention of freeing Yusupov.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Analysis: Scandals Increase Tensions Ahead Of Controversial Elections In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan

    Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are holding elections on January 10, the results of which will inevitably be unpopular with segments of the two countries’ populations before and after election day.

    Kazakhstan’s Nur-Otan party, created in 1999 to keep Nursultan Nazarbaev in power and still headed by the now former president, is expected to retain its omnipotent position in parliamentary elections.

    In Kyrgyzstan, Sadyr Japarov is also expected on January 10, 2021, to formalize his meteoric rise from prisoner to president in barely three months and will likely enjoy greater powers than previous Kyrgyz presidents as the country also votes on a referendum to move from a parliamentary system of government back to a presidential one.

    Such outcomes are already unpalatable to many people in both countries, but those who seem sure to win in these upcoming elections are connected to recent scandals that are tarnishing the image of their countries and providing their opponents with additional reasons to reject the results of these polls.

    That will almost surely result in a rise in tensions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

    Same Old, Same Old In Kazakhstan

    Nur-Otan is the party of first Kazakh President Nazarbaev and, as mentioned, has been since the day it was created. The party was originally called Otan, which means “Fatherland,” but in December 2006 party members decided to add Nur (radiant) to the title, which certainly emphasized whose party it was.

    Nur-Otan has won the majority of seats in every election it has participated in; from the first in 1999, when the party won 23 of 77 seats available to the last election in 2016 when the party won 84 of 98 seats at stake.

    It would be remiss not to recall the party’s greatest victory, in 2007, when Nur-Otan took all 98 of the seats, leaving the other six token parties participating in those elections out in the cold.

    It is also important to note that Western election observers have not ever deemed a presidential or parliamentary election in Kazakhstan as “free and fair.”

    With such a background, it is fair to assume the Nur-Otan party will prove equally successful on January 10.

    It will, however, be the first time the party is running without Nazarbaev as president.

    Nazarbaev stepped down from office in March 2019.

    His chosen successor, Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev, is officially the president, though many believe Nazarbaev still runs the country.

    The transfer of the presidential office has made little difference in the style of governance in Kazakhstan, but it did reinvigorate a largely dormant opposition in the country that hoped a change in presidents would also lead to a change away from the authoritarian ways of Nazarbaev.

    There have been visible signs of discontent ever since Toqaev took over, including some of the biggest demonstrations Kazakhstan has seen in some 20 years.

    One of the candidates from Nur-Otan in the upcoming elections is Darigha Nazarbaeva, the unpopular daughter of Nazarbaev.

    She was the chairwoman of Kazakhstan’s Senate, the position next in line to the presidency (having taken over for Toqaev when he moved to the president’s office) until May, before scandals surrounding her brought much unwanted international attention on Kazakhstan.

    There were reports in foreign media about expensive property she and her oldest son Nurali owned in Britain, including one building that served as the address of the famous fictional detective Sherlock Holmes.

    And her younger son, Aisultan, who had drug-abuse problems, had taken to posting on social networks again at the start of 2020, claiming once that his father was really Nazarbaev, who is his grandfather, and also alleging that someone in his family wanted him dead.

    It was not the first time Nazarbaeva had to leave the political scene.

    She also took a hiatus from politics after she divorced her first husband, Rakhat Aliev, in 2007 and she stayed away while her former husband hurled serious accusations from self-exile in Europe about the corrupt and criminal practices of Nazarbaev and his government. She only returned as a candidate for Nur-Otan in the 2012 parliamentary elections.

    Her ex-husband Aliev died under mysterious circumstances while being held in an Austrian prison in 2015. Officially ruled a suicide, there were many credible reports that suggest Aliev was killed.

    Her son, Aisultan, died of a heart seizure allegedly caused by cocaine usage in August of this year.

    But it seems Darigha is now returning to politics.

    Timur Kulibaev is the husband of Dinara Nazarbaeva, ex-President Nazarbaev’s second daughter.

    It is well known that Kulibaev is rich and he and Dinara are regularly listed as being among the wealthiest people in Kazakhstan.

