Category: kazakhstan

  • Russia and Kazakhstan are seeking another increase in oil output during the January 4 meeting of OPEC+ members as other nations express concern about global energy demand amid the rapid spread of a new strain of the coronavirus.

    OPEC and allied producers including Russia, a grouping known as OPEC+, decided at a meeting in December 2020 to raise their total output by 500,000 barrels per day (bpd) in January, anticipating a boost in demand, and agreed to meet every month to review production.

    At the latest meeting on January 4, Russia and Kazakhstan urged another output increase in February while Iraq, Nigeria, and the United Arab Emirates recommended holding production steady, Reuters reported, citing two unidentified sources.

    Saudi Arabia’s energy minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, said that OPEC+ should be cautious about further production increases as the new variant of coronavirus is unpredictable. Britain was expected to announce a new lockdown in England as the new variant spreads in its southern regions.

    Saudi Arabia is the de facto leader of OPEC and its disagreement with Russia in March over oil output quotas caused the largest one-day drop in prices in decades.

    After a weeks-long standoff between Moscow and Riyadh, OPEC+ producers agreed in mid April to cut 9.7 million bpd, or about a tenth of global production, as the rapid spread of the coronavirus caused record demand destruction.

    OPEC+ have since increased production several times as global demand slowly rebounded and prices moved above $50 a barrel. The January increase has now reduced the existing cuts to 7.2 million bpd.

    Bjornar Tonhaugen, the head of oil markets at research firm Rystad Energy, said in a note to clients on January 4 that another production increase before the May driving season would hurt prices.

    However, he said that Russia “may not want to lose face and capitulate so easily” and that OPEC+ members “may be in for some lengthy negotiations.”

    With reporting by Reuters, AP, and RBC

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Kazakhstan has abolished the death penalty, making permanent a nearly two-decade freeze on capital punishment in the Central Asian country, a statement on the presidential website said on January 2.

    The statement said Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev had signed off on parliamentary ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – a document that obligates signatories to abolish the death penalty.

    Kazakhstan instituted an indefinite moratorium on capital punishment in 2003 but retained the death penalty for terrorism-related offenses.

    In 2016, the death penalty was imposed on a man who was convicted of a mass shooting in Almaty.

    Ruslan Kulikbaev had been the only person on death row in Kazakhstan. He will now serve a life sentence in prison.

    Toqaev announced that his country would join the protocol on the abolition of the death penalty in his speech at the 74th session of the UN General Assembly in December 2019.

    Russia, Tajikistan, and Belarus are now the only three countries in Europe and Central Asia which haven’t yet signed or ratified the Second Optional Protocol. Belarus is the only country in the region that still carries out executions.

    With reporting by AFP

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The approval of COVID-19 vaccines has raised hopes that the “new normal” of a post-pandemic world will start to emerge in 2021.

    But international rights groups say civil society must be able to return to its “normal” pre-pandemic role to prevent a permanent expansion of overreaching government power.

    They argue that civil society must provide checks and balances to ensure the rollback of temporary, emergency public-health measures imposed — and sometimes misused — during 2020.

    Transparency International has long warned about “worrying signs that the pandemic will leave in its wake increased authoritarianism and weakened rule of law.”

    “The COVID-19 crisis has offered corrupt and authoritarian leaders a dangerous combination of public distraction and reduced oversight,” the global anti-corruption group says.

    “Corruption thrives when democratic institutions such as a free press and an independent judiciary are undermined; when citizens’ right to protest, join associations, or engage in initiatives to monitor government spending is limited,” Transparency International says.

    Protesters clash with police in front of Serbia's National Assembly building in Belgrade on July 8 during a demonstration against a weekend curfew announced to combat a resurgence of COVID-19 infections.

    Protesters clash with police in front of Serbia’s National Assembly building in Belgrade on July 8 during a demonstration against a weekend curfew announced to combat a resurgence of COVID-19 infections.

    says authoritarianism in theory, as well as authoritarian regimes in practice, were “already gaining ground” before the pandemic.

    Hamid says some aspects of the post-pandemic era — such as COVID-19 tracing schemes and increased surveillance — can create “authoritarian temptations” for those in charge of governments.

    “During — and after — the pandemic, governments are likely to use long, protracted crises to undermine domestic opposition and curtail civil liberties,” Hamid concludes in a Brookings report called Reopening The World.

    The intent to suppress on the part of the government can provoke an unusually intense desire to expose its mistakes on the part of the press, the legislative branch, and civil society.”

    But despite those dangers, Hamid remains cautiously optimistic about political freedoms recovering in a post-pandemic world.

    In due time, he says, the removal of emergency restrictions will help “political parties, protesters, and grassroots movements to communicate their platforms and grievances to larger audiences.”

    “Democratic governments may try to suppress information and spin or downplay crises as well — as the Trump administration did — but they rarely get away with it,” Hamid concludes.

    “If anything, the intent to suppress on the part of the government can provoke an unusually intense desire to expose its mistakes on the part of the press, the legislative branch, and civil society,” he says.

    In countries from Russia to Turkmenistan, authoritarian tendencies under the guise of pandemic control have included the use of emergency health measures to crack down on political opposition figures and to limit the freedom of the press.

    They also have included attempts by authorities to restrict the ability of civic organizations to scrutinize and constrain the expansion of executive power.

    Crackdown In Baku

    Actions taken by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s government are a case in point.

    In March, Baku imposed tough new punishments for those convicted of “violating anti-epidemic, sanitary-hygienic, or lockdown” rules.

    The new criminal law imposed a fine of about $3,000 and up to three years in prison for violations such as failing to wear a mask in public.

    Those convicted of spreading the virus face up to five years in prison.

    A police officer inspects a woman's documents under the gaze of an Azerbaijani soldier in Baku in July during the coronavirus pandemic. Azerbaijan deployed troops to help police ensure a tight coronavirus lockdown in the capital and several major cities.

    A police officer inspects a woman’s documents under the gaze of an Azerbaijani soldier in Baku in July during the coronavirus pandemic. Azerbaijan deployed troops to help police ensure a tight coronavirus lockdown in the capital and several major cities.

    Human Rights Watch (HRW) warned that Baku’s criminal punishments for spreading COVID are “not a legitimate or proportionate response to the threat posed by the virus.”

    The U.S.-based rights group says it is all too easy for such laws to be misused to “target marginalized populations, minorities, or dissidents.”