    On December 4, the Financial Times reported Kulibaev received millions of dollars from a pipeline scheme involving purchases of steel from China that went to Ukraine and Russia for processing into pipeline segments that were sold to companies building the Central Asia-China natural-gas pipelines.

    The report only mentioned $53 million and some people think Kulibaev has made a lot more shady money than that in his far-flung business dealings. But the report in the Financial Times again brought unwanted attention on Kazakhstan.

    On December 9, Kulibaev called on Kazakhstan’s prosecutor-general to investigate these allegations, though it is difficult to say who would be persuaded by Kulibaev being cleared by Kazakhstan’s Prosecutor-General’s Office.

    Is Darigha Nazarbaeva returning to politics?

    Is Darigha Nazarbaeva returning to politics?

    And there is Nazarbaev’s longtime friend, Bulat Utemuratov, whom one of the diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks said was rumored to be Nazarbaev’s “personal finance manager.”

    On December 1, The Wall Street Journal reported the Business and Property Courts of England and Wales had ordered some $5 billion in assets to be frozen “including stakes in luxury hotels, cash in bank accounts in half a dozen countries, and a Burger King franchise” that are connected to Bulat Utemuratov.

    The assets are part of a legal battle that involves an opposition figure in exile, fugitive banker Mukhtar Ablyazov, who has been “pursuing a personal feud against Nazarbaev” for a decade.

    The coronavirus global pandemic has hurt economies around the world and Kazakhstan has been no exception.

    It has been a tough year for many in Kazakhstan and all these reports of millions and billions of dollars belonging to a few people all connected with Nazarbaev will not engender much goodwill toward the first president, his family, and his friends.

    But regardless, on January 10, Nazarbaev’s Nur-Otan party is going to again win the most seats in parliament and his daughter, Darigha, seems sure to return to the country’s political scene.

    Worries In Kyrgyzstan

    Kyrgyzstan’s situation is more complicated.

    January 10 will mark slightly more than three months since Kyrgyzstan conducted parliamentary elections (October 4) that were marred by allegations of vote buying and the use of administrative resources that led to unrest in the capital, Bishkek, and saw a crowd storm state buildings and bring down the government, eventually including the president.

    A huge void was created and a group that played no role in bringing down the government came to power with Sadyr Japarov — freed from prison one day after the elections — becoming the apparent leader.

    How Japarov went from a prison cell, where he was serving time for hostage-taking, to being appointed prime minister and then, simultaneously acting president, in barely two weeks is a question still being debated but he clearly had support from influential people in Kyrgyzstan. Many believe much of that support came from organized criminal groups.

    Raimbek Matraimov, a former deputy chief in Kyrgyzstan’s Customs Service, is suspected of being one of the leading criminal figures in the country and his connection to the Mekenim Kyrgyzstan party that took the second-largest amount of votes in the October 4 parliamentary elections helped fuel the unrest that led to those results being annulled.

    Matraimov and some of his family members and business associates have been the subject of several lengthy investigative reports from the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), Kyrgyzstan’s Kloop media outlet, and RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, known locally as Azattyk.

    Their latest reports on the Matraimovs were released on December 14.

    After becoming prime minister, Japarov vowed to crack down on organized crime and Matraimov was taken into custody on October 20, though quickly released and put under house arrest.

    According to the investigative reports, Matraimov was a central figure in a smuggling and money-laundering scheme in which hundreds of millions were funneled from Kyrgyzstan, and there is testimony alleging he may be connected to some murders linked to the major money-laundering scheme. He has denied those charges in comments to RFE/RL.

    Japarov said in an interview on October 21 that there is nothing to be gained by putting Matraimov in prison.

    “[Matraimov’s] arrest won’t solve the problem,” Japarov said. “If he is in prison, no one will be able to get even a som from his assets…. How many corrupt figures have [already] been detained? None of them paid any money.”

    Japarov said Matraimov had promised to bring back 2 billion soms (about $24 million) and put it in a special bank account for recovered funds. Much of that has reportedly been returned to state coffers.

    Though Japarov spoke about corruption in the interview, he never specifically said Matraimov was involved in it or offered a clear reason why Matraimov — who has professed total innocence of the allegations made against him — was paying back any money at all.

    The current chief of the State Committee for National Security (UKMK), Kamchybek Tashiev, is a longtime friend of Japarov.

    In an interview with Azattyk less than two weeks before being appointed head of the UKMK, Tashiev criticized the media for “blackening” Matraimov’s image.

    “[Matraimov] is an ordinary citizen who has never held any high posts,” Tashiev said.

    The Kyrgyz Prosecutor-General’s Office has dragged its feet in taking any action against Matraimov.

    On December 10, Prosecutor-General Kurmankul Zulushev said an investigation is under way but added that the investigation involved “other parties guilty of economic crimes” and that “Raimbek Matraimov has made a deal with the investigation.”

    Sadyr Japarov: from prisoner to president

    Sadyr Japarov: from prisoner to president

    Zulushev was speaking the day after the U.S. Treasury Department announced it had put Matraimov on the Magnitsky Act sanctions list.

    Matraimov’s wife was added to the list on December 11.

    And U.S Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Donald Lu had already offered help in the Kyrgyz investigations of organized crime on December 3 and, two days later, repeated the offer, saying the journalistic investigation of Matraimov was the most important event in Kyrgyzstan in the last 18 months.

    These reports have been widely reported in Kyrgyzstan.

    With all of this background, Japarov remains the favorite going into the January 10 presidential election, which will have 18 candidates.

    But his and other officials’ attitudes toward Matraimov and the thus far soft treatment of other underworld figures such as Kamchy Kolbaev — who is also on the U.S. Treasury list of Specially Designated Nationals — has only deepened suspicions that organized crime is in charge or at least far too influential in Kyrgyzstan.

    And if the referendum is passed Japarov, as president, will have greater powers than his predecessors pending a referendum to be held the same time as the election.

    It was difficult to see how Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan would be able to hold these elections without protests.

    The addition of these latest scandals seems to ensure problems could occur before and after the votes are tabulated.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: How Far Has Tashkent Gone In Greater Respect For Religious Rights?

    Under President Shavkat Mirziyoev, who was elected on December 4, 2016, Uzbekistan has made some progress addressing the long list of rights violations that came to characterize the Uzbek government under Mirziyoev’s predecessor, Islam Karimov. But how much?

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: Fighting To Stop Violence Against Women

    November 25 was the International Day For The Elimination Of Violence Against Women and it started 16 days of activism that concludes on December 10.

    Violence against women is a problem in Central Asia, and while the issue is receiving somewhat more attention, progress in combating abuse has been slow — and efforts by authorities have often been no more than superficial.

    On this week’s Majlis podcast, RFE/RL’s Media-Relations Manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion about what changes have and are taking place in Central Asia to address the scourge of gender violence, and some of the challenges that still lie ahead.

    This week’s guests are: from Kazakhstan, Khalida Azhigulova, the director of the Research Center for Human Rights, Inclusion, and Civil Society and an associate professor at the Eurasian Technology University; from Uzbekistan, Irina Matvienko, a feminist activist and founder of Nemolchi.uz, which loosely translates as “don’t remain silent” and is an organization dedicated to the prevention of violence against women and helping victims; and Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Majlis Podcast: Fighting To Stop Violence Against Women

    November 25 was the International Day For The Elimination Of Violence Against Women and it started 16 days of activism that concludes on December 10.

    Violence against women is a problem in Central Asia, and while the issue is receiving somewhat more attention, progress in combating abuse has been slow — and efforts by authorities have often been no more than superficial.

    On this week’s Majlis podcast, RFE/RL’s Media-Relations Manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion about what changes have and are taking place in Central Asia to address the scourge of gender violence, and some of the challenges that still lie ahead.

    This week’s guests are: from Kazakhstan, Khalida Azhigulova, the director of the Research Center for Human Rights, Inclusion, and Civil Society and an associate professor at the Eurasian Technology University; from Uzbekistan, Irina Matvienko, a feminist activist and founder of Nemolchi.uz, which loosely translates as “don’t remain silent” and is an organization dedicated to the prevention of violence against women and helping victims; and Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Is Uzbekistan Returning To The ‘Bad Old Days’ Of Reporting Only Good News?