    During the summer — amid public dissatisfaction about the lack of a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with neighboring Armenia — Aliyev also faced dissent over rampant corruption, economic mismanagement, and his handling of the pandemic.

    Aliyev’s response was to launch a crackdown in July widely seen as an attempt to eliminate his political rivals and pro-democracy advocates once and for all.

    A Washington Post editorial said Aliyev had “blown a gasket” with a “tantrum” that threatened to “obliterate what remains of independent political forces in Azerbaijan.”

    More than 120 opposition figures and supporters were rounded up in July by Aliyev’s security forces — mostly from the opposition Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (AXFP).

    Two opposition figures among those arrested were charged with violating Azerbaijan’s emergency COVID measures — Mehdi Ibrahimov, the son of AXFP Deputy Chairman Mammad Ibrahim, and AXFP member Mahammad Imanli.

    HRW says its own review of pretrial court documents concluded that Imanli was “falsely accused” of spreading COVID-19 and endangering lives by not wearing a mask in public.

    Ibrahimov’s arrest was based on a claim by police that he took part in an unauthorized street demonstration while infected with the coronavirus.

    But Ibrahimov’s lawyer says COVID tests taken after his arrest in July show he was not infected.

    In fact, he said, the charges of violating public-health rules were only filed against Ibrahimov after he was detained and authorities discovered he was the son of a prominent opposition leader.

    Belarusian Borders

    Critics accuse Belarus’s authoritarian ruler, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, of using COVID-19 restrictions to suppress mass demonstrations against his regime.

    To be sure, the use of politically related COVID-19 measures is seen as just one tool in Minsk’s broader strategy of intensified police crackdowns.

    The rights group Vyasna said in December that more than 900 politically motivated criminal cases were opened in 2020 against Belarusian opposition candidates and their teams, activists, and protesters.

    The ongoing, daily demonstrations pose the biggest threat to Lukashenka’s 26-year grasp on power — fueled by allegations of electoral fraud after he was declared the landslide winner of a sixth term in a highly disputed August 9 presidential election.

    While Minsk downplayed the threat posed by COVID-19 for months, Lukashenka has repeatedly accused the opposition and hundreds of thousands of protesters on the streets of being foreign-backed puppets.

    A Belarusian border guard wears a face mask and gloves to protect herself from the coronavirus early in the pandemic. Belarus closed off its borders to foreigners on November 1.

    A Belarusian border guard wears a face mask and gloves to protect herself from the coronavirus early in the pandemic. Belarus closed off its borders to foreigners on November 1.

    On November 1, after months of brutal police crackdowns failed to halt the anti-government demonstrations, Belarus closed off its borders to foreigners.

    The State Border Committee said the restrictions were necessary to “prevent the spread of infection caused by COVID-19.”

    In December, authorities expanded the border ban to prevent Belarusians and permanent residents from leaving the country — ostensibly because of the pandemic.

    Lukashenka’s own behavior on COVID-19 bolstered allegations the border closures are a politically motivated attempt to restrain the domestic opposition.

    In late November, Lukashenka completely disregarded safety protocols during a visit to a COVID-19 hospital ward — wearing neither gloves nor a mask when he shook hands with a medic in full protective gear.

    Opposition leader Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who left Belarus under pressure after she tried to file a formal complaint about the official election tally, says the border restrictions show Lukashenka is “in a panic.”

    Russia’s Surveillance State

    In Moscow, experts say the pandemic has tested the limitations of Russia’s surveillance state.

    Russia’s State Duma in late March approved legislation allowing Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin to declare a state of emergency across the country and establish mandatory public health rules.

    It also approved a penalty of up to five years in prison for those who “knowingly” disseminate false information during “natural and man-made emergencies.”

    The legislation called for those breaking COVID-19 measures to be imprisoned for up to seven years.

    In April, President Vladimir Putin tasked local governments with the responsibility of adopting COVID-19 restrictions.

    Experts say that turned some Russian regions into testing grounds for how much increased surveillance and control Russians will stand for.

    It also protected the Kremlin from political backlash over concerns that expanded government powers to control COVID-19 could become permanent in post-pandemic Russia.

    Meanwhile, Moscow took steps to control the free flow of information about Russia’s response to the pandemic.

    “It is staggering that the Russian authorities appear to fear criticism more than the deadly COVID-19 pandemic,” Amnesty International’s Russia director, Natalia Zviagina, said.

    “They justify the arrest and detention of Anastasia Vasilyeva on the pretext that she and her fellow medics violated travel restrictions,” Zviagina said. “In fact, they were attempting to deliver vital protective equipment to medics at a local hospital.”

    Anastasia Vasilyeva, a Russian doctor who heads a medical workers union, was arrested in April after she exposed shortcomings in the health system’s preparations to fight COVID-19.

    Anastasia Vasilyeva, a Russian doctor who heads a medical workers union, was arrested in April after she exposed shortcomings in the health system’s preparations to fight COVID-19.

    Zviagina concludes that by putting Vasilyeva in jail, Russian authorities exposed “their true motive.”

    “They are willing to punish health professionals who dare contradict the official Russian narrative and expose flaws in the public health system,” she said.

    The State Duma also launched reviews and crackdowns in 2020 on reporting by foreign media organizations — including RFE/RL — about the way Russia has handled COVID.

    Human Rights Watch said police “falsely claimed” protesters violated COVID-19 measures — “yet kept most of the detained protesters in overcrowded, poorly ventilated police vehicles.”

    In July, police in Moscow detained dozens of journalists during a protest against Russia’s growing restrictions on media and freedom of expression.

    In several cases, Human Rights Watch said police “falsely claimed” protesters violated COVID-19 public health measures — “yet kept most of the detained protesters in overcrowded, poorly ventilated police vehicles where they could not practice social distancing.”

    HRW Russia researcher Damelya Aitkozhina says those cases “have taken the repression to a new level.”

    Aitkhozhina says authorities in Moscow “detained peaceful protesters under the abusive and restrictive rules on public assembly and under the guise of protecting public health, while exposing them to risk of infection in custody.”

    Rights activists say local authorities in some Russian regions also used COVID-19 measures as an excuse to crack down on protesters.

    In late April, authorities in North Ossetia detained dozens of demonstrators from a crowd of about 2,000 people who’d gathered in Vladikavkaz to demand the resignation of regional leader Vyacheslav Bitarov.

    Thirteen were charged with defying Russia’s COVID-19 measures and spreading “fake information” about the pandemic.

    In Russia’s Far East city of Khabarovsk, authorities used COVID-19 measures to try to discourage mass protests against the arrest of a popular regional governor on decades-old charges of complicity in murder.

    Demonstrators say the charges were fabricated by the governor’s local political opponents with help from the Kremlin.

    While municipal authorities in Khabarovsk warned about the risks of COVID-19 at the protests, police taped off gathering places for the demonstrations — claiming the move was necessary for COVID-19 disinfection.

    But the crowds gathered anyway — reflecting discontent with Putin’s rule and public anger at what residents say is disrespect from Moscow about their choice for a governor.

    Demo Restrictions In Kazakhstan

    Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev signed legislation in late May that tightened government control over the right of citizens to gather for protests.

    Going into effect during the first wave of the global COVID-19 outbreak, the new law defines how many people can attend a demonstration and where protests can take place.

    Critics say the new restrictions and bureaucratic hurdles include the need for “permission” from authorities before protests can legally take place in Kazakhstan — with officials being given many reasons to refuse permission.

    RFE/RL also has reported on how authorities in Kazakhstan used the coronavirus as an excuse to clamp down on civil rights activists who criticized the new public protest law.

    Kazakh and international human rights activists say the legislation contradicts international standards and contains numerous obstacles to free assembly.

    Information Control In Uzbekistan

    Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev has been praised by international rights groups since he came to power in late 2016 for his slight easing of authoritarian restrictions imposed by his predecessor, the late Islam Karimov.

    But the COVID-19 crisis has spawned a battle between emerging independent media outlets and the state body that oversees the press in Uzbekistan — the Agency for Information and Mass Communications (AIMC).

    Officials in Tashkent initially claimed Uzbekistan was doing well in combating COVID-19. But by the summer, some media outlets were questioning that government narrative.

    They began to delve deeply into details about the spread of the pandemic and its human costs within the country.

    AIMC Director Asadjon Khodjaev in late November threatened “serious legal consequences” about such reporting — raising concerns that COVID-19 could be pushing Uzbekistan back toward more authoritarian press controls, much like the conditions that existed under Karimov.

    Kyrgyz Upheaval

    Before the pandemic, Kyrgyzstan was considered by the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders as Central Asia’s most open country for the media. But Kyrgyzstan’s relative openness has been eroded by lockdowns and curfews imposed since a state of emergency was declared on March 22.

    Most independent media outlets have had difficulty getting accreditation or permits allowing their journalists to move freely in Bishkek or other areas restricted under the public health emergency.

    Violent political protests erupted after Kyrgyzstan’s controversial parliamentary elections on October 4 — which were carried out despite the complications posed by the COVID-19 control measures.

    The political tensions led to the downfall of President Sooronbai Jeenbekov’s government, plans to hold new elections, and the declaration of a state of emergency in Bishkek that included a ban on public demonstrations.

    Pascaline della Faille, an analyst for the Credendo group of European credit insurance companies, concludes that social tensions contributing to the political upheaval were heightened by the pandemic.

    She says those tensions included complaints about the country’s poor health system, an economy hit hard by COVID-19 containment measures, and a sharp drop in remittances from Kyrgyz citizens who work abroad.

    Turkmenistan Is Ridiculed

    One of the world’s most tightly controlled authoritarian states, Turkmenistan has never had a good record on press freedom or transparency.

    Not surprisingly, then, President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov’s claim that he has prevented a single COVID-19 infection from happening in his country has been the target of global ridicule rather than admiration.

    Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov

    Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov

    Ashgabat’s continued insistence that the coronavirus does not exist in Turkmenistan is seen as a sign of Berdymukhammedov’s authoritarian dominance rather than any credible public health policies.

    In early August, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that Berdymukhammedov had agreed to give WHO experts access to try to verify his claim about the absence of COVID-19 in his country.

    Hans Kluge, WHO’s regional director for Europe and Central Asia, said Berdymukhammedov had “agreed” for a WHO team “to sample independently COVID-19 tests in country” and take them to WHO reference laboratories in other countries.

    But after more than four months, Berdymukhammedov has still not kept his promise.

    Meanwhile, Turkmenistan’s state television broadcasts perpetuate Berdymukhammedov’s cult of personality by showing him opening new “state-of the-art” medical facilities in Ashgabat and other big cities.

    Privately, Turkmen citizens tell RFE/RL that they don’t believe the hype.

    They say they avoid hospitals when they become ill because facilities are too expensive for impoverished ordinary citizens and state facilities often have little to offer them.

    Patients at several regional hospitals in Turkmenistan told RFE/RL they’ve had to provide their own food, medicine, and even firewood to heat their hospital rooms.

    Still, in a former Soviet republic known for brutal crackdowns on critics and dissent, nobody openly criticizes Turkmenistan’s health officials about the dire situation in hospitals out of fear of reprisals.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • On January 10, Kazakhstan will hold its first parliamentary elections since the country’s longtime president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, stepped down in March 2019.

    Nazarbaev remains the head of the Nur-Otan party, which is expected to do well in these elections to the Mazhilis, the lower house of parliament, as it always has since its founding in 1999.

    Conspicuously absent from these elections are any political parties that could remotely be called a genuine opposition, despite a pledge from the new president, Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev, about the need for opposition parties to participate in politics.

    Political activists are reporting increased harassment in the weeks leading up to elections.

    And a new report from RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service, known locally as Azattyq, casts new light on the vast wealth former President Nazarbaev and members of his family have acquired outside Kazakhstan.

    On this week’s Majlis Podcast, RFE/RL’s media-relations manager for South and Central Asia, Muhammad Tahir, moderates a discussion on Kazakhstan’s approaching parliamentary elections and what has changed and what looks the same under a different president.

    This week’s guests are: from Kazakhstan, Darkhan Umirbekov, Azattyq’s digital editor, who also participated in preparing the report on the Nazarbaev family wealth; Sofya du Boulay, who is researching the study of legitimation, authoritarian durability, and politics in Central Asia and the South Caucasus at Oxford Brookes University; Luca Anceschi, professor of Central Asian studies at Glasgow University and author of the recently published book Analysing Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: Regime Neo-Eurasianism In The Nazarbaev era; and Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • SHYMKENT, Kazakhstan — An activist in Kazakhstan’s southern region of Turkistan has been handed a parole-like sentence for his links with a banned political movement.