    There is a very public battle under way in Uzbekistan between several media outlets and the agency tasked with overseeing the press in the country.

    The outlets say they have the right — and a duty — to report on current and pervasive energy shortages and the true scale of the spread and human cost of the coronavirus pandemic in Uzbekistan.

    But the Agency for Information and Mass Communications (AIMC) objects to the sources and “negativity” of some reports and what it calls “one-sided” information.

    AIMC Director Asadjon Khodjaev has warned the offending outlets and said there could be “serious legal consequences” if they do not rein in their reporting.

    Ever since Shavkat Mirziyoev became president in late 2016, Uzbek authorities have promised to ease restrictions put in place by his predecessor, longtime authoritarian leader Islam Karimov, that earned the government a reputation as a chronic abuser of rights.

    There have been some positive changes, though the media has been kept on a short leash the past four years.

    Uzbek President Shavkhat Mirziyoev (file photo)

    Uzbek President Shavkhat Mirziyoev (file photo)

    The AIMC and Uzbekistan’s Supreme Court have warned media outlets about “objectivity” in their reporting, and the AIMC has made it clear that the authorities will hold not only media outlets — but also bloggers and people posting material on social networks — responsible for their comments and content.

    Uzbek media outlets reported on an Energy Ministry announcement at the start of November that there would be limits on the use of gas and electricity in homes and businesses.

    Some small- and medium-sized businesses in Tashkent said they were cut-off entirely from gas supplies while others faced rationing.

    Many people around Uzbekistan looked for substitutes for heating and cooking – including using gas canisters, coal, wood, and pressed manure (kizyak).

    ‘Serious Legal Consequences’

    Gazeta.uz, one of the media outlets that recently got a warning from the AIMC, reported on November 10 that Deputy Energy Minister Behzot Normatov gave assurances there was no need to resort to burning wood, coal, or “kizyak” since there were ample supplies of gas canisters that could be used to cook.

    But one week later, RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, known locally as Ozodlik, reported that people were waiting in line to buy coal in some parts of Uzbekistan and unscrupulous merchants were jacking up the prices.

    Uzbeks line up for coal in the Andijon region. (file photo)

    Uzbeks line up for coal in the Andijon region. (file photo)

    Media outlets such as Daryo started reporting on the deaths of thousands of chickens at poultry farms after their electricity had been turned off.

    Many other businesses were left without gas or electricity and now face financial ruin while an ever-increasing number of people are huddled together in their dark, cold homes.

    Kun.uz was one of the outlets reporting on the energy shortages, including a November 22 story, Give The People Electricity And Gas! An old and painful topic on social media, it reported what problems people were posting about due to the electricity and gas shortages.

    The next day, Kun.uz received a letter from AIMC Director Khodjaev that claimed the “[Kun.uz] material highlights the problems in the supply of electricity and natural gas to the population in a one-sided way.”

    The letter warned Kun.uz that if it “does not take the necessary measures to prevent the recurrence of such a situation in the future, it will have serious legal consequences.”

    The management at Kun.uz was sufficiently incensed at the letter that they wrote and published a response, including an English version, to AIMC and Khodjaev.

    Lack Of Transparency?

    The other story of major significance for Uzbekistan in November was the continued debilitating effects of the coronavirus and some doubts that officials are providing accurate information about the number of people infected and those who have died from COVID-19.

    A lack of transparency on the part of the state regarding those numbers has long been suspected.

    As of December 1, the number of registered coronavirus cases in Uzbekistan was 73,145 with about 610 deaths in a country of more than 34 million.

    Many have cast doubt on Uzbekistan's official coronavirus infection rates, which are considerably lower than those recorded in some neighboring countries. (file photo)

    Many have cast doubt on Uzbekistan’s official coronavirus infection rates, which are considerably lower than those recorded in some neighboring countries. (file photo)

    In neighboring Kazakhstan, with a population of about 18.7 million, the number of registered cases as of December 1 was 132,348 with 1,990 deaths. And in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, with a population of some 6.5 million, the number of registered cases was about 73,200 with 1,275 deaths.