    The Keles district court on December 22 sentenced Marat Duisembiev to 3 1/2 years of “freedom limitation” after finding him guilty of involvement in the activities of the banned opposition Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK).

    The trial was held online due to coronavirus restrictions. Duisembiev participated in the process via a video link from a detention center in the regional capital, Shymkent.

    The 44-year-old activist was arrested and charged in August after he openly called for people to take part in an unsanctioned rally organized by the DVK.

    Human rights organizations in Kazakhstan recognized him as a political prisoner last month.

    Duisenbiev’s sentence was handed down two days after another activist, Alibek Moldin, was sentenced to one year of “freedom limitation” for being associated with the DVK-linked unregistered Koshe (Street) Party, also banned in Kazakhstan as an extremist organization.

    DVK is led by Mukhtar Ablyazov, the fugitive former head of Kazakhstan’s BTA Bank and outspoken critic of the Kazakh government. Kazakh authorities labeled DVK extremist and banned the group in March 2018.

    Several activists have been sentenced to various prison terms and limitations in Kazakhstan in recent months for involvement in the DVK’s activities, including taking part in the DVK-organized unsanctioned rallies.

    Opponents of the Kazakh government have said that the crackdown on the DVK’s supporters has intensified ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for January 10.

    Human rights groups have said Kazakhstan’s law on public gatherings contradicts international standards as it requires preliminary permission from authorities to hold rallies and envisions prosecution for organizing and participating in unsanctioned rallies even though the nation’s constitution guarantees its citizens the right of free assembly.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • AQTOBE, Kazakhstan — Authorities in the northwestern Kazakh city of Aqtobe have forcibly placed a wheelchair-bound activist in a psychiatric clinic after he allegedly tore down a poster of the ruling Nur Otan party.

    Dana Zhanai, the chairwoman of the Qaharman human rights center, said on December 22 that activist Asanali Suyubaev had been taken to a psychiatric clinic a day earlier, a move she says is likely part of a campaign by the ruling party to sideline activists ahead of January 10 parliamentary elections.

    The clinic’s deputy chief physician, Esenaman Nysanov, confirmed to RFE/RL that Suyubaev had been brought to the facility by medical personnel and police.

    “The patient has mental changes. But he does not accept it. He behaved in a strange way, namely, while outside, he was tearing election posters, which can be defined in a medical term as addictive behavior,” Nysanov said, adding that Suyubaev had been under “psychiatric control” since 2012.

    Aqtobe police refused to comment on Suyubaev’s situation.

    Zhanai told RFE/RL that Suyubaev was forcibly placed in a psychiatric clinic for 20 days in April after he distributed leaflets for the unregistered and banned Koshe (Street) party.

    “The authorities isolated him intentionally right before the [January 10] parliamentary elections. Activists have started a campaign to prove that the ruling Nur Otan party’s ratings are fictitious and that votes will be stolen during the poll. Because of that, many activists across Kazakhstan are being persecuted now. Many are under house arrest, in detention centers, and in this case, they put Suyubaev in a psychiatric clinic,” Zhanai said.

    Rights activists in Kazakhstan have criticized authorities for using a Soviet-era method of stifling dissent by placing opponents in psychiatric clinics..

    Earlier in November, another government critic, journalist Aigul Otepova, was placed in a psychiatric clinic for 18 days. She was released on December 11 and remains under house arrest over posting an article on Facebook criticizing official efforts to curb the coronavirus outbreak.

    Investigators have charged her with having links with banned opposition movement Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, which Otepova denies.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • An RFE/RL investigation shows the relatives of former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev have invested nearly $785 million in luxury properties in at least six countries over a 20-year time span.

    The investigation, published on December 22, is not a comprehensive accounting of all the real estate investments made by Nazarbaev’s children, grandchildren, in-laws, or other politically connected Kazakh elite, but for the first time attempts to document and value those investments, some of which have drawn media and legal scrutiny over the years or been the source of controversy.

    SPECIAL REPORT: Big Houses, Deep Pockets

    A luxury hillside villa in Cannes, France, figured into a bitter, multiyear lawsuit between Nazarbaev’s brother, Bolat, and his ex-wife Maira Kurmangalieva, as did posh apartments on New York City’s Wall Street and overlooking Central Park.

    A palatial, ocean-side estate on Spain’s Costa Brava owned by Timur Kulibaev, the husband of Nazarbaev’s second daughter, Dinara, has been a regular source of controversy, as local environmentalists have fought the estate’s efforts to close an access road. Nazarbaev has reportedly visited the property, known as Can Juncadella.

    Several U.K. properties linked to Nazarbaev’s eldest daughter, Darigha, and her son Nurali have been the target of Britain’s National Crime Agency, which charged that the funds used to purchase the properties may have come from illicit sources. A court in April, however, dismissed those allegations.

    Darigha also owns part of a block of townhouses on London’s famous Baker Street, whose acquisition was made using anonymous shell companies.

    The father-in-law of Darigha’s other son, Aisultan, owns a luxury estate southwest of London, near a famous golf course, and hotels in the Czech Republic.

    And Kulibaev’s purchase and renovations of the U.K. mansion once owned by Prince Andrew have drawn scrutiny from British newspapers.

    In Switzerland, Nazarbaev’s second daughter, Dinara, owns two chateau-type mansions on the shores of Lake Geneva.

    And Kulibaev has also been tied to a historic property in Lugano, in southern Switzerland, and a semi-dilapidated spa on a hilltop overlooking the historic Czech spa town of Karlovy Vary.

    Between 1991 and 2019, Nazarbaev was Kazakhstan’s singular political leader, holding an iron grip over the country’s political life and stamping out any rival attempts to challenge him.

    The country’s prosperity grew substantially during that period, fueled by its large oil and gas reserves, but corruption and nepotism in the country became entrenched.

    Anti-corruption activists and Central Asian researchers have said a clan-type system benefiting a narrowing group of elites poses a long-term danger.

    Kazakhstan ranked 113th of 198 countries on Transparency International’s corruption index in 2019 and was 157th on Reporters Without Borders 2020 World Press Freedom Index.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • A villa in Cannes, a Swiss chateau, an entire block in central London: those are just a few of the investments made by relatives of former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev, who resigned in 2019. In an extensive investigation, RFE/RL journalists have documented the vast wealth acquired by the former first family during nearly three decades of Nazarbaev’s rule.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • GENEVA – In the gentle dawn of Switzerland’s late summer, Lake Geneva’s ripples lap against the properties on the eastern shore in the suburb of Anières, home to diplomats, bankers, and well-to-do Swiss.

    Some of the buildings are understated in their wealth, with slate shingles or mansard roofs or Corinthian columns. Some have gazebos on manicured lawns looking west to the Jura Mountains, or docks where motorboats and kayaks are parked. Many have gates and surveillance cameras to protect from curious passersby.

    And then there’s the property at No. 399 Route D’Hermance: a 3,200-square-meter three-level villa with a butterfly staircase, a 25-meter indoor-outdoor swimming pool, spa, guest quarters, and terraced landscaping.

    In an area known for having some of the most expensive housing in the region, it’s an exceptional property.

    The owner of the estate, according to Swiss property records, is Dinara Kulibaeva, the daughter of Kazakhstan’s longtime ruler, Nursultan Nazarbaev. She and her husband, Timur Kulibaev, who are among Kazakhstan’s wealthiest people, purchased the villa in 2009 for a reported $75 million.

    And they are among several immediate and extended relatives of Nazarbaev who own lavish real estate in the West.

    Over the past two decades, relatives of Nazarbaev have purchased hundreds of millions of dollars in posh real estate in Europe and the United States, a string of high-end properties on luxurious lakesides, amid Manhattan’s skyscrapers, London’s tony suburbs, and overlooking the azure waters of Spain’s Costa Brava.

    A new RFE/RL investigation provides the most comprehensive overview to date of the properties in this sprawling real estate network linked to Nazarbaev’s relatives, including two of his daughters, his grandsons, and his brother.

    The findings are not an exhaustive record of every foreign property owned by a relative of the former Kazakh president, who was officially granted the title “Leader of the Nation” in 2010 and currently serves as chairman of the country’s powerful Security Council and heads its ruling political party.


    Nursultan Nazarbaev

    But they offer an unprecedented window into the scale of the real estate investments by Nazarbaev’s relatives, and how many in close proximity to Kazakhstan’s ruling family ended up with luxury assets in exclusive locations.

    RFE/RL identified at least $785 million in European and U.S. real estate purchases made by Nazarbaev’s family members and their in-laws in six countries over a 20-year span. This figure includes a handful of properties that have since been sold, including multimillion-dollar apartments in the United States bought by Nazarbaev’s brother, Bolat. It does not include a sprawling Spanish estate owned by Kulibaev, for which a purchase price could not be found.

    These acquisitions have been funded by the vast fortunes Nazarbaev’s relatives have amassed in the oil-rich nation’s energy, banking, and other sectors, while at various times also serving in official government posts.

    Nazarbaev’s patronage is widely seen as crucial to the wealth built by his relatives, who have repeatedly and vehemently insisted they are successful businesspeople independent of their family and political connections.

    Prominent among those is Kulibaev, who has been dogged for years by accusations that his wealth, mainly from his work in the oil-and-gas industry, derives from his familial relations. The Financial Times on December 2 said it had uncovered a secret scheme that allegedly channeled tens of millions of dollars from contracts related to a massive gas pipeline to China to Kulibaev. His lawyers denied specifics of the report to the Financial Times and did not respond to queries from RFE/RL.

    Several of these properties documented by RFE/RL have been the subject of legal challenges, including permitting disputes, an acrimonious divorce, and British freezing orders on three London residences that were later overturned by a court.

    The investments in pricey foreign properties also come against the backdrop of the country’s overall increase in national wealth since the Soviet collapse. This increased prosperity has lifted livelihoods for many average Kazakhs — but it has also helped the politically connected elite transform into jet-setting tycoons and fodder for newspaper gossip pages.

    And with 80-year-old Nazarbaev in his twilight, there’s a growing uncertainty about what, and who, will succeed him when he fully departs from Kazakh politics — and what might happen to the fortunes of those closest to him.

    “The system is so brittle. The political economy that Nazarbaev has built, it’s built on one man,” said Kate Mallinson, a London-based consultant and researcher of Central Asian politics.

    His relatives and closest allies have “hedged the bets on the future, not knowing what will happen — and so they’ve had to put assets outside the country,” Mallinson told RFE/RL.

    Yevgeniy Zhovtis, the head of Kazakhstan’s oldest and largest human-rights organization, said “it is hard to separate the government from the [Nazarbaev] family” and “hard to say how it will be in Kazakhstan” after Nazarbaev dies.

    “You cannot rely on protection from the rule of law when you live in such political systems,” Zhovtis said.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are holding elections on January 10, the results of which will inevitably be unpopular with segments of the two countries’ populations before and after election day.

    Kazakhstan’s Nur-Otan party, created in 1999 to keep Nursultan Nazarbaev in power and still headed by the now former president, is expected to retain its omnipotent position in parliamentary elections.

    In Kyrgyzstan, Sadyr Japarov is also expected on January 10, 2021, to formalize his meteoric rise from prisoner to president in barely three months and will likely enjoy greater powers than previous Kyrgyz presidents as the country also votes on a referendum to move from a parliamentary system of government back to a presidential one.

    Such outcomes are already unpalatable to many people in both countries, but those who seem sure to win in these upcoming elections are connected to recent scandals that are tarnishing the image of their countries and providing their opponents with additional reasons to reject the results of these polls.

    That will almost surely result in a rise in tensions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

    Same Old, Same Old In Kazakhstan

    Nur-Otan is the party of first Kazakh President Nazarbaev and, as mentioned, has been since the day it was created. The party was originally called Otan, which means “Fatherland,” but in December 2006 party members decided to add Nur (radiant) to the title, which certainly emphasized whose party it was.

    Nur-Otan has won the majority of seats in every election it has participated in; from the first in 1999, when the party won 23 of 77 seats available to the last election in 2016 when the party won 84 of 98 seats at stake.

    It would be remiss not to recall the party’s greatest victory, in 2007, when Nur-Otan took all 98 of the seats, leaving the other six token parties participating in those elections out in the cold.

    It is also important to note that Western election observers have not ever deemed a presidential or parliamentary election in Kazakhstan as “free and fair.”

    With such a background, it is fair to assume the Nur-Otan party will prove equally successful on January 10.

    It will, however, be the first time the party is running without Nazarbaev as president.

    Nazarbaev stepped down from office in March 2019.