    Gazeta.uz, for one, reported on the discrepancies in the figures between state agencies and in one of the reports.

    It noted in a November 17 statement from the prime minister’s press service that 17,500 beds had been made available for COVID-19 patients around the country and currently some 6,570 infected people were being treated.

    Gazeta.uz noted in its report that on the same day, the Health Ministry had reported that 2,123 patients were being treated for COVID-19. The news site had inquired with the Health Ministry about the lower figure but had not yet received a response.

    Khodjaev sent a letter on November 20 warning Gazeta.uz of “serious legal consequences” for, according to Gazeta.uz, publishing news that “compared statistics of patients at COVID-19 hospitals with data from the Health Ministry.

    Gazeta.uz’s management wrote on November 25 that it considered “the warning letter an overreaction [and] an attempt to force the publication to stop asking the government ‘unpleasant’ questions.”

    On November 27, Gazeta.uz said the AIMC had warned Gazeta.uz, Daryo.uz, Kun.uz, Podrobno.uz, and Repost.uz about publishing “commentary and insults” and for “expressing doubts about coronavirus statistics and a failure to provide an official clarification.”

    Concerning Khodjaev’s complaint about reports on electricity and gas shortages, Kun.uz wrote that Khodjaev’s letter claimed “the government of Uzbekistan was accused of committing crimes against the population in the material.”

    But Kun.uz countered: “the material was about how people reacted to problems in the power supply system [and] was not focusing on criticizing the government.”

    Kun.uz continued that “it is a fact that electricity is cut off for hours all over the country. This can be seen from the complaints on social networks and the thousands of appeals addressed to our editorial office.”

    In its November 25 post, Gazeta.uz responded to the AIMC complaints by saying: “There are many cases when state bodies provide the public with incomplete information on issues of interest to citizens or do not issue it at all.” It continued: “Often the AIMC in such situations remains on the sidelines and the public, not receiving important information, loses.”

    Western diplomats in Uzbekistan have certainly taken note of the dispute between the media outlets and the AIMC.

    On November 26, British Ambassador to Uzbekistan Tim Torlot posted on Twitter: “I am surprised and sad to see how AIMC’s approach [in] support of [the] development of [the] mass media seems to have changed recently. A democratic society cannot be built without a robust, free media.”

    ‘Smells Like Old Uzbekistan’

    On November 28, U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan Daniel Rosenblum tweeted that he was “Disappointed by recent actions taken by the Agency for Information and Mass Communications to pressure [independent] media outlets. To succeed, Uzbekistan’s ambitious reforms require a free & open press. AIMC pressure [is] not consistent with this.”

    As mentioned, the AIMC and Uzbekistan’s Supreme Court have previously warned media outlets about their reporting and the prime minister and mayor of Tashkent have also had some very harsh words and even threats for journalists.

    But there are mixed signals coming from Uzbek officials.

    On November 30, 2019, the chairwoman of the Uzbek Senate, Tanzila Narbaeva, addressed parliament, saying, “The head of our state rightly stressed that the media play a special role in the implementation of reforms” and that “we [officials] need to accept media criticism the right way.”

    On February 3, Saida Mirziyoeva, the president’s daughter, presented a new social fund for the development of the country’s mass media by saying, “We believe in freedom of speech and its power.”

    The media outlets mentioned have all reported on certain successes the government has claimed in the fight against the spread of the coronavirus. They have also covered efforts to improve the gas-distribution system, the discovery of new gas fields, increases in production, and other positive stories associated with efforts to improve Uzbekistan’s horribly inadequate power grid.

    But it is difficult to put a positive spin on severe power shortages in winter and people becoming ill from a virus that worldwide has affected nearly 64 million people and killed about 1.5 million.

    Uzbek officials, including President Mirziyoev, have emphasized that the media is essential for reporting the problems and opinions of Uzbeks so that the authorities are aware of the problems.

    Yet when reporting bad news, several media outlets have been threatened with “legal consequences” if they continue to do so.

    Kun.uz wrote, “It would not be wrong to say that this behavior [toward the media] smells like ‘Old Uzbekistan.’”

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.