    His chosen successor, Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev, is officially the president, though many believe Nazarbaev still runs the country.

    The transfer of the presidential office has made little difference in the style of governance in Kazakhstan, but it did reinvigorate a largely dormant opposition in the country that hoped a change in presidents would also lead to a change away from the authoritarian ways of Nazarbaev.

    There have been visible signs of discontent ever since Toqaev took over, including some of the biggest demonstrations Kazakhstan has seen in some 20 years.

    One of the candidates from Nur-Otan in the upcoming elections is Darigha Nazarbaeva, the unpopular daughter of Nazarbaev.

    She was the chairwoman of Kazakhstan’s Senate, the position next in line to the presidency (having taken over for Toqaev when he moved to the president’s office) until May, before scandals surrounding her brought much unwanted international attention on Kazakhstan.

    There were reports in foreign media about expensive property she and her oldest son Nurali owned in Britain, including one building that served as the address of the famous fictional detective Sherlock Holmes.

    And her younger son, Aisultan, who had drug-abuse problems, had taken to posting on social networks again at the start of 2020, claiming once that his father was really Nazarbaev, who is his grandfather, and also alleging that someone in his family wanted him dead.

    It was not the first time Nazarbaeva had to leave the political scene.

    She also took a hiatus from politics after she divorced her first husband, Rakhat Aliev, in 2007 and she stayed away while her former husband hurled serious accusations from self-exile in Europe about the corrupt and criminal practices of Nazarbaev and his government. She only returned as a candidate for Nur-Otan in the 2012 parliamentary elections.

    Her ex-husband Aliev died under mysterious circumstances while being held in an Austrian prison in 2015. Officially ruled a suicide, there were many credible reports that suggest Aliev was killed.

    Her son, Aisultan, died of a heart seizure allegedly caused by cocaine usage in August of this year.

    But it seems Darigha is now returning to politics.

    Timur Kulibaev is the husband of Dinara Nazarbaeva, ex-President Nazarbaev’s second daughter.

    It is well known that Kulibaev is rich and he and Dinara are regularly listed as being among the wealthiest people in Kazakhstan.

    On December 4, the Financial Times reported Kulibaev received millions of dollars from a pipeline scheme involving purchases of steel from China that went to Ukraine and Russia for processing into pipeline segments that were sold to companies building the Central Asia-China natural-gas pipelines.

    The report only mentioned $53 million and some people think Kulibaev has made a lot more shady money than that in his far-flung business dealings. But the report in the Financial Times again brought unwanted attention on Kazakhstan.

    On December 9, Kulibaev called on Kazakhstan’s prosecutor-general to investigate these allegations, though it is difficult to say who would be persuaded by Kulibaev being cleared by Kazakhstan’s Prosecutor-General’s Office.

    Is Darigha Nazarbaeva returning to politics?

    Is Darigha Nazarbaeva returning to politics?

    And there is Nazarbaev’s longtime friend, Bulat Utemuratov, whom one of the diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks said was rumored to be Nazarbaev’s “personal finance manager.”

    On December 1, The Wall Street Journal reported the Business and Property Courts of England and Wales had ordered some $5 billion in assets to be frozen “including stakes in luxury hotels, cash in bank accounts in half a dozen countries, and a Burger King franchise” that are connected to Bulat Utemuratov.

    The assets are part of a legal battle that involves an opposition figure in exile, fugitive banker Mukhtar Ablyazov, who has been “pursuing a personal feud against Nazarbaev” for a decade.

    The coronavirus global pandemic has hurt economies around the world and Kazakhstan has been no exception.

    It has been a tough year for many in Kazakhstan and all these reports of millions and billions of dollars belonging to a few people all connected with Nazarbaev will not engender much goodwill toward the first president, his family, and his friends.

    But regardless, on January 10, Nazarbaev’s Nur-Otan party is going to again win the most seats in parliament and his daughter, Darigha, seems sure to return to the country’s political scene.

    Worries In Kyrgyzstan

    Kyrgyzstan’s situation is more complicated.

    January 10 will mark slightly more than three months since Kyrgyzstan conducted parliamentary elections (October 4) that were marred by allegations of vote buying and the use of administrative resources that led to unrest in the capital, Bishkek, and saw a crowd storm state buildings and bring down the government, eventually including the president.

    A huge void was created and a group that played no role in bringing down the government came to power with Sadyr Japarov — freed from prison one day after the elections — becoming the apparent leader.

    How Japarov went from a prison cell, where he was serving time for hostage-taking, to being appointed prime minister and then, simultaneously acting president, in barely two weeks is a question still being debated but he clearly had support from influential people in Kyrgyzstan. Many believe much of that support came from organized criminal groups.

    Raimbek Matraimov, a former deputy chief in Kyrgyzstan’s Customs Service, is suspected of being one of the leading criminal figures in the country and his connection to the Mekenim Kyrgyzstan party that took the second-largest amount of votes in the October 4 parliamentary elections helped fuel the unrest that led to those results being annulled.

    Matraimov and some of his family members and business associates have been the subject of several lengthy investigative reports from the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), Kyrgyzstan’s Kloop media outlet, and RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, known locally as Azattyk.

    Their latest reports on the Matraimovs were released on December 14.

    After becoming prime minister, Japarov vowed to crack down on organized crime and Matraimov was taken into custody on October 20, though quickly released and put under house arrest.

    According to the investigative reports, Matraimov was a central figure in a smuggling and money-laundering scheme in which hundreds of millions were funneled from Kyrgyzstan, and there is testimony alleging he may be connected to some murders linked to the major money-laundering scheme. He has denied those charges in comments to RFE/RL.

    Japarov said in an interview on October 21 that there is nothing to be gained by putting Matraimov in prison.

    “[Matraimov’s] arrest won’t solve the problem,” Japarov said. “If he is in prison, no one will be able to get even a som from his assets…. How many corrupt figures have [already] been detained? None of them paid any money.”

    Japarov said Matraimov had promised to bring back 2 billion soms (about $24 million) and put it in a special bank account for recovered funds. Much of that has reportedly been returned to state coffers.

    Though Japarov spoke about corruption in the interview, he never specifically said Matraimov was involved in it or offered a clear reason why Matraimov — who has professed total innocence of the allegations made against him — was paying back any money at all.

    The current chief of the State Committee for National Security (UKMK), Kamchybek Tashiev, is a longtime friend of Japarov.

    In an interview with Azattyk less than two weeks before being appointed head of the UKMK, Tashiev criticized the media for “blackening” Matraimov’s image.

    “[Matraimov] is an ordinary citizen who has never held any high posts,” Tashiev said.

    The Kyrgyz Prosecutor-General’s Office has dragged its feet in taking any action against Matraimov.

    On December 10, Prosecutor-General Kurmankul Zulushev said an investigation is under way but added that the investigation involved “other parties guilty of economic crimes” and that “Raimbek Matraimov has made a deal with the investigation.”

    Sadyr Japarov: from prisoner to president

    Sadyr Japarov: from prisoner to president

    Zulushev was speaking the day after the U.S. Treasury Department announced it had put Matraimov on the Magnitsky Act sanctions list.

    Matraimov’s wife was added to the list on December 11.

    And U.S Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Donald Lu had already offered help in the Kyrgyz investigations of organized crime on December 3 and, two days later, repeated the offer, saying the journalistic investigation of Matraimov was the most important event in Kyrgyzstan in the last 18 months.

    These reports have been widely reported in Kyrgyzstan.

    With all of this background, Japarov remains the favorite going into the January 10 presidential election, which will have 18 candidates.

    But his and other officials’ attitudes toward Matraimov and the thus far soft treatment of other underworld figures such as Kamchy Kolbaev — who is also on the U.S. Treasury list of Specially Designated Nationals — has only deepened suspicions that organized crime is in charge or at least far too influential in Kyrgyzstan.

    And if the referendum is passed Japarov, as president, will have greater powers than his predecessors pending a referendum to be held the same time as the election.

    It was difficult to see how Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan would be able to hold these elections without protests.

    The addition of these latest scandals seems to ensure problems could occur before and after the votes are tabulated.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • When 29-year-old Symbat Kulzhagarova fell to her death from her 11th-floor apartment in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan, the police said it was suicide. Kulzhagarova’s social-media posts claiming she was being beaten by her husband have raised doubts about this, and some 70,000 people have signed a petition demanding tougher punishment for domestic violence.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Opposition activists in Kazakhstan’s largest city, Almaty, marked the Central Asian nation’s Independence Day with an unauthorized rally. Hundreds of activists gathered in the city’s central Republic Square on December 16 to demand the immediate release of all political prisoners, fair parliamentary elections on January 10, and the registration of opposition parties.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • NUR-SULTAN — Kazakhstan has kicked off its parliamentary election campaign with five parties — none of which is running on an opposition platform.

    The Central Election Commission (OSK) said on December 10 that the campaign started at 6 p.m. local time and will run until midnight on January 9, the day before the elections to parliament’s lower chamber, the Mazhilis.

    Along with the ruling Nur-Otan party, four other political parties loyal to the government — Aq Zhol (Bright Path), Adal (Honest), Auyl (Village), and the Communist People’s Party — will take part in the election, the OSK said.

    It added that the terms for debates between the parties will be decided by December 30, while voter preference polls can be conducted only by pollsters that have at least five years of experience and have given preliminary notice to the OSK.

    OSK Chairman Berik Imashev on December 10 brushed off criticism by civil rights organizations and unregistered opposition groups over a recent OSK resolution banning nongovernmental organizations whose charters do not envision such activities.

    The resolution also banned online live video coverage from polling stations and introduced restrictions for taking pictures at them.

    Civil rights activists have said that they will appeal the OSK’s moves in court.

    The vote will decide 98 of 107 seats in the Mazhilis. Nine other seats will be separately elected by the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan — a political body representing dozens of ethnic groups of the Central Asian nation.

    The only officially registered political party that calls itself opposition, the All-National Social Democratic Party, is boycotting the elections.

    OSDP leader Askhat Rakhimzhanov said that his party decided on November 27 not to participate in the elections because Kazakhstan’s political landscape continues to be dominated by the “same” political elite.

    Since 2019, several other political groups and parties have tried to register in order to be eligible to take part in the poll, but Kazakh authorities have rejected all of their applications.

    None of the elections in Kazakhstan since it gained independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has been considered by Western observers as fair and free.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • Foreign Ministers of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have approved a draft concept on further developing cooperation in several areas, including the coronavirus pandemic.

    The Kazakh Foreign Ministry said in a statement that ministers approved a number of documents at the December 10 meeting, including a concept of military cooperation between CIS member states to 2025.

    It added that the Council of the CIS leaders will be held online on December 18.

    “The participants discussed a wide range of integration cooperation issues within the CIS, with a special emphasis on joint actions to overcome the negative effects of the coronavirus pandemic,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said after the meeting.

    CIS members are former Soviet republics — Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan has an associate status in the grouping.

    Ukraine quit the grouping in 2018, four years after Russia forcibly annexed Ukraine’s Crimea region in March 2014 and started backing separatists in Ukraine’s east in a conflict that has killed more than 13,200 people since April 2014.

    Ukraine was an associate member of the CIS since the grouping was established following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

    Earlier, in 2009, another former Soviet republic, Georgia, quit the CIS following a five-day Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, after which Russia has maintained troops in Georgia’s breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and recognized their independence from Tbilisi.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • November 25 was the International Day For The Elimination Of Violence Against Women and it started 16 days of activism that concludes on December 10.

    Violence against women is a problem in Central Asia, and while the issue is receiving somewhat more attention, progress in combating abuse has been slow — and efforts by authorities have often been no more than superficial.

    On this week’s Majlis podcast, RFE/RL’s Media-Relations Manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion about what changes have and are taking place in Central Asia to address the scourge of gender violence, and some of the challenges that still lie ahead.

    This week’s guests are: from Kazakhstan, Khalida Azhigulova, the director of the Research Center for Human Rights, Inclusion, and Civil Society and an associate professor at the Eurasian Technology University; from Uzbekistan, Irina Matvienko, a feminist activist and founder of Nemolchi.uz, which loosely translates as “don’t remain silent” and is an organization dedicated to the prevention of violence against women and helping victims; and Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • November 25 was the International Day For The Elimination Of Violence Against Women and it started 16 days of activism that concludes on December 10.

    Violence against women is a problem in Central Asia, and while the issue is receiving somewhat more attention, progress in combating abuse has been slow — and efforts by authorities have often been no more than superficial.

    On this week’s Majlis podcast, RFE/RL’s Media-Relations Manager Muhammad Tahir moderates a discussion about what changes have and are taking place in Central Asia to address the scourge of gender violence, and some of the challenges that still lie ahead.

    This week’s guests are: from Kazakhstan, Khalida Azhigulova, the director of the Research Center for Human Rights, Inclusion, and Civil Society and an associate professor at the Eurasian Technology University; from Uzbekistan, Irina Matvienko, a feminist activist and founder of Nemolchi.uz, which loosely translates as “don’t remain silent” and is an organization dedicated to the prevention of violence against women and helping victims; and Bruce Pannier, the author of the Qishloq Ovozi blog.

    Listen to the podcast above or subscribe to the Majlis on iTunes or on Google Podcasts.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The son-in-law of former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev raked in tens of millions of dollars as part of a secret project linked to the construction of a natural-gas pipeline from Central Asia to China, the Financial Times reported.

    The December 3 report, based on leaked e-mails and other documents, said Timur Kulibaev arranged the contracts via a Moscow-based company called ETK.

    Under the scheme, ETK bought cheaply produced steel from China, and then imported it to industrial facilities in Ukraine and Russia, where pipes were made for the pipeline going from Central Asia to China.

    The documents obtained by the Financial Times said that the major part of the sum made by the scheme, some $53 million, went to a company controlled by Kulibaev.

    Kulibaev’s lawyers told the Financial Times that he “has never had any interest or stake in any ETK entity, directly, indirectly or via any kind of nominee arrangement or similar scheme.”

    Married to Nazarbaev’s middle daughter Dinara, Kulibaev has accumulated a vast fortune in Kazakhstan, Russia, and elsewhere. He’s long been dogged by accusations that his wealth derives from his family connections, something he has repeatedly denied.

    The paper reported that the scheme echoed corruption allegations that were publicized last year by Kulibaev’s nephew Aisultan, who is the son of Nazarbaev’s eldest daughter, Darigha.

    Aisultan Nazarbaev was found dead in London in August. An autopsy by British authorities said he died of cardiac arrest.

    Over his career, Kulibaev has held top executive positions in several major Kazakh oil and gas companies since the late-1990s. Since 2011, he has also served as a board member for Russia’s state-controlled natural-gas giant, Gazprom.

    With reporting by the Financial Times

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is expected to resolve a months-long impasse over the conflict-resolution body’s leadership team during a two-day ministerial meeting on December 3 and 4.

    Originally established during the Cold War to foster dialogue between the Soviet Union and the West, the 57-nation OSCE is known for its election monitoring work, reports on human rights and press freedom, and engaging in diplomacy to resolve conflicts, including in Ukraine, Belarus, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

    Since July, the OSCE’s top four positions have been empty because member states failed to renew the three-year terms of diplomats in those posts, in what is normally a formality.

    The Vienna-based organization strives to reach decisions by consensus, leaving is susceptible to gridlock between its European, Central Asian, and North American member states.

    Russia and several former Soviet states have complained top leadership positions have traditionally been held by Westerners, who they say have focused too much on human rights issues.

    Under a compromise, OSCE members are expected to approve Helga Schmid as the new secretary-general.

    A German, Schmid currently serves as secretary-general of the EU’s diplomatic service. She is best known for playing a key role in negotiating the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and world powers.

    The other three top posts will be filled by an Italian, Portuguese, and Kazakh.

    Matteo Mecacci, a former Italian parliamentarian, has been nominated to head the OSCE’s democracy, human rights, and election monitoring office.

    Former Kazakh Foreign Minister Kairat Abdrakhmanov has been tapped as OSCE high commissioner for minorities.

    Maria Teresa Ribeiro, a secretary of state in the Portuguese Foreign Ministry, is the nominee for the OSCE media freedom representative.

    U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE, James Gilmore, said on December 1 that he expects member states to agree on filling the top four positions with these candidates.

    However, an unrelated dispute between Hungary and Ukraine over national minority issues has emerged in recent days that as a potential to create problems, he said.

    With reporting by AFP, dpa, die Presse, and Reuters.

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.

  • ALMATY, Kazakhstan — A large banner denouncing Kazakhstan’s first President Nursultan Nazarbaev appeared in the Central Asian nation’s largest city, Almaty, on December 1 as the country marks the Day of the First President.

    Nazarbaev, who ran the oil-rich former Soviet republic since before the collapse of the Soviet Union announced his decision to step down in March last year, but continues to control the nation’s internal and foreign policies as the lifetime chairman of the powerful Security Council and the leader of the ruling Nur-Otan party. He enjoys almost limitless powers as elbasy — leader of the nation.

    December 1 has been commemorated as the Day of the First President since 2011.

    The banner that appeared in downtown Almaty said “47.3 Billion Tenges For A Man’s Name” and carried hashtags #qazaqkoktemi (Kazakh spring) and #cancelelbasy.

    A group called Rukh2k19 (Rukh means spirit in Kazakh) wrote on Instagram that its activists placed the 10-meter long banner in Almaty to protest the government’s move to rename the capital Nur-Sultan in honor of Nazarbaev after his official resignation last year. They also renamed all of the main thoroughfares in towns and cities across the nation after him. The capital previously was known as Astana.

    “By various estimates, more than 47.3 billion tenges (almost $111 million) have been spent to try to immortalize Nazarbaev’s name. Today, when he and his entourage mark this holiday, those citizens who do not recognize him as a leader are thinking about ways to stop this cult-of-personality situation,” the group’s post says.

    The group also noted that according to the Kazakh Constitution, “the only source of power in the country is its people,” and “every citizen of Kazakhstan must have a chance to take part in the nation’s affairs” as “freedom of choice and freedom of speech must be respected.”

    “We also state that in our common home everyone is equal before the law and therefore the Law on the Nation’s Leader must be annulled,” the protest group said.

    The decision to rename Astana to Nur-Sultan just one day after Nazarbaev announced his resignation last year sparked protests in the capital and other cities of the tightly controlled nation.

    Nazarbaev’s opponents say he controls the country’s current president, his handpicked successor Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev.

    Critics and rights groups have accused Nazarbaev of showing no tolerance to dissent, and say he denied many citizens basic rights and prolonged his power in the energy-rich country of 18.7 million by manipulating the democratic process.

    Kazakhstan ranks 157th among 180 countries in the 2020 Press Freedom Index compiled by media watchdog Reporters Without Borders (RSF).

    This post was originally published on Radio Free